On January 30, Yasmine Abdillahi, a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center published an article in Le Monde arguing that although Africa accounts for nearly 20% of the world’s population, it contributes less than 1% of the data used to train AI systems. This imbalance, she warns, risks excluding African languages, cultures, and lived realities from artificial intelligence.

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But that is just the beginning. As money is paid out to service this debt, it is diverted from social services and the stimulation of economic activity, which can lead to fewer jobs, lower tax revenue, and slower growth. In 2026, borrowing across the continent will continue to rise, and with it, the impact of debt crises on citizens’ lives. What, then, is the state of debt across Africa, and what can be done to address it? With the African Union as a core member, part of this answer may lie with the G20—and the other part, with homegrown strategies.

Understanding debt distress in Sub-Saharan Africa

The situation in the region is, in short, concerning. Currently, twenty-two low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are in or at high risk of debt distress, as designated by the World Bank. This assessment is based on a variety of structural and economic factors and measures a country’s debt-carrying capacity and debt-burden indicators against country-specific thresholds.

But debt is not an abstract concept, and a country that struggles to service its debt faces consequences beyond the disdain of foreign creditors. When a country stops paying, its reputation in global financial markets takes a hit. Large debt obligations may discourage new investment and economic growth—a phenomenon known as debt overhang. In these instances, creditors lose confidence in the country’s ability to repay its debts in full, making it harder to obtain new, affordable financing.

At the same time, a reliance on borrowing leads to a reliance on rating agencies that view African nations as far more risky than local or regional credit agencies suggest. This can cause a country’s ratings to plummet during times of struggle, making it even more difficult for countries to access financing, even as they recover. In other words, heavier debt loads in African nations are associated with weaker sovereign credit ratings, which in turn raise borrowing costs, creating a cycle that makes it harder for countries to stimulate the growth needed to reduce debt in the long run. Today, African nations often face interest rates topping 10 percent, whereas many Group of Seven countries borrow at rates closer to 2 to 3 percent.

Why this debt matters

There are two compelling reasons why debt in Africa warrants particular attention from the global community. The first is that Africa’s debt is largely external. Yes, countries such as Japan and the United States maintain debt-to-GDP ratios much higher than those of Sudan, Guinea, and Malawi. But with debt denominated in foreign currencies, African governments are forced to spend far more on servicing their debt if exchange rates fluctuate and domestic currencies weaken. By contrast, a weaker US dollar can provide breathing room for countries, as their domestic currencies gain value against it.

The external nature of Africa’s debt also makes it difficult to restructure. China has come to the forefront as a creditor for African nations, but its selective participation in international debt relief efforts complicates coordinated efforts to restructure and diminishes the effectiveness of the Paris Club process. African nations have also seen a nearly 15 percent increase in debt held by private creditors from 2010 to 2021—a rate faster than any other developing region—which further complicates efforts to reach restructuring agreements by adding more, differing actors to coordination efforts.

The second reason for paying close attention is that many countries in debt distress are classified as low- or lower-middle income. This presents a significant challenge. Low-income countries are designated as such by the World Bank due to a gross national income below a certain threshold. Low income leads to a lowered ability to fund social services and infrastructure, which is particularly harmful for countries that are already fiscally constrained by high debt loads, limiting their ability to deliver services to their citizens. In fact, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, more than half of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population lived in countries that spent more on interest payments than on education and health in 2023.

The impact of the global community—and its limits

Let’s go back to Johannesburg for a moment. As a high-level convening body, the G20 mostly engages in agenda-setting through acknowledgments and rhetoric regarding debt conversations. During the last summit in late November 2025, host nation South Africa highlighted debt sustainability as one of its four core priorities—a focus reflected in the G20 Leaders’ Declaration. By elevating this notion to the global stage, the G20 moved debt higher up on the agenda.

Moreover, the G20 has considerable convening power. Through its G20-Africa High-Level Dialogue on Debt Sustainability, which was held two weeks before the G20 Summit itself, the G20 brought together finance ministers, central bank governors, and African Union officials to identify practical solutions to excessive debt burdens. Additionally, the Africa Expert Panel on Debt—composed of senior African economic and financial leaders—produced a report on a new debt refinancing initiative and a borrower’s club for debtor countries.

The G20 is also capable of taking action through concrete measures and critical commitments—though this has proved the exception rather than the rule. In May 2020, for instance, the G20 implemented the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which suspended $12.9 billion in debt-service payments for eligible countries to allow governments to focus resources on saving lives and adapting rapidly to the COVID-19 pandemic. Of the seventy-three low-income countries eligible for the pause, only forty-eight participated in the initiative before its expiration in December 2021—accounting for just a quarter of the debt the G20 initially pledged to suspend.

Following the DSSI, the G20 established the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, aimed at providing coordinated debt relief for countries facing unsustainable debt by bringing together official bilateral creditors and requiring comparable treatment from private creditors. The initiative coalesces creditors in a so-called “official creditor committee” before negotiations with private creditors, acknowledging the changing creditor landscape beyond the Paris Club. But so far, only four countries have made requests for debt relief under the framework. And criticism is loud regarding its slow pace, procedural complexity, insufficient debt relief, and its preference for debt reprofiling over outright reduction.

The Common Framework for Debt Treatments requires urgent reform to account for the mismatch between lengthy restructuring timelines and the urgent need for immediate financing, as well as China’s role in debt negotiations. To address debt sustainability over the long term, discussions must shift focus from debt levels alone to the structural features of domestic economies and the international financial system that transform manageable debt into distress.

At last year’s G20 Summit, broad acknowledgment of the mounting debt crisis marked a step in the right direction, but commitments on debt remained largely rhetorical. While much was said about the issue, actionable steps proved elusive. With limited enforcement mechanisms and a reliance on consensus, the G20 is only as strong as the collective commitment behind it, and the lack of reform to its own processes left many observers disappointed.

Debt relief requires growth and homegrown strategies

To address the debt crisis, the answer cannot just be to spend less money. After all, it is nearly impossible to reduce debt through austerity measures alone. The G20, led by the African Union, must prioritize growth in countries facing debt distress, and a first step toward this is economic diversification.

As shown in the graph below, many countries in debt distress already struggle to sustain economic growth due to high levels of commodity dependence. While commodity exports are not inherently bad for growth, reliance on energy, agricultural, or mining exports exposes economies to volatile international prices that are largely beyond national control. When prices surge, revenues increase. When they fall, however, growth slows—and in the worst cases, economies can tip into recession. This dynamic played out between 2013 and 2017, when falling commodity prices triggered slowdowns in sixty-four commodity-dependent countries. For countries already in debt distress, stimulating growth precisely as revenues decline poses a particularly acute challenge.

For a country such as the Republic of the Congo, for instance, where 94 percent of exports are commodities, debt repayment is complicated not only by exchange-rate volatility but also by exposure to commodity price shocks that undermine steady growth.

Efforts have also focused on addressing the economic extractivism that has plagued African nations by shifting toward domestic processing and reducing reliance on raw-material exports—particularly as debt-servicing costs rise faster than countries’ ability to acquire foreign currency. 

Against this backdrop, African leaders remain confronted with politically unpopular choices, including austerity measures and tax increases—decisions that risk deepening domestic grievances amid already difficult economic conditions. Yet continental and regional institutions have begun advancing strategies to foster growth, generate wealth, and build a financial architecture better suited to a rapidly developing continent.

African nations are not poor—and they are far from monolithic. Across the continent, countries continue to grapple with their own unique political, economic, and social dynamics; however, there exists immense human-capital, natural-resource, and infrastructure potential. As debt outpaces growth and shrinking fiscal space threatens progress, the solution to debt crises in African nations lies in global and regional cooperation. The G20 must support the African Union as it steps up to help countries manage and service their debt and must listen to homegrown strategies related to credit rating and growth promotion to secure a more stable and prosperous future.

Development needs remain urgent—and shortfalls in funding for health, education, and social services continue to impact citizens’ everyday lives. The global debt system must shift away from prioritizing wealthy lenders over the development and well-being of citizens. As African governments and regional institutions continue working to reduce heavy debt burdens and promote sustainable growth, the international community must listen to—and act on—the reforms and recommendations emerging from the continent, ensuring countries are not forced to choose between paying for the past and investing in a better future.

Juliet Lancey is a consultant and a former young global professional with the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center.

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In April 2023, this civil war erupted amid escalating tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF, stemming from disagreements over the RSF’s integration into the national army. These disputes followed a period of SAF-RSF power-sharing in the wake of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019.

Thus far, the conflict has claimed perhaps more than 150,000 lives and displaced more than twelve million people, making it one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises.

With every diplomatic initiative over the past thirty-three months failing to halt the violence, US President Donald Trump’s administration has recently focused more on Sudan. This month, a US-Saudi cease-fire initiative has been under review by the Security and Defence Council, a body that includes members of the SAF. Whether this initiative can move forward and help reverse the country’s descent into catastrophe remains to be seen.

Nonetheless, the Trump administration’s efforts to play a productive role in winding down the conflict will depend, in no small part, on how Washington chooses to engage—and with whom.

Trump, MBS, and the personal diplomacy factor

The landmark visit by Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to the White House in November helped direct Trump’s attention toward Sudan, which he described as the “most violent place on Earth” and the “single biggest humanitarian crisis.” As Trump acknowledged during his meeting with MBS, Sudan was “not on my charts to be involved in that,” adding that he viewed the conflict as “just something that was crazy and out of control.”

That MBS played a decisive role in bringing Sudan onto Trump’s radar underscores the depth of the US president’s personal ties with key Gulf leaders. In contrast to previous US administrations that relied heavily on institutional channels such as the State Department for Middle East engagement, Trump has consistently favored leader-to-leader relationships as the foundation of his administration’s foreign policy decision-making.

Challenges before the Quad

Trump is determined to work with the so-called Quad—the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—to bring Sudan’s war to an end. However, this effort will face stiff resistance from both belligerents: the SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (popularly known as Hemedti).

Each side remains unwilling to make painful compromises, instead pursuing maximalist objectives. Their intransigence will complicate efforts by Trump, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Special Envoy Massad Boulos to secure a cease-fire, deliver humanitarian assistance, and launch negotiations under the auspices of a civilian-led government in Khartoum. Within the Quad, however, each regional partner brings distinct priorities shaped by geography, security concerns, and geopolitical pressures.

Egypt has firmly backed the SAF, positioning itself as Burhan’s principal regional supporter while viewing the RSF as a destabilizing force and an immediate security threat. Cairo sees the SAF as possessing the legitimacy of a national institution and the capacity to restore stability. With a shared 793-mile border with Sudan and the arrival of at least 1.5 million Sudanese refugees since April 2023, Egypt has a strong interest in preventing further displacement. This imperative underscores Cairo’s desire to see the conflict end.

Earlier on in this conflict, Saudi Arabia took care to present itself as a relatively neutral mediator between the two sides, yet its posture tilted toward the SAF. Following Saudi Arabia’s reversal of Emirati gains in Yemen in late 2025 and early 2026, Riyadh has grown increasingly determined to leverage its enhanced regional credibility to counter Abu Dhabi’s influence in the Sudanese conflict through multiple channels.

Riyadh’s ambitious Vision 2030 agenda depends on stability along the Red Sea, where major investments, particularly in tourism, are underway. Prolonged fighting in Sudan, and the risk of its escalation into a broader regional crisis, therefore deeply concerns the Saudi leadership. In this context, Saudi officials view a state army such as the SAF as far preferable to a militia such as the RSF, which they regard as unpredictable, institutionally weak, and lacking legitimacy. Ultimately, Riyadh seeks a coherent authority in Sudan capable of effective governance and control over Red Sea ports, which is not a role that Saudi Arabia sees the RSF fulfilling.

The UAE has charted a markedly different course than Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Though Abu Dhabi officially denies it, United Nations experts, human rights organizations, and many media outlets have concluded that the UAE has been arming the RSF, bearing significant responsibility for Hemedti’s rise. However, Abu Dhabi sees the force as a vehicle for projecting Emirati influence in Sudan and, by extension, across parts of Africa. Dependent on external financing and logistics, the RSF has become deeply reliant on financial networks in the UAE, particularly in Dubai. This reliance has substantially expanded Abu Dhabi’s leverage in Sudan. It is notable how Ethiopia, which is under much Emirati influence, has aligned closely with Abu Dhabi in terms of backing the RSF.

Ideologically, the UAE casts Burhan and the SAF as Muslim Brotherhood-aligned, while perceiving the RSF as a dependable anti-Islamist force capable of shaping a post-conflict order consistent with Abu Dhabi’s campaign to marginalize Brotherhood-linked movements across the Arab world.

Emirati support for the RSF reflects a desire to safeguard Abu Dhabi’s interests and preserve the UAE’s autonomy of action in a volatile environment. This approach is occurring within a broader context of intensifying economic and political competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi across the Arab world and parts of Africa, amid heavy involvement by multiple regional and extra-regional actors.

Although Saudi Arabia followed the UAE in designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization back in 2014, Riyadh adopts a notably less rigid stance toward the Islamist movement than Abu Dhabi. Collaborating closely with Turkey and Qatar—both known for their Muslim Brotherhood–friendly foreign policies—on a host of regional issues, Saudi Arabia increasingly prioritizes regional stability and the prevention of state collapse in countries such as Sudan and Syria.

In practice, the Quad’s internal contradictions risk undermining its diplomatic effectiveness, while Washington’s engagement risks being somewhat empty and reactive unless the Trump administration develops a comprehensive strategy that applies sustained pressure on both Sudanese and external actors. Yet, given Trump’s close ties to Abu Dhabi’s leadership, there is reason to doubt whether the White House would press the UAE to curtail its support for the RSF. Despite such challenges, there are good reasons to believe that Trump will see it in Washington’s interests to become more involved in Sudan’s civil war, which brings us to Iran.

The Iranian factor in Sudan’s civil war

While Arab states dominate coverage of regional involvement in Sudan, Iran has also intervened in the civil war. Tehran has supplied the SAF with military support, chiefly Mohajer-6 drones, since late 2023. After the setbacks suffered by the “Axis of Resistance” in 2024, Iran’s foreign policy has increasingly focused on exerting influence near two strategic global chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab. Its leverage over the latter is reinforced by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, now the strongest faction in the Iran-led axis. Sudan, for its part, offers Tehran an opportunity to expand influence along the Red Sea through state-level engagement, rather than warfare via surrogates.

With Burhan dependent on external backing, the Sudanese civil war has given Iran a chance to reclaim influence in Khartoum. Iran lost that foothold in the 2010s when Saudi Arabia and the UAE drew Omar al-Bashir’s regime away from Tehran, culminating in Khartoum joining Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in severing diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic in early 2016.

In this context, the Trump administration is likely concerned that a prolonged conflict in Sudan could advance Iranian interests and undermine the White House’s “maximum pressure 2.0” campaign. Alongside Israel, the Trump team seeks to prevent Sudan from reverting to its former role as an Iran-friendly state along the Red Sea, at the strategic crossroads of the Arab and African worlds.

Navigating Sudan’s geopolitical crossroads

In sum, Sudan’s civil war illustrates how local conflict can become a crucible for regional rivalries. The Trump administration’s new focus on Sudan, spurred by MBS’s November visit to Washington, may place the United States at the center of a complex interplay among competing Arab ambitions, Iranian strategic calculations, and the entrenched divisions between Sudanese actors.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia favor the SAF as the guarantor of stability and state legitimacy, while the UAE’s support for the RSF reflects a broader strategy of influence projection and counterweighting Riyadh. Iran’s involvement further complicates the calculus, presenting both a challenge to the US-Israeli alliance’s desire to counter Iran’s influence near the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, and an opportunity for Tehran to regain lost ground in Khartoum.

Actors within Sudan’s rich, complicated, and layered civil society—from established organizations to grassroots resistance committees—have been delivering humanitarian aid, organizing communities, and articulating credible visions for a democratic transition. No sustainable peace process can succeed without the inclusion of these civil society groups, which retain local legitimacy and organizing capacity. As the White House seeks to restore peace, the Trump administration cannot afford to sideline these actors again, because ignoring Sudanese civil society would mean repeating strategies that have already proven ineffective and unstable.

Additionally, there is the African Union (AU), which has sought to serve as the central diplomatic convener on Sudan, advancing a roadmap focused on a cease-fire, civilian protection, humanitarian access, and a Sudanese-led political transition. Through the Peace and Security Council, coordination with the United Nations and regional bodies, and public condemnation of atrocities such as those in el-Fasher, the AU has worked to align international efforts around an African-led approach, even as its limited enforcement capacity has constrained outcomes. Nonetheless, the AU remains the only actor with continent-wide legitimacy, sustained engagement with Sudanese stakeholders, and an existing framework for coordination.

For US policymakers, the path forward demands more than reactive diplomacy. Sustained pressure on Sudanese factions and regional patrons, careful balancing of rival interests, and an emphasis on humanitarian relief and durable governance are all necessary. Ultimately, the outcome in Sudan will not only determine the future of its people, but also serve as a test of how effectively external powers can navigate the overlapping ambitions, alliances, and rivalries that define Sudan’s position in a complicated geopolitical order.

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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Somaliland’s leaders hailed Israel’s decision as “historic,” celebrating it as long-awaited validation of de facto statehood, with the Israeli flag projected in Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa. The decision builds on Somaliland’s record of relative stability and functioning democratic institutions, factors that have long differentiated it within a volatile region. However, beyond its symbolism, the significance of recognition will be shaped by its implementation. How Israel translates this decision into security, economic, and diplomatic engagement, while managing regional sensitivities and coordinating with key partners, particularly the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), will determine whether recognition evolves into a durable framework for regional cooperation.

Recognition and its limits

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland reshapes the scope of bilateral engagement but does not eliminate the diplomatic and political constraints tied to Somaliland’s contested status. In practical terms, recognition elevates Israel–Somaliland relations from informal coordination to institutionalized state-to-state ties, enabling formal bilateral channels for security dialogue, economic cooperation, and diplomatic presence. The Israeli statement has already signaled an intention to expand cooperation in areas such as agriculture, health, technology, and economic development with Somaliland.

The security implications are most pronounced in the Red Sea context. Israeli officials have confirmed that the recognition is linked to countering Iran and its regional proxies, particularly the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Somaliland’s leadership has, according to regional reporting, been open to hosting an Israeli security presence in exchange for recognition. Formal ties now allow for open discussions on intelligence sharing, port security, and, over time, potential logistical or monitoring arrangements aimed at Red Sea threats.

Economically, recognition reduces political risk for investment and long-term cooperation. Israeli engagement in sectors such as water management, agriculture, health technology, and logistics now rests on a formal diplomatic foundation, creating pathways for trade relations and tangible economic outcomes.

At the same time, recognition does not resolve Somaliland’s contested international status. The Somali Federal Government considers Somaliland part of its territory and opposes any foreign engagement implying recognition. Israel remains the sole United Nations member to have taken this step. The United States, European Union, African Union (AU) members, and even Somaliland’s closest regional partner, the United Arab Emirates, have thus far refrained from recognition. The AU has rejected Israel’s move, reaffirming its commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and limiting Somaliland’s access to international institutions in the near term.

Nor does recognition eliminate regional resistance. Somalia’s federal government and several regional actors view Israel’s move as divisive rather than a stabilizing development. In a joint statement, Somalia, Egypt, Turkey, and Djibouti condemned Israel’s decision and reaffirmed their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. The recognition raises concerns about regional fragmentation and risks inflaming nationalist sentiment in Somalia, while straining Israel’s relations in Africa.

Taken together, recognition expands what can be done while narrowing the margin for error. It enables cooperation but also raises expectations and diplomatic costs that must now be actively managed.

Why this decision came now

Israel’s unprecedented recognition of Somaliland reflects a convergence of strategic and political calculations. Domestically, Netanyahu is under intense pressure from the “Qatargate” scandal: allegations that his top aides accepted Qatari funds to influence policy. With Netanyahu facing calls to resign and looking ahead to a 2026 election year, the move offers an opportunity to shift the narrative with a diplomatic win. Netanyahu explicitly framed the decision “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” aligning it with US President Donald Trump’s revived normalization framework. This alignment allows Netanyahu to tout a foreign-policy success at a time when both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia appear reluctant to normalize relations with Israel in the near term, largely due to sustained political sensitivities around the war in Gaza.

Security dynamics further help explain the timing. As Israel emerges from a multifront war in which it has significantly degraded Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iranian assets in Syria, one front remains unresolved: the Houthis in Yemen. Despite extensive US and Israeli military action, including more than 1,100 US strikes and repeated Israeli operations, the Iranian-backed group continues to strike Israel and disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea, exposing enduring intelligence and operational constraints for both Washington and Jerusalem.

In this context, Somaliland’s geography takes on heightened relevance. Located across from Yemen near the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, Somaliland offers a stable platform for intelligence cooperation, maritime monitoring, and contingency planning against a shared Houthi threat that neither Israel nor the United States has been able to decisively neutralize. The recognition, therefore, is not merely diplomatic; it reflects a recalibration toward long-term Israeli positioning in a theater where the conflict is not over.

Washington’s calculus

Trump responded to Israel’s recognition by making clear that Washington is not prepared to follow Jerusalem’s lead, reiterating that the matter remains under review. This caution comes despite growing bipartisan pressure in Congress toward recognition. In August, Republican Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) publicly urged the administration to consider recognition, framing Somaliland as a reliable security partner and a strategically aligned actor in the region. At the time, Trump acknowledged that the administration was “looking into” the question of recognition, signaling openness without committing to a policy shift.

The hesitation reflects competing strategic calculations. On one hand, US defense planners have long recognized Somaliland’s value. Senior US Africa Command officials have recently visited Hargeisa, and Somaliland has reportedly offered military basing that could enhance US capabilities to counter Houthi maritime disruption and limit Chinese influence along the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, formal recognition carries diplomatic costs. A unilateral shift risks undermining US relations and counterterrorism coordination with Somalia’s federal government while also straining ties with regional partners.

Therefore, Washington will continue to face pressure from Mogadishu and the AU to preserve the status quo. Still, the strategic consequences of Israel’s move, combined with US interests in the region, make eventual US recognition increasingly plausible.

Abu Dhabi’s balancing act

The UAE takes a more nuanced position. Abu Dhabi has been Somaliland’s most significant partner for nearly a decade, investing heavily through DP World’s development of Berbera port and maintaining a diplomatic liaison office in Hargeisa. These ties reflect a strategic interest that predates Israel’s recognition and position the UAE as a central economic and security actor in Somaliland.

Notably, while the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) issued a collective statement condemning Israel’s recognition, the UAE has not issued a standalone national condemnation. This distinction matters. Abu Dhabi’s posture signals its careful balancing of Somaliland engagement against broader Gulf dynamics, particularly Saudi Arabia’s firm response. Riyadh’s stance, aligned with Somalia and reinforced through the GCC and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, constrains the UAE’s room for maneuver, even as intra-Gulf competition in the Horn of Africa continues to shape Emirati strategy.

In practice, the UAE is unlikely to scale back its presence in Somaliland. Instead, Abu Dhabi is expected to deepen engagement quietly, continuing port and infrastructure projects while avoiding a high-profile diplomatic break. Formal recognition remains possible over time, but would likely be pursued in coordination with Washington and in consultation with the AU.

Turning recognition into strategy

With Israel and Somaliland now formal partners, the priority should be to consolidate this diplomatic opening without inflaming regional tensions. What follows should be guided by coordination, restraint, and sequencing, particularly with the United States.

For Israel, close coordination with Washington is essential. Acting in parallel with the United States, rather than ahead of it, will reduce friction with regional partners and avoid working at cross purposes. At the same time, Israel should quietly engage key Arab and African partners, including the UAE, Ethiopia, and Kenya, to explain its move, encourage pragmatic cooperation, and mitigate long-term fallout.

Israel should prioritize a phased rollout of cooperation with Somaliland. Rushing into highly visible steps, such as military facilities or overt security deployments, risks provoking backlash from Somalia and its allies. In the near term, Israel would be better served by avoiding provocations and emphasizing civilian and developmental cooperation, signaling good faith and framing recognition as stabilizing rather than militarizing. Security cooperation, while clearly part of Israel’s calculus, should initially remain low-profile, focused on intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism rather than overt operations.

Finally, Israel should embed its engagement with Somaliland within a multilateral framework. Coordinating security and economic initiatives with the United States and the UAE, leveraging the UAE’s established military and logistical presence in Somaliland and existing US Africa Command infrastructure, would anchor cooperation within broader regional architectures, enhancing legitimacy and durability.

The United States, even if not prepared to recognize Somaliland at this stage, remains central to shaping outcomes through its regional security presence and diplomatic influence on both African and Arab actors. The Trump administration has stated that the issue remains under review; this window should be used to conduct a structured interagency assessment of US policy toward Somaliland and its implications for Red Sea security, counterterrorism, and regional diplomacy.

Short of recognition, Washington can deepen engagement incrementally. Options include upgrading its diplomatic presence in Hargeisa to a liaison office, expanding security cooperation and training, and increasing investment; steps that advance US interests while preserving strategic flexibility.

At the same time, Washington should leverage its influence with Mogadishu to discourage escalation with Somaliland. A US-facilitated confidence-building process, building on this administration’s successful mediation track record, could help preserve space for dialogue.

Ultimately, Israel’s unprecedented recognition of Somaliland reflects confidence in a stable partner and a belief that engagement can strengthen security in the Red Sea. If implemented in alignment with Washington, this move has the potential to reshape regional dynamics beyond the Horn of Africa.

Amit Yarom is a graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is a foreign policy researcher, specializing in the Arabian Gulf.

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Fourteen years after the 2011 uprising and NATO-led military intervention that toppled Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains divided. While the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) rules the northwest, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by military leader Khalifa Haftar, controls most of eastern Libya—with both factions backed by competing foreign militaries.

For years, the situation on the ground seemed frozen. Yet two recent developments mark a shift: Oil majors are returning to the country, and the United States is stepping up its military engagement. The visits by the top leadership from US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in October and December last year and the announcement that Libya will join Exercise Flintlock—AFRICOM’s largest annual special operations exercise historically focused on West Africa—signal that the US administration now views Libya’s trajectory as inseparable from broader regional stability.

Against this backdrop, the United States has a narrow—but real—opportunity to reset conditions in Libya by combining carefully calibrated security engagement with strategic investment. Taking this opportunity is urgent, especially as Russia and other foreign powers seek to cement their influence over the southern Mediterranean’s political future.

Libya’s geostrategic significance for energy, Europe, and the Sahel

Libya straddles Europe and Africa. While its coastline faces Italy, its southern expanse feeds directly into the Sahel, where al-Qaeda-aligned groups such as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State (IS) affiliates operate. What happens in Libya affects US and European energy security, regional counterterrorism efforts, and global migration flows. Moreover, the country produces between 1.2 and 1.4 million barrels of oil per day and aims to reach two million by 2030. With Western sanctions tightening on Russian energy, Europe increasingly views Libyan crude oil as a pressure-valve alternative.

In November, Shell, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, and Repsol* were all pre-qualified to participate in Tripoli’s first exploration auction in eighteen years. However, instability in southern Libya continues to amplify extremist mobility and arms flows from the Sahel, directly threatening these investments. That risk is further compounded by the expansion of Russia’s Africa Corps—the successor to the paramilitary Wagner Group—in the east and south. Meanwhile, the Central Mediterranean migration route remains a sensitive domestic political issue for Italy. Rome’s Mattei Plan is explicitly built around stabilizing Libya’s energy production and migration management.

Navigating fragmentation and proxy competition to unlock investment

Progress in Libya’s hydrocarbons sector remains contingent on a minimum threshold of stability and predictability in governance, which is still fractured between the Tripoli-based GNU—backed by Turkey and Qatar—and Haftar’s LNA in the east, supported by Russia (via the Africa Corps), Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

The signing of a 2019 maritime boundary treaty with the GNU has given Turkey de facto veto power over Libya’s western security sector and offshore zones. Meanwhile, Russia has entrenched itself in eastern Haftar-controlled areas since 2023. Instead of relying on the Wagner Group, however, Moscow has transitioned to formal involvement via the Ministry of Defense. Russia now controls airbases, logistics hubs, and key desert routes into the Sahel, with personnel positioned near critical oil fields and terminals—the same assets the Tripoli government is attempting to license to Western firms.

The result is that Libya has become the Mediterranean’s most active proxy chessboard, with foreign powers positioning themselves to capture future revenues from hydrocarbons and reconstruction. Absent a credible US counterweight, decisions on energy access, migration management, and political transition will be made in Moscow or elsewhere—but not in Washington or Brussels.

A new window for US reengagement

Two developments suggest a modest but meaningful upward trend in US reengagement. First, building on the US Navy ship visit to Libya in April (the first in fifty years), AFRICOM’s deputy commander visited GNU-controlled Tripoli and LNA-held Sirte in October. Inviting Libya to Exercise Flintlock was deliberate signaling: The US government seeks to pull Libya into a broader Western security network—rather than cede the field to other countries with stronger influence, such as Russia. This trajectory continued in early December, when Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah met AFRICOM’s commander to expand cooperation on training, equipment, and force professionalization. The GNU’s public request for deeper US support in professionalizing Libya’s security forces marks a notable shift after years of strategic hedging between Washington, Ankara, and Doha.

Second, there has been a surge of activity around Libya’s energy sector. Since 2023, oil output has stabilized, front lines have frozen, and neither the LNA nor the GNU has achieved decisive military or political dominance. This stalemate has created political space for external influence. Energy-sector momentum has been reinforced by high-level diplomatic traffic in both directions. The US special envoy for Africa and Arab Affairs, Massad Boulos, traveled to Tripoli and Benghazi in July, followed by a GNU delegation visit to Washington in August. That trip signaled the GNU’s intent to re-anchor Libya with Western stakeholders and request US assistance in pushing Russia out of eastern military bases to restore unified territorial control.

That momentum was further reinforced by a joint statement on November 26 from the United States, major European partners, Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Kingdom. The statement backed a renewed mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), endorsed a political roadmap by UNSMIL head Hanna Tetteh, and explicitly called for deeper east-west military and economic coordination—a rare moment of alignment among Libya’s external powerbrokers. For the US administration, this sent the strategic signal that Libya’s unification is now within reach. The window of opportunity, however, is closing fast—and another conflict cycle, election breakdown, or foreign miscalculation could shut it indefinitely.

The energy-security nexus: Why investment alone will fail

The return of oil majors represents the most consequential shift in Libya in a decade. But investment without security is unlikely to endure. In March last year, Libya launched its first licensing round for oil exploration in eighteen years, signaling a bid to attract Western technology, capital, and expertise. Shell, BP*, TotalEnergies, and Eni have reopened channels with the National Oil Corporation (NOC)—and ExxonMobil* signed a memorandum of understanding in August for offshore exploration in the Sirte Basin.

Yet these developments do not change the fact that some of Libya’s most valuable reserves remain under Russian influence. Western firms cannot scale operations without predictable access, enforceable contracts, and baseline security guarantees.

An intentional presence to protect investment

To consolidate recent political and economic gains—and protect sizable Western energy investments—the United States should deliberately expand its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Libya, in close coordination with allies.

The March 2024 announcement that the United States will reopen an embassy in Libya is a critical step toward sustained engagement across military and economic channels. It will also enable closer coordination with key partners—including Italy, Egypt, Turkey, and the UN—whose objectives overlap with US interests.

As the multi-year process to open the embassy inches forward, AFRICOM and its components should pursue near-term, high-impact initiatives. US special operations forces should help build and professionalize vetted Libyan special forces units across both western and eastern factions, units that would pursue shared security interests, no matter the progress toward an eventually possible unification. Additionally, maritime partnerships should be expanded rapidly to strengthen Libyan Navy and Coast Guard capabilities, particularly in interdiction, offshore asset protection, and port security. At the same time, the United States could leverage its convening power to establish a technical deconfliction cell in Sirte, allowing GNU and LNA representatives to coordinate security around oil infrastructure and prevent escalation. Such mechanisms could also support counterterrorism cooperation, including targeting IS remnants and blocking spillover from the Sahel.

Layered US engagement can unlock stability

However, military engagement alone will not be sustainable without economic development. Given the complex legacy of US involvement—from the economically devastating sanctions of the 1980s to the 2011 NATO intervention and the overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi regime—the United States must work through partners to advance both economic and counterterrorism objectives. The US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank could prioritize export credits for pipelines, gas processing, and power generation, explicitly linking financing to transparency and anti-corruption benchmarks.

US and partner foreign assistance could also support long-overdue reforms at the NOC, including modern contracting practices, environmental standards, and shared revenue frameworks. These efforts should extend beyond governments: Western energy companies involved in Libya should participate in coordinated infrastructure planning, rather than simply launching isolated investments.

Layering diplomatic, military, and economic tools would allow the United States to establish a modest but coherent posture capable of unlocking outsized stabilization effects—and preventing any country that works against US interests from having dominance over Libya’s future. For the United States, Libya offers a proving ground for a new model of engagement—one built on security assistance that enables Western investment instead of substituting for it. AFRICOM’s renewed presence and the surge of Western energy interest create a rare opportunity to reintegrate Libya into a Western orbit. If the United States seeks stability in the Mediterranean, resilience in the Sahel, and credible alternatives to Russian energy, now is the time to make coordinated security and economic investments in Libya.

Rose Lopez Keravuori is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, an associate director at Strategia Worldwide, and chair of the board of advisors of GCR Group. She previously served as the director of intelligence at the US Africa Command.

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council.

Note: Several companies mentioned in this article—Shell, BP, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, Repsol, and ExxonMobil—are donors to the Atlantic Council but not to this article series.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

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The post The US is reengaging with Libya—and it’s the right call appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

Financial-sector policymakers and financial service providers are facing both a real challenge and unique opportunity to drive economic inclusion for about three billion people and spur growth toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The good news from the World Bank’s Global Findex Database 2025 is that 79 percent of adults globally and 75 percent in low- and middle-income economies (LMIEs) now have a financial account of some kind. Mobile phones are even more ubiquitous, with 86 percent of adults globally and 84 percent in LMIEs having one, which in most contexts can be used to access financial services. This means about four out of every five people have the potential to save safely and borrow prudently to meet their financial needs and the potential to pay and be paid digitally. This is good news for the individuals, their families, and for these economies because, as the IMF has found,
financial inclusion serves as a catalyst for both economic participation and inclusive growth.

However, the majority of adults in LMIEs that have a financial account do not yet fully engage with the formal financial sector. Only 40 percent of adults in LMIEs (on average) saved formally and only 24 percent of adults in LMIEs (on average) borrowed from a formal financial service provider in the last year and even they do not necessarily have the type of credit they need.¹ There are, therefore, about three billion people who could actively engage in the formal financial sector, and they present both a challenge for financial sector leaders and an opportunity for accelerating inclusive growth.

The main reasons adults in LMIEs do not use formal digital financial services are affordability, lack of trust in service providers, and lack of products to meet their needs. Rapid advances in digital public infrastructure (DPI) and artificial intelligence (AI) have the potential to directly tackle these challenges. Together they can reduce costs, increase trust, and tailor products for individuals, thereby improving lives and driving growth:

• DPI has been endorsed by the Group of Twenty since India’s presidency in 2023.² Ninety-seven countries now have DPI-like digital payments; sixty-four countries have digital IDs, and 103 have data exchange—together reducing costs and increasing trust.³
• AI, by cheaply analyzing massive data sets, is turbocharging cost reduction and product tailoring, which translates into greater affordability and access for people on lower incomes.⁴

Yet, there are potentially problematic aspects to these exciting innovations. DPI has the potential for loss of data privacy (if privacy by design is not embedded), for rent extraction (if not an open-source platform), and for government surveillance (if DPI safeguards are not central).⁵ AI has the potential to turbocharge fraud, scams, and identity theft and compromise trust.⁶

Therefore, government financial-sector regulators and policymakers have urgent and important decisions to make about how to enact and enforce responsible guardrails in the financial ecosystem. These guardrails are essential so new customers have affordable, appropriate products, can trust their money and data are safe, and have effective recourse mechanisms if problems occur. National coordination at the highest level is essential, regional approaches including policy harmonization can be cost-effective, and urgency is imperative. Financial-service leaders also have key decisions to make about how to design affordable and responsible financial products that build trust, enable resilience, and foster financial well-being and economic growth. There is now a unique opportunity for financial-sector leaders to unleash economic potential for three billion people and accelerate inclusive growth.

Ruth Goodwin-Groen is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Goodwin-Groen brings thirty years of strategic and technical leadership in financial-sector development and financial inclusion in emerging markets to her current consulting practice, Goodwin-Groen Consulting. Her focus is on responsible digital financial inclusion and equality in financial services for women.

Goodwin-Groen is best known as the founding managing director of the United Nations-hosted Better Than Cash Alliance, which created a global movement from cash to responsible digital payments to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Alliance members and partners include over 113 governments, 229 companies, and most of the UN—accounting for over 90 percent of global gross domestic product.

Goodwin-Groen has a PhD in financial-sector development from the University of Bath, an MBA with distinction from Harvard Business School, and a Bachelor of Science with Honors from the University of Western Australia.

The author extends special thanks to those providing expert input on this paper: Isabelle Carboni, Expert Consultant; Eric Duflos, CGAP; Nicole Goldin, United Nations University-Centre for Policy Research & Atlantic Council; Leora Klapper, World Bank; David Porteous, Integral: Governance solutions; and Camilo Tellez-Merchan, Gates Foundation. She also deeply appreciates the input of Atlantic Council colleagues Josh Lipsky, Sophia Busch, and Juliet Lancey as well as those who contributed to the findings and recommendations of this report through their participation in two roundtable discussions at the Atlantic Council in April and October of 2025. See the Appendix for a list of the participants. This report was made possible in part by a grant from Tala.

New Atlanticist Oct 15, 2024

Advancing a twenty-first century approach to remittances

By Alisha Chhangani, Ananya Kumar

Valued at nearly $900 billion each year, global remittances have become a large portion of many nations’ gross domestic product. But transaction costs remain too high—a problem that policymakers should tackle at upcoming meetings in Washington and Rio de Janeiro.

Africa Americas

Issue Brief Sep 20, 2024

Toward a financial inclusion agenda for the global majority

By Nicole Goldin

Policymakers, investors, and innovators must advance a new financial inclusion agenda designed for the global majority.

Economy & Business Fiscal and Structural Reform

Issue Brief Nov 2, 2023

Asking the right questions: Can digital currency enable financial inclusion?

By Ananya Kumar

Cryptocurrencies and CBDCs have the potential to enhance financial inclusion. However, the lack of quantitative data makes it challenging to evaluate their impact. To assess their financial inclusion capacity, this paper builds a rubric for policymakers which includes layers of consideration.

Digital Currencies Economy & Business

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post A three-billion-person challenge: The rising global market for financial leaders appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 9th, 2025, Global China Hub Assistant Director Caroline Costello published an op-ed in Foreign Policy about China’s role in fueling illegal logging in Africa.

The post Caroline Costello in Foreign Policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction

The political landscape in Africa defies generalization. Despite setbacks and challenges, democratic progress continues in Ghana, Malawi, and Senegal, among other countries. Next to these bright spots, military juntas have deepened their grip on multiple West African and Sahelian governments, long-standing authoritarian regimes remain in Rwanda, Uganda, and other countries, and conflict and war continues to upend lives and threaten the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Numerous other countries are best described as hybrid regimes, combining democratic and authoritarian forms of governance and producing inconsistent outcomes for their citizens in terms of delivering public goods, securing basic rights, and promoting economic growth.

Against this backdrop, the United States is recasting its relationship with African governments and their constituencies. Department of State officials describe “trade, not aid” as the foundation of US policy in Africa. In doing so, they have named expanded access to critical minerals and energy resources, alongside the development of new markets for US exports, as signature priorities for the Trump administration on the continent. This shift has brought cascading effects on African nations. As the region with the largest historic inflow of US foreign assistance, deep and sudden cuts to the aid budgets of the US Department of State and the closure of the US Agency for International Development have disproportionately affected African countries.[2]

Previous US administrations—including the first Trump administration—promoted democratic governance and stability in Africa using a combination of diplomatic and development tools. In fiscal year 2023, for example, the US government spent more than $338 million on democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programming in Africa. Even more was spent in the final year of the first Trump administration, when DRG spending in Africa stood at more than $415 million.

Today, the outlook is very different. In addition to eliminating most democracy assistance to the continent in the early round of aid cuts, the administration has sought to defund the National Endowment for Democracy and proposed the elimination of nearly all DRG funds in its 2026 budget. Meanwhile, it has shifted away from criticizing foreign governments on democratic and human rights grounds.

Regardless of the direction of US government policy, recent history shows that both African societies and US national interests are best served by stable, democratic, and accountable systems of governance, which have proved more effective at delivering peace, expanding socioeconomic opportunity, and fostering market economies that attract domestic and international investment. Given this reality, the “dealmaking” intended to drive the administration’s foreign policy will find its greatest long-term success in countries with stronger and more democratic institutions.

This brief makes recommendations for how and why US stakeholders should work with democratic partners in Africa to seek democracy and stability-related outcomes. It includes specific recommendations directed at the US government for using democracy assistance as a tool to advance key African and American priorities. Recognizing that the near-term reality of reduced funding for US government democracy assistance will generate new shortfalls and challenges, this brief also identifies opportunities for other American institutions, namely private philanthropy and the private sector, to partner with key democratic actors and advance DRG practice in Africa.

Why prioritize democracy, good governance, and stability?

There are numerous practical reasons for the US government and constituencies to prefer and encourage democracy, good governance, and stability in Africa. Most importantly, it is what African publics want. Survey respondents on the continent consistently report a preference for democratic systems of government over all other options. The 2021–23 Afrobarometer survey found that, across thirty-nine surveyed countries, 66 percent of respondents prefer democracy over any other kind of government, while 78 percent oppose one-party rule and 66 percent oppose military rule. Despite some erosion in overall support for democracy over the past decade, popular support for democratic governance remains resilient in the face of social and economic headwinds and global momentum for authoritarian governments.

Despite challenges, democratic and institutionally stable regimes have yielded economic, political, and social benefits. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes show that globally, while gains often take time to accrue, democratizing countries see an average bump of 8.8 percent in gross national product per capita over a twenty-year period compared to their autocratic peers. Meanwhile, institutional instability and fragility remain especially damaging to socioeconomic well-being. Countries with the highest levels of fragility as defined by the Fragile States Index have seen slow or significantly negative economic growth, conflict, and recurrent humanitarian crises. Insecurity and crisis, in turn, create unstable markets, disrupt supply chains, and erode long-term investment for US industries.

From an American perspective, African countries with stable and democratic institutions have been reliable economic, political, and security partners. They are more inclined to establish and strengthen rules-based economic and political systems that protect US and other investors. In regions like the Sahel, as elaborated on below, democratic governments serve as key political and security allies, while undemocratic and especially unstable countries have invited foreign interference by geopolitical rivals and create risks related to radicalization.

Institutional stability will only become more important as the US government and corporations push to expand trade relations and close deals in capital-intensive sectors like mining. Moving forward, the limiting factor on investments that generate returns for African and American economies alike is not the ability of the US government to sign deals today, but its ability to encourage stable economic and political conditions that protect those investments in the years to come.

Priorities for democracy assistance

A sensible US foreign policy interested in achieving meaningful social, political, and economic gains for African partner societies and US stakeholders alike would make diverse investments in stable, democratic, and accountable governance on the continent. We identify three broad priorities that could power an effective democracy assistance strategy:

1. Invest in countries on a democratic pathway.
2. Ally with citizens, including in backsliding democracies and autocracies.
3. Prioritize stabilization and local institutions that enable peace and security.

These priorities and the specific investments listed below are not meant to be comprehensive, but rather indicative of what a balanced and sufficiently ambitious US democracy assistance strategy could entail. The priorities could be applied across a wide set of countries and regions, or focus on specific geographies where the US government has direct economic and security interests, such as large population centers and economies like Nigeria and Kenya, or strategic regions like the Great Lakes, Horn of Africa, and Sahel. Recognizing that the US government is poised to reduce its investments in critical areas of intervention, we identify specific opportunities for private philanthropy and the private sector to play a leadership role in delivering and reenvisioning elements of a democracy assistance package moving forward.

Priority 1: Invest in countries on a democratic pathway

Reinforcing the economic, political, and security gains to democratic stability in Africa, the United States should continue to invest in the success of aspiring and longer-standing democracies on the continent. Democratic governments are better at protecting the rights and well-being of their citizens while creating hospitable conditions for secure, long-term investments and trade relations. Key democratic governments on the continent have set reform agendas with the potential to benefit their citizens and serve near- and long-term American economic and political interests. Furthermore, multiple democratic countries represent anchor security partners for the United States and critical bulwarks against instability, radicalization, and foreign interference in volatile regions such as the Sahel.

Take Senegal, for example. Senegal provides a case study for how a country that has made long-term democratic progress—and that overcame threats to its 2024 presidential election—is prioritizing economic and governance reforms that are responsive to the stated interests of its citizens. Like other recently elected governments on the continent, Senegal’s administration has prioritized anti-corruption, structural economic reforms, and poverty reduction, among other signature initiatives. Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye led this effort by declaring his assets during the election and, once in office, announcing audits of the oil, gas, and mining sectors. The administration similarly proposed multiple transparency laws and released previously unpublished reports from anti-corruption institutions.

The extent and success of reform efforts in Senegal remains to be seen, but they have the potential to strengthen its citizens’ socioeconomic security and overall market economy. Alongside Ghana, Senegal remains a long-standing democratic partner in a region where the proliferation of military-led governments has put US security interests and assets at risk, as evidenced by the recent closure of US military bases in Niger. The U.S., therefore, has a direct stake in the success of governance-strengthening efforts in countries like Senegal.

The US government and other entities should make strategic investments in countries on a democratic pathway, like Senegal, to achieve results in high-priority areas of reform and strengthen key institutions, including in sectors of mutual interest to the US stakeholders and partner governments.

• Prioritize support for reforms that are championed by government partners. External technical and financial assistance is most effective when supporting reform and governance-strengthening initiatives that are owned and led by government partners. Indeed, political commitment alongside bureaucratic capacity are among the interrelated factors contributing to the success or failure of reform. In countries seeking to entrench democratic and economic reforms, the US government can work with partner governments that see their political futures as tied to the success of reforms across a range of economic and social sectors, such as public health, transportation, and financial services where key benefits accrue to US constituencies. The US government can aid these reform efforts by providing technical assistance, technology transfers, and direct financial support, concentrating on sectors where the US has a strategic interest.
• Continue social and capital investments in democratizing countries. The US government has used vehicles such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to invest in economic and social sectors in countries meeting basic governance benchmarks. This has included, for example, using cofinancing models to support upgrades of the energy sector in Senegal and the transport sector in Malawi. The MCC’s investment-led, government-to-government approach is suited to countries on a stable and democratic trajectory, where US and partner country investments are more likely to be secure. While its future remains uncertain, the MCC and institutions like the Development Finance Corporation can help democratizing countries generate capital for high-priority, high-impact sectors that can contribute to economic growth and social welfare. Looking forward, the US government can maintain investments in strategically important countries like Cote d’Ivoire and Zambia. It can also use its investments to crowd in funding to sectors of mutual interest for African and American businesses and other stakeholders.

The role of other actors: Private philanthropy must maintain support for free and fair electoral systems

The integrity of electoral institutions and, ultimately, the conduct of elections has an outsize influence on the trajectory on democratic consolidation. The US government has decades of experience supporting political parties, strengthening the infrastructure for independent election monitoring, and strengthening electoral management bodies (EMBs), which research shows is critically important to democratic trajectories, including re-democratization. Meanwhile, the current Department of State has backed away from electoral assistance programs and issued directives restricting embassies from criticizing foreign elections.

Given trends in US government policy, private philanthropy can help preserve US leadership in international electoral support. While the philanthropic sector cannot replace US government election funding—which included $48.9 million in support for unanticipated events like snap elections across twenty-eight African countries between 2022 and 2024—it can make high-impact investments that help preserve and build on democratic gains. These investments could include, for example, prioritizing targeted support for EMBs and the electoral monitoring capacities in countries working to consolidate their democratic progress.

Priority 2: Ally with citizens, including in backsliding democracies and autocracies

In pursuing a dealmaking-focused foreign policy, it will be tempting for the US government and private sector to “deal” primarily or exclusively with power-wielding political and economic elites. Doing so risks putting the United States at odds with African publics who express a preference for democracy and accountable governance, while potentially promoting corruption and distorting markets key to fair competition for US and other businesses.

Many African societies have tended to hold positive views of the United States and find resonance with its economic and political values. Recent research from Pew found that the some of the highest US approval ratings from foreign publics come from surveyed African countries. These findings mirror older Afrobarometer data showing that preference for the US development model outcompetes China’s by 11 percentage points across surveyed countries. This research suggests that views of the United States are influenced by its perceived commitments to democratic and free-market development approaches.

An effective foreign policy focused on long-term US interests must grapple with the reality that the political and socioeconomic interests of African citizens are not always served by their leaders. Many regimes tilt the electoral system in their favor, effectively silencing their electorates. Across a range of countries, civil society and human rights leaders face political repression for exercising their fundamental political rights. And too many large-scale investments in extractives and other sectors—including investments led by transactional Chinese state and corporate entities—have undermined the human rights and failed to serve the interests of local communities.

Allying with African citizenries does not mean forgoing economic and political dealmaking. Across regime types, citizens want to see expanded economic opportunity, social welfare gains, and security. Failure to prioritize the economic and political needs and interests of African societies, however, would put the United States on the wrong side of many of the youngest populations in the world, jeopardizing hard-won admiration on the continent. Democracy assistance offers practical tools for supporting and protecting key constituencies.

• Invest in strengthened economic governance and business climates. African publics and the US government and corporations have a shared interest in strengthening business sectors that enable fair, rules-based market competition. The US government should invest in strengthened economic governance through targeted support to government and nongovernment actors, potentially focusing on sectors with heightened exposure for the United States. This could, for example, include supporting efforts to reduce child labor and forced labor from supply chains, thereby addressing significant human rights violations and leveling the economic playing field for US corporations that must adhere to international labor standards. Where there is state commitment to reform, the US government can support technical assistance to lawmakers and regulatory bodies to put in place and implement legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks that meet international standards. It can also support chambers of commerce, industry associations, and civil society organizations to promote transparent and accountable business practices and advance market-oriented reforms.
• Prioritize anti-corruption and accountability. Support for anti-corruption efforts by committed government and citizen actors offers a clear opportunity for the US government to stand with African publics. In countries as varied as Gabon, Gambia, Liberia, and South Africa, more than 70 percent of Afrobarometer respondents report that corruption increased “somewhat/a lot” in the past year.” Corruption concerns have helped fueled democratic transitions in countries such as Ghana and Senegal, as well as large-scale protests in Kenya, Madagascar, and South Africa, among others. The US government could assist governments committed to anti-corruption efforts to advance e-governance that has been shown effective at reducing opportunities for corruption. The United States should also support civil society and independent media to conduct investigations, analyze public data, and advocate for public transparency and accountability, including to address regional challenges like cross-border illicit financial flows that harm US economic interests.

The role of other actors: Private philanthropy should prioritize emergency assistance to civil society and human rights institutions

With the near-term decline of the US government’s support to civil society in Africa and globally, private philanthropy is best placed to shore up critical gaps while shifting the terms of assistance for civic institutions. In particular, private foundations can prioritize funding for emergency assistance aimed at protecting individuals and organizations facing acute risks of political repression. The annual value of US government human rights programming in Africa was $21.6 million in fiscal year 2022, of which emergency assistance activities was only a part. The sums involved for sustaining core emergency assistance categories are within the capabilities of individual or coalitions of leading US philanthropies.

Private foundations can also adopt regional or global approaches to directly funding and supporting local civic institutions. This could include developing programs that facilitate horizontal relationships, learning, and mutual assistance among civic actors from Africa, the United States, and other regions grappling with common struggles related to conflict, democracy, and accountable governance in their societies.

Priority 3: Prioritize stabilization and local institutions that enable peace and security

Instability and conflict remain critical challenges across key regions and countries in Africa. The Fragile States Index shows that four out of the five most fragile countries (and sixteen out of the most fragile twenty-five countries) globally are in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent years have seen a rapid expansion in the scope and intensity of conflict in the region. This includes conflicts fueled or amplified by extremist groups in the Sahel, West Africa, and coastal East Africa. It also includes civil conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan, among other countries. The human and economic costs of conflict are vast. In 2023, the number of displaced persons in Africa approached 35 million, representing nearly half of the total number of displaced persons globally.

In the DRC and broader Great Lakes region of Africa, the Trump administration has shown a willingness to use its political capital to seek an end to a long-standing and worsening conflict that threatens its trade and investment interests. In late June 2025, the US government announced a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda governments aimed at halting the conflict between state authorities and the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels. Questions remain about the ultimate effectiveness of the settlement given that M23 and other rebel groups are not direct parties to the agreement. The US government, however, has expressed commitment to its implementation, which it sees as necessary for enhanced American access to critical minerals, including cobalt, copper, and tantalum. As in other countries with active conflicts, the US government has cut important aid programs to the DRC that invest in the social infrastructure and critical institutions necessary for supporting and sustaining peace deals. The long-term durability of any peace, however, depends on empowered individual and institutional structures that can deliver foundational levels of governance, and social and economic benefits that can reinforce stability.

• Maintain support to networks of peacebuilders at the local, regional, and national levels. Integrated networks of formal and informal peacebuilding institutions and individual activists are critical to monitoring, responding to, mitigating, and managing conflict, especially at the local level. Local peacebuilding committees and related structures have a track record of enabling community-level peace outcomes and social cohesion in countries like Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya. Similarly, mutual aid groups are playing a key role in responding to the impacts of conflict in contemporary Sudan. The US government should prioritize cost-effective investments in the peace institutions and structures that monitor and strengthen peace settlements, especially in countries and regions where it invests in negotiation.
• Prioritize stabilization and repairing local institutions. Where it pursues diplomatic solutions to conflict, the US government can help secure gains by investing in interventions that produce stability. The DRC shows how daunting the challenge of stabilization can be, with more than 2 million Congolese having faced displacement from the M23-driven conflict between January and June 2024 alone. Effective stabilization efforts require prioritizing humanitarian responses to meet the basic needs of families and communities experiencing displacement, return, and other traumas. It also must include supporting the reestablishment of local civil society and state institutions that can help deliver services, manage public goods, and resolve disputes.

The role of other actors: The private sector should foster multisector investments in peace and security

The long-term ability of private sector companies to operate and recoup investments in conflict-affected communities depends on durable peace and security. Direct investments in peace dividends (i.e., socioeconomic returns to peace) can help reinforce reductions in conflict. US and other private sector companies are optimally positioned to strengthen their local business environments by making social and economic investments that help communities and regions benefit from periods of relative calm while strengthening overall socioeconomic well-being. This can include making investments in local infrastructure, public goods, and service delivery capacities. Private sector actors, especially within the extractives sector, can also build on frameworks like the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and commit to business and human rights practices that reinforce good governance and security.

Committing to and growing who leads democracy assistance

During its first ten months in office, the Trump administration has removed long-standing infrastructure and funding for delivering democracy assistance globally, including in Africa. The near- and long-term interests of African societies and key US stakeholders, however, are bolstered by the advancement of democratic, accountable, and stable governance on the continent. Not only is a robust democracy assistance strategy in Africa in line with long-standing US values that underpin America’s reputation and image on the continent, but it is also instrumental to stated objectives of the current administration, such as expanding fair access to strong foreign markets and securing priority peace agreements.

Regardless of its ultimate policy, the US government is, at least for the time being, stepping back from traditional aspects of DRG programming. In this context, other institutional actors can do more. Private philanthropy and the private sector cannot replace US government democracy assistance, but they can make targeted, evidence-based, and cost-effective investments that protect important areas of intervention, such as emergency assistance for human rights defenders, institutional support for EMBs, and pro-peace investments in conflict-affected communities. These and other types of investments are affordable, and when well executed, they can positively influence the trajectories of individual democratic actors, institutions, and partner countries.

Private foundations are especially well positioned to pursue DRG investments while prioritizing direct support to African-based institutions. This can include forging mutual relationships among democratic actors grappling with common 21st-century democratic challenges in Africa, the United States, and beyond, to seed the sector with stronger horizontal ties and novel partnership approaches and new strategies for the future.

Mason Ingram is vice president for governance at Pact, a nongovernmental organization that carries out development work around in the world in partnership with private sector organizations government agencies, including with USAID until the agency’s closure in 2025. Pact continues to receive funding from the US Department of State. Ingram has more than 15 years of experience designing, advising, and managing international development programs, with a focus on civil society and governance programming.

Alysson Oakley is vice president for learning, evaluation, and impact at Pact. Oakley also teaches courses on program design and evaluation of democracy assistance and conflict resolution interventions at Georgetown University. Oakley holds a PhD from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a bachelor of arts degree from Brown University.

Jack Higgins is a research assistant and MA candidate at Georgetown University’s College of Arts and Sciences.

The authors are grateful for consultations provided by experts on democratic governance in Africa, including Dr. Babra Ontibile Bhebe (executive director, Election Resource Centre), Bafana Khumalo (co-executive director, Sonke Gender Justice), Omolara Balogun (head, policy influencing and advocacy, West African Civil Society Centre), Jean-Michel Dufils (retired senior governance research expert and program manager), and Jon Temin (visiting fellow, SNF Agora Institute). 

The future of democracy assistance

This paper series provides an in-depth look at the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The post Democracy and stability in Africa: Why US leadership still matters appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

From classrooms to farming communities, generative artificial intelligence (gen AI) holds great potential for Africa. The key question is whether its promise of abundance will reach everyone—or only those already well-connected.

The technology should be regulated with both its strengths and weaknesses in mind, and approached with a healthy dose of skepticism toward corporate advocates; but ignoring the obvious value and use of gen AI makes little sense. Those concerned with development in Africa must engage with the technology and consider its potential for reducing poverty and strengthening education, alongside other priorities such as digitizing and preserving languages.

Gen AI poses real risks and requires guardrails, especially for young people. Yet disengagement carries risks of its own: if gen AI is not actively shaped and governed, the very youths and communities it could benefit—or harm without proper controls—risk being left behind. Not engaging with gen AI would be not only harmful but also patronizing. More conversation is needed between those inventing and implementing gen AI models and those who work in development assistance, including actors involved in shaping and advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Two of these SDGs—ending poverty and providing quality education—closely mirror gen AI’s promise, or boast, of future “abundance” and human or even superhuman intelligence. The SDG and gen AI camps must explore what each can realistically offer the other.

Issue Brief Apr 24, 2025

The Millennium Challenge Corporation could prove essential in the race for critical minerals. Reform it, don’t shut it down.

By Aubrey Hruby

As the Trump administration aligns foreign aid with core strategic interests, the MCC represents an underutilized asset.

Critical Minerals Energy & Environment

Issue Brief Jul 21, 2025

Atlantic piracy, current threats, and maritime governance in the Gulf of Guinea

By Maisie Pigeon

A drop in attacks in the Gulf of Guinea does not necessarily mean piracy has been resolved. Pirates have adapted their tactics, and the potential for resurgence remains high; this issue remains a critical security and development concern. It is not just a regional priority—it is an international imperative.

Africa Economy & Business

Issue Brief Jun 10, 2025

Marine energy: Harnessing the power of the Atlantic

By William Yancey Brown

In partnership with the Policy Center for the New South, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center is launching a new series of publications and events dedicated to the power of the Atlantic ocean with an inaugural policy brief on energy and mineral potential.

Africa Critical Minerals

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Engaging generative artificial intelligence in African development appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There are compelling reasons for the United States to increase its footprint in Nigeria, but fears of a genocide against Nigeria’s Christian population are unfounded. In fact, both Christians and Muslims are victims of violence and terrorism in Nigeria, as Trump’s own senior advisor for Arab and African affairs, Massad Boulos, has noted. If the United States is genuinely interested in helping the Nigerian government address violence and terrorism, then it must change course. After all, applying pressure on Nigeria risks driving it toward greater economic dependence on China or deeper military reliance on Russia, as has occurred with some of Nigeria’s Sahelian neighbors in recent years.

Why Nigeria matters

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, is a major oil producer, and has the potential to become an African superpower. Contrary to the trajectory of many Sahel states in recent years, Abuja stands as a bulwark against further destabilization in West Africa and is a leader within the Economic Community of West African States. Though the country experienced democratic backsliding under former President Muhammadu Buhari from 2015 to 2023, Nigeria has been an electoral democracy since 1999—and it remains politically stable despite last month’s unconfirmed coup plot and military reshuffle.

Among African countries, Nigeria had the most favorable view of the United States in 2025, according to surveys by the Pew Research Center. While US favorability ratings in Kenya have dropped by double digits over the past year, Nigerian favorability ratings have remained relatively stable. Last year, two-thirds of Nigerians expressed confidence that Trump would do the right thing in world affairs, putting him three points ahead of former US President Joe Biden. By applying overt pressure in dealing with Nigeria, the United States would risk alienating a key regional partner whose population still expresses confidence in US leadership.

Moreover, if US ties with Nigeria were to deteriorate, this could provide an opening for China or Russia to gain influence. The Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index shows a steep rise in Chinese influence in Nigeria over the past decade and a half. China has become Nigeria’s largest trading partner, and Nigeria is one of the most active participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Last September, Tinubu met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where the two leaders formally elevated China-Nigeria relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

Russia, too, has increased its influence over Nigeria in the past decade, signing a military cooperation agreement with Abuja in late 2021. In May 2025, the head of Nigeria’s military visited Moscow for discussions with top Russian military officials. Russia offered additional weaponry and training, which the Nigerian military saw as a reaffirmation of Russian support. Following Trump’s comments about potential US military action in Nigeria, Russia warned that such a step could escalate global tensions.

Given these dynamics, US pressure on Nigeria could backfire, inadvertently driving the country into the arms of Russia and China. This would ultimately weaken US influence in a strategically vital region and mirror the path of some members of the Alliance of Sahel States—a bloc comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—that have come to depend on Moscow for security and on Beijing for economic support.

Surveying political violence in Nigeria

Violence is a big problem in Nigeria, but it’s also a complex one. It’s local and it’s regional, occurring both between groups and within them. To shape effective US policy, it is important to understand the country’s complex landscape of political violence.

Nigeria ranks sixth among countries most afflicted by terrorism, according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project lists Nigeria as one of ten countries globally—and three in Africa—experiencing “extreme” levels of conflict. As the charts below show, political violence in Nigeria has grown significantly since 2020, reaching all-time highs in 2025, though fatalities have not increased proportionally.

Political violence in Nigeria has risen—though fatalities have not grown at the same rate

Political violence in Nigeria    Demonstrations in Nigeria    Fatalities in Nigeria

Source: ACLED, accessed November 1, 2025

Terrorism in the northeast

The terrorist group Boko Haram has been militarily active in Nigeria’s northeastern states since 2009. The group’s violent attacks surged in 2014 and 2015, after it infamously abducted 276 schoolgirls in the town of Chibok and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). However, internal disputes prompted the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) to split from Boko Haram by 2016. Since then, an inter-jihadist turf war has been waged, leaving Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau dead in 2021. In 2024, armed conflict involving the two groups killed nearly 1,400 people, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)—and in 2025, they attempted at least twenty ambushes on military positions in Nigeria’s northeastern Borno State. On November 17, ISWAP militants claimed to have captured and killed a Nigerian brigadier general.

Banditry and kidnappings in the northwest

Nigeria’s northwest is a hub for criminal violence. Kidnappings in this region and throughout Nigeria are generally carried out by criminal gangs rather than ideologically motivated groups. In November, twenty-five schoolchildren were kidnapped in Kebbi State in northwest Nigeria and fifty-two more in Niger State in the country’s Middle Belt region. In March 2024, militants kidnapped 280 schoolchildren in the northwest state of Kaduna. Ansaru, a Boko Haram offshoot, is also active in this region. It is responsible for a series of kidnappings for ransoms and attacks against the Nigerian government.

Middle Belt violence

The crisis in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, one of the country’s most ethnically diverse regions, is mostly driven by farmer-herder conflicts. Violence in the Middle Belt occurs primarily between ethno-religious groups amid disputes over resources and land. These conflicts have long and complex roots, exacerbated by climate change and desertification. However, conflating violence by primarily Muslim Fulani herders against mostly Christian farmers with jihadist violence has, in part, led to misconceptions of a “Christian genocide” in the country. In some years, pastoral violence has indeed resulted in more fatalities than Boko Haram-ISWAP insurgencies—for instance, in 2018. However, this was not the case in 2025.

Oil militancy and piracy

Decentralized networks of oil militants, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have attacked oil infrastructure and kidnapped oil workers in Nigeria’s southeast for two decades. While less threatening than in the 2000s, oil militants remain active, as evidenced by a MEND attack on an oil facility earlier this year. Piracy off Nigeria’s coast, once more severe than Somali piracy, has declined due to shipping security measures, but both pirates and militants continue to evolve and collaborate whenever opportunities arise.

Separatist troubles

Aiming to restore the short-lived Republic of Biafra, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) was established in 2014. Protesting the marginalization of the Igbo people, IPOB’s militant wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), has waged a low-level insurgency against the Nigerian government. In 2024, this conflict caused about two hundred fatalities, according to UCDP data. On November 6, just days after Trump’s statements about Nigeria, IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu appealed to the US president to investigate state-sponsored killings of Christians in eastern Nigeria. On November 20, Kanu was sentenced to life in prison for terrorism, raising the risk of further clashes between the ESN and security forces.

Neighboring problems

In neighboring Mali, the deadliest Salafi jihadist terrorist group, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), continues to expand its influence. JNIM launched its first attack in Nigeria’s Kwara State on October 28, killing one soldier. Of additional concern are potential links between JNIM and Ansaru. In late August, Nigerian security officials arrested two Ansaru leaders who allegedly underwent substantial training from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, now a part of JNIM. Boko Haram also operates in Cameroon’s Far North region.

How the United States can support Nigeria

Nigeria faces major security challenges, but carrots, rather than sticks, are more likely to succeed when it comes to US-Nigeria security cooperation. Two primary areas for strategic cooperation should be prioritized:

First, help professionalize Nigeria’s security services. A new US-supported working group presents opportunities for increased engagement with Nigerian military and security forces. This can help Nigeria build a force that appreciates the importance of professionalization, training, and respect for human rights. In late November, Nigeria’s national security advisor met with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in Washington. According to a State Department official, the United States is considering an “expansive” engagement plan, including intelligence sharing. Given Nigeria’s record of operational mishaps—including incidents that have killed civilians—this is an opportunity for the United States to help train the Nigerian military on intelligence analysis and mission planning.

Similarly, the United States can support Nigeria as it incorporates advanced technology into its military. In recent years, the country has expanded its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but there are risks to such rapid UAV adoption. In fact, the proliferation of drone technology can exacerbate domestic conflicts—and Nigeria is no exception. Between 2017 and 2023, at least three hundred Nigerian civilians were killed in Nigerian air force strikes. Extensive training and engagement, potentially including better communication systems and intelligence integration, could reduce casualties.

In addition to broader military engagement, the United States has pursued specialized partnerships with Nigerian forces. Last year, for instance, the US Coast Guard proposed a partnership with the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, and in the past, US special forces have trained the so-called Special Boat Service, a special forces unit of the Nigerian Navy—though this hasn’t occurred since 2021. Such efforts can both strengthen the integrity of the bilateral relationship and professionalize Nigerian forces. This cooperation can also help shape the force into a pro-Western military and build relationships between Nigerian and US soldiers that could foster future collaboration.

Second, support anti-corruption efforts. Nigeria’s security challenges exist within a context of widespread government corruption, which fuels the grievances of various rebel groups. In Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Nigeria ranks 140 out of 180 countries, with 180 indicating the highest level of perceived corruption. For many Nigerians, working toward changing this status quo is a priority—and both the US administration and the Nigerian government should keep that in mind. Security cooperation alone isn’t enough. There must also be political action that improves government performance and accountability more broadly—something the United States could assist with. Recently, the Nigerian president warned public officials about corruption and government theft, opening the door for the United States to offer support for and encourage anti-corruption programs. 

Despite its myriad security challenges, Nigeria remains a major regional power. Trump is not wrong to focus on the country, but a punitive approach or unauthorized military action risks missing key opportunities to deepen engagement. If the United States relies solely on sanctions and threats, then it may find itself on the outside looking in. A more effective strategy is to engage Nigeria from within—offering carrots rather than sticks.

Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University.

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état, which was named one of the best historical materials published in 2022-2023 by the American Library Association.

Julien Derroitte is completing a BA in architecture with dual minors in international relations and political science and in American politics and law at Carnegie Mellon University.

The post To curb violence in Nigeria, the US should offer Abuja carrots, not sticks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But what results have Trump’s peace efforts yielded so far—and where do the agreements that the US administration has facilitated over the past months stand today? This series takes stock of Trump’s peace deals across the world, highlights the patterns, tools, and strategic choices that characterize them, and assesses whether they can deliver stability over the long run.

From negotiations with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to talks with Cambodia and Thailand, several cross-cutting themes emerge. Trump uses economic tools such as trade deals, tariff pressure, and targeted incentives to bring parties to the table and further US interests, while highly visible announcements and signing ceremonies serve to reduce tensions and lock parties into deals.

With this unorthodox style, Trump aims to position the US economy as a driver of cooperation abroad while simultaneously securing domestic wins, such as beneficial agreements on critical minerals. His style produces rapid outcomes and creates political openings that might otherwise be unattainable. However, it also runs the risk of substituting short-term gains for long-term peace.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

—Bailey Galicia is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post Inside Trump’s peace plans   appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Trump administration’s global push for peace is aimed both at ending wars and at improving the president’s chances of winning a Nobel Peace Prize. Regardless of the motivations, the diplomatic energy the administration is expending to resolve conflicts in Africa is creating movement and shaking up systems in a way that could break stalemates or at least disrupt patterns of violence for short-term gains.  

US President Donald Trump’s proclivity for dealmaking and leveraging influence may not generate long-term solutions, but the administration’s disruption of the conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda represents an unorthodox approach to creating negotiation space. Stepping into this space created by Trump’s style could offer an opportunity to forge new short-term paths to peace.

Unconventional moves, unforeseen results? 

Building on the diligent efforts of the Joe Biden administration, the Trump team gave significant political weight to the DRC-Rwanda negotiations early in the term by tapping Massad Boulos, the US senior advisor for Africa—and father-in-law of the president’s daughter Tiffany Trump—to lead the talks. This resulted in a “declaration of principles” in April, followed by the “Washington Accord” in June, both signed by the countries’ foreign ministers. Then, on December 4, the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda signed the “Joint Declaration” in Washington, with Trump and leaders from Qatar, Kenya, Angola, Togo, Burundi, Uganda, and Nigeria witnessing.  

This peace agreement was violated just four days later, and the Rwandan-backed M23 militia continues to gain ground in eastern DRC. Burundi’s involvement in the conflict is also increasingly concerning. However, the US administration’s diplomatic investment has created international momentum for peace, providing the parties and regional actors more room to maneuver in their respective domestic politics. For the DRC, the political push from the White House has generated a buzz of activity in the critical-minerals sector, as exemplified by myriad recent forums in Washington policy circles and the interest of several companies in capitalizing on the “peace.” Similarly, Rwanda, which has long faced criticism for greenwashing and sportswashing its reputation for human rights abuses and autocracy, has had the opportunity to burnish its image as a promoter of peace on the global stage by signing this series of high-profile agreements. In that sense, both countries are already benefiting from Trump’s political signaling, though the stickiest details of a long-term solution remain unaddressed.   

In Sudan, US foreign policy faces its toughest test 

The same may be true in Sudan, where Trump recently announced that he intends to focus on resolving the crisis after meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. While there might be a short-term gain, the US approach is unlikely to deliver a sustainable political path toward an enduring peace. Still, Boulos’s engagement on Sudan could inject some much-needed energy into a stalled mediation process led by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A lasting resolution to the conflict in Sudan, where the world’s largest humanitarian disaster is unfolding, would be a real feather in Trump’s cap.  

Most Sudan watchers have argued that any solution must start with the United States exerting political pressure on the UAE to terminate its support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a Darfur-based paramilitary group. In January, the outgoing Biden administration determined that the RSF has committed genocide, and continued Emirati support has allowed the group to perpetrate more atrocities, such as those widely reported during its late October siege of the Sudanese city of El Fasher. However, the UAE is an important US ally and a key strategic partner in other global conflicts—from the war in Gaza to countering the Houthi threat in Yemen. Using US leverage to squeeze Abu Dhabi on Sudan has therefore proven politically impractical.  

If Trump were to pull it off, an Emirati pivot on Sudan would indeed result in a power shift on the battlefield. Still, spearheading an effort for lasting peace would require another seismic political shift. The US administration would also need to elevate legitimate Sudanese political actors who could lead this fractious and war-ravaged country—and that is no easy feat. After all, neither of the two main belligerents, the Sudanese Armed Forces or the RSF, maintains any political legitimacy, as Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations argues. If Trump or Boulos could pick up those two giant rocks—Emirati support for the RSF and legitimate Sudanese political leadership—and move them even inches forward, that would represent real progress that evaded the Biden administration. 

Small wins can produce big diplomatic yields 

As Trump continues his pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize, there are myriad other conflicts across the African continent that may receive a burst of diplomatic attention as his administration seeks to unlock sustainable paths to peace. The Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan dispute around Nile River water access and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) may be one of those cases. Although it should be acknowledged that Trump has previously overstated his claim of resolving the conflict, he could still theoretically pull off an agreement, as argued by Allison Lombardo and Peter Quaranto. While Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has little motivation to strike a deal on the GERD, Egypt might be more amenable to negotiations.  

During his July 2025 travel to North Africa, Boulos continued discussions with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on both the GERD and on emerging space to possibly broker a deal on Libya. There may yet be developments in this arena as the US administration seeks to create opportunities for energy-sector deals for US companies.   

The administration is also pursuing solutions to several other security challenges in Africa, including the metastasizing terrorist threats in Mali and across West Africa. Here, the United States has been increasingly sidelined, with regimes from Burkina Faso to Niger pivoting to Moscow. However, there is an opportunity to redirect Sahelian states’ attention away from Russian patrons if the United States steps up with its own counterterrorism support. 

In northern Somalia, a new collaboration between Somaliland and Puntland may provide a vehicle for the United States to advance locally driven counterterrorism solutions aimed at containing or degrading threats posed by the Somali affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, al-Shabaab, and even the Houthis operating in the Red Sea region. Likely with a lighter touch than was needed to advance DRC-Rwanda negotiations, the Trump administration could make near-term counterterrorism gains that may open space for partner governments—including Western allies, Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar—to share burdens and claim political and diplomatic wins. 

It is easy to criticize the administration’s nontraditional approach to peace promotion, particularly when paired with sizable tariffs, visa bans, and misleading narratives about marginalized groups in South Africa and Nigeria. However, the reality is that the political disruption that Trump’s style can generate, combined with his unpredictable decision-making and pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize, has shifted political thinking about what is possible in the DRC and Rwanda. With sustained and credible engagement, similar diplomatic openings could emerge in Sudan, Libya, and other terrorism hot spots in Africa. In many of these cases, small victories may prove more valuable than prolonged stalemates. 

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council. 

Issue Brief Dec 12, 2025

It’s all about Hamas’s disarmament

By Daniel B. Shapiro

A US-brokered cease-fire ended the Israel-Hamas war, but the next phase depends on the group’s disarmament. Until that happens, Gaza’s reconstruction, regional diplomacy, and political future hang in the balance.

Israel Middle East

Issue Brief Dec 12, 2025

In Southeast Asia, the promise and pitfalls of tariff diplomacy are on full display 

By Amy Searight

US President Donald Trump’s high-profile intervention in the Thai-Cambodian border dispute delivered a cease-fire, but its violation exposes the fragility of tariff diplomacy and raises questions about the durability of coercive US diplomacy in the region.

Indo-Pacific Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post From the DRC to Sudan, Trump’s disruptive moves could revive stalled negotiations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Their recent footsteps on the continent are becoming more and more attention-grabbing. These include Saudi companies buying 2.2 million tons of carbon credits at a 2023 Kenya auction and, in 2024, the UAE becoming the biggest investor in new business projects in Africa—including an investment of $4.5 billion in clean energy on the continent. At the same time, global attention has focused on Khartoum’s suit at the International Court of Justice alleging UAE involvement in the civil war in Sudan, which broke out in early 2023. The UAE has denied supporting the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group.

In 2024, the third Qatar Africa Business Forum took place, following the Chinese, Russian, Japanese, US, and European Union summits with African nations. Doha has also been hosting the peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda through the M23 since March 2025, with the meeting between Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame under the aegis of the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. Before the October 7 Hamas attacks, Israel hoped to join this geopolitical trend with the goal of amplifying its ties with African partners beyond traditional security issues. In 2023, Japan celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. Meanwhile, Indonesia sealed $3.5 billion in business deals from the Indonesia-Africa Forum in 2024, nearly six times the amount generated at the first forum six years ago.

As middle-power nations position themselves on the international scene, they are entering into direct competition with global powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. Moreover, new tensions are emerging among middle powers. For example, in April 2025, India held its first-ever Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) exercise, co-hosted with Tanzania and involving nine other African nations such as Kenya, Madagascar, South Africa, Djibouti, and others. Part of India’s motivation for this exercise is to offer a non-coercive security alternative in the Indian Ocean—countering China’s increasingly dominant maritime presence in Africa. Observers see India’s large-scale naval outreach as part of a broader geopolitical push: by strengthening maritime ties, India is increasing its influence in Africa at the expense of China’s traditional footprint there.

Even for closer allies such as China and Russia, a competition can exist: Russia providing security, weapons, and political backing in insecure regions risks undermining China’s investments focused on long-term economic stability (infrastructure, trade).

These moves have been triggered by three major internal changes that occurred on the African continent in the past few years: population growth, pro-sovereignty sentiment, and industrial transformation.

The African century

First, Africa is poised to become the next “demographic champion,” behind India and China. It is already on track to double its population by 2050, and may be the most populous continent by the end of the century. On the youngest continent in the world, this shift will have a strong economic impact on business markets with a rising group of African workers, consumers, and clients. The continent had already launched the largest free trade area in the world with the 2018 signing of an agreement to create the African Continental Free Trade Area. The numbers confirm these structural shifts. In February 2024, the African Development Bank noted that Africa featured prominently in a list of the world’s fastest-growing economies in 2024 and had better-than-average growth prospects in 2025, subject to global shocks. Sub-Saharan economic growth averaged 4.0 percent in 2024, exceeding expectations by 0.4 percentage points—but global shocks created a “sudden shift in the economic landscape,” including higher tariffs and greater uncertainty, according to the IMF’s April 2025 sub-Saharan report. When the IMF lowered the global growth outlook for 2025 by 0.5 percent, it trimmed sub-Saharan Africa’s outlook by 0.4 percentage points to 3.8 percent, noting that “regional growth is now expected to slow this year.”

Second, internal sentiment has led to significant external changes. A feature of African public opinion is a strong eagerness to protect African nations’ sovereignty against former colonial powers like France, with collateral impact on those powers’ allies: After France withdrew its military forces from Niger, the United States was asked to close its military bases there in July 2024 and in Chad in May 2024.

Nations without a colonial past in Africa have also faced criticism and pushback, including a growing call for transparency and value creation when it comes to Chinese lending practices and mining exploitation. Meanwhile, Russia’s Africa Corps (the successor to the Wagner Group) has regularly been exposed for its contribution to deadly attacks in the Sahelian countries they are supposed to be supporting with security assistance. The strong aspiration for greater African sovereignty is not limited to authoritarian regimes in the Sahelian countries—Mali, Niger, Burkina-Faso, and Chad—that recently experienced coups d’états. Democratic regimes such as Senegal are pivoting toward a more independent path as evidenced by the presidential campaign of April 2024 and the victory of a “patriotic” candidate.

This powerful trend is visible in various sectors, from defense policy (with the end of military cooperation agreements) to currency (with the growing rejection of the France-linked CFA franc), energy (with new norms of mining exploration), and even arts (with the restitution of African cultural heritage).

Third, industrial transformation has become a priority for many African countries. Observing that humanitarian aid and assistance have not always been productive and cannot meet their huge development needs, most African countries prioritize a transformation-driven vision. In the energy sector, where Africa is home to 30 percent of the world’s critical mineral reserves (cobalt, lithium, rare earth elements, copper, chromium, graphite, manganese, and platinum), expectations for what the sector can deliver are higher than ever. And in Africa’s underdeveloped manufacturing sector, there is “a significant opportunity to leapfrog more developed nations and build a thriving low-carbon manufacturing sector from the ground up,” according to a McKinsey & Company report; to do so would likely require investments of roughly $2 trillion to spur “decarbonization-fueled growth.” Therefore, the question is simple: How can Africa move from the extractive, even predatory, model of which it has often been victim to one that guarantees economic diversification, infrastructure development, increased revenue, fiscal stability, improved environmental management, and workforce training?

Within this transformative context, rising middle powers are playing an opportunistic card to capture the new African demands and take advantage of the diversification of African partnerships. Indonesia, for example, which needs more critical minerals (such as lithium) to feed its electric-vehicle (EV) battery industry, is actively positioning itself in Africa’s mining space, in partnerships and not necessarily at the expense with African states.

This is quite significant because it shows Indonesians are not only investing in resource-rich African countries, but also partnering with local state mining firms. For example, PT Timah (an Indonesian tin mining company) has a signed memorandum of understanding with Stamico, a Tanzanian state-mining corporation, to explore tin, nickel, gold, and even rare earth elements.

Returning to Africa for the twenty-first time on the occasion of the thirty-seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva noted that “more than half of the 200 million Brazilian citizens recognize themselves as Afro-descendants.” During Lula’s first presidency, Brazil opened nineteen African embassies. Meanwhile, India showcased its support for the African Union’s Group of Twenty (G20) permanent seat in September 2023.

Regional routes

Very often, investment expansion starts with a bold airline strategy. Consider Turkish Airlines, which connects more than sixty African destinations and has long been a key tool for Turkey’s influence in Africa. Thanks to its “Action Plan for Africa” in 1998 and its “Opening to Africa” program launched in 2005, Turkey’s international outreach to sub-Saharan Africa has flourished, while the European Union’s doors remain closed to Ankara. Turkey has expanded trade ties with African partners, with bilateral trade growing from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $40.7 billion in 2022. The number of Turkish embassies has also increased from twelve to forty-three between 2009 and 2021.

Qatar is taking similar steps, with Qatar Airways investing $1.3 billion to acquire 49 percent of RwandAir in 2020 and, more recently, a 25 percent equity stake in one of Africa’s largest regional airlines, Airlink, which serves fifteen African countries and flies to forty-five destinations.

Building on this experience and taking advantage of their geographical proximity, many Muslim countries in the Middle East have been developing ties with African countries. Water, forests, land, critical minerals: Africa has strategic resources Gulf countries lack. From 2016 to 2023, the commercial volume generated between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—and Africa doubled to $121 billion, according to Afreximbank. The pan-African organization notes that those investments come primarily from the UAE (54.9 percent), Saudi Arabia (25.6 percent), Qatar (7.2 percent), Kuwait (5 percent), and Bahrain (4.2 percent); they have been directed to Egypt (69.8 percent), Morocco (4.6 percent), Algeria (3 percent), Nigeria (2.6 percent), and South Africa (2.3 percent).The level of direct investments in Africa between 2012 and 2022 has outpaced $100 billion, while the Gulf countries spent $9.2 billion in aid in 2022 (equal to 14 percent of global aid received by African countries). The key sectors of investment are construction, environmental technology, energy, transportation, and agribusiness.

What is a middle power?

Despite their geographical diversity, the middle powers that have emerged on the African scene in a significant way share common features.

For sure, we know they are neither superpowers like the Cold War’s United States and USSR nor hyperpowers as the United States was named following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. They don’t belong to the P5, the group of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Economically speaking, they are not yet among the richest countries in the world (based on gross domestic product): the United States, China, Germany, Japan, India, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada. (The case of India is discussed below.) But many are close: Brazil (tenth place), South Korea (twelfth), Indonesia (sixteenth), Turkey (seventeenth), Saudi Arabia (nineteenth), and the UAE (twenty-seventh). Even if some have not reached the top thirty, their ambitions are large enough to place them among Africa’s rising partners, such as Qatar (in fifty-fifth place), which pledged to invest $103 billion across six African countries in 2025.

Beyond belonging to the group of high-GDP countries, middle-power nations have four other common characteristics:

• They make demonstrations of power: e.g., South Africa referred a case to the International Court of Justice in May 2024 accusing Israel of “genocide” in Gaza.
• Middle powers can belong to the neighborhood, like the Gulf countries, or be located far away like South Korea, which organized a June 2024 African summit attracting forty-eight African delegations.
• Their influence is contained because a regional power is not autonomous: It belongs to a more global system of influence like Turkey, which may be expanding its diplomacy in Africa but is limited by its NATO membership.
• Middle powers must be creative by deploying indirect persuasion techniques on the ground: In 2017, Turkey persuaded Senegal to close schools linked to Fethullah Gülen, a cleric Ankara alleges was behind a 2016 coup attempt.

The cases of Russia and India

While some of the countries mentioned above clearly belong to the category of middle powers, two cases remain difficult to classify.

After losing the Cold War and its empire in 1991, Russia, now the world’s eleventh largest power in terms of GDP, has since sought to move from a Eurasian middle power, integrated into the Commonwealth of Independent States, to a global power that spans from its position within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as far as Africa with the newly renamed Africa Corps, which deploys propaganda operations there.

As for India, the most populous country and the fifthlargest economic power in the world, it has been able to expand its influence in Africa thanks to the longstanding presence of its diaspora in the east of the continent as well as its involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement, which emerged from a summit in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1953.

The uncertainty about the position of Russia and India is not due to their economic power—they are both among the richest countries in the world—but stems from the fact that these two countries have more impact than the middle powers but less than the global powers. They have features of both groups. Time will tell where they will fall. Thus, while Russia was the leading supplier of arms to Africa ($14.6 billion) in 2021—far ahead of the United States ($5.4 billion)—the level of its trade with Africa has remained very low. According to European data, in 2022, Africa’s imports from Russia were less than 2 percent of its total imports; and African exports to Russia were less than 1 percent of Africa’s total exports. This supports the idea that even as trade has grown in absolute terms, Russia is still not a major economic partner for Africa compared to the European Union or China.

Three weight classes

The middle-power nations can be divided into three groups, depending on their economic weight and the depth of their engagement in Africa:

• Level 1: UAE, Brazil, and Turkey
• Level 2: Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar
• Level 3: South Korea and Malaysia

They are all benefiting from the retreat of the former colonial powers, which are essentially European, the most striking expression of which is France in the Sahel. Also of note is the relative weakening of superpowers in Africa: According to a recent Gallup report, China surpassed the United States in popularity on the continent in 2023. At the same time, China’s dominant position is no longer so hegemonic: While the value of China-Africa trade has increased nearly thirty-fold since 2000 to reach $282 billion in 2023—making China Africa’s largest trading partner—China’s official loans totaled less than $1 billion in 2022 for the first time in eighteen years, according to Boston University’s Global Initiative for China. When the world powers are less involved, there is a vacuum that the middle powers have been quick to fill. And African nations are among those interested in interacting with them in regional groups such as the BRICS: South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt have all joined the intergovernmental organization.

Creativity and boldness

In any case, the tools of influence that the middle-power nations deploy in Africa are different from those of the traditional powers. Thus, the UAE has established itself, with its maritime giant Dubai Ports World, as one of the world’s largest port operators in the strategic areas of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, with the aim of being less dependent on hydrocarbons and ensuring its food security. The cultural influence of regional powers, which is less well-known, has also been crucial in recent years. For example, Saudi Arabia’s investments in West African education systems have increased the use of the Arabic language. The Indian diasporas have served as an effective support for India’s strategy, whose successful Bollywood films participate in the information war. The Qatari channel Al Jazeera and the Turkish news agency Anadolu cover the continent widely. Many middle powers broadcast their messages in local African languages; Turkey’s TRT and Natural TV offer programs in Hausa and Swahili and television series popular in many countries.

As a result, these middle powers have acquired considerable political influence. India took advantage of its presidency of the G20 in September 2023 to take credit for the African Union’s permanent seat in the G20. In 2015, many African countries, including Niger, Chad, and Mauritania, joined the founding members of the Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition, created by Saudi Arabia.

While none of these middle powers has been able to replace the traditional global powers or former colonial powers such as France or the United Kingdom in terms of engagement volume, their growing influence on the continent puts them in a position of strength. The competition will not, however, benefit everyone in the long run. No doubt the future belongs to the powers that can navigate the shifts already underway by forming complementary and winning alliances in a more complex geopolitical scene—dominated by interests, not ideology. This is undoubtedly the reason why, in the African theater, Russia and Iran are seeking closer cooperation, as, separately, China and Russia are as well. On these complex alliances, the Western powers are behind. Meanwhile, regional powers may need to clarify their intentions in Africa, such as the case of the UAE in the bloody civil war in Sudan, in order to preserve their comparative advantage vis-à-vis the informed African public, aware of what is happening on their soil.

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This is the first chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

Ghana’s signature achievement since the mid-1990s is the consolidation of civic and political freedoms and a competitive political order in which citizens, journalists, and civic organizations routinely hold leaders to account. The durability of this achievement is not a result of elite benevolence or political will but the product of a dense, independent civil society and a remarkably resilient independent media ecosystem. When governments test the boundaries of civic space, the response is often swift and organized; this social infrastructure is the primary reason Ghana’s civic and political freedoms have remained consistently strong for more than two decades. This context is reflected in the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes’ political subindex for Ghana, which sits well above the economic and legal subindices. In recent years, it sits in the low-to-mid 70s out of a maximum score of 100, a pattern that aligns with lived realities. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2024, an overwhelming majority of Ghanaians (85 percent) reported that they did not fear political violence or intimidation during the last national elections, a strong testament to the electoral freedoms that Ghanaians enjoy. Moreover, a majority (52 percent) expressed trust in civil society organizations, ahead of religious leaders (who are trusted by 49 percent). Only the military (trusted by 65 percent) ranks ahead of civil society organizations in Ghana.¹

The historical roots of this civic vigilance matter. From the anti-colonial mobilization led by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first post-independence president, and mass professional and student associations to later generations of advocacy groups and think tanks, Ghanaians have long treated resistance to state overreach as a civic obligation.

As formal unions of lawyers, teachers, students, and medical professionals gave way to contemporary civil society and independent media organizations and research networks—among them, the Media Foundation for West Africa, the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition, the Ghana Integrity Initiative, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, and many others, including subnational advocacy groups—the core impulse has remained the same: to protect and defend civic space, demand procedural fairness, and insist that those in power remain answerable to the public. This explains why the social reaction to efforts to undermine political freedoms is often met with resistance and why Ghana’s political openings have not been easily reversed.

Electoral integrity is a useful illustration of how these social checks operate. While the courts can usually be swayed by partisan crosscurrents when individual political actors are charged with corruption or other acts of impropriety, the dynamic is often different with election disputes. The vigilance of civil society and independent media organizations in monitoring and independently collating election results at the polling-station level often helps to provide credible evidence when electoral disputes arise. The volume and quality of that evidence strengthen adjudication, making it harder for judicial bias to gain traction and increasing the credibility of outcomes, even in contentious contests.² This distinction is important: While the administration of justice in ordinary (nonpolitical) cases is broadly reliable, the politicization of corruption cases can distort judicial behavior; election cases, by contrast, have benefitted from robust, external scrutiny that fortifies the work of the courts.

This juxtaposition points to the core challenge in Ghana’s performance on legal freedom: The judiciary’s structural vulnerability to executive influence, particularly through appointments to the High Court and Supreme Court. Observers can—and do—sort judges into partisan “buckets,” a perception that inevitably erodes confidence in the system’s neutrality. Survey data clearly show a deterioration of citizens’ trust in the judicial system in the last fifteen years, falling by 20 percentage points since 2011.³ Yet outside of high-stakes political cases, the courts tend to function competently and deliver justice with regularity.

Recent movement in the legal subindex has been mildly positive, driven in part by improvements in informality and, to a lesser degree, by steadier security conditions after the turbulence of the early 2000s. On informality, the government’s digitalization initiatives, including the introduction of national (and tax) identification (the Ghana Card) and a digital address system, have helped to identify and increasingly formalize informal businesses. Other initiatives, such as the institution of fee-free secondary education, opened opportunities for young Ghanaians to further their education instead of entering the informal economy. The National Youth Employment Program, although relatively less successful, helped to draw young entrepreneurs into more formalized activities. Finally, a surge of capital investments into construction, alongside an expansion in mining activities, has created demand for artisans, contractors, and allied tradespeople who transact in more formal ways than the street-level microenterprise typical in developing economies. The result is a measurable reduction in the prevalence of informality, a trend visible within the relevant component of the legal subindex.

The gradual strengthening of security owes more to internal stability than to a benign regional environment. Ghana’s northern border with Burkina Faso and proximity to Nigeria’s insurgency-affected areas create constant risks, and yet Ghana has avoided the cascade of instability that has afflicted parts of the Sahel. That relative steadiness, together with the normal functioning of everyday justice for nonpolitical cases, helps explain why legal freedom is trending slightly upward despite persistent concerns about executive sway over judicial appointments and decisions.

Corruption control within the justice sector is another area to watch. Across administrations, chief justices have consistently placed anti-corruption at the center of their institutional reform agendas, and recent executive appeals to rebuild public trust in the courts suggest continued political salience. However, these public commitments have not always translated into tangible reforms or outcomes. Public perception of judicial corruption remains high: According to the 2024 Afrobarometer survey, more than 40 percent of Ghanaians believe that “most or all judges and magistrates” are corrupt.⁴ The growing trend of presidents appointing loyalists to the Supreme Court has only reinforced these perceptions, contributing to Ghana’s relatively weak performance on the legal subindex. The ongoing constitutional review presents an opportunity to reform judicial appointments and promotions, tighten avenues for corruption, and strengthen judicial independence.

Ghana’s strong performance on elections, civil liberties, and political rights within the political subindex is tempered by weaker scores on legislative constraints on the executive, highlighting concerns about the effectiveness of institutional checks in practice. However, civil society remains uncompromising in defending democratic norms, including contesting attempts to erode these checks. The resulting equilibrium is not perfect—nor is it immutable—but it has proven remarkably resilient over the past generation.

Economic freedoms have followed their own trajectory, with a notable increase from the mid-2000s into the first half of the 2010s, a period that coincided with the broader “Africa Rising” narrative. This period was characterized by strong improvements in governance and economic growth, rising incomes, and a growing middle class. Consolidation of Ghana’s return to constitutional democracy commenced in the year 2000 with the transfer of power from the ruling party to an opposition party, which further boosted optimism in the country’s political and economic outlook. The new political leadership signaled a clear focus on improving the economy, and market openness and property-rights enforcement seemed to find firmer footing. Former President John Kufuor is remembered in this context for emphasizing macroeconomic health and business-climate improvements that many citizens experienced in their daily lives. The results of committed political leadership and effective economic management are reflected in the economic subindex and the other components such as investment freedom and property rights, starting in the mid-2000s.

The subsequent downturn around 2015 is worth noting. Rising debt-service pressures, coupled with a large budget deficit and high inflation culminated in Ghana going in for an IMF program; a similar pattern occurred around 2023-24 as reflected in the downward trend of the economic subindex. These patterns signal the fragility of gains when fiscal anchors are not backed by disciplined fiscal decisions—such as politically motivated increases in public spending during election years and subsidies on utilities and petroleum products, among others—and when investment freedom and property-rights expectations face credibility questions. These observations underscore that Ghana’s enviable political freedoms do not automatically translate into disciplined fiscal management or sustained economic openness. The freedom metrics capture this: The political subindex remains high, while the economic and legal dimensions fluctuate with policy choices that either reinforce or erode market institutions and democratic norms.

Trade freedom tells a more erratic story. Ghana’s trade policy framework has generally been open by regional standards, but the component’s volatility reflects the broader health of the economy and investors’ read on the policy environment. In periods of economic stress, policy consistency suffers, and openness on paper does not translate into confidence in practice. The trends in the data thus track not only tariff schedules and non-tariff measures but also the credibility of macroeconomic management, which is often punctuated in election years.

The trajectory of women’s economic freedom stands out as a major structural improvement. Around 2004, there was a steep rise in the economic subindex driven in part by a cluster of women’s empowerment policies of the Kufuor administration: free maternal health services, including postnatal care services that reduced a key barrier to women’s labor-market participation, and explicit efforts to expand women’s access to finance and enterprise support. Those initiatives may have helped to boost women’s economic autonomy and anchor a higher plateau that persisted in the years that followed. The component’s level has stagnated since about 2008 and hence leaves some room for improvement—but the rapid change around 2004 is unmistakable. Recent Afrobarometer survey data for Ghana show strong popular support for women to have equal rights to work as men. However, more than a quarter of Ghanaians (26 percent) identify employers’ preference for hiring men as the top barrier to women’s advancement, ahead of childcare (17 percent) and skills gaps (16 percent).⁵

Where do remaining constraints lie? First, land ownership: In Ghana,  community and family lands are predominantly controlled by male heads; women’s ownership and collateralization of land remain very limited. Given the economic value of land, women remain at a significant disadvantage that dampens entrepreneurship, constrains access to credit, and restricts intergenerational wealth transfer for women. Second, intrahousehold decision-making: In many households, women’s ability to take paid work outside the home remains mediated by male authority. These social and legal frictions are the kinds of de facto constraints that keep the Women’s Economic Freedom component below its potential despite the formal policy gains that started in the mid-2000s.

Evolution of prosperity

Ghana’s prosperity trajectory since the mid-2000s mirrors, in broad outline, the “Africa Rising” era: a period of macroeconomic optimism, improved governance, favorable terms of trade, and political stability across much of the continent. Between 2005 and the mid-2010s, the Prosperity Index registered a strong and upward trend, reflecting the robust growth in incomes and steady improvements in social indicators, even as inequality widened in the classic early-development pattern. Ghana rode this wave and, for several years, significantly outpaced the sub-Saharan Africa average.

The story of the income component is familiar but still striking in its local particulars. A large discovery of offshore oil in the late 2000s added a new driver to a commodity basket already weighted toward gold and cocoa. In the mid-2000s, when global commodity prices were favorable, Ghana’s growth accelerated sharply; in 2011, Ghana recorded a double-digit real GDP growth rate (about 11 percent), up from about 8 percent the year prior. Oil windfalls amplified these gains, though they also heightened exposure to volatility and raised questions about how resource-linked revenues were managed.⁶ The income component of the Prosperity Index captures this rise and the subsequent plateau, which has persisted over the last decade. Reversals are visible too, mainly coinciding with the two IMF interventions mentioned earlier, driven in large part by fiscal indiscipline during election years.

The inequality component of the Prosperity Index shows a rapid deterioration, especially from the year 2000. But the composition of Ghana’s inequality is complex. It is not simply a rural-urban story; it is also generational. Large cohorts of better-educated youth, especially those under thirty-five, struggle to find formal employment at scale, while older cohorts, who are relatively less educated, hold on to existing jobs.⁷ The consequence is an age-skewed labor market that expands inequality even as education levels rise. On the rural side, extensive reliance on small-holder agriculture—more than 40 percent of the population is engaged in subsistence farming—keeps cash incomes low. Climate variability has compounded these pressures, with shifts in rainfall and temperature patterns outpacing the seed and crop research needed to adapt. The Index’s inequality line captures the macro pattern, and the underlying micro-mechanisms are the youth (un)employment crunch and the persistent productivity trap of smallholder agriculture.

Environment and health are relative bright spots. The national push to switch households from charcoal and wood to liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking—especially the 2013 rural LGP promotion program—may have helped to reduce indoor air pollution and, with it, the number of respiratory and related illnesses. Additionally, the government’s 2021 Green Ghana initiative to plant five million trees nationwide to combat desertification signaled a strong commitment to environmental issues in the country.⁸ The behavioral transition and practical action on desertification probably account for the Prosperity Index’s environment component alongside CO₂ and other measures. On the health side, Ghana’s COVID-19 response benefitted from institutional memory and capacity developed during earlier West African epidemics. Ebola never crossed into Ghana, thanks in part to the region’s experience dealing with health epidemics. When COVID-19 broke out, pandemic protocols were quickly activated and enforced, which resulted in comparatively low infection rates and deaths and a health system that proved more resilient than many expected.

Education presents a more mixed picture. Policy volatility in the secondary cycle—oscillating between three- and four-year models—created confusion and capacity mismatches just as youth cohorts ballooned. Free, compulsory basic education expanded access, but in many districts infrastructure and staffing could not keep pace, producing “shift systems” and, in some cases, causing students to drop out before completing upper-secondary education. Because the Prosperity Index’s education component bundles mean years of schooling with expected attainment, the friction from policy oscillation and demographic pressure is visible at a level that remains middling despite long-run improvements.

Finally, informality also intersects with prosperity through the labor market. The government’s digitalization programs—the introduction of the Ghana Card, which links to individual tax identification numbers, as well as the digital address system—have expanded formalization of the national economy. Moreover, governments’ special initiatives to increase youth employment and a boon in the construction and mining sectors have pulled workers into the formal sector. These interventions should, in principle, raise tax revenues and improve public service availability and access over time. The hard question is durability: Formalization built on cyclical or enclave sectors may not last if investment slows or governance costs mount. The Prosperity Index cannot answer that question by itself, but its pattern—modest gains in prosperity with uneven distributional effects and vulnerability to macro slippage—point to areas where reforms might matter most.

The path forward

The economic, social, and political outlook of Ghana’s next decade will depend largely on the steadiness with which it improves core institutions and transforms its civic strength into predictable, broad-based gains. Moreover, aligning reforms to citizens’ stated priorities—jobs, public services, and integrity—can increase traction.⁹ The political foundations are relatively strong; the next important step is ensuring that the transparency and accountability mechanisms that guard the conduct of elections also insulate the justice system from partisan distortion in high-stakes cases. Judicial appointments will remain politically salient, but the deeper imperative is to tighten the system’s incentives so that corruption cases are decided on evidence rather than allegiance. Civil society and media can help—by maintaining the evidentiary standard that has worked in election disputes—but ultimately the judiciary must build a reputation for political impartiality that is strong enough to withstand executive pressure. The ongoing constitutional review offers a chance to implement a judicial reform agenda that delivers on this objective.

Economic management is the second pillar. The political business cycles are familiar by now: A new government comes to power and starts out with prudent fiscal management that boosts confidence and attracts investment, often resulting in an increase in the economic subindex. Then comes election time and fiscal indiscipline—such as excessive borrowing and indiscriminate public spending with weak fiscal oversight—erode confidence and investment freedom, triggering adjustment and decline. Breaking this cycle requires more than fiscal rules on paper; it requires political commitment to enforce them consistently and minimize politically motivated borrowing and spending. The 2015 and 2024 IMF programs are markers of what happens when that discipline falters. In the coming years, the goal should be to make investment freedom boring—i.e., stable, predictable, and insulated from the electoral business cycle.

On economic freedom, two structural agendas stand out. The first is women’s economic freedom. The 2004 leap tied to women-centered policies shows how targeted policy can permanently raise the ceiling of economic progress. The unfinished business is in property rights, especially land ownership. In areas where family land remains the norm and titles are controlled by male heads, women’s ability to own, mortgage, and leverage land is curtailed. Reform here is politically delicate, embedded in social norms and local authority structures, but the economic payoff could be enormous: more women-owned firms, better access to credit, and fairer intergenerational asset accumulation. The women’s freedom component of the Index offers a clear benchmark; moving from the mid-seventies to the high eighties would require not just programs but enforceable property rights.

The second is youth (un)employment. Inequality in Ghana increasingly wears a generational face;a cohort of better-educated young people cannot find formal, stable jobs in sufficient numbers. Policy tools here must focus on easing business entry, expansion in labor-absorbing sectors, and modernizing agricultural value chains so that rural youth are not confined to subsistence farming. Climate-smart research and extension services, reliable input markets, and storage and transport infrastructure can help farmers move up the value ladder—and should be paired with vocational pathways aligned to construction, light manufacturing, and services. Such an agenda could help to address the twin problems of rural low productivity and urban underemployment.

Strengthened legal freedom and rule of law can support both agendas if reforms focus on clarity of the law and the quality of bureaucracy. Where statutes are clear, predictable, and enforced uniformly, the transaction costs that push firms into informality will fall; where frontline administration is competent and corruption risks are contained, formalization becomes a benefit rather than a burden. Ghana’s recent sector-led formalization has demonstrated that workers and firms will choose formal channels when the opportunity set changes. The task now is to make those choices systemic: digital one-stop services for business registration and tax collection; credible and quick adjudication for commercial disputes; and incentives for small firms to formalize without fear of retroactive penalties.

Regional (in)security will remain a concerning external variable. Instability in parts of the Sahel and the enduring threat of violent extremism in neighboring regions create risks that Ghana has to grapple with. The country’s success to date reflects internal discipline and professional security services, but the calculus can change quickly as alliances and external funding priorities shift. Ghana’s democratic resilience—anchored in a vigilant civil society and robust private media—makes it better placed than many to navigate these shocks without sacrificing core freedoms. The imperative is to ensure that security responses remain proportionate and bounded by law, so that security gains are not purchased at the cost of civil and political liberties that have been the bedrock of Ghana’s democratic success story.

Geoeconomic partnerships will also shape the opportunity set for Ghana. Specifically, infrastructure that lowers freight costs—an inland port located up north with rail connectivity, for instance—has immediate appeal, and Ghana would do well by investing in this area. Engagements with Chinese state and private investors are often judged domestically on whether they deliver such tangible benefits; they are not, by themselves, read as threats to democratic credentials. The test for the next decade is to structure these partnerships transparently, align them with national priorities, and avoid governance concessions that have complicated infrastructure deals elsewhere. If done well, they can help stabilize economic policy by supporting trade freedom in practice, not just on paper, and by attracting private investment that widens formal employment.

The prosperity side of the ledger will hinge on two slow-moving but decisive social investments. The first is education system reliability. When secondary school terms oscillate, cohort planning collapses; when seating capacity lags enrollment, “shift systems” lead to lost learning and early exits. The policy objective must prioritize stability: a curriculum and cycle length that survives political alternation, infrastructure that grows with cohorts, and targeted support to keep marginal students—especially rural girls—through upper secondary. If achieved, educational attainment will move steadily upward, with compounding effects on income and inequality.

The second is health and environment. Ghana’s clean cooking fuel and afforestation initiatives demonstrate how coordinated public messaging and practical access can drive large-scale shifts in household behavior—which often yield immediate and tangible benefits. Extending this logic—through cleaner fuels, safer urban air, adaptive health systems, and expanded green coverage—can enhance environmental quality, improve health outcomes, and free up resources otherwise consumed by preventable disease burdens.

Finally, the country’s political economy will continue to be shaped by how it manages its natural resource wealth. When mineral and oil revenues supplant tax collection, citizens have fewer reasons to monitor spending, governments face fewer incentives to be transparent, public resource leakages rise, and the discipline that keeps debt manageable erodes. A forward-looking reform would therefore tackle the credible fiscal rules that bind during booms, transparent revenue management that makes it costly to divert funds, and a tax system that is simple enough to comply with and fair enough to legitimize. The expanded government digitalization programs offer sound foundations to make this possible. If Ghana can lock in these basics while preserving the civic and media freedoms that have distinguished it for three decades, legal and economic institutions will catch up and converge with political freedom, and prosperity gains will follow.

Ghana’s comparative advantage is … the lived practice of accountability that precedes and outlasts any single administration.

Civil society and media have proven that they can guard the franchise; the task before us is to extend that guardianship to the legal system’s most politically sensitive corners and to the fiscal choices that unlock prosperity and avoid the familiar cycle of fiscal indiscipline, crisis, and repair. If managed well, the evidence should be visible where it matters most: a steadier investment freedom line, a women’s economic freedom score that rises again rather than plateaus, an inequality curve that bends as youth employment expands, and a legal freedom profile that reflects not just order in the streets but fairness in the courtroom. That is the trajectory Ghana can reasonably aim for in the decade ahead, and it is within reach.

about the author

Joseph Asunka is the CEO of Afrobarometer, a pan-African survey research organization that conducts public attitude surveys on governance and social issues across the continent. His research interests are in governance, democracy, and political economy of development. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of California at Los Angeles.

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Against a global backdrop of uncertainty, fragmentation, and shifting priorities, we invited leading economists and scholars to dive deep into the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries around the world. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

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1    Center for Democratic Development, Afrobarometer Round 10 Survey in Ghana, 2024, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Ghana-summary-of-results-Afrobarometer-R10-22april25.pdf (see pages 30, 32, and 33 of the summary of results tables).

2    For causal evidence that domestic observers in Ghana’s 2012 elections reduced fraud and violence at monitored stations and altered parties’ manipulation strategies, see Joseph Asunka et al.,  “Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies,” British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 1 (2019): 129–51.

3    See the Afrobarometer report on public trust in institutions here: https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/AD891-PAP20-Africans-trust-in-key-institutions-and-leaders-is-weakening-Afrobarometer-31oct24.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

4    Center for Democratic Development, “Ghanaians Decry Widespread Corruption, Afrobarometer Survey Shows,” news release, February 14, 2025, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/R10-News-release-Ghanaians-decry-widespread-corruption-Afrobarometer-14feb25.pdf.

5    Ghana Round 10 Summary of Results, April 22, 2025, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Ghana-summary-of-results-Afrobarometer-R10-22april25.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

6    According to an Afrobarometer survey in 2022, 85 percent of Ghanaians support tighter regulations of natural resource extraction. See Center for Democratic Development, “Ghanaians Call for Tighter Regulation of Natural Resource Extraction,” news release, November 8, 2022, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/R9-News-release-Ghanaians-call-for-tighter-regulation-of-natural-resource-extraction-Afrobarometer-bh-7november22.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

7    Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny, Shannon van Wyk-Khosa, and Joseph Asunka, “Africa’s Youth: More Educated, Less Employed, Still Unheard in Policy and Development,” Afrobarometer, November 15, 2023, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/AD734-PAP3-Africas-youth-More-educated-less-employed-still-unheard-Afrobarometer-13nov23.pdf.

8    Elorm Ntumy, “Green Ghana Day: A Chance to Turn the Tide on Deforestation,” UN Capital Development Fund, 2021, https://www.uncdf.org/article/6857/green-ghana-day.

9    See Joseph Asunka and E. Gyimah-Boadi, “People-Centered Development: Why the Policy Priorities and Lived Experiences of African Citizens Should Matter for National Development Policy,” Foresight Africa 2025–2030, May 13, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/people-centered-development-why-the-policy-priorities-and-lived-experiences-of-african-citizens-should-matter-for-national-development-policy/.

The post Delivering justice and jobs is the real test of Ghana’s storied democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-g20-is-moving-forward-on-global-ai-governance-and-the-us-risks-being-left-out/ Tue, 02 Dec 2025 13:07:25 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=890515 The leaders’ declaration adopted at the recent Group of Twenty Summit in South Africa offers a new vision of the future of artificial intelligence.

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]]> Something notable happened in Johannesburg late last month, although it drew limited attention in Washington: Many of the world’s major economies signaled a growing alignment around how artificial intelligence (AI) and data should be approached—not primarily as instruments of geopolitical competition, but as vehicles for inclusive and sustainable development. The Group of Twenty (G20) leaders’ declaration, adopted despite uneven participation among several countries, reflects an important shift in how states are positioning themselves on AI governance. It offers a snapshot of an emerging global conversation that increasingly links AI to development goals and digital equity.

And the United States was not part of that moment.

The US delegation did not attend the Johannesburg summit and declined to join the declaration—a decision that stemmed in part from concerns about the host nation and broader disagreements with aspects of the process. And the United States is making AI a focus of the G20 summit it is hosting next year, an indication that it has not ruled out collaboration. Still, this year’s absence carried symbolic weight. It suggested a narrowing US appetite to engage multilaterally at a time when many governments are moving quickly to shape the rules and norms surrounding transformative technologies. Other capitals may reasonably interpret this as an opening: If Washington steps back from these discussions, others will step forward.  

And many did.

The G20’s digital agenda this year went further than any previous summit in knitting together AI governance with sustainable development. What emerged from Johannesburg was a clear premise: AI is not just a commercial or security asset; it is a public good, one that must be governed collectively. Countries from South Africa to Brazil to India insisted that data governance, ethical guidelines, and inclusive digital infrastructure are not luxuries—they are developmental necessities.

What came out of Johannesburg wasn’t the usual tech-salon optimism or Western policy jargon. It was the voice of a world determined to stop the next wave of innovation from hard-wiring the injustices of the last. For example, the declaration insisted that AI must be “human-centered” and “development-oriented,” backed by trustworthy data governance—not just for privacy, but as the backbone of equitable AI. It called for digital public infrastructure and real capacity-building for countries long pushed to the margins of the digital economy. And it linked information integrity directly to democratic resilience. It aligned itself with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO’s) ethical AI framework and the United Nations’ resolutions on equitable technology.

Call it whatever you want: multilateralism, solidarity, or simple common sense. But the message was unambiguous. A broad group of the world’s largest economies came together to say that AI must serve humanity, not just the handful of companies and countries capable of building it.

The United States still has avenues to re-engage—not by dictating outcomes, but by participating as a genuine partner.

What makes the US absence so striking is that for decades it was the United States that championed precisely these kinds of conversations. US diplomats helped build the global internet governance system through international multilateral and multistakeholder fora, such as the Internet Governance Forum. American civil society was instrumental in pushing human rights into digital debates. American universities trained the researchers shaping AI ethics. Yet today, as major economies explore AI’s developmental dimensions, the United States is largely outside the room.

The US administration’s current approach to AI—marked by a preference for domestic industrial strategy and selective bilateral partnerships—reflects a hardening belief that multilateral governance is either futile or dangerous. In too many parts of Washington, there is a sense that global cooperation simply helps China; that multilateral institutions dilute US influence; and that if the United States leads on innovation, it doesn’t need to lead on rules.

This is a profound misreading of how power works in the digital age.

It is true, of course, that the United States remains the world’s AI frontrunner. Its companies build the most advanced models and its research institutions are unmatched—at least for the time being. But technological dominance without normative influence is brittle. Governance frameworks—data standards, safety norms, ethics principles—shape markets and behavior as much as silicon and compute. If the rest of the world agrees on a vision for AI grounded in development, inclusion, and human rights, and the United States is not part of that process, then Washington risks becoming a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker.

Some observers are already calling Johannesburg a win for China. There is some truth to that. Beijing has long argued that developing countries deserve a larger voice in global tech governance, with Chinese President Xi Jinping criticizing the idea of AI as a “game of rich nations,” a theme emphasized in Chinese state media coverage. And China’s investments in digital infrastructure across the Global South give it clear geopolitical advantages. With Washington absent, Beijing’s narrative—centered on equity, development, and multilateral dialogue—faces fewer obstacles.

But focusing solely on China misses the bigger story. Johannesburg was not a Chinese diplomatic triumph. It was a Global South diplomatic triumph. India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and others played central roles in shaping the digital agenda. They were not passive recipients of a Chinese vision; they were co-authors of something genuinely new: a multilateral AI framework that reflects their own developmental priorities. This agency was highlighted not only in the declaration but also in the reporting across the Global South, including South Africa’s official summit briefings.

None of this means the United States has been written off as an ally. But it does reflect a growing impatience among other states. Adopting the declaration without US support was not a rebuke; it was a recognition that global cooperation cannot wait for universal participation. A generation ago, such a move would have been unlikely. Today, it feels increasingly normal.

What should worry Washington most is that this shift comes at the precise moment when AI is beginning to reshape the global economy in ways as profound as industrialization. The International Monetary Fund estimates that AI could boost global growth by nearly a full percentage point, transforming labor markets, education, healthcare, and agriculture. It could concentrate power or democratize it. And the rules that govern these transformations are being written now.

To be clear, G20 declarations are nonbinding and often aspirational. Implementation will depend on infrastructure, innovation ecosystems, and the particular needs of member states. Still, the fact that the Johannesburg declaration so explicitly anchors AI within the sustainable development agenda—at a moment when US alignment with that agenda is often questioned—signals a meaningful shift in global positioning.

By staying home, the United States is making a bet that it can shape these norms later, through market dominance alone. But history suggests otherwise. Governance norms, once set, are sticky. They embed themselves in institutions, standards, and expectations. They shape how technologies are built and how they spread. And they rarely bend to accommodate a latecomer—even a powerful one. 

It is telling that, while the world was forging a collective path in Johannesburg, Washington was charting a very different course at home with the launch of the Genesis Mission—an ambitious drive to harness AI for domestic innovation and national competitiveness. It’s a bold investment, but one that risks reinforcing a US approach to AI that is inward-looking and self-referential at the very moment the rest of the world is moving toward shared governance and collective benefit.

But retreat is not destiny. The United States still has avenues to re-engage—not by dictating outcomes, but by participating as a genuine partner. The G20 declaration did not emerge in a vacuum; it builds on existing foundations the United States helped create, including the Group of Seven’s Hiroshima AI principles and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) AI framework. Those earlier initiatives emphasized trustworthy, rights-based AI—but they lacked a deep developmental dimension. Johannesburg extends the trajectory, integrating ethical safeguards with the practical realities of inclusion and infrastructure.

If Washington wants to regain its normative footing, it can start by showing up. The upcoming India AI Impact Summit in February 2026—already gaining momentum as a convening of Global South digital priorities—offers a stage where the United States can listen rather than lecture, and even align itself with the developmental intent now shaping global AI norms. And with the United States set to host the G20 next year, it has a rare chance to reset: to bring the existing principles into conversation with the Johannesburg framework rather than treating them as competing visions.

The choice ahead is not between US power and multilateral governance. It is whether the United States can recognize that power now depends on multilateral governance—on shaping shared norms, not merely exporting products. Much of the world has signaled that AI must be human-centered, equitable, and globally accessible. The question is whether Washington is willing to take its seat—not at the head of the table, but at the table at all.

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Konstantinos Komaitis, PhD, is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Democracy + Tech Initiative at the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab).

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/mali-is-at-a-turning-point-that-risks-a-disastrous-domino-effect/ Tue, 25 Nov 2025 18:52:06 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=890455 A JNIM seizure of power, though less likely, is possible—and threatens to turn Mali into Africa’s Afghanistan.

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]]> Mali’s military regime may be on the brink of collapse after a months-long siege of Bamako by al-Qaeda aligned terrorists, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). A major nationwide fuel crisis in the landlocked state, due to a blockade (which JNIM expanded on November 1) of fuel imports that must travel along major highways patrolled by militants, forced Mali to close schools from late October to mid-November. On November 7, France joined the United States and United Kingdom in urging their citizens to leave the country, while the US embassy evacuated non-emergency personnel and families.

On November 18, the United Nations (UN) secretary general briefed the UN Security Council on “a moment of profound urgency” and the risk of “a disastrous domino effect” across West Africa and the Sahel. The ongoing blockade is an escalation by JNIM, with the group extending its reach further south than ever before. It is possible that the blockade forces the junta, led by Mali’s President Assimi Goïta, to the negotiating table, or in a replay of 2012 events, militant advances could provoke a coup d’état. A JNIM seizure of power, though less likely, is possible—and threatens to turn Mali into Africa’s Afghanistan, similar to the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021, where terrorists can train, operate, and plan freely in a safe haven.  

How did the situation arrive here? And what are the implications of a jihadist takeover in Mali? A JNIM takeover in Mali would represent the first time an al-Qaeda affiliate had taken power in a country, with major regional and underappreciated global implications. This strategic turning point in Mali’s decade-long insurgency could, in the short term, mark the beginning of the end of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, as well as Russian influence in the region. In the long term, a JNIM regime heightens risks of transnational terror.

A jihadist takeover is now on the board

Since 2012, Mali has suffered three military coups (in 2012, 2020, and 2021) and an escalating separatist-turned-Islamist insurgency. Domestic insecurity contributed to growing public and military unrest that led to the ouster of two democratically elected presidents, Amadou T. Touré and Ibrahim B. Keïta.

Attempts to restore democracy and stability have only had temporary successes since. In 2012, major population centers fell to Islamists and Tuareg rebels who sought to establish a regime in the north (sometimes referred to as the “Azawad” by some northern groups). French intervention with Operation SERVAL in 2013 saved Mali’s government and prevented extremists from moving further south on Bamako. The UN launched the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in 2014 to bolster stabilization efforts. 

In 2017, a conglomerate of four smaller organizations, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), merged to form JNIM. Problematically, the security situation worsened in spite of the presence of UN and French forces, prompting calls for the West to leave Mali after the 2020 and 2021 coups. Ultimately, both France and the UN withdrew their forces, as Malian protestors waved Russian flags and called for Moscow’s support. They got it. By 2022, the Russian private military Wagner Group became Mali’s principal security partner. Human rights abuses and armed conflict only increased.

In 2024, Mali was ranked fifth among countries most affected by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index. Armed conflict in Mali caused at least 1,900 fatalities last year, the third-highest figure on record (behind 2022 and 2023). JNIM expanded its geographical reach in central, northeast, and southern Mali. With the army and Wagner Group unable to protect many communities, pro-government Dozo militias have mobilized for self-defense across central Mali, often exacerbating insecurity. Army and Dozo operations to combat the fuel blockade brought record levels of violence and mass atrocities to Mali’s Segou and Sikasso regions last month.

The beginning of the end of the Sahel alliance

Burkina Faso and Niger have similar stories—a poor security environment as a result of JNIM and ISIS-Sahel attacks, military coups, and a fragile post-coup political environment as juntas repudiated Western security assistance and turned to Russian forces (initially Wagner Group, which morphed into Russia’s Africa Corps).

In September 2023, the three countries withdrew from the long-standing regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and in its place established the AES, a defense pact to defeat jihadists and maintain power. The fall of Bamako would lead one of three core members to leave the Sahel alliance; the rump Burkina-Niger axis would be imperiled and on the defensive.

A setback for Russia in the Sahel

Although JNIM sees itself as an alternative to “puppets of the West,” a JNIM takeover would first and foremost see Russia’s star over the Sahel dim. JNIM, which has been fighting Russian mercenaries for years, will not be lining up to deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The failure of the AES and Russia to defend Mali serves as a cautionary tale that Russian intervention often exacerbates conflicts on the ground. Ditching security cooperation with Western democracies for Russia’s Africa Corps in the name of national sovereignty may have been popular, but it is a losing strategy.

Russia’s influence across the African Sahel has expanded since 2017, with Russian forces arriving in Burkina Faso in January 2024 and Niger in May 2024. Russia will not receive such invitations from others at this rate.

Inviting the French back in may be out of the question in light of public opinion in the Sahel on French intervention, but regime change in Mali by either a rival military faction or JNIM extremists might provide a window of opportunity for the United States to bolster cooperation with eager states outside of the Sahel alliance—especially among the West African littorals and Mali’s neighbors. 

Risks of state-sponsored terrorism in Africa

If there is one group to watch on the continent other than al-Shabaab (one of al-Qaeda’s most competent branches that once had a pilot in flight training for a 9/11-style attack), it’s JNIM. If it were to capture the state apparatus in Mali, the country could easily become a haven for jihadists in the region and become a leading state sponsor of terrorism on the continent, much like Sudan became after Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood affiliate National Islamic Front) came to power following a 1989 coup.

Many terrorist groups in Africa that have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda senior leadership or ISIS remain fixated on local grievances despite rebranding—but JNIM has the potential to evolve given its al-Qaeda identity is baked into its roots. JNIM’s DNA is comprised in part of an organization, AQIM, that, despite also having local gripes, had leadership (though now deceased) that fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and had historical links to Osama bin Laden. JNIM maintained its allegiance to al-Qaeda senior leadership and maintained AQIM’s relevance and reach in the Sahel with a newer, larger, and more lethal brand under the leadership of Iyad al-Ghali.

Countries beyond the Sahel could become targets, and JNIM could expand its area of influence. At the end of October, JNIM claimed responsibility for its first attack in Nigeria, which killed a Nigerian soldier. It is worth noting that a Boko Haram spinoff, Ansaru, operates not terribly far from where this attack occurred—this group was once believed to have a connection to AQIM, though to what extent is unclear.

Bamako faces a stronger enemy than ever, but unlike in 2013, it now lacks Western support to defeat it. The African Union offers rhetorical support, but no boots on the ground. Military support from ECOWAS seems like the only plausible intervention. Despite the Sahel alliance rebuking Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso’s membership earlier this year, ECOWAS offered to keep the door for reengagement open. If there is a lifeline, Bamako should grab it. If left unchecked, JNIM could grow bolder, bigger, acquire additional affiliates, and, one day, sponsor or enable operations beyond the region.

Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University.

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état, which was named one of the best historical materials published in 2022–2023 by the American Library Association.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/el-fasher-is-only-the-latest-wake-up-call-to-the-genocide-unfolding-in-sudan/ Tue, 25 Nov 2025 18:46:14 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=890375 Sudan’s civil war has become one of the world’s deadliest crises—and the massacre in El Fasher exposes a genocide unfolding in plain sight. As regional powers fuel the war, millions face famine, displacement, and systematic violence.

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]]> Last week, US President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that Sudan “has become the most violent place on Earth” and that he and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had talked about the United States using its influence to “bring an immediate halt to what is taking place in Sudan.”

Such a statement comes after unproductive attempts by Washington to mediate the conflict. It also isn’t clear how the president would bring a halt to the situation, since both sides in the fighting are supported by US partners. But Trump is waking up to the reality of what is happening in Sudan—and he’s not the only one.

On October 27 this year, two and a half years into the Sudanese civil war, the international community seemed to finally grasp that a genocide was unfolding in front of its eyes. After enduring an eighteen-month blockade marked by relentless drone strikes, the city of El Fasher, the final major urban center in Sudan’s North Darfur state outside the grip of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was overrun. The RSF is the paramilitary faction that has been at war with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since April 2023.

Once the group pushed into El Fasher, reports and footage circulating across social media and television revealed widespread killings of civilians. Around 1,500 people were killed and some ninety thousand displaced, with another fifty thousand fleeing violence in the neighboring North and South Kordofan provinces, according to the Sudan Doctors Network and the United Nations.

El Fasher had long been one of the most violent fronts in the devastating conflict between Sudan’s national army and the RSF. In April, the paramilitary group had intensified its offensive on the city, shortly after being driven out of the capital, Khartoum.

The world’s most serious humanitarian crisis

For years, the genocide unfolding in Sudan barely registered on the world’s radar. The international community remained more focused on crises in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine. But the fighting and killing in Sudan never stopped.

In a country in tatters, where there is no systematic record of the dead, casualty estimates vary. Some sources suggest that the number hovers somewhere around 150,000. However, human rights organizations believe that the real toll of the civil war is likely much higher. The conflict has displaced about fourteen million people out of a population of fifty-one million. Half of them are refugees in neighboring countries. As of April 2025, twenty-five million Sudanese were facing acute famine—and according to Doctors Without Borders, over 70 percent of children under the age of five were acutely malnourished. Among those who fled El Fasher, 35 percent suffered from “severe acute malnutrition.”

With severe damage to its hospitals and water supply, Sudan now faces one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises—one that some experts say even eclipses the emergencies in Gaza and Ukraine. Still, El Fasher is not the first, but merely the latest genocidal campaign in the country.

Naming the genocide

Engaging in war crimes and crimes against humanity, RSF soldiers have carried out child abductions, mass rape, sexual slavery, and village burnings for years, mostly in Darfur in western Sudan. Even as far back as 2001, the predecessor of the RSF—a militia known as the Janjaweed—repeatedly looted homes and engaged in gang rape in the region. Between 2003 and 2008, the group killed hundreds of thousands of non-Arab civilians. The campaign displaced around three million people and was described as a “genocide” by US President Joe Biden just before leaving the White House and as a “ethnic cleansing” by international observers. Against this background, Darfur is not a newly emerging hotspot. Home to several long-persecuted non-Arab tribes—Fur, Masalit, Berti, and Zaghawa—it is, in fact, again becoming one.  

The Zaghawa, who are the majority group in El Fasher, rallied to the army in late 2023 after the RSF committed massacres against the Masalit and other non-Arab communities in the city of El Geneina in West Darfur. In a report released in May 2024, Human Rights Watch documented these killings as ethnic cleansing. The report cited the testimony of a seventeen-year-old boy who described the murder of twelve children and five adults from several families: “Two members of the RSF… tore the children from their parents and, as the parents began to scream, two other members of the RSF shot and killed the parents. Then they piled the children up and shot them. They threw their bodies into the river, along with their belongings.”

African apathy—and cynical regional powers

With its paltry communiqués, a powerless African Union has, for two years, contented itself with calling for an end to the fighting or expressing its concern about the humanitarian crisis, without ever sending a single African head of state to the front lines in Khartoum or to visit the victims of the El Geneina massacre.

In a press release marking two years of conflict, Amnesty International noted that “the world has only contributed 6.6% of the funds needed to address the humanitarian catastrophe raging in the country.” Observers usually recommend enforcement of the arms embargo, increased emergency humanitarian aid, and justice for the victims. However, there is one issue on which the United Nations Security Council and the mediators remain discreetly, if not embarrassingly, silent: the armed support that the belligerents receive from regional powers.

Egypt, Iran, Turkey, China, the UAE, and even Russia and Ukraine have all turned their attention to Sudan, siding either with the SAF or the RSF. Drones, gold, military intelligence, and mercenaries are all being used to intensify the violence of the war, while the meddling regional powers deny any involvement. Motivations for their involvement include securing the Nile’s waters, controlling the eight hundred kilometers of Sudanese Red Sea coastline, and the mineral resources of eastern Sudan. Sudan has also accused Chad and Kenya of being parties to the conflict. At the London Sudan Conference on April 15, the second anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef reiterated these allegations.

Clearly, the complex web of geostrategic interests in the region makes any mediation difficult, with Sudan even considering taking action against the UAE before the International Court of Justice for supplying the RSF with weapons.

The people as a solution

As it stands, Sudan is trapped in a dangerous regional power play and is threatened with partition. Should the country fall apart, this would not only destabilize the African continent but also endanger the exceptional Sudanese cultural heritage.

Any solution in Sudan must run through its civil society and, ultimately, its people. They are strong in part because of—and shown by—their history. With eight borders and a geostrategic position between the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, Sudan is a crossroads of African cultures, religions, and civilizations. The country still bears a name that means “land of the Blacks,” despite the attempts to erase its African roots carried out by the Islamist regime of long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir. Sudan, which rivaled ancient Egypt, eventually conquered and ruled the Egyptian throne, becoming the twenty-fifth dynasty of pharaohs. All this happened a long time ago, under Black African leadership, before Christians and Muslim Arabs expanded their influence in the country.  

This history and legacy help explain the political resilience of the Sudanese people and the dynamism of Sudan’s civil society. Bashir’s ousting in 2019 would not have been possible without democratic resistance, embodied by civic organizations such as the Sudanese Professionals Association, the nonviolent Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, and the grassroots Girifna movement.

Today, as in the past, the Sudanese people—rather than an apathetic international community or meddling regional powers—could once again be the decisive force for change. Empowering civil society and grassroots organizations should therefore be the starting point for any diplomatic initiative.

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Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dispatch-from-south-africa-the-g20s-center-of-gravity-continues-to-shift/ Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:52:15 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=889856 Emerging markets are building coalitions, designing financial tools, and articulating visions for multilateral reform with growing clarity and confidence.

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]]> JOHANNESBURG—This wasn’t South Africa’s first “T20.” The country has staged some of cricket’s most dramatic Twenty20 (abbreviated as T20) matches—packed stadiums, high stakes, and global attention on Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban. In the opening session of the November 13–14 meetings, Alvin Botes, South Africa’s deputy minister of international relations and cooperation, nodded to that sporting record but noted that this T20 belonged to think tanks instead of to cricket. This one focused not on bowlers and wickets but on the future of global economic governance.

Two weeks ago, I was in Johannesburg for South Africa’s Think20 (T20) Summit, the policy engagement group that informs the Group of Twenty (G20) leaders. The meeting came at a critical moment: the final year in a four-year cycle of Global South G20 presidencies. What I heard was a clearer, more assertive articulation of expectations—alongside pointed frustrations.

That assertiveness played out days later at the G20 Summit itself. South Africa secured adoption of the 122-point Leaders’ Declaration at the outset of the meeting, an uncommon step in G20 practice. The declaration proceeded without US endorsement but with broad support from other members. For the first G20 held in Africa, the early adoption was significant. It reflected an emerging-market cohort more willing to manage processes and shape outcomes on its own terms.

Here is what I heard on the ground in Johannesburg: 

US economic leadership remains unpredictable but indispensable

Throughout the week, I heard consistent concern about the stability and rules of the global economic order. Participants described US policy tools—from tariffs and export controls to financial sanctions—as being deployed more frequently, with shorter notice and fewer clear guardrails, creating spillovers that materially affect emerging-market stability. The T20 communiqué’s emphasis on reducing reliance on a single dominant currency, for example, reflects some of these concerns.

And yet, no one argued that the system can function without the United States. The Johannesburg declaration’s focus on adaptation finance, debt sustainability, and critical minerals still leans heavily on institutions where US support is essential. The goal is not to abandon the existing system, but to diversify risk within it and push for more transparent, rules-based, and reliable engagement from Washington.

AI as the new fault line

Sessions on artificial intelligence (AI) and the digital economy revealed a different but related imbalance. There was a shared recognition that the global AI ecosystem is highly concentrated: compute capacity, high-quality datasets, and advanced model development sit in a handful of countries and firms.

For emerging markets, this raises two concerns. First, dependence on foreign technology and infrastructure. Second, governance frameworks that were largely designed elsewhere and may not reflect their development priorities. Speakers argued that current global AI frameworks reflect advanced-economy risk profiles and regulatory debates, not the realities of countries still building basic digital infrastructure. Several participants called for open-source models, stronger regional collaboration, and domestic data-governance frameworks that better protect their interests.

AI is no longer a niche technical issue in these conversations. It is now firmly part of debates on industrialization, labor markets, and sovereignty.

A more coordinated Global South posture

The current presidency cycle has widened the G20 agenda to include development-finance reform, climate adaptation, and inclusive growth—areas emerging markets have long prioritized. Speakers emphasized that they are not simply responding to external pressures but setting agendas and building coalitions.

Africa is no longer framed as peripheral to global affairs. European participants described the continent as essential to the energy transition and supply-chain diversification. For both the United States and China, Africa has become a central arena of strategic competition. Participants argued that this attention can be turned into leverage, particularly as Africa is the center of critical-minerals supply chains.

Infrastructure and connectivity offered one of the clearest tests of this shift. Participants consistently argued that Africa needs better transport, energy, and digital links, but there was far less agreement on who should build them and on what terms. Frustration persists that many Western-backed corridors still primarily facilitate extraction and export of raw materials rather than supporting domestic industrial capacity. As one participant noted, Africa is “more connected to the global economy than to itself.” The core question was not how to supply more minerals to global markets, but how to capture more value within their own borders.

That leverage was visible in Johannesburg. The G20 Leaders’ Declaration and the new critical-minerals framework both emphasize “resilient” and “stable” critical-minerals value chains—reflecting the priorities of import-dependent economies. African officials, by contrast, used their position in those value chains to push for value addition at source and for corridors that knit together African markets under the African Continental Free Trade Area. Whether that leverage translates into concrete outcomes depends on a G20 system that is already overextended.

The leaders’ declaration also exposed a structural problem. While the G20 agenda keeps expanding, the willingness to deliver on commitments appears to be shrinking. The forum’s scope has evolved—infrastructure and critical minerals are now core macroeconomic issues, but they sit alongside debt, trade, and financial regulation on an increasingly crowded agenda, all competing for limited political capital and delivery capacity. That the declaration was adopted at all, and at the outset of the summit, sets an important precedent as the presidency rotates again in 2026. But it also raises a harder question: Can the G20 meaningfully tackle an ever-expanding list of priorities, or will it be forced to pivot to a more focused agenda?

Next up is the United States

The upcoming rotation presents an unusual opening. In its G20 presidency in 2026, the United States could lead on issues such as debt transparency, financial innovation, and energy security—areas where US interests align with broader G20 concerns about productivity and structural reform.

What stood out in Johannesburg is that, despite deepening geopolitical divisions, G20 members still face common economic challenges. Rising debt burdens, energy-security pressures, technological disruption, and climate adaptation affect all members, even as they diverge on solutions. That reality gives every major power a stake in keeping the G20 as a venue where these debates continue. Whether the G20 can maintain its relevance will depend on how those powers respond to emerging-market expectations and on whether they can still identify practical areas of coordination even as broader consensus frays.

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Alisha Chhangani is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Note: The author’s visit to Johannesburg was sponsored by the South African T20 secretariat.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/after-a-lackluster-g20-in-south-africa-trump-can-take-the-group-back-to-basics-in-2026/ Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:08:14 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=890363 A 2026 agenda of economic and financial stability could refocus the group and make it more relevant.

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]]> One memorable impression left by the 2025 Group of Twenty (G20) Summit under South Africa’s presidency was the empty chairs: six leaders—from the United States, China, Russia, Nigeria, Mexico, and Argentina—were absent. Among these, the United States’ nonappearance was perhaps the most notable, since it is scheduled to host the group in 2026. While other countries sent lower-level representatives to the summit, Washington boycotted this year’s G20 since the beginning, skipping the ministerial preparatory meetings leading up to the November 22-23 summit. 

This wasn’t just about the Trump administration’s fraught relations with the South African government. Washington strongly objected to the G20 themes selected by the host—Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability. It also objected to the wide-ranging agenda, which included climate change and global wealth inequality, and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent complained that “the G20 has become the G100” due to the large number of invited countries (twenty-two nonmembers were invited). The United States also warned against the G20 issuing a statement at the end of the summit, arguing that given its objections, there is no consensus in the group. US President Donald Trump has even said that South Africa should not be in the G20 anymore.

Meeting participants agreed to issue a declaration at the beginning of the summit instead of the traditional concluding statement, although Argentina said that it did not endorse it. While South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and others have pointed to the declaration as proof of a successful G20 Summit, the declaration more likely reveals the fundamental differences among the group’s members.

So, where does this group go from here?

It’s easier to understand the challenges the 2025 G20 presidency encountered by comparing today’s international circumstances with those surrounding the summits in 2008 and 2009. In the depths of the global financial crisis in 2008, then US President George W Bush elevated the G20—which had started in 1998 as annual meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors in response to the Asian financial crisis—to the level of heads of state or government. Bush did this to move quickly to help coordinate policy measures to quell the crisis. Both the 2008 summit and the G20 Summit in London the following year succeeded in implementing significant and timely stimulus policies, together with pledges not to raise tariffs, to contain the crisis and set the stage for a recovery. Those two G20 summits also launched financial regulatory reforms and the Financial Stability Board to safeguard against future major financial crises. Looking back, it is clear that the factors facilitating the positive outcomes of those G20 summits also included a degree of mutual trust and the perception of common interests and purposes—now largely gone due to geopolitical contention. 

Rebuilding this sense of trust and common purpose will take more than one presidency but—to the relief of many members who fear a total US withdrawal from the G20—it appears that the United States will remain engaged with the group, not least because it will play host in the year ahead. Moreover, early indications are that it will take a “back to basics” approach to its presidency that could prove to be productive. The agenda of successive G20 summits have kept expanding to cover many topical issues, including climate finance, inclusive and sustainable growth, sovereign debt problems and global taxation. These have diluted the G20’s focus, making it difficult to come up with concrete solutions.

Trade tensions represent another longstanding factor behind the G20’s current dysfunction. During his first term, Trump raised tariffs against China to rectify its unfair trade practices. The fact that the second Trump administration has doubled down on tariffs—imposing these and other trade restrictions on most countries to different degrees—poses a challenge for future G20 meetings.

However, as the United States prepares to take over the G20 presidency in 2026, there is a chance that the “back to basics” agenda helps facilitate meaningful exchanges of views. As Bessent recently explained, the agenda currently promises to zero in on “unleashing economic prosperity by limiting, eliminating the burdens of regulations, unlocking affordable energy and pioneering new technologies.” In other words, an agenda of economic and financial stability could refocus the G20 and make it more relevant. At the same time, the G20 must overcome the current lack of mutual trust and shared interests to regain its role as the premier forum for global cooperation and coordination. 

With the right balance of “back to basics” and a willingness to negotiate key issues such as the range of policy measures to promote growth, energy security, and technological innovation, the Trump administration could make the next G20 Leaders’ Summit, scheduled to take place in December 2026 in Doral, Florida, more relevant than the one that just concluded.

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Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South. He is a former managing director at the Institute of International Finance and former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/pinar-dost-joins-strait-talk-at-trt-world-to-discuss-the-g20-summit-in-south-africa/ Tue, 25 Nov 2025 14:13:14 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=896085 The post Pınar Dost joins “Strait Talk” at TRT World to discuss the G20 Summit in South Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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ORIGINAL SOURCE

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This article is the first in a series published by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security exploring the nexus between US security and economic interests across Africa.

On Africa’s southeastern coast along the Indian Ocean, Mozambique sits atop vast reserves of hydrocarbons and critical minerals. The country also controls a vital shipping corridor: the Mozambique Channel. Stretching between the mainland and Madagascar, this passage has become a critical chokepoint for commercial vessels seeking to bypass the pirate-ridden Red Sea.

Long overlooked by US policymakers, Mozambique’s resource wealth and strategic location have now brought it into the spotlight for foreign investment. Yet economic engagement in the country is anything but straightforward, as most of its assets are concentrated in the north—the same region where the Islamic State affiliate ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M) remains active.

For the United States, which increasingly seeks access to critical minerals and strategic resources—and remains committed to counterterrorism—this necessitates a twofold strategy: it must not only build commercial ties with Mozambique, but also strengthen security-sector cooperation to safeguard the country’s stability and economic potential.

From terrorism to trade?

Gas discoveries in the north during the 2010s catapulted Mozambique into the top ranks of global gas producers. Since then, the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) have invested heavily in the country’s energy sector—and particularly in developing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) reserves—and more modestly in projects that support economic stability in northern communities. Today, the combined commitments of ExxonMobil’s Rovuma Basin LNG project and TotalEnergies’ investments in Mozambique exceed the country’s gross domestic product.

In March 2025, EXIM approved a $4.7 billion loan for LNG equipment and services. Similarly, DFC launched several projects, ranging from less than $175,000 to $1.5 billion, aiming to bolster energy security for large LNG ventures and the surrounding communities. Besides forming the basis for mutually beneficial economic engagement, the United States hopes that these investments help build resilience in areas that might otherwise tolerate or even support ISIS-M. Exxon’s and Total’s investments in Mozambique also represent key down payments to ensure a stable supply of non-Russian LNG for the United States and its allies. At the same time, they have already led to increased security coordination between Mozambique and the United States, proving that investment can drive engagement.

Violence in the north puts economic development at risk

Beyond its gas reserves, Mozambique hosts the Balama mine—one of the world’s largest graphite mines—along with several other emerging critical minerals sites. Mozambican graphite is used in steelmaking, nuclear reactors, lithium-ion batteries, and as a lubricant for heavy machinery—all essential to the US industrial base. In addition, new mining concessions continue to be announced across the country.

Yet progress toward exporting Mozambique’s LNG and critical minerals has been severely hampered by insecurity. ISIS-M’s terrorist attacks in the north, which began in 2017, pose a direct threat to major US energy and critical minerals investments in the province of Cabo Delgado. They not only disrupt local governance but also cause mass displacement and casualties. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Mozambique has witnessed 2,162 political-violence events and 6,165 total fatalities since 2017—2,554 of them civilian.

Mozambique was identified as a priority country under the Global Fragility Act (GFA), passed into law during the first Donald Trump administration. Despite that designation, meaningful policy attention and funding have not materialized. Instead, the current administration rescinded $200 million in GFA funds that would have been shared among Mozambique and eight other countries to promote stability near LNG and mining projects. This stands in stark contrast to the nearly $820 million in development assistance that Mozambique received in FY 2024, mostly for health programming.

Building stability through partnership and purpose

The Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) first deployed to Mozambique in 2021 as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission in Mozambique and have since maintained a presence in the north. While imperfect, the RDF presence has helped reduce violence to the point that the TotalEnergies–ExxonMobil consortium recently lifted its force majeure declaration that froze its Cabo Delgado LNG project mid-construction in 2021. The mission—coordinated by Rwanda and SADC—reflects the oft-promoted principle of “African solutions to African problems.” Still, Rwanda’s efforts alone will not stabilize the area.

Given that Mozambique possesses strategic resources highly sought after in the United States and that its terrorist threat is manageable, the US administration—working with Rwanda and in partnership with France, Portugal, and other allies and partners with investments in Mozambique—should pool resources to stabilize the country. Such a diverse group working to promote Mozambique’s security and prosperity—while respecting the country’s sovereignty—would also align with the burden-sharing model the Trump administration aims to advance in its foreign engagements.

To reinforce regionally-led counterterrorism efforts that both preserve Mozambican lives and promote stability around key US investments, the Department of Defense and the State Department should expand security cooperation and security assistance in northern Mozambique—especially because failure to engage risks leaving US firms dependent on insufficient Rwandan support or Chinese security guarantees. US Special Operations Forces, with their unique capabilities in counterterrorism training and civil-military operations, could strengthen Mozambican and regional forces through joint combined exchange training, civil affairs projects, and military information support operations.  

Mozambique could point the way for US engagement in Africa

Combined with the local economic growth that energy and minerals projects bring, such efforts can pave the way for northern communities to no longer view ISIS-M as their only opportunity. Instead, US security investments should help rebuild trust in the state by delivering security, essential services, and livelihoods that reduce the appeal of extremism. Maritime forces from the United States and partners such as India should also conduct freedom of navigation operations in the Mozambique Channel to preserve open access to this vital trade artery. Finally, the State Department’s counterterrorism programs should strengthen community-security force cooperation to protect strategic investments and prevent further terrorist attacks. Security for communities will translate into security for assets. If Washington wants sustainable influence in Africa, it must align stability with shared prosperity.

As global competition for critical resources intensifies, Africa will serve as a testing ground for the fusion of finance and security. Modest, targeted investments in Mozambique’s stability—building on those already made by regional partners—and a focus on value creation represent the clearest example for how US capital can shape a security posture in Africa. Mozambican President Daniel Chapo’s visit to Washington in late October, where he met with US Vice President JD Vance and the chief executive officer of the DFC, underscores this growing convergence of economic and security priorities. As Chapo announced on the sidelines of this year’s United Nations General Assembly, “Mozambique is open for business.”

Indeed, integrated regional solutions supported by measured US engagement can help ensure Mozambique remains a stable and secure partner contributing to the US industrial base. Such a strategy could make the country a model of “security through investment”—a blueprint the United States could apply elsewhere in Africa.

Rose Lopez Keravuori is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, an associate director at Strategia Worldwide, and chair of the board of advisors of GCR Group. She previously served as the director of intelligence at the US Africa Command.

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

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Just before the United Nations’ annual climate conference kicked off in Brazil November 10, three hundred mayors gathered in Rio de Janeiro. C40, a coalition of big-city leaders that has long pushed to be included in decision-making about climate action, hosted the mayors for talks about dealing with the extreme heat, turbocharged storms, and other results of a changed climate. As the summit opened, the conference’s president André Corrêa do Lago stressed “the need to place cities at the center of climate negotiations.”

Is the mayors’ moment here? 

By Peter Engelke

Imagine standing on any street corner in any city center in the world: New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Shanghai, Delhi, Berlin, Dubai, Lagos, São Paulo, or thousands of others. You would see a bustling hive of activity, people conversing, working, selling, buying, playing, demonstrating, shipping, transporting, exercising, building, demolishing, loading, unloading, and a million other things besides. These scenes are both ancient and new: ancient in that they repeat countless similar activities on countless street corners over thousands of years; new in that the massive amounts of energy required by such activities in cities today are transforming the very planet we live upon.

Cities are where most of the world’s population lives, where the vast majority of its buildings, factories, companies, homes, and vehicles are located. They are also a central driver of anthropogenic climate change, accounting for 75 percent of global energy use and 70 percent of global carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions.¹ But they are also where climate solutions will be found. The trick will be in minimizing the first and maximizing the second. As United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres has said, “Cities are where the climate battle will largely be won or lost.”²

If we are to decarbonize the global economy in time to ward off the worst climate impacts, then we are going to have to transform how thousands of cities around the world function, and how billions of people live, work, travel, and entertain themselves in cities.

Are cities up to the challenge of shaping a livable future for billions of people? Will the world’s nation-states enlist these powerful assets in the fight against climate change, helping cities find and scale up workable solutions?

Why cities matter

Cities can be a partner for—or a counterweight to—national governments.

The debate over how to reduce carbon emissions—decarbonization—typically focuses on nations: how China’s emissions stack up against India’s, for instance. Nations have the power as sovereigns to raise funds, direct investment, and drive policy. Yet the world’s national governments have failed to place binding limits on carbon emissions, with the nonbinding nationally determined contributions under the 2015 Paris Agreement being the most successful outcome of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process thus far. Unfortunately (and predictably), there has been little progress implementing those emissions caps: National governments’ current policies are insufficient to reach the Paris Agreement’s target of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels.³ (The 1.5-degree goal is swiftly disappearing as a realistic target. In 2024, the world’s hottest year on record, the global average temperature was 1.6 degrees Celsius higher than preindustrial levels.)⁴ Nor is progress guaranteed, as states’ decarbonization policies can change—including in the wrong direction—with electoral outcomes and shifts in priorities.⁵ The United States, to give a prominent example, scrapped its Paris Agreement commitments to cut emissions when President Donald Trump again withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement on the first day of his second term.

Cities create wealth and power.

There is every reason for national governments to work with city governments on climate, for cities are among the greatest assets that countries have. Cities are an important element of national power: They are, the economist Edward Glaeser argued in his landmark 2011 book, Triumph of the City, gigantic value-adding machines. Why? People live close together in cities. This physical proximity leads to exchange, invention, cooperation, planning, and execution, enabling the formation of institutions—governments, stock exchanges, start-ups, factories, corporations, universities, philanthropies, hospitals, and much more.⁶ Proximity thereby creates wealth, through invention, innovation, collaboration, manufacturing, servicing, and a great many other valuable things besides. The data bear this out: Globally and on balance, the most urbanized countries are the wealthiest, the least urbanized the poorest.⁷

Cities are where most people live.

Although cities are among humanity’s oldest complex creations (the world’s first cities emerged at least five thousand years ago), it was not until recently in historical terms that a truly urbanized world emerged.⁸ Rising fossil fuel use was at the center of this shift. The Industrial Revolution, which captured energy from coal, was the turning point. Starting in northern Europe and expanding outward, the Industrial Revolution enabled mass urbanization, as steam-powered factories pulled workers off the land and into cities.⁹ The city’s appeal today is the same as it was when the revolutionary Boulton & Watt steam engines appeared in Birmingham, England, in the 1770s: Cities, per Glaeser, are where economic opportunities lie.¹⁰

The world is still going through this demographic realignment that began with the Industrial Revolution. In 2022, cities were home to 4.5 billion people, about 57 percent of the global population.¹¹ Those figures will rise for decades to come, by 2050 to nearly 70 percent of the world’s population (6.7 billion city dwellers), with most growth occurring in Asia and Africa.¹²

The five sectors to green up

Cities will need to swiftly cut carbon emissions if global warming is to be limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels, the goal set under the 2015 Paris Agreement, or even 2 degrees given that the 1.5-degree goal in 2025 is already nearly moot.¹³ There are numerous ways in which cities can cut their emissions, including removing fossil fuels from electricity generation and power grids, making buildings more efficient (buildings account for roughly 40 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions), electrifying urban transport, shifting to nonmotorized modes such as the bicycle, reducing waste streams, decarbonizing urban infrastructure, and expanding local carbon sinks such as urban tree cover.¹⁴ This diversity of urban decarbonization can be grouped into five main categories—electricity, buildings, transportation, waste, and carbon sinks and offsets—from which most local emissions are generated.

Examples of urban creativity across these five priority sectors can be found nearly everywhere in the world.

Tokyo in 2010 became the first city in the world to implement a mandatory CO₂ cap-and-trade program, focused on the metropolitan area’s largest CO₂ emitters (factories, large buildings, and so on).¹⁵

Paris is implementing Plan Vélo to substantially increase the share of residents traveling by the greenest mode of travel—the bicycle. The plan will dramatically expand the city’s network of bicycle lanes, prioritize cyclists on streets and at intersections (via traffic lights and other traffic rules), expand bicycle parking throughout the city, and otherwise encourage cycling at the expense of driving.¹⁶

Cape Town is piloting waste-to-energy plants to reduce methane releases from the city’s landfills, with an eventual goal of generating 7-9 megawatts of electricity. For decades, Cape Town has been a sustainability pioneer, having experimented with numerous approaches to reducing the city’s carbon emissions through renewable energy projects.¹⁷

Melbourne is piloting a neighborhood battery system that will store renewable energy generated during the daytime and then release it to communities—residents and small businesses—in the evenings when it is most needed.¹⁸

Medellín has planted thousands of trees and hundreds of thousands of shrubs along “green corridors”—roads and waterways—to cool temperatures in the city during heatwaves.¹⁹

The scale of urban decarbonization at the global level is enormous, given the thousands of cities and billions of structures, vehicles, and people that will be involved if the world’s cities are to be successfully decarbonized. In the building sector alone, new urban construction will have to be much less carbon intensive—projections show that some 40 percent of all buildings that will exist in 2050 are not yet built—while the stock of existing buildings will have to be renovated.²⁰ Global energy demand in buildings continues to rise, owing (mostly) to rapid urbanization in a few world regions—Africa, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific, and Eurasia. Most of the projected growth will occur in emerging economies that lack advanced energy-efficient building codes. However, there is enormous opportunity here as well: The adoption of efficiency codes for new buildings can help all economies, advanced and emerging; make buildings more energy efficient; spur demand for renewable sources of energy; and boost climate resilience by, for example, enabling buildings to better withstand heatwaves.²¹

An important piece of good news here is that local leaders tend to see decarbonization as a positive for their cities, rather than a negative. Decarbonization strategies in cities, if envisioned and implemented smartly, can enhance urban livability, address inequities for historically marginalized communities, reduce climate impacts, improve the local environment, and boost local economic competitiveness all at once. This positivity springs in large part from the pragmatism that abounds in cities. Cities are in constant flux as economic, demographic, environmental, technological, cultural, social, political, and other driving forces change in real time. To stay in office, mayors and city councils must competently anticipate and manage these forces.²²Increasingly, they seem to understand that the creation of a livable, healthy, safe, and sustainable environment buttresses their cities’ economic fortunes. They understand that the global competition for talent requires that their cities offer, all at once, a high quality of life, a clean environment, economic opportunity, and inclusive and competent governance.

In cities, these things are always linked because cities—as Glaeser has written—are where everything happens in one physical place. There is simply no way for local officials to avoid having to manage all these items at the same time. Hence cities are laboratories of policy experimentation, where bold initiatives can be trialed and then adopted, refined, or discarded.

The policymaking behind bus lanes and better building codes

Policy experimentation is commonplace in the world’s cities. In Valencia, Spain, the city government has built a decarbonization agenda around four pillars—energy efficiency, renewable energy, green infrastructure, and sustainable mobility. In each of these areas, Valencia’s efforts have focused on reducing carbon emissions while increasing the city’s livability and economic viability, a trifecta that city leaders insist is the right way to look at the decarbonization problem.²³ While Valencia has been working to reduce emissions, in October 2024 it fell victim to climate-driven disaster. Extreme rainfall generated unprecedented flooding in the city, demolishing parts of it and costing hundreds of lives. The event speaks to the need to build greater urban disaster resilience including through nature-based solutions.²⁴ In Rotterdam, Europe’s busiest port city, energy and shipping companies, local politicians, academics, architects and city planners, and civil society leaders generated the 2019 Rotterdam Climate Agreement, which sought to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by nearly 50 percent by 2030 through a three-pronged strategy: energy efficiency, low-carbon energy generation, and sustainable transportation.²⁵ Six years on, the latest data available from the Port of Rotterdam and surrounding industrial area showed a faster-than-projected drop in greenhouse gas emissions.

In January 2024, New York City began implementing a long-awaited building performance standard, Local Law 97, which requires owners to retrofit their buildings to reduce carbon emissions (buildings generate about two-thirds of New York City’s greenhouse gas emissions).²⁶New York’s regulation, viewed as one of the earliest and most important in the world, was well ahead of the federal government’s policymaking curve.²⁷ This phenomenon is not unusual. A 2022 survey conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development found that 88 percent of cities and regions required higher energy standards in buildings than did their national governments.²⁸

Cities are also banding together. For example, mayors and city councils in Mexico City, Medellín, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, San Salvador, São Paulo, and elsewhere in Latin America have been experimenting with a variety of efforts aimed at decarbonization and environmental protection, in some cases for many years, and have been working together in city-based coalitions to engage on these issues.²⁹

A few of these Latin American cities long have been acknowledged as world leaders—Curitiba, Brazil, for instance, is regarded as one of the world’s most sustainable cities. Starting under the visionary guidance of legendary mayor Jaime Lerner, Curitiba in the 1970s began innovative and highly successful programs focused on green space, environmental education, recycling, and transportation. (Lerner once enlisted hundreds of children to sit upon and paint a newly opened pedestrian street, thereby preventing a motorists’ protest that was planned for the same time on the same street; his creative intervention allowed the people-friendly innovation to survive.)³⁰ Curitiba’s most famous innovation, bus rapid transit, privileged mass transit over cars on the city’s streets and became a model for city planners around the world.³¹

For cities to maximize their individual and collective decarbonization efforts, local and national climate policies should match in a mutually reinforcing cycle. National governments have a critical, even foundational, role to play, through setting performance floors and providing much-needed funding to support local investments of all kinds, including but not limited to infrastructural investments. It is critical that national governments also encourage state and local governments to experiment with their own solutions, as with New York’s Local Law 97.

Synergies between local and national authority are not a given, however. California, for example, long has been empowered under federal Clean Air Act requirements to set its own more stringent automobile emissions standards. Owing to California’s massive consumer market, historically the state’s adoption of stricter emissions standards has driven automobile manufacturers to comply with these tighter standards—an example of a subnational standard leading to national-level improvements the national government might not have been able to achieve on its own.³²Yet the so-called California waiver under the Clean Air Act might be coming to an end. The Trump administration is suing the state of California to end its implementation of more stringent emissions requirements under the waiver.³³

Decarbonization policies are often controversial when they are first proposed and implemented, as New York’s building performance standard has been. This political fact requires city leaders to design inclusive processes that incorporate the views of residents. Attempts to do otherwise will fail on political grounds. Cleveland, for example, has spent years building the groundwork for a broad-based decarbonization strategy that is inclusive of historically marginalized perspectives—the city residents whose neighborhoods were divided by highway construction or lost jobs when factories closed or who live too far from bike lanes or bus stops to benefit from those investments. In conversation, Cleveland’s stakeholders stress that such efforts are difficult and time consuming, yet ultimately rewarding.³⁴When citizens and key stakeholders are systematically consulted, as they have been in Cleveland, Valencia, Rotterdam, and many other places, cities can enjoy sustained progress around a coherent decarbonization agenda.

As nations stall, cities band together

Cities and intercity networks form a parallel global governance architecture, a counterweight to an unreliable international system. Cities therefore constitute a steady presence on the global landscape, a cooperative constant within an international system that is becoming less so. National governments, international institutions, and foreign and security policy communities alike should regard cities and the people who run them—city governments and local stakeholders—as allies in the fight against all manner of international challenges, climate change first among them. Cities bring unique strengths, including creativity, innovativeness, global outlook, and flexibility, to the table in finding positive-sum solutions to concrete problems.

Cities are far from parochial actors focused only on their own issues: Transnational cooperation is a hallmark of urban governance, especially for the world’s largest cities such as New York or Tokyo (but also for many of its smaller ones).³⁵ Cities do not exist in a state of geopolitical competition as do nation-states. China and the United States both have an interest in slowing climate change, but their on-again, off-again bilateral climate diplomacy has been hampered by geopolitical suspicion.³⁶ City governments are freed from existential worry about geopolitical power, allowing them to devote their efforts to pragmatic and cooperative problem-solving across national borders. (Geopolitics does have a hand here, if indirectly. China’s rapid growth to global power starting in the early 1980s was centered on its cities. Now China, in a bid to augment its power via the Belt and Road Initiative, is pouring huge sums into transforming cities from Asia to Europe to Africa.)³⁷

Over the past several decades, local governments have formed numerous city associations dedicated to tackling climate change and other problems at the global level. These include C40 Cities, United Cities and Local Governments, ICLEI–Local Governments for Sustainability, Metropolis, the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, and the Resilient Cities Network.³⁸ These networked associations share best practices, build interurban solidarity, and augment cities’ collective impact within global climate negotiations. For example, two organizations, the Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments and the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities Constituency, formally represent subnational governments within the UN system, including at the UN’s annual climate summits.³⁹

The upshot is that cities and their associations are not vassals but agents in world affairs. As Simon Curtis, a scholar of intercity diplomacy, has written, “Nation-states need quickly to realize the potential of global cities and take steps to empower them to meet the global challenges of the twenty-first century … [by allowing them] more fiscal autonomy and [giving] them a louder, more influential voice in the deliberations of international organizations.”⁴⁰ And individual cities and city networks (along with supportive institutions such as philanthropies) should continue to deepen and expand their cooperative decarbonization efforts.

Channeling Guterres, the climate problem is an urban one. Cities are at the heart of the global economy and therefore at the center of both the problem of climate change as well as its solution. If the world’s cities can be decarbonized, they will deliver what they are supposed to deliver—prosperity and a high quality of life to billions of people—at low ecological cost.

Cities around the world have proven their willingness to innovate in pursuit of these goals. Whether national governments will support their efforts remains an open question—and one on which the planet’s future may hinge.

Peter Engelke is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and its Global Energy Center. He is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

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Articulated buses pull into a terminal in Curitiba, Brazil. Curitiba pioneered bus rapid transit in the 1970s with dedicated bus lanes and protected bus shelters—creating a mass-transit system that reduces car use for much less money than building a new subway or light rail would cost. Video by bydronevideos/Storyblocks

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As the US role in the Sahel is weakening, Turkey’s role is rising. With new defense agreements, increasing diplomatic engagements, and joint economic development projects with new, junta governments that espouse anti-colonial rhetoric in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, Turkey finds itself working in the same theater as the Kremlin to fill the void left after Western forces departed. Turkey’s new trusted status among Sahelian governments and its state-led approach make it one of the nations positioned to influence regional security dynamics during a time when other Western powers are constrained. Although Turkish efforts in the Sahel have been primarily based on its own strategic ambitions and national interests, Ankara’s growing influence offers a rare channel through which the United States and its allies could recalibrate their approaches to the region. 

The Sahel’s break with the West 

Since these coups and the establishment of military juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, France and the United States have faced the annulment of defense agreements in the region, French and US troops have withdrawn from the region, the European Union’s Takuba Force ceased anti-Jihadist operations in Mali, and, in January, Niger revoked a counterterrorism accord with the United States, demanding the withdrawal of 1,000 US troops from the country. The United States has laws that prohibit it from assisting governments that have overthrown democratic governments, including clear guidance from the US State Department against foreign assistance to Niger, and now Washington finds itself without a clear role in the Sahel.

The region’s Western-backed security architecture has collapsed: Three withdrawals (i.e., Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) prompted the dissolution of the Group of Five (G5) for the Sahel. The same three departures from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has left the Sahel searching for new patrons and new strategic frameworks. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, for example, have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a political and defense bloc that rejects old alignments. To fill the new defense void, alternative partners without the baggage of colonial legacy—most notably Russia and Turkey—have stepped in, offering defense cooperation without the governance conditions demanded by the West. 

The United States, which provided humanitarian aid, economic investment, and security forces to the region for roughly a decade prior to the coups, lost much of its ability to advance regional security interests when it was pushed out of the region. Its ability to monitor threats in the region and in neighboring countries like Libya, coordinate strategies with local forces, and access crucial intelligence was significantly degraded. Although US security operations in the region have been constrained by new partnerships, it still has options. Opportunities remain through indirect engagement—particularly with actors that retain both credibility on the ground and diplomatic standing in the West. Turkey is one of the only powers operating in the Sahel that meets both criteria.

​Turkey’s role amid a shrinking Western presence, rising Russian influence

Turkey’s military cooperation in the Sahel draws on nearly two decades of experience positioning itself as a rising power in Africa, rooted in its 2003 ​​​​Strategic Depth​ doctrine and early initiatives like the “Strategy for the Development of Economic Relations with Africa” and the “year of Africa” in 2005—the same year it secured observer status in the African Union. Initially, Turkey relied on soft power, leveraging shared Ottoman heritage, cultural diplomacy, and economic partnerships to expand its influence. However, what began as a soft-power push—through development aid, cultural ties, and embassy openings—has evolved into a defense and infrastructure strategy, especially under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s aim to position Turkey as a leader among emerging powers. Turkish delegations have conducted regular visits to AES capitals, striking arms and infrastructure deals while pursuing bilateral military agreements.  

At the same time, Russia, too, has made swift inroads. It is capitalizing on anti-colonial sentiment and offering support through its largest private military company, the Wagner Group, to provide “training, close protection, and counter-terrorism operations.” Through proxy forces, Russia has gained access to political influence and resource extraction in exchange for security-force training, arms deals, and protection of junta leaders. Russia’s use of proxy forces has allowed it to distance itself from Russian casualties and military failures. 

However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has slowed its operations in the Sahel. Across AES, Russian forces are stretched thin. Despite Russia’s success in stabilizing the Touadéra regime in the Central African Republic in 2021—a conflict that gave Russia defense legitimacy despite the fact that Sahel—Russian forces have largely been unsuccessful. In 2024, fifty-one percent of global terrorism-related deaths took place in the Sahel. This was the deadliest year in the Sahel’s history as the region remains mired in conflict and plagued by violent insurgencies, fragile state institutions, and waning international engagement. 

​​​​In the Sahel, Turkey can play the same role as Russia. Turkey can offer Sahelian militaries affordable, “rapidly deployable” equipment. And Russia, which has been struggling to keep up with military-industrial demands, is an increasingly unreliable partner. Sahelian clients grew more discontented with the Russian proxy forces’ unsuccessful operations and inability to fulfill weapons contracts, and the Wagner Group officially left Mali, announcing on Telegram that its mission was accomplished. In its place, Russia plans to consolidate its troops under the Russian Ministry of Defens​​​​e-backed Africa Corps. Reestablishing connections, building trust, and establishing higher capacity supply lines will take time; meanwhile, alternative partners like Turkey are in place in the Sahel and can take advantage of the Kremlin’s declining foreign-operations capacity. 

In contrast to Russia’s focus on mercenary deployments and ​​​​direct-combat missions, Turkey offers a more varied tool​ ​kit: combining diplomacy, state-to-state defense deals, economic engagement, intelligence sharing, and technology transfers. Turkey’s defense industry, particularly its drone sector, made early moves into the African market, supplying low-cost, high-capability platforms like Baykar’s Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones. These have become cornerstones of AES air power, and are ​​​​​often more cost-effective​ than systems from Iran, Israel, or even Russia. 

Turkey is now the main producer of combat drones for Africa, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (part of the US Department of Defense). In December 2024 Mali received Turkish Akinci drones in addition to its eight TB2 drones; Niger has purchased six TB2 drones, five Karayel-SU drones, and Aksungur drones; and Burkina Faso has purchased at least six TB2s and two Turkish Akinci drones. These drones are managed and operated out of local airbases, like the Niamey air base in Niger or the Bamako Air Base 101 in Mali, and are managed by a “hyper-closed circle” of high-ranking officials. In early April 2025, Mali was also found to be using MAM-T bombs 20 kilometers from its border with Algeria when a Turkish-made Akinci drone was shot down. This was the first time the Malian armed forces were found to be using MAM-T bombs, which are guided, high-explosive fragmentation munitions that can be strapped to Bayrak drones, and are manufactured by Turkish company Roketsan. 

On the ground, Turkey’s engagement increasingly makes up for declining Russian power. Turkish drones and, ​​​​​​reportedly, Turkish-hired Syrian mercenaries disrupt insurgent operations in areas where state forces are absent, helping to alleviate local manpower shortages. ​​​​​Although unconfirmed, Sadat, a private Turkish military contractor often referred to as Erdogan’s “parallel army,” was alleged to have sent more than one thousand Turkish-trained Syrian mercenaries to Niger and Burkina Faso in 2024, ​​​​tasked with protecting mines, petroleum infrastructure, and military installations​. This is not the ​​first time​​ Sadat has been accused of using Syrian ​​mercenaries​​ in foreign conflicts.

Already, Turkey has increased intelligence-sharing capabilities in the region through its intelligence agency, Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, which recently opened a hub in Niger. Its growing network​ of embassies, companies, and security personnel across the Sahel gives Ankara access to critical information, which can influence security operations.

Turkey’s economic expansion in the Sahel

Turkey has slowly expanded its influence in the Sahel by expanding its security operations simultaneously with its commercial agreements. 

While the AES has implicitly distanced itself from former colonial powers through new security partnerships and arms contracts, the three states are also turning to alternative partners for economic support. They had perceived prior Western economic conditions as unfair and are seeking more beneficial economic relationships. After revoking mining licenses and pulling out of economic partnerships with the West, the Sahel now needs new partners to help develop its potentially lucrative energy and raw materials sectors.  

Since the 2010s, Turkey has increasingly engaged with Africa’s energy sector, leveraging its 2017 National Energy and Mining Policy to enhance its energy independence. It has signed agreements with at least seventeen African countries across North, West, and East Africa, as well as the Horn of Africa, focusing on renewables and critical minerals. Trade volumes between Turkey and Africa increased from ​​​​$5.4 billion in 2003 to $40.7 billion in 2022, and a ​​​​growing number of Turkish companies are expanding their operations in Africa. 

Turkey now has greater reason to diversify its imports away from Russia and Iran— given the disruption of trade patterns by conflicts in Ukraine, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East—and toward Africa. The Sahel’s underdeveloped energy sector offers Turkey a foothold in new supply routes and economic opportunities.  

A Turkish energy company has taken a leading role in Mali, supplying 60 megawatts of power and building a heavy fuel oil power plant. Turkish exports to Mali rose from $87 million in 2021 to $111 million in 2023. Similarly, Turkey has boosted trade with Burkina Faso, despite regulatory hurdles in the mining sector. Exports rose from less than $100 million prior to 2020 to $166 million in 2024, reflecting Ankara’s deeper economic engagement with the new military government. 

In the Sahel region, Niger has traditionally been Turkey’s strongest energy partner in the region. Turkey and Niger have signed bilateral mining agreements and oil and natural gas agreements, established a working committee​ to expand economic cooperation, and held leadership-level discussions about infrastructure development projects​ in northern Niger. Turkish firms have been uniquely willing to engage in high-volatility regions, implementing critical infrastructure, energy, and mining projects simultaneously with increased defense cooperation. 

The Sahel’s mineral wealth is critical to Turkey’s industrial ambitions and plans to become a processing hub for critical minerals. Turkey’s defense industry depends heavily on critical minerals used in advanced weaponry, aerospace systems, and batteries and, at the same time, Turkey’s rising clean technology industry has accelerated the need for lithium, nickel, copper, and other raw minerals. While Turkey is beginning to build up its raw mineral processing capabilities in an attempt to limit foreign control over critical supply chains, Ankara is in search of suppliers for these materials.  

With limited domestic reserves and rising industrial needs, Ankara is targeting the region’s large supplies of raw materials. Mali is Africa’s second-largest lithium producer; Niger is a leading exporter of uranium; and Burkina Faso is a major gold supplier. Though Turkey has domestic reserves of tungsten, graphite, and cobalt, access to the Sahel’s minerals enables Turkey to compete in global markets and develop its own processing base. 

Through diplomatic and corporate efforts, Turkey has tried to secure access to gold and uranium in Niger, the world’s seventh-largest producer of uranium; Turkish and Azerbaijani companies have discussed joint mining projects in the Sahel; and, until recently, a Turkish company held the industrial exploitation rights of the largest gold mine and the largest manganese mine in Burkina Faso. Russian companies have likewise expanded their economic presence in the Sahel; Russian companies ​​​​have signed lithium mining deals with Mali, lithium and uranium mining deals with Niger, and deals on nuclear cooperation with Burkina Faso. While Western companies have been sidelined, governments in the Sahel remain open to cooperation with both Ankara and Moscow. Turkey, as a NATO ally that retains the political space to operate in these markets, is a potential counterbalance to Russia’s growing influence while advancing its own strategic and industrial objectives.

Solution-based diplomacy in a security-first landscape

What sets Turkey apart from other external actors—especially Russia—is the diversity of its engagement. Unlike Moscow’s arms-for-access model, which is often viewed as exploitative and destabilizing, Ankara has prioritized a ​​​​multifaceted approach that includes trade, infrastructure, defense, diplomacy, and development. Turkish-African trade spans sectors from textiles to healthcare and energy, and Turkey’s public and private sectors have actively invested in education and capacity building across the continent. This “solution-based” diplomacy contrasts sharply with Russia’s security-first playbook. 

Yet Turkey’s growing presence in contested regions comes with risks. Infrastructure investments in unstable political environments require security guarantees—and that often means greater military involvement. As Ankara deepens its footprint, it must decide whether to align more openly with Russia, or to use its position to mediate and potentially counter Russian influence. 

Turkey is viewed by many African leaders as a reliable, noncolonial partner. This gives Ankara access that Western powers now lack. While Turkey has not publicly aligned with US or European policy in the Sahel, its access and credibility in the region offer an opportunity to bridge the growing gap between Western interests and Sahelian realities. 

If Ankara chooses to leverage this position, it could quietly support Western objectives—sharing intelligence, coordinating security policies, or shaping development strategies that undercut Russian influence. Turkey would not be acting as a Western proxy, but as a sovereign actor leveraging its credibility and access to serve both its own interests and those of the broader international order. In a region where Western engagement is rapidly shrinking, Turkey’s role may become indispensable—not as a rival, but as a crucial partner.

Not a proxy but a pathway: The West’s reentry point in the Sahel

The power balance between Russia and Turkey is markedly different from conflict zones where they stood or stand on opposite sides—such as Syria, Libya, Ukraine, and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. In the Sahel, both powers are engaging the same postcoup regimes—Russia through mercenary-led counterinsurgency and Turkey through state-led arms deals, drone operations, and economic development. They are not in direct confrontation in the Sahel, nor are they locked in zero-sum competition. Instead, they operate in parallel, often in the same theaters and with the same governments, but with divergent methods, capabilities, and long-term goals. 

Parallel engagement between Russia and Turkey raises security concerns for Western powers who have lost their influence in the region, but it also creates a unique opening. While Russian security forces have been largely unsuccessful in their efforts to mitigate threats in the Sahel, Turkey has an opportunity to increase its engagement with local forces. And as the only Western partner force that is directly engaging with the region, Ankara can potentially disrupt Russian influence and coordinate with the West on security strategy. Its access to critical mineral assets, defense infrastructure, and high-level political relationships across the AES bloc can offer the West indirect access to a region from which it has been largely expelled. 

Since President Donald Trump returned to office at the beginning of 2025, both Washington and Ankara have shown renewed willingness to deepen their bilateral partnership on regional matters and cooperate in third countries, most notably Syria. In addition to diplomacy, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Secretary of State Marco Rubio meeting in Washington and Brussels, both capitals have continued demonstrating top-level cooperation on Syria with the trilateral gathering in Riyadh, where Trump and Erdoğan met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, together with the creation of the joint Syria Working Group to further enhance closer cooperation on Syria’s reconstruction and stability efforts. This dynamism and strategic alignment can be a strong foundation for extending the US-Turkey partnership into Africa, where shared interests in stability and security could help reshape the dynamics of great​-​power competition in the region. 

Turkey’s pragmatic foreign policy is not without complications. But in the Sahel, that very pragmatism can work to the West’s advantage. If Washington moves beyond its reflexive skepticism and recognizes Turkey’s intermediary potential, the Sahel could shift from a symbol of Western retreat to a frontier of renewed influence—anchored by a partner that understands and navigates both the streets of Niamey and the corridors of NATO.

Alp Burak Ozen is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

Haley Nelson is a Boren Scholar and a Georgetown University alumna. She is an independent geopolitical consultant with a focus on energy and infrastructure security in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey.

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Executive summary

The rapid adoption of biometric and digital identification systems is transforming governance and public administration across Africa. Promoted as tools to modernize service delivery, enhance electoral integrity, and strengthen state capacity, these systems are becoming central to how identity and citizenship are managed. From national identification schemes and voter registration to border management and SIM card registration, biometrics have become deeply embedded in Africa’s political, social, and economic landscape. 

However, this technological expansion comes with profound risks. Weak legal frameworks, limited oversight, and a growing reliance on foreign vendors have created an ecosystem vulnerable to privacy breaches, state surveillance, and systemic exclusion. Biometric systems increasingly integrate electoral and civil identity data, giving governments vast surveillance capabilities while disenfranchising marginalized groups such as rural communities, migrants, and individuals without foundational IDs. 

The report explores the main use cases driving biometrics and digital identification systems in Africa, focusing on their governance, vendor dynamics, and human rights impacts. Key areas include national identification and civil registration, which provide the foundation for legal identity and access to services; immigration management; elections, where they strengthen voter registration and authentication; and smart city initiatives, which leverage digital IDs for efficient service delivery and urban governance. 

The research reveals that foreign technology firms dominate Africa’s biometric ecosystem; that forty-nine African countries have at least one form of biometric system; and thirty-five out of the fifty-four countries on the continent use biometrics in their election processes. Companies such as Idemia (France), Semlex (Belgium), Veridos (Germany), Thales (France), and Huawei (China) provide the core technology, hardware, and algorithms that underpin these systems. African governments often finance these projects through loans from international institutions like the World Bank, creating dependencies that shape procurement and governance practices. 

While biometric systems are often introduced to improve electoral processes and service delivery, their fragmented rollout forces citizens to repeatedly submit sensitive data across multiple platforms, increasing costs and risk of fraud. Many projects lack transparency, with procurement processes shielded under the guise of national security. Public knowledge of these systems remains low: a sample study in three countries by ICT Works found that only 38 percent of surveyed citizens were aware of their governments’ purchases of biometric, facial recognition, or AI systems, highlighting a significant transparency gap. 

To mitigate these risks, the report offers seven key policy recommendations: 

1. Strengthening independent oversight bodies free from political interference; 
2. Enacting comprehensive data protection laws covering the full life cycle of biometric data; 
3. Ensuring transparent, participatory deployment processes; Integrating human rights due diligence into all projects; 
4. Establishing continuous oversight and remedies for rights violations; 
5. Protecting electoral integrity and preventing the over-integration of ID systems; 
6. Embedding a rights-based governance model rooted in privacy, equality, and non-discrimination. 

The findings underscore that biometric and digital identity systems must not be viewed merely as technical tools for modernization. They are inherently political, with the potential to either strengthen democratic governance or entrench authoritarian control. Without robust reforms, these systems risk becoming instruments of exclusion and surveillance rather than empowerment. 

Sani Suleiman Sani is a policy and research strategist shaping continental dialogue on digital rights, technology governance, and inclusive innovation in Africa. He leads the research portfolio at Paradigm Initiative, where he oversees multi-country studies that inform legislative processes, corporate accountability, and global debates on digital policy.

Thobekile Matimbe is a human rights lawyer and Senior Manager Partnerships and Engagements at Paradigm Initiative (PIN) where she dedicates her skills to the advancement of digital rights and inclusion in Africa and beyond.

Kenton Thibaut is a senior resident China fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), where she leads China programming for the Democracy + Tech Initiative, and a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

 Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Democracy+Tech Initiative. She specializes in the complex interplay between technology and political dynamics. 

This report was made possible with support from the Embassy of Denmark in the United States. The Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) would also like to thank the Paradigm Initiative for contributing writing and research.

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Executive summary

China’s economic rise and its integration with Africa have catalyzed new infrastructure and industries across the continent. But this also now exposes African countries to negative ripple effects from changes in China’s domestic economy. As China’s investment- and manufacturing-centric economic model loses steam, African officials and policymakers will need to plan for growth and economic transformation, with an understanding that their largest trade and investment partner might look very different than it has over the past decade.  

This report investigates how different projections of China’s economic growth and structure over the next five years (through 2030) will affect trade and financial engagement with the African continent, and what these outcomes will mean for decision-makers. It deploys a novel framework to estimate how economic flows between China and Africa shift under different growth scenarios. To account for Africa’s diverse economies—spanning some of the world’s least developed countries as well as high-income financial centers—this analysis extends to country groups.

No growth scenario in China will benefit all of Africa’s nations equally. But on balance, the best long-term outcome for Africa is likely one in which China accepts the cost of reform to implement slower, but more stable, growth. While countries could previously envision the net benefits of close trading relationships with China in 2030, trade now presents both opportunity and threat: opportunity in the form of cheap imports, but complication in the form of persistent trade imbalances and overcapacity in manufacturing. Under any growth scenario, finance from China’s banks and investors will continue to decline—whether sharply or gradually—as China’s domestic financial system evolves.

Chapter 1 surveys economic conditions in Africa as of 2025, as well as how commodity markets and external imbalances make many African countries vulnerable to shifts in the global growth environment and in their economic relationships with China. Even countries with limited direct exposure to China are likely to feel the impact of a slowdown via regional economic linkages and the effect of China’s exports and imports on global prices.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of trade and financial flows between China and Africa. While the importance of individual flows varies, a few channels account for the majority of economic value: goods trade, commercial and development finance, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Baseline growth rates of these flows are used to inform projections in the later analysis.

Of these, the goods trade represents the largest scope of bilateral engagement between China and the African continent, approaching $300 billion annually as of 2024, or about 10 percent of Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP). However, imbalances driven by structural characteristics of the two economies have intensified in recent years. Despite recent attempts to diversify trade, African countries still have large trade deficits, mostly exporting commodities to China and importing manufactured goods. China’s mode of finance mixes concessional and commercial motives, and new financial flows are slowing as lenders look to control risk. The result has been that China is collecting more in debt service payments than it is disbursing in new loan finance.

China’s outbound financial activity, which recovered after COVID-19 downturns, is now more diverse in both its form and its targets. New annual FDI flows from China now exceed new lending from China to African countries ($6 billion in annual deals as of 2023, according to Rhodium Group data). Portfolio flows are still small. Estimated total Chinese portfolio investment amounted to only $1.6 billion as of June 2024, which remains concentrated in economies with more developed financial markets, such as South Africa and Egypt. The differences in scale between these flows influence the channels through which China’s growth effects will be most keenly felt.

To evaluate the impact on African economies of spillovers from China’s growth slowdown, Chapter 3 establishes a baseline of economic conditions in China. The real question to determine China’s future growth is whether it manages to reform its investment-driven system or stagnate on its current path. To evaluate both of these possibilities, we evaluate the economic assumptions of China’s growth scenarios—and from there, the impacts on African countries— through 2030, using three different perspectives.

• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) scenario: In its official World Economic Outlook (WEO) projections, the IMF forecasts growth of 3.4 percent by 2030.
• The reform scenario: China begins to successfully rebalance toward a consumer-oriented economy and the country’s economic growth slows in the short term before rising to a more sustainable rate of around 4 percent by 2030.
• The stagnation scenario: Beijing’s reform efforts flounder and China’s economy grinds slower and slower. Growth slows to 2.5 percent by 2030.

Chapter 4 assesses outcomes for African economies, based on the growth scenarios laid out in Chapter 3 for China through 2030. The impacts of growth projections are evaluated for goods trade across four product groups of Chinese imports from Africa (oil, minerals, agricultural products, and manufactured goods) and two product groups of Chinese exports to Africa (manufactured goods and commodities). Impacts on key outbound financial flows from China to Africa are also evaluated, including lending, portfolio flows, and FDI. Several key takeaways arise from this analysis.

• Across different scenarios, China’s oil imports from Africa are likely to decline due to growing electric vehicle adoption and clean power generation capacity, but they hold up best in scenarios in which China’s structural reforms are limited.
• China’s non-oil mineral imports will likely grow quickly under all scenarios, but demand might shift among mineral products, with different implications for different African countries. Commodities such as iron ore and those used in clean tech sectors are core inputs for a variety of China’s manufacturing industries. As a result, the projected growth of China’s mineral demand is strong across all scenarios.
• African manufactured and agricultural goods do best in a reforming China, where an empowered consumer base spends more on foodstuffs and African-made manufactured goods such as clothing. In the stagnation scenario, and to a lesser extent, the IMF scenario, weak Chinese demand and expanding manufacturing output and trade surplus suppress demand for African manufactured goods. Growth of China’s agricultural imports is projected to be strong under all three scenarios. In the reform scenario, growth projections are highest for both agriculture and manufacturing imports. As Chinese household consumption grows, industrial upgrading in China will move out of lower value-added industries, letting African manufacturers capture more market share.
• All three scenarios project that lending to Africa will be stronger than other forms of finance. Chinese lenders will still need to refinance and support their existing obligations despite tightening constraints on their balance sheets.
• Under all three scenarios, the growth of FDI to Africa is projected to continue at modest levels over the next five years. Chinese FDI in Africa is heavily concentrated in capital-intensive sectors that are stickier and more often linked to policy goals, such as control of critical minerals and other essential inputs used by Chinese manufacturers.

Chapter 5 concludes by assessing the potential impacts of each scenario by country group. While oil exporters and “traditional” mineral and commodity metal exporters would paradoxically benefit from a “stagnating” China that maximized oil consumption, this would not be a net benefit to the rest of the continent. Instead, a reforming China—better positioned to resolve trade and financial imbalances, and to drive consumption of Africa’s exports—offers the best prospects overall for a larger group of African countries.

• For transition mineral exporters, demand for Africa’s critical minerals is likely to persist regardless of scenario, as these sectors will remain a core focus of China’s (and other countries’) national economic strategies. It is more difficult to predict outcomes for low-income countries even if they are less exposed to commodity markets, where much depends on regional transmission of spillovers. Though China’s aid and development finance are far from the only considerations for policymakers in this group, they are not guaranteed to rise even in a high-growth scenario. For the middle-income group as well, much depends on the balance between surging Chinese exports and opportunities to capture investment from China. A reform scenario is their best bet.

Matthew Mingey is an Associate Director with Rhodium Group, focusing on China’s economic diplomacy and outward investment, including development finance. Matthew is based in Washington, DC. Previously, he worked on global governance issues at the World Bank. Matthew received a Master’s degree in Global Business and Finance from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a Bachelor’s degree from the University of Pennsylvania.

Jeremy Smith is a Research Analyst with Rhodium Group’s China practice, focusing on China’s evolving growth dynamics and economic engagement with the world. Jeremy previously worked at S&P Global, where he performed macroeconomic forecasting and sovereign risk analysis for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Prior to that, he was a James C. Gaither Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Jeremy received a master’s degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, concentrating in international economics and China studies. He also earned a graduate certificate from the Hopkins-Nanjing Center and a bachelor’s degree from Williams College.

Laura Gormley is a Senior Research Analyst with Rhodium Group’s China Projects Team, focusing on China’s innovation ecosystem and external economic engagement. Prior to joining Rhodium Group, she was a research assistant with the Global Development Policy Center – Global China Initiative at Boston University, where she contributed to the Center’s work on China’s development finance and decarbonizing the Belt and Road Initiative. Laura holds a Master’s degree in Global Policy from Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies and a Bachelor’s degree from McGill University.

This report was written by Matthew Mingey, Laura Gormley, and Jeremy Smith, with support from the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center’s Charles Lichfield and Jessie Yin.

Rhodium Group and the GeoEconomics Center wish to thank the colleagues, fellow analysts, and reviewers who shared their ideas and perspectives with us during the writing process and helped us strengthen the study in review sessions and individual consultations. Our gratitude goes out to Daniel Rosen and Josh Lipsky.

This project was made possible thanks to the philanthropic support of Carnegie Corporation of New York.

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Last month’s vote—which constitutes a rupture from the status quo of the international community’s decades-long balancing act between Moroccan and Algerian interests—came days before the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the 1975 Green March. The event saw a peaceful, Moroccan-led march of 350,000 people lead to the liberation of Western Sahara from Spanish colonialism.

When Spain withdrew, Morocco asserted historical claims of sovereignty over the territories, while the Polisario Front declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and sought full independence. The ensuing war and its 1991 cease-fire left the region divided by a fortified berm and a frozen political process.

Originally brought to the UN in 1963 as a decolonization issue, Western Sahara remains one of the world’s most protracted, unresolved conflicts.

Persistent challenges remain after last month’s landmark vote. Importantly, the Polisario Front has categorically rejected the UN resolution, stating that “it violates the territory’s decolonization status and undermines the UN peace process by supporting Morocco’s autonomy plan.”

But today, Morocco is nevertheless experiencing a similar dynamic to that hopeful moment in 1975, with the success of a series of well-orchestrated diplomatic victories, “marching” intently toward a lasting resolution of the conflict.

This resolution marks a decisive turn in the future of the dispute, as it eliminates the possibilities of a partition or a referendum, focusing instead on crafting “genuine” autonomy and on the practicalities of the advanced regionalization plan under Rabat’s flag. The document expresses “full support of the Secretary General and his Personal Envoy in facilitating and conducting negotiations taking as basis Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal” and “calls upon the parties to engage in these discussions without preconditions, taking as basis Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal.”

The other previous proposals by the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) since the 1991 cease-fire, including a territorial partition or a referendum, were becoming increasingly obsolete and impractical in the eyes of key political players, given the demographic complexities on the ground. Drawing a line in the sand dividing Western Saharan people—who are a transnational community extending from Mauritania to northern Morocco, Algeria, and Mali—would only compound colonial border disputes, which led to the current conflict in the first place.

Similarly, a referendum is nearly impossible. Western Saharan people are not indigenous to the current disputed territories, and any voting lists would have to take into consideration the Hassani people’s movement since the fourteenth century. Not to mention, there is much ambiguity around the populations, which over the past fifty years moved to the Moroccan-administered territories (around 80 percent of the disputed land) and the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria.

The UN is playing catch-up

While this recent shift is deemed a turning point in the semantic sense, the UN is barely catching up with the fast-evolving realities on the ground. The Moroccan autonomy plan has been gaining momentum since 2020, when US President Donald Trump’s first administration recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and stated that the conflict can only be resolved within that framework.

Soon after, France and Spain—the former colonizers of the region, both at the very source of the current territorial disputes due to the legacy of colonial borders—decided to side with Morocco. Other key international allies have since joined this new momentum in favor of Rabat, including the United Kingdom, Belgium, Israel, and numerous Arab, Latin American, and African countries that opened diplomatic representations or undertook significant investment projects in Western Sahara in support of the Moroccan stance.

The second Trump administration has taken a more assertive approach, largely advocating for the autonomy proposal and offering to host mediations between the parties to the conflict. Trump’s current cabinet has been pressuring the UN, Morocco, and Algeria to push for a fast and sustainable deal—likely seeing resolution to the Western Sahara dispute as low-hanging fruit that Trump can add to his arsenal of peace trophies, according to sources from the current administration.

The United States in September signaled to UN Special Envoy for Western Sahara Staffan de Mistura that the only way forward for the conflict was under Moroccan sovereignty. Washington’s UN funding cuts added more pressure on MINURSO. MINURSO, which was becoming outdated and dysfunctional within the current context, had no other option but to play along to survive.

A firmer US leadership to harness peace

The United States has, meanwhile, been directly pursuing its own mediation efforts outside the corridors of the UN. Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior advisor for Africa, has prioritized the conflict and led several bilateral negotiations to address the dispute with North African leaders over the summer. He has also repeatedly reiterated Washington’s support of Morocco’s claim to the territory, even promising to open a consulate in Dakhla, Western Sahara, to cement this position.

Additionally, US Peace Envoy Steve Witkoff recently revealed in a televised interview that a Morocco-Algeria peace deal could be imminent. The interview, which was conducted alongside Jared Kushner—another strong Rabat advocate in the Trump administration and the de facto broker of the Morocco-Israel peace deal—reveals firmer US leadership aimed at advancing peace in North Africa, starting with Western Sahara.

The United States has been holding the pen on this recent UNSC resolution and trying to shape the conversation in line with its vision of the dispute. An earlier draft leaked to the media this week disclosed a more decisive tone in favor of Morocco and a less nuanced vision for the future of MINURSO, limiting the mission’s renewal to only three months.

Another less-known fervent supporter of Moroccan territorial integrity is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Abu Dhabi put its full diplomatic weight behind this new resolution by fielding multiple calls with UNSC permanent members, including France and Russia, to ensure their support of the US-proposed draft, according to my discussions with diplomatic sources.

Besides the UAE’s long-term push to build a pan-Abrahamic bloc in North Africa with Morocco, Mauritania, and Sahel countries, its president, Mohamed Bin Zayed, also has a lesser-known connection to the dispute. Indeed, the UAE president had lived and spent his formative years at the Royal Academy in Morocco. At age fourteen, he became one of the youngest participants of the 1975 Green March to Western Sahara alongside members of the Moroccan kingdom’s royal family. Once more, the UAE is walking along its historical ally, pouring thirty billion dollars in investments into the North African country and becoming the first Arab state to open a consulate in Laayoun, Western Sahara, in 2020.

The challenges ahead for an autonomy plan

Now that the diplomatic dust has settled, all eyes are on Morocco and whether it can practically operationalize its autonomy plan.

Rabat has been heavily investing in ambitious infrastructure and strategic projects in Western Sahara. Projects include the Atlantic Initiative, which is promising economic prosperity and integration for Western Sahara with landlocked Sahel neighbors. Additionally, the Dakhla Atlantic Port, a $1.2-billion project, is estimated to handle 35 million tons of goods a year starting in 2028. Other strategic projects include significant investments in adventure and business tourism infrastructures.

However, economic prosperity alone cannot guarantee a sustainable and genuine autonomy plan. Morocco will have twelve months to deliver a detailed, advanced regionalization workplan that outlines the territories’ governance and economic management through elected local representatives. This will also require constitutional reforms and a referendum on the Moroccan side, but, more importantly, an agreement from the Polisario Front to sit at the negotiation table and to operate under the Moroccan flag—a distinct challenge given their rejection of the resolution.

Meanwhile, serious diplomatic moves are at play. The Moroccan king recently visited the UAE. Additionally, there are signs of appeasement between Algeria and France, with Algeria’s recent pardon of detained French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, a prominent advocate of a Moroccan Western Sahara.

King Mohamed VI also clearly stated in his address following the vote that he wants “no winners or losers” in this conflict and invited “his brother,” the president of Algeria, to revive the Maghreb Union together. These are all positive signals for meeting Witkoff’s prediction of a Morocco-Algeria peace deal within the next sixty days.

The UN Western Sahara resolution is an essential milestone in US leadership, aligning the international community with “the most credible and realistic” solution to end the fifty-year-long agony of the Sahrawi people. Still, much needs to be unpacked at the levels of local governance, economic resource management, and local culture promotion to achieve “genuine autonomy,” and to organize a second, peaceful Green March.

Sarah Zaaimi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Her research focuses on North Africa, the Western Sahara conflict, and Arab-Israeli normalization.

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Those defining lines of tension were this month underscored at a pivotal moment for the region. Intense rainfall over the Ethiopian Highlands this month triggered severe flooding in several northern Egyptian governorates, including Beheira, Kafr el-Sheikh, and Menoufia.

The floods triggered renewed hostility over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia presents the GERD as a developmental milestone aimed at poverty reduction and energy self-sufficiency. For Egypt and Sudan, however, the project’s unilateral management represents an existential risk.

Egypt’s Ministry of Irrigation blamed Ethiopia for “reckless dam management,” claiming that abrupt water discharges from the GERD exacerbated the recent surge in floodwaters. Addis Ababa—having formally inaugurated the dam only weeks earlier, on September 9—countered that operations followed technical protocols and mitigated what would otherwise have been worse flooding in Sudan. This episode underscores how data opacity fuels political mistrust.

The latest escalation coincides with a renewed diplomatic shift. In a recent interview with Al Arabiya Arabic, Massad Boulos—senior adviser to US President Donald Trump on African, Arab, and Middle Eastern Affairs—stated that Washington now supports a “technical, not political” approach to the GERD dispute. According to Boulos, “the GERD issue must be resolved through technical means, not political pressure,” a position that signals a recalibration of US engagement and places the emphasis on data transparency, operational coordination, and joint risk mitigation rather than on coercive diplomacy.

Cairo warned more than once that rapid filling or uncoordinated water releases could sharply reduce downstream flows, disrupt irrigation, and even increase flood risk during heavy rains—challenges that pose real risks for a deeply water-stressed country.

The GERD and Egypt’s water stress

Costing roughly five billion dollars, located fourteen kilometers from the Sudanese border, and designed to hold 74 billion cubic meters of water, the GERD represents Africa’s largest hydroelectric plant. Following the fourth and final filling in September 2023, Addis Ababa declared the dam fully operational, doubling national power capacity and consolidating its ambition to become a regional energy hub.

The hydrological risks of the project for Egypt’s Delta are both immediate and structural. In the short term, large or poorly coordinated releases from upstream reservoirs can overwhelm outdated drainage systems, provoking floods and disrupting irrigation cycles. In the medium to long term, a new operational regime at GERD will alter seasonal flow patterns, affecting groundwater recharge and salinity levels, and challenging agriculture and infrastructure alike. Without transparent data-sharing and coordinated management, Cairo will struggle to anticipate these shifts.

With over 118 million people and relying on the Nile River for nearly 97 percent of its freshwater, the Nile represents not merely a resource but Egypt’s national bloodstream. Average water availability per person has declined from almost 1,900 cubic meters in 1959 to fewer than six hundred today—well below the United Nations’ water-poverty threshold—and is expected to fall below five hundred by 2050, signaling an absolute water scarcity level. Climate change, sea-level rise, and irrigation inefficiencies compound these pressures, placing food production and social stability at risk.

Cairo, therefore, faces a dual challenge: modernizing its irrigation and drainage infrastructure while preventing upstream states from restricting flows. Meanwhile, Ethiopia—despite contributing 86 percent of the Nile’s waters—remains among the world’s lowest in water-use capacity, struggling with recurrent droughts and power shortages.

Historical legacies and legal asymmetries

The current diplomatic crisis cannot be understood without recalling colonial-era water agreements between Egypt and Sudan. The 1929 British-brokered Nile Waters Agreement granted Egypt 48 billion cubic meters per year and Sudan 4 billion, along with Cairo’s veto over upstream projects—an agreement negotiated solely between Egypt, Sudan, and their former colonial power, the United Kingdom. Ethiopia was never a party to this treaty and has consistently rejected its legitimacy, arguing that no upstream state can be bound by colonial-era arrangements in which it had neither representation nor consent. The 1959 Egypt–Sudan accord reinforced this asymmetry, allocating about 84 percent of the river’s flow (55.5 billion for Egypt and 18.5 for Sudan) and creating a joint commission to oversee water management between these two countries—again without Ethiopian participation. Addis Ababa regards both treaties as legally irrelevant and historically obsolete.

For decades, these treaties anchored Egypt’s claim to “historic rights,” while upstream countries rejected them as colonial relics. The result is a structural mismatch between legal legitimacy and hydrological reality: Upstream states see their development prospects as constrained, while Egypt perceives any alteration in river flow as an existential threat.

But structural tensions escalated with Ethiopia in 2011 when Addis Ababa launched construction of the GERD. Years of negotiations mediated by the African Union, the United States, and the World Bank have yet to yield a binding trilateral agreement, leaving both hydrological and political uncertainty unresolved and tensions high among these states. In this context, water management has become inseparable from national security, energy policy, and regional diplomacy.

Ethiopia insists that dam operations follow seasonal hydrology and turbine requirements, while Egypt argues that opaque management violates the 2015 Declaration of Principles on equitable use of Nile waters. From a geopolitical and security perspective, the return of tensions among these states confirms the reemergence of hardened positions and the risk of a prolonged hydropolitical confrontation. Addis Ababa continues to argue that the GERD symbolizes a new order based on equitable development and regional interdependence, rather than dominance. Yet, this new order still lacks a legal and technical framework acceptable to all. No binding agreement exists on how the dam will be filled and operated during droughts or flood years, leaving each side vulnerable to the other’s decisions.

Sociopolitical tensions further magnify these physical risks. Recurrent floods and perceived external threats to national water security could exacerbate domestic grievances, fuel nationalist rhetoric, and push policymakers toward confrontational postures—including legal or, in extreme cases, military options. Indeed, Egypt has repeatedly framed control over Nile waters as an existential issue and has at times indicated that it would consider armed intervention if upstream dam operations were to threaten downstream flows.

Recommendations

Today, three overlapping deficits continue to undermine Nile Basin governance: a technical deficit (lack of real-time data on releases and inflows), an operational deficit (absence of agreed rules for drought or flood management), and a political deficit (mutual distrust and competing national narratives). The recent floods starkly reveal the cost of these gaps. Egypt’s repeated assertion that the Nile constitutes a “red line” underscores how water security remains inseparable from national sovereignty, making compromise politically difficult.

Cairo should consider a strategic path forward from this dilemma, based on a dual approach.

On the one hand, it must intensify external engagement—pursuing legal and diplomatic efforts through mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice, which reframes the dispute in legal rather than existential terms, while sustaining negotiations under the African Union (regional legitimacy) and the United States (one of the few external actors able to exert leverage on all three capitals).

Representatives of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia will establish an independent trilateral technical commission under African Union oversight to analyze hydrological data and develop predictive flood models. At the same time, an integrated early-warning system that interconnects the existing hydrological, meteorological, and dam-operation monitoring platforms in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt—allowing real-time data sharing and coordinated response to droughts, floods, and irregular water releases—would help avert humanitarian crises and improve coordination during extreme weather events. Equally important is the negotiation of legally binding operational guarantees—however minimal—that can anchor political trust in measurable hydrological parameters. International partners, including the United States, have promoted technical confidence-building measures designed to calm tensions, such as installing automated flow gauges and satellite-based monitoring to increase transparency. Yet such measures will build trust only if embedded within a political framework for data sharing and collaborative drought management.

On the other hand, Cairo should prioritize domestic adaptation by investing in water efficiency, desalination, and drainage upgrades to enhance resilience regardless of upstream actions. Egypt must accelerate its adaptation efforts by upgrading drainage infrastructure, modernizing pumping stations, and expanding agricultural insurance schemes to protect vulnerable communities. Ultimately, international diplomacy should be reframed toward the goal of shared resilience, encouraging Ethiopia to view coordination as an expression of responsible sovereignty, rather than an externally imposed constraint.

The recent floods serve as a warning: Technical cooperation cannot remain hostage to political rivalry. Whether the GERD becomes a driver of regional integration or a lasting fault line will depend on how quickly riparian states shift from mutual accusations to shared management. The alternative—a future of recurrent floods, escalating mistrust, and securitized water politics—would threaten not only livelihoods in the Nile Delta but also the broader stability of the Horn of Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Alessia Melcangi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. She is also an associate professor of contemporary history of North Africa and the Middle East at the Sapienza University of Rome, an associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies in Milan, and a member of the scientific committee of the Fondazione Med-Or Leonardo SpA in Rome.

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During the Arab Spring in 2011 and 2012, many large-scale demonstrations were led or at least widely participated in by youth. More recently, young voters helped unseat the party that had governed Botswana since independence and caused the vote share of South Africa’s African National Congress party to fall below 50 percent for the first time since the end of apartheid. Youth protesters in Bangladesh, too, ousted the government of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in July 2024.

Even against this backdrop, however, the global scale and impact of the Gen Z protests in the past year is unprecedented.

In Kenya, protests against rising prices, youth unemployment, and corruption broke out after the announcement of new tax hikes in 2024, with further protests taking place in July. In Indonesia, young people have been protesting against high allowances for members of parliament and widespread food poisoning brought about through the government’s school meals program. In the Philippines, public demonstrations sparked by the misallocation of flood relief funds began in September.

And there’s more. Outraged by government bans on social media, young people in Nepal burned the parliament building and ousted the sitting government on September 9. The same month, Peruvian youth protesting against increased crime and corruption sparked conversations about government overhaul. Morocco’s “Gen Z 212” movement, (named after the country’s international dialing code), took to the streets to express their frustration with government funds being directed toward preparations for the 2030 World Cup rather than public services. Just last month, demonstrations by disillusioned youth in Madagascar sparked by water and electricity failures sent the president into exile and prompted a military-led government overhaul.

The root causes of public upheaval vary widely across these seven countries, as do the countries’ political contexts and the ultimate outcomes of their youth-led protest movements. Moreover, these seven countries are by no means the only nations around the world that have experienced mass protests led by young people dissatisfied with the political status quo in the past few years, as evidenced by youth-led protest movements in Serbia and South Korea.

Even so, the past year’s Gen Z protests are worth analyzing together for what they have in common, as these movements are influenced by one another and were all initiated by youth adept at using technology to organize. And, as the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes demonstrate, there are other broad similarities that warrant further examination.

What do the data tell us?

For starters, six of the seven countries score well above their respective regional averages in the political rights component of the Freedom Index, indicating that these countries protect freedom of association, expression, and access to information better than their neighbors. The only exception is Peru, which only recently saw its political rights score dip below the Latin America and the Caribbean regional average.

Secondly, these countries all perform below the regional average on at least one key metric of prosperity, whether that be income, health, or education.

Nepal and Madagascar score higher than their regional averages on political rights

Nepal and Madagascar score lower than their regional averages on income

If people are prone to comparing their conditions to those of their counterparts in neighboring countries, then the data indicate that conditions for protests may be largely defined by an appreciation for relatively high levels of political expression and a frustration with relative shortfalls in income levels, health standards, or education quality.

Lastly, and critically, these countries all have notably high youth populations. In all seven countries, the median age is lower than the global median and the percentage of the total population between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four is higher than the global average.

What the data show, then, is that all these countries have a lot of young people with an understanding of democratic rights, expectations of government accountability, and legitimate grievances related to the lack of government service provision.

Pair that with a growing confidence in their ability to drive change due to youth protests that came before and access to technology that allows them to easily communicate and organize, and you get the globally connected youth movement that has sprung up in recent months.

A force for positive change, or a temporary disruption of the status quo?

Attempting to find explanations for why these youth-led protests are happening is important, but assessing their impact is even more critical. Of the seven countries where protests have occurred or, in the cases of Morocco and Peru, are still occurring, two have experienced full regime change.

In both Nepal and Madagascar, the head of state was removed and replaced with interim governments organized by military figures. Perhaps one explanation for the protests leading to regime change in these two countries is that, in both cases, the military stood by and allowed protests to oust the sitting government before ushering in transitional governments of their liking. In both countries, the political influence of the young people who instigated the upheaval has diminished as new governing regimes have taken shape. Youth in Madagascar have expressed frustration with a career politician and former opposition leader being chosen to lead the country’s National Assembly, and Nepalese protest leaders say they have been frozen out of the transitional government.

The effects of the Gen Z protests in countries that have not experienced regime or leadership change have been mixed. In Kenya, protesters succeeded in convincing President William Ruto to withdraw his contentious tax bill but failed to bring about the systemic change that many wanted. The Moroccan government has responded to protests by pledging to increase health and education spending, but protesters remain unsatisfied.

If the aftermath of the Arab Spring and last year’s revolution in Bangladesh are any indication, establishing more accountable democracies through youth mobilization will prove exceptionally challenging. It is too early to tell whether the recent youth protests will truly bring about the systemic change that young people are demanding, but breaking with history will undoubtedly require young people to sustain the tremendous organized effort they have undertaken.

What’s next?

As the effects of Gen Z protests continue to materialize, there are two important questions to consider.

First, can young people use their numbers and organizational power to make government more democratic, more accountable, and less corrupt in the long term?

Only time will tell whether the answer to this question is yes or no.

The second question is perhaps more interesting: Based on the characteristics of the countries where Gen Z protests have occurred, is it possible to predict where they will happen next?

While exact predictions are impossible, the number of countries with characteristics like those of the seven examined above is limited. For example, Honduras has a high youth population, scores well above the regional average on political rights, and scores well below regional income and education averages. Côte d’Ivoire also has a high youth population, scores well above the average Sub-Saharan African country on political rights, and scores below the regional average on health and inequality. If the governments of either of these countries are widely blamed for corruption or failure to deliver services among younger people, youth populations may well follow the example their counterparts around the world have set. In Côte d’Ivoire, initial frustration over the results of last month’s presidential election could serve as a flashpoint for prolonged unrest.

Côte d’Ivoire scores higher than the regional average on political rights

Côte d’Ivoire scores lower than the regional average on life expectancy

Broadly, the data show that countries within the “low freedom” and “low prosperity” categories that have high youth populations and relatively well-protected political rights, and that perform relatively poorly in at least one indicator of prosperity, appear more prone to Gen Z demonstrations.

This is not to say that Honduras, Côte d’Ivoire, or other countries that share similar characteristics are destined for a youth uprising. But it certainly should not come as a surprise if the movement of youth-led protests spreads further across the developing world.

Protesters in Madagascar took inspiration from the Gen Z movement in Nepal, which was in turn inspired by demonstrations in Indonesia. With protests in Peru and Morocco continuing, it is possible that the wave of Gen Z frustration with a lack of government effectiveness and accountability is only just getting started.

What is certain is that increased access to technology and global information has empowered youth in limited, flawed, and unaccountable democracies to attempt to incite change through organized protest.

The voices of these young people are undoubtedly being heard; whether their demands will be met remains to be seen.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

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For Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the designation and threat of military intervention couldn’t have come at a more politically fraught moment. With a population of more than 230 million people, Nigeria continues to grapple with inflation, a struggling currency, and widespread poverty despite recent reforms. With the CPC designation, Washington is questioning the government’s ability to protect its citizens from religiously motivated violence. The moment demands Nigeria to deliver a more coherent diplomatic posture toward the United States.

A relationship built on mutual interests

The US–Nigeria relationship has historically been one of pragmatic partnership. The United States is Nigeria’s largest foreign investor, with US investments concentrated in oil and gas, wholesale trade, and services. Bilateral trade surpassed thirteen billion dollars in 2024, and Nigeria ranks among the top African markets for US exports.

Washington also provides strategic security support, including military training, counterterrorism assistance, and limited arms sales to help Nigeria confront groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province, while also addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria, in turn, remains a strategic partner for US interests in West Africa, which faces overlapping crises of extremism, migration, and democratic backsliding. Under Tinubu, however, the relationship appears to be drifting—not through open hostility, but mutual disengagement.

A diplomatic drift

Since his inauguration in May 2023, Tinubu has not traveled to Washington and allowed a diplomatic vacuum to fester. In September 2023, Tinubu recalled all Nigerian ambassadors worldwide and still has yet to appoint permanent replacements. What’s more, he was conspicuously absent from Trump’s meeting in July with West African leaders. Tinubu’s distance from the White House may also reflect political caution on his part, following renewed reporting on his past in the United States, including his connection to a federal criminal case and questions about his academic records.

Although Tinubu appointed a handful of consuls-general and chargés d’affaires (including in Washington) earlier this year, Nigerian foreign policy experts note that these temporary measures fall far short of the representation expected of a country of Nigeria’s stature, and reports have detailed the poor state of Nigerian diplomatic missions. Officials in Abuja cite financial constraints for the delay in appointing ambassadors. Amid the dispute with the United States, Tinubu is now reportedly finalizing a list of ambassador nominees.

Tentative diplomacy

Tinubu’s contacts with the Trump administration appear to be limited. In April in Paris, he met for the first time with Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior advisor for Africa and a citizen of Nigeria among other countries. While that encounter signaled a tentative opening, there is no indication of any ongoing back-channel relationship.

Boulos himself recently stirred debate in Nigeria when he remarked publicly that it is not only Christians who are victims of violence in Nigeria. The comment diverged from claims made by Christian advocacy groups that a genocide against Christians is taking place in Nigeria, a claim that resonates with segments of Trump’s political base. Boulos’s attempt to bring some nuance to the conversation appears to have done little to shift Washington’s broader perception that Abuja has not done enough to contain extremist violence or to demonstrate accountability for religiously targeted attacks.

But even before the religious freedom debate, there was friction on other fronts. Earlier in July, Nigeria’s government vowed to resist pressure from the Trump administration to accept deportees from Venezuela and other third countries.

What the CPC designation means for Nigeria

Being named a “Country of Particular Concern” is not merely symbolic. Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), it places a country in the category of states that have “engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” It can trigger diplomatic censure and, in some cases, targeted sanctions or aid restrictions, unless the president grants a waiver for national-security reasons.

Nigeria was first placed on the CPC list in 2020, during the first Trump administration, but was removed in 2021 by the Biden administration ahead of then Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Nigeria. The decision drew sharp criticism from the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent body created by the IRFA. And last month, US Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) introduced a bill calling for the CPC designation and the imposition of sanctions on Nigeria, including measures against Nigerian officials who “implement or support blasphemy and Sharia laws.” The redesignation, therefore, represents a policy reversal and a warning that Washington expects progress on religious-freedom protections or further consequences may follow.

At a crossroads

Tinubu, himself a Muslim, faces a delicate balancing act in a country roughly evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. Ahead of the 2023 presidential election, his selection of a Muslim vice presidential running mate from Nigeria’s northeast Borno state drew opposition from voters who considered the move at odds with Nigeria’s religious diversity. While his administration has vigorously rejected the notion of a “Christian genocide” in Nigeria—arguing that that framing does not reflect the true situation in the country—terrorist organizations have targeted churches, kidnapped clergy, and committed massacres in Christian farming communities. Washington’s renewed CPC designation challenges Nigeria’s leadership to confront Christian-targeted extremist violence more decisively.

For Tinubu, who has already clinched his party’s endorsement for re-election in 2027, his approach to this issue will define his foreign-policy credibility and political legacy. Domestically, as a politician from Nigeria’s predominantly Christian south, he must avoid alienating Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim north or feeding perceptions of Western bias in framing the country’s security crisis. Internationally, he must reassure partners that his government is committed to defending pluralism and prosecuting those responsible for faith-based atrocities.

The cost of inaction could be severe. Nigeria’s CPC status could complicate security cooperation—including military training and intelligence sharing—and add to concerns over the foreign investment environment unless Abuja demonstrates measurable improvements.

More profoundly, the designation exposes the fragility of Nigeria’s social contract. When Nigeria gained independence in 1960, its founders envisioned a country where ethnic and religious pluralism would coexist. Decades later, deepening religious and ethnic polarization poses a threat to that vision. Unless the Tinubu administration tackles corruption, poverty, and insecurity, any diplomatic fallout will be secondary to the domestic unraveling already underway.

A path forward

Restoring confidence will require concrete steps. Tinubu should:

1. Reassert Nigeria’s diplomatic presence in Washington. Nigeria, as the world’s largest Black democracy, should project the diplomatic stature befitting its status on the world stage. The absence of robust diplomatic representation has left Nigeria increasingly vulnerable in Washington. The country has been hit hard by the new US tariff policy and could face further repercussions if the Trump administration expands its travel ban. This diplomatic gap is particularly striking given that Nigeria is the most common country of origin for African immigrants to the United States and those of African descent. Restoring a full ambassadorial presence in Washington can help send a message that Abuja has the will and resources to revitalize US–Nigeria relations. A credible diplomat with bipartisan connections in Washington could help reset the tone of engagement and re-establish trust.
2. Open Nigeria’s doors to transparency and external scrutiny. It is not enough for the government to dismiss claims of a “Christian genocide.” Nigeria must cultivate an atmosphere of transparency that allows external observers to assess the facts firsthand. That should include inviting assessments by USCIRF or multilateral partners such as the United Nations or the African Union, along with greater access for journalists, civil society organizations, and independent researchers.
3. Restore accountability in Nigeria’s fight against sectarian violence. Many Nigerians have grown accustomed to government complacency and the impunity that has characterized the violence across parts of Nigeria. Abuja’s credibility at home and abroad depends on visible consequences for perpetrators of sectarian violence—regardless of faith or region—and protection of witnesses who can testify to atrocities. That starts with better funding for security forces. Nigeria’s fight against insecurity may remain a myth if its police force remains underfunded and ranked among the lowest globally in capacity and morale. The government must also address growing concerns that former Boko Haram fighters and other defectors are evading rehabilitation and reintegrating directly into local communities. Compensating victims, whether Christians or Muslims, while empowering them to rebuild and resettle, could further signal that the state values every Nigerian life equally.
4. Prioritize the welfare of Nigerians and address the root causes of violence. Nigeria’s minimum wage stands at 70,000 naira (about $48) per month—one of the lowest in Africa—while legislators, among the highest paid globally, earn between $150,000 and $190,000 annually, and there has been a recent push for increased pay. This disparity reflects a failure to align the cost of governance with the realities of most citizens. Long-term security will depend on tackling the roots of instability: poverty, youth unemployment, and social exclusion. With eighty million Nigerian youths out of work, the government must expand education, job creation, and rural development, especially in conflict-prone areas. Prioritizing these domestic investments would signal commitment to reform and help shift Nigeria’s global image from a country that manages crises to one that builds resilience.

For its part, the United States should moderate its pressure with an open door for engagement. Blanket condemnation risks provoking defensiveness in Abuja. Constructive partnership could yield better results. US policy should aim not merely to punish but to strengthen Nigeria’s capacity to protect its own citizens. Without a doubt, Nigeria’s renewed CPC designation is a diplomatic alarm bell, but it need not herald a breakdown in US–Nigeria relations or escalate into a wider geopolitical standoff, with Beijing already warning against US “interference” or “use of force.” As an African adage cautions, “when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”—and in this case, ordinary Nigerians stand to bear the cost of great-power rivalry in the region. The current imbroglio could instead become an inflection point, prompting both governments to re-evaluate their priorities and restore the principled cooperation that once defined their ties.

But the ball is now in Tinubu’s court. With Nigeria on the brink of a major diplomatic crisis with one of its most important strategic partners, he must confront extremist violence without inflaming sectarian divides, rebuild diplomatic trust with Washington, and prove that Nigeria’s diversity is its strength, not its death knell. If he can navigate that delicate balance, Nigeria might yet emerge from this moment of scrutiny stronger, more credible, more prosperous, and more united.

Ohimai Amaize is a Nigerian journalist and the senior editor for social media strategy and audience engagement at the Atlantic Council.

The post With Trump’s threats of military intervention in Nigeria, Tinubu faces a delicate balancing act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The African Great Lakes region is where nearly three‑quarters of global cobalt is mined and where flows of untraceable tantalum, tin, and tungsten continue to fuel sustainability risks that ripple through the supply chains of US manufacturers. If the peace agreement and the related US-DRC critical minerals deal fail to deliver on their promises, illicit networks will entrench themselves further, and China will remain the default processor and refiner of the minerals core to electric vehicles, semiconductors, and defense systems. The United States has one instrument that can respond with the scale, speed, and credibility this moment demands—the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

Designed to turn political will into economic transformation

Founded in 2004, the MCC set out with the aim of using large grants to spur economic growth and open markets in poor countries with good governance. The MCC has been active in twenty-four African countries, making investments of over ten billion dollars in energy, agriculture, and infrastructure, with a notable 3,800 kilometers of road completed. Within the US government’s economic statecraft toolbox, the MCC’s large-scale grant capital is a rare and strategic asset able to fund enabling infrastructure for US investment in markets of strategic import. The MCC can also work regionally, not just bilaterally, which is exactly what a cross-border security and trade deal requires. Reimagined as “MCC 2.0,” it can accelerate the development of minerals-corridor infrastructure in African markets, help investors navigate complex permitting regimes, and crowd in US private investment. Armed with flexible funds, MCC compacts finance feasibility studies, workforce upskilling, data gathering, energy, and infrastructure that create the “bankability” that US investors need to move into the DRC market, while also driving regional economic development.

Unlike the US Development Finance Corporation, which is driving the US-Ukraine minerals deal signed earlier this year, the MCC has expertise in driving policy shifts by conditioning disbursements on reforms, addressing market entry barriers. The corporation’s regional focus also suits the fact that mineral supply chains will cross borders, allowing the MCC to reinforce both the corridor‑based US-DRC minerals deal and the related DRC‑Rwanda agreement. Tying disbursements to measurable governance benchmarks gives the United States leverage beyond diplomacy and makes reform inseparable from financing. With the MCC, the Trump administration has an execution platform, not just a financing source, that can support the long-term success of the US-DRC critical minerals deal. 

Country eligibility requirements: An operational choice, not legislative constraint

Over the past twenty years, the MCC has developed complex and often onerous eligibility requirements that score countries—using data from Freedom House, Reporters without Borders, and the World Bank, among others—and determine which can receive grants. Neither the DRC nor Rwanda would qualify for a full compact under MCC’s current scoring regime.

However, these eligibility practices do not have to stand in the way of the MCC being mobilized to make the peace and economic agreements successful. The metrics that are currently used to determine country eligibility are an operational choice: Such use of these metrics is not mandated by the statute that created the MCC, and it precludes the agency from adapting to urgent, strategic opportunities like the one now unfolding in Central Africa. Congress instructed the MCC to partner with countries demonstrating a commitment to governance, economic freedom, and investment in people, and the compacts must align with US national interests.

The procedural hurdles and rigid scorecard formulas that have been layered on the law’s framework can be removed by new political leadership. To let operational rigidity block US minerals security and Congolese development ambition is to let process defeat purpose.

MCC needs political direction

There is no need to rewrite the MCC’s authorizing statute. Congress has already put in place its legal authority and full‑year appropriations. What is needed is political direction. Now that the corporation has a new board that met in August, the agency is beginning work on compacts that had been paused during the foreign assistance review. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as chair of the MCC board, should instruct the MCC to fast-track a Great Lakes regional compact to become the platform for the execution of the peace agreement and critical minerals deal. Such a compact, focusing on power, rail, border systems, mining-skills training, and rule‑of‑law, could create an investible minerals corridor integrated with the US-supported Lobito Trans‑Africa Corridor* connecting the DRC to ports in Angola.  

At the least, a $750 million Great Lakes regional compact could rapidly do the following:

• Support data collection and the use of artificial intelligence in minerals exploration;
• Fund the basics of bankability, including through feasibility and environmental studies;
• Co‑fund last‑mile rail and road spurs to connect the Kivu (in the DRC) and Copperbelt (in Zambia) nodes to Lobito rail and border crossings in coordination with the DFC’s Lobito financing;
• Finance substation upgrades and dedicated lines to processing zones in eastern DRC;   
• Digitize customs, implement pre‑clearance for certified minerals, and modernize warehousing;
• Support metallurgy/geoscience training and tech transfer programs; and
• Accelerate traceability and the formalization of the artisanal mining sector through digitization.

The metrics for success could be visible within a year in terms of private capital mobilized, US offtake agreements, and reduced cost of production. As specific mining projects mature, DFC and Export–Import Bank financing could be leveraged to match the growing need for equity and debt financing and insurance products.

The bottom line for the administration

The Trump administration should be applauded for its diplomatic efforts in Central Africa. Now it must back that diplomacy with a minerals corridor that demonstrates the shared economic dividends of peace. The MCC is operating, the board is engaged, and the legal and financial authorities exist to move now. A Great Lakes regional compact would leverage the MCC’s unique strengths—flexible grants, reform conditionality, and regional scope—to turn a fragile deal into durable minerals security and local development. Any delay would simply entrench China‑centric processing. It’s time to move fast, with the MCC in front.

Aubrey Hruby is a senior adviser and senior fellow at the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council and leads the center’s Critical Minerals Task Force.

*Rawbank, which supports the Atlantic Council Africa Center’s work on the Democratic Republic of Congo, has an equity stake in the Africa Finance Corporation, which leads the development of the Lobito Corridor.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post The Millennium Challenge Corporation is needed for peace in the Great Lakes Region—and US mineral security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A coup that promised stability—and delivered chaos

When Colonel Assimi Goïta seized power in back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021, he vowed the “refoundation” of a sovereign and secure Mali. Instead, the Malian army—trained to fight terrorism—ended up dismantling what was left of the state’s institutional foundations.

Initially expected to strengthen the military, the power grab only deepened its divisions, splitting the army between privileged loyalists of the regime and those sent to the front lines. Coupled with the departure of international forces from Mali, this fragmentation led to abandoned positions, weapons falling into the hands of separatists, and jihadists expanding their hold over the rural north.

Meanwhile, internal purges multiplied and intelligence services—once meant to hunt terrorists—turned inward, redirecting their focus toward political opponents of the regime. The recent imprisonment of former prime ministers Choguel Maïga and Moussa Mara epitomizes a security apparatus more obsessed with loyalty than with counterterrorism.

Bamako’s isolation has deepened

Mali’s internal fragility has been exacerbated by the fact that it has methodically cut itself off from regional and global partners. While its break with France could be framed as a quest for independence and a response to two decades of unsuccessful anti-terrorist operations, Bamako’s estrangement from African allies—particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—and its withdrawal from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission underscore the junta’s preference for isolation over cooperation.

Even relations with Algeria, which once maintained relatively cordial ties with Mali, have sharply deteriorated. In April, Mali accused its northern neighbor of sponsoring terrorism after the Algerian military shot down a Malian drone. Algiers responded by closing its airspace to Malian aircraft. Meanwhile, Turkey’s recent diplomatic overtures in Algeria suggest that Ankara—which had deepened cooperation with Mali over the past years—might also adjust its policy away from Bamako.

The Russia illusion is fading

The junta’s hope that new alliances could fill this gap has not materialized. Initially optimistic that cooperation with Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group would help the Malian military suppress jihadist insurgencies, the partnership has instead produced disastrous outcomes. After the Russian mercenaries failed to make meaningful gains, the Kremlin announced in June that it would restructure the paramilitary organization into a new entity called the “Africa Corps,” leaving behind a gaping security and political vacuum.

According to internal reports, Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries have since repeatedly clashed on the ground, and northern Mali has once again become a contested battlefield. In January 2024, the official abrogation of the 2015 Algiers Accord—a peace agreement with armed insurgent groups—reignited separatist tensions. As a result, the war in the north now stretches almost one thousand miles of front lines across territory the army struggles to control.

Amid this chaos, Mali has become a proxy battleground. Diplomatic sources cite indirect Ukrainian involvement—including intelligence assistance, drone supplies, and support for groups hostile to pro-Russian mercenaries. Meanwhile, Turkey advances its influence by supplying Bayraktar drones and technical support to the Malian army. Mali has essentially become a geopolitical chessboard, where foreign interests and competing local ambitions collide.

The economic asphyxiation of a landlocked nation

Adding to the chaos is Mali’s dependence on supply routes that are increasingly vulnerable. The landlocked country relies heavily on the Dakar-Bamako corridor to import essential goods. Senegal exports nearly 60 percent of its petroleum products to Mali, representing over 20 percent of its foreign trade. Meanwhile, the Casablanca-Nouakchott-Bamako corridor is blocked, as the commune of Diéma in the Kayes region is under siege by armed groups. The Abidjan-Bamako corridor is also disrupted, and even the internal route between Bamako and the city of Ségou in the northeast has come under growing threat, with attacks and kidnappings on the rise.

For weeks, fuel supplies have been interrupted by convoy attacks and restrictions imposed by armed groups, creating endless lines at Bamako gas stations. In a country where transportation, electricity, and logistics depend on diesel, this shortage is tantamount to a national shutdown. For the army, the consequences are severe: Without fuel, armored vehicles are immobilized, convoys are grounded, and northern bases are left exposed.

A fractured and demoralized society

Mali’s diversity has historically been a strength. Between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries, the Mali Empire, founded by Soundiata Keïta, was one of West Africa’s largest and most powerful civilizations. Stretching from the Senegal River to Gao and from the Sahara to the Gulf of Guinea, it thrived on multiculturalism and trade among different groups. In the fourteenth century, Mali was essentially a global commercial crossroads, supported by a flexible system that ensured stability across vast and diverse lands while maintaining a tradition of religious tolerance.

Today’s Mali tells a different story. Ethnic tensions in the central and northern regions, amplified by military abuses, have shattered intercommunity trust. The advent of self-defense militias has fractured national cohesion, and entire villages now refuse to cooperate with the armed forces. The demoralized population oscillates between fear and resignation.

Paths to reconstruction

The US evacuation call could foreshadow Mali’s imminent collapse. Yet, an end to the junta’s reign would not be cause for triumphalism, as Malians’ legitimate desire for sovereignty would persist.

For the time being, the urgent task is to mend the national fabric, restore constitutional order within a renewed governance framework, and rebuild alliances. To that end, the army must return to its primary role: defending the homeland, not governing it.

Counterinsurgency presents the most daunting challenge in this regard. France spent almost a decade on the ground, and while it had some early success, it abandoned its counterinsurgency effort.

While intelligence and counterinsurgency will be important going forward, it will be important not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Given the country’s fragmented state, dialogue with jihadists may be unavoidable. Still, their Wahhabi-inspired ideology remains marginal in Mali—and excessive concessions could spark conflict. Is there a potential institutional framework that reconciles demands for Islamization with maintaining a federal republic?

Addressing geographic challenges through deep decentralization or pragmatic federalism could restore power and responsibility to Mali’s regions. Engagement with the Atlantic—via Morocco’s proposals to enable access to the ocean for Sahel countries and Senegal’s historical cooperation—remains critical. Rebuilding ties with the subregion to jointly combat terrorism and reintegration into ECOWAS, even if it requires reform, is equally urgent.

Finally, Mali will need patriots capable of enlightened leadership—something the immediate predecessors of the junta failed to provide—to chart sustainable economic prospects. Mali’s assets remain vast: It is among Africa’s top gold producers; has untapped reserves of lithium, iron, bauxite, phosphates, manganese, and uranium; and has significant agricultural potential from cotton and livestock. Moreover, Mali maintains a strategic position in West Africa, with strong hydropower and solar potential, and, above all, a large and determined youth population.

All it needs is the right leadership to seize that potential.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Hussein Ba is a Senegalese columnist who frequently covers security and political issues in Mali.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Mali has not just plunged into crisis. It has been unraveling for years. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With a population approaching six million, Nairobi faces many of the same urbanization challenges as New Delhi and other cities in the Global South: rapid rural-to-urban migration, rising car ownership, and limited space for urban expansion—all putting immense pressure on the city’s transport infrastructure. Exploring the New Delhi model could provide a practical blueprint for addressing these challenges.

Lessons from India for African cities

Several features make the Delhi metro particularly instructive for cities like Nairobi. First, its per-kilometer construction cost of $24 million is not only low but the lowest among Indian metro projects—cheaper than similar endeavors in Mumbai, Bengaluru, Pune, and Chennai. This cost-effectiveness stems from the strong project governance and innovative procurement strategies by the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) and Rail India Technical and Economic Service, which have become sought-after consultants for metro projects both domestically and internationally, including Jakarta, Dhaka, and Mauritius. In New Delhi, DMRC leveraged Japanese engineering support to develop a hybrid model that balanced international standards with economic efficiency. Since Kenya—like many African countries—faces the twin challenge of building affordable infrastructure while managing a heavy debt burden, DMRC’s low-cost approach may be particularly appealing.

Second, India may offer a model that’s easier to replicate for Kenya than China. While the Chinese infrastructure record is impressive—and Chinese firms are still running many of Africa’s big infrastructure projects—its methods are not always applicable to countries with more robust private property protections. Meanwhile, India’s and Kenya’s laws around land acquisition and compensation are far more aligned. Whereas in China, the state can unilaterally appropriate land for public projects, both India and Kenya maintain stronger protections for property owners, including market-value compensation, judicial oversight, and public participation.

Third, the Delhi metro provides valuable lessons in logistical efficiency—and its seamless integration into the city’s urban fabric demonstrates the importance of transit-oriented development (TOD). In August 2025, the system set a new record by carrying 8.1 million passengers in a single day. In a city of more than fifteen million cars, it has significantly helped reduce road congestion, while simultaneously shortening travel times and lowering carbon emissions—all benefits that Nairobi could put to good use.

According to estimates, the Kenyan capital, notorious for its chronic traffic jams, loses an estimated $1 billion annually to congestion. As one of East and Central Africa’s largest economic hubs—accounting for half of Kenya’s formal employment and gross domestic product—it urgently needs a modern transit system incorporating TOD to reach its full economic potential. Not surprisingly, the Nairobi Metropolitan Area Transport Authority has noted that the “lack of a scheduled public transport system and an elaborate non-motorized transport network forces people to use personal vehicles over short distances, whereas they would have otherwise walked, cycled or used public transport.”

The road ahead for Nairobi’s urban transit

However, New Delhi’s experience also offers cautionary lessons: delays in early project phases, coordination failures among institutions, and challenges in integrating the metro with other transport systems. It will therefore be imperative that Nairobi plans for inclusive, equitable urban renewal, adapting rather than directly copying the New Delhi blueprint.

To emulate the Indian capital’s strategy and to avoid its missteps, Nairobi’s metro development should begin by focusing on high-density corridors and low-car-ownership areas, typically low-income neighborhoods. Such an approach would be more pragmatic than its current strategy of expanding highway infrastructure, such as the Nairobi Expressway, given that only 12.9 percent of Nairobi residents owned cars as of 2019. At the same time, the city must mitigate risks of gentrification and rising property prices that can accompany metro expansion.

Ultimate success—not only in Nairobi, but in other rapidly urbanizing African capitals—will depend on how well the New Delhi model can be tailored to the local context. As the continent’s urbanization rate is expected to climb from 45 percent in 2023 to around 60 percent by 2050, low-cost light rail systems will be central to Africa’s transportation future. While cities such as Dakar, Addis Ababa, and Lagos have already successfully implemented urban rail projects, many others will need to follow to live up to the promises of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which envisions “world class infrastructure [that] criss-crosses Africa.”

Sibi Nyaoga is the program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Why Nairobi should look to New Delhi for its transit transformation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In June 2024, coordinated suicide attacks in Nigeria’s Borno State struck a wedding, a hospital, and a funeral within hours, killing more than thirty people and wounding over one hundred. Months later, militants overran a garrison in Chad, killing more than forty soldiers, demonstrating the insurgency’s ability to operate across borders.

In 2025, violence has escalated further. Bombings and improvised explosive devices tore through markets and roads in Borno: one July attack killed more than ten people, while another at a fish market claimed at least twelve lives. Analysts warn that Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State West Africa Province, may be undertaking a broader tactical reset—including renewed use of armed drones and roadside mines.

Fatalities near record highs

Across the basin, fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups hover near record highs. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates nearly four thousand deaths over the past year, with new hotspots in Cameroon’s Far North. Humanitarian needs remain staggering, even as displacement has dipped slightly: as of May 2025, more than 2.9 million people were still displaced across the basin.

One pattern has proven consistent over time: military force alone cannot defeat a movement fueled by governance failures, economic exclusion, and security-force abuses. To their credit, regional governments have been recalibrating their responses.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has demonstrated that joint, intelligence-driven operations can exact real costs on militants. In 2024, Operation Lake Sanity II destroyed camps in the region, neutralizing dozens of fighters, while coordinating air and ground actions across sectors—precisely the kind of cross‑border pressure the insurgents fear most.

The African Union’s Peace and Security Council has sought to align these operations with the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s Regional Stabilization Strategy. At the same time, the UNDP-managed Regional Stabilization Facility launched a four-year phase to fund rapid, visible rehabilitation in liberated hubs.

Yet the basin’s security architecture is fragile. In April, Niger’s junta announced its withdrawal from the MNJTF to focus resources on protecting oil infrastructure. Whether a formal withdrawal has taken place remains unclear, but this episode illustrates how diplomatic tensions, national politics, and energy priorities can disrupt longtime cross-border routines.

The resource paradox

Security is only one half of the ledger. The other is an economic paradox: the Lake Chad countries are rich in hydrocarbons and minerals, yet governance weaknesses hinder their wealth from being transformed into opportunity or legitimacy.

Nigeria holds Africa’s largest natural‑gas reserves and is a top oil producer, but years of underinvestment, theft, and opaque contracting have eroded both its economic impact and public confidence. Cameroon is pushing to revive upstream and downstream activities—including a long-planned overhaul of its national oil refining company (SONARA)—while eyes turn to gas-to-power and storage investments that could anchor industrial growth if policy risks are managed carefully.

Niger, known for its high‑grade uranium, has also become an oil exporter through a nearly two-thousand‑kilometer pipeline to Benin. Despite diplomatic spats and sabotage last year, shipments resumed in August 2024, and the corridor now sits at the intersection of energy and politics. Chad, for its part, remains tied to the Chad–Cameroon export system that once carried the promise of a model corridor for development—and the cautionary tale of how social safeguards can fray without sustained transparency.

Why hasn’t all this resource potential translated into security and shared prosperity? Because governance is failing.

Governance failures feed insecurity

The latest Transparency International index scores Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger among the world’s most challenging environments for transparent governance and accountable public spending. Sector‑specific governance is equally uneven.

On paper, Nigeria’s 2021 Petroleum Industry Act offers a pathway to streamline the industry and share benefits with host communities. However, the broader oil-and-gas governance score remains classified as “weak,” with licensing transparency a persistent issue that discourages responsible investment. In practice, corruption and predation squander revenue and fuel insecurity, reinforcing insurgent claims that the state extracts resources while communities are left to suffer.

At the rural margins, citizens face corruption and insurgent “taxation,” which erodes trust and cooperation. Addressing this issue requires linking security, governance, and economic recovery through targeted operations paired with rapid stabilization: repairing infrastructure, restoring services, supporting livelihoods, and building accountable community security forces integrated into professional policing.

What real stabilization requires

Stabilization efforts should align with the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s strategy and be scaled through UNDP funding to turn military gains into trust. Resource development must adhere to strict transparency, requiring community consent, open contracts, shared revenues for local infrastructure, and genuine job creation. The Africa Mining Vision offers a framework for equitable, community-driven benefits—and it should become the standard for foreign‑backed deals in the basin.

Foreign partners should welcome this clarity. Partnerships—whether for offshore oil blocks, uranium concessions, or pipeline rights—must transfer technology, build local supply chains, and co‑finance community assets. This governance‑first approach serves both as development policy and a security strategy: when contracts are transparent, new pipelines fund local clinics and roads, and jobs are allocated to qualified locals, militants lose their recruiting fuel.

Trust as the ultimate security

Leaders must ground counterinsurgency in transparent, mutually beneficial economic deals. Despite persistent violence, governments have demonstrated their ability to coordinate effectively, and communities have proven resilient, with markets and farms sustaining life amid conflict.

The region’s resource base is real: oil and gas in Nigeria and Cameroon, uranium and oil in Niger, and a regional pipeline network that could become a development corridor—rather than a grievance machine—if managed effectively. The decision is ultimately political. Double down on short-term force and opaque resource deals, and violence will continue to adapt while the development window narrows. Or tackle the roots of conflict and build a transparent partnership that puts citizens first.

Only the latter can transform Lake Chad’s natural wealth into durable security—and offers the potential to outpace an insurgency that has finally learned to survive.

Stabilizing the Lake Chad Basin is fundamentally about trust. Building trust—through state protection, transparent contracts, and fair partnerships—is the only way to turn the basin’s crisis into an opportunity. If regional leaders commit now, alongside citizens who can hold them accountable, they can match insurgents’ adaptability and steer the region toward peace and prosperity.

Jude Mutah is a policy expert with extensive experience in Africa and holds a doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore. He has worked with the United States Institute of Peace and the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post The Lake Chad Basin could power growth instead of conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A number of recent media reports have highlighted the growing role of foreign nationals in the Russian military. In early October, an Indian citizen was captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting for Russia. The 22 year old claimed to have been arrested in Russia while studying and pressured into signing a contract with the Russian army in order to secure his release from prison. After just two weeks of basic training, he was sent to the front lines of the war in Ukraine.

Also in early October, the Los Angeles Times reported that Russia may have recruited tens of thousands of foreign fighters via social media, with many coming from disadvantaged countries across the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. The article detailed how many of these recruits are allegedly enticed with offers of generous benefits including large salaries and Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in non-combat roles. In practice, however, most are soon sent straight into battle.

Meanwhile, a group of more than twenty Kenyan men were rescued from a suspected human trafficking ring in September following a raid on a residential complex in Nairobi. The men had reportedly been promised jobs in Russia but were set to be sent to fight in Ukraine. The multi-agency operation highlighted growing concerns that Moscow is stepping up efforts to lure African men to Russia and forcing them to join the Russian army.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The single largest contingent of foreigners currently fighting for Russia may be Cubans. An October 2 cable from the US State Department sent to dozens of US diplomatic missions claimed that up to 5000 Cuban nationals are currently serving in the ranks of Putin’s army. Ukrainian officials say the total number could actually be far higher and estimate that as many as 20,000 Cubans may have been recruited by Russia.

While Russian officials have typically been tight-lipped about the presence of foreigners in the country’s military, some have recently acknowledged the growing presence of Cuban troops. Andrey Kartapolov, who heads the Russian Parliament’s Defense Committee, defended the practice of recruiting Cubans and indicated that many more may soon be joining the invasion of Ukraine. “If young people from Cuba want to help our country, there is nothing strange about that,” he commented.

This increasing openness has also been evident in relation to the participation North Korean soldiers in Russia’s war. When reports first emerged of North Korean troops being deployed to Russia in late 2024, the Kremlin responded with a series of denials. Months later, Putin himself officially confirmed the presence of a North Korean contingent. “We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on an equal basis with their Russian brothers in arms,” he commented in April 2025.

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It is easy to understand why Moscow is so interested in enlisting foreigners to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, more than one million Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the start of the full-scale invasion, making the current war by far the costliest undertaken by the Kremlin since World War II.

The human wave tactics favored by Russian commanders require a steady supply of fresh troops, but Moscow is reluctant to conscript large numbers of Russian civilians into the army. A partial mobilization in September 2022 sparked a major backlash, with hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing the country to avoid wartime service. Instead, the Kremlin has focused on sourcing manpower from Russia’s prison population and attracting volunteers by offering increasingly large financial incentives. CNN reports that numerous Russian regions have dramatically increased the amounts they offer to new recruits in recent months amid a decline in volunteers.

There are growing indications that the current approach may no longer be enough to compensate for Russia’s heavy losses on the front lines in Ukraine. The number of new recruits receiving signing-on bonuses during the second quarter of 2025 was the lowest in two years, according to research by independent Russian investigative outlet iStories based on Russian federal budget data. The outlet’s findings indicated that around 38,000 people volunteered for military service between April and June 2025, two and a half times lower than the figure for the same period one year earlier.

The Kremlin’s appetite for foreign fighters is not merely an attempt to make up the numbers. Crucially, Moscow also regards the recruitment of non-Russian troops as significantly cheaper and less politically risky. Since 2022, the Kremlin has established an extensive system of compensation payments for Russian soldiers killed or wounded in Ukraine. None of this applies to foreigners. Likewise, every Russian military death on the Ukrainian front lines risks fueling anti-war sentiment at home, while casualties from faraway lands have virtually no impact on Russian public sentiment.

These factors have encouraged Putin and other Kremlin leaders to view foreign fighters as an expendable alternative to dwindling numbers of Russian recruits. “If a foreigner dies, there are no social payouts and no responsibility. There are no relatives inside Russia who are unhappy with the war, and of course there are fewer dead Russians,” Ukrainian Military Intelligence spokesman Andriy Yusov told US Congress officials in September.

Moscow’s efforts to secure more foreign troops are an indication of the mounting manpower challenges confronting the Kremlin. Russia is still a very long way from running out of soldiers, but Putin has no more easy options as he seeks to replenish his decimated invasion force and continue the war into a fifth year. With declining numbers of Russians prepared to risk their lives in exchange for financial incentives, Putin may have to choose between a deeply unpopular mobilization or a further expansion of Russia’s international recruitment campaign. Neither option is likely to produce the kind of skilled and motivated fighting force capable of defeating Ukraine.

The presence of assorted Cubans, North Koreans, Indians, Africans, and other foreign troops within Putin’s military directly undermines widespread but misleading notions of Russia’s limitless resources. In reality, the Russian army in Ukraine is increasingly overstretched and may be far more vulnerable than Moscow would like us to believe. This should motivate Kyiv’s partners to expand their support for the Ukrainian war effort. Putin currently has no interest in ending his invasion, but the prospect of military defeat could force him to accept the necessity of a negotiated peace deal.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 14, 2025

Tomahawk missiles are Russia’s latest red line. Will Trump call Putin’s bluff?

By Peter Dickinson

Time and again since 2022, Moscow has declared a new red line while warning of the West of nuclear escalation, only to then do nothing when their red lines are crossed. Trump can now call Putin’s bluff over Russia’s latest red line by providing Ukraine with Tomahawks, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet

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NATO must urgently learn from Ukraine’s unique experience of Russian drone warfare as the alliance seeks to address the growing threats posed by Putin’s drone swarms, writes David Kirichenko.

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Without robust intellectual property (IP) protections, Ukraine may lose control of the defense tech innovations that are currently helping to defend the country on the battlefield, writes Andriy Dovbenko.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Today’s global financial architecture was designed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference, which looked to rebuild postwar Europe. But there was no African representation there. Today, the global financial system struggles to meet the needs of a continent that is home to 1.5 billion people—nearly a fifth of the world’s population. African countries still face high borrowing costs, debt distress, and limited fiscal space.

But now, policy forums are looking to reform the financial system to ensure that it works for African countries. One such forum is the Group of Twenty (G20) International Financial Architecture Working Group (IFAWG), a technical working group of the G20’s Finance Track, which focuses on monetary, fiscal, and economic issues. I am participating in the group today in my capacity as an advisor at the African Development Bank. Here’s my analysis on the policy discussions we’re having this year in the IFAWG and why they matter for Africa.

Inside IFAWG

IFAWG was established following the 2008 global financial crisis and is mandated to promote stability in the international financial system. Initially focused on issues including capital flow volatility and crisis prevention, its role has since expanded dramatically. Today, the working group is the G20’s central venue for discussions on sovereign debt and debt sustainability, cost of capital, reforms of multilateral development banks (MDBs), and strengthening the global financial safety net.

The group submits its deliverables to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meetings, and such deliverables ultimately form part of the negotiated G20 communiqué. That’s why African representation in these working groups is so important. These groups are fora where policies are shaped before receiving endorsement at the ministerial level.

This shaping—of both policy and conversation—has increasingly been conducted by African voices, particularly during South Africa’s G20 presidency this year. South Africa chose “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability” as the theme of its presidency, and it has set priorities intended to align with the development needs of the African continent and the Global South. Within IFAWG, such priorities include strengthening MDBs, mobilizing development finance, addressing sovereign debt sustainability and liquidity challenges, reforming the global financial safety net, and enhancing capital flows to emerging markets and developing economies.

Strengthening MDBs and unlocking capital

IFAWG is focusing on strengthening MDBs, as implementing reforms will be particularly important for unlocking much-needed capital at scale. But the MDB-reform agenda has already been underway for some time. It began under Italy’s 2021 G20 presidency, when Italy initiated a review of capital adequacy frameworks, which help banks pinpoint the capital needed to support their assets, liabilities, and risks. By conducting the review, the G20 was looking to boost MDB lending capacity to respond to global challenges. The subsequent Indonesian, Indian, and Brazilian G20 presidencies have built on this work, with Brazil’s presidency specifically devising a roadmap for reforms to enable such banks to better address regional and global challenges—and ultimately help countries achieve their development objectives.

IFAWG, under the South African presidency, has focused its MDB work on a monitoring and reporting framework to track the implementation of these recommendations. Africa’s role in shaping this conversation is crucial for designing financial innovations geared toward the continent’s wants and priorities. For example, to boost MDB lending, the African Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank worked together on a joint proposal to use special drawing rights (or SDRs, global reserve assets maintained by the International Monetary Fund) as hybrid capital. In practice, this proposal would allow advanced economies to channel unused SDRs to the African Development Bank or Inter-American Development Bank, while still counting them as reserves. Subsequently, both banks could then leverage these SDRs to raise more financing on markets, multiplying their impact and providing long-term, low-cost resources for development.

On a broader scale, the G20 at a ministerial level is catching up to the conversations about strengthening MDBs and unlocking capital. This can be seen in G20 support, as expressed in recent communiqués, for the seventeenth replenishment of the African Development Fund—the concessional financing window of the African Development Bank Group, which provides grants and low-interest loans to Africa’s lowest-income countries.

Addressing debt sustainability

IFAWG is paying particular attention to fixing the debt architecture because of the urgency of doing so. African countries, on average, pay a roughly 300-basis-point risk premium on what they borrow from international financial markets, unlike even similarly rated peers. Interest payments alone consume 18 percent of government revenues on average. These are resources diverted from health and education systems, as well as infrastructure projects. Under these circumstances, many African nations find themselves at high risk of debt distress.

The G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatment, launched under the Saudi Arabian presidency in 2020, was meant to provide a structured and coordinated approach to sovereign debt restructuring for eligible low-income countries. Four African countries—Chad, Zambia, Ghana, and Ethiopia—have entered the framework, each navigating complex restructurings with mixed outcomes. Although the framework received much attention for being bold, its execution has drawn criticism for lack of clarity, predictability, and speed.

In response, IFAWG is working to improve transparency and consistency. African voices have played an active role in pushing for predictability, speed, and transparency. Senior government officials are advocating for faster and more transparent debt-resolution processes, more predictable timelines, a fair participation of all creditors, to name a few issues.

Therefore, Africa is not merely affected by these reforms. It is actively shaping them. The continent is proactively engaging in technical debates and, in so doing, is producing foundational shifts on issues ranging from strengthening multilateral development banks to debt restructuring and reducing the cost of capital. As the G20 Leaders Summit nears, Africa’s voice is no longer on the margins; it is at the heart of global financial reform. IFAWG’s work is proof of that.

Sijh Diagne is an advisor to the vice president of finance and chief financial officer of the African Development Bank Group. He participates as a representative of the African Development Bank at the G20 International Financial Architecture Working Group meetings. He previously served as senior advisor to the minister of economy, planning, and cooperation of Senegal and as G20 deputy representing the African Union during Senegal’s African Union chairmanship in 2022.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post African voices are shaping G20 discussions around international financial architecture reform appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Current production of critical minerals is largely insufficient to keep up with rapidly growing global demand for cobalt, nickel, manganese, and other minerals that are essential for new green technologies.

Africa has a significant opportunity to capitalize on the large-scale investments currently unfolding in the global mining sector: Roughly one-third of the world’s metal reserves including copper, cobalt, lithium, and manganese are found there. If the continent can move beyond extraction to maximize value through refining, it has the potential to become a major global hub for the mining industry.

However, the extreme volatility of natural resource revenues leaves African economies vulnerable to external shocks from fluctuating commodity prices, which can lead to substantial economic downturns. Additionally, the capacity limitations and operational bottlenecks within African governments often hinder the effective conversion of resource revenues into productive investments and long-term benefits. Given that minerals are inherently finite resources, there is a risk of declining trade balances as the surge in mineral earnings may be offset by increased imports of goods and services. Concurrently, other sectors of the economy may experience a decline in exports, particularly those disrupted by the rapid expansion of the critical minerals sector, potentially leading to the phenomenon known as “Dutch disease.”

To mitigate these risks, many mineral-rich nations have established sovereign wealth funds as tools for fiscal and financial planning, supporting both short- and long-term policy objectives. The primary purpose of these funds is to manage mineral revenues transparently and sustainably, protecting domestic economies from the volatility of strategic mineral and petroleum revenues while promoting long-term economic stability. Industrialized and developing nations alike have adopted sovereign wealth funds as a mechanism to stabilize government spending, shield against inflationary shocks, and serve as an intergenerational savings tool for finite resources.

In the African context, effective management of natural resource revenues presents a unique opportunity to drive long-term economic development. By adopting best practices, these revenues can be leveraged to invest in human and physical capital, build economic buffers to weather external shocks, and create lasting financial reserves. Transforming mineral resources into financial or physical assets can benefit citizens and foster broad-based economic and social development.

Mamadou Fall Kane is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He also is the deputy secretary of Senegal’s Strategic Orientation Committee for Oil and Gas, a committee created by the president to strengthen the management of natural resources following Senegal’s accession to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives. He was energy advisor to the Senegalese president from 2016 to 2024. He graduated from Sciences Po Paris before completing his education at the Ecole Polytechnique of Paris in economics and public policy. He also holds an executive master’s degree in management and finance in innovation from the University of California, Berkeley.

Report Sep 23, 2025

The critical minerals boom is an opportunity to integrate public health into mining operations

By Connor Gregory, Ciara M. Weets, and Rebecca Katz

Africa is central to the global push for cleaner energy, including the continent’s stocks of critical minerals that power green-energy technologies. But a race to extract more minerals poses public health risks, from the occupational hazards miners suffer to new disease outbreaks in mining camps. There’s a better course for investors and African governments.

Africa Critical Minerals

Report Jul 1, 2024

From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge

By Aubrey Hruby

This report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

Africa Critical Minerals

AfricaSource Mar 27, 2025

Prioritizing access to critical minerals will require prioritizing Africa

By Benjamin Mossberg

Access to critical minerals is an urgent national security issue. The United States must view investments in African energy, mineral, and mining—key to securing this access—with similar importance.

Africa Critical Minerals

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Responsible stewardship models can transform Africa’s mineral wealth into prosperity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the start of Trump’s second term, the US dollar has depreciated by roughly 12 percent against a broad basket of currencies, including many across Africa. For African economies that borrow and trade in dollars, a weaker greenback eases debt burdens and lowers import costs. In this way, a weaker dollar provides these African countries with unexpected breathing room in an otherwise difficult global financial environment.

Why do African countries rely so heavily on the US dollar?

Challenges around public debt in Africa are not a recent development, but a structural feature of the continent’s political economy. For several decades, many African governments have faced persistent difficulties in mobilizing sufficient domestic capital to meet rising expenditure demands. These constraints stem largely from the shallowness of domestic financial markets, characterized by a narrow investor base and underdeveloped institutional investors. Consequently, many countries have relied on external borrowing. 

Instruments denominated in local currencies attract little demand in international markets, compelling leaders to issue debt in foreign currencies—primarily the US dollar, followed by the euro. Relying on foreign currency borrowing exposes governments to significant exchange rate risk, as currency movements remain beyond their control. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation recently estimated that more than 70 percent of Africa’s external public debt is denominated in US dollars.

External debt denominated in foreign currency is a suboptimal financing strategy that amplifies a range of macro-financial vulnerabilities. It is a short-term solution to a long-term problem. Exchange rate risk is the most obvious concern, compounded by the nature of international capital markets. Sovereign debt issued in US dollars by countries other than the United States is typically priced with a risk premium above the benchmark yield on US Treasury securities, due to perceived credit risk and broader investor sentiment toward emerging markets. 

Moreover, African leaders frequently issue debt with relatively short maturities, heightening rollover risk and constraining fiscal space for long-term development planning. This dynamic results in a paradox: Governments rely on a costlier and more volatile source of financing to address structural investment needs that, by definition, require stability and predictability.

How much external debt is there?

The chart below presents the ratio of external debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio for selected African economies, alongside the nominal interest payments denominated in US dollars. In Mozambique’s case, external debt exceeds 300 percent of GDP. Aggregate interest obligations on external public debt across the continent now exceed $23 billion annually. This scale of debt service illustrates the growing fiscal burden associated with liabilities in foreign currency, which divert scarce public resources away from development priorities and render African countries more vulnerable to changes in global financial conditions. 

How much debt is too much?

The ongoing accumulation of public debt in Africa—exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and increasingly frequent extreme weather events—has pushed several countries to the brink of default. According to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 2023 Debt Sustainability Analysis, seven African countries are already in debt distress, while an additional thirteen are classified as being at high risk. At present, the IMF has active programs with twenty-five African countries with approved commitments exceeding 21.5 billion in special drawing rights (SDR)—equivalent to around $30.9 billion. SDR is an international reserve asset created by the IMF, valued against a basket of major currencies, and used to supplement member states’ foreign exchange reserves. 

Among IMF instruments, the most widely used in Africa is the Extended Credit Facility (ECF)—the organization’s flagship concessional lending tool for low-income countries. The ECF provides long maturities, zero-interest financing, and reform support. It is intended to help enable governments to address persistent balance-of-payments pressures and advance structural reforms. Typically, countries request an ECF arrangement when short-term financing proves insufficient to meet prolonged macroeconomic and developmental challenges. The chart below presents a more comprehensive picture of the IMF’s current engagement in Africa.

How a weaker dollar is helping

Any precise assessment of Africa’s external debt trajectory must consider the value of the US dollar. For African countries, where more than two thirds of external public debt is denominated in US dollars, a depreciation of the dollar relative to local currencies temporarily reduces the cost to service debt and creates additional fiscal space for the government. 

In this sense, a weaker dollar provides a measure of relief, not strain. To be sure, the value of a free-floating currency can change rapidly, reversing positive fiscal impact. It is important to note that a weaker dollar can also negatively impact African exports to the United States, as it makes African-made products more expensive relative to the stronger dollar. The trade landscape between the United States and Africa is further complicated by the recent expiration of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a US trade program that grants duty-free access to the US market for thousands of products from eligible sub-Saharan African countries to promote economic growth and development.

The trend of a weaker dollar is likely to continue. Since the beginning of Trump’s second term, the US dollar has depreciated by roughly 12 percent against a set of major African currencies, yielding an estimated $2.3 billion in annual savings on interest payments. This additional fiscal space provides governments with a unique opportunity to either front-load debt repayments or accelerate the implementation of development projects. 

How African countries can seize this momentum

African countries could use the additional fiscal space to pursue front-loading debt repayments. In its April 2025 Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, the IMF commends the region for reducing public debt levels. However, the primary driver of lower public debt has been the GDP deflator—in other words, inflation—followed by real GDP growth, while the nominal stock of debt has remained broadly unchanged. The fiscal savings resulting from a weaker US dollar present an opportunity to accelerate principal repayments, strengthen the fiscal position, and bolster market confidence in the long term.

Another possible use of the extra resources would be to accelerate large-scale development projects aimed at boosting growth in the private sector—while avoiding the subsidization of private consumption—and enhancing productivity. It is important for governments to avoid welfare projects that would increase daily spending, creating long-term fiscal liability when conditions become less favorable. Instead, African governments should seek to leverage their young populations by expanding access to education and digital services, which could unlock innovation potential and lead to sustainable growth. 

Path toward the domestic debt market

In a long-term strategy, echoing the IMF’s recommendations, African countries should intensify their efforts to develop domestic debt markets as the foundation for long-term fiscal sustainability and effective debt management. Strengthening local markets would yield several benefits. First, issuing debt in local currency eliminates exchange-rate risk, insulating public finances from external currency fluctuations. Second, if appropriately designed, domestic markets can facilitate the extension of debt maturities, thereby enhancing stability and predictability in public debt management. Third, a broader domestic investor base ensures that interest payments remain within the local economy, supporting financial sector development and reducing the transfer of national resources abroad.

So, one might ask: What has prevented African countries from working toward a more robust domestic debt market? The answer lies in the complexity of the issue, which requires a long-term plan. Macroeconomic challenges such as a shallow investment base, underdeveloped financial infrastructure, and institutional weaknesses demand a well-anchored strategy. It is important to start this process when fiscal conditions are more favorable. Eliminating central bank deficit financing would be a welcome first step forward.

By most indications, the Trump administration did not set out with the intention to weaken the US dollar. But a reality of the second term so far has been a weaker dollar, and this outcome carries far-reaching implications. For African countries with external debt denominated in dollars, this development offers a welcome reprieve, easing fiscal pressures and creating new policy space. It’s now up to national authorities to proactively seize this opportunity, as the current environment of a weaker dollar may prove temporary. The moment is favorable—decisive action today can translate into lasting economic resilience tomorrow.

Bart Piasecki is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Juliet Lancey, a young global professional at the GeoEconomics Center, contributed research to this article.

The post How a weaker US dollar can help debt-burdened African countries appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The younger “Gen Z” generation is leading the latest protest movement, demanding greater government accountability and structural reforms in the fields of employment, health, and education. The movement represents the largest mass protest the country has seen since the February 20, 2011, Arab Spring uprisings. These demonstrations place Morocco at a crossroads between spectacle and substance, as its youth are no longer content with “bread and circuses” alone. The most anticipated reaction, however, is due this week—with a consequential address from King Mohamed VI to the parliament set for October 10.

A healthy sign in a two-speed country

On September 11, Morocco celebrated the inauguration of its state-of-the-art Prince Moulay Abdellah soccer stadium in Rabat, which has a capacity of 68,500 and a construction cost of over $75 million. This architectural jewel was completed in under two years, just months before hosting the 2025 African Cup of Nations. Three days later, protests erupted in the coastal city of Agadir over medical negligence, leading to the alleged death of several female patients. The incident, along with the stark contrast between the country’s sports ambitions and public health policies, fueled public outrage among Morocco’s youth online, leading to the launch of the #GenZ212 hashtag and calls for protests.

The kingdom lives in a disjointed reality, where the government prioritizes large-scale infrastructure and entertainment projects over the country’s external branding and tourism industry at the expense of investing in servicing its citizens. This reality was best described with the words of the kingdom’s own monarch: “a two-speed country.”

Morocco, for example, is eleventh in the world on the FIFA soccer ranking, yet ranks 120th out of 193 countries in the United Nations’ 2025 Human Development Index (HDI). It is building the largest stadium in the world in anticipation of hosting the 2030 World Cup, yet it still sits in the bottom half globally of the Healthcare Index score. It rose to second place as the fastest bullet train in the world and dropped to ninety-eighth place in the Global Knowledge Index.

Protests in a stable and dynamic country like Morocco, with a historical empire muscle and a proven survival record over the past twelve centuries, should be seen as a positive form of political participation. That’s especially true given the outsized participation of a younger, statistically more apathetic generation—and serves as a sign of a healthy society holding accountable its elected officials amid the apparent failure of performative, spectacle politics. Nonetheless, danger persists if the demonstrations spiral further. The protests have already seen moments of confrontation and vandalism, resulting in casualties, signaling how volatile the situation could become.

A generation searching for the ‘One Piece’

To understand the ongoing demonstrations, it’s essential to understand the generation that drives them. There are nearly eleven million Moroccans between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four, a quarter of whom are NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training), according to a recent study by the Moroccan Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE). The rates are far worse among women and in rural populations. Morocco’s unemployment rate soared to 13.3 percent in 2024, as the economy continues to recover from the COVID-19 crisis, despite achieving significant strides in niche industrial sectors like automotive, aeronautics, and pharmaceuticals. The current Akhannouch government coalition, led by a mishmash of oligarchs and technocrats, vowed to reduce unemployment to under 9 percent and create 350,000 new jobs by 2026, but failed to convince Moroccan youth who grew disenchanted with most political elites.

The numbers place Gen Z as the lowest age group in terms of political participation, with only 33.5 percent of the eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds registered to vote, and 55 percent of the eighteen to twenty-nine age group wanting to emigrate. Still, the massive numbers of youths who took to the streets, paired with their active online engagement, offer a different point of insight on youth political investment. Mobilization content produced on social media platforms like Discord and Instagram demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of political dynamics and a high sense of social justice.

The symbolism used in some social content borrows metaphors from popular culture, such as the Korean series Squid Game or the Spanish drama The Platform—both startling allegories about social injustice and proletarian struggle—confirms the values and aspirations guiding the protests. Similar to Gen Z movements in Nepal, Indonesia, and Europe, there is one Japanese anime that became the main symbol of these protests: One Piece. Moroccan youth seem to identify most with the manga, which tells the story of a brave subaltern youth seeking to defeat the establishment and find a mysterious treasure called the One Piece.

The ‘Zlayji’ versus the ‘Hargaoui’

Gen Z in Morocco, however, is not a homogeneous group, as it comprises several distinct archetypes within the same generation. The Z word, for example, can also apply to the “Zlayji” group of youth. The pejorative term entered the Urban Dictionary in recent years amid the raging cultural war between Morocco and Algeria over heritage symbols, such as the Kaftan, couscous, and Zellij tiles—hence the appellation of Zlayji (tile artisan). A typical Zlayji Gen Z is a fervent defender of Moroccan exceptionalism. He or she unquestioningly supports a supremacist narrative calling for the revival of the glory of the Moorish Empire in North Africa under Moroccan leadership.

The trend, which began as a spontaneous reaction to the ongoing Moroccan-Algerian rivalry, quickly evolved into an ideological tool to further expand the government’s “bread and circuses” posture and disseminate a form of banal nationalism. During the recent events, this group went completely silent, especially the army of online influencers who benefited financially from promoting Morocco’s World Cup ambitions. Others tried to recalibrate and join the new wave, siding with the more peaceful form of demonstrations.

In opposition to this class of neo-chauvinists, another archetype appeared in the kingdom’s public sphere: the “Hargaoui.” The term historically refers to a class of “uncivilized” people who behave against the social norms of politeness and respect for public property and order. The appellation Hargaoui, however, is not exclusive to a particular socio-economic class in Moroccan society, but rather a behavioral profile inherited from the era of “Blad Siba”, which was widespread in non-state-governed areas prior to the colonial encounter with the French and Spanish in 1912. 

The Hargaoui Gen Z never felt ownership of the infrastructure erected in preparation for the African and World Cups, and even actively engaged in vandalizing stadiums, signaling that they do not adhere to the government’s entertainment-focused development model. This group soon took center stage in what started as peaceful demonstrations, dragging the movement into violent confrontations, leading to the destruction and looting of private and public property.

Where we go from here

Initial government reactions show positive signs of containment and readiness to engage in constructive dialogue and reforms. Some even publicly confessed their failure in governing and responding to the aspirations of the new generations. After the demonstrations turned sour, many opposition leaders, such as Abdelilah Benkirane (the former prime minister from 2011 to 2017), who had initially fueled the discord, started calling for restraint and condemning violence. One year before the next electoral cycle, which is due in September 2026, partisan elites have come to understand the significance of youth in their political future and are attempting to appeal to them. Nevertheless, Gen Z has lost hope in the political class and is demanding accountability and the resignation of the current government.  

King Mohamed VI’s address this week will send an important signal on the steps forward. The monarch is largely considered the guarantor of the social contract between elected officials and the citizens and the symbolic “Commander of the Faithful”, according to the Moroccan Constitution. Back in 2011, in the height of the February 20 movement, the king stepped in with bold constitutional reforms and offered a pathway out of the crisis for the country’s Millennial generation. The movement has recently published its petition calling for the King to impeach the government, dissolve certain political parties, and hold public courts to punish fraudulent politicians. These demands pose a real existential conundrum for the very nature of a constitutional monarchy. Such ends will constitute a regression from the gains of the 2011 constitution, limiting the powers of the King in favor of stronger legislative and executive branches, which other generations sacrificed to attain.

An equally crucial response is expected from Crown Prince Moulay El-Hassan, who is actively being groomed for throne succession and is a Gen Z himself. Moulay El-Hassan has been increasingly active in representing his father at important development initiatives, greeting world leaders, and slowly forging a separate, more youthful, and firm public persona for himself. Several protesters have addressed him directly in some of their social media posts and solicited his mediation. 

Beneath the spectacle of gleaming stadiums and bullet trains lies a deeper hunger for dignity, accountability, and equity. Just like the pirates of “One Piece”, Gen Z Moroccans are charting their own course toward justice and belonging. Their quest is not against the crown or the system, but against the illusion that performance equals progress. Whether the Makhzen (the establishment) chooses to listen—or continues dazzling itself with its own reflection—will define the trajectory of an entire nation.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, where she also serves as the center’s deputy director for communications.

The post ‘Bread and circuses’ no more: Morocco’s Gen Z rejects spectacle politics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May 2025, the China Global South Initiative (CGSi), a collaboration between the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, convened a group of twenty-two African environmental experts at the Peduase Valley Resort in Ghana for a three-day workshop on China’s environmental impact in West Africa. This policy workshop, hosted with the support of the Ford Foundation, included representatives from eleven West African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and South Africa. Amid three days of comradery and collaboration, these experts worked together to draft policy memorandums on China’s environmental impact across the region. In the months following the workshop, we worked closely with the authors to curate three briefs—on mining and resource extraction, timber and wildlife, and fisheries and water resources—that identify the challenges and offer actionable policy solutions. We would like to recognize the excellent work of the co-authors who contributed their time and expertise to creating these briefs. In particular we would like to thank the group leaders Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, and Ebimboere Seiyafa and Awa Niang Fall, respectively, for their diligent work.

First and foremost, we would like to thank Caroline Costello, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, for her essential contributions to the workshop in Ghana and this collection of issue briefs. Her tireless efforts were truly essential to the success of the project. Ashley Bennett, events strategy program director of the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, provided critical logistical support across a dozen countries. Alexandra Towns at the Keough School and Cate Hansberry, Beverly Larson, and Jeff Fleischer at the Atlantic Council provided expert editorial support. Guidance from Notre Dame’s Pamoja Africa Initiative helped us identify contributors, and the Kellogg Institute helped support their participation. We would also like to thank the excellent staff of the Peduase Valley Resort for their hospitality during the May 2025 workshop. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our partner, the Ford Foundation, whose support made the workshop and these policy briefs possible. Ford is not responsible for the content of these policy briefs.

Executive summary

Driven by growing global demand for minerals, West Africa has become a major hub for mining. Chinese entities—including individuals and private actors and corporations, some of them backed by state financing—are expanding legal and illegal mining for gold, diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, lead, zinc, stones, and critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and copper. These activities, which range from large-scale commercial ventures to small-scale artisanal mining, often cause serious environmental degradation. In many West African countries, Chinese nationals involved in illegal artisanal mining collaborate with local and transnational criminal actors. While some Chinese operations have created jobs and infrastructure in mining communities, their negative impacts on water resources, forests and biodiversity, livelihoods, health, and food security across West Africa have been profound. National or regional policies and enforcement mechanisms have failed to adequately address the social and environmental impacts of mining in the region. This brief proposes policy recommendations responding to the detrimental social and environmental impacts of Chinese mining in West Africa.

Background

There is growing concern about the detrimental environmental effects of Chinese mining operations in West Africa. Chinese companies exploit policy gaps, weak institutions, and the lack of regulatory enforcement
across mineral-rich West African countries. Their involvement in legal and illegal large-scale corporate mining, as well as the small-scale artisanal mining intended for locals, demands policy responses that strengthen governance and enforcement across the region.

The environmental impacts of Chinese mining activities in the region are complex, evolving, and difficult to fully identify due to the blurred lines between formal and informal mining operations. While industrial-scale mining tends to be confined to specific areas and is somewhat better regulated, illegal small-scale mining operations are poorly monitored despite their environmental and social harms. Chinese actors’ deployment of heavy-duty machinery in small-scale mining has significantly damaged ecosystems, especially forests and watersheds. Ultimately, both large- and small-scale mining have become major sources of environmental degradation, enabled by noncompliance with mining regulations, weak regulatory enforcement, and a lack of accountability and prosecutions for legal violations in the mining sector.

The impacts of these activities are not only ecological but also social. The scale of Chinese mining operations with heavy machinery drive land dispossessions and displacement across the region.¹ Chinese operators in illegal mining often convert farmland, forest, and rivers into mining sites—sometimes forcibly or through collusion with government, traditional leaders, and private landowners—eroding long-standing livelihoods rooted in agriculture and fishing.² The loss of land for farming bananas, rice, potatoes, and other traditional crops undermines food security, fuels social tension, and stokes conflicts between local communities and Chinese miners.³

Weak regulatory enforcement in the mining sector stems from both systemic and political failures. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are underdeveloped, and existing legal frameworks fail to address the complex challenges posed by the involvement of Chinese nationals throughout the formal and informal mining sectors. Critically, there is a lack of political will to enforce existing laws—due in large part to the complicity of state and local authorities. High-level government officials, security personnel, and local leaders often benefit from illegal mining operations through bribery schemes, unlawful permits and licensing, and even ownership of mining equipment and operations.⁴ These activities undermine law enforcement, shielding both local and Chinese violators from prosecution. Compounding the problem is the widespread failure of Chinese mining companies to honor their corporate social responsibility (CSR) agreements. Although mining laws in many West African countries require community engagement and CSR implementation, Chinese company compliance is often absent or minimal, leading to public resentment and straining diplomatic relations between China and countries such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Nigeria.⁵ These problems, detailed in the following section, underscore the urgent need for national and regional policy responses that address regulatory gaps, strengthen enforcement mechanisms, and promote transparency and accountability in the mining sector.

Evidence

The environmental impacts of Chinese mining activities are broad and far reaching, encompassing land degradation, ecosystem destruction, landslides, pollution deforestation, biodiversity loss, desertification, and exacerbating climate change. Chinese miners’ consistent flouting of environmental standards and safety measures has severely damaged forest reserves, farmlands, and water resources. Chinese mining in West Africa is commonly tied to illegal small-scale artisanal operations carried out in collusion with local and transnational actors, including criminal gangs.⁶ These activities have profound consequences across the region.

Deforestation and soil erosion are commonplace across West African mining sites, and pollution of marine and freshwater bodies occurs at multiple stages of mining exploration. Small-scale gold mining causes extensive land degradation and harms water quality.⁷ In Nigeria, Liberia, Mali, and Ghana, Chinese financing has enabled local miners to excavate deeper with bulldozers and use harmful chemicals more extensively.⁸ Local mining workers and artisanal miners are exposed to hazardous mercury, cyanide, arsenic, and fluoride, often due to the lack of proper protective gear.⁹ Wastewater from mining containing these and other toxic heavy metals pollutes soil, groundwater, and rivers in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Mali, where landslides at abandoned Chinese-owned artisanal mines have resulted in fatalities.¹⁰ In Nigeria, lead poisoning in mining sites in Zamfara State in 2010 resulted in about four hundred children falling ill or dying.¹¹ Wastewater discharge onto farmlands from mining reduces crop yields and introduces toxins into the food chain, affecting human and animal health.¹² Many mining communities have reported disproportionate cases of cancer, respiratory infections, waterborne diseases, reproductive disorders, skin disorders, asthma, spontaneous abortions, and birth defects.¹³

In coastal communities where mining is widespread, dredging boats discharge oil, fuel, and chemicals, obstruct riverbeds, cause erosion, and deform watercourses. Chinese mining operations have also released ballast water containing invasive species and toxic waste into marine ecosystems.¹⁴ Harmful runoff in mining sites poisons fish and reduces the size and quality of local stocks. Meanwhile, loss of farmland worsens poverty and undermines food security. In Ghana, the majority of small-scale “galamsey” gold mining sites are run by Chinese nationals, with more than fifty thousand Chinese nationals entering the country between 2008 and 2013 to engage in illegal gold mining. According to the Mankurom Cocoa Cooperative Farmers Association, small-scale gold mining has destroyed more than 100,000 acres of cocoa farmland.¹⁵ In Nigeria, mining-related disruptions have intensified farmer-herder conflicts due to declining access to water and grazing land.¹⁶

Chinese artisanal and illegal mining has also accelerated deforestation.¹⁷ In Ghana, bauxite mining in the Atewa Forest has devastated 5,000 hectares.¹⁸ In Nigeria, mining in forest zones has resulted in significant habitat loss. From 1975 to 2005, Bukuru, Plateau state, lost 63 percent of its forested area due to mining.¹⁹ These forests filter pollution and ensure a steady supply of water to important inland rivers such as the Falémé River (Senegal and Mali), Bagoé River (Côte d’Ivoire and Mali), Tano-Bia Basin (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire), and the Volta Basin (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Togo).²⁰

Chinese involvement in mining across West Africa is linked to organized crime and the proliferation of weapons.²¹ Transnational criminal networks linked to Chinese mining have destabilized mining regions and eroded trust in both local and national governance.²² Illegal mining has also become a funding source for armed groups and terrorists, such as Boko Haram and bandits in the Nigerian state of Zamfara.²³ Illicit gold mining in the Central Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—has been linked to transnational organized crime and instability. The illicit trade in Sierra Leonean diamonds and Malian gold has been tied to criminal syndicates and terrorism.²⁴

While Chinese involvement in mining has supported some job creation, infrastructure development, and technology transfer in mining communities, these benefits are typically accompanied by poor working conditions, low wages, environmental hazards, and labor-rights violations.²⁵ Even when communities negotiate infrastructure projects, the benefits rarely offset the environmental and social damage.²⁶ Numerous cases of inadequate compensation, unpaid royalties, and poor infrastructure have fueled community tensions and intracommunity disputes.²⁷ In Niger, for example, top Chinese oil executives were expelled for failing to adhere to the mining code requiring them to use local subcontractors and laborers
for extraction.

Governance weaknesses exacerbate these challenges. Environmental and natural resource agencies across West Africa are underfunded, lack the independence needed to enforce regulations, and are plagued with corruption.²⁸ Overlapping mandates and poor interagency communication hinder enforcement, while lax licensing systems allow illegal Chinese operations to flourish. Weak coordination between federal, provincial, and local authorities further enables illegal mining to thrive.²⁹ Many countries also lack clear procedures governing the entire process from mineral exploration to mine decommissioning.³⁰ In Nigeria, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia, small-scale mining licenses are often misused for large-scale operations and many Chinese firms operate without proper registration or licenses.³¹ In Ghana, where artisanal mining is restricted to nationals, Chinese actors are heavily involved through local intermediaries.³² Governments frequently issue licenses without consulting or compensating local landowners.³³ In Nigeria and Ghana, vague and controversial land laws allow governments to appropriate land regardless of prior ownership, often keeping marginalized communities from receiving the economic benefits of mineral extraction.³⁴

Even in countries that have environmental impact assessment (EIA) laws—such as Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire—implementation is politicized and inconsistent and rarely results in severe penalties for violators. Officials often exploit the EIA process for personal gain, circumventing pollution-mitigation and land-restoration requirements. In Ghana, EIAs are mandatory for small-scale mining, but enforcement is weak.³⁵ In Nigeria, the process remains opaque, and officials have misled local communities, particularly in areas with high illiteracy.³⁶

This evidence underscores the urgent need for national and regional policies to close regulatory gaps and strengthen enforcement to curb the socioenvironmental consequences of Chinese mining in West Africa.

Policy recommendations

Improve oversight and compliance

• Establish a digital reporting system. To empower reform-minded actors as a counterweight to corrupt elites, civil society organizations should develop a secure, accessible, and digitalized reporting system that includes strong whistleblower protections. Under the banner “See something, say something,” the system should allow for various channels—such as phone calls, WhatsApp, Telegram platforms, encrypted messaging, and dedicated call lines—to report violations and upload images. It should include a robust mechanism for data protection to ensure the safety of whistleblowers and the integrity of reports. Simplicity, reliability, and accessibility should guide its design, and the system should be created in partnership with credible civil-society organizations and community groups that could help provide capacity to investigate the veracity of each report and guard against manipulation by corrupt actors. To demonstrate its effectiveness and have immediate impact, the system should be piloted in select mining regions in which civil society groups and community organizations have existing local relationships. The system could be expanded gradually, region-by-region, with the ultimate aim being the creation of an integrated reporting network throughout West Africa.
• Update and enforce visa regulations for Chinese nationals and strengthen immigration and border controls. To address the poorly regulated licensing regimes and the involvement of Chinese entities in illegal mining, visa requirements and regulations should be reviewed, strengthened, and strictly enforced for Chinese visitors entering the region. Extradition treaties must be updated and enforced to hold foreign violators, including Chinese citizens and entities, accountable for environmental crimes. Locals who help foreign mining firms violate visa laws should be strictly prosecuted under the law.
• Clarify and improve mining license regimes and land tenure laws. Clear, equitable land policies are essential to protect communities from dispossession and ensure fair access to the profits of mining. Governments should review their existing licensing structures to close loopholes and clearly distinguish between different categories of mining operations—both formal and informal. Land tenure laws should be updated and reformed to eliminate ambiguities—particularly around the ownership and use of mineral-rich lands. This will ensure transparency, streamline oversight, and reduce regulatory loopholes for illegal mining.
• Create a regional mining compliance database to monitor implementation of EIA and CSR and identify bad actors. West African countries should establish an online monitoring and evaluation mechanism for all international mining companies operating in the region. The system would be overseen by a multinational committee comprising state and local stakeholders and civil-society organizations, which would conduct random biannual checks to verify compliance and enforcement. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) could develop the database in collaboration with member states.
• Establish mining escrow accounts. This mechanism would ensure that mining companies have set aside sufficient funds for land reclamation and environmental remediation. Firms would pay into an escrow account before they begin mining. If they clean up the environmental destruction associated with their activities, the funds would be returned to them with interest. But if mining companies fail to carry out proper land remediation, then the money in the escrow account would be used to support the cleanup and/or as compensation.

Raising public awareness

• Strengthen public education. Governments and civil society should establish national and sub-national level educational programs to inform the public—especially grassroots actors and traditional leaders—about the health risks and environmental impacts of illegal and artisanal mining. These efforts should include targeted publicity campaigns using radio broadcasts pamphlet distribution, and social media platforms with language-accessible slogans. Mining communities should also be educated about the environmental, social, and health consequences of mining through community meetings and gatherings designed to raise public awareness. These educational initiatives can leverage regular community gatherings and forums, and should be conducted in local languages to reach a broader audience. They could be led by nonprofit and civil-society organizations in close partnership with local health authorities and relevant stakeholders. This collaborative approach would help to effectively communicate medical and environmental risks while fostering greater community awareness and engagement.
• Train and protect journalists. Journalists should receive specialized training by professionals from local and international media and other international community organizations to build capacity for professional and investigative reporting on mining issues involving Chinese actors.

Empower communities

• Form community monitoring committees. Local community groups should be formed and should work in collaboration with security agencies, government bodies, local and international nonprofit organizations, civil-society groups, and the press to distinguish between legitimate (i.e., properly registered and escrow backed) and illegal mining activities. These groups would expose collusion between Chinese entities, local actors, and transnational criminal networks. To prevent corrupt actors from co-opting them, these committees should prioritize transparency and undergo regular reviews and oversight checks by a committee of experts from neighboring countries.
• Register local miners and support cooperatives. Begin a campaign to register local small-scale miners to enhance transparency. Registration could come with access to credit facilities to disincentivize them from relying on Chinese financing. Establish mining cooperatives, or support existing ones, that encourage small-scale artisanal miners to move from illegal to formal mining by helping them apply for appropriate licenses and explaining the harm caused by heavy metals.

International engagement

• Engage the Chinese government. West African governments should establish regular channels for both formal and informal discussions between state institutions (e.g., environmental protection agencies, ministries of environment and natural resources, ministries of mines and energy, minerals commissions, and other such institutions with oversight over minerals and mining), the local Chinese embassy, and their counterparts in Beijing. West African leaders and officials should raise the issue of environmental degradation in discussions with senior Chinese leaders, and it should be placed on the agenda and prioritized at the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and other multilateral meetings with Chinese counterparts.
• Engagement among West African governments. West African governments should establish regular channels for information sharing among their relevant ministries. These mechanisms can be formal or informal, bilateral or multilateral, but their objective should be to exchange timely information—for example, about cross-border bad actors and mining-induced environmental pollution—as well as to coordinate collective action among likeminded officials.

Richard Asante is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics, Development and African Studies at the University of Ghana, Legon. His research focuses on the intersection between politics and development, with particular focus on Africa-China relations, Ghana-U.S security cooperation, natural resource governance, environmental security and communal conflicts, and impact of peacekeeping on domestic and regional security. Asante has been a visiting professor at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Pomona College, Claremont, California, USA, where he taught comparative politics of Africa and peace and security in Africa (2016/2017). He also served as a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow, at the Program of African Studies (PAS), Northwestern University; he taught comparative politics and development in Africa (2012/2013). Asante holds a B.A and M. Phil degrees in Political Science from the University of Ghana, and a PhD degree in Political Science under the Harvard University (Boston, USA)-University of Ghana split-PhD program. He was a special student in the Department of Government at Harvard University, Boston, USA (2008/2009). He is the Regional Manager, West Africa for the Varieties of Democracy.

Joseph Asunka is the CEO at Afrobarometer, a pan- African survey research organization that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy, and social issues across Africa. Joseph’s research interests are broadly in governance and democracy in Africa, with specific interests in elections and electoral processes and public service delivery. Joseph holds first and second degrees in Statistics & Computer Science and Economics from the University of Ghana and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at Los Angeles.

Abosede Omowumi Babatunde is a professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. Prof. Babatunde has been awarded several distinguished academic fellowships including the 2024 Afox Visiting Research Fellow (Africa-Oxford Initiative) in the Merton College and African Studies Centre, University of Oxford, United Kingdom. Her work has been supported by research grants from CODESRIA; APN/SSRC, APSA Centennial Foundation and IPRA Foundation. Her research interests include conflict resolution, natural resources governance, human rights and security, peacebuilding and gender studies. She recently co-authored the book “Managing Violent Religious Extremism in Fragile States: Building Institutional Capacity in Nigeria and Kenya,” Routledge African Governance Series” (recommended by CHOICE and selected for the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Ethiopia Tana High Level Forum Book Launch, 2023).

Joshua Eisenman is a professor of politics at the Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame. His research focuses on the political economy of China’s development and foreign relations with the United States and the Global South — particularly Africa. His latest book, China’s Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement (Columbia University Press, 2023), explains the tactics and methods that China uses to build relations with African countries and contextualizes and interprets them within Beijing’s larger geostrategy.

Francis Egu Lansana is a forward-thinking development enthusiast with technical knowledge in natural resource governance, gender inclusion and leadership. He is an experienced public and private sector manager. He has a strong foundation in current methodologies paired with an understanding of trends and a desire to innovate. His research examines open governance and citizens’ participation in mining concession decision-making. He holds a master’s degree in development studies from Erasmus University, The Netherlands.

Sanusha Naidu is a senior research associate with the Institute for Global Dialogue. Her areas of analysis include democracy, development and the political economy of Africa’s international relations and South Africa’s Foreign Policy. She has also focused her interests on South-South Cooperation and the footprint of emerging powers in Africa. She previously worked at the Centre for Conflict Resolution based in Cape Town and managed the South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI) at the Open Society Foundation for South Africa.

Ogbonnaya Igwe is the chairperson of the Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Research Group, and the Lead of Engineering Geology/Geotechnical Engineering Unit, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is an environmental expat specializing in sustainable environmental protection and disaster prevention/management. He is the coordinator of the ICL-UNESCO Centre of Excellence and Tuning Africa Project in Applied Geology University of Nigeria, Nsukka
and consults for the oil and gas industry in environmental and social impact assessment and environmental evaluation studies projects.

Youmanli Ouoba is a professor of economics at the University of Thomas SANKARA. His research interests are in natural resources management, agricultural development and environmental economics. He is the current director of the Center for Economic and Social Studies, Documentation and Research (CEDRES) of Thomas SANKARA University, Burkina Faso.

Boukary Sangaré is a Malian anthropologist and independent consultant and has conducted several studies for international NGOs working in Mali and the Sahel. He joined the Institute for Security Studies in 2019 as a research consultant. Before joining ISS, he was a program officer for the Peaceful Coexistence, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Program at the Danish Embassy in Bamako. Boukary has worked in the Sahel for the past decade on conflict, violent extremism, radicalization, governance, social mobility and social media.

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebimboere Seiyafa, Awa Niang Fall, Ellis Adjei Adams, Kadidia Kane, Isa Elegbebe Olalekan, Kodjo N’Souvi, and Salamatu Joana Tannor

Chinese companies have rapidly expanded into West Africa’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese demand for timber and wildlife in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, Roland Balgah, Caroline Costello, Moses Fayiah, Jean-Luc Kouassi, and Christine A. I. Nougbodé Ouinsavi

West Africa’s forests are vital for climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and economic growth.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Chinese mining in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May 2025, the China Global South Initiative (CGSi), a collaboration between the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, convened a group of twenty-two African environmental experts at the Peduase Valley Resort in Ghana for a three-day workshop on China’s environmental impact in West Africa. This policy workshop, hosted with the support of the Ford Foundation, included representatives from eleven West African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and South Africa. Amid three days of comradery and collaboration, these experts worked together to draft policy memorandums on China’s environmental impact across the region. In the months following the workshop, we worked closely with the authors to curate three briefs—on mining and resource extraction, timber and wildlife, and fisheries and water resources—that identify the challenges and offer actionable policy solutions. We would like to recognize the excellent work of the co-authors who contributed their time and expertise to creating these briefs. In particular we would like to thank the group leaders Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, and Ebimboere Seiyafa and Awa Niang Fall, respectively, for their diligent work.

First and foremost, we would like to thank Caroline Costello, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, for her essential contributions to the workshop in Ghana and this collection of issue briefs. Her tireless efforts were truly essential to the success of the project. Ashley Bennett, events strategy program director of the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, provided critical logistical support across a dozen countries. Alexandra Towns at the Keough School and Cate Hansberry, Beverly Larson, and Jeff Fleischerat the Atlantic Council provided expert editorial support. Guidance from Notre Dame’s Pamoja Africa Initiative helped us identify contributors, and the Kellogg Institute helped support their participation. We would also like to thank the excellent staff of the Peduase Valley Resort for their hospitality during the May 2025 workshop. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our partner, the Ford Foundation, whose support made the workshop and these policy briefs possible. Ford is not responsible for the content of these policy briefs.

Executive summary

West Africa’s forests are vital for climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and economic growth. They store carbon, protect watersheds, and sustain millions of rural livelihoods. However, accelerating deforestation, habitat loss, illegal wildlife trade, and unsustainable resource extraction—often linked to Chinese actors—threaten these critical functions. Chinese timber companies, agribusinesses, infrastructure developers, and wildlife traders have increasingly contributed to forest degradation across the region. Illegal logging— particularly of rosewood and other valuable timber in Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia— has fueled widespread forest loss, including in protected areas. Driven almost entirely by Chinese demand, rosewood is now the world’s most trafficked illegal wildlife product in terms of both value and volume, surpassing ivory and rhinoceros horn combined. Though Chinese investments in the region’s timber industry have brought some economic benefits, the environmental costs far outweigh the local gains. Largescale land acquisitions and infrastructure projects frequently lead to forest conversion, erode community land rights, and put endangered species at risk of extinction. This policy brief examines the environmental and social impacts of Chinese exploitation of forests and wildlife in West Africa and offers recommendations to strengthen enforcement, promote accountability, and engage Beijing to address these challenges.

Background

West Africa contains some of the continent’s most intact tropical forests, which support more than nine hundred bird species and nearly four hundred species of terrestrial mammals.¹ The region is recognized as a global biodiversity hotspot and hosts 113 key biodiversity areas across countries such as Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, and Cameroon.² However, these ecologically important regions are under increasing threat, with more than 265,000 hectares of forest lost in the past decade.³

A significant driver of this forest loss is the growing footprint of Chinese economic activity in the region. China’s involvement in timber extraction, agribusiness, infrastructure development, and wildlife trade has been linked to deforestation, biodiversity loss, and the breakdown of essential ecosystem services such as climate regulation, water provision, and carbon storage.⁴ The demand for valuable hardwoods, especially rosewood—driven almost entirely by the Chinese market—has led to widespread illegal and unsustainable logging, often in protected areas and forest reserves.⁵

Over the past two decades, Chinese investments in West Africa—estimated at more than $200 billion as of 2021—have expanded rapidly across various sectors.⁶ While these investments have spurred infrastructure development and trade, they have also caused serious environmental damage. In countries such as Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, Chinese firms are frequently associated with both legal and illicit timber operations. In addition, Chinese-backed agribusiness ventures, particularly in rubber and palm oil, have led to extensive land acquisitions and deforestation, undermining traditional land tenure systems and disrupting local livelihoods.⁷

Chinese infrastructure and mining projects have opened previously undisturbed forest and conservation areas, fragmented habitats and weakened the ecological integrity of critical landscapes. These developments often erode community-based forest management practices and contribute to the marginalization of local populations.⁸

Despite existing legal and voluntary frameworks—including forest codes, environmental impact assessment laws, and international commitments such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+, developed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) and the African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative—many West African countries struggle with enforcement due to weak institutional capacity, underfunded regulatory agencies, corruption, limited monitoring, and political interference.⁹ In many cases, Chinese firms bribe local officials to push forward opaque timber and land deals.¹⁰ The co-optation of local elites further shields environmental offenders from accountability.¹¹

There is an urgent need for coordinated national and regional responses to address these challenges. Key policy priorities should include strengthening environmental governance, enhancing transparency in investment and land deals, securing community land rights, and holding Chinese firms accountable for environmental damage. Without these measures, the region’s forests—and the critical ecological and social benefits they provide—will remain at risk from unchecked Chinese firms’ exploitation.¹²

Evidence

The evidence of China’s role in accelerating deforestation and biodiversity loss in West Africa is substantial and alarming. Driven by surging demand for valuable timber and wildlife products Chinese firms have emerged as the dominant foreign actors in the trade. Even when there are existing protections for threatened tree species (e.g., the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), these logging activities, which are often conducted illegally or through weak regulatory channels, have far-reaching consequences for ecosystems and rural livelihoods.¹³

At the heart of the crisis lies demand for rosewood, a valuable tropical hardwood used in traditional Chinese furniture. According to the Environmental Investigation Agency, rosewood is now the most trafficked illegal wildlife product globally—by both value and volume—surpassing ivory, rhinoceros horn, and big cats combined.¹⁴ The value of rosewood exports from West Africa to China was estimated to have surpassed $2 billion between 2017 and 2022, with logs fetching on average more than $20,000 per metric ton in 2021.¹⁵ China’s domestic market demand drives rampant logging in West Africa, with an estimated 70 percent of logging in Ghana, 65 percent in Cameroon, and 56 percent in Nigeria classified as illegal.¹⁶ Despite an export ban, Ghana sent 540,000 metric tons of rosewood to China between 2012 and 2019—equal to six million trees or about 2,000 acres of forest loss.¹⁷

The financial losses attributed to illegal timber harvesting are staggering. The World Bank estimates that illegal logging deprives source governments worldwide of between $7 billion and $12 billion annually.¹⁸ In 2018, illegal deforestation cost countries approximately $4,000 per hectare in lost tax revenue, ecosystem degradation, and social conflict.¹⁹ Each year Nigeria loses $191 million to $383 million in tax revenues; Cameroon loses $51 million to $103 million; Côte d’Ivoire loses $38 million to $76 million; and The Gambia loses $4 million to $9 million.²⁰ The illegal rosewood trade—driven by corruption, the misuse of licenses to recover trees downed by storms or construction, and weak oversight – has been particularly profitable.

Criminal and extremist networks use profits from this illicit trade to fund their operations. As of 2020, more than 1 million trees were illegally harvested and sent to China from Senegal’s Casamance region, helping to fund separatist groups such as the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance.²¹ In Mozambique, the rosewood trade fuels al-Shabab militants linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).²² Chinese smugglers source rosewood from Nigerian regions controlled by Boko Haram, allowing the group to profit.²³ In Mali, despite a 2020 national export ban, nearly 150,000 tons of rosewood—equivalent to 220,000 trees—were exported to China.²⁴ In Mali, al-Qaeda-linked Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin militants profit by controlling access to rosewood forests.²⁵

Corruption plays a central role in sustaining the illegal timber trade. Chinese companies often operate through shell firms or local agents to obscure accountability.²⁶ Regulatory enforcement remains underfunded and inconsistent, while laws requiring environmental impact assessments for logging are frequently bypassed or ignored. Forestry agencies and customs offices are often compromised by corruption.²⁷ One of the most egregious cases happened in Nigeria in 2017, when Chinese customs authorities intercepted 1.4 million illegal rosewood logs valued at $300 million, facilitated by nearly $1 million in bribes to Nigerian officials.²⁸ Chinese-funded infrastructure also contributes to deforestation.

Chinese-funded infrastructure also contributes to desforestation. Chinese-financed roads, ports, and dams often cut through protected areas, offering loggers access to previously unreachable forests. Operating through local intermediaries, Chinese timber companies extract high-value hardwoods such as rosewood, teak, and ebony either illegally or through legal loopholes. Based on geospatial analysis, approximately 10 percent of Ghana’s critical forest reserves and 11 percent of Côte d’Ivoire’s over-lap with Chinese-sponsored infrastructure.²⁹ One of the most contested cases is Ghana’s Atewa Forest Reserve, a biodiversity hot spot threatened by Chinese bauxite mining.³⁰ Despite strong civil-society opposition, the government proceeded with road construction in anticipation of mining operations, causing significant environmental degradation including forest fragmentation, incursions into conservation zones, and habitat destruction. Deforestation disrupts rainfall patterns, accelerates erosion, and increases the frequency of droughts and floods, undermining agricultural productivity in a region where 70–80 percent of rural livelihoods depend on farming.

Large-scale agricultural ventures compound these impacts. In Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Cameroon, Chinese agribusinesses have cleared vast tracts of forest for rubber, palm oil, and rice cultivation. Free, prior, and informed consent policies are on the books in all of these nations, requiring consultations with indigenous peoples and local communities.³¹ But agribusinesses routinely ignore such requirements. In
Cameroon, Sudcam (a subsidiary of China Hainan Rubber Group) cleared more than 10,000 hectares between 2011 and 2018 and contributed to 45,000 hectares of deforestation.³² These enterprises displace communities without proper compensation.

In addition to timber, China’s demand for exotic wildlife has turned West Africa into a hub for global wildlife trafficking. Since 2015, Nigeria has been China’s primary source for ivory and pangolin scales. Between 2018 and 2023, seizures in Nigeria included more than 30 metric tons of ivory and 167 metric tons of pangolin scales, equivalent to at least 4,400 elephants and hundreds of thousands of pangolins, respectively.³³ While West African countries are signatories to relevant international frameworks like CITES, which monitors the trade in endangered wild animals and plants, in many West African countries sales continue due to weak enforcement, corruption, poor monitoring, and lack of effective local regulatory mechanisms.³⁴

China has responded to criticism of its global development and infrastructure initiatives by releasing voluntary environmental sustainability guidelines, including the 2017 Guidance on Promoting a Green Belt and Road and the 2021 Green Development Guidelines for Overseas Investment.³⁵These guidelines encourage Chinese firms to abide by host country laws, but they lack enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, China’s 2019 Forest Law discourages illegal timber imports but lacks provisions for supply chain oversight. Firms can evade prosecution by claiming ignorance of illegality.³⁶ A 2022 draft regulation aims to apply aspects of China’s domestic Forest Law to its international practices, but it lacks the enforcement mechanisms necessary to make the international supply chain traceable.³⁷

In short, China’s timber harvesting, infrastructure construction, agriculture investments, and wildlife trade have contributed significantly to deforestation and biodiversity loss in West Africa. The convergence of high domestic Chinese market demand, weak governance across West Africa, lapse enforcement within China, and corruption has created a perfect storm of environmental degradation. Addressing this behavior requires a strong political commitment to combat criminal activity and shift the incentives that drive the market for illegally traded wildlife products. To address the problem, African countries must coordinate policy responses across the local, regional, and international levels. For its part, China should adopt and strictly enforce mechanisms that ensure responsible practices toward West African forests and wildlife.

Policy recommendations

Improve oversight and compliance

• Disclose environmental and social impact assessments. To enhance transparency and facilitate oversight. West African governments should require all foreign investments in logging, agribusiness, and infrastructure to conduct and publicly disclose their environmental impact assessments. These results must be made available to relevant local authorities prior to project approval.
• Improve legal transparency. Publish a national land and concession registry that includes all foreign allocations and permits. Ensure contracts are clearly defined, legally binding, and aligned with national conservation laws. Update land tenure legislation to protect customary rights and require public registration of all foreign land concessions. Strengthen customs enforcement in African countries, shared border points, and Chinese ports to prevent the export and import of unverified timber and endangered species.
• Establish escrow accounts to ensure reforestation. Require licensed logging and agribusiness firms to deposit funds into escrow accounts dedicated to ecological restoration. Funds should only be released upon verification of reforestation or land rehabilitation by either a certified private institution or the relevant state agency, depending on relevant laws and regulations. If companies fail to restore the land, the funds should be redirected to local communities for remediation and compensation.
• Create national whistleblower systems. Develop national level secure, multilingual tools—such as short message service (SMS) platforms, mobile apps, and anonymous hotlines—for communities, nongovernmental organizations, and forestry workers to report illegal logging, land grabs, and wildlife crimes. Rather than rely entirely on global reporting platforms that may be inaccessible, national and local level platforms would enable faster and real time detection of illegal logging for prompt action by relevant subnational institutions. Enforce strong legal protections for whistleblowers and environmental defenders. Partner with international bodies such as Interpol, TRAFFIC (a network of two hundred experts on the trade of wild species), and CITES to verify and investigate reported violations.

Raise public awareness

• Support regional civil-society coalitions. Fund and strengthen regional and national coalitions of civil-society organizations that monitor Chinese forestry investments and expose violations of national laws and regulations. Recognize land governed and managed according to traditional community-based systems and build local capacity to negotiate fairer contracts. Equip community actors with tools including drones, Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, and mobile reporting apps to document and report illegal activities in real time.
• Train and protect environmental journalists. Work closely with local and transnational civil society organizations to provide training for local journalists to investigate the illegal timber trade, land seizures, and biodiversity threats linked to foreign investments. Training should focus on developing investigative methods, digital security, environmental law, and data-gathering. National and regional safety support programs should be made available to journalists, including emergency legal support, and encrypted communication platforms for those facing threats or harassment.

Regional cooperation

• Adopt a regional forestry code of conduct. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should establish a binding regional code of conduct that sets minimum environmental and social standards for all foreign investments in terms of forests and biodiversity. This framework could be modeled on the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) polices of the European Union or United Kingdom, and include voluntary partnership agreements.³⁸ Collective regional action can encourage individual reform-minded leaders to act as a counterweight against corrupt local officials.
• Create a regional public forestry investment database. Establish and maintain an online database that tracks foreign licenses, timber exports, and environmental violations. Under ECOWAS auspices, this platform should become a regional information hub that documents licensing status, compliance records, and audit outcomes. The intention is to enable public oversight of Chinese and other foreign firms operating in forest and critical biodiversity areas.
• Enhance international coordination. Set up an ECOWAS task force to regularly exchange information on West African forest and wildlife resource exploitation. The task force would facilitate intelligence sharing on illegal timber trade routes and identify specific violations and bad actors. It could facilitate joint investigations into cross-border violations in shared forests such as the Upper Guinea region, which traverses Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea. The group would publish an annual report for ECOWAS members states and make specific recommendations to member countries. The task force could form a collective negotiation platform in collaboration with national forestry commissions to engage Chinese state-owned enterprises and private investors.
• Work with China. Create formal and informal dialogue channels among African environment ministries, ECOWAS, and Chinese embassies and companies to address logging violations and environmental disputes. To enhance contract transparency, the equitable sharing of benefits, and improve oversight, urge Beijing to make its Green Development Guidelines for Overseas Investment mandatory. West African governments should push China publicly and privately to implement timber supply chain tracing and to regularly publish customs data on timber imports into China.

Roland Azibo Balgah is professor of development studies at the University of Bamenda, Cameroon, and visiting professor at Sol Plaatje University, South Africa and University of Cologne, Germany. As a social economist, he researches on the human-nature sustainability nexus, with thrust on hazards, poverty and livelihoods, and sustainable development in Africa.

Caroline Costello is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Costello worked on the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program. In previous roles, she has taught English in Xiting, China; interned with the Peace Corps, the Department of State, and Save the Children; and served as the head of Learning Enterprises, an international volunteer program which sends students to teach English in underserved communities abroad.

Moses Fayiah is a forestry lecturer at the Department of Forestry and Wood Science, School of Natural Resources Management, Njala Campus, Njala University, Sierra Leone and has over 10 years of professional experience. He is also the executive director of Universal Consulting Services and the Forum for Environment, Biodiversity and Climate Change in Sierra Leone. His research interests include forest regeneration, sustainable forest management, climate change, forest policy and ecosystem restoration and conservation.

Jean-Luc Kouassi is an assistant professor of forestry and environmental management at the Felix Houphouet-Boigny National Polytechnic Institute (INP-HB) of Cote d’Ivoire with a decade of experience in cacao agroforestry, fire ecology, and GIS. His research explores the intersection of agriculture and sustainability, focusing on climate change mitigation, community empowerment, and sustainable landscape management.

Christine Ajokè I. N. Ouinsavi is a professor at University of Parakou (Benin), where she coordinates doctoral training in natural resources management, chairs the Scientific Committee of Natural Sciences and Agronomy, and leads the Forestry Studies and Research Laboratory. Her research focuses on ecology, agroforestry, climate change, biodiversity conservation, forest management and restoration in tropical regions. As former cabinet minister she led national policies in trade and education, chaired critical commissions, and participated in international negotiations.

Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh is an Associate Professor in in ecology and sustainable management of land at Nangui Abrogoua Universiy, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. He has an extensive experience in stakeholder engagement, feasibility studies, and strategic planning. He is currently involved in projects for the sustainable management of tree-based cash crops agroforestry and other climate smart cropping practices. He is also in dialogue with various ministries responsible for forest, agriculture, and the environment in Côte d’Ivoire to provide science-based insights into their activities and develop integrated management plans for the sustainable management of agroecological landscapes.

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebimboere Seiyafa, Awa Niang Fall, Ellis Adjei Adams, Kadidia Kane, Isa Elegbebe Olalekan, Kodjo N’Souvi, and Salamatu Joana Tannor

Chinese companies have rapidly expanded into West Africa’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese mining in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Richard Asante, Joseph Asunka, Joshua Eisenman, Fancies Egu Lansana, Sanusha Naidu, Igwe Ogbonnaya, Youmanli Ouoba, and Boukary Sangare

Chinese entities are expanding legal and illegal mining for minerals in West Africa.

Africa China

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Chinese demand for timber and wildlife in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May 2025, the China Global South Initiative (CGSi), a collaboration between the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, convened a group of twenty-two African environmental experts at the Peduase Valley Resort in Ghana for a three-day workshop on China’s environmental impact in West Africa. This policy workshop, hosted with the support of the Ford Foundation, included representatives from eleven West African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and South Africa. Amid three days of comradery and collaboration, these experts worked together to draft policy memorandums on China’s environmental impact across the region. In the months following the workshop, we worked closely with the authors to curate three briefs—on mining and resource extraction, timber and wildlife, and fisheries and water resources—that identify the challenges and offer actionable policy solutions. We would like to recognize the excellent work of the co-authors who contributed their time and expertise to creating these briefs. In particular we would like to thank the group leaders Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, and Ebimboere Seiyafa and Awa Niang Fall, respectively, for their diligent work.

First and foremost, we would like to thank Caroline Costello, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, for her essential contributions to the workshop in Ghana and this collection of issue briefs. Her tireless efforts were truly essential to the success of the project. Ashley Bennett, events strategy program director of the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, provided critical logistical support across a dozen countries. Alexandra Towns at the Keough School and Cate Hansberry, Beverly Larson, and Jeff Fleischer at the Atlantic Council provided expert editorial support. Guidance from Notre Dame’s Pamoja Africa Initiative helped us identify contributors, and the Kellogg Institute helped support their participation. We would also like to thank the excellent staff of the Peduase Valley Resort for their hospitality during the May 2025 workshop. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our partner, the Ford Foundation, whose support made the workshop and these policy briefs possible. Ford is not responsible for the content of these policy briefs.

Executive summary

Overfishing by Chinese trawlers poses a serious threat to West Africa’s rich fisheries and water resources, endangering regional food security, national economies, and local livelihoods. Chinese companies— including state-backed firms and private actors—have rapidly expanded into the region’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters. Hundreds of Chinese vessels now fish off the West African coast, primarily between Senegal and Mauritania. These vessels are much larger than the artisanal canoes used by local fishermen and easily outcompete them. The expansion of Chinese companies’ fishery operations and overfishing in the region strains marine and freshwater ecosystems and undermines longstanding livelihoods of traditional fishing communities. Chinese vessels employ bottom trawling and other destructive methods, which—combined with limited oversight and poor enforcement of national and transboundary laws—have caused severe environmental degradation and declining fish stocks, weakened local economies, and deteriorated coastal water quality. At the same time, inland fish populations—especially in transboundary rivers such as the Falémé, Niger, and Volta—continue to decline due to runoff pollution from Chinese companies’ illegal mining operations. This policy brief examines the ecological and social risks posed by Chinese trawlers’ fishing in West Africa, and offers policy recommendations to strengthen legal protection and enhance regional cooperation to safeguard the region’s fisheries and water systems.

Background

Fisheries and aquaculture are vital to West Africa’s food security and economy—contributing more than 15 percent of regional gross domestic product (GDP), with Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana accounting for 70 percent of total production.¹ Fish are the main source of animal protein for more than 60 percent of households in the region, which produces 32 percent of Africa’s annual fish catch and 21 percent of its aquaculture in Africa.²

In recent decades, growing concerns have emerged among environmental experts, national policymakers, and coastal communities in West Africa about the environmental and socioeconomic effects of China’s expanding role in the region’s fisheries and water resources. Chinese firms’ involvement— driven by the depletion of domestic fish stocks—now extends throughout West African countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), major rivers, and shared transboundary watersheds.

Small-scale, artisanal local fishermen are no match for the larger, more powerful Chinese trawlers, which engage in both legal and illegal fishery activities, often exploiting weak local regulations, limited enforcement capacity, and the complicity of corrupt local actors.³ The lack of coordinated monitoring
and limited presence of enforcement agencies, such as coast guards or marine patrols, have enabled these fleets to operate with minimal oversight.⁴ China’s sizeable investments in industrial fishing—backed by state subsidies, low-interest loans, and tax exemptions—has resulted in growing instances of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in West Africa, ultimately undermining the long-term sustainability of the region’s fishery stocks.⁵

Besides fishing, Chinese companies’ activities in mining, dredging, and infrastructure development compound pressures on water quality and aquatic ecosystems, with direct implications for fishery sustainability. Gold mining operations, particularly those involving mercury and cyanide, have contaminated rivers and their fish with harmful chemicals.⁶ Bucket excavators used in mining operations deposit oils, fuels, and alluvium into riverbeds, which causes erosion, changes the shape of river channels, and damages ecosystems. Dredging also stirs up sediments, turning clear water murky. This increased cloudiness, known as high turbidity, makes water hazardous for drinking and affects aquatic ecosystems.⁷ The consequences of mine-related pollution extend to upstream catchments and transboundary river basins with socioeconomic and ecological importance, including the Tano-Bia Basin (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire), the Falémé River (Senegal and Mali), and the Bagoé River (Côte d’Ivoire and Mali).⁸

West African governments face structural obstacles in addressing Chinese vessels’ impact on fisheries and water resources, including under-resourced enforcement agencies and outdated legal frameworks that hinder effective regulation and governance. Corruption—particularly at the local level, where Chinese fishers sometimes pay communities not to report illegal fishing and mining—weakens oversight.⁹ Political and business elites with vested interests in fishery ventures involving Chinese companies often obstruct reform or weaken enforcement. Moreover, the presence of non-state armed groups in key maritime zones, such as the Gulf of Guinea, hampers monitoring and leaves fisheries and waterways increasingly vulnerable to exploitation by Chinese trawlers.¹⁰

These governance challenges are further compounded by West African states’ dependence on loans from China’s state-owned banks and infrastructure projects, which have reduced their bargaining power and undermined their ability to hold Chinese companies accountable. Despite the existence of regional initiatives such as the Economic Community of West African States Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) and the African Common Fisheries Policy, implementation has remained weak.¹¹ Taken together, these impediments to enforcement leave marine and freshwater sectors neglected, allowing the associated environmental and social devastations to persist.

Evidence

China’s fishing fleet is currently considered the largest in West Africa, with nearly 17,000 vessels and annual catch amounting to roughly $3.8 billion.¹² Chinese vessels benefit from state subsidies and advanced fishing technologies, enabling them to overwhelm local fisheries, leaving artisanal fishers unable to compete. In Ghana, local fishermen in wooden canoes have drowned after their small boats capsized in the wakes of large Chinese vessels.¹³

Many Chinese fishing companies exploit poorly regulated licensing systems to conceal vessel ownership, engaging in joint partnerships with local actors, operating through local intermediaries, or registering as subsidiaries of local operators.¹⁴ Using local companies as legal fronts allows Chinese firms to circumvent fishing license laws that prevent foreign vessels from operating within national EEZs.¹⁵ Meanwhile, local corruption and collusion between China’s fishing operations and local political elites further stifles law enforcement.

Chinese industrial vessels operating in West African waters often fish in prohibited zones and use illicit practices such as dynamite, illegal nets, and chemicals that harm marine life and pollute waters.¹⁶ The impacts of these destructive techniques on local coastal communities in West Africa are profound. In Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana, which account for 70 percent of the region’s fish production, foreign vessels dominate the industry, undercutting local economies and ecosystems.¹⁷

Due to illegal fishing, small-scale fishers, many of them women working in fish processing and sales, face declining catches and rising unemployment.¹⁸ Illegal fishing has led to over 300,000 losses in artisanal and traditional fish related jobs in West Africa. In 2018, illegal fishing cost Nigeria an estimated $70 million.¹⁹ In Ghana, Chinese firms’ fleets engage in saiko, a form of illegal fishing in which industrial trawlers deliberately catch and resell small, juvenile fish at sea.²⁰ By catching undersized fish, they undermine the sustainability of fish populations in the region’s marine ecosystems. This illegal fishing practice threatens the livelihoods of coastal communities that rely on sustainable fishing for survival.²¹

The abuse and neglect of local workers is common on Chinese fishing vessels. Interviews by the Environmental Justice Foundation found that 94 percent of Ghanaian crew members received inadequate medicine or witnessed verbal abuse.²² One fisherman claims that he was treated like a “slave”: beaten, spit on, starved, forced to drink dirty water, and witnessed the deaths of three other African fishermen due to neglect and abuse.²³ In Ghana and Senegal, local communities have reported labor violations and bribery involving local officials—practices that undermine local governance and strain relations between China and West African countries.²⁴

Industrial pollution is another major concern. Chinese vessels and processing plants routinely discharge harmful waste into both marine and inland waters. Pollution from Chinese-owned fishmeal factories has been reported in The Gambia, where the process contaminates inland waters, killing fish and precipitating the collapse of some local lagoons.²⁵ Gold mining operations, particularly those involving mercury and cyanide, are a public health menace, contaminating rivers and groundwater and threatening both fish and crops. Chinese companies dredging and mining operations have polluted and deformed the Falémé River in Senegal and Mali and the Bagoé River in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, reducing the productivity of local fisheries and farmlands.²⁶ China’s infrastructure development has further complicated water governance. The construction of the Lekki Deep Seaport in Lagos, for example, has severely disrupted local water and fishery ecosystems.²⁷

Efforts by individual countries—such as Ghana’s Fisheries Commission and Nigeria’s new Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy—have been undermined by weak institutional capacity and limited financial investment.²⁸ In Togo, understaffing and poor coordination among fisheries and water institutions undermine enforcement despite the country’s accession to the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) to combat illicit and unregulated fishing.²⁹ The presence of armed groups in the Gulf of Guinea inhibits enforcement officers’ ability to conduct the surveillance and monitoring necessary to curb illegal activity and protect marine sovereignty.³⁰ These multilayered security challenges underscore the urgent need for national and regional policy interventions to improve oversight and safeguard the sustainability of fisheries and water resources by regulating Chinese fishers exploitation in the EEZs of West African countries.

Policy recommendations

Strengthen governance and legal frameworks

• Implement stricter penalties. Penalize local fishing companies that collaborate with Chinese trawlers to circumvent fishing license laws and other environmental policies. Fines, vessel confiscation, and blacklisting mechanisms should be introduced for companies and individuals acting as intermediaries to enable illegal fishing or the dumping of waste and pollutants into marine and freshwater systems.
• Revise outdated fisheries and water resource policies. Update policies and laws to reflect current realities including the rapid expansion of industrial-scale overfishing, invasive ballast discharge by foreign vessels, and plastic waste pollution. Policymakers should engage all relevant stakeholders—including small-scale fishers, processors, local nongovernmental organizations and local communities—to revise existing laws and policies. New laws should clearly outline regulatory loopholes and specify new monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to address them.
• Invest in the navy and the coast guard. To better monitor China’s illegal fishing activities along their coasts and EEZs, West African countries should invest in increasing the capacity—through better equipment and training—of their navy, coast guard, and other maritime security and enforcement agencies. Port authorities, coast guards, and inland water management units must be trained and incentivized to enforce existing environmental standards effectively and consistently.
• Work with the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC). The SRFC, based in Dakar, Senegal, should grow its policy influence in West Africa by coordinating closely with member states to develop regional policies and guidelines for dealing with overexploitation. The SRFC can become the regional hub for the harmonization of fishery laws, joint patrols, and shared resource management.

Improve regional monitoring and surveillance

• Develop a regional real-time monitoring system to track water resources, illegal activities, and waste dumping. The system should integrate satellite data, citizen reporting platforms, and automatic identification systems (AIS) to create a comprehensive monitoring web across the Gulf of Guinea and key river basins. AIS are positional awareness systems used to identify ships and provide additional information such as location, speed, intended port of call, prior identities, and activity history. They give authorities a full view of ships’ likely involvement in illegal fishing activity.³¹ Ghana has already employed AIS tools as part of its Vessel Viewer pilot program, and has seen success in strengthening its monitoring, control, and surveillance operations.³² AIS should be made mandatory for all industrial vessels operating in West African EEZs, with remote data made accessible to national and regional authorities.
• Develop public reporting systems. Growing public anger and grassroots activism have the potential to force governments to respond to these challenges, even if elites prefer the status quo. Highly publicized labor abuses, coupled with increasing resentment toward corrupt officials, exact a reputational toll. Civil society campaigns should seek to channel this anger into action, standing up platforms that allow citizens to anonymously report bad actors, including vessels, companies, complicit government officials, and intermediaries involved in illegal fishing or toxic waste disposal. This system should offer multiple online reporting options. This system should begin on the national level with an eye toward expanding to the regional level. By democratizing the response to this problem, civil society leaders can diversify oversight away from a small group of corrupt actors and elite gatekeepers. By demonstrating to officials that the desire for public monitoring is widespread, a successful reporting system will also be a mechanism for generating greater political will for change.

Promote sustainable fisheries agreements and mechanisms

• Empower the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote transboundary cooperation on shared waterways. Joint watershed management programs should be established to address shared pollution risks, dam regulation, and hydrological data sharing. This should begin with transboundary river systems such as the Volta Basin, the Falémé, and the Tano-Bia. ECOWAS could promote multilateral agreements and provide a multinational venue for promoting data sharing and enabling enforcement transboundary agreements. Working multilaterally can help override local elite resistance, as reform-minded officials can justify enforcement by citing binding regional commitments and reputational risks within ECOWAS.
• Negotiate regional fisheries agreements with China that prioritize the interests of coastal communities. Enforced under ECOWAS, these regional agreements should emphasize environmental sustainability, verifiable catch quotas, mandatory gear and equipment specifications, and designated no-fishing zones.

Ellis Adjei Adams is an associate professor of geography and environmental policy at the Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame. With background in both social and natural sciences, his research examines the social, political, institutional, and governance dimensions of environmental and natural resources, particularly water. He currently conducts research in Ghana, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, and the United States.

Awa Niang Fall is full professor of physical geography at Cheikh Anta Diop University, in Dakar, Senegal. Since 2010 she has been involved in the African Networks of Centres of Excellence on Water Sciences Project, and leads the Master/UNESCO Chair on Integrated Management and Sustainable Development of West African coastal zone (Master GIDEL). Since June 2022 she has been coordinating the European Union-funded GoNEXUS project on behalf of UCAD, covering 6 river basins in Europe and Africa.

Kadidia Kane is a Malian civil servant working at the Mopti Regional Hydraulics Directorate. She holds a degree in hydrogeology engineering and a master’s degree in integrated water resources management. She currently serves as Head of the Water Resources Inventory and Management Division within this directorate, where she is involved in all activities related to water and related resource management.

Kodjo N’Souvi holds a master’s degree in economic analysis and policy and a doctorate in agricultural economics, majoring in fisheries economics and management. He is currently working as post-doctoral research associate at the College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Ocean University, China. His major area of research includes economics of aquaculture, namely shrimp, the socioeconomics of small-scale fisheries, sustainable fisheries, aquaculture development, and climate change.

Isa Olalekan Elegbede is a distinguished environmental assessment, planning, and sustainability expert focusing on marine sustainability and the blue economy. He is the Deputy Chair of IUCN/CEESP/TGER, Switzerland, and a Future Earth Coast (FEC) Fellow. Dr. Elegbede plays a key role in shaping policies for sustainable fisheries management and marine governance through his contributions to the Central and South Atlantic Regional Scientific Research Working Group and as a co-chair of the GEO BON Blue Planet Fisheries Working Group.

Ebimboere Seiyefa is a lecturer at Baze University in the department of international relations and diplomacy, with a background in politics, governance and security in West Africa. She has worked with Conflict Research Network West Africa, ACLED, NATO Southern Hub and USIP, amongst other institutions, to advance human security initiatives towards a peaceful West Africa.

Salamatu J. Tannor is a certified Mining HSE Professional with an interdisciplinary background in natural sciences. She is currently working as postdoctoral research associate at the Faculty of Life Sciences, Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences Kleve, Germany. Her research interests include the interactions of global economic systems such as mining and agribusinesses with other socio-ecological systems (people & water) within rural landscapes.

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese demand for timber and wildlife in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, Roland Balgah, Caroline Costello, Moses Fayiah, Jean-Luc Kouassi, and Christine A. I. Nougbodé Ouinsavi

West Africa’s forests are vital for climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and economic growth.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese mining in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Richard Asante, Joseph Asunka, Joshua Eisenman, Fancies Egu Lansana, Sanusha Naidu, Igwe Ogbonnaya, Youmanli Ouoba, and Boukary Sangare

Chinese entities are expanding legal and illegal mining for minerals in West Africa.

Africa China

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Sun, September 28, 2025 • 4:00 pm ET

Former Senegalese President Macky Sall on Africa’s rising global role

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Former President of Senegal and Chairperson of the African Union Macky Sall discusses Africa’s economic and security outlook.

Africa Economy & Business General Africa North & West Africa

Giving the African continent permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is “the right thing to do,” argued former Senegalese President Macky Sall. “The continent has to be involved in the management of crises.”

Sall, who is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s International Advisory Board, gave his take on the UNSC debate during a Front Page event hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center on Monday, as the UN General Assembly continued in New York. The former African Union chairperson, speaking in French throughout the event, argued that for the Security Council to serve everyone, it will need to have permanent members representing Africa.

He pointed to the Ezulwini Consensus, a proposal backed by the African Union that calls for at least two permanent seats (with veto power) and five total nonpermanent seats for African nations. But Sall, a previous chairperson of the African Union, said that before this consensus becomes reality, African nations will need to determine how they will allocate seats.

“Africa must organize itself so that . . . when the time will come, we’ll be ready so that Africa can find its right place,” he said.

Below are more highlights from Sall’s conversation with Julian Pecquet, US correspondent with Jeune Afrique/The Africa Report, in which Sall outlined the challenges facing the African continent, from climate and energy uncertainties to debt crises.

A just transition

• Sall said it is “completely unjust” to argue that developing countries in Africa shouldn’t tap their fossil-fuel resources, considering the continent has produced less than 4 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.
• “We can’t condemn Africa,” Sall said. “Africa has to continue to exploit its natural resources to be able to develop itself, to be able to industrialize.”
• Sall said that while African governments are considering non-fossil-fuel-based sources of energy, such as nuclear, such sources require “basic infrastructure” that the continent sorely lacks. “We need railways, we need bridges, we need the nuclear power plants,” he explained.

Debt dilemma

• Yet, the loans currently available for building such infrastructure “are short-term, and the interest rate is very high,” Sall said, raising fears among African leaders of landing in a debt crisis. “It’s not how we rebuilt Europe” after World War II, he said, pointing to the US-funded Marshall Plan.
• With Africa’s infrastructure financing gap estimated at up to $108 billion, Sall said that more private investment and public-private partnerships could make financing needed infrastructure easier. But, in the end, “it’s necessary to change the financial architecture of the world,” he said.

Keeping the peace

• Sall said that Africa will continue to grapple with security challenges, including the “terrorism that is plaguing the whole continent today.” He added that Sahel countries in particular “have to spend a lot of their resources to fight,” meaning they have less money for development-related initiatives such as education and health.
• As several Sahelian states experienced coups d’état over the past few years, Sall said that the Economic Community of West African States—which once included these Sahelian countries—struggled to respond to the crisis and impose sanctions.
• And now, since Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have left and formed the Alliance of Sahel States, Sall said that it is important to “maintain dialogue” between the two regional bodies to avoid “consequences” that would result in citizens losing important benefits, such as freedom of movement.

The youth wave

• Sall pointed to one final challenge: Harnessing Africa’s talented youth. He pointed out that the continent’s population is set to surge, yet trained young people often leave the continent seeking opportunities elsewhere.
• “One in four in the future is going to be an African youth,” Sall said, “so we should not waste our time just consuming things that are already being produced and put on the market. We have to invest ourselves into training.”

Katherine Golden is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post Former Senegalese President Macky Sall on designing an international architecture with Africa in mind appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Limited access to electricity has long constrained both quality of life and economic growth across much of Africa. About 42 percent of the continent’s population still lives in homes without any access to national grids, mini-grids, or even standalone renewable systems.^{1 2} With 19 percent of the world’s population, Africa accounts for just 3.1 percent of global electricity demand.³ Indeed, the majority of people without access to electricity live in sub-Saharan Africa.⁴ This depresses living standards and stymies commercial and industrial development across the continent.

Average annual electricity consumption in Africa (excluding South Africa) was just 180 kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 2021, compared with 6,500 kWh in Europe and 13,000 kWh in the United States.⁵ Most people in sub-Saharan Africa consume less electricity in a year than an average US fridge.⁶ Power supplies in the region are not only inadequate, they are often unreliable, with outages a feature of life from Nigeria to South Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa also has the lowest per capita gas consumption of any region, at less than one-quarter of the global average,⁷ and accounts for just 4 percent of global gas demand.⁸

According to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 7, UN member states committed to achieving “access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all” by 2030. This target will not be reached by that date as the current pace of progress is nowhere near fast enough to connect 600 million African people in the next five years. Still, a growing number of African governments are pushing for universal access to electricity for their countries, and helping them succeed should be a global priority.

It is critical to tackle this challenge now while electrification efforts are being stepped up and over half the African population has access to electricity at home for the first time. Moreover, a significant increase in power generation will be needed to achieve universal electrification at a time of massive demographic growth. The United Nations forecasts that the population of sub-Saharan Africa will grow from 1.3 billion at present to 2.2 billion by 2054 and 3.3 billion by 2100.⁹ Power demand will expand even further with the adoption of electric vehicles and construction of new data centers.

It is technically possible to rapidly increase African electrification rates through renewables backed up with battery energy storage systems (BESS), hydroelectric schemes, and geothermal power (where available). Yet change on such a scale would require massive global investment that is not a realistic prospect in the foreseeable future, particularly given the recent drastic cuts to international aid budgets by some western governments.¹⁰

Africa’s untapped and associated gas reserves can provide part of the solution by supporting renewable energy in boosting electrification rates.¹¹ Although gas-fired generation is typically more expensive than solar,¹² it delivers the baseload, round-the-clock capacity needed to fuel a rapid increase in intermittent renewable energy production. What’s more, there is a substantial amount of gas expertise in Africa, as gas is the continent’s primary source of electricity, accounting for 43 percent of production in 2024.¹³

In response to the climate crisis, fossil fuel output will taper down, but some production will continue for many years. Emissions from gas-fired plants are at least half as high as those from coal, making gas a driver of climate change. Yet the African continent accounts for such a small proportion of global per capita emissions that new gas projects on the continent would be fair and justified where they would have a demonstrable impact on living standards and where failing to develop them would act as a brake on electrification efforts. Moreover, as this report will demonstrate, gas appears to be either a necessary or commercially viable option only in specific African countries.

Gas-to-power projects carry high upfront investment costs but are often easier to finance when attached to big export projects. The United States and Qatar, in particular, are investing heavily in new liquefied natural gas (LNG) production capacity to satisfy global demand, but European gas markets are keen to secure new sources of supply to displace piped Russian gas, and many Asian countries are switching from coal to gas-fired generation. As a result, there is scope for both new African LNG plants and pipelines under the Mediterranean Sea that could support power production in much of West Africa, while also generating export revenues for Nigeria.

Securing financing for African gas projects will be a crucial challenge, especially in light of the high capital costs for operating projects on the continent and investors’ reluctance to fund hydrocarbon schemes in recent years. However, the new African Energy Bank and the Trump administration’s support for oil and gas investment could make a considerable difference. US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said in March that the United States would partner with African governments and companies to support the development of projects using natural gas and other energy technologies, including by providing capital.¹⁴ Indeed, the Trump administration acted quickly to approve $4.7 billion in funding from US Export-Import Bank for TotalEnergies’ Mozambique LNG scheme.¹⁵

This report will set out why it is reasonable for Africa to develop its own gas reserves to drive electrification, explain how gas can fit into a broader energy transition on the continent, examine which countries would benefit from developing gas projects, and discuss the relationship between gas exports and local consumption. It will conclude with recommendations for how all stakeholders can utilize the continent’s natural gas resources to promote electrification at the lowest possible climate cost.

What role should natural gas play in Africa’s energy transition?

Most African countries account for a tiny proportion of global emissions but desperately need improved power supplies

¹⁶

Developing new gas-fired power plants in Africa to boost living standards and promote industrial growth would help the continent achieve a just energy transition.¹⁷ While effort should be made to rein in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Africa as elsewhere, the energy transition burden of each country should be based on its absolute per capita emissions rather than year-on-year changes in its emissions. The world’s poorest countries, including most African states, have played a very small role in driving climate change, and Africa is responsible for just 3.7 percent of carbon emissions from burning fossil fuels—a far lower per capita share than any other region.¹⁸ Per capita carbon emissions in 2021 stood at 1.04 metric tons/year in Africa, four times less than the global average of 4.69 metric tons/year¹⁹ and far lower than the US average of 14 metric tons/year.²⁰

New African gas-fired power projects should be developed where they can help speed up much-needed electrification, particularly as new fossil fuel projects continue to be developed elsewhere. The United States plans to ramp up domestic oil production,²¹ while China began construction of 94.5 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-fired power plants last year.²² By contrast, South Africa—which has the biggest installed generating capacity on the continent—has a total generation capacity of just 63.4 gigawatts.²³

In the United States, after years of negligible new gas-fired capacity, developers are building a string of gas plants, leaving some to wait up to seven years for delivery of gas turbines.²⁴ A single Texas power company, NRG Energy, said on May 12 that it plans to acquire 13 GW of gas-fired generation capacity²⁵—seven times the total generating capacity of Uganda.

It was anticipated that a series of planned terminals would boost US liquefied natural gas (LNG) export capacity from 90 million metric tons per annum (mtpa) to 200 mtpa²⁶ even before President Trump lifted the ban on new projects. New gas-fired plants are also being developed in Europe, with 20 GW of new capacity planned in Germany by 2030.²⁷ It is therefore difficult to expect African countries to refrain from developing projects when the big polluters are failing to do so.

Asking low-emitting, energy-poor countries to forgo gas development while wealthier countries continue to expand their production capacity is hypocritical. According to the World Economic Forum in 2020, tripling African power production using gas-fired plants would only add 1 percent to global emissions.²⁸

Per capita emissions in most African countries are “lower than what is compatible with a 1.5C degree world, so even if they grow substantially, the continent would not exceed its fair share of emissions,” wrote a leading researcher on the need to assess Africa’s energy transition strategies on a country-by-country basis.²⁹

It is possible to integrate more natural gas within a broadly low emissions power sector

It is difficult to overstate the energy poverty of most of sub-Saharan Africa. With some notable exceptions, particularly in South Africa and North Africa, most of the continent has constrained access to reliable power supplies. It is easy to argue that this energy poverty should be overcome by focusing entirely on clean energy. The continent could leapfrog gas use and expensive gas infrastructure, in favor of moving straight to green technologies, in the same way that it has in large part bypassed landline technology in favor of mobile telecommunications. Solar should certainly be the centerpiece of power strategies in most African countries, considering the continent represents 60 percent of the world’s solar potential,³⁰ and yet it produced just 4 percent of all solar power in 2024.³¹

Africa also has attractive wind resources, although in more limited areas that include South Africa, Morocco, and Egypt. Geothermal energy is another very attractive contribution to any generation mix: It is a renewable source of energy that provides baseload energy because it is “always on.” However, it is available in only a few African countries, mainly along the line of the Great Rift Valley and most notably in Kenya.

BESS can store solar energy and then release it into grids for two to four hours to cover evening peak demand. Long duration energy storage (LDES) projects hold the promise of stabilizing longer-term fluctuations in intermittent power production.

Immediate and substantial investment is needed in these technologies, but they alone cannot achieve 100 percent electrification in many African countries in the near future. Solar power, for instance, may be cheaper than gas-fired capacity per unit of energy³² and will become even cheaper over time, but it does not produce power outside of daylight hours.

The BESS sector is at an early stage of development in Africa, as costs remain high and expertise low. As for LDES, the only commercially viable technology today is pumped storage hydro, which involves moving water between two reservoirs at different levels: The water is released downhill to drive turbines to generate electricity when it is most needed and then pumped back uphill during lower-cost periods when other technologies are productive. Pumped hydro storage helps to balance grids but is a net consumer of electricity and is technically feasible in only specific geographical areas.

A comprehensive rollout of BESS and LDES should make 100 percent clean energy in Africa possible one day, but most African countries will need a greater baseload power capacity to balance out intermittent sources of power production for a long time to come. Consequently, in the interim, they must be allowed to develop gas-fired generation capacity.

Key power sector terms:

• Baseload technologies operate 24/7 except when they are undergoing maintenance. These include oil, coal, and gas-fired projects, geothermal power plants, and hydroelectric schemes, although output falls during periods of prolonged drought.
• Intermittent technologies produce variable amounts of power: Solar power plants produce electricity only during the day and wind farms when the wind blows.
• Battery energy storage systems (BESS) store surplus power, usually from solar projects during the daytime, to release it into the grid when needed, often in the evening.
• Back-up power projects help maintain supplies when other forms of generation are lacking. These can include BESS, small-scale diesel generators, and even some gas-fired technologies that can be used only when required. However, building an expensive gas-fired plant for occasional use only is not commercially attractive without additional system payments. These payments are allocated to generators to reward them for being available to support the grid, in addition to each kilowatthour of actual electricity they produce, particularly during periods of peak demand.

More gas can complement the rollout of low emissions technologies. Developing new gas-to-power projects alongside renewables could help drive access to electricity in many African countries over the next decade. The renewables sector has taken off in a small number of African countries, led by South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco, with large projects currently in development elsewhere on the continent. Yet gas and renewables should not be viewed as an either-or choice: gas-fired projects can be paired with renewable energy and large hydro to provide grids with reliable power where renewable energy penetration is increasing.

Gas-fired plants could be used as back-up for solar and wind power, but this secondary role risks making construction commercially unviable in most markets. Financing is only likely to be secured for gas projects that provide baseload capacity;³³ still, these plants could be downgraded to back-up in the longer term.

Replacing back-up diesel generators with gas-fired capacity offers the added benefit of reducing GHG emissions. At present, millions of African homes and businesses rely on diesel generators to provide electricity when their national grids fail to meet demand. These generators produce 74.14 kilograms of CO2 per million British thermal units (Btu) compared to 52.91 kilograms for gas-fired capacity.³⁴

Fossil fuel power plants, whether gas, coal, or oil-fired, currently provide 75 percent of all electricity in Africa, with 25 percent coming from clean energy (7 percent from solar and wind and most of the remainder from hydro). And yet, 54 percent of new capacity added between 2020 and 2025 was clean energy.³⁵ Coal-fired power plants are the second biggest power-generation technology in Africa (after gas), but the picture is skewed because of its dominant role in South Africa, which hosts 84 percent of African coal-fired capacity.³⁶ Africa’s coal consumption has remained flat over the past two decades, and little new coal-fired capacity is planned, as highly polluting coal is increasingly overlooked.³⁷

Hydro schemes provide round-the-clock electricity but are devastated by droughts and generally not classified as renewable energy projects because of the impact on local communities, flora, and fauna during construction and flooding.

Building a diverse generation mix is a strategic method of balancing out variations in power production. As a result, new gas sector investment should not be made at the expense of renewable energy investment and must be seen as one element of a generally low emissions generation mix.

The benefits of technological diversity, including natural gas, can be amplified by greater cross-border power integration. For example, building high-capacity transmission lines to connect neighboring national grids allows electricity to be moved from areas of surplus capacity to areas of shortage. This helps each area focus on its strengths and even out variations in production. Similarly, a prolonged drought in one country may not affect hydro reservoirs in other countries, while gas-fired plants can stabilize power supplies over a wider area. There is already evidence of cross-border efforts, with power pools­ (where neighboring states share power production to some extent) at various stages of development in Southern, East, and West Africa.

Increased gas use in Africa has many potential benefits

Improving access to electricity, including via gas-fired power plants, will help boost living standards and drive economic growth in Africa, especially for the poorest half of the population that currently lacks any access at all. Consider the enormous benefits of having electricity: Even very small amounts enable children to do their homework in countries where it is dark by 7:00 p.m., medicines to be safely stored at the necessary temperatures, and electronic devices to be charged.

Restricted access to electricity and natural gas hampers efforts to attract manufacturing and industrial investment. Rising labor costs are driving manufacturing offshoring from China to Southeast and South Asia but not yet to Africa, partly because the continent lacks adequate infrastructure. Even if the electrification of industrial processes using renewables is likely in the long term, relying on gas produces lower emissions than coal in industrial processes such as steel and aluminium smelting.

Natural gas is important in the production of nitrogen-based fertilizers, both as a source of energy and as a direct input. At present, African fertilizer production is inadequate to satisfy national and continental market demand at prices farmers can afford, with average use in the sub-Saharan region less than 20 kg/hectare, compared to the global average of 135 kg/hectare.³⁸

Gas use can also yield important environmental benefits. In South Africa, unlike most other countries, synthetic fuels provide the bulk of its liquid fuel needs, with most synthetic fuel produced from coal but some from natural gas.³⁹ Switching more of this production from coal to gas would cut emissions.

Using gas for cooking, often in the form of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), can substitute for kerosene and biomass (such as wood fuel), which contribute to 3.2 million annual deaths from household air pollution and accidents worldwide.⁴⁰ Biomass use also drives deforestation and reduces an environment’s ability to absorb carbon. In 2022, 970 million Africans, or 67 percent of the continent’s population, lacked access to clean energy for cooking.⁴¹

Switching to gas from coal improves air quality. Although natural gas produces roughly 50 percent of the GHG emissions of coal plants, it has other environmental benefits, particularly in terms of lower air pollution. Gas produces virtually no sulfur dioxide emissions or fine particulate matter,⁴² whereasparticulate matter from coal use results in 42,000 deaths a year in South Africa.⁴³

Improved access to electricity, including from gas-fired plants, would support some climate change mitigation strategies, including water desalination plants, air conditioning, cold storage, and the concrete and steel used in resilient infrastructure.⁴⁴ Finally, in the longer term, gas sector pipelines could be converted to transport green hydrogen—produced using renewable energy—to offer continued use by tapping a lower-emissions energy resource compared to natural gas.

On both climate and economic grounds, commercial outlets for gas that is currently flared are needed. Non-associated gas on hydrocarbon fields is only produced in order to be used, but gas is also associated with oil and other hydrocarbons, such as natural gas liquids, where it can be commercially marketed, reinjected to aid oil production, or flared to dispose of it. Flaring creates emissions without any commercial benefit and releases more than 350 million tons of CO2 worldwide, more than Egypt’s total emissions in 2023.⁴⁵

In addition to ending gas flaring, the global warming impact of gas projects can be minimized by reducing methane leakage during LNG transport and through carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS). CCUS involves storing carbon from gas-fired power plants and industrial facilities underground, or using it in commercial projects, including in synthetic fuel production.

The commercial rollout of CCUS is only starting to take off worldwide, and it will likely be many years, if ever, before its use is prevalent in Africa. All CCUS options require increased energy use, additional equipment, and state support on early-stage projects.

The ideal generation mix varies greatly among African countries

Decisions relating to the role of natural gas should be made on a country-by-country basis. Because conditions are not uniform across the continent, there is no single approach that should be implemented in all markets.

Some African countries have already launched universal electrification programs. Kenya’s push to hit the 2030 SDG 7 target is discussed later, while twelve countries, including Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) and Nigeria, published detailed plans in January 2025 to connect more people to their respective grids.⁴⁶ Yet the best route to achieving full connectivity varies from country to country.

Each country’s energy transition must be feasible within the context of its economy, geography, and natural resources. Rather than offer “unhelpful generalisations,” the international community must “embrace and support nuance and country-specific analysis,” as Youba Sokona, author and vice chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, said in 2022.⁴⁷

If universal, reliable electrification can be achieved in the medium term without recourse to natural gas, then new gas-fired plants should be avoided given their relatively high life-cycle emissions. However, countries with relatively low electrification rates and significant gas reserves should be encouraged and supported in building gas-to-power projects.

Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Tanzania would all fall into this category. Gas-fired plants would be particularly useful in Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, and Congo-Brazzaville because they flare large amounts of gas. It would also apply to West African countries that can reap the benefits of the coastal gas pipeline between Nigeria and Morocco, which has been proposed to remedy the generally low electrification rates across the region.

Nigeria has enough gas to reach 100 percent electrification—hopefully in conjunction with more rapid renewables development—but gas industry growth has been hampered by attacks on gas infrastructure and low regulated domestic prices.

Algeria has achieved 100 percent electrification but could divert gas that is currently flared to provide additional generation capacity.

Flaring is a problem in Libya and Egypt as well, but financing new power plants in conflict-torn Libya would be difficult, while Egypt is struggling to balance gas exports with domestic requirements. Countries with existing upstream gas operations already have the infrastructure and expertise in place to support new gas-to-power projects. Investment there should focus on transmission connections between gas fields, power plants, and other industrial offtakers or buyers.

Ahead of the 27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27), hosted by Egypt in 2022, academics from fifty institutions, including many in Africa, produced a paper calling on the Global North to stop thinking of the continent as a “homogenous collective” with similar energy needs and a common route to net zero.⁴⁸ The research, published in Nature Energy, compared the situation in four African countries: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa.⁴⁹ The researchers offered the following recommendations for balancing electrification with climate concerns in those countries:

• Burkina Faso should opt for a combination of solar and diesel projects. The country has a limited power grid, high power costs, and restricted access to finance, so smaller-scale, local solar and diesel projects are favored in addition to improved cross-border transmission connections, rather than building expensive gas import infrastructure. With an electrification rate of just 20 percent, the country needs to focus on cheap and quick solutions.
• Ethiopia can continue to rely on large hydro, having built 5,250 MW of dam projects over the past decade, with another 12,000 MW in the development pipeline.⁵⁰ The hydro sector now provides 90 percent of its electricity and can be complemented by growing solar and wind power investment. Ethiopia can also use hydro schemes as batteries to compensate for variation in intermittent power production, so gas is unlikely to play a role here.
• Mozambique should develop gas reserves for domestic supply alongside LNG projects to provide the baseload capacity needed to balance intermittent renewables production and increase the electrification rate from the current 44 percent.⁵¹ Providing that security challenges in the far northeast of the country are overcome, Mozambique is set to become one of the world’s biggest emerging LNG exporters, so dedicating a small proportion of gas for power and fertilizer production could significantly boost living standards. The government is backing new gas-fired capacity while banking on off-grid solar for rural electrification.
• South Africa should combine solar and wind projects with BESS because it would be cheaper and faster than building gas-to-power plants to move away from king coal. The country already has one of the most developed renewables sectors on the continent and is currently developing its first utility-scale BESS projects.

It might be expected that South Africa would be an ideal candidate for gas sector investment. Coal provides 81.6 percent of its generation mix, so switching coal for gas would substantially cut emissions. South Africa produced 394 million metric tons of carbon from all fuel combustion in 2022, the most on the continent, 1.2 percent of the global total and a 40 percent increase over 2021.⁵² Fuel combustion emissions come from thermal power generation and internal combustion engine vehicles, with coal plants accounting for 83 percent.⁵³

Previously developed South African gas-fired power plants have suffered from lack of gas feedstock, and domestic gas reserves are limited, so efforts to reduce emissions have focused on renewables. Power utility Eskom plans to build a 3,000 MW gas-fired power plant near Richards Bay backed by an LNG import terminal by 2030, with a smaller terminal planned for Ngqura. Yet, import projects have fallen through in the past, and gas is unlikely to play a big role in South Africa.

Research by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) in 2022 concluded that gas will not be needed for South African power sector within the next decade—in part because solar and wind power was 57 percent cheaper than gas-fired plants⁵⁴ and short lead times for developing solar projects make them an attractive response to the country’s ongoing power supply crisis. South Africa also has 2,832 MW of pumped storage capacity out of national capacity of 63.4 GW to act as LDES.⁵⁵ The IISD also found that coal-fired plants can provide back-up capacity in the medium term, while three-hour BESS facilities are 30 percent cheaper than simple cycle gas plants—the most suitable gas plants in this instance—for covering peak demand.⁵⁶

Still, gas imports could play a growing role in South Africa’s synthetic fuels industry. Sasol, a South African producer of synthetic fuels, currently uses 185 petajoules (PJ) of gas a year, of which 160 PJ/yr is imported by pipeline from southern Mozambique. As these fields become exhausted, alternative sources of gas are needed, including recent discoveries of domestic gas.⁵⁷

Kenya, like South Africa, is a country where gas-fired plants are unnecessary, and it is on track to achieve universal electrification by 2030, with the electrification rate rising from 37 percent in 2013 to 79 percent in 2023. Geothermal, hydro, wind, and solar power accounts for 90 percent of power production, with geothermal and hydro plants providing baseload capacity.⁵⁸ Kenya’s 985 MW geothermal capacity is the fifth highest in the world.⁵⁹ Plans to build coastal Kenyan gas-fired plants are intermittently proposed and shelved but such projects are optional rather than essential.

Should Africa focus on gas exports or intra-African demand?

More new gas reserves have recently been found in Africa than anywhere else in the world

Africa accounts for just 6.46 percent of global gas output, producing 265 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2023, of which 115 bcm were exported out of the continent.⁶⁰ This compares with global production of 4,100 bcm.⁶¹ Four countries—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria—account for 80 percent of Africa’s output. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that African demand will grow by an average of 3 percent per year, reaching 187 to 246 bcm by 2030 and up to 437 bcm by 2050.⁶²

Roughly 40 percent of natural gas discovered worldwide between 2015 and 2024 was in Africa, mainly in Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, and Tanzania.⁶³ Namibia is the latest country in Africa to join the list, with Shell and TotalEnergies making big offshore oil and gas finds. Routine gas flaring is banned under Namibian law, so the gas will either have to be reinjected or commercially marketed. With 246 bcm identified to date, the government of Namibia aims to implement a common gas plan across all fields, including for local power generation and petrochemical production.⁶⁴

African gas is used on the continent for cooking and synthetic fuel production and in various industrial processes but mostly for power generation. The share of gas-fired capacity in the African generation mix has steadily increased from 20.82 percent in 2000 to 43.13 percent in 2024. In many cases, gas-fired power plants are connected to gas fields by dedicated pipelines, but Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria all have more comprehensive distribution networks that are capable of supplying gas to a high number of different customers, large and small. Oil and gas companies need long-term offtake supply contracts with local utilities to invest in downstream gas operations, but signing ten- or twenty-year contracts is a huge commitment for those utilities. Energy subsidies and regulated prices help reduce prices for consumers but deter investment. According to the International Gas Union, about 55 percent of Africa’s natural gas consumption is sold at prices below the cost of supply as governments try to make gas and power more affordable for consumers.

Financing for electrification is currently far from sufficient

Developing gas-to-power projects and associated gas transmission and power grid capacity is expensive. According to the IEA, Africa must double its annual power investment to $200 billion by 2030 to achieve universal electrification while meeting climate change pledges.⁶⁵

African governments and utilities have limited access to financing for new gas and power projects, while capital costs for African projects are often up to three times those in other countries,⁶⁶ so the sector urgently needs access to external sources of low-cost finance. Foreign investment is therefore key, whether from commercial investors, the multilaterals, development finance institutions (DFIs), or donors.

Gas-to-power projects in less wealthy countries may not generate enough income to justify construction. Moreover, long-term gas contracts can lock African power utilities into relatively high-cost thermal power at a time when solar energy costs are falling in the region with the best solar resources on the planet.

Environmental, social, and economic risk assessments need to be thorough because of the risk of asset stranding in what are mostly small markets. Although Mozambique and Senegal have large gas reserves to develop for exports, both countries are burdened by a high cost of capital and national debt—and low levels of experience in the sector—so they could be outcompeted by lower-cost exporters.⁶⁷

Financing from the multilaterals and international banks for African oil and gas projects has become scarcer because of climate concerns, but a new source of funding was launched in June 2025. African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the Africa Petroleum Producers’ Organization set up the African Energy Bank with initial capital of $5 billion, although it was established to support the entire hydrocarbons sector rather than specifically gas-to-power projects.

Egypt has focused on gas

• International engineering companies are prepared to develop large gas-fired plants in Africa under sufficiently attractive terms of investment. In 2018, Siemens and Egyptian partners Orascom Construction and Elsewedy Electric completed the world’s three biggest combined cycle gas-fired plants: Beni Suef, Burullus, and New Capital, which provided a total of 14.4 GW out of national capacity of 59 GW in 2022.⁶⁸
• Alongside a contract to build six power substations and other transmission infrastructure, they were built for the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, which estimates that they save the country more than $1 billion a year.⁶⁹ Siemens’s involvement was crucial to financing as it was able to secure loan agreements from two export credit agencies, Germany’s Euler Hermes and Italy’s SACE, to underpin loans from more than thirty international banks.⁷⁰

African gas exporters favor LNG

The majority of Africa’s gas markets are small and fragmented and have relatively low regulated prices, so it is no surprise that exports drive most investment. Gas can be exported from Africa by pipeline or as LNG, which involves cooling gas to a concentrated, liquid state for sea transport. Such projects require the construction of expensive liquefaction plants in producing countries and regasification facilities in destination markets, but they are generally considered cheaper than piping gas over very long distances. They are also the most flexible form of export, as producers are not tied to specific export markets.

Algeria and Libya both export gas to Europe via subsea pipelines, while both—along with countries further south—also ship LNG. Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Angola have traditional onshore LNG plants, but Africa has become a global center of floating LNG (FLNG) development, which entails placing LNG production vessels on offshore gas reserves.

FLNG projects are smaller than their onshore counterparts, but they avoid onshore security difficulties, can be moved to other locations if required, and enable the development of gas reserves that might be flared. Projects are already operating in Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique, Senegal/Mauritania, and Cameroon. Eni is developing a second FLNG project offshore Congo-Brazzaville and planning a second project in Mozambique, while the UTM Offshore FLNG project is being planned for Nigeria’s deepwater Yoho field, where it would use gas that is currently flared.

A huge onshore project designed to host production for two different consortia has been partially built in northern Mozambique. Work was suspended in 2021 following militant attacks, but TotalEnergies and the other developers plan to restart work this year.⁷¹ Equinor and Shell hope to finalize arrangements on a huge project in southeastern Tanzania. Africa already contributes almost 10 percent of the global LNG supply,⁷² but if both of these projects are completed, it will make the southern Tanzania/northern Mozambique region a global engine of LNG production.⁷³

With global gas demand rising, US and Qatari LNG production is accelerating, with 350 bcm expected to be added to the world’s 2024 output of 670 bcm by 2030.⁷⁴ The scope for African LNG projects beyond those already underway, therefore, may be limited.⁷⁵ As with gas-to-power projects, export schemes—whether piped or LNG plants—could stall because of lack of market capacity.

Piping Nigerian gas to Europe could benefit most of West Africa

In addition to their cost, long-distance, cross-border pipelines are difficult to develop due to the number of stakeholders involved—from the supplying to transit and receiving countries. At present, the most high-profile proposed projects in Africa are two rival schemes to pipe gas from the Niger Delta to Algeria and Morocco for onward transportation to Europe. These projects, however, are taking very different routes.

The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP), under discussion since 2022, would run 4,000 km through Niger to Algeria. Backed by two state-owned oil companies, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company and Algeria’s Sonatrach, it would have capacity of up to 30 bcm per year. Although the project would connect big reserves with huge markets, the core challenge will be security in the face of a range of armed groups operating across the Sahel. Similar security concerns have deterred construction of the proposed Turkmenistan-India pipeline through Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1990s.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, efforts are ongoing, with Penspen energy consultants agreeing to update a feasibility study into the TSGP in 2025, nineteen years after completing its initial study.⁷⁷ The desire of European nations to end their long-term reliance on Russian gas may make development more likely this time around.

The rival Africa-Atlantic Gas Pipeline (AAGP) would run around the West African coast and enable onshore connections to eleven countries between Nigeria and Morocco: Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Gambia, and Mauritania. Gas could be supplied to all of the transit countries as well as European customers.

The challenge with AAGP will be reaching sales and transit agreements with so many countries—not to mention security issues, including on the final stretch through contested Western Sahara. Like the TSGP, this 6,000-km project would have a 30 bcm/year capacity.⁷⁸ The governments of Morocco and Nigeria plan to form a special company to drive project development.

Abuja and the project developers must guarantee that supplies to the Nigerian market are not curtailed and ensure that gas is ring-fenced for domestic use at commercially viable prices. If the AAGP succeeds in providing gas feedstock to the eleven transit countries, this could make it the most important piece of infrastructure on the entire continent.

Gas exports can aid rather than block local consumption

Many question whether gas export projects divert production from African markets or help make domestic supply commercially viable. The answer largely comes down to the political will of host governments to demand that developers consider local as well as export needs. The oil and gas companies that develop LNG projects are attracted by export revenues and deterred from domestic markets by their often limited size and low regulated prices.

African governments, of course, are keen to see LNG projects developed. The planned Tanzanian⁷⁹ and Mozambican⁸⁰ schemes promise the biggest ever single investments into each country, delivering benefits in terms of taxes and royalties to job creation, but it is critical to ring-fence a portion of production for local distribution.

Choosing to export gas or use it for local supply is not a binary decision. The domestic requirements will be small in relation to export volumes and can help drive domestic power generation. Ensuring that gas production benefits local communities can also foster a sense of social and resource justice. For instance, developing LNG projects in northern Mozambique while leaving most locals without access to electricity would be neither just nor sensible given the region’s militant insurgency.

Several governments, including Nigeria, Tanzania, and Senegal, already require that some gas from export-focused projects be set aside for the domestic market. For instance, the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission has the ability to force upstream producers to supply the local market.”⁸¹

Occasionally, there is tension between export obligations and domestic supplies, even when the government is committed to both. Following new gas field discoveries, for example, Egypt’s government has been eager to supply the country’s LNG industry while satisfying growing domestic demand, including from the power sector. However, in response to rising domestic consumption, it has been forced to periodically block LNG production and rely on Israeli gas imports, dealing a blow to export revenues and triggering political criticism at home.⁸²

Recommendations

The drive for electrification will continue in at least some African countries with or without increased global support. The whole of North Africa has achieved close to universal electrification, while Kenya and Ghana are among the countries making significant progress toward that goal. For countries making less progress, there is much that can be done to help speed up the process, including by supporting gas sector development where needed. The following principles should guide the development of the continent’s natural gas resources to promote electrification at the lowest possible climate cost:

• Climate responsibility should be based on absolute per capita emissions, not on change over time. Apart from South Africa, Africa accounts for a tiny proportion of global GHG emissions.
• The goal of achieving universal electrification should be at the core of energy transition strategies. Leaving hundreds of millions of Africans without access to electricity on climate grounds—when the rest of the world’s GHG emissions are so much higher than Africa’s—should not be acceptable.
• The primary focus of financing should be on renewable energy development, not least on grounds of cost per kWh. Given its relatively high life-cycle emissions, new gas-fired capacity should be avoided if universal, reliable electrification can be achieved in the medium term without it. However, countries with low electrification rates and access to gas should be backed in building gas-to-power projects—along with projects that rely heavily on gas that is currently flared.
• The views of each country’s residents must be taken into account. They understand what it means to use kerosene and biomass fuel and to lack access to electricity.
• In terms of electrification, renewables and gas-fired power plants should be seen as complementary rather than competing. Gas-fired capacity can provide baseload capacity to support increased renewables’ penetration, while solar microgrid and standalone residential systems can supply off-grid rural areas.
• Pathways to clean energy systems should be considered on a country-by-country basis.

The governments of industrialized countries

Governments in North America, Europe, the Gulf States, and East Asia, among other areas, need to step up support for the African energy transition, mainly in renewables but also in gas-fired capacity where appropriate. This would boost living standards on the continent while minimizing emissions, create stronger African trading partners, and improve political and security stability in the wider world.

The International Partners Group formed at COP26 in 2021 was conceived as the primary mechanism for providing the necessary international financing for the energy transition in developing countries. As part of their efforts, the group would create Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) between investors and host governments, but only four JETPs have been forged to date: with Indonesia ($20 billion), Senegal ($2.6 billion), South Africa ($11.6 billion), and Vietnam ($15.5 billion). The United States pulled out of the program, and additional JETPs are now considered unlikely.⁸³

Still, the objective of coordinating development finance institutions (DFIs), the private sector, host governments, multilateral development banks, and philanthropists to work together on the issue is a sound one. New “country platforms”—where host communities have greater agency and more of the funding is provided as direct grants—are being attempted instead, but it is vital that gas remains part of the equation where conditions require it. Whatever arrangement or vehicle is used, comprehensive financing mechanisms must be put in place as soon as possible.

The United States has drastically cut its aid budget, but other countries can continue to contribute, either through their development budgets, DFIs (such as British International Investment [BII] and the German Investment Corporation), or sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). BII, for instance, is committed to improving energy access⁸⁴ in Africa, and although it curtailed almost all investment in fossil fuels in 2020, it remains open to financing gas-fired projects where they support human development needs. It should be more explicit in specifying progress toward universal electrification among these needs, and other DFIs should follow suit.⁸⁵

The European Union has various mechanisms for supporting African development, principal among them is NDICI-Global Europe, which aims to improve living conditions and political stability including through investment in the energy transition in coordination with EU member states and institutions.⁸⁶ While the organization currently does not finance gas-fired projects, it should do so where gas-fired capacity is the best route to electrification.

Sovereign wealth funds and export credit agencies

Gulf governments and their SWFs are active investors in African development, with the United Arab Emirates committed to co-financing the $25 billion Africa-Atlantic Gas Pipeline from Nigeria to Morocco⁸⁷ alongside the European Investment Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the OPEC Fund. The central project will export Nigerian gas to Europe, but the Gulf States and other members of the consortium could also help to finance spur pipeline connections to the West African transit states and gas-fired power plants in those countries.

Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, one of the world’s biggest SWFs and which derives most of its income from the country’s oil and gas industry, is another potential investor. It has halted investment in coal projects but continues to invest heavily in hydrocarbons, as well as African renewable energy, and seeks to promote economic development through its investments.⁸⁸ However, it does not appear at present to invest in African gas-fired power plants. Drawing on Norway’s expertise in the gas sector, the fund could further many of its interests by supporting such projects, and its actions and strategies are often followed by other institutional investors.⁸⁹

Despite sizable cuts to the US aid budget, the world’s biggest economy can still play a major role. US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) recently approved a $4.7 billion loan for TotalEnergies’ Mozambique LNG project that will help attract pension and institutional funds “to support upstream gas development and associated infrastructure.”⁹⁰ Such investment could be combined with support for Mozambican gas-fired power projects. Because EXIM’s support for the LNG project was rooted in helping US workers and businesses involved in the scheme, it might be inclined to participate in power projects developed by US firms.

The current US government is in favor of wider oil and gas development, so African gas-to-power projects may be able to benefit from US organizations with federal connections. There could also be a pathway to develop gas-fired power plants and other gas projects in exchange for access to critical minerals in infrastructure-for-resources deals. This could be a valuable negotiating tool with mining-rich DR Congo, for instance, where Chinese companies have largely failed to develop promised infrastructural projects.⁹¹ DR Congo has neighboring states with gas reserves both to its north and south, including in Cabinda.

Apart from EXIM, other export credit agencies have played a crucial role in financing African gas-to-power projects. Euler Hermes and SACE were key to developing Siemens’ three gas-fired power plants in Egypt, and their counterparts across the world could play a similarly vital role.

African governments and regional organizations

African governments, the African Union (AU), and the continent’s regional economic communities are key players in driving electrification, including gas-fired power. The AU and regional communities have a particular role in promoting cooperation between different states. Above all, they should support cross-border power transmission integration to help neighboring countries balance out variations in power production, thereby allowing gas-fired plants to supply a larger pool of customers and support more intermittent power production.

The Southern African Power Pool has been operating since 1995, but progress has been slow in other regions, especially with respect to making the West African Power Pool (WAPP) a reality. Nigerian and Ghanaian gas could help supply energy across the region, either piped gas feedstock or electricity via cross-border power interconnectors. Political mistrust and a lack of investment have held back development of the WAPP, while the project clings to its grand vision of many cross-border, high-capacity transmission links. However, transmission integration is more likely to happen by following a step-by-step process than by imposing an overarching plan from above.

The Economic Community of West African States, which oversees the WAPP, also needs to encourage neighboring governments, power utilities, and regulators to cooperate on the technical aspects of integration, such as permitting, regulatory capacity building, and grid operation. It is difficult to trade power across borders when neighboring countries have different electricity standards that make it burdensome to secure project permit approvals.

Academic institutions, think tanks, and research organizations

At present there is very little detailed, specific research on the best energy transition strategy for individual African countries. While more than 150 research groups model the German energy system and propose long-term pathways, there are often none taking the same approach to individual African countries, even those with large gas reserves, such as Mozambique and Senegal.⁹² Much more country-specific research is needed, including to assess whether falling renewables and battery storage costs could leave gas-fired assets stranded.

Research is also needed on where gas-fired generation could support renewables and where it would block them. There is a real risk that gas investments could crowd out renewables by locking up infrastructure and capital.⁹³ Detailed research on the intersection of technology and economics, along the lines of studies conducted by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the United States, would be beneficial. These organizations focus on the US energy sector, but it would be helpful if they and their peers were to dedicate a small portion of their research efforts to energy-poor countries, not least because of the learnings they would gain for their own markets.

Conclusion

Difficult choices are called for when two worthwhile causes come into conflict with each other. With the United Nations estimating that the world is on course for an average temperature rise of 3.1C by the end of this century, it is incumbent on the international community to step up efforts to mitigate climate change.⁹⁴ These efforts must include phasing out the vast majority of coal and oil and probably even natural gas projects.

Yet, to more fairly distribute the remaining emissions, developing new gas-fired power plants in Africa should be a top priority. Requiring African countries to abstain from gas development when more prosperous countries are forging ahead could easily appear to be climate colonialism.

Implementing these recommendations to allow gas to be a minor but significant part of Africa’s electrification efforts would yield big improvements in living standards in some of the poorest countries in the world. There would be clear benefits for the people of Africa but also for the wider world through economic development and increased stability.

Neil Ford is a freelance consultant and journalist specializing in African affairs and the global energy sector. His main areas of interest include African development, regional integration, boundary disputes, the energy transition, and African logistics. He produces reports for a range of organizations, including law firms, energy consultancies, and financial platforms.

With over twenty-five years’ experience as a journalist, he has worked for dozens of outlets, including African Business, the BBC, Platts, Jane’s, and Reuters, for whom he also writes renewable energy and energy transition white papers. After earning a BA in history and geography at Sunderland University and an MSc in African history at the University of Edinburgh, he completed a PhD at Edinburgh. His dissertation on the creation of Tanzania’s international boundaries involved research in twelve countries, including much of Eastern Africa. He was previously deputy editor of Charity Finance magazine and a senior analyst at World Markets Research Centre.

Report Jun 6, 2025

Keeping China at bay and critical minerals stocked: The case for US-Africa defense collaboration

By Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu

As Russia, China, and other authoritarian powers expand their global reach, US security is at stake. To stay competitive, the United States must turn to Africa—for both critical minerals and partnership in countering rising adversarial influence on the continent.

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By Julien Marcilly and Bradford Simmons

Indonesia and its success with resource nationalism can serve as an example for many mineral-rich African countries.

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From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge

By Aubrey Hruby

This report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

Africa Critical Minerals

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Natural gas has a small but important role in Africa’s energy transition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the global critical minerals race heats up, resource-rich African countries once again face a double-edged opportunity to harness a wave of investment and economic opportunity in the mining sector, while avoiding resource-curse pitfalls and advancing public health.

Global demand is booming for cobalt, copper, lithium, and other minerals important for the transition away from fossil fuels, and as a result, Africa is central to the global push for cleaner energy and supply chain diversification. But realizing the full potential of this moment requires more than just mineral extraction: It requires intentional and creative solutions that elevate public health as a strategic priority for investors, mining companies, and African governments.

From occupational hazards to infectious disease outbreaks, the African mining sector has a checkered public health legacy. But in this new report, Rebecca Katz, director of Georgetown University’s Center for Global Health Science and Security, shows that the current moment is a chance to change that. The wave of geopolitical attention and capital investment presents opportunities to strengthen health systems, surveillance, and regional cooperation across the continent. Realizing these benefits will require deliberate action and to ensure such projects deliver on their full promise, public health should be prioritized as a core consideration, not a peripheral concern.

The global race to secure critical mineral supply chains has drawn strategic attention and amid this shifting geopolitical landscape, public health represents one potential avenue through which new entrants might differentiate themselves from incumbents.

In addition to providing recommendations for key stakeholders, this report explores the intersection of mining and public health in Africa, spotlighting the Lobito Corridor and other prominent mining-driven development corridors and their implications for public health.

Report Jun 6, 2025

Keeping China at bay and critical minerals stocked: The case for US-Africa defense collaboration

By Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu

As Russia, China, and other authoritarian powers expand their global reach, US security is at stake. To stay competitive, the United States must turn to Africa—for both critical minerals and partnership in countering rising adversarial influence on the continent.

Africa Critical Minerals

Report Sep 23, 2024

Lessons for African mineral producers from the Indonesian experience

By Julien Marcilly and Bradford Simmons

Indonesia and its success with resource nationalism can serve as an example for many mineral-rich African countries.

Africa Energy & Environment

Report Jul 1, 2024

From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge

By Aubrey Hruby

This report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

Africa Critical Minerals

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post The critical minerals boom is an opportunity to integrate public health into mining operations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• United States: After the war, it’s time to revive and expand the Negev Forum
• Israel: That the accords have endured is telling
• UAE: The accords fulfill Sadat’s people-to-people dream 
• Bahrain: Balancing domestic sentiment and regional integration
• Morocco: ‘Pan-Abrahamism’ is crucial for the monarchy’s throne succession

Five years ago, the announcements that the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain would normalize relations with Israel caught the world by surprise. Subsequent announcements on Kosovo, Sudan, and Morocco demonstrated that the new spirit of cooperation in the Middle East—embodied in the Abraham Accords signing ceremony at the White House on September 15, 2020—was not an isolated trend.

The world and the Middle East specifically have changed significantly in those five years, with intensifying major power competition, a reimagining of the US role in the world, rapid technological change, major evolutions in the conflict between Iran and both Israel and Gulf countries, significant political change across the Middle East, and the  October 7 tragedy and the resulting war in Gaza—to name a few. 

Many of these developments have reinforced the trends driving the Abraham Accords: Evolving geopolitical dynamics and economic and technological change have underscored the value of stronger cooperation between Israel and its neighbors and the importance of mending the rifts that have impeded the Middle East’s economic potential for too long. For the United States, the diplomatic achievement of the Abraham Accords highlights the value of America’s unique form of strategic partnership (as compared to competitors like China) and provides a platform for transforming its partnerships in the Middle East for a new era: away from counterterrorism and forever wars and toward cooperation around mutually beneficial, private-sector-led prosperity. The force of these trends explains why there was so much momentum toward deepening and expanding the accords in mid-2023, as Dan Shapiro describes in this collection of essays. 

Of course, other recent developments—most notably October 7 and the war in Gaza but also fears of Iranian retaliation—have challenged the positive trends associated with the Abraham Accords and demonstrated that the forces propelling division and discord remain influential. There is a risk that these forces could derail or at least further delay positive momentum. But at the N7 Initiative, we remain hopeful that these forces are waning in the face of more powerful global and regional trends. A durable end to the war in Gaza is essential to realizing the potential for a new era of de-escalation and cooperation in the Middle East. And a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear threat will help resolve one of the most persistent challenges to that new era.

This compilation of essays and reflections from American, Bahraini, Emirati, Israeli, and Moroccan authors reminds us that the transformational change and “warm peace” envisioned by the Abraham Accords is a long-term, generational project. Sarah Zaaimi describes how the Moroccan king was inspired to embrace the accords precisely because he was thinking about future generations and creating a more stable and prosperous country when leadership eventually passes to his son.  And as Loay Alshareef points out, positive economic and cultural change between Israel and its neighbors is continuing, and this change has deep roots that predate the accords themselves.

Those who believe in the vision for an integrated Middle East must retain a commitment to this project and continue to invest in initiatives today that will make that more promising vision for the future possible. In his reflection, Dan Shapiro, who served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017 and deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East from 2024 to 2025, describes what some of these initiatives could entail and underscores the importance of investing in a multilateral architecture to institutionalize a range of economic, security, and cultural projects. While less flashy than major new political announcements, this architecture is what will help cement regional integration for decades to come.

Finally, remaining focused on the long-term promise of the Abraham Accords can help policymakers navigate the immediate challenges facing the region more effectively. As Israel’s first ambassador to the United Arab Emirates Amir Hayek points out, the strategic partnerships Israel has forged through the Abraham Accords can provide Israel with a more comprehensive security than military power alone can deliver.  Similarly, Ahmed Khuzaie argues that Bahrain’s engagement with Israel has elevated the small country’s position as a leader of pragmatic diplomacy, allowing Bahrain to help shape regional discourse on issues like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

The N7 Initiative remains committed to working with policymakers, the private sector, and thought leaders to build on these lessons. In doing so, we seek to ensure the Middle East five years from now is a more integrated, tolerant, and prosperous place.

Allison Minor is the director of the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the United States, Israel, and Arab and Muslim countries. She previously served as the deputy US special envoy for Yemen and the director for the Arabian Peninsula at the US National Security Council.

United States: After the war, it’s time to revive and expand the Negev Forum

Five years after the Abraham Accords, the promise of these agreements to help shape a far more peaceful, prosperous, and integrated Middle East remains. But advancing it is also frustrated by the ongoing war in Gaza that Israel launched in response to Hamas’s terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023. But the war will end, the sooner the better. When it does, countries committed to this vision of integration must move quickly to restore momentum that has been lost.

One opportunity that should be seized as soon as possible after the war is to resume the work of the Negev Forum. The Negev Forum was launched at the Negev Summit in Israel in March 2022, when the foreign ministers of Israel, the United States, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco met together in the first gathering of its kind. They launched the Forum, with a steering committee and six working groups, covering security, health, water and agriculture, energy, education and coexistence, and tourism. The working groups were tasked with developing multilateral projects aimed at bringing the benefits of regional integration to the citizens of these nations. (The N7 Initiative conducted its own conferences on education and coexistence, water and agriculture, and trade with regional experts in 2022 and 2023 to support the governments’ work.)

Progress was mixed, as some working groups progressed faster than others, and countries had different bandwidths and levels of commitment to pursuing projects. But by the summer of 2023, when I assumed the duties of the US representative to the Negev Forum steering committee as part of my role as the State Department Senior Adviser on Middle East Regional Integration, we were gaining momentum. At the UN General Assembly in September, plans were finalized to host a second Negev Forum ministerial in Marrakesh, at which working group projects would be endorsed by the foreign ministers and advanced toward implementation. Host country Morocco insisted on going forward with the meeting despite a recent, devastating earthquake. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was set to attend, following a visit to Israel and Saudi Arabia intended to advance work on a normalization agreement. The date of the ministerial was set for October 19, 2023.

Of course, it never happened. Hamas’s brutal attack and the war that ensued consumed the region’s attention. But when the war ends, reconvening this gathering should be an early goal, with working group projects dusted off and updated, ready for ministerial approval.

In fact, the Marrakesh ministerial was set to be an expanded version of the original Negev Summit. Plans were at an advanced stage to include Jordan as a new member, and to invite senior Palestinian Authority representatives to participate in some of the sessions. In addition, a number of other countries, including African members of the Arab League and other countries outside the region, had expressed interest in attending as observers.

That expansion, too, should be on the table for after the war. Jordan, as a full member, and the Palestinian Authority are obvious participants. Oman, Mauritania, the Comoros, Somalia, Djibouti, and Indonesia are all plausible participants as observers. A number of European partners could also attend at lower levels to indicate where their governments could provide expertise and funding to support the main countries’ efforts.

Over time, the institutionalization of a regional grouping like the Negev Forum would add considerable ballast to efforts to build a more integrated region. As its projects deliver benefits to the citizens of Negev Forum countries, more countries will want to join the club. In time of war, it may seem far-fetched, but the goal should be for an ASEAN-style regional organization to take hold in the Middle East and North Africa region, the kind of organization that creates a thickened web of ties that help make war less likely in the future.

It will be tempting to let post-war priorities that are more urgent—like the reconstruction of Gaza—or flashier—like Israeli-Saudi normalization or Israeli-Syrian understandings—crowd out the work of building a broader regional architecture. The United States should not let that happen. But given the intensity of the work involved, more resources are needed. That is why President Donald Trump should nominate, and the Senate should confirm, the special envoy for the Abraham Accords that Congress created in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. The appointment of a high-profile envoy in this role will communicate the United States’ seriousness about expanding regional integration in every direction, and buttress the work of other senior envoys who may focus on the higher profile efforts in Riyadh and Damascus.

Once the Negev Forum has been revived with an expanded ministerial meeting, Trump could make a major contribution to his peacemaking aspirations by convening a Negev Forum head of state summit. This summit could be held in concert with, or as a means of encouraging, progress toward an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal. As much as anything, the summit would demonstrate that the dramatic regional transformation toward integration launched by the Abraham Accords is alive and well and moving forward as the Middle East emerges from the tragedy of October 7 and the Gaza war.

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He also previously served as the director of the N7 Initiative.

Israel: That the accords have endured is telling

As we mark the fifth anniversary of the Abraham Accords, the region is living through another difficult chapter of violence and uncertainty. The horrific October 7 attacks and the ongoing war have challenged even the most resilient partnerships. War, by its nature, undermines trust and stability. And yet, despite these headwinds, the Accords have endured. From my perspective, that endurance is not accidental. It is the product of leadership, commitment, and the recognition that the path blazed by UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed five years ago is that of a marathon, not a sprint. 

When I speak about the Abraham Accords, particularly the relationship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, I often think about it as a marathon. In a marathon, there are stretches where the road is smooth and momentum is strong, but there are also moments of fatigue. But the essential point is that you keep running. That is what we have seen in the past five years: Despite difficulties there has been an unshakable commitment to continue moving forward. 

In recent weeks, the United Arab Emirates has made it clear that Israeli annexation of  West Bank territory would jeopardize its relationship with Israel after an Emirati official made a public statement saying that such a move is a “red line”  and would “foreclose on the idea of regional integration.” This sentiment is not new, as the suspension of previous West Bank annexation plans was a condition for the UAE to sign the Abraham Accords. The Emiratis, known for their long-term planning, want to take action—and believe that action must be taken—to build a new, secure, and strong Middle East economically and strategically. For the Emiratis, annexation would lead to a loss of hope in their vision for the future of the Middle East, and this loss would jeopardize long-term plans. From my acquaintance with the Emirati leadership, I know that their words should be taken very seriously.

We must do everything to continue, develop, and preserve the Abraham Accords for the benefit of future generations.

The UAE’s stance following October 7 has illustrated its commitment to moving forward. Despite facing significant regional and domestic pressure, Abu Dhabi remained firmly committed to the Abraham Accords and condemned Hamas’s brutal attacks. The UAE went beyond rhetoric and maintained flights to Israel from the very first day of the war, when nearly all others suspended them. At the same time, the Emiratis leveraged their relationship with Israel to deliver humanitarian support to the people of Gaza—they provided food, medicine, medical treatment for children, and critical infrastructure like hospitals and desalination plants.

For Israel, one of the clearest lessons of the past five years is that the country waited too long to pursue these kinds of partnerships. Israel lost decades of potential cooperation in the region by relying only on military power and conflict management, rather than investing in regional alliances. The Abraham Accords have shown that real security does not come from military power alone—it comes from trusted partners, shared interests, and commitments to growth and stability. Israel has found such partners in the UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain, and the country’s long-standing peace with Egypt and Jordan remains foundational. I believe more countries will join this circle of normalization in time, motivated by the desire to counter radicalization and to pursue regional prosperity. This is not wishful thinking; it is the realistic trajectory of a region that cannot afford to remain hostage to old conflicts. 

Future partners in the region can look at Israel’s relations with the UAE and ask themselves: “Why not us?” 

The past five years have also demonstrated the tangible benefits of peace. Trade between Israel and the UAE reached over $3.2 billion in goods last year, not including government-to-government transactions or software and services. Investments have surpassed $5 billion, and more than two million Israelis have traveled to the UAE since normalization. These are not abstract statistics; they represent millions of human interactions and billions of dollars driving growth on both sides. Looking forward, the next phase must include deeper cooperation in science, academia, culture, and the arts—because while leaders may sign agreements, it is ultimately people-to-people connections that sustain them. 

The priority for Israel and its Abraham Accords partners should not be narrowly defined. Security cooperation cannot stand without economic growth. Economic growth cannot last without cultural and human connections. Trust cannot deepen without all three reinforcing each other, thus they must be pursued simultaneously. Areas of potential cooperation include regional food security, energy innovation, AI, tourism, and more. 

While the potential of bilateral relations is high, the potential of regional and multilateral cooperation is much higher.   

As we reflect on these first five years, we must avoid the temptation to take a snapshot in a moment of crisis and declare the Accords a failure. Marathons are not judged at the halfway mark. They are judged by whether the runners reach the finish line. 

Amir Hayek is a nonresident senior fellow in the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation. Hayek served as the first Israeli ambassador to the United Arab Emirates from 2021 to 2024, working to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties between the two countries after they formalized relations under the Abraham Accords.

UAE: The accords fulfill Sadat’s people-to-people dream 

When I think about the Abraham Accords, I cannot help but look back to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, my role model for peace. In 1979, Sadat’s peace with Israel brought Egypt the full return of Sinai and opened diplomatic relations. But his dream went beyond maps and treaties. Sadat envisioned a true people-to-people peace between Egyptians and Israelis that would transform generations and replace suspicion with trust. 

Tragically, Sadat paid for this vision with his life in 1981. The bullets that killed him also killed the momentum for deep human connection. His successor, Hosni Mubarak, maintained security cooperation without cultural, social, or economic warmth as he was too afraid of the political risk. While Sadat paid the cost for peace, history remembers him as a hero who dared to dream beyond the limits of his time. 

The Abraham Accords, signed in September 2020, are in many ways the realization of Sadat’s unfinished mission. Unlike the Egypt-Israel peace, these agreements between Israel, the UAE, and later Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have not stopped at the level of government-to-government arrangements. They have opened the gates for business partnerships, tourism, cultural exchange, and everyday friendships between peoples who for decades never met face to face. 

Trade between Israel and the UAE has soared into the billions of dollars. Daily flights between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv are packed with the likes of diplomats, entrepreneurs, tourists, and families. Israelis shop in Dubai’s malls and Emiratis tour Jerusalem’s holy sites, demonstrating that this is a warm peace where people learn each other’s languages, work on joint ventures, and share meals together. 

Up until the October 7 attacks the peace was unstoppable. Reports and seized Hamas documents confirm that Hamas carried out that massacre as a way to derail the potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Only two weeks earlier, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia publicly said, “Every day, we get closer” in reference to normalization with Israel. That statement must have infuriated Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, who feared peace more than war. 

The UAE suddenly found itself in an extremely challenging position. On one hand, the leadership has always been clear in supporting the Palestinian people. On the other, it had to navigate a public mood already warming to the Abraham Accords. The reality is that enthusiasm for the Accords varies across the Emirates—Abu Dhabi embraces them strongly, while in Sharjah the sentiment is much cooler. 

In the midst of the crisis, the UAE was one of only two governments in the entire Middle East to condemn Hamas’s barbaric attacks—the other being Bahrain, whose Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa also spoke out. Both took a principled stance, knowing that condemning terrorism is essential for any genuine peace to survive. 

The way forward will not be easy. But I believe the war must end in the right way: Hamas’s total surrender, the complete release of all hostages, and the removal of a radical ideology that has held Palestinians hostage for decades. Only then can we begin to repair what was broken on October 7. 

When that moment comes, peace activists must double down on building more people-to-people projects that connect Muslims and Jews, Arabs and Israelis, in ways that create real human investment in peace. Initiatives like the I2U2 Group, a partnership between India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States, show the potential for cross-regional collaboration in areas like agriculture, energy, water technology, and infrastructure. This is a model worth expanding, but it is not enough. 

We must create platforms that also include Palestinians who reject Hamas’s pathological ideology—voices that want to see prosperity, education, and mutual respect flourish. Without them, peace will remain incomplete. 

The future I believe in is one where Ishmael and Isaac both prosper—where their children travel, trade, and thrive together. The biggest loser after this war must be the extremist worldview that seeks endless cycles of bloodshed. 

Five years on, the Abraham Accords remain the best hope we have for Sadat’s dream—a peace that is lived, not just signed. And that dream is worth defending, nurturing, and expanding, no matter the cost. 

Loay Alshareef is a United Arab Emirates-based Arab Muslim peace advocate whose mission is to bridge divides between Muslims and Jews and to champion peace in the Middle East.

Bahrain: Balancing domestic sentiment and regional integration

Bahrain’s formalization of relations with Israel—which the country has remained committed to despite intensifying domestic and regional pressures following October 7—has recalibrated its foreign policy approach. The kingdom now finds itself navigating a nuanced landscape, where strategic partnerships must be weighed against the evolving currents of negative public sentiment.

When Hamas launched an incursion into southern Israel in October 2023, resulting in the subsequent Israeli military campaign, scrutiny of Bahrain’s normalization with Israel intensified. Public sentiment in Bahrain remains overwhelmingly pro-Palestinian, rooted in long-standing civil society activism and religious solidarity. Unlike the UAE, Bahrain has a more vibrant public sphere, where demonstrations and symbolic acts—such as protests outside the Israeli embassy and parliamentary statements—have expressed opposition to continued normalization. 

Anti-Israeli sentiment in Bahrain is largely shaped by the ideological influence of regional Islamist movements, particularly the Iranian ayatollahs and the Muslim Brotherhood. These groups have cultivated narratives that resonate with segments of the population, framing normalization efforts as a betrayal of regional and religious identity. In response, Bahrain has sought to marginalize this influence through deepening strategic collaborations with Western partners—most notably Israel—as part of a broader effort to insulate its foreign policy from ideological pressures. 

In November 2023, Bahrain’s parliament issued a statement declaring the suspension of economic ties with Israel and the departure of the Israeli ambassador. However, this move was merely symbolic; foreign policy remains under the purview of the executive, and Bahrain has not formally abrogated the Abraham Accords. Instead, the government has adopted a nuanced approach: condemning violence on both sides, calling for a ceasefire, and emphasizing humanitarian assistance, while quietly maintaining strategic ties with Israel and the United States. 

This balancing act reflects Bahrain’s broader geopolitical calculus. Hosting the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and participating in operations like Prosperity Guardian against Houthi threats, Bahrain remains closely aligned with Western security frameworks. Yet, it has also engaged in regional diplomacy, including communicating with Iran via Omani intermediaries, to mitigate domestic and regional backlash. 

Despite the political sensitivities, Bahrain’s relationship with Israel has yielded several tangible benefits across economic, strategic, and diplomatic domains. Since 2020, Bahrain and Israel have signed multiple bilateral agreements covering sectors such as technology, healthcare, tourism, and telecommunications. Direct flights and business exchanges have facilitated commercial ties, although the scale remains modest compared to the UAE-Israel corridor. Bahrain’s strategic positioning as a financial hub and its free trade agreement with the United States have made it an attractive partner for Israeli firms seeking Gulf access. 

The normalization has as well reinforced Bahrain’s role as a key US ally in the Gulf. With the Abraham Accords serving as a platform for regional security cooperation, particularly in maritime and cyber spheres, Bahrain’s participation in multilateral naval coalitions and its leadership in the US-led Combined Maritime Forces Task Forces underscore its strategic utility. 

Increased engagement with Israel has elevated the country’s diplomatic profile as well, positioning it as an Arab state willing to engage in pragmatic diplomacy. This has facilitated its inclusion in gatherings like the Negev Summit and enhanced its bilateral ties with the West. The normalization also provides Bahrain with leverage in shaping regional discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advocating for a two-state solution while maintaining dialogue with all parties. 

The Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA), signed in September 2023 between Bahrain and the United States, offers a blueprint for deepening regional integration. Structured around three pillars—defense and security, economics and trade, and science and technology—C-SIPA redefines traditional security cooperation by incorporating economic and technological dimensions. 

Bahrain’s navigation of the post-Abraham Accords landscape illustrates the complexities of small-state diplomacy in a polarized region. While domestic sentiment poses constraints, Bahrain’s leadership has pursued a pragmatic strategy that preserves strategic partnerships and economic opportunities. By building on frameworks like C-SIPA and expanding regional cooperation, Bahrain can reinforce its role as a bridge between Gulf pragmatism and Mediterranean integration—without abandoning its commitment to Palestinian rights or regional stability. 

Ahmed Khuzaie is an international political consultant, writer, essayist, and media commentator from Bahrain. He is the managing partner of the Washington-based political consultancy firm Khuzaie Associates LLC.

Morocco: ‘Pan-Abrahamism’ is crucial for the monarchy’s throne succession

To ensure the continuity of Morocco’s Alaouite dynasty, the ailing King Mohammed VI is gradually preparing his heir, Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, for a seamless succession. This effort translates into ambitious infrastructure and development initiatives, alongside strategic alliances with global powers to secure a lasting resolution to the Western Sahara dispute and cement the kingdom’s fate. Morocco’s 2020 re-normalization with Israel, brokered by the first Trump administration, should be viewed less as a diplomatic shift and more as a calculated move to position Rabat as a dependable pro-Western, pan-Abrahamic partner in North Africa—consolidating the future of the throne.

In his July 30 speech commemorating the twenty-sixth anniversary of his accession to the throne, it became undeniable that the Moroccan monarch is growing more feeble than ever. Mohammed VI, at sixty-two, has accumulated long periods of public absences and surgeries over the past decade, which have led to international speculation about his level of involvement in state affairs, despite local media cover-ups. In line with the Alaouite dynasty’s succession traditions since 1631, the current king has been gradually prepping and empowering the next monarch in line. Moulay Hassan, who recently turned twenty-one, is gradually being entrusted with more royal duties, meeting global leaders like Chinese President Xi Jinping, inaugurating major initiatives, and even being promoted to the rank of colonel-major in the Royal Armed Forces in July 2025—all signaling that the crown prince’s star is rising in key governance matters.

To reign over an ethnically and culturally diverse country like Morocco in a challenging regional and international context, the young prince needs to be surrounded by trustworthy and influential allies, hence the importance of joining the Abraham Accords’ newly forming bloc together with traditional allies from the “Arab monarchy club” like the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Jordan—which are also looking for self-preservation by ensuring seamless succession for their kingdoms—along with influential players like the United States, Israel, and the European transatlantic community.

The Moroccan monarchy has survived for twelve centuries, and the Makhzen (the establishment) is wise enough to read the tea leaves and understand the profound geostrategic shifts that the region is undergoing after the 2024 collapse of the last of the pan-Arabist regimes in Syria. Alliances are being redefined, and narratives are being reimagined to provide a new ideological framework for the countries of the region, where a shared and integrated future is possible together with Israel. Similarly, the “Axis of Resistance” countries are gearing up proxies and client-states to shape the region in their own image, offering an anti-hegemonic alternative based on Iranian revolutionary Islamism and enabled by China and Russia, who increasingly challenge US unipolarity. While neighboring Algeria appears to align with old Cold War allegiances, showing an increased rapprochement with the axis, Morocco remains consistent with its post-World War II positioning and has chosen to strike a new pact with the Pan-Abrahamist clan.

Beyond this more existential zeitgeist, the Abraham Accords and the reestablishment of ties with Israel in December 2020 have yielded numerous benefits for both Rabat and Tel Aviv in the past five years. The two reconciled countries have never been closer at the military, intelligence, and economic levels despite the growing popular anti-normalization sentiment in Rabat amid the ongoing Gaza war.

October 7 sounded the alarm among Moroccan governing elites of what an Iranian proxy is capable of, especially with the growing rapprochement between Polisario militants in Western Sahara and Iran and its proxies. The kingdom’s appetite for Israeli-made weapons and security systems has grown in recent years as it found in Tel Aviv an evident partner with similar priorities and adversaries. So far, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces have acquired three Israeli-made Heron drones, developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), for approximately $48 million. Additionally, they have purchased SkyLock Dome anti-drone systems for $500 million and Barak MX missile systems for another $500 million. Morocco is also poised to acquire a spy satellite from IAI in a $1 billion deal.

Since the tripartite agreement between the United States, Israel, and Morocco in 2020, in which the United States recognized Rabat’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara territories in exchange for Israel and Morocco resuming diplomatic relations, the kingdom has become increasingly emboldened and achieved multiple consecutive foreign policy successes. Morocco, mainly thanks to the Accords, has moved from seeking international recognition for its national cause to de facto exercising sovereignty over Western Sahara. With the historical neutrality regarding Western Sahara of the former two colonizers of North Africa, France and Spain, reversed and support from key global actors like the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, in addition to multiple Arab and African countries, the incoming monarch can confidently ascend to power. Moulay Hassan will not have to worry that half of the territories of his kingdom are internationally contested, empowered with the vote of three UN Security Council members and the favorable momentum facilitated by his father’s long-term vision.  

The young prince will still have to defend Morocco’s strategic choices to side with pan-Abrahamism against revolutionary Islamism, particularly with his emotionally charged and largely pro-Palestinian population, which may favor regional pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sentiments over regional security and dynastic continuity. As the war in Gaza entered its second year, support for normalization with Israel dropped from 31 percent in 2021 to only 13 percent in 2024, according to the Princeton University Arab Barometer. While kingdoms with a millennial memory and an empire muscle see beyond isolated wars and conflicts, symbolic historical positions remain crucial for forging national unity and shaping public imaginaries—and Moulay Hassan will have to convince his citizens that he is a visionary leader who stands on the right side of history.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, focusing on normalization and minorities in the region. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

MENASource Aug 12, 2025

There is a way forward for a two-state solution, if Palestinian leaders embrace the Abraham Accords

By Ghaida Rinawie Zoabi

By collaborating with regional partners and taking incremental steps within the framework of the Abraham Accords, the PA can move closer to realizing a Palestinian state.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Jun 10, 2025

Yes, now is the time to double down on the Abraham Accords

By Allison Minor

The United States and its partners cannot simply wait for the war in Gaza to end or for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. They must take steps now.

Economy & Business Israel

The N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and the Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation, seeks to broaden and deepen normalization between Israel and Arab and Muslim countries. It works with governments to produce actionable recommendations to deliver tangible benefits to their people.

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The post The Abraham Accords at five appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Foreword

As Donald Trump’s second term as president of the United States unfolds, African decision-makers are closely watching the deployment of his new trade policy, trying to identify potential opportunities for Africa under the “America First” agenda. In addition to the issue of migration, it seems that he wants to focus his strategy on Africa with a policy of “trade, not aid.” However, beyond rhetoric, the key question is how to mobilize the necessary commercial tools. Following the abolition of USAID, trade instruments are now under scrutiny, particularly the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which is awaiting reauthorization by Congress. On the continent, this shift is being monitored with a mixture of caution—as a transactional approach could neglect local development needs—and optimism because Africa has long awaited access to capital, investment, and infrastructure. Now it also awaits access to the global value chains that the new American approach promises.

For decades, the United States has lagged its competitors such as China, India, Turkey and, more recently, the United Arab Emirates. These countries have used state-owned enterprises or concessional financing to secure key resources and capture market share.

While American companies deemed Africa too risky, companies from other nations were constructing ports, railways, mines, and digital networks, thereby gaining political influence and financial returns. Today, Africans hope that the Trump administration’s desire to refocus US trade strategy on strategic competition will finally trigger the long-awaited flow of US private investment, particularly in high-growth, high-impact sectors such as energy, agriculture, digital infrastructure, and the industrial processing of minerals.

The “DFC 2.0” project embodies this reorientation. It plans to increase the agency’s lending ceiling from $60 billion to $250 billion, establish a $3 billion revolving equity fund, streamline bureaucracy, and encourage risk-taking in order to stimulate investment.

Although this transformation is primarily driven by US economic and security interests, it cannot succeed without addressing Africa’s urgent needs. If implemented wisely, it could lead to mutually beneficial relationships, with projects that secure American supply chains while creating African jobs, industrial capacity, and tax revenues.

For African leaders, this new policy represents a strategic opportunity where traditional aid has failed to deliver the desired results. If the DFC finances the initial stages and risky projects that private investors were reluctant to support, these countries could establish their economies in future industries while supplying the United States and its allies.

However, African stakeholders remain clearheaded: Promises must be kept. The DFC has historically been perceived as slow and risk-averse, much to the frustration of entrepreneurs and governments eager to take actions. Africans will expect a DFC 2.0 to break with this culture, focusing instead on innovation, speed, and local partnerships. They hope for US support not only to extract resources, but also to develop local industries, build skills, and modernize infrastructure. Simply extracting raw materials for US supply chains without creating local value would be a missed opportunity for them. With a population of 1.4 billion people, many of whom are young, and largely untapped markets, Africa offers the United States not only resources, but also resilient allies, dynamic consumers, and innovative entrepreneurs.

Africans expect US embassies, trade missions, and financial institutions to collaborate closely with their governments and the private sector rather than operating independently from Washington.

The reauthorization of the DFC will therefore be a decisive test. If the United States mobilizes its immense capital markets, technologies, and expertise to co-construct African growth, it will advance its strategic objectives and strengthen African aspirations. If it fails, others will fill the void. As Trump’s America redesigns its trade tools, Africa watches with cautious hope, ready to seize opportunities, but determined to ensure that this time, the partnership will be truly reciprocal.

Rama Yade
Senior Director, Africa Center
Senior Fellow, Europe Center
Atlantic Council 

Issue Brief Apr 24, 2025

The Millennium Challenge Corporation could prove essential in the race for critical minerals. Reform it, don’t shut it down.

By Aubrey Hruby

As the Trump administration aligns foreign aid with core strategic interests, the MCC represents an underutilized asset.

Critical Minerals Energy & Environment

Issue Brief Jul 21, 2025

Atlantic piracy, current threats, and maritime governance in the Gulf of Guinea

By Maisie Pigeon

A drop in attacks in the Gulf of Guinea does not necessarily mean piracy has been resolved. Pirates have adapted their tactics, and the potential for resurgence remains high; this issue remains a critical security and development concern. It is not just a regional priority—it is an international imperative.

Africa Economy & Business

Issue Brief Jun 10, 2025

Marine energy: Harnessing the power of the Atlantic

By William Yancey Brown

In partnership with the Policy Center for the New South, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center is launching a new series of publications and events dedicated to the power of the Atlantic ocean with an inaugural policy brief on energy and mineral potential.

Africa Critical Minerals

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post DFC 2.0: A blueprint for a bigger, faster and more strategic agency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite Africa’s global significance, Western influence on the continent has waned in recent years. A 2024 Gallup report shows that the United States is losing ground on the soft power front to China, which just last year offered Africa $51 billion in funding over the next three years. And following Trump’s “liberation day” tariff announcements, China dropped all tariffs on African imports. Russia’s security influence in Africa is expanding as well, especially in the coup-laden Sahel, and Moscow is deepening its efforts at soft power on the continent, especially through sports. The Trump administration has approached relations with Africa with a trade-not-aid approach, and the 2025 US-Africa Business Summit yielded a record-breaking $2.5 billion in deals and commitments. Even so, the United States could use some help to gain favor in an increasingly complex international stage in which states don’t want to make binary choices between potential allies and where partnerships are based more on interests than ideology.

Though often overlooked as a major player in Africa, Turkey has been actively engaging and expanding its ties on the continent. Just this summer, Gabonese President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, Congolese Prime Minister Anatole Collinet Makosso, and Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko made official trips to Turkey and were received by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. And in October, the Turkish president will travel to Senegal, where Turkey has built the Dakar Arena, the Abdoulaye-Wade Stadium, and the Cap-des-Biches power plant.

As Turkey continues to develop closer ties to African nations, the United States and Europe should work with Turkey as a partner in its efforts to gain soft power throughout the continent and counter Russian and Chinese influence.

Diplomatic and cultural ties between Turkey and Africa

Turkey’s relationship with Africa is a special one, unencumbered by the colonial baggage of Western powers. Turkey presents itself as an alternative to the West and an equal partner to African countries, a model that has been dubbed the “Ankara consensus” in contrast to both the neoliberal and state-led growth models.

For the past decade, Turkey has been growing its presence in Africa on all fronts, with forty-four embassies on the continent. Erdoğan has paid official visits to thirty African countries, more than any other state leader. Turkish Airlines flies to sixty-one destinations in forty-one African countries.

Turkey also has extensive involvement on the continent through aid and cultural projects. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency has twenty-two offices across Africa that function under a “Turkish-Type Development Cooperation Model.” And the Turkish Maarif Foundation operates 175 Turkish-curriculum schools across twenty-five African countries. All these developments point to growing Turkish soft power on the continent.

Turkey’s defense cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Turkey also has a significant military presence in Africa. Some two thousand Turkish soldiers are stationed at Turkey’s military base in Mogadishu and the Turkish Navy patrols the Horn of Africa. Turkey is also well-versed in navigating regional disputes. In December 2024, Turkey brokered the Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia in an effort assuage concerns over sovereignty and maritime port access that arose over the Somaliland port disagreement between the two countries. This year, Turkey has even started to build a space base in Somalia.

Turkey also contributes to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Sub-Saharan Africa. These include the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (a disputed area between Sudan and South Sudan), the UN Mission in South Sudan, and the UN International Support Mission to Mali. Additionally, twenty-two Sub-Saharan countries have signed security agreements with Turkey.

As Turkey’s defense sector evolves, Turkish defense companies have also turned their attention to Africa. While still a relatively small arms supplier for Africa, Turkey’s influence is growing. In 2021, Turkey exported $328 million worth of arms to Africa, and in 2024, Turkey was the fourth-biggest arms supplier to West Africa, accounting for 11 percent of the region’s imports. Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles are especially popular in Africa due to their relatively low cost. Ten Sub-Saharan countries have ordered or are currently using Turkish Baykar drones. Most recently, Kenya acquired six TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles in late 2024.

Turkish investments in Africa

While Turkey has signed free trade agreements with only four African countries—Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Mauritius—Turkish businesses have been expanding in Africa over the past two decades. Turkey-Africa trade volume has grown from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $37 billion in 2024 and Turkey aims to raise this to $50 billion in 2025.

Turkish companies are especially active in construction and infrastructure in Africa. In the first half of this year, 17.9 percent of all international contracts awarded to Turkish construction firms in the came from Africa, valued at a total of $97 billion.

Turkey’s energy demand is currently 74 percent import dependent. Due to high energy bills, Turkey has turned to the African energy market as a cheaper alternative to regional suppliers. Through energy projects across Africa, Turkey aims to both diversify its supply and enhance its long-term energy security.

Turkey first struck energy deals with Nigeria in 1995 and with Algeria in 1998, diversifying Turkey’s natural gas imports. Turkey also signed a mineral exploration deal in Niger in September 2020. In 2024, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation signed a deal with Somalia on onshore hydrocarbon exploration, as well as an agreement to launch oil and gas exploration activities in Libya. In late 2024, Turkey signed a cooperation agreement with Senegal covering oil and gas exploration, production, and trade.

An alignment of alternatives

In the past several years, Turkey has expanded its footprint on the continent across sectors, from people-to-people ties, economic agreements, and security cooperation. As the West looks for likeminded allies to partner with on counterterrorism operations, strategic investments, and on-the-ground expertise, Turkey has much to offer. Not only are Turkey and the United States NATO allies, but following enhanced cooperation in Syria and Ukraine, the growing momentum behind their bilateral relations can help grease the wheels for cooperation in Africa.

For African nations, a core measure of success when it comes to foreign investment is local development. Creating jobs and raising domestic revenue are the top priorities for African countries in business and investment negotiations. The combination of increasing US interest in African goods and materials and Turkey’s presence on the ground creates an opportunity to counter China’s economic influence and security engagements on the continent. For African nations, more potential partners mean better potential deals and greater negotiating power.  

To be sure, efforts to develop cooperation between Turkey and the West in Africa to its full potential will face challenges. The expansion of Turkish influence can rub up against established Western interests, as highlighted by disputes between Turkey and France over their policies toward Libya, Mali, and the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, as Turkey continues to invest in and engage with the continent, its presence in Africa offers opportunities for collaboration.

It is therefore worthwhile for Africa watchers, both in Europe and the United States, to take note of Turkey’s diplomatic successes and growing footprint on the continent. US and European policymakers can help advance cooperation with Turkey on the continent in the following ways:

• Identify Africa’s most pressing needs by offering joint initiatives on social infrastructure, such as housing, hospitals, schools.
• Support African goals on global governance, such as establishing permanent African seats at the UN Security Council and strengthening Africa’s voting in Bretton Woods institutions.
• Incentivize joint initiatives on critical minerals and energy between Turkey and institutions such as the Export-Import Bank, the US International Development Finance Corporation, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
• Establish a multilateral business organization that will enable business interaction and networking between parties. 
• Encourage academic exchange and technology transfers by funding projects and universities that involve Turkish, US, European, and African universities.

Defne Arslan is the senior director and founder of Atlantic Council Turkey Program, leading the Council’s global work and programming on Turkey.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The Atlantic Council Turkey Program aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Learn more

The post To counter Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, Turkey could be a decisive ally for the US and Europe appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction

This October, the mandate for one of the US government’s most effective tools in its global competition with China is set to expire. The International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) was created under the first Trump administration with the goal of mobilizing private capital to promote economic development in low-income countries (LICs) and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) while advancing US foreign policy interests.

In the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, the bill that first established DFC, China is never mentioned by name. But China’s shadow looms large over references to “debt sustainability” and providing countries with an “alternative to state-directed investments.” When the BUILD Act was written seven years ago, US policymakers were just starting to take note of China’s growing presence in LICs and LMICs. Since then, China has become the top trading partner of 145 countries, making up roughly 70 percent of the world’s population. Between 146 and 150 countries have joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Xi Jinping’s $1 trillion flagship lending program. China is the world’s largest official creditor, and its lending initiatives have won Beijing significant geopolitical influence.

However, in the last seven years, DFC has turned the United States from a passive observer of China’s meteoric rise as a development lender into a serious contender in an intensifying front of competition with Beijing. DFC is making good on its mandates: advancing development objectives in LICs and LMICs, furthering US foreign policy goals, and winning deals that China wanted. Its lending has exceeded $50 billion to 114 countries, impacting more than 200 million people and businesses worldwide. This includes multiple cases in which DFC stepped in to provide financing that outcompeted Beijing, from the Elefsina Shipyard in Greece to the acquisition of a telecommunications company in the Pacific Islands and the Lobito Corridor railway in Zambia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

DFC is one of the United States’ few remaining tools of positive economic statecraft to compete with China in global development—and it must be protected. Congress has an opportunity to fine-tune DFC’s operations and set it up for even greater success before the reauthorization deadline on October 6. In that spirit, this brief explores three case studies in Chinese development lending, what they teach us about why China’s lending programs succeed—and fail—and how Congress can make DFC an even sharper tool.

Case study 1: Jakarta-Bandung railway

China’s approach: Flexible mandates, high risk tolerance

When Beijing is asked to participate in multilateral debt relief initiatives, there is an insistence that one of its two state-owned policy banks, the China Development Bank (CDB), is a commercial lender, and not an official creditor. As a state-owned bank acting purely in its own commercial interests, Beijing argues, CDB is not furthering the PRC’s foreign policy goals, and it should not be subject to the same transparency requirements as other official lenders.

As revealed in an AidData analysis of CDB lending practices, the bank often behaves like a commercial institution adhering to standard commercial lending practices such as lending at floating market interest rates. However, when Beijing deems a project strategically important, CDB will suddenly change its practices, offering unusually concessional lending terms.

CDB came across one such strategically important project in 2014, when the Indonesian government announced a bid to finance a high-speed rail line connecting two of its largest cities, Jakarta and Bandung. Just a few months earlier, during a trip to Indonesia, Xi had announced his intention to build a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” to enhance connectivity throughout Southeast Asia. This proposed maritime silk road became the “road” in “One Belt, One Road,” the lending program now known as the Belt and Road Initiative. The Indonesian government’s newly announced rail project presented an opportunity to develop a strong early example to showcase Xi’s new initiative in action.
From January 2014 to May 2017, CDB and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) submitted competing bids to bankroll the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail project. JICA offered to finance 75 percent of the project at a 0.1 percent interest rate, contingent on the Indonesian government providing a sovereign repayment guarantee. CDB’s counteroffer was to finance 100 percent of the project at a 2 percent interest rate, with a lower overall cost and shorter construction timeline, provided the Indonesian government guaranteed repayment.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo surprised observers by rejecting both offers, citing a desire to avoid taking on substantial sovereign debt. JICA responded with a 50 percent reduction in the debt that the government would need to back with a sovereign guarantee. But CDB offered the winning bid: an arrangement that would require Indonesia to take on no debt whatsoever. Instead, the bank would create an off-government balance sheet by lending to a special purpose vehicle, a separate legal entity jointly owned by Chinese and Indonesian state-owned enterprises, created solely for the purpose of financing and building the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Railway. This would allow CDB and Widodo to work around the Indonesian government’s debt ceiling. The final loan was far more concessional than CDB’s typical offers, and far more concessional than the minimum standards the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development uses to define concessionality.

CDB blurs the lines between its commercial, developmental, and geostrategic purposes and, as a result, Beijing gets to have it both ways. CDB protects its balance sheet, evades its responsibility to participate in multilateral debt relief initiatives, and lends at far below-market rates when an opportunity arises to advance the government’s policy objectives.

Lessons for the United States

Flexibility can be a strength. DFC has a dual mandate: support sustainable development in LICs and LMICs and advance US foreign policy interests. This has implications for where DFC operates, and there is currently widespread disagreement among experts on this front.

The conversation around DFC’s reauthorization is bifurcated between two camps. In one corner, development practitioners voice frustration with DFC’s gradual shift toward lending to richer countries. These observers rightly argue that US foreign policy interests have led DFC to stray from its original mandate to prioritize LICs and LMICs. In the other corner, national security analysts advocate harnessing DFC’s demonstrated effectiveness to respond to the short-term foreign policy challenges of the day.

Dealing with China means swimming in murky waters. Beijing blurs the lines between the commercial, the developmental, and the geostrategic, and a heavily siloed US system will not meet the multifaceted and overlapping challenges that the United States must address. While DFC should not neglect its development mandate, it should also have the flexibility to respond to challenges where they occur.

High risk tolerance is critical. Risk tolerance is an oft-cited advantage for Chinese lenders, and an oft-cited disadvantage for DFC. DFC’s cautiousness limits its ability to move quickly and lean into opportunities where the returns are nonmarket geostrategic wins.

Case study 2: DRC Sicomines copper-cobalt deal

China’s approach: Extreme high-volume financing

In 2007, the Export-Import Bank of China and two Chinese state-owned construction firms signed an agreement with the government of the DRC for the nation’s largest resources-for-infrastructure (RFI) deal. RFI deals, in which loans for infrastructure development are repaid with natural resources, are commonplace for China.

Under this deal, the Chinese parties would provide a staggering $9 billion of loans—more than three times the DRC’s annual government budget of $2.7 billion. The deal included $3 billion earmarked for developing and operating the Sicomines copper-cobalt mine, with the Chinese consortium owning 68 percent, and $6 billion earmarked for postwar rebuilding projects following the Second Congo War.

Ultimately, the deal was renegotiated several times. In 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) called for a renegotiation due to concern over the DRC’s capacity to repay the loan. In 2021, the deal faced renewed public scrutiny, and DRC President Félix Tshisekedi launched an audit that found that the agreement presented “an unprecedented harm in the history of the DRC.” China had only spent a fraction of the amount promised for postwar reconstruction projects—reaping $10 billion in profits and giving the DRC only $822 million in return. Last year, this gave the country leverage to renegotiate the deal once more and secure an agreement that increased the infrastructure budget by $4 billion and gave the DRC a greater share of mining revenues.

In this case, Beijing was willing to commit an astounding volume of capital to a highly risky endeavor, but China has lent far greater amounts to critical minerals over the last two decades, nearly $57 billion from 2000 to 2021.

It is difficult to overstate the geopolitical gains that have resulted from high-volume financing deals like this one, which have enabled Beijing to capture over 70 percent of the world’s rare earths extraction and almost 90 percent of processing capacity. Beijing has unparalleled dominance over the essential inputs underpinning the construction of the modern world. To build everything from fighter jets to consumer electronics, MRI machines, and electric vehicles, the rest of the world is now, to some extent, dependent on Beijing’s good graces.

Lessons for the United States

The United States cannot compete with China on a dollar-for-dollar basis, but current resources are insufficient. The United States does not have to close the gap between what it and China can offer globally. US lenders can be strategic, focus on key sectors and countries, and double down on areas in which the United States has a competitive advantage. Narrow the gap it must, though. Small, strategic investments could not have won China supply chain dominance in critical minerals. The current level of resources dedicated to this challenge are not proportionate to the severity of the threat

Invest with foresight. China’s dominance in critical minerals was built over decades of placing strategic bets on resource rich countries with assets that have national security implications. Beijing pledged $9 billion for the Sicomines copper-cobalt deal in 2007, many years before terms like “critical minerals,” “electric vehicles” or “5G” entered the public lexicon. DFC should similarly aim to make strategic investments in the supply chains of the future.

Case study 3: 2025 Sino Metals Zambia dam disaster

China’s approach: Move fast, break things

This February, a dam built by Sino-Metals Leach Zambia, a Chinese state-owned mining firm, burst, spilling toxic mining waste into the Kafue River in Zambia. The damage was catastrophic and unprecedented. The river, now an acid-leached wasteland, had supplied drinking water for roughly 5 million people and supported the livelihood of roughly 20 million farmers, fishermen, and industrial workers.

The dam held waste from nearby mines that were slated to serve a critical role in meeting an ambitious development goal: triple Zambia’s copper output by 2033. As the Zambian government raced forward in pursuit of this objective, the country became increasingly reliant on the only international partner who could meet the speed and scale they required: China.

Over the last several months, Zambian civil society has demanded greater transparency and accountability in the government’s mining deals. Thanks to public pressure to disclose further information, we now have a detailed record of the negligence behind this disaster.

It’s clear now that prioritizing speed led the parties involved to overlook negligence in terms of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards. Sino Metals operated within the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, Africa’s first special economic zone designed to attract international investment through incentives like tax breaks and streamlined approvals, including environmental approvals. In 2014, a Zambian auditor warned that tailings dams, large embankments used to store mining waste, were being systemically mismanaged in Zambia’s Copperbelt. Nevertheless, Sino Metals decided to rely on a tailings dam to store copper mining waste from its Chambishi Leach Plant. Rather than building a new dam, it was faster for the company to raise the wall of an existing dam built many years earlier.

Once built, the company repeatedly failed to conduct routine inspections, and there is no evidence to suggest that the dam was managed by licensed engineers. Sino Metals’ sister company, NFCA Africa Mining, admitted to disregarding safety and environmental standards in an internal report. Zambian regulators and the Chinese project managers had many chances to prevent the disaster from happening. A 2017 study found that the groundwater near the Sino Mines facility was already contaminated. In 2022, Sino Mines expanded the dam once again.

Lessons for the United States

ESG standards and transparency are important competitive advantages for US-backed deals. The Sino Metals dam disaster was not a one-time occurrence. Beijing routinely scores own goals in the form of flagrant disregard for host countries’ environmental, labor, and anti-corruption standards. The Jakarta-Bandung high speed railway project managers sped through an environmental impact assessment that should have taken twelve to eighteen months in only seven days. The consequence: a fatal accident, flooded roads, ruined homes and farms, improper waste dumping, mass protests, and $1.49 billion in cost overruns.

Particularly in democracies sensitive to public opinion and countries facing civil society backlash against opaque Chinese deals, the United States should lean into this strategic edge.

Moving fast makes a difference. Paradoxically, speed is a commonly cited factor contributing to host countries’ preference for Chinese loans. While the United States should not save time by cutting regulatory corners, US-backed deals cannot afford to be burdened by needlessly lengthy bureaucratic timelines.

Policy recommendations

To promote thoughtful versatility:

• Rethink the guidelines on where DFC operates. The BUILD Act mandates that DFC prioritize the provision of support to countries that meet the World Bank classifications for LICs and LMICs. The resulting arrangement excludes many countries with significant development needs that are classified as upper-middle-income countries (UMICs), often because of socioeconomic disparities or remittances. Examples include Mexico, Brazil, Tuvalu, Thailand, and Malaysia. Rather than relying on the World Bank’s rigid income classifications, DFC should revisit its lending criteria, borrowing from other official lenders’ practices.
• Clarify the key terms of DFC’s dual mandate. The BUILD Act instructs DFC to “pursue highly developmental projects” and assess their “strategic value,” but does not put forward standard criteria to determine what is developmental or strategic. A Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis, which collected insights directly from US government development practitioners, found that different agencies apply varying standards for what qualifies as “highly developmental.” Setting standard definitions for these key terms will begin to bridge the divide between the two camps of development practitioners and national security analysts who have different visions for where DFC should operate.

To strengthen risk tolerance:

• Establish an internal advisory council to provide guidance on projects that have the potential to generate nonmarket returns. The advisory council can weigh the project’s commercial viability against its implications for US strategic interests and judge whether the risk is acceptable to DFC’s balance sheet.
• Transfer the responsibility to approve exceptions to the LIC and LMIC preference from the president of the United States to the DFC’s Board of Directors. Under current law, exceptions to this rule—41.6 percent of investments made in DFC’s first five years—must go up a lengthy approval chain to the highest authority in the United States, who is then expected to parse through highly technical financial terms to evaluate the project’s risk-return profile and repayment terms. Instead, LIC and LMIC preference exceptions should be approved by DFC’s board, a group of development finance and foreign policy experts from across federal agencies. Particularly amid heightened political scrutiny of US government spending, professional oversight may empower DFC to take calculated risks with greater assurance.
• Evaluate investments at the portfolio level, not the individual project level. This creates space for DFC to take on, for example, a high-risk, high-reward mining project, provided the aggregate critical minerals portfolio is generating returns.
• Authorize DFC—permanently. The life cycles of many current DFC projects extend well beyond another seven-year reauthorization period. In contrast, BRI loans have been steady, providing highly concessional, long-term financing that complements LIC and LMIC governments’ long-term economic development plans. Repeated reauthorization cycles disincentivize DFC from pursuing partnerships that require a long-term steady commitment. DFC has built credibility that warrants a longer leash. Despite weathering a global pandemic, significant leadership turnover, and two highly tumultuous presidential transitions, DFC is delivering on its mandates: investing in LICs and LMICs, generating returns, and outcompeting China for key deals.

To boost finance volume:

• Triple DFC’s portfolio cap, from $60 billion to $180 billion. While this may sound like a hefty increase, $180 billion will only make up 12 percent of the $1.5 trillion infrastructure finance gap in LICs and LMICs. A larger portfolio cap will increase the total value of outstanding commitments that DFC can have at any given time and enable DFC to back bigger deals.
• Fix the budget rule accounting for DFC’s equity investments. The BUILD Act granted DFC the authority to make direct equity investments, an arrangement that grants the United States unique influence by giving DFC partial ownership in individual companies and projects. Oftentimes, this means DFC earns a voice in management decisions, enabling DFC to ensure projects align with development and US policy goals. Unfortunately, this authority has been underutilized due to an administrative rule with an outsized impact. Under current federal budget rules, DFC’s equity investments are treated as grants, assuming a total loss on 100 percent of DFC’s equity investments. Instead, DFC’s equity investments should be reflected using net present value scoring, which accounts for the likelihood of financial return over time to determine the true cost to taxpayers.
• Emphasize the importance of collaboration. The United States should pool funding with allies and partners’ development finance institutions to meet the scale and speed needed to match Chinese state-backed capital. DFC already has partnerships with Australia, Japan, and the Inter-American Development Bank; these partnerships should cut the burden of dealmaking in half, not double it. DFC should work with US partners to create standard due diligence requirements, term sheets, and agreements. This will create opportunities for more effective collaboration across institutions and help joint projects move forward faster.

To streamline operations:

• Increase the threshold of investments subject to congressional notification. While the notification process allows for additional oversight and gives Congress the opportunity to raise concerns, this bar is currently set at $10 million, an extremely low threshold that imposes a significant administrative burden for roughly 60 percent of DFC transactions.
• Improve staffing. DFC was built to be a lean and dynamic entity akin to a private corporation, but in practice, it has not been given the personnel and resources it needs to work efficiently. The Office of the Inspector General’s most recent report on DFC found that staffing was insufficient to perform robust site visits. DFC has been steadily growing its workforce and had a total of 675 employees in 2024, but the corporation has not released updated staffing figures since the US government terminated all probationary employees earlier this year. The World Bank has more than thirteen times as many employees managing a portfolio less than twice the size of DFC’s. Furthermore, the salaries of DFC’s investment professionals with prior deal experience are roughly a quarter of their private-sector peers’. Having more staff on board—and compensating them fairly—will help to move transactions through DFC’s project preparation workflows more efficiently.

Conclusion

The most common refrain in commentary on US-China competition in LICs and LMICs is that “don’t take China’s money” is not a policy. It is not tenable to beg host governments not to make deals with China, especially when China is the only option for meeting urgent development needs. For many years, experts have repeated the same recommendation to the US government: show up. Offer a US-led alternative to Chinese capital. DFC represents a major step in the right direction. The last seven years have been proof of concept. Now, Congress must scale it and commit resources that will allow DFC to live up to its full potential.

Staff

Caroline Costello

Assistant Director

Global China Hub

China Chinese

Issue Brief Jun 9, 2025

Why Congress must reauthorize the US Development Finance Corporation

By Enrique Millán-Mejía, Martin Cassinelli

Congress has an opportunity to give the United States tools to create jobs at home and strengthen ties overseas. Updating the Development Finance Corporation and reauthorizing it before the October deadline are the first steps.

Americas Economy & Business

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2024

China pairs actions with messaging in Latin America. The United States should do the same.

By David O. Shullman

China has coordinated trade, financing, and investment with diplomatic engagement, public diplomacy, and information operations to deepen its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington should, in turn, pair diplomatic engagement and messaging with greater attention to regional countries’ needs.

China Economy & Business

Report Mar 24, 2025

How Beijing uses inducements as a tool of economic statecraft

By William Piekos

As strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, Washington and Beijing seek every possible advantage to gain an edge. In this environment, both countries are increasingly turning to economic statecraft—the use of economic coercion or inducement to pursue strategic goals—to advance their interests.

China Economy & Business

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Leveraging Beijing’s playbook to fortify DFC for global competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This issue brief is part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s National Defense Strategy Project, outlining the priorities the Department of Defense should address in its next NDS.

Executive summary

The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) is being drafted at a critical moment when the United States risks permanently ceding strategic influence to China in Africa—especially West Africa—without a reimagined approach to the continent. With lifesaving foreign assistance drastically reduced due to the current administration’s budget cuts to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department programs, along with uncertain economic effects from tariffs, the United States has voluntarily weakened its diplomatic and economic tools to influence and support Africa.  

This reality gives additional weight to the importance of defense diplomacy and military cooperation as critical means by which the United States can exercise strategic influence in the region. While the US administration may be looking to narrow the United States’ role on the continent, Africa is too vast, important, and complex to attempt bilateral defense diplomacy, military-to-military relations, and counterterrorism efforts on the cheap, by proxy, or from afar. 

Key issues for the Department of Defense (DoD) include acknowledging the looming strategic dilemma posed by China’s increased influence in Africa; developing a cohesive and responsive strategy to counter that influence; managing bilateral defense relationships; and addressing other regional priorities such as Russia’s growing influence and counterterrorism issues, which also have inextricable connections to China. The new NDS needs to lay a foundation to address these challenges. The alternative is over-regionalization of the China challenge to the Indo-Pacific, which could impose short-sighted limitations that will affect the US role in Africa for years to come.

Staff

Tressa Guenov

Director, Programs and Operations and Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Issue Brief Jul 24, 2025

Five pillars for deterring strategic attacks

By Mark J. Massa, Alyxandra Marine

As its highest priority, the Department of Defense must deter strategic attacks on the United States. A five-pillar strategy could guide efforts to prevent nuclear and nonnuclear threats while ensuring resilience and readiness against large-scale nuclear attacks on the US homeland.

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Issue Brief Aug 21, 2025

Winning through people: The human capital advantage in great-power competition

By Beth Foster and Alex Wagner

To maintain military readiness, deter conflict, and preserve its technological edge, the United States must prioritize human capital by investing in resilient service members and a skilled civilian workforce.

Defense Policy National Security

The Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, works to advance resilience as a core tenet of US and allied national security policy and practice.

Learn more

The post Addressing China’s military expansion in West Africa and beyond appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Rule of law is the strongest driver of prosperity 
• The rule of law is an enabler of political and economic reforms
• Case in point: Rwanda and Nigeria show two diverging paths
• A decade of global decline in rule of law
• Case in point: Chile reverses the trend
• What comes next?

What drives long-term prosperity and where should reform begin? Data suggest that the rule of law consistently emerges as the most influential factor—outperforming economic and political freedom—in driving prosperity, not only enabling economic growth but also reinforcing political and market reforms.  

Institutions are critical to development, yet they remain notoriously difficult to define and measure. Concepts like democracy, rule of law, or market economy are interpreted differently across different contexts, and scholarly debates frequently get mired in theory rather than grounded analysis. 

To cut through this complexity, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center takes a pragmatic and functional approach. Instead of debating abstract definitions, we focus on how core institutional domains operate in practice, and how they shape a country’s trajectory. 

The Freedom Index developed by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center offers a clear framework to do just that. It rests on the idea that a country’s institutional foundation is made up of three interrelated domains: political, legal, and economic. These domains can be empirically assessed through the degree of freedom they confer on individuals and enterprises. 

Each pillar of the Index captures a distinct facet of institutional quality:  

• the political subindex evaluates how executive authority is attained and constrained; 
• the legal subindex examines the rule of law, that is, the adherence to laws by both citizens and public officials; and  
• the economic subindex assesses the extent to which markets, rather than the state, allocate resources.  

Each is given equal weight to constitute the Freedom Index.  

What sets the Freedom Index apart is its methodological clarity and empirical breadth. It translates complex institutional arrangements into measurable components, generating scores for 164 countries from 1995 to 2024. This allows a deeper examination of how each pillar—economic, political, and legal—functions in practice and influences a country’s long-term development and prosperity. 

The Freedom and Prosperity Center’s research aims to investigate the relative impact of different institutional pillars and how they interact over time. While the rule of law emerges as the most influential factor, durable prosperity depends on the strength and interplay of all three institutional pillars—political, legal, and economic. The data simply offer indications of where reform efforts should begin, especially in contexts where progress must be sequenced or prioritized.   

Rule of law is the strongest driver of prosperity 

What do the most prosperous countries have in common? The data are clear: The rule of law is the strongest institutional driver of prosperity. It outperforms both political and economic freedom as a predictor of a country’s overall wellbeing. 

Table 1. Rule of law shows the strongest correlation with overall prosperity 

The rule of law then appears pivotal for building a stable, just, and prosperous society. It ensures that everyone, including and especially those in power, is subject to and accountable under the law. By having a robust and trusted rule of law, citizens have a framework so that when disputes occur, they know the system will ensure adequate protections. This not only ensures individual’s rights are protected by the law but also fosters economic development. Having environment where the rule of law is predictable and stable encourages more investment, innovation, and durable growth. 

Its impact goes beyond economic growth. Across most dimensions of prosperity—such as income levels, life expectancy, and the treatment of minorities—the rule of law exerts the strongest and most consistent influence, and stands out as the dominant factor overall. 

Figure 1. The rule of law shows the strongest correlation to most indicators of prosperity 

The rule of law is an enabler of political and economic reforms 

The rule of law might not only support prosperity but also underpin progress in other institutional domains. When we examine pairwise correlations between the rule of law, economic freedom, and political freedom, we find that both economic and political freedom correlate most strongly with the legal foundation provided by the rule of law. This indicates that the rule of law may serve as an enabler of democratic governance and market reforms.  

Table 2. The rule of law correlates strongly with economic and political freedom 

Case in point: Rwanda and Nigeria show two diverging paths 

In 1995, Rwanda and Nigeria had nearly identical scores on the Freedom Index score, which averages countries’ performance across the three pillars: the rule of law, economic freedom, and political freedom. Over the next three decades, both countries made substantial progress, reaching similar overall levels by 2024.  

However, the composition of their gains differed significantly. Rwanda’s improvement was driven by steady advances in the rule of law and economic freedom, while levels of political freedom remained largely unchanged. In contrast, Nigeria’s rise was largely the result of a sharp increase in political freedom following its transition from a military autocracy to a civilian-led democracy in 1999, with limited and inconsistent progress in legal and economic institutions. 

Figure 2. Rwanda focused on rule of law and market reforms, whereas Nigeria led with political liberalization 

These divergent experiences reflect two distinct models of institutional development. Rwanda followed a path that prioritized stability, legal order, and economic liberalization, while limiting political pluralism. This approach resembles the pre-democratic phases of South Korea and Spain, where legal and economic modernization preceded political opening. Nigeria, by contrast, pursued a “democratization first” model, mirroring the trajectory of many Latin American countries during the third wave of democratization at the end of the last century, where political liberalization outpaced improvements in state capacity and market openness. 

While Rwanda’s case is of course unique because of the 1994 genocide, the continued restrictions on political freedom may be holding back its full potential. In the aftermath of 1994’s events, the country focused on restoring security, rebuilding legal institutions, and reconstructing the economic landscape. These efforts have produced impressive gains in prosperity. The outcome is measurable: Between 1995 and 2024, Rwanda’s Prosperity Index score increased by 19 points (out of 100), while Nigeria’s rose by almost 13 points.   

However, despite these successes, Rwanda has yet to make the leap to full democratization, unlike South Korea and Spain, which transitioned to democracy and reaped long-term economic dividends. Rwanda’s gains were more stable and broad-based, but its long-term trajectory may depend on whether it embraces the political freedom reforms that historically accompany and reinforce sustained prosperity. In fact, according to our 2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: How political freedom drives growth, democratizing countries see an average 8.8 percent boost in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over twenty years compared to those that remain authoritarian. 

Nigeria offers a striking example of  political liberalization that has not been matched by corresponding advances in legal and economic institutional reforms. Following Nigeria’s transition to democratic governance in 1999, the country has seen significant improvement in the early years. However, in the past ten years, the country has seen a decline in political freedom, though the level remains higher than in 1999. Much of the improvement has encountered challenges, as improvement of political freedom has not been accompanied by continuous process in economic liberalization and building strong rule of law system.  

Economic liberalization has been inconsistent and sector-specific. While sectors such as telecommunications and banking have undergone meaningful reforms, erratic trade policies, and persistent uncertainty in the oil sector have hindered the development of a balanced market economy.  

Meanwhile, legal institutions continue to underperform, hampered by corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and insecurity. For nearly three decades, Nigeria’s score on bureaucracy and corruption has remained below the regional average, ranking 133 out of 164 countries. Politically motivated violence and instability, measured in our security component, are even more troubling, with Nigeria ranking 151 out of 164. Weak rule of law and politicized institutions have enabled rent-seeking elites to control the political landscape, carving out electoral integrity and public trust. 

Nigeria has made undeniable progress in political freedom, but without stable market frameworks and a robust legal foundation, the country’s overall development trajectory remains constrained. 

A decade of global decline in rule of law

Despite its critical role, the rule of law has been in global decline for more than a decade.  Rule of law scores have dropped for eleven consecutive years, bringing the world to a seventeen-year low.  

This trend affects all five legal components: clarity of the law, judicial independence and effectiveness, security, informality, and bureaucracy and corruption. Among them, clarity of the law has seen the steepest drop. 

Strikingly, the steepest declines occurred in OECD countries (members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), those with the highest incomes and strongest historical rule of law traditions. While their absolute scores remain higher than non-OECD countries, the rate of deterioration is greater. 

Figure 3. OECD countries have seen a steeper decline in four of the five components of rule of law