Resilience - Atlantic Council

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Drones are at the heart of Ukraine’s defensive strategy, serving as a ubiquitous presence over kill zones and preventing localized Russian advances from consolidating into more substantial breakthroughs. Meanwhile, in some sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk, ground robotic systems are now being used to deliver the vast majority of supplies to troops. With this in mind, Ukrainian commanders argue that all future defensive lines should be optimized for both aerial and ground drones.

These technological advances do not eliminate the need for manpower. Even the most sophisticated fortifications require soldiers to react to emerging threats. When Russian units manage to infiltrate defensive lines or push into urban areas, infantry forces remain essential in order to clear and secure ground. While Ukraine’s improved fortifications are an encouraging development for the war-weary nation, no physical barrier can realistically stop Russia unless it is supported by sufficient quantities of well-trained troops.

Strengthening Ukraine’s fortifications and addressing manpower shortages will be among the top priorities for incoming Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who took up his post this week. Fedorov made his name in government as Minister of Digital Transformation. Since 2022, he has been one of the driving forces behind Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone warfare capabilities.

Fedorov’s extensive defense tech background, along with his reputation as a modernizer who has countered institutional corruption through the digitalization of state services, has led to considerable optimism over his appointment. He is now faced with the twin challenges of improving Ukraine’s front line defenses while addressing the mobilization and desertion problems hindering the Ukrainian war effort. If he is able to make progress on these two fronts, Ukraine’s prospects for 2026 and beyond will begin to look a lot better.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

To counter hybrid threats, Latvia formally recognizes the information space as a defense domain, implementing multilayered strategies that combine government-led strategic communications, support for independent media, civil-society engagement against disinformation, and international cooperation, notably through hosting the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. Societal resilience is further boosted by public-preparedness campaigns like “72 Hours: What to do in case of a crisis,” media literacy programs, and integrating national defense education, including psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance, into curricula.

Significant reforms are modernizing Latvia’s crisis management, with the planned National Crisis Management Center (CMC) under the prime minister, centralizing coordination and decision-making. Civil-protection measures are strengthening as well, with new legislation for public shelters and updates to the State Civil Protection Plan.

International cooperation is indispensable, with NATO providing collective defense, the EU offering funding and policy coordination, and robust bilateral ties with the United States and regional cooperation with Baltic and Nordic partners. The LVARes project itself exemplifies Latvia’s proactive international engagement in studying national capabilities, raising awareness, and sharing best practices.

Challenges persist, including resource constraints, interagency coordination complexities, evolving threats, and the need to bolster societal cohesion. Future imperatives involve fully operationalizing the CMC, implementing the shelter program, sustained investment in capabilities, and deeper public engagement in CND. Strategic recommendations for policymakers emphasize CMC effectiveness, civil-protection investments, public-private partnerships, psychological resilience, volunteer engagement, and integrating nonviolent resistance. For international partners, continued support for Latvian capability development, amplifying LVARes findings, facilitating resilience benchmarking, and supporting cross-border exercises are crucial. Through these efforts, Latvia fortifies its security and contributes valuable lessons to the Euro-Atlantic community.

Introduction

The contemporary security environment is characterized by an array of complex and interconnected threats. These range from the potential for conventional military aggression to the more pervasive and persistent challenges of hybrid warfare, sophisticated information operations, and malicious cyber activities. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and its full-scale war against Ukraine have significantly amplified these threats, underscoring the vulnerability of states in the region and the urgent need for robust national preparedness. Latvia’s position as a frontline state of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), sharing a direct border with the Russian Federation, has inherently shaped its national security posture and necessitated a continuous adaptation of its defense strategies, pushing for an essential shift in Latvia’s defense thinking.

The traditional focus on military defense, while still fundamental, is increasingly understood as insufficient on its own. Consequently, Latvia has progressively embraced a broader concept of national resilience encompassing not only military strength but also the resilience of its society, the continuity of government and essential services during crises, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the cultivation of psychological defense among its populace. This evolution reflects a growing understanding that national security in the twenty-first century is a whole-of-society endeavor.

Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security. These include ensuring the operational continuity of essential services and the resilience of critical infrastructure, actively countering hybrid threats in the information and cyber domains, fostering broad societal resilience through public preparedness and education, and acknowledging the potential role of nonviolent civil resistance. The aim of this report is to systematically analyze the evolution in Latvia’s defense and security policy, particularly its implementation of a comprehensive national defense framework, and to share the insights and lessons learned with allies, partners, and the broader public to enhance collective security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

A comprehensive approach to defense and resilience

Latvia’s approach to national defense has undergone a significant evolution, moving from a primary focus on conventional military capabilities and professional military service orientation toward a more encompassing strategy known as Comprehensive National Defense (CND). Adopted in 2018, the CND system is designed to ensure security and crisis preparedness across all sectors of the state and society, thereby enhancing Latvia’s overall deterrence posture and its resilience against armed conflicts or a wide spectrum of potential crises. The overarching aims of CND are the following:

Preparing the Latvian population to actively participate in the defense of their country.
Facilitating efficient and effective crisis management at the national level.
Ensuring the continuity and support of critical state functions, including government operations, energy supply, healthcare, and logistics, even under duress.

A fundamental and defining characteristic of Latvia’s CND is its “whole-of-society” approach, which recognizes that national defense and resilience are not the sole responsibility of the armed forces or government ministries but require the active involvement and cooperation of every element of society. This comprehensive vision entails the systematic integration of municipalities, the owners and managers of both public and private critical infrastructure (spanning sectors such as energy, communications, finance, and healthcare), nongovernmental organizations, the broader business community, and individual citizens into national defense planning and preparedness efforts.

A significant emphasis within this approach is placed on building and nurturing mutual trust and robust partnerships between public authorities at all levels and private-sector entities. These collaborative efforts are seen as essential for creating a networked civil and military defense system where each component is prepared and able to work in sync. The success of the CND model hinges on the ability to overcome traditional challenges and foster a shared sense of responsibility for national security.

The whole-of-society approach is further strengthened through the way the CND is managed and its legal basis, both of which are designed as a multitiered framework to ensure a whole-of-government and -societal approach to national resilience. The management structure (detailed in Annex 1) integrates political leadership, ministerial responsibilities, operational agencies, local governments, and societal actors to prepare for and respond effectively to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from military aggression to civil emergencies. Whereas the framework of strategic concepts, national plans, legal acts, and supporting regulations (a detailed list provided in Annex 2) ensure that CND is not merely a theoretical construct but a systematically planned and implemented national effort. Strategic concepts like the National Security Concept and the State Defense Concept, both approved by the parliament, articulate Latvia’s high-level strategic assessments, goals, and priorities in response to the evolving security environment, providing the overarching vision and direction for the development of the CND.

This approach also aligns with the direction set by NATO at its 2016 Warsaw Summit, where the Alliance adopted seven baseline requirements for national resilience. For the first time, NATO established clear conditions that member states’ civilian institutions must meet to support Article 4 and 5 military operations. These requirements include: continuity of government and critical services; resilient energy, food, and water supplies; the ability to manage uncontrolled population movements; resilient civil communication and transportation systems; and the capacity to handle mass casualties. In this regard, Latvia’s CND system goes beyond these NATO requirements by also incorporating societal resilience and the involvement of the private sector in defense operations and other aspects.

Alongside NATO’s framework, relevant EU-level initiatives provide significant complementary support for resilience. These include the EU’s crisis-management framework, particularly its Civil Protection Mechanism, and the Military Mobility initiative, which supports development of civilian infrastructure to facilitate the rapid movement of military forces across Europe. These efforts directly reinforce both NATO and national resilience objectives, providing practical tools and funding to enhance collective defense.

Beyond multilateral alliances, Latvia cultivates strong bilateral partnerships and engages actively in regional cooperation formats to enhance its security and resilience. The 2020 State Defense Concept emphasizes the strong military cooperation between Latvia and the United States, highlighting the long-standing and highly valued partnership between the Latvian National Armed Forces and the Michigan National Guard. The United States is widely regarded as a major strategic partner for Latvia’s security and independence.

The three Baltic states also work closely together to develop their collective security and defense capabilities. This cooperation includes joint efforts to strengthen their external borders, deepen collaboration in civil protection and crisis management, combat disinformation through shared intelligence and strategies, and enhance overall societal resilience. Joint military exercises are also a regular feature of this trilateral cooperation.

Nordic-Baltic cooperation provides another layer of security collaboration. Latvia’s comprehensive defense approach shares many similarities with the strategies adopted by Nordic countries, facilitating mutual learning and coordinated efforts. The Nordic and Baltic countries have also demonstrated solidarity through joint statements and coordinated actions, for example, in reaffirming their support for Ukraine.

Latvia’s multifaceted international engagement—spanning NATO, the EU, key bilateral relationships such as with the United States, and intensive regional cooperation—is not merely about receiving security assistance or aligning with external frameworks. It increasingly reflects a strategy of proactive contribution. As a frontline state that has rapidly developed its resilience concepts and capabilities in response to direct and evolving threats, Latvia is well-positioned to share valuable expertise and lessons learned.

Key pillars of Latvian resilience

Since the adoption of CND, Latvia has pursued a comprehensive approach to defense based on an understanding that every element of the government and population plays a part in creating a networked civil and military defense system—and recent lessons from Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression have further reinforced this understanding. This approach grew out of necessity: Latvia, a small country with limited strategic depth, neighbors Russia, a large, aggressive military power that has attacked countries in its so-called near abroad. Latvia’s approach, like those of its fellow Nordic-Baltic countries, is built on a straightforward idea that the country’s civil and military defense systems can achieve a greater deterrence and defense impact if they collaborate and if each part is prepared. Meanwhile, Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security.

While the CND concept encompasses eight dimensions, ranging from military development to psychological resilience, our report examines it through four perspectives: military, civil, societal, and governmental resilience. This approach allows for a cohesive, strategic evaluation of the dimensions of readiness without sacrificing the scope of the original concept.

Military resilience

Latvia’s military resilience is a central aspect of its national defense, resting on the fundamental pillars of domestic responsibility for developing its own capabilities and a robust collective defense provided by its allies.

Lessons learned from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine since 2014 have driven initiatives to ensure that Latvian institutions and society can respond effectively to any unconventional or hybrid threat scenarios. Changes to the National Security Law have empowered the National Armed Forces (NAF), from the lowest level up, with the authority to respond to any military threat, conventional or unconventional, even without immediate orders from the political leadership. The law explicitly states that armed resistance may not be prohibited in times of war or occupation and affirms that every citizen has the right to take up arms to resist an aggressor. This legal framework solidifies the principle of total defense, ensuring that the entire nation is prepared and authorized to contribute to the defense of the country.

To maintain this posture, Latvia has steadily increased its defense budget. By 2018, Latvia had met the NATO defense spending goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which has significantly contributed to the development of military capabilities, including within the National Guard. Military resolve is evident in the budget’s rapid growth, which is projected to reach approximately 3.65 percent of GDP in 2025, with announcements indicating a further increase to 5 percent by 2026. This funding is crucial for keeping military modernization on track through the strategic procurement of advanced weapon systems. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities to enhance its deterrence posture. The commitment to acquiring advanced systems—such as High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers, IRIS-T air defense systems, and coastal defense missiles—sends a vital message that the country is serious about bolstering its defense. National resilience also necessitates forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. Latvia is proactively addressing manpower challenges, most notably through the reintroduction of mandatory conscription in the form of the State Defense Service (SDS). Introduced in 2023, the SDS aims to increase recruitment and build a larger, well-trained reserve force. This policy of eleven-month mandatory service has shown early signs of success. Latvia plans to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028 and, notably, 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, complemented by an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. However, this rapid expansion presents significant challenges. The primary obstacles include a lack of sufficient modern training infrastructure to accommodate the larger number of recruits, a shortage of qualified instructors to lead the training, and the immense organizational task of building a functional reserve system that can effectively manage and retrain thousands of new reservists annually after their active service ends. Successfully overcoming these hurdles is critical to ensuring the SDS translates into a genuine increase in combat-ready forces.

Comprehensive defense exercise “Nameis 2024,” National Armed Forces of Latvia, https://www.flickr.com/photos/latvijas_armija/54023090223/in/album-72177720320603776.

Advanced capabilities and increased manpower are only effective if they are maintained at a high state of readiness. This is achieved through a rigorous schedule of military exercises designed to test plans and ensure interoperability. The flagship event is the annual Comprehensive Defense Exercise “Namejs,” which tests the armed forces in joint operations at every level.

These exercises are crucial for more than just military units, serving as the primary mechanism for implementing the whole-of-society defense concept in practice. During Namejs, the NAF systematically drills its cooperation with the civilian sector. This includes collaborating with municipalities and state-owned companies to support military mobility and countermobility efforts, and working with private-sector entrepreneurs on resource mobilization. Similarly, through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated both ingenuity and cooperation. It is exemplified by efforts to formalize the roles of civilian groups in national defense, such as the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—a patriotic and armed segment of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. As comprehensive defense evolves into a societal reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Civil resilience

Civil resilience in Latvia focuses on the comprehensive preparedness of its civilian structures and population, encompassing robust civil-defense planning across all government levels, from national ministries to local municipalities. This emphasis recognizes the critical role of municipalities in fostering a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine beginning in 2014 and 2022 deeply reverberated across Latvian society, creating significant momentum for action. The latter created public demand that pushed local governments beyond mere declaratory contingency plans to proactively explain preparedness strategies to their constituents. Latvia has adopted the necessary legislative basis that mandates that Latvian municipalities ensure the continuity of essential services during crises or war, therefore actively participating in developing a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Pilskalns Exercises

The Pilskalns exercises stress-test the developed defense and crisis management plans, enhance knowledge, and inform participants about potential challenges during a military crisis at the municipal level. These exercises provide the opportunity to engage national and local institutions and the National Armed Forces to test their ability to communicate, mobilize resources, and manage evacuation in the event of a crisis.

This is primarily achieved through civil-defense plans, which are now mandatory for all municipalities. Developed in close cooperation with the National Armed Forces, these plans must be exercised at least annually. A prime example of this is the Pilskalns series of tactical exercises. While all municipalities are now mandated to develop such plans, some have been more proactive. For instance, Jelgava, Latvia’s fourth-largest city, established a municipal operation information center in 2011, preceding many other local governments. In peacetime, this center functions as a municipal hotline for damaged infrastructure, but in a crisis, it transforms into the municipal early warning system.

Another key aspect of civil resilience involves ensuring the continuity of essential services and protecting critical infrastructure. Latvia has strategically shifted its crisis-management thinking from solely focusing on infrastructure protection to prioritizing the uninterrupted delivery of essential services and functions. While this shift presents additional planning challenges, it stems from the understanding that critical infrastructure cannot operate in isolation from broader national defense factors; it is rendered ineffective without skilled personnel, operational processes, and supporting services vital for its functioning. Businesses are consequently required to develop robust continuity plans.

Latvian Mobile Telephone

Latvian Mobile Telephone (LMT) is one of the first companies in Latvia to establish its own National Guard subdivision, underscoring its role as a critical infrastructure provider. LMT is responsible for maintaining national connectivity, even in times of war, and actively develops innovative solutions for military use. Composed of the company’s own employees, the subdivision’s primary mission is to strengthen the security and defense of LMT’s critical infrastructure and essential services, defending against attacks aimed at destabilizing the country by targeting its critical infrastructure.

The Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the NAF retain a central role in comprehensive defense planning. This reflects both the fundamental need to integrate military and civilian planning factors closely within comprehensive defense systems and the traditionally high level of societal trust in the National Armed Forces. Consequently, even private industry’s preparedness plans are drafted in close cooperation with both the relevant sectoral ministry and the MoD. This collaborative approach ensures that the government is aware of civilian-sector resources, can provide expertise and experience, and can monitor how these plans integrate into the broader national resilience system and warfighting plans. Furthermore, industrial actors participate in joint exercises with their specific sectoral ministry and the MoD at least once every four years. An innovative development is the creation of specific National Guard units staffed by personnel from critical infrastructure entities, whose primary role is to defend critical infrastructure objects in case of military contingencies.

Latvian electricity company Sadales tīkls undergoing National Guard Training. Ministry of Defense of Latvia, https://www.sargs.lv/lv/latvija/2022-10-27/sadales-tikls-veido-zemessardzes-apaksvienibu-ar-merki-aizsargat-uznemuma.

The ability to ensure the flow of money for goods and services constitutes another critical service. Societal upheavals, crises, and wars often disrupt peacetime payment systems, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s experience. To address this, the Bank of Latvia (which is analogous to the US Federal Reserve) is developing crisis payment solutions, both cash and noncash, for a society with a high adoption rate for noncash transactions. For example, the Bank of Latvia is collaborating with major commercial banks to develop approved offline solutions, ensuring individuals can use their bank cards for basic necessities even if bank communications are down. Similarly, during a crisis or war, banks are required to maintain a predefined network of ATMs, with at least one ATM per municipal center, and have developed a map of critical ATMs that would operate in case of crisis.

Latvia also has proactively sought to improve the integrity of its communications systems. This involves ensuring that critical data—including sensitive healthcare, defense, security, and economic data—remains within Latvian territory and that critical information technology systems continue to function without interruption even if the connection to the global internet is disrupted. To achieve this, the government now mandates that national and municipal institutions, companies, and owners/managers of critical IT infrastructure prioritize using a single national internet exchange point, GLV-IX, a statewide and state-operated local internet ecosystem, for their data flows if the outer perimeter of electronic communications is compromised.

Finally, Latvia has actively addressed two common challenges in building preparedness: improving the communication of preparedness requirements and funding resilience efforts. Many national governments struggle with effectively communicating military crisis and war preparedness expectations to municipalities and private industries. While both disseminating information and issuing legislation are important, these efforts must be augmented by activities that encourage thoughtful planning, accurate understanding of requirements, and knowledge development. Indeed, Latvian municipalities have sometimes voiced concerns about insufficient resources for civil preparedness, arguing it should be a national responsibility. Similarly, even large, well-funded hospitals struggle to meet the three-month supply requirement for medicine and supplies, while smaller hospitals lack adequate funding altogether.

Latvia has sought to address these questions through legislative changes, clarifying responsibilities and tasks, and mandating regular exercises. Over time, continuous cooperation and the mandatory requirement of yearly exercises are expected to foster a better understanding of the overall defense system, individual roles within it, and mutual expectations among all parties involved. Regular exercise schedules significantly benefit Latvia’s preparedness across sectors by stress testing developed plans, building knowledge, and informing participants about potential organizational challenges during a military crisis or war. For example, the yearly state-wide comprehensive defense exercises Namejs involve municipalities, allied forces, and local companies playing out different scenarios alongside the National Armed Forces. On a local level, Pilskalns exercises, in use since 2020, test municipalities’ planning and practical response capabilities under wartime scenarios, involving national and local institutions, the NAF, and local companies. These exercises are crucial for stress testing plans, identifying gaps, and building practical experience among all involved parties. Ultimately, however, private enterprises are expected to fund their own preparedness planning and implementation activities.

Societal resilience

Societal resilience in Latvia is built on the principle that national security is a shared responsibility that extends to every citizen, empowering individuals with the practical knowledge and tools needed to withstand a crisis. The government has fostered a “culture of readiness” through regular information campaigns and hands-on materials that include tips to spot false information.

The most visible example of this is Latvia’s “72-hour preparedness guide,” a practical tool aimed at bolstering individual and, by extension, societal resilience. This campaign advises citizens on how to be self-sufficient for the first seventy-two hours of a crisis, a critical period before state emergency services may be able to provide widespread assistance. The booklet provides practical guidance on reliable information sources, identifying and countering disinformation, essential supplies to stock like water and food, preparing an emergency kit, and developing a family crisis action plan. This proactive approach is rooted in both general emergency-management principles and Latvia’s specific geopolitical and historical context. It not only promotes self-sufficiency that reduces the immediate burden on state resources, but also empowers citizens with concrete actions they can take, which reduces feelings of helplessness and fosters a sense of control and readiness. Public preparedness campaigns like this booklet encourage citizens to volunteer and self-organize, which are foundational elements for any form of collective resistance. The State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD) plays a vital role in this public preparedness effort by actively informing the population on safety measures. To significantly enhance these capabilities, Latvia fully implemented a national cell broadcast system in early 2025. This modern alert system allows the VUGD to instantly send critical warnings directly to all mobile phones within a specific geographic area during an emergency, functioning without requiring users to install an application. This technology provides an immediate and widespread communication layer, complementing existing tools like sirens and the “112 Latvija” mobile application, which is also promoted by the VUGD as a key resource for emergency information.

Youth Guard

The Latvian Youth Guard (Jaunsardze) is Latvia’s largest state-sponsored youth movement, operating under the Ministry of Defence to provide education in national defense. Its primary mission is to foster patriotism, civic consciousness, leadership skills, and physical fitness among young people aged ten to twenty-one. By providing voluntary training in military basics, first aid, and survival skills, the Jaunsardze strengthens the nation’s will to defend itself, serving as a vital component of Latvia’s comprehensive state defense system and a primary pathway for future service.

This culture of readiness is reinforced through long-term educational investments designed to foster an informed, critical, and defense-aware society. The national defense education program in schools aims to instill patriotism, civic responsibility, and basic preparedness skills, fostering an understanding among young people of their role in national defense. Media literacy training is a central component, being built into both school curricula and community programs.

These practical and educational efforts are underpinned by a broader national defense strategy that formally acknowledges psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance as crucial components of CND. A noteworthy aspect of Latvia’s posture is the formal integration of nonviolent civil

resistance, where the 2020 State Defense Concept explicitly includes “nonviolent civil resistance against occupation forces” as a component of the societal dimension of “total defense.” This signifies a preparedness to resist aggression through a wide spectrum of means, not limited to armed conflict. This is, in large part, a direct response to Russia’s information manipulation and its treatment of the information space as a critical front. Securing an open media space and bolstering psychological resilience against manipulation is now a paramount security goal, involving the cultivation of critical thinking skills to withstand attempts to sow discord.

To defend this front, Latvia employs a multilayered approach. The state has bolstered strategic communication resources, with a dedicated unit under the State Chancellery that coordinates messaging and works to disarm foreign malign information activities. Quality journalism is supported by funding and policy, and authorities have banned most of the Russian propaganda channels. In 2021, Latvia became the first Baltic state to prosecute individuals for willfully spreading dangerous falsehoods as per the criminal law, though there have been few convictions due to legal ambiguity in Article 231 around the definition of “fake news.” This state-led approach is complemented by a vibrant ecosystem of nongovernmental organizations, academics, and volunteers—such as the “Baltic elves”—who actively debunk falsehoods. Investigative journalists, fact-checkers, and initiatives like the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence also work to expose disinformation and promote high standards in journalism.

At the community level, these principles are put into practice through societal and municipality-led initiatives. Continuing work started in the previous year, the Riga municipality has organized a cycle of seven practical civil-defense seminars across various city neighborhoods. During the workshops, residents learn about specific risks in their area, such as nearby high-risk objects and evacuation routes, as identified by the Riga city municipality. They also receive practical training on how to: adapt a basement into a safe shelter; properly assemble a seventy-two-hour emergency bag; and build mental resilience with psychological self-help techniques.

To address the wider Russian threat to Western society, Latvia is sharing what it is learning with its allies and partners. It hosts NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, and it works with allies and partners to combat malign influence. Examples of this kind of cooperation are IREX (International Research and Exchanges Board), which conducts media training in the Baltic area, and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, which investigates disinformation and debunks narratives, educates media consumers, and has had staff based in Latvia since 2017.

Governmental resilience

Governmental resilience is the central pillar that ensures the state can continue to lead and function during a crisis, providing the necessary command, control, and coordination within the CND system. This is achieved through a robust legal framework, a clear institutional hierarchy, contingency and crisis-response planning, and a commitment to testing these plans through regular exercises to guarantee the continuity of government.

The crisis-management system of Latvia is multilayered. The State Civil Protection Plan clearly outlines the responsibilities and leading roles of all state institutions in case of state-level contingencies. The system is designed to be flexible; for example, the Ministry of Health has the leading role and responsibility for management of pandemics, as was the case with COVID-19, with all institutions (including the armed forces) supporting these efforts. Meanwhile, in the case of a military threat or war, civilian institutions have the role of supporting the armed forces and ensuring continuity of governance and essential services. At the practical level, the system envisions the establishment of the Civil Protection Operational Management Centre (abbreviated in Latvian as CAOVC), that is formed in case of state-level contingencies, including war. It would be led by the Ministry of the Interior and composed of delegated experts from across the government, tasking it with coordinating interinstitutional response, compiling a comprehensive situational picture, and providing support to the NAF.

This role is to be complemented by municipal-level responsibility through the establishment of municipal civil-protection commissions that are obliged to plan and execute response activities on a regional level, as well as coordinate with state-level efforts.

The “Kristaps” series involves the Cabinet of Ministers in simulating strategic decision-making, as well as NATO Crisis Management Exercises (CMX), while the operational comprehensive defense exercise Namejs includes tests of civil-military cooperation, the practical implementation of civil defense plans, and the coordination functions of the planned CAOVC.

Latvia’s current push to improve its crisis-management system and governmental resilience is a direct response to lessons learned from a series of major crises. The COVID-19 pandemic served as a stark, real-world test of cross-sectoral crisis management, exposing significant shortcomings in interministerial coordination, public communication, and the ability to manage state material reserves effectively. The 2021 hybrid attack and instrumentalization of migration organized by Belarus on the EU’s eastern border tested the state’s ability to coordinate a response between interior, defense, and foreign policy bodies under “gray zone” threat conditions that are, as another Atlantic Council report put it, diffuse and hard to attribute. Most significantly, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022 has provided an invaluable, albeit grim, case study in the requirements of modern national defense. It underscored the absolute necessity of a resilient government able to overcome the massive scale of civil-defense challenges and pervasive hybrid threats. These events collectively created a clear need for reevaluation and reform of the crisis-management system in Latvia, highlighting systemic challenges in achieving effective horizontal coordination across ministries.

To resolve these issues, Latvia is establishing a new centralized National Crisis Management Center (CMC). The concept for the CMC, approved by the government in early 2025, represents the keystone of the nation’s reformed resilience architecture. Its creation is a direct answer to the lessons learned from past crises, designed to provide the professional, permanent, and agile coordination that was previously lacking. Operating under the direct authority of the prime minister, the CMC is designed to provide a single, empowered hub for analysis, planning, and, crucially, to improve coordination in crisis management between key state institutions, especially in complex threat scenarios, and provide support to decision-makers and political leadership.

The core functions of the CMC will include: continuous monitoring of the situation and information gathering; identifying potential risks and threats; conducting analysis of information and data to assess these risks and threats; strategic planning and coordination of operational planning; coordinating the planning, logistics, and recovery of state-level civilian crisis-management resources, including state material reserves; and coordinating crisis-communication efforts. Meanwhile, in the specific context of a military crisis, the CMC will be responsible for coordinating the civilian sector’s response and ensuring seamless cooperation with the military sector.

In essence, this new structure, continuously validated through planning and exercises, aims to ensure the leadership and effective whole-of-government coordination deemed essential for navigating these complex security challenges.

Challenges and future imperatives for resilience

Latvia has been systematically working to integrate all societal elements into its national defense posture, particularly since 2014. This ongoing effort, while showing significant progress, presents a range of challenges and necessitates clear future developments to ensure sustained and enhanced security in a complex geopolitical landscape.

Latvia’s commendable strides in building a comprehensive national resilience model are met with several persistent and evolving challenges; therefore, for the continued evolution and strengthening of Latvian resilience it is crucial to address them in a timely manner:

Building and maintaining robust military defense capabilities. Maintaining momentum in military modernization programs and ensuring the capacity to sustain combat operations beyond an initial phase are crucial for credible deterrence and defense. This includes addressing the timeline for military buildup in relation to potential Russian force reconstitution. While Latvia’s defense spending is projected to reach 3.45 percent of GDP in 2025, with ambitions for 5 percent by 2026, efficient allocation across diverse needs—from military modernization to civil protection and societal programs—remains a complex undertaking. This financial strain also impacts critical infrastructure operators and municipalities tasked with new preparedness responsibilities. Therefore, continued investment in critical military capabilities, including air defense, coastal defense systems (like Naval Strike Missile systems), and long-range precision fires (HIMARS) should be pursued.
Expanding the National Armed Forces. Planned expansions of the NAF and the full implementation of the State Defense Service face manpower constraints, requiring substantial investment in training infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative recruitment policies. The current reserve system also requires significant overhaul. Latvia should continue the expansion of the NAF, overhaul the reserve system to effectively integrate SDS graduates, and implement both dedicated reservist training and early military education. Ensuring adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies for recruitment and training is crucial.
Developing targeted strategies for critical areas. The development of industry-specific expertise for business and service continuity, particularly for critical infrastructure, can be a bottleneck. Cultivation of a deeper culture of shared responsibility with the private sector through targeted incentives, joint training programs, and secure information-sharing platforms should be continued. Additionally, mechanisms for improving intermunicipal coordination and resource sharing can alleviate the burden or strain associated with this issue. Latvia should also move beyond awareness campaigns to foster active participation, skill building, and a sense of ownership among the citizenry. Relatively low levels of public trust in certain state institutions can potentially hinder the full engagement of society in defense and resilience efforts. Actively integrating civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills could help resolve this challenge. A primary challenge is also extending the intensity of preparedness from military threat scenarios to encompass nonmilitary crises across all civilian institutions. Intermunicipal coordination, particularly in resource sharing, needs strengthening. Consistent funding for new municipal responsibilities in civil defense is also a point of discussion, which the municipalities have on previous occasions cited as one of the reasons for their inability to build up civil defense capacities.
Interagency coordination and centralized leadership. Ensuring seamless collaboration and clear, consistent communication of preparedness requirements across all sectors and among numerous actors remains a continuous task. Latvia faces persistent interagency coordination complexities. While the spirit of comprehensive national defense promotes collaboration, the practicalities of aligning different ministries, agencies, and even different levels of government can be challenging. Each entity has its own priorities, budgets, and institutional cultures. The MoD, while a key actor, cannot guarantee or ensure the engagement and resource commitments of other ministries. Effective comprehensive national defense requires a process led by a centralized authority with the power to direct and synchronize efforts across government—ideally the prime minister’s office or a dedicated high-level body. This is especially true for distributing tasks effectively among ministries and bodies of equivalent hierarchical power. Therefore, the establishment of the new Crisis Management Center is a promising development that could further leadership in the implementation of comprehensive national defense and serve as a central actor for confronting crisis situations. However, its mandate, authority, and resourcing will be critical. It must be empowered to not just coordinate but also to direct and enforce; it also must avoid becoming yet another silo and instead act as a true hub for national crisis response and comprehensive national defense implementation. The assurance that the CMC is rapidly and effectively staffed, resourced, and empowered to coordinate across all government levels, municipalities, and the private sector is paramount. The CMC should also be tasked with leading institutionalized, regular, complex cross-sectoral crisis-management exercises. Engaging all nongovernmental organizations and local media more consistently in preparedness exercises and overcoming local political inertia are both ongoing efforts. Effective Comprehensive National Defense coordination across ministries, especially in horizontal tasking, presents difficulties.
Countering evolving threats in the information landscape. Democratic countries like Latvia must counter influence within political, ethical, moral, and legal constraints, while adversaries often operate without such limits, giving them an advantage in proactive narrative projection. Latvia must continuously adapt its resilience strategies to counter new and evolving hybrid threats, sophisticated disinformation techniques, and novel cyberattack methods. Sustaining and enhancing programs to equip the population to withstand long-term information influence operations and maintain morale during crises is crucial. Further exploration and integration of nonviolent resistance concepts into national defense training and public guidance could promote the adaptability of resilience in this area. Latvia’s main approach to countering malign activities in the information space has been blocking narratives rather than proactively projecting its own strategic messages. A shift in policy is also needed from primarily blocking disinformation to more proactive narrative projection by developing and disseminating national strategic narratives that reinforce democratic values and societal cohesion. Expanding media literacy and critical thinking education is still an option; so, too, is allocating more support to independent and local media. Collaboration with allies on resilience benchmarking particularly for critical services, countering hybrid threats, and protecting critical infrastructure could bring about collective benefits in resilience building.
Reviewing the conceptual framework of national defense. Latvia has made impressive progress in defining and implementing the CND concept. However, we believe that the evolution of its conceptual framework must continue to better adhere to the complexities of real-life challenges and diverse crisis situations. As time passes, a review of the initially laid out core principles is needed. A primary concern is preventing comprehensive national defense from becoming a catch-all concept. While its all-encompassing nature is a strength there is risk that its boundaries are too wide and therefore its core purpose can become diluted, leading to a diffusion of effort and resources. For instance, if every societal issue is framed as a comprehensive national defense matter, prioritization becomes difficult and the focus on core security and defense preparedness could be lost. Future work should aim to refine the operational scope of the comprehensive national defense, ensuring it remains a focused and effective framework while clearly delineating its relationship with broader societal well-being initiatives. We need to clearly define what falls within comprehensive national defense and what is supportive but distinct to maintain its strategic integrity.
Deepening societal engagement and cohesion. Latvia should continue its efforts to make its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality not just a government policy on paper. As comprehensive defense evolves into a social reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia. Although we have seen great examples of civil engagement from businesses in actively pursuing their role in the defense system, challenges remain with broad-based individual and community-level engagement. Latvia, for various historical and societal reasons, doesn’t always exhibit the strong deeply embedded community culture seen in some other nations. This can make reaching individuals and fostering grassroots resilience initiatives more challenging. Simply put, many individuals may not yet fully internalize their role or feel connected to a local preparedness network. Achieving genuine societal cohesion and developing the resilience of individuals within their respective communities must become a more pronounced strategic goal. This requires more than just information campaigns. It means investing in local leadership development, supporting community-based organizations, designing exercises that actively involve ordinary citizens in practical ways, and perhaps leveraging existing structures like schools, cultural centers, or even hobby groups to build networks of mutual support and preparedness. The aim should be to empower individuals and communities to self-mobilize for constructive action in crisis rather than relying solely on top-down directives.
Continued advocacy for enhanced support from NATO, the EU, the United States, and regional allies for Latvia’s capability development, military modernization, joint exercises, and resilience projects is crucial, as is maximizing the prepositioning of allied military equipment and stocks. The current strategic window, while Russian forces are degraded by the war in Ukraine, should be used to rapidly build up defense capacity and societal resilience, secure continued US commitment, generate a greater NATO forward presence, deepen regional integration, and refine reinforcement mechanisms. Other regional resilience priorities include transitioning the Baltic defense line from a concept to a concrete reality with fortified positions, leveraging natural terrain, and ensuring forces train to fight effectively from these prepared positions.

Editors: Armands Astukevičs, Elīna Vrobļevska.

Contributors: Mārcis Balodis, Hans Binnendijk, Marta Kepe, Beniamino Irdi.

Annex 1: Management structure

A. Strategy and policy level

President of Latvia and National Security Council (NSC): The president, as NAF supreme commander, chairs the NSC. The NSC, comprising top state officials and security heads, advises and coordinates on national security and defense, and offers recommendations to the Saeima (see below) and Cabinet.

Saeima (Parliament): Enacts national security, defense, and civil-protection laws; approves key strategic concepts (National Security Concept, State Defense Concept); and provides parliamentary oversight.

Key committees:

National Security Committee: Prepares national security policy documents for Saeima approval.
- Defense, Internal Affairs and Corruption Prevention Committee: Oversees relevant ministries, legislation, and budgets.
- Comprehensive National Defense Subcommittee: Monitors government implementation of Comprehensive National Defense (CND) elements within the National Security and State Defense Concepts.
- Other committees: May address specific CND implementation aspects as needed.

Cabinet of Ministers (CoM): The highest executive body, implementing national CND policy, approving strategic plans and regulations, allocating resources, and directing ministries.

Key bodies:

Crisis Management Centre (CMC): Concept approval in early 2025; planned to be fully operational when legislation has been passed. Envisioned as the central, national crisis-management coordinator (monitoring, analysis, strategic planning. Its potential role in leading overall CND coordination is under active discussion.
- Ministerial-Level Working Group for CND: Chaired by prime minister or lead minister. Ensures political alignment and high-level interministerial CND strategy coordination.

B. Planning and coordination level

State Secretary-Level Working Group for Comprehensive Defense (CND): Chaired by MoD state secretary. Coordinates CND plan development, harmonization, and monitoring across ministries at the senior-civil-servant level, translating Cabinet decisions into actionable plans.

Ministry of Defense (MoD): Lead institution for the State Defense Concept/Plan and CND concept development; responsible for military defense, NAF development, and civil-military cooperation planning.

Ministry of Interior (MoI): Lead institution for public order, internal security, and the State Civil Protection Plan; oversees the State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD), State Police, and Border Guard; coordinates the Civil Defense Operational Management Centre.

Line ministries (e.g., health, transport, economy): Develop and implement sector-specific resilience plans and CND measures, ensuring continuity of essential services and participating in relevant working groups and exercises.

Bank of Latvia: Ensures financial-sector resilience, including payment systems and cash circulation, in cooperation with commercial banks.

C. Implementation and operations (state level):

National Armed Forces Headquarters (NAF HQ): The NAF’s highest military headquarters and main operational command and control entity under the chief of defense; manages NAF operations, plans/executes joint operations (peacetime, crisis, war), and coordinates with civil authorities such as the Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection.

Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection: A state-level coordination body for major crises or military threats; integrates multiagency expert groups and works closely with NAF HQ to coordinate civil-military efforts.

State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD): Primary state agency for firefighting, rescue operations, and practical civil-protection measures; implements elements of the State Civil Protection Plan.

Other key state agencies and services (e.g., Emergency Medical Service, State Police, Border Guard): Implement crisis response and resilience measures according to their mandates and plans, participating in exercises and interagency coordination.

Municipal and private-sector actors:

Civil Defense Commissions (thirty-seven at municipal level): Develop and implement local civil defense plans; coordinate local resources and crisis response (including public notification, evacuation, basic services, shelters); cooperate with regional NAF units and state services.

Private sector/critical infrastructure operators: Develop and implement business continuity plans for essential service resilience; cooperate with state and municipal authorities; may be involved in resource mobilization.

Annex 2: Framework of concepts, plans, laws, and regulations

Project editors

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. Currently, he is working on his doctoral dissertation on authoritarian regime resilience. He has a master’s degree in political science from University of Latvia. Astukevičs’ previous work experience includes policy analysis and planning in the Latvian Ministry of Defense, where he focused on crisis management and comprehensive national defense issues. His current research interests relate to topics on the defense and security policy of the Baltic states, national resilience and resistance to hybrid threats, and analysis of Russia’s foreign policy processes.

Elīna Vrobļevska is a researcher and deputy director at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. She has a doctoral degree in international relations from Rīga Stradiņš University, with her thesis on “Russia’s foreign policy identity ideas and their manifestation in foreign policy (2012–2022).” Vroblevska serves as a lecturer and researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Rīga Stradiņš University. Her research interests include the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy narratives and their impact on political processes, the study of Russia’s foreign policy and the security challenges it poses, as well as the examination of Russia’s activities in the information space.

Contributing authors

Mārcis Balodis is a researcher and a member of the board of the Center for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on Russia’s foreing and security policy as well as Russia’s use of hybrid warfare.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Marta Kepe is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior defense analyst at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization.

Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also the head of strategic and international affairs at Deloitte Legal Italy and founder and CEO of HighGround, a political risk consulting firm.

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Employment needs to take center stage in Gaza security plans

Melanie Robbins — Fri, 19 Dec 2025 16:40:38 +0000

Employment and economic opportunity are two of the most overlooked areas for strategic development in Gaza. The benefits of focusing on these are rather straightforward: populations stripped of economic opportunity are vulnerable to becoming dependent on armed groups or nonstate actors, especially those that have a monopoly on access to social services and economic opportunity. This means every family in Gaza without an income is an opening for Hamas, militias, or the black-market war economy. Gaza’s economy has long been shaped by coercion, taxation, and armed patronage networks because no legal economic alternative has been built.

Many political and security leaders remain unconvinced that employment should be its own goal or that employment is central to immediate security. While US President Donald Trump’s twenty-point peace plan for Gaza refers to employment in broad terms, it is only referenced as an outcome of investments and large-scale development, but employment is not viewed as a goal in and of itself.

For example, point number ten states that “many thoughtful investment proposals . . . will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for the future of Gaza.”

Gaza cannot function without guaranteed pathways to work. To disarm Hamas, there must be a fiscal strategy alongside effective street-level security. Most critically, the best way to undermine Hamas’s power on the ground is to employ the people Hamas pays today. Security requires a fiscal plan; in Gaza, Hamas controls labor, resources, and opportunity, eliminating competition. To break this chokehold, Gaza requires deliberate intervention to generate employment across sectors.

Hamas and Gaza’s employment crisis

Before the launch of war in 2023, Gaza already faced some of the worst labor conditions in the region. Hamas-led public sector employment accounted for nearly one-third of all those working in the Strip, according to the Ramallah-based Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. In 2017, the average monthly household expenditure in Gaza was 934 dinars, or roughly $1,300. Meanwhile, Hamas is paying young fighters up to three hundred dollars per month, according to Wall Street Journal reporting citing Israeli officials—an amount that pays for a crucial portion of those expenses. Additionally, the patronage network system of Hamas meant that those in the militant group’s networks were able to access aid, resources, and other market goods in a way that those unaffiliated could not, something that has continued throughout the war as well.

This meant that the few available jobs or reliable opportunities inside Gaza were disproportionately Hamas-affiliated—whether related to civil service or fighting. Against this backdrop, youth unemployment reached as high as 70 percent in Gaza, and overall unemployment reached 80 percent.

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Today, close to 70 percent of Gaza’s population is homeless or displaced, with no clarity on when they will return to stable housing. This has made the need for new employment even more urgent.

When more than a million people have no work, no prospects, and no timeline for rebuilding their lives, the outcome is predictable: Many will return to the only functioning economic structure available, which is dominated by the Hamas-led network. Gaza’s geographic isolation exacerbates this, as the majority of Gazans have never left the Strip. Without jobs, mobility, or legitimate income, dependency becomes permanent.

If Hamas were no longer the leading source of employment, its patronage networks would weaken, reducing its control over communities’ access to salaries, goods, and services. Peacebuilding experience shows that employment changes daily incentives. People with families, stability, and predictable income see militancy as a high-cost and less rational choice.

Ignoring the central variable

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) belief that it has sufficient institutional capacity to rehabilitate Gaza, as its prime minister wrote recently in its economic plan, is troubling to most long-term analysts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Almost every major Arab country and Western ally has made it clear through numerous UN resolutions and diplomatic statements (including most recently in Trump’s twenty-point plan and the New York declaration by Saudi Arabia and France) that the PA requires significant reformation before it can take on control of Gaza.

In the PA’s recently released economic plans, unemployment is treated only as a minor humanitarian issue, rather than a development factor or as a central determinant of whether a cease-fire can hold or Gaza returns to terrorism and war. Specifically, the plan suggests providing $4.2 billion in cash assistance for food, supplies, minor reconstruction, and housing support. Yet, the plan’s development of employment schemes and workforce participation receives only $500 million—far short of what is required for serious job creation.

To underscore just how ill-prepared PA thinking is regarding employment outcomes, to match the current income provided by Hamas employment, the plan would need several billion dollars annually to enable workers to earn the same as they do now from Hamas coffers, as either civil servants or fighters. Yet the PA plan, similar to the Trump plan, does not explicitly focus on the details of making new workforce access available or on pursuing long-term job creation through strategic development, nor does it seek to put significant resources towards the goal of earned income. Instead, it commits Gaza to being an aid-dependent economy, in which international investors are expected to operate without a reliable labor force. This is a direct path back to patronage, dependency, and long-term instability.

Employment as a human rights and security imperative

In my book, What Role for Human Rights in Peacebuilding, I argued that peacebuilding has traditionally overemphasized political rights, institution-building, and security-sector reform while relegating economic, social, and cultural rights to a secondary status. Yet, human rights are interconnected and cannot be pursued as separate goals. Political participation cannot be realized when people are uneducated, unhealthy, unhoused, or unemployed. Civil and political rights must be linked to economic, social, and cultural rights for transitions to be viable.

The models often employed in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process do not address foundational gaps in economic, social, and cultural rights, especially in the area of long-term employment. Unless international leadership takes seriously the central role employment plays in deradicalization and stabilization, Gaza’s reconstruction will replicate past failures. Employment is a framework for disarmament, but only when sustained for the long term—not when limited to temporary per diem labor, food-for-work schemes, or short-term projects.

A sustainable employment paradigm must be put at the center of Gaza’s next phase. Many Gazans will explain, when asked, that many of the flanks of Hamas fighters are not driven by ideology but by predictable payrolls and access to goods for Hamas-affiliated families. Without a competing legal economy, Hamas will always have recruits.

Gaza needs macroeconomic and microeconomic development schemes that create market infrastructure capable of supporting the entire workforce. Education, vocational training, private-sector investment, and targeted upskilling can all generate meaningful employment. In Gaza, ignoring this is not simply poor economics. It is a direct security risk. This requires understanding the actual size of Gaza’s labor force, reasonable income targets, and priority sectors where workers can quickly enter employment with existing or modestly enhanced skills. Both public- and private-sector models will be required, with private-sector growth as the long-term engine of prosperity.

A full-employment-oriented mandate is not extreme government intervention, nor is it a call for the PA to dominate the labor market; rather, it should be defined as a strategy for long-term private-sector growth, carried out in partnership with and supported by public actors.

Impact on Palestinian sovereignty

Palestinian self-sovereignty requires economic independence and access to the world. One of the strongest inoculations against Hamas is broad access to markets and opportunities. Some of this will require long-term planning and sector-specific analysis, but many aspects are straightforward. For example, if private firms and the international community could employ Gazans to rebuild at even a slightly higher wage than Hamas salaries, stable employment could ultimately extend to swaths of the population, with Gazans able to support their families without using dollars tied to the militant group.

Sectors such as environmental rehabilitation, food production, education, medical care, infrastructure, and vocational services all require new labor. If a transitional authority seeks to meet the moment, it should invest heavily in private-sector job creation so that disarmament, deradicalization, and reintegration can begin.

Gaza’s next phase must recognize what weakens Hamas’s grip: economic independence and freedom of movement. Employment severs Hamas’s patronage networks by providing a reliable income not tied to armed actors. It rewires daily incentives, making militancy too costly for most people. The appeal of armed groups declines as economic opportunity expands.

Gaza’s future depends on far more than security forces or humanitarian aid. It depends on whether people see a path out of the rubble that is grounded in economic self-sovereignty, dignity, and the possibility of success. If security and political leaders ignore this reality, they will guarantee that the next war comes even while the debris of this one remains.

Melanie Robbins is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Realign For Palestine project.

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How Syria’s grassroots civil peace committees can help prevent intercommunal conflict

Gregory Waters and Kayla Koontz — Mon, 01 Dec 2025 15:58:29 +0000

In late September, violence erupted in the countryside around Suqaylabiyah, a large Christian town in Syria’s Hama governorate. The area had generally avoided the type of sectarian violence that has plagued other parts of the country since the December 8, 2024 collapse of the Assad regime. But an unsolved rape case in nearby Hawrat Amurin fueled new anger and tensions, eventually leading to the kidnapping and torture of a local soldier by Alawi insurgents. The next day, members of the soldier’s family entered the village near where he was kidnapped, demanding he be released. At the same time, Sunnis from other nearby communities stormed Hawrat Amurin, looting homes and killing an elderly man.

Security forces quickly intervened and the mob fled. In response to the rapidly deteriorating situation, the head priest of Suqaylabiyah held several dialogue sessions with Sunni and Alawi community leaders and local security officials. They agreed to form a committee to continue intercommunal dialogue and to address any future disputes before they turned violent.

This impromptu civil peace committee is not the first of its kind in post-Assad Syria. The first such committee was formed in Tartous’s Qadmus district in December 2024 by the town’s Ismaili population to address disputes with their Alawi neighbors and ease the arrival of the new government’s forces to the area. Since then, similar committees have been formed across parts of Damascus, Homs, Tartous, Latakia, and rural Hama. They are largely oriented toward resolving sectarian-related problems, whether between the Sunni security forces and Alawi locals, or between neighborhoods and villages of different sects.

The authors have traveled regularly to Syria over the past year, visiting with local security officials and activists across much of Homs, Hama, Tartous, and Latakia studying the challenges and successes of local peace-building in the wake of dictator Bashar al-Assad’s fall. Civil peace committees and similar systems have consistently stood out as an important aspect of trust-building and dispute resolution. While they have proven highly effective in some areas, they are only present in a few parts of the country. At times, they face opposition from government officials. Still, they offer one important model for dealing with the country’s decades of deeply rooted social divisions and the bouts of intercommunal violence that continue to leave Syrians dead.

The role of civil peace committees

Damascus formed a National Civil Peace Committee in the aftermath of the March 6 coastal massacres, theoretically tasked with preventing violence and easing intercommunal tensions through mediation. In June, this committee made headlines when news broke that one of the Assad regime’s most notorious criminals, Fadi Saqr, had effectively joined the committee. His inclusion reflected Damascus’s choice to try and maintain calm via close engagement with former regime-affiliated security and military officers, who some members of the new government argue will help prevent their former colleagues from engaging in renewed insurgent activity.

This controversial national body, however, has nothing to do with the civil peace committees organically forming at the local level in several municipalities across Syria. These committees vary in size, function, and form, but they all seek to prevent violence and improve communication at the hyper-local level. This often involves connecting locals to the new security apparatus via trusted community figures.

It is difficult to say with certainty how many civil peace committees are active in Syria, since many do not conform to the name even when they function in a similar capacity. Most of the more structured and explicitly named committees are concentrated in the southwestern Damascus suburbs, Homs, and Syria’s coast—reflecting both the concentration of strong activist networks and complex sectarian communal dynamics.

There are, however, core commonalities among the groups. Committees are usually formed around a council of local notables. Their success is largely dependent on two factors: 1) the attitudes and acceptance of local security officials and 2) the initiative and determination of local civil society. At their core, these committees facilitate communication between the security officials and locals who are too afraid to communicate with them directly. One Christian activist in Baniyas explained the importance of this role to the authors succinctly:

“Fear is rooted in isolated violations and a rejection of government narratives . . . direct government outreach cannot fix this fear because locals don’t trust the government’s words or actions. Rather, they need civil society intermediaries.”

Due to their organic formation, each civil peace committee has its own culture and practices. In Jaramana, according to one member, the civil peace committee is very strong, includes representatives of all sects, and even has its own security force. In Alawi communities, the committees’ main roles are improving communication between locals and security officials and working with officials from Syria’s General Security Service, the country’s core internal security force, to address concerns and violations. Local officials use the committees to disseminate information, conduct peaceful disarmament campaigns, and gather complaints about misconduct of government personnel.

In other places, such as Homs and parts of Damascus, committees are equally focused on resolving intercommunal and housing, land, and property (HLP) disputes. For example, the committees in the suburbs of Daraya, Moadimiyah, and Sahnaya worked together to return civilians kidnapped and arrested during the violence there in May and to stop the attacks on the nearby Alawi suburb of al-Somoriyeh in September.

Expansion of informal intermediaries and religious bodies

More common than the formal civil peace committees are informal networks and individuals who do the same work as committees but under different names. Many of these networks are built around religious figures, as opposed to the aforementioned committees built around activists and administrative leaders of local towns. For example, in Homs, a small network of Christian priests, Sunni sheikhs, and Alawi leaders work together with the city’s mukhtars and security officials to resolve disputes and calm intercommunal tensions. While not a formal committee or council, these men are able to use their personal connections to each other and their respective communities to resolve many smaller issues.

In Homs’s Old City, the Syriac Orthodox Santa Maria Church is the main actor for settling disputes involving the neighborhood’s Christian population. The church’s leader, Father Yuhanna, has helped mediate disputes that occur between the residents and others in the city, but he also helps ease tensions when security officials conduct arrests or investigations of Christian men in the area. These religious and community leaders interact directly with the city’s security officials and the governorate’s political affairs director to discuss the implementation of laws and issues of government abuse.

In Salamiyah, the long-standing National Ismaili Council plays the same role through its various subcommittees. This council has been crucial for bridging the gap between the new government and the Ismaili population more generally, as well as the Alawi and Shia populations in Salamiyah specifically.

But in other places, the intermediary networks are much weaker and rely on only one or two individuals. This is particularly true in the coast, where Alawi communities face a double hurdle: a lack of historical civil society and extreme distrust and fear between themselves and the new government. Still, in some places, such as Tartous’s Sheikh Badr and Latakia’s Beit Yashout, there are individual men and women who do the same work as civil peace committees: improving communication between locals and security officials and resolving arrest- and security-related disputes.

For example, the mayor of Beit Yashout serves as a key communication node between the district security official and the local towns and villages. Whenever news of a large security convoy entering the area emerges, locals quickly message the mayor, who in turn calls the district security official to convey their concerns and learn what is happening. He then sends messages to a wide network of local leaders and media activists, sharing what the official told him and urging calm (the authors witnessed this first hand during a visit in September). He also regularly sits with security personnel at checkpoints to help encourage closer relations between them and the locals. In a region wracked with fear, these basic actions are critical for reducing tensions and preventing reckless actions by terrified locals and security forces.

Reconciliation committees

Both the formal civil peace committees and informal networks are new phenomena which have been met with mixed reactions by local officials. But there is a third type of dispute resolution mechanism, which has for decades been a staple of Syrian society: the reconciliation committee (majlis al-sulhi). However, these committees differ significantly from civil peace committees both in scope and the type of communities they serve.

Reconciliation committees focus almost exclusively on HLP issues for displaced people. The bulk of the dispute resolution conducted by the bodies are between those community members who were displaced and those who remained under the regime. They are most commonly found in Sunni communities in Idlib, Hama, and Homs, and they rely heavily on close family and communal ties for mediation. Nonetheless, these committees have long been embraced by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-backed Salvation Government in Idlib, setting a precedent for the new government’s acceptance of such civil peace-oriented systems. This acceptance should now be extended to the civil peace committee model.

Creating opportunities for peace

Creating lines of communication may be the most important function of these different systems. They often provide the only means of engagement with the authorities in places where many people are too afraid to approach officials on their own. These committees and networks also play a central role in resolving intercommunal and community-state disputes before they spiral into serious violence, as happened in Hamrat Amurin in September.

Much of the work of civil peace committees is initiated by motivated individuals who take it upon themselves to advance intercommunal trust-building. Many Ismaili and Christian activists who have been involved in these networks since December have stressed the same thing to the authors across multiple field trips—that local groups must assert themselves to the new government and force it to work with them. This approach has proven to work, but it is also a difficult concept for many activists, especially those from the Alawi community, to embrace when there is so much fear and distrust, and inconsistent government treatment of civil society more broadly.

Thus, most activists working in civil peace and dispute resolution issues emphasize the need for officials to genuinely engage with their work while giving them the space to operate freely. Members of multiple committees also discussed with us the need for logistical support to expand their networks, linking committees across districts to help share experiences and strategize communication and dispute resolution approaches. Such regional networks would give rural areas a more grounded view of the situation in other regions, undermining the chokehold that social media misinformation has on much of the country.

Inconsistent government limitations

Yet despite the benefits of this system, many civil peace activists across the country are still facing obstacles from the new government. While committees in places such as Qadmus, Damascus, and Salamiyah have seen many successes, the experiences of cities such as Baniyas, Masyaf, and Dreikish show how reliant this system is on a cooperative local government.

In Baniyas, a civil peace committee was formed after the extreme violence the city experienced on March 6, bringing together prominent Sunni and Alawi activists and religious leaders. Yet while it gave space for the Alawi community to voice complaints and work with local officials, their demands have been consistently ignored. The committee has been described by some former members as essentially being a mouthpiece for the local government, with no real agency of its own.

Masyaf’s short-lived committee faced a more direct challenge from its local government. In June, activists in the city gathered more than five hundred people to hold the country’s first-ever local elections for a civil council. Prior to the election, the organizers had received approval from the district director, Muhammad Taraa, to create the new body. Yet as soon as it was formed, Taraa began to oppose it. After sidelining and ignoring the new council for a month, Taraa called on the Hama Political Affairs Office to order its disbandment. Civil peace work in the district has now gone partially underground, with only a small civil peace committee now working exclusively on securing the release of ex-regime soldiers from the district’s rural villages who were captured by opposition forces during the final battles of the war.

Tartous’s Dreikish District has largely been another success story for the role of civil peace committees, but recent pressure from some local officials may undermine the positive steps that have been made. Like with the Ismailis in Qadmus, a small group of respected and educated Alawi leaders formed a committee in Dreikish the day after the regime fell. These men worked closely with Damascus’s newly appointed security official, fostering a deep bond of trust that endures today. However, the official was later transferred out of Dreikish, and his replacement was executed by local insurgents on March 6. The committee members were able to save the lives of the rest of the General Security officers that night, but the murder of the official has resulted in new pressure on the area since March. Now, two of the districts’ security officials still work closely with the committee, while a third views the body with distrust and refuses to engage with it. Committee members stress the importance of the close personal relationship they had built with their first official as well as the official killed on March 6, and the role these personal friendships and animosities play in the effectiveness of their work today.

Even when local government officials do embrace these committees and informal networks, their ability to address local grievances remains limited. These systems almost always engage with security officials—representatives of the Interior Ministry charged with overseeing the Internal Security Forces. Thus, issues such as the behavior of checkpoint personnel, detentions, and communication are more easily addressed, but these local officials have no say over the more pressing structural issues such as economic recovery, the settlement problem, political demands, and services. The inability of local security officials to address these topics limits the trust-building impacts of their engagement.

Empowering committees

Despite the potentially significant benefits of an expanded and empowered civil peace committee network in Syria, this system is largely isolated to addressing the symptoms of social discord. These committees should form one part of a broader approach to civil peace, bridging organizations and wider Syrian society with good governance practices to gradually break down the anger and loss felt between Syrian communities. One former civil defense member in Aleppo, who now works on humanitarian and civil peace issues, described the problem to the authors this way:

“Civil peace itself is not a means but an end. . . it is not possible to make people accept this idea so quickly. . . but the government is burning this by trying to make everyone accept each other in a few days. They don’t understand civil peace. . . In all of Syria, there are civilian intermediary offices working between General Security and the people. . . But these offices solve the problems only after they occur. We have to focus on dealing with the source of conflict, not just one symptom.”

Some committees and civil peace activists fear that expansion could result in backlash from the government. Licensing issues and anxiety offer state monitoring stem from the government’s unclear and discouraging policies toward civil society. Instead, Damascus should understand the benefits these committees can provide as allies for civil peace.

The Syrian government should create and enforce a clear policy for how its security and political officials engage with civil society organizations that work on civil peace and sectarian issues. This policy should encourage the creation of independent civil peace committees across districts and sub-districts experiencing sectarian tensions, particularly in the coast, Homs, and rural Hama.

Damascus should ensure that officials engage with these committees in a genuine and honest manner to maintain their trust with their own communities, without which these committees are entirely ineffectual. Lastly, Damascus should expand the type of officials and government bodies that engage with these systems to begin addressing non-security-related local issues. This would increase peoples’ trust in both these intermediaries and the local government, while also providing more senior officials with granular insights into the needs of these area.

International organizations can support this work by funding trainings and dialogue sessions that bring together committees and activists from different parts of the country to share their experiences and best practices. Countries such as Turkey and Qatar that provide training to Syria’s Ministry of Interior personnel can also support these local peace efforts by including civil engagement and communication courses when training security officials.

Despite their mixed track record, these committees have laid forth a blueprint for preventing intercommunal violence and trust-building with the new government. Now they should be expanded across more areas and empowered by Damascus to operate freely rather than hindered. Taken together, this approach will help prevent further conflict while strengthening the new government’s ties to local communities across the country.

Gregory Waters is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Kayla Koontz is a PhD candidate at the Carter School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a researcher at the Syrian Archive.

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Hurricane Melissa left $8 billion in damage. Jamaica needs US support to get back on its feet.

Patricia R. Francis, Maite Gonzalez Latorre — Fri, 07 Nov 2025 22:39:54 +0000

By any standard, Jamaica has been a model of fiscal discipline and climate preparedness. For more than a decade, it kept a primary surplus above 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), reduced its debt, and earned bipartisan praise for responsible governance. In September, S&P Global Ratings upgraded Jamaica’s credit rating to BB- and reaffirmed its “positive outlook,” a rare achievement for any small island economy.

Then came Hurricane Melissa, the strongest Atlantic hurricane on record ever to make landfall in Jamaica. Starting late last month and into this week, it tore through the island’s central and western parishes, destroying towns, roads, hospitals, and critical infrastructure.

After days of watching the slow, relentless approach of Hurricane Melissa, one of the authors, Patricia, sheltered in her home in Kingston. She could hear the wind howling at over 100 miles per hour (mph) and rain lashing sideways against the windows—yet even that was nothing compared to the 185 mph winds and torrential rain battering the west of the country, where her friends and family live. While Patricia dealt with small leaks, her friends and family were left with nothing.

In the days after, her family visited some of the hardest-hit communities to distribute care packages, and what they saw was heartbreaking. Entire neighborhoods flattened, the landscape looking as if an atomic blast had torn through it.

At least 40 percent of the buildings and roads on the western part of the island, including Montego Bay, suffered damage. Many small communities, such as the port town Black River, were almost completely wiped out. Such damage is remarkable mostly for its sudden severity, not for its novelty. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries lose an estimated 2 percent of their infrastructure capital stock annually to climate-related damage. Infrastructure upgrades must therefore be a priority, given the region’s exposure to natural disasters and climate change.

This is where US leadership can step in, not as charity, but as shared investment in resilience and regional stability. Jamaica has kept its promises: it has delivered disciplined fiscal reform, climate-smart policies, and innovation in risk financing. It has done what the international system asks of developing nations. Now, it needs that system, and its closest ally, the United States, to respond.

Reality over foresight

The Caribbean remains highly vulnerable to hurricanes and other climate-related events, which can disrupt or extend projects critical to rebuilding, driving up costs. Natural disasters often destroy essential infrastructure, forcing projects to pause or cancel. The question now is how long it will take Jamaica to recover from this cumulative destruction. The immediate response is urgent, but so too is planning for the months ahead. With projections indicating that dangerous climate events will become more frequent and severe, insurability declines and the cost of future investment rises.

The damage caused by Hurricane Melissa already amounts to almost eight billion US dollars, which is equivalent to nearly half of Jamaica’s annual GDP. That figure dwarfs the country’s much-heralded $150 million parametric catastrophe bond that it arranged with the World Bank. This bond, purchased as a form of insurance from capital markets, is designed to trigger after major disasters like this one. Given the strength of Hurricane Melissa and the scale of Jamaica’s losses, it is expected that the 2024 catastrophe bond to pay out its full $150 million value. Even so, Jamaica will need much more to rebuild.

Two sustainable paths forward

The destruction caused by Hurricane Melissa is so extensive that once the search-and-rescue efforts end and basic services such as water and electricity are restored, the damage to homes and infrastructure will exceed the capacity of any single government. Jamaica’s recovery will likely therefore depend on two important factors: innovative financing models that reduce investment risk and strong public-private partnerships that accelerate sustainable recovery.

The Caribbean’s unique and small markets call for creative financing, but there are tools readily available to help US companies invest in infrastructure and the recovery process. Two options are especially relevant.

First, US companies partnering with multilateral development banks and insurance companies can help de-risk investments. To reach the average of advanced economies by 2030, Jamaica would need significant investment, including $5.8 billion for new infrastructure and asset replacement in road infrastructure. It would also need more than $1.4 billion toward telecommunications infrastructure for fixed broadband and 4G networks to reach equivalent levels in developed economies. This significant need offers opportunities large enough to attract major investment. Limited human and institutional capacity make collaboration with third-party institutions even more important. Projects such as the Inter-American Development Bank’s One Caribbean program can help prepare projects, strengthen public-private partnerships, and manage political risk. Equally important is building trust with local partners. Many Caribbean firms are family-owned and community-rooted, which makes relationship-building essential for lasting investment. Joining local business organizations such as American Chamber of Commerce chapters and participating in trade missions can help US investors understand regulations, identify talent, and ensure that projects succeed over time.

Second, public-private partnerships can help the Jamaican government and their partners meet urgent recovery needs while driving long-term, sustainable efforts. Launching public-private partnerships is one of the most effective ways to mobilize capital from local, regional, and private investors. Under these partnerships, governments provide needed guarantees and subsidies to reduce risk, while the private sector generates the capital needed to determine a project’s commercial viability.

It is important that this model is used, as opposed to wholesale private ownership of foreign operators, to avoid eroding projects’ national economic value. Therefore, local equity participation should be prioritized in public-private partnership structures to maximize national benefits and ensure long-term sustainability. The private sector can work with governments and local civil society to strengthen resilience through environmental and social impact assessments. It can also support by improving infrastructure standards, including for underground piping and the usage of hurricane-proof glass, as well as updating building codes where necessary. Insurance can also help keep infrastructure projects afloat during delays and stoppages resulting from natural disasters. At the same time, new investments will need to focus on renewable energy, resilient infrastructure, digital connectivity, and community housing, all sectors where US expertise and capital can make an immediate impact.

Hurricane Melissa tested Jamaica’s strength and found it unbreakable but not inexhaustible. The island has proven that fiscal responsibility is possible. Now it’s time for the United States to prove that climate solidarity is, too.

Patricia R. Francis, who currently resides in Jamaica, is a nonresident senior fellow for the Caribbean Initiative at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council.

Maite Gonzalez Latorre is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council.

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Michta published in RealClearDefense on strengthening US alliances

dfitzsimmons — Mon, 27 Oct 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Original Source

On October 27, 2025, Andrew Michta, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in RealClearDefense. He argues for closer strategic alignment between the US and its allies.

If the West is to win against this Axis of Dictatorships, our leaders need to speak directly to the dramatically changing balance of power not just in our region, but globally. We need a shared agreed upon multi-faceted strategy involving genuine military readiness, robust alliances, economic measures that restore our industrial power base, technological superiority over our adversaries, and most of all ideological resilience.

Andrew Michta

Fellow

Andrew A. Michta

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

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#AtlanticDebrief – Why is health important to global economic resilience? | A debrief with Michael Oberreiter

lignac — Tue, 21 Oct 2025 13:41:15 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Finance ministers and central bank governors from around the globe descended on Washington, DC for the World Bank/IMF 2025 Annual meetings last week. This year’s Annual meetings touched upon everything from debt and development to trade, monetary policy, artificial intelligence, and geopolitical risk. What was markedly missing from many of the discussions was the importance of health and innovation, which promises both economic and societal benefits.

In this episode of the #AtlanticDebrief, Jörn Fleck sits down with Michael Oberreiter, Head of External Affairs International at Roche, to discuss why heath should be part of the broader global economic agenda.

This #AtlanticDebrief is supported by Roche.

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Staff

Jörn Fleck

Senior Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

The post #AtlanticDebrief – Why is health important to global economic resilience? | A debrief with Michael Oberreiter appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Addressing China’s military expansion in West Africa and beyond

Tressa Guenov — Thu, 21 Aug 2025 18:00:00 +0000

Director, Programs and Operations and Senior Fellow

This issue brief is part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s National Defense Strategy Project, outlining the priorities the Department of Defense should address in its next NDS.

Executive summary

The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) is being drafted at a critical moment when the United States risks permanently ceding strategic influence to China in Africa—especially West Africa—without a reimagined approach to the continent. With lifesaving foreign assistance drastically reduced due to the current administration’s budget cuts to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department programs, along with uncertain economic effects from tariffs, the United States has voluntarily weakened its diplomatic and economic tools to influence and support Africa.

This reality gives additional weight to the importance of defense diplomacy and military cooperation as critical means by which the United States can exercise strategic influence in the region. While the US administration may be looking to narrow the United States’ role on the continent, Africa is too vast, important, and complex to attempt bilateral defense diplomacy, military-to-military relations, and counterterrorism efforts on the cheap, by proxy, or from afar.

Key issues for the Department of Defense (DoD) include acknowledging the looming strategic dilemma posed by China’s increased influence in Africa; developing a cohesive and responsive strategy to counter that influence; managing bilateral defense relationships; and addressing other regional priorities such as Russia’s growing influence and counterterrorism issues, which also have inextricable connections to China. The new NDS needs to lay a foundation to address these challenges. The alternative is over-regionalization of the China challenge to the Indo-Pacific, which could impose short-sighted limitations that will affect the US role in Africa for years to come.

View the full issue brief

About the author

Staff

Tressa Guenov

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Explore the program

The Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, works to advance resilience as a core tenet of US and allied national security policy and practice.

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Winning through people: The human capital advantage in great-power competition

Beth Foster and Alex Wagner — Thu, 21 Aug 2025 18:00:00 +0000

Executive summary

The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) will likely continue to emphasize deterring great-power competition from escalating into conflict; accelerating the development and deployment of new technologies and capabilities; shifting resources from the United States’ military presence in Europe and the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific; and strengthening the defense industrial base. However, the time has come for the NDS to give greater attention to another essential component of US military power: its human capital.

While effective diplomacy, exquisite sensor platforms, and advanced weapon systems are essential to deterrence, the men and women in uniform—and the Department of Defense (DoD) civilians who support them—remain the United States’ most enduring strategic advantage. They are highly capable and resilient, rigorously trained and well-educated, and operate within a decision-making structure where plans serve as starting points and a commander’s intent guides action.

The upcoming NDS must therefore elevate the “people” component of the US national security enterprise—integrating personnel challenges and opportunities more directly into the strategy and recognizing the robust capabilities of the people behind the platforms. Three specific priorities stand out in this regard: recruiting, service member resilience, and quality of life. While this list is by no means exhaustive, these issues demand urgent attention and investment if the current administration hopes to fulfill its promise of “peace through strength.”

View the full issue brief

About the authors

Beth Foster is the former executive director of the Office of Force Resiliency at the US Department of Defense.

Alex Wagner is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoStrategy Initiative and former assistant secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

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Crisis management and resilience: Lessons from Latvia for NATO allies

Heidi Hardt and Māris Cepurītis — Thu, 21 Aug 2025 16:54:29 +0000

This project, a collaboration between the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Latvia-based Centre for East European Policy Studies, aims to advance understanding of Latvia’s defense and security policies, with an emphasis on resilience-building strategies. Latvia’s measures offer lessons for other frontline states, and demonstrate an increasing willingness to prioritize defense in an uncertain geopolitical environment. Read the other articles in this series here and here.

For the past decade, Latvia has faced a set of interlinked challenges that have tested the government’s crisis management and resilience. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 loom large. The COVID-19 pandemic, too, put stress on the system.

And the challenges are not over. Latvian leaders remain concerned that Russia may commit subsequent acts of hybrid or conventional aggression under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians in the Baltic states. But Latvians are also learning from these crises to boost resilience for what comes next.

Three core lessons have been the importance of 1) adopting a whole-of-society approach, 2) increasing clarity on decision-making in times of crisis, and 3) establishing frequent trainings and exercises, as well as cultivating a culture of preparedness. Allies from across NATO can learn from how Latvia has applied each of these lessons.

Responding to the past decade

Positioned on NATO’s eastern flank and sharing borders with Russia and Belarus, Latvia has faced numerous crises involving state and nonstate actors. The country has navigated a range of Russian and Belarusian hybrid threats—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, and attacks on undersea pipelines in the Baltic Sea. Russia and Belarus have also weaponized migration to the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish borders and refugee flows following the invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in public health infrastructure, crisis preparedness, and coordination among national and international actors, as well as driving the politicization of government decision-making.

In response, Latvia set about overhauling its crisis management, emphasizing comprehensive defense, centralized coordination, and societal resilience. By 2021, Latvia—along with other allies—had officially institutionalized resilience and civil preparedness into NATO’s workstreams. Riga engaged with other allies via the NATO Resilience Committee to exchange lessons and best practices. Today, it hosts NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, which has produced reports and recommendations on disinformation and influence operations. Latvia has also received more than €800 million so far in European Union (EU) support for national recovery and resilience planning, with more funding promised.

A whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach

A key lesson Latvia has applied is the need for a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach to defense. In a shifting regional security environment, leaders have updated their security and defense strategies. Latvia’s main strategic planning document in the field of security, the National Security Concept, has undergone several iterations since 2011 but has consistently identified foreign threats (including hybrid threats) as top priorities and emphasized the need to strengthen the country’s defense capabilities. The concept has also prioritized “business continuity and resilience,” mandating the creation of plans that clarify who is responsible for what in a crisis.

After Russia annexed Crimea and launched its proxy war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Latvian decision makers were forced to more realistically assess the country’s ability to defend against both conventional and hybrid threats. Since 2014, the country has gradually increased its defense budget and, as of this year, Latvia contributes more than 3 percent of its gross domestic product to defense, well on its way to The Hague summit pledge of 5 percent by 2035.

The hybrid nature of Russia’s malign actions prompted Latvia to adopt a holistic approach to defense, involving other state sectors in resilience efforts. This whole-of-society approach mitigates the deficiencies of individual state institutions, including limited capacities, small personnel sizes, specialist bottlenecks, and technical limitations—offering lessons for other NATO allies with limited resources.

Latvia’s State Defense Concept of 2016 officially adopted a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. The most significant shift, however, came in 2019, with the adoption of the Comprehensive National Defense (CND) system, which required security and crisis preparedness across all sectors, including responding to military conflicts. The CND strengthened civil-military ties through enhanced coordination among military, municipalities, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations. The private sector has also responded in kind, especially following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, by supporting military efforts and increasing business resilience. At the same time, the invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the importance of practical defense capabilities and maintaining the integrity of the chain of command.

Clarity in decision-making in moments of crisis

Latvia has also demonstrated the importance of decision-making reform. Leaders opted to amend national security laws and decision-making structures to clarify institutional responsibilities in crises, including territorial attacks. As in most democracies, the most critical decisions regarding the use of armed forces and special security measures are taken by the highest state institutions, such as the Cabinet of Ministers. As of 2014, the government instituted precautionary measures to ensure political decisions could be made even when the cabinet’s work is disrupted. For example, the cabinet can now task the Ministry of Defense to initiate threat mitigation activities, including deploying the military to specific regions. If the cabinet is suddenly incapacitated, the prime minister assumes decision-making authority. And if the prime minister is unable to act, then the responsibility falls to the minister of defense. Prior to this change, only the cabinet could make such decisions.

Latvia has also improved integration between state institutions and the private sector, such as developing clearer response algorithms. However, with hybrid attacks becoming more common, allies should develop closer coordination between state institutions and military, municipal, private-sector, and nongovernmental organizations on shared planning and response frameworks that can be activated in crises. This is important for allies of any size or resource capacity, as crises can range dramatically in scale.

Regular training, exercises, and developing a culture of preparedness

Another important lesson is the need for regular training involving both civilian and military actors. As a 2021 RAND report notes, such training should include diverse actors in different configurations and across multiple levels (local, regional, national, and multilateral). In addition to government officials, relevant officials from private industry, including utility companies, airports, and the defense industry, should be invited, as well.

A key responsibility of Latvia’s Crisis Management Center (CMC), which was established in early July and is overseen by the prime minister, will be the planning and execution of national-level exercises that include top-level decision makers; such exercises will complement existing activities and NATO’s Crisis Management Exercises. One of the authors has observed that sometimes NATO allies and officials deviate from the Alliance’s crisis response system or are unfamiliar with the steps outlined in the manual. This underscores the importance of frequent exercises. While working for the Latvian government, one of the authors observed that political interests sometimes overrule expert advice during crises. This suggests a need for a coherent “crisis management culture.” Mandates are not enough; crisis management requires established institutional practices, training, exercises, and an improved culture. Those participating in exercises need to be the actual individuals who would be responding to a crisis, not lower-level personnel. Regular exercises and training reveal coordination problems and provide opportunities to fix them.

Allies need to proactively develop a culture of preparedness. Such efforts range from actions focused on building up resilience by civilian and military actors within the government—from the hyper-local to national levels—all the way up to closer engagement on resilience efforts via multilateral frameworks. The latter requires frequent communication with the private sector and the public sector alike. For business leaders, this means concrete conversations about divisions of labor, which essential services can and cannot be restored and in what timeframes, which systems are back-up systems, and who should step in for which functions in an emergency.

Looking ahead: Reforming Latvia’s crisis management system

Even with its advances in recent years, Latvia has significant room to improve its crisis management system. As the State Audit Office noted after the COVID-19 pandemic, the system required clearer delineations of institutional responsibility, better alignment of plans with real-world conditions and available resources, increased investment in critical material reserves, and, importantly, a need for regular interagency exercises.

Thankfully, Latvia is reforming its crisis management system. At the center of this reform is the creation of the CMC. Among its core functions is gathering and analyzing real-time information to identify and assess potential risks and threats. The CMC will be primarily focused on the nonmilitary domain, and it will support the work of the Crisis Management Council, prepare draft decisions for government approval, and coordinate institutional actions during large-scale crises. It will also plan the country’s material reserves.

Despite its small size, Latvia demonstrates that it can respond swiftly and decisively by aligning national efforts with broader EU and NATO resilience frameworks. Strengthening resilience also positions Latvia as a reliable ally within NATO and the EU, reinforcing the Alliance’s overall deterrence posture and highlighting the importance of solidarity in an increasingly volatile security environment. The coordination of civilian crisis response still needs improvement. Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 migration crisis demonstrated the need to increase coordination between state institutions, clarify institutional responsibilities, and establish institutions that can monitor threats 24/7 and coordinate responses.

Latvia’s experience offers an example of how a small state can respond to complex, hybrid crises. The crisis management reforms that Latvia has already implemented signal growing resilience. True resilience requires institutional shifts, preparedness, coordination, regular training, and public trust. As threats evolve—from pandemics to cyberattacks to geopolitical confrontations—Latvia’s path demonstrates both the vulnerabilities that countries face and the potential for democratic crisis governance to overcome them.

Heidi Hardt is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine.

Māris Cepurītis is the director of the Center for Eastern European Policy Studies and a lecturer at Riga Stradins University.

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Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever during wartime

Olena Halushka — Tue, 05 Aug 2025 20:13:31 +0000

The Ukrainian Parliament voted last week to reverse controversial legislative changes that threatened to deprive the country’s anti-corruption institutions of their independence. This apparent U-turn by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy came after thousands took to the streets in Ukraine’s first major public protests since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago.

The scandal surrounding efforts to subordinate Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies to the politically-appointed Prosecutor General was part of a broader trend that has sparked concerns over potential backsliding in the country’s reform agenda. Additional factors include the failure to appoint a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, investigations targeting prominent anti-corruption activists, and alleged attempts to undermine the work of other key institutions like the High Qualification Commission of Judges.

The recent wave of nationwide protests in defense of the country’s anti-corruption reforms served as a timely reminder that Ukraine’s democratic instincts remain strong, even amid the horrors of Russia’s invasion and the escalating bombardment of Ukrainian cities. The message to the government was clear: Ukrainian society is determined to defend the democratic progress secured over the past eleven years since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This includes safeguarding the independence and integrity of the watchdog institutions established in the wake of the revolution.

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The readiness of Ukrainians to rally in support of the country’s anti-corruption reforms undermines efforts by detractors to portray today’s Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt and unworthy of international support. In reality, Ukrainians are more committed than ever to the democratic values that have shaped Ukraine’s national journey throughout the turbulent past few decades.

Meanwhile, the anti-corruption bodies established since the 2014 revolution are evidently effective enough to target senior figures close to Ukraine’s political leadership. They have also won the respect of the country’s vibrant civil society and are regarded as an important element of Ukraine’s reform agenda by much of the population.

It should come as no surprise that so many ordinary Ukrainians view the fight against corruption as crucial for the country’s future. After all, efforts to improve the rule of law are widely recognized as central to Ukraine’s European ambitions.

Over the past decade, anti-corruption reforms have helped the country achieve a series of key breakthroughs along the path toward EU integration such as visa-free travel, candidate country status, and the start of official membership negotiations. Ukrainians are well aware of the need to maintain this momentum, and remain ready to pressure the government on anti-corruption issues if necessary.

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Since the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine’s reform progress has been closely monitored and fiercely guarded by Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian public combines a strong sense of justice with a readiness to act in order to preserve fundamental rights. They are backed by a seasoned and self-confident civil society sector, along with an independent media ecosystem that refuses to be silenced.

Over the past decade, Ukraine’s ability to adopt and implement reforms has often depended on a combination of this grassroots domestic pressure together with conditions set by Ukraine’s international partners. These two factors remain vital in order to keep the country on a pathway toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration.

Some skeptics have suggested that the fight against corruption is a luxury that Ukraine cannot afford while the country defends itself against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Such thinking is shortsighted. Faced with a far larger and wealthier enemy like Russia, Ukraine must make every single penny count.

In peacetime, corruption can undermine the business climate and hinder the country’s development. The stakes are far higher in wartime, with corruption posing a threat to Ukraine’s national security. It is therefore crucial to increase scrutiny and reduce any graft to an absolute minimum. Meanwhile, the long-overdue reform of specific sectors such as the state customs service and tax administration can generate important new revenues that will provide a timely boost to the Ukrainian war effort.

The success of Ukraine’s recent protest movement is encouraging and underlines the country’s status as a resilient young democracy. At the same time, it is too early to declare victory.

In the coming weeks, Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners will expect to see a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine appointed, along with the appointment of four Constitutional Court judges who have passed the international screening process. Efforts to pressure civic activists and the country’s independent media must also stop.

Speaking on August 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a point of attacking Ukraine’s anti-graft agencies. He obviously recognizes that strong anti-corruption institutions serve as important pillars of Ukraine’s long-term resilience and represent an obstacle to Russia’s plans for the conquest and subjugation of country. The Kremlin dictator’s comments should be seen as further confirmation that Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever in the current wartime conditions.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

After July 4, federal, state, and local officials tried to avoid or deflect responsibility, or claim this flash flood was unforeseeable, but the truth is that all levels of government hold some measure of blame for this catastrophe. A series of tactical blunders added up to a strategic failure. Some examples:

After a deadly flood downstream in 2015, local officials in Kerr County decided a one-million-dollar emergency warning system that included flood gauges and sirens was too expensive.
Local officials later applied to the Texas Division of Emergency Management, which controlled billions of dollars of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) money. They were turned down because the county had not written a hazard mitigation plan. By the time the county wrote one, Texas prioritized other counties devastated by Hurricane Harvey.
In 2021, Kerr County could have used $10.2 million from the American Rescue Plan Act signed by President Joe Biden, but the county spent a lot of the money on other projects (including a communications system for the sheriff’s office that helped during the flood).
Earlier this year, Texas lawmakers proposed giving local governments $500 million to upgrade emergency communications systems, but the bill died in a Texas Senate committee.
On July 4, the first flash flood warning from the National Weather Service (NWS) was at 1:15 a.m. The NWS computer model used available data but considerably underestimated the amount of rain. Other models were more accurate. The Trump administration’s cuts to NWS data collection programs may have affected the NWS’s ability to issue an earlier, or more accurate, warning—which could have saved lives at Camp Mystic.
A forecast of life-threatening weather not communicated to the people who need to act on it is, by definition, a system failure. The Trump administration’s layoffs and early retirements at NWS included the one official whose formal responsibility was to communicate with state and local officials when warnings are issued. Inadequate outreach to local officials and the public may have contributed to the death toll.
With no sirens or flood gauges, the regional emergency system relied on cell phones to alert people—but many officials and residents claim they never got those alerts on July 4, and children and even counselors at Camp Mystic did not have their cell phones at night.
Kerr County officials chose not to use its emergency notification system, the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System, that could have activated every cell phone in the valley into an alarm.
Instead of FEMA’s traditional practice of surging resources like urban search and rescue teams to look for survivors—which, under earlier administrations, would likely have arrived in Kerr County by the evening of July 4—Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem’s requirement to personally approve all DHS contracts above $100,000 meant that crucial funding to deploy the teams was not authorized until July 7. The head of FEMA’s urban search and rescue team later resigned, telling colleagues that he was frustrated at the “bureaucratic hurdles” in the administration’s flood response.
On July 6, FEMA laid off contractors whose job was to field phone calls. FEMA contractors answered 99.7 percent of the 3,027 calls on July 5, but only 35.8 percent of 2,363 calls on July 6 and a meager 15.9 percent of 16,419 calls on July 7.
FEMA had fewer than a hundred people on the ground four days after the floods in Texas, whereas a week after Hurricane Helene under the Biden administration, FEMA had more than 1,500.

Before the next flash flood in Texas … or elsewhere in the US

Other states, and Washington, need to learn the lessons of the central Texas flash floods. There are some straightforward fixes: River flash flood alarms are essential in vulnerable populated areas. Cell phone alerts need to be tested the way schools test fire alarms—if you can’t hear the fire alarm, the school should install more alarms. If cell phone networks are the main alarm system, then local officials need to insist on better cell phone coverage as a public safety requirement.

But other needed changes will be more complex. Preventing future Camp Mystics will require sustained focus—and resources—from federal, state, and local governments—as flash floods this summer have hit everywhere including New Jersey, Illinois, North Carolina, and New Mexico.

Here are some steps to take now:

1. Change the mindset—and the money—for strategic resilience. A more strategic approach to resilience would have led to different priorities for funding and responding before and during flash floods. A larger shift is needed in how both individuals and governments understand and prepare for resilience. Just as Texas and other Gulf Coast states take the threat of hurricanes seriously, Texas and other parts of the country must ensure that communities view flash floods with a similar level of seriousness and resolve. Acting FEMA administrator David Richardson said on July 23, “Resilience is a priority for me, and it’s a priority for FEMA.” These words need to be backed up by action—and money. More money is essential to prevent the future loss of life and property damage from flash floods. Studies have shown that disaster prevention has an extraordinary return on investment. A US Chamber of Commerce 2024 study on weather-related disasters calculated that each dollar spent in disaster preparedness saves thirteen dollars in costs reduced, damages avoided, and cleanup made unnecessary. Thinking of the children in Texas whose lives could have been saved by an earlier flash flood warning, the non-financial return on investment is incalculable.

2. Don’t place more of the burden of disaster recovery on states, because states will not be ready for three years—if ever. The Trump administration has said it wants to make FEMA more responsive to state and local needs, which sounds like the administration is unaware of FEMA’s longtime mantra that disaster recovery should be locally led, state-managed, and federally supported. If the goal is streamlining aid and making FEMA more flexible, much can be done to improve what FEMA does, and this will have broad support. However, emergency managers fear the administration’s real intention is to shift more of the financial and personnel burden of recovery to the states, which are already reeling from billions of dollars of cuts to Medicaid, supplemental nutrition, and other vital programs. Most states have to balance their budgets, and few can borrow money after a disaster as cheaply as the federal government can. Because of how state budgets are developed, it will take most states three years, at least, to decide whether to increase taxes—or tell communities there will be no money to rebuild. This will hurt all Americans, especially in southeastern states that voted for Trump in 2024. Until and unless states are ready, the Trump administration should fund FEMA, hire the employees and contractors FEMA needs, and eliminate red tape that slows FEMA down.

3. Open an honest, impartial, nonpartisan investigation into the Texas floods. As soon as practicable, there needs to be a credible, national-level, nonpartisan, no-fear-or-favor investigation into what went wrong. There is bipartisan Senate legislation to set up a disaster safety board modeled on the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), but with the House adjourned, other credible bodies should urgently set up an ad hoc, nonpartisan investigation led by experts in weather forecasting, emergency management, and hazard mitigation.

4. Restore and fund the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program. BRIC was intended by the first Trump administration and Congress in 2018 to get billions of dollars to state and local governments for precisely the kind of investments needed to warn of flash floods and reduce losses during other disasters. But the Trump administration killed the program in April, canceling $882 million in already appropriated money and drawing a lawsuit from twenty states. The Trump administration should quickly settle the lawsuit, and Congress should follow the lead of Republicans on the House Appropriations Committee who voted to revive BRIC and make it a mandatory program that DHS cannot abolish or de-fund on its own.

5. Establish a Joint Congressional Resilience Caucus. Disaster response and recovery is complex and, to the public, often confusing. Within DHS, FEMA has the lead, but in Texas both the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection had life-saving roles. For long-term recovery, the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Defense, especially the Army Corps of Engineers, are essential. Congressional oversight of DHS is divided among eleven different committees in the House and nine in the Senate. In 2023, House Democrats established the Disaster Equity and Building Resilience Caucus. Congress needs to establish a bipartisan caucus to promote and increase strategic resilience across the federal government and to advocate for what states need.

6. Commit to making disaster recovery bipartisan. Trump and other Republicans criticized FEMA under Biden for slowness in responding to Hurricane Helene. While many of those complaints were false or unjustified, even former FEMA leaders agree FEMA could improve how it responds. FEMA is good at getting initial cash quickly into disaster victims’ hands, but then sometimes takes years to close out projects. Many of the delays, ironically, are caused by congressional mandates or the desire to avoid taking actions without approval from political appointees. Reducing red tape and avoiding requirements to spend money in unproductive ways needs bipartisan support. The administration and Congress should commit to making disaster response and recovery a bipartisan effort. The just-released bipartisan Fixing Emergency Management for Americans Act of 2025 is an important step that needs serious consideration. The Trump administration should endorse it and work with its sponsors, state and local emergency managers, and congressional appropriators to make reforms with bipartisan support.

Strategic resilience needs to become a national priority before the next disaster. US leaders owe as much to the adults and especially the children who died in central Texas on July 4.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served for more than a decade in the Department of Homeland Security.

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A Ukraine without Ukrainians: Putin is erasing Europe’s largest nation

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 31 Jul 2025 01:09:58 +0000

When Ukrainian schoolchildren in Russian-occupied regions of the country return to the classroom following the summer holidays, they will no longer be able to receive even minimal instruction in their country’s national language. This blanket ban on Ukrainian language education is the latest stage in a Kremlin campaign to extinguish all traces of Ukrainian identity as Vladimir Putin pursues an extreme form of eliminationist imperialism in the heart of twenty-first century Europe.

According to a draft directive published recently by the Russian Education Ministry, the study of Ukrainian is to be removed from the school curriculum throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine beginning in September 2025. The directive cites “changes in the geopolitical situation in the world” as justification for the decision.

In reality, the official ban on Ukrainian language studies is a formality confirming processes that have been well underway ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, and for far longer in areas of Ukraine occupied by Moscow following the initial onset of Russian aggression in 2014. The removal of the Ukrainian language from Ukrainian classrooms has been accompanied by the introduction of a new Kremlin-friendly curriculum that glorifies the ongoing Russian invasion while denying Ukraine’s right to exist and demonizing Ukrainians as Nazis. Parents who resist risk losing custody of their children.

This campaign of classroom indoctrination is only one aspect of the Kremlin’s comprehensive Russification policies in occupied Ukraine. Since February 2022, the Russian authorities have conducted mass arrests of anyone deemed a potential threat to the occupation, with thousands of Ukrainian officials, activists, community leaders, veterans, and patriots disappearing into a vast network of prisons. A recent UN probe has classified these large-scale detentions as a crime against humanity.

Ukrainian civilians still living in occupied Ukraine are being forced to accept Russian citizenship or lose access to essential services such as pensions and healthcare, along with the ability to run a business or hold a bank account. Beginning in September, new legislation will make it possible for the authorities to expel anyone without Russian citizenship from their own homes and deport them.

Meanwhile, public symbols of Ukrainian statehood, heritage, and culture are being methodically removed and replaced by the trappings of an imported Russian imperial identity. Likewise, the demographic makeup of the occupied Ukrainian regions is being systematically transformed by Kremlin programs that aim to attract migrants from across the Russian Federation.

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The hard line Russification policies currently being implemented in the 20 percent of Ukraine under Russian occupation offer a chilling blueprint for the rest of the country if the invasion succeeds. Indeed, it is now be abundantly clear that Putin’s ultimate objective is a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

This should come as no surprise. For years, Putin has insisted Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has accused Ukraine of being an illegitimate state occupying historically Russian lands. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he began referring ominously to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia,” while describing the country as an “inalienable” part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space. More recently, he underlined his contempt for Ukrainian independence by declaring: “All of Ukraine is ours.”

Putin’s Ukraine obsession has been one of the dominant themes of his entire reign. This reflects the Kremlin dictator’s desire to reverse the 1991 Soviet collapse and his fear that the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood could spark the next stage in a Russian imperial retreat that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

For Putin and millions of his fellow Russians, the emergence of an independent Ukraine is a bitterly resented reminder of their own country’s post-Soviet humiliation, while Ukrainian society’s efforts to embrace a democratic European identity offer alarming echoes of the pro-democracy movements that led to the fall of the USSR. For the past two decades, Putin’s top priority has been making sure Ukraine’s turn away from authoritarianism does not serve as a catalyst for similar democratization demands inside Russia itself.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

During the early years of his reign, Putin attempted to return Ukraine to Moscow’s orbit via a combination of political interference, economic leverage, and soft power tools including the Kremlin-controlled Russian media and the Russian Orthodox Church. When this strategy failed, he opted to launch the limited military intervention of 2014, which began with the seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.

Once it became apparent that even the partial occupation of Ukraine would not derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Putin appears to have concluded that he could no longer take the risk of allowing an independent Ukraine to exist at all. This set the stage for the full-scale invasion of 2022 and laid the ideological foundations for the Kremlin’s current efforts to extinguish Ukrainian national identity entirely.

Unless Putin is stopped, there can be no serious doubt that millions more Ukrainians will be robbed of their identity and subjected to Putin’s ruthless brand of Russian imperial indoctrination. During recent bilateral peace talks in Istanbul, Kremlin officials underlined their determination to secure Kyiv’s complete capitulation. Moscow’s terms include the revival of Russian dominance over every aspect of Ukrainian public life and the dramatic reduction of the Ukrainian military. It does not take much imagination to anticipate exactly what kind of treatment Russia has in mind for the civilian population if Ukraine compiles with these demands and is left defenseless.

Putin’s calculated campaign to erase the identity of the largest country situated wholly in Europe makes a complete mockery of efforts to portray the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a conventional armed conflict with limited goals. This is no mere border dispute or rational response to legitimate Russian security concerns; it is a classic war of colonial conquest with the explicit intention of destroying Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

If it is allowed to continue, the magnitude of this crime will dwarf anything seen in Europe since World War II. This will fuel Putin’s sense of impunity and whet his imperial appetite, creating the conditions for further previously unthinkable acts of international aggression. It will then only be a matter of time before other “historically Russian” nations are subjected to the horrors currently being inflicted on Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

It’s not just hard power and soft power that matter. ‘Resilience power’ is every bit as essential.

Elizabeth Sizeland — Tue, 08 Jul 2025 15:18:32 +0000

Imagine a moment—years from now, or perhaps only weeks—when tensions between the United States and China escalate rapidly. US forces are deployed to deter aggression and reassure allies in the Indo-Pacific. But at home, the pressure mounts. Cyberattacks shut down airports. Water systems fail. Fuel and food distribution grind to a halt. Disinformation floods social media, spreading panic and mistrust. Protests erupt as confidence in federal leadership falters. Markets wobble. Emergency services are overwhelmed.

In that moment, how easy would it be to project military force abroad while the domestic environment crumbles? How long would public opinion support overseas deployment if people couldn’t live their daily lives safely and securely? And how credible would deterrence be if adversaries believed the United States could be destabilized faster than it could respond?

This is not science fiction. It is a plausible test of national resilience in the 2020s.

For decades, national security strategies have focused on projecting strength outward through military deterrence and diplomatic influence. But today’s threats are no longer distant or episodic. They are persistent, interconnected, and increasingly domestic. Great-power competition, cyber sabotage, economic coercion, disinformation, and natural hazards are no longer confined to distant battlefields. They manifest at home, and often without warning.

Without the ability to function under pressure, even the most sophisticated military and diplomatic strategies will falter.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 made this clear. Ukraine’s defense did not rest on firepower alone. It was held together by resilient institutions, digital agility, civic unity, and leadership under pressure. Civil society improvised, government systems adapted, and citizens endured. This was resilience in action; a demonstration that true power includes the ability to sustain national functions while under siege.

In this context, it’s time to rethink and expand policymakers’ conception of national power. Hard power and soft power remain critical, but they are no longer sufficient. A third pillar, resilience power, must be treated as equally foundational. Resilience power is the ability of individuals, societies, and systems to anticipate, withstand, recover from, adapt to, and bounce forward from shocks and disruptions. In an era of systemic risk, resilience is a form of power.

Resilience power matters for all nations, but especially those without great-power status. They may not control the intentions of adversaries, but they do have agency over their own exposure and preparedness. In a world of systemic risk, this internal strength becomes a form of deterrence.

And yet, in many national security strategies, resilience is still treated as a support function—worthy, but technical and unglamorous. Too often, it is confined to contingency planning or relegated to the margins of homeland security policy. There remains a tendency to cast resilience as a defensive posture or something to fall back on when more assertive tools fail. This framing misses the strategic potential of resilience power. In reality, such resilience actively enables offensive capability. It allows governments to focus externally by ensuring domestic continuity. It deters adversaries by reducing the disruption they can cause. It is not a retreat from strength, but the very heart of national security. And in a world where shocks are inevitable, it may be the most decisive form of power a democracy can possess.

Resilience power is not only the preserve of emergency responders or civil crisis planners. It requires experts in both threat and hazard to step out of their silos and see the connections. And it is a whole-of-nation, multidimensional societal task. In March, the Atlantic Council launched the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative, which is focused on advancing resilience as a core tenet of US and allied national security policy and practice. A recent discussion among members of the initiative described the resilience architecture as spanning five interconnected layers: the individual, the community, local and state governance, national leadership, and international cooperation. Each layer plays a role, and none can carry the weight alone. This system is bound together by an understanding of risk, adaptable skills, secure infrastructure, and trusted institutions.

But this capability cannot be built overnight. It demands long-term leadership and serious commitment. Resilience power must be developed through sustained, cross-cutting programs that are both ambitious in scope and elevated to the same level of strategic priority as any other pillar of national power. The countries that take this seriously now will be the ones best equipped to absorb pressure, maintain sovereignty, and lead even in the face of disruption.

Governments have a unique role to play. Only they can deliver national risk assessments, strategic reserves, emergency logistics, and cyber defense at scale. But they cannot act alone. In most democracies, critical infrastructure is privately owned. Public-private partnerships, especially in technology, energy, and communications, are essential to ensuring continuity and rapid recovery.

None of this will be easy. Democracies face structural and fiscal challenges, and electoral cycles can discourage long-term planning. Investments in resilience rarely win headlines or deliver short-term political victories. But the cost of delay is rising, and the strategic logic is clear. Politicians and leaders in the public and private sectors need to step up to the challenge.

The strength of a nation lies not only in how it projects hard power or soft power, but also in the resilience power that makes those tools meaningful. Without the ability to function under pressure, even the most sophisticated military and diplomatic strategies will falter. In the years ahead, it may be this capacity to adapt, withstand, and recover that determines whether democracies not only survive, but lead. Resilience power must be recognized not as a complement to national security, but as one of its primary expressions.

Report

Jul 8, 2025

For the US and the free world, security demands a resilience-first approach

By Elizabeth Sizeland

This report is the foundational document of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative and outlines a bold vision to embed resilience as a core pillar of US and allied security. As crises compound, this report calls for investing across individual, institutional, and international levels of resilience to withstand, adapt, and thrive amid disruption.

Crisis Management Cybersecurity

Elizabeth Sizeland is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht National Security Initiative and Geostrategy Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is a former UK deputy national security adviser.

The post It’s not just hard power and soft power that matter. ‘Resilience power’ is every bit as essential. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For the US and the free world, security demands a resilience-first approach

Elizabeth Sizeland — Tue, 08 Jul 2025 12:00:00 +0000

This report is the foundational document of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative (AANSRI) and outlines a bold vision to embed resilience as a core pillar of US and allied security. As crises compound, the initiative calls for investing across individual, institutional, and international levels of resilience to withstand, adapt, and thrive amid disruption.

Acknowledgements

This report is made possible through the vision and generosity of Adrienne Arsht, whose commitment to resilience as a national and global imperative has driven the development of the AANSRI. Her curiosity to explore how individuals build resilience—and why some people withstand adversity while others struggle—has opened new avenues for understanding the role of resilience in shaping societies. This initiative extends that focus, recognizing that resilience is not only an individual trait but a collective necessity, underpinning community cohesion, national security, and international stability.

The author also extends her gratitude to the members of the AANSRI, whose unwavering commitment and generous insights have been instrumental in developing this report over the past nine months. They are leaders and innovative thinkers in their respective fields, and their dedication and collaborative spirit have been invaluable in shaping the future of the initiative’s work. The author also wishes to thank former Atlantic Council staff member Danielle Miller for her efforts in organizing the task force from its inception.

Prologue: Resilience in Action
Part 1: Understanding the resilience challenge—and why it matters
US resilience as a cornerstone of free world strength
Framing the conversation
What must democracies be resilient against?
Complicating factors: The realities undermining resilience
The need for a more individual-centric approach
Strategic partnerships are under strain in a shifting world order
The rapid pace of events is a resilience disruptor
Democracy is an asset and a challenge for resilience
Fragmentation of resilience responsibility
Technology as an enabler—and a threat—to resilience
The architecture of resilience
Part 2: Shaping the response
Conclusion
Task Force members
Glossary

Prologue: Resilience in action

At dawn on February 24, 2022, Kyiv woke to explosions. Sirens screamed across the Ukrainian capital. Families rushed into underground shelters. Russia’s full-scale invasion had begun. Although the intelligence community had sounded the alarm, for many ordinary Ukrainians the sound of missiles striking their city was almost unimaginable. Just days earlier, life had felt normal for most of the nation: work, school, errands, birthdays. A full-scale war had arrived in an instant and shattered the illusion of safety and security.

In his apartment, cybersecurity entrepreneur Yegor Aushev took a call from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. The official didn’t give him orders, only a request: help us defend the country in cyberspace. Aushev issued a message urging fellow cybersecurity professionals, developers, and ethical hackers to join Ukraine’s digital resistance. By nightfall, thousands had signed up, with Ukrainians and international allies alike offering their credentials, their skills, and their will to help.

Telegram channels multiplied and volunteers in this “IT Army” began to successfully disrupt Russian military communications. This hastily configured task force also helped to defend Ukrainian systems and mapped vulnerabilities across a sprawling and unstable digital battlefield. While tanks advanced on Kyiv and battles unfolded around the country, civilians launched a cyber counteroffensive.

At the same time, neighbors across the capital self-organized. Apartment buildings pooled food and medical students ran first aid training. Teachers arranged online lessons to resist disruption to children’s education. Volunteers repurposed apps into tools for sharing alerts and information.

Kyiv’s municipal government adapted at pace. Within seventy-two hours, the city’s public services app (Kyiv Digital) was reprogrammed to provide real-time air-raid alerts, directions to shelters, and updates on pharmacy supplies. Local authorities coordinated fuel deliveries and waste collection under bombardment. Officials rerouted power and protected infrastructure with the knowledge that help might not come for days.

Nationally, the government did not break. Thanks to pre-invasion decisions, Ukraine’s critical digital infrastructure had already been migrated to secure cloud servers through partnerships with Amazon and Microsoft. Ministries continued to function, the parliament adapted, and the cabinet met in bunkers. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy refused evacuation. Instead, he remained, appearing on camera night after night, anchoring both morale and state legitimacy. Many citizens immediately stepped forward to join the military response, at great personal risk and often without any prior training.

Outside the country, the response accelerated. Following a pre-invasion declaration of support, the United Kingdom deployed anti-tank missiles, logistics support, and intelligence to assist with Ukraine’s defenses. The United States quickly authorized support in the form of anti-aircraft systems, small arms, and ammunition, as well as critical intelligence support. Estonia provided cyber intelligence and expertise, Polish nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provided medical care and food at the border, and California provided satellite internet. Drones came from Turkey thanks to some prior planning, and refugee support came from Germany, among other nations. Coordination was messy, but allies were leaning in quickly.

Ukraine’s defense in those first weeks did not rely solely on weapons or walls. It was held together by a living system of resilience: the foresight of national institutions, the agility of local government, the improvisation of communities, the solidarity of international partners, and—most critically—the resolve of individual citizens and communities who stood up when nothing was certain.

When the missiles came, Ukraine adapted and withstood, refusing to collapse. The shock and chaos of war in our own neighborhoods are inconceivable to most of us, but what if our communities wake up to a crisis on a scale we have never experienced? We have a crucial opportunity to learn lessons from those who have shown us what resilience in action truly means. They have shown us that resilience does not begin at the point of crisis. It begins in policy decisions made years earlier, in drills conducted without headlines, in the wiring of institutions, in civic trust, in practiced autonomy, and in the mindsets and resilience of ordinary people. We all have roles to play.

People take shelter in a metro station in Kyiv as Russian missiles strike the Ukrainian capital in April 2024. Source: REUTERS/Alina Smutko.

Part 1: Understanding the resilience challenge—and why it matters

Resilience is an essential—yet often publicly underappreciated—element of national security. Public discourse often centers on deterrence, diplomacy, military strength, and intelligence capabilities. However, emerging and persistent threats—from cyberattacks and climate change to pandemics and acute natural hazards—have revealed significant gaps in national and international resilience, pushing the topic much further up the agenda. Resilience, or “resilience power,” is the foundation on which “hard power” and “soft power” rest. Without these elements, a nation is exposed, and its broader security strategy weakened.

The 2017 US National Security Strategy contains six references to resilience, compared with thirty-six to defense. By the release of the 2022 US National Security Strategy, there were twenty-nine references to resilience compared with thirty-one to defense, reflecting the growing importance of the topic. It’s clear that democracies are increasingly seeing the need to anticipate, endure, and bounce forward.

Despite the growing focus on resilience in national security and policy discussions, too little attention has been paid to the factors that enable individuals to develop and sustain resilience. Governments often prioritize infrastructure hardening and institutional preparedness while neglecting the human element. Along with a top-down approach, the United States must do more to ensure that citizens are psychologically, socially, and economically equipped to endure, and emerge well from crises. Without addressing these individual-level factors, broader resilience and national security strategies risk failing their most important responsibility: to safeguard citizens. The AANSRI will look to redress this balance, advocating for increasing focus and attention on this vital area of resilience work.

National security strategies are valuable opportunities to survey the risk landscape and chart a direction for the future. Yet in a world where specific threats are difficult to predict, such strategies can quickly feel outdated or overtaken by events. A resilience-first approach offers greater adaptability. Rather than focusing solely on defining threats and prescribing bespoke solutions, it equips nations, communities, and individuals to build the capacity to anticipate disruption, absorb shocks, and adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. It demands much more effort to close the vulnerabilities that adversaries seek to exploit. And it embraces uncertainty, enabling a more dynamic and enduring form of security.

The COVID-19 pandemic, the increasing frequency of natural disasters, economic shocks, the rise of disinformation, and state-sponsored cyber and sabotage operations have demonstrated that resilience is not just about recovering well but about proactively reducing risks and ensuring the continuity of society’s essential functions. Inaction in resilience building equates to a tacit acceptance of risk. When governments, institutions, or communities delay or deprioritize resilience work, they are accepting the inevitability of system stress and possible failure. Inaction is not a neutral position but a strategic decision to accept the full impact and cost of disruption rather than mitigate it. There is much more the US government and civil society could do in all areas of society to set citizens up for success.

Governments, businesses, and communities must integrate resilience into decision-making at all levels. This report argues that resilience should be viewed not as a static state but as an evolving “resilience power” capability influenced by investment, governance, technology, and the will of citizens.

Figure 1. The components of national security

“Resilience is the ability of individuals, societies, and systems to anticipate, withstand, recover from, adapt to, and bounce forward from shocks and disruptions.”
– AANSRI task force

US resilience as a cornerstone of free world strength

A strong and sovereign United States, alongside a secure and stable free world, begins with resilience. In an era of intensifying geopolitical competition, economic uncertainty, and evolving security threats, democratic nations must ensure they can withstand, adapt to, and recover from crises—whether in the form of cyberattacks, supply chain disruptions, economic coercion, or natural disasters. Resilience is about ensuring that nations retain the ability to govern, defend, and prosper under pressure.

Collective resilience among democratic allies is what protects shared values, upholds open societies and economies, and ensures that no single crisis can fracture the international order. Without it, fragility in one system or nation can have a compound effect.

For the free world, including the United States, this imperative aligns with a belief that security begins at home but extends beyond borders. Just as energy independence strengthens economic sovereignty, resilience independence—the ability of nations to sustain themselves without reliance on adversarial powers (for example, on China’s technology)—fortifies the free world’s collective strength.

Prioritizing domestic resilience means ensuring that US communities, businesses, and infrastructure can function amid crises without excessive reliance on federal intervention. At the same time, reinforcing resilience across the free world strengthens US national security, ensuring that allies and partners are not weak links that adversaries can exploit to undermine US strength.

This report presents a framework for resilience that is rooted in self-reliance, economic strength, and strategic partnerships: a vision that places US security and prosperity at the forefront while reinforcing the stability of democratic allies. In an era in which adversaries seek to exploit vulnerabilities, resilience must be a specific pillar of national power, alongside economic competitiveness, soft power, and military superiority. A resilient free world is a strong free world, and a United States that leads on resilience will be more secure, more prosperous, more influential, and more prepared for the challenges ahead.

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Framing the conversation

The United States and democracies worldwide are already achieving much on the resilience agenda, with a lot of mutual learning between friends and allies. The AANSRI task force has not sought to describe all the existing activity here. Instead, its experts have looked for areas of program work that will add value for governments and practitioners already working hard to tackle these complex challenges.

The AANSRI will provide a center of new thought leadership on resilience issues, from the role of the individual up to international collaboration. This report will set out some of the avenues of research and practical policy generation that the initiative can undertake in the coming months and years.

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What must democracies be resilient against?

In today’s volatile security environment, it is difficult to make specific predictions about the future. But looking at some trends and the trajectory of events can help to determine a broad set of assumptions about the future risk landscape that democracies might face.

To ground the initiative’s discussions and planning, the task force identified three fundamental assumptions. These are not all theoretical constructs; in some cases, they reflect real and current challenges that are already shaping the geopolitical landscape.

These assumptions are “best judgments,” and they provide the initiative with a basis for planning. Because the potential breadth of resilience activities is vast, it will be important to prioritize work streams to achieve maximum impact, with the understanding that the initiative will need to adapt to and address unexpected shocks and developments.

Democratic societies are persistently targeted through non-military aggression

Hostile state and non-state actors are engaged in sustained, non-military aggression against democratic nations. These threats take multiple forms, including

cyber campaigns targeting critical infrastructure, government systems, and financial institutions;

economic coercion and trade disruptions designed to weaken national economies and strategic industries;

supply chain manipulation that creates dependencies on adversarial nations in key sectors such as technology, rare earth materials, and pharmaceuticals; and

influence operations, misinformation, and disinformation, undermining public trust in institutions and disrupting social cohesion.

The United States and its allies face a growing risk of military conflict and high-impact domestic threats

There is real potential for democratic societies to become involved in a military conflict that escalates beyond regional theaters. If this occurs, adversaries will likely target civilian and domestic environments, not just military assets. Scenarios could include

cyber or kinetic attacks on financial systems, energy grids, or water supplies;

nuclear or non-conventional threats creating widespread panic and disruption; and

concurrent and cascading crises, in which a conflict escalates in tandem with economic, technological, or environmental disruptions designed to overwhelm response systems.

Chronic global risks endure and require systemic management

Long-term, non-malicious threats remain equally urgent, requiring resilience efforts that balance acute security risks with persistent global challenges. These include

climate change driving extreme weather, resource scarcity, and mass migration;

food insecurity increasing geopolitical instability, migration, and vulnerability in supply chains;

anti-microbial resistance (AMR) threatening public health and economic stability; and

future pandemics remaining high-likelihood events, even after the COVID-19 pandemic.

These risks demand sustained investment, active management, and strategic coordination, rather than the reactive approaches often seen today.

A critical dynamic—the simultaneity, interdependence, and multiplicity of risks—cuts across all these domains. In today’s interconnected world, crises rarely occur in isolation. Instead, societies must contend with the reality of multiple shocks unfolding at once, compounding one another in complex and unpredictable ways. A cyberattack might coincide with an extreme weather event; a disinformation campaign might amplify the impact of a public health emergency. These overlapping disruptions can strain response systems, compete for resources and attention, and overwhelm traditional models of governance built to handle sequential crises, potentially further eroding public confidence in these institutions. Therefore, resilience planning must assume the likelihood of compound and cascading events. 

These national security risks are not distant concerns. They can shape the daily realities of individuals, families, businesses, and communities. Democratic societies are already being tested in real time by natural hazards, adversary attacks, and economic shocks. Developing resilience is not just a matter of preparing for worst-case scenarios, but an urgent and ongoing mission to safeguard the stability, security, and prosperity of societies.

Complicating factors: The realities undermining resilience

The three risk scenarios above reflect the landscape of risk that the task force anticipates over the coming months and years. However, these baseline scenarios do not account for a range of additional dynamics that increasingly complicate resilience building. These include a lack of engagement with the resilience of the individual, the instability of strategic partnerships, the accelerating pace of crises, the challenges of operating within a democratic system, and technological advances. These factors make it more difficult for governments and institutions to build sustainable, forward-looking resilience strategies.

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The need for a more individual-centric approach

While resilience at the national and international levels is crucial, the capacity of individuals to withstand and adapt to crises forms the foundation of a resilient society. Yet, individual resilience is shaped by deeply personal factors (psychological, social, economic, environmental, and physical) that vary widely across populations. People with strong support networks, stable employment, and access to healthcare might be better equipped to endure crises, while those facing financial hardship, social isolation, or chronic stress might be more vulnerable.

The uneven distribution of these enablers means that resilience is not just a question of individual nature or willpower but is significantly influenced by external circumstances that shape people’s ability to respond to crises and trauma. Early childhood experiences, education, community ties, and exposure to adversity are influential in determining resilience outcomes. Early-life trauma, for instance, can weaken an individual’s ability to cope with later crises, while strong social bonds and access to mental health support can enhance recovery and adaptability. Intergenerational and historical trauma—such as that experienced by communities affected by slavery, colonization, or displacement—can shape stress responses across generations, influencing both psychological and biological resilience. Genetic and epigenetic factors, which affect how genes are expressed in response to environmental stressors, might also play a role in how individuals adapt to adversity. These insights suggest that resilience is not simply an innate trait but a skill that can be cultivated through targeted interventions at individual, community, and policy levels.

The resilience of those individuals at the front line of security, safety, and democratic free speech is equally vital. National security professionals, military and intelligence officers, diplomats, medical professionals, and journalists all operate under intense pressure and often deal with complex and harrowing issues. Their capacity to withstand and manage psychological strain is essential for both their own well-being and the effectiveness of their institutions in protecting people. A truly resilient nation must invest in the resilience of these professionals by understanding their lived experiences and ensuring they are supported to remain well, capable, and committed for the benefit of all.

Despite the growing focus on resilience in national security and policy discussions, the AANSRI will examine the factors that enable individuals to develop and sustain resilience over time. Governments often prioritize infrastructure hardening and institutional preparedness while neglecting the human element of ensuring that citizens are psychologically, socially, and economically equipped to endure crises. Without addressing these individual-level factors, broader resilience strategies risk failing the very people they are meant to protect.

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Strategic partnerships are under strain in a shifting world order

The international alliances that once provided stability and predictability in security planning are now under increasing strain. Shifting political priorities, economic realignments, and growing strategic divergence among US allies and partners make it harder to maintain long-term resilience efforts. While multilateral institutions such as NATO, the Group of Seven (G7), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations (UN) remain crucial frameworks for cooperation, internal divisions and misaligned national interests have weakened their ability to coordinate resilience efforts across borders. For example, in early 2022, efforts to pass robust resolutions in the UN to enable greater humanitarian access and protection in Ukraine were watered down or blocked by Russia as a permanent member of the Security Council.

At the same time, adversarial states are actively exploiting fractures between allies. Cyber aggression, economic coercion, and covert influence campaigns are being used to drive wedges between strategic partners, making collective resilience more difficult. This is particularly evident in supply chain vulnerabilities, as dependencies on adversarial nations in key sectors such as critical minerals, semiconductors, and energy create potential leverage points for disruption. These pressures are playing out across multiple strategic relationships.

The Alliance, while still strong, is facing increasing policy divergence on economic security, trade, and technology governance. NATO, traditionally the bedrock of transatlantic security, is experiencing calls from both sides of the Atlantic to increase European defense burden-sharing, including an emphasis on national resilience, as found in Article 3 of the founding treaty. As Europe provides for more of its own defense, national resilience among NATO members will only become more critical for individual and collective security. In the Indo-Pacific, the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) continues to coordinate efforts in some areas, but there will inevitably be differences in priorities for resilience building. Meanwhile, the tangible outcomes of G7 efforts to collaborate on key economic security priorities are still unfolding.

Still, US alliances have weathered difficult challenges in the past and should remain an important component of advancing shared resilience objectives in the future. The crucial question is how to adapt, develop, or reinvent mechanisms to meet current challenges and dynamics.

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The rapid pace of events is a resilience disruptor

Beyond the challenges of alliance instability, the accelerating speed of crises is outpacing governments’ ability to plan and respond effectively. Geopolitical conflicts, technological shifts, and economic shocks are unfolding at a rate that strains resilience frameworks, which were designed for slower-moving risks.

This challenge is further compounded at the international level, where multilateral institutions and cooperative mechanisms often operate at a pace ill-suited to the urgency of modern threats. Organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the G7 play important roles in resilience coordination, but their decision-making processes are frequently constrained by consensus requirements, political divergence, and bureaucratic inertia. As crises become more complex and move faster, these institutions risk becoming irrelevant unless they evolve to match the speed and scale of emerging risks.

To remain effective, international resilience efforts must become more agile, allowing for faster decision-making, more flexible coalitions, and the integration of bilateral initiatives when multilateral consensus is too slow or ineffective. Without meaningful reform, traditional mechanisms of global collaboration will struggle to provide the resilience support that nations require, forcing states to seek alternative frameworks that can respond at the necessary speed and scale.

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Democracy is an asset and a challenge for resilience

Democratic systems have distinct advantages for building resilience. The decentralized nature of power allows responsibility to be distributed across government, civil society, and the private sector, making crisis responses more flexible and adaptable. Local and regional actors can take independent initiative, ensuring that resilience efforts are not dependent on a single point of failure. NGOs are encouraged to play a critical role in local resilience and are supported in these efforts.

The free flow of information is also a huge asset. Open discourse, independent media, and transparency enable early risk detection and effective crisis response. Unlike authoritarian regimes that suppress inconvenient truths, democracies encourage debate and learning, helping refine strategies over time. Public trust is also a critical asset. In democratic systems, citizen engagement in decision-making tends to foster higher trust and legitimacy, which in turn supports voluntary compliance with emergency measures and long-term recovery. Autocratic systems may ensure compliance through fear and force, democracies build resilience through consent.

Case study: The Thames Barrier

Democracies can and do succeed at long-term resilience planning when the risk is well understood and a political consensus and will to act are developed. The Thames Barrier in London, constructed between 1974 and 1984, is a great example of sustained action to reduce risk over time. This movable flood defense was developed in response to the devastating North Sea flood of 1953, which claimed more than three hundred lives in the United Kingdom. The barrier protects 125 square kilometers of central London, including critical infrastructure and £321 billion worth of residential property, from tidal surges and storm floods. 

This trigger event galvanized politicians across the spectrum, with successive Labour and Conservative governments depoliticizing the issue and keeping the project funded and on track. The Thames Barrier’s success stems from transparent governance, public accountability, and adaptive planning. In contrast to autocratic systems, where rapid implementation can overlook long-term sustainability, the Thames Barrier showcases how democratic processes and political leadership emphasizing stakeholder engagement, transparency, and adaptability can lead to enduring and effective resilience infrastructure.

Democracies must find new ways to trade on the strengths of systems to improve resilience, while balancing electoral accountability with long-term resilience strategies, ensuring preparedness remains a priority despite political turnover.

The Thames Barrier is one of the world’s largest movable flood defenses. It is designed to protect London from tidal surges and rising sea levels. Source: UK.Gov

Fragmentation of resilience responsibility

One of the most significant challenges to resilience is fragmentation, in which responsibility for managing risks is dispersed across multiple institutions, sectors, and levels of government with limited coordination. In many democracies, resilience-related functions such as cybersecurity, disaster response, infrastructure protection, and countering disinformation are divided among government agencies, private companies, and local authorities—often with misaligned priorities, unclear responsibilities, and limited mechanisms for collaboration. Although largely unavoidable, this lack of unity can make it harder to anticipate, prevent, and respond effectively to crises.

Beyond government, much of a nation’s resilience power resides in civil society, businesses, and local communities. Private-sector actors own and operate the majority of critical infrastructure, yet their risk calculations are often driven by market forces rather than national security imperatives. Meanwhile, local governments and community organizations are frequently on the front lines of crisis response but might lack the necessary resources, authority, or integration into national resilience strategies. These silos can slow decision-making and create vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit.

To overcome this, the United States needs a fundamental shift in how resilience is structured and managed. Rather than just allocating responsibilities, governments must activate all layers of the resilience architecture supporting them to interact in ways that reinforce and enable one another. This means

ensuring vertical integration, so that resilience efforts at the national, regional, and local levels are aligned and mutually reinforcing;
strengthening horizontal coordination across sectors, ensuring that critical industries, government agencies, and civil society organizations work in concert rather than in isolation; and
creating mechanisms for shared awareness and adaptive learning so that resilience actors at all levels can anticipate emerging threats, adjust strategies in real time, and support one another’s efforts.

There is precedent for such robust collaboration. Launched in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Operation Warp Speed (OWS) brought together federal agencies, military logistics, and private pharmaceutical companies to accelerate vaccine development, manufacturing, and distribution. This public-private partnership initiated by the US government in May 2020 overcame bureaucratic and logistical barriers to deliver safe, effective vaccines in record time. The initiative demonstrated how aligning government support with private-sector innovation can rapidly build national resilience in the face of a public health crisis, creating a blueprint for future efforts.

A more interconnected resilience ecosystem is essential to navigating the complex threats of the future. Without it, resilience efforts will remain fragmented, reactive, and vulnerable to disruption.

Case study: The Texas power grid

The devastating 2021 Texas power grid failure was a disaster for the state. In the aftermath of the disaster, the state reported more than two hundred deaths and up to $195 billion in damages. The roots of the failure can be found in Austin’s energy regulation strategy, a unique approach that left it vulnerable to disaster and unable to withstand the shocks of increased demand.

In the 1990s, the Texas state government decided to decentralize its grid, prioritizing a competitive, market-based system of transmission operators and energy retailers. This resulted in lower energy prices for consumers but, with a desire to keep prices low, the companies operating the grid lacked incentives to invest in maintenance, upgrades, and general oversight. At the height of the crisis, 4.5 million customers were without power, and the grid was only four and a half minutes away from total failure.

In the lead-up to the crisis, authorities flagged that the grid was not sufficiently winterized and lacked waterproofing that would allow it to withstand snow and ice. Further exacerbating the crisis, the Texas grid operates independently of the power grids of other states. This is by design, minimizing the amount of federal oversight and regulation required, but also meant that the Texas grid was unable withstand the impacts of the storms.

An electrical transformer station in Galveston, Texas. Source: REUTERS/Reginald Mathalone, NurPhoto.

Technology as an enabler—and a threat—to resilience

Technology presents both a challenge and an opportunity. While digital advancements can enhance resilience, they also introduce new vulnerabilities, from cyber threats to the rapid spread of misinformation. Digital advancements can bolster preparedness and response by enhancing early warning systems, improving crisis coordination, and securing supply chains. But they also introduce vulnerabilities that can undermine these efforts. 

Cyber threats pose one of the most immediate challenges to national resilience. The 2021 ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline disrupted fuel supplies across the US east coast and highlighted the susceptibility of critical infrastructure to cyber threats. And these threats are evolving under the direction of hostile states. China has been using advanced technologies and persistently attacking critical national infrastructure in democracies, specifically targeting communications, energy, and transportation systems. China’s Volt Typhoon operation has successfully compromised a range of US infrastructure. And China is not alone in seeking to exploit cutting-edge technology to its advantage. For example, recent reports indicate that North Korea has established Research Center 227, a unit dedicated to developing offensive hacking technologies and programs, including those leveraging artificial intelligence (AI).

Looking ahead, the resilience challenges posed by quantum computing could be even more profound. Advances in quantum technology have the potential to break current encryption standards, threatening the security of financial systems, government communications, and sensitive data. Democracies are already working on post-quantum cryptography to counter this risk, but the transition will take time, and adversarial actors could exploit weaknesses before defenses are fully in place.

Beyond the digital sphere, bioengineering and robotics introduce entirely new dimensions of risk. Synthetic biology could be used to develop engineered pathogens, blurring the line between natural pandemics and deliberate biological threats. At the same time, advances in autonomous systems and robotics could revolutionize warfare, raising concerns about weaponized AI-driven systems operating beyond human control. The intersection of these scientific fields—quantum computing, AI, bioengineering, and robotics—presents unknown risks to resilience and national security.

At a more basic level, public platforms and ubiquitous technology can be exploited to undermine resilience and crisis response. For example, the rapid spread of misinformation on social media platforms during crises can erode public trust and complicate effective responses, as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic. Off-the-shelf drone technology has disrupted air travel and caused huge concern about reconnaissance and even weapon deployments against domestic targets.

To build true resilience, it is necessary to mitigate today’s technological threats, anticipate how emerging technologies will shape the future risk landscape, and fully understand how technology shapes both strengths and vulnerabilities. 

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The architecture of resilience

Resilience is a multi-layered ecosystem requiring participation at different levels of society, from individuals and communities to states and the international order. Each layer plays a distinct role in absorbing, adapting to, and recovering from disruptions, and resilience cannot be truly effective unless it is developed holistically across these levels.

At the individual level, resilience is shaped by psychological, social, economic, and genetic factors that determine how people respond to crises. Individuals with strong support networks, adaptive mindsets, and economic stability are better equipped to withstand and recover from shocks. However, individual resilience does not exist in isolation; it is influenced by the structures and resources available within communities and broader systems.

Community resilience builds on this foundation by fostering social cohesion, local preparedness, and collective problem-solving. Strong communities serve as the first line of response in crises, providing informal support networks that complement institutional responses. Yet, communities require policy support, infrastructure, and investment to maintain their ability to function under stress.

At the local and state levels, resilience depends on governance structures, coordination mechanisms, and resource allocation. Effective local resilience requires a well-integrated approach that ensures cities, states, and national authorities work together to mitigate risks. However, governance fragmentation often weakens resilience efforts, with responsibilities split across institutions that might lack clear coordination. This is particularly evident in crisis response scenarios, in which local authorities—without national support—might lack the capacity or funding to act swiftly.

National resilience integrates all these layers, ensuring that resilience is not only built at the community level but is also embedded in national security strategies, economic policies, and infrastructure planning. This level of resilience requires governments to prioritize long-term risk reduction, balancing investment in critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, and strategic reserves while maintaining the agility to respond to immediate crises. However, as discussed earlier, short-term political incentives often hinder sustained investment, making national resilience a complex challenge.

Finally, international resilience reflects the reality that no nation operates in isolation. Global crises—whether pandemics, cyberattacks, or geopolitical conflicts—demand coordinated responses across borders. Resilience at this level is shaped by alliances, multilateral cooperation, and shared risk-management strategies. However, geopolitical tensions, economic competition, and diverging national interests often limit the effectiveness of global resilience efforts, making collaboration challenging even when threats are transnational.

All of these layers are interdependent; weakness at any level undermines the resilience of the whole. To create a truly resilient society, resilience must be treated not as a siloed concept but as a structural framework, integrating individuals, communities, governance, national security, and international cooperation into a unified approach to risk and preparedness.

Figure 2. The layers of resilience

Part 2: Shaping the response

Individual resilience: The foundation of national strength

At the heart of the AANSRI lies a simple truth: a nation cannot be resilient unless its people are resilient. Governments can build strong institutions, invest in infrastructure, and create policies to mitigate risk, but the nation will remain vulnerable if individuals lack the capacity to withstand and adapt to crises. Individual resilience is not only about personal survival; it is the foundation upon which community, state, and national resilience are built. Without it, all other layers of resilience are compromised.

Resilience at the individual level is shaped by several key factors, including psychology, social support, practical security, and genetics. The resilience of the individual is inextricable from community resilience, of which aspects of social network support are covered in greater detail below.

Psychological resilience, which is often described as mental toughness or emotional endurance, determines how well individuals respond to stress, uncertainty, and trauma. Those with naturally adaptive mindsets, problem-solving skills, and emotional regulation are more likely to navigate crises effectively. However, psychological resilience does not develop in isolation; it is strengthened or weakened by social conditions and the availability of practical resources.

Despite the importance of individual resilience, it is often overlooked in national security and policy discussions. Governments tend to focus on macro-level resilience strategies, assuming that institutional strength will translate into societal resilience. But policies, strategies, and emergency plans are only as effective as the people who must implement and respond to them. Without better understanding of, and investment in, the resilience of individuals through education, the United States is missing a vital piece of the puzzle.

A core argument of the AANSRI is that resilience must begin at the individual level. Strengthening individuals strengthens communities—which, in turn, reinforces local, national, and international resilience. This initiative places individual resilience at the center of a national security conversation, recognizing that resilient nations are built from the ground up.

Case study: A national security analyst’s story

For nearly a decade, Maya, a mid-career national security analyst, thrived in a high-stakes federal agency known for its demanding tempo and mission-critical work. Tasked with coordinating real-time intelligence during a rapidly escalating international crisis, she often worked fourteen-hour days in secure facilities, balancing classified briefings, urgent decision-making, and the weight of knowing that lives depended on timely, accurate analysis.

Over time, this cumulative stress began to take a toll. Maya experienced persistent insomnia, emotional detachment, and difficulty concentrating—early signs of burnout she initially ignored. In a field where stoicism is often mistaken for strength, seeking help felt risky. Still, she quietly reached out to her agency’s internal wellness team and was connected with a resilience coach through a pilot program developed for high-performing staff in critical roles.

The intervention proved transformative. Maya learned tools drawn from cognitive-behavioral science to manage stress and improve focus. She also joined a peer support group for national security professionals, in which she could speak candidly about her experiences for the first time. Through structured coaching and informal connection, she reframed her stress response from something shameful to something manageable—and even instructive.

With time and support, Maya returned to her role with renewed clarity and a deeper understanding of what sustainable performance looks like. She became a champion for integrating resilience practices into team workflows—advocating for debriefing rituals and flexible scheduling where possible, and encouraging early-career staff to use the wellness resources she once hesitated to explore.

Maya’s story underscores a core insight from resilience science: it’s not the absence of stress, but the presence of support, skills, and self-awareness that makes the difference. In mission-driven environments such as national security, where the cost of burnout is high and the stigma around seeking help remains, individual resilience is not a luxury—it’s a strategic imperative.

Scene from a live-fire exercise at Novo Selo Training Area (NSTA), a Bulgarian military facility used primarily by NATO forces. Source: US Department of Defense/Nathan Arellano Tlaczani.

Strong individuals make strong nations: Recommendations for the AANSRI

1. Conduct research on the drivers of individual resilience.

Perform a comprehensive analysis of resilience factors.
Develop and analyze case studies. Draw from both domestic (US) and international examples to compare resilience-building approaches across different cultural and policy contexts.
Distinguish between innate psychological traits (e.g., temperament, cognitive flexibility, and genetics) and external social influences (e.g., community, education, and institutional support) that enhance or hinder individual resilience.
Conduct targeted research interviews with professionals in high-stress fields where resilience is critical. This should include military and intelligence personnel, journalists operating in conflict zones, frontline medical staff (e.g., emergency room doctors, paramedics, and disaster response teams), and humanitarian workers in crisis zones.

2. Build an evidence-based case for individual resilience.

Quantify social and economic impacts.
Commission research and economic modeling to assess the cost of low resilience (e.g., increased mental health issues, reduced workforce productivity, and greater reliance on government support in crises) and the economic and social benefits of resilience-building measures.
Integrate policy, using findings to advocate for policy shifts that recognize resilience as a strategic asset, integrating it into education, workforce training, and public health initiatives.

3. Apply behavioral science to strengthen resilience.

Analyze cross-sector behavior.
Examine how behavioral science is used successfully in other policy areas (e.g., health, security, and disaster preparedness) and identify best practices.
Develop strategic implementation pathways with practical policy recommendations that could be implemented at national and state levels (e.g., public awareness campaigns, resilience education in schools, and workplace stress-management policies) or by private-sector actors, particularly social media companies, to explore how digital platforms could foster resilience-building behaviors rather than exacerbating stress and division.

4. Highlight and elevate the voices of individuals who have been able to bounce forward from adversity to convey the importance of individual resilience to a general audience.

The AANSRI could produce a Profiles in resilience video series that spotlights individuals in the national security community who have faced significant hardships or experienced especially challenging circumstances in the course of their work. Importantly, this series should aim to highlight the lessons in resilience interviewed participants can draw from those experiences.

Figure 3. Steps to elevate individual resilience to a national security priority

While individual resilience is the foundation of a resilient nation, communities act as the first line of defense in times of crisis. A well-connected, engaged community can absorb shocks, adapt to disruptions, and recover more effectively than individuals acting alone. Community resilience is built on trust, local leadership, shared resources, and the ability to mobilize quickly in response to emergencies.

Strong communities enhance resilience by providing mutual support networks that supplement government responses. Whether through informal networks of neighbors, faith-based organizations, or structured civil society groups, resilient communities act as force multipliers in times of crisis.

However, communities face significant barriers to resilience, including economic disparities, political disengagement, and lack of local investment. In many cases, the most vulnerable communities are also the least equipped to prepare for, respond to, and recover from crises. Governments often assume that resilience will develop organically. But without deliberate efforts to strengthen community capacity, social cohesion can quickly erode under stress.

Social resilience stems from the networks and relationships individuals rely on in times of crisis. Strong communities, family ties, and support systems act as buffers, reducing the impact of external shocks. Studies on disaster recovery have consistently shown that individuals embedded in cohesive social networks (including digital networks) fare better than those who are isolated.

Resource stability is equally critical. Individuals living in poverty or financial precarity have fewer resources to absorb shocks, whether from job loss, health crises, or natural disasters. This is not just about income; it includes access to education, healthcare, and financial literacy, all of which determine an individual’s ability to plan, adapt, and recover. Local NGOs can play a critical role in meeting the resource gap for less well-equipped individuals. When a crisis manifests at a local level, faith-based organizations and other community groups are often vital in both preparedness and response activities.

Another major challenge is the fragmentation between local initiatives and national policies. While governments might have national resilience strategies, these do not always translate into localized, community-driven preparedness efforts. Effective resilience building requires a bottom-up approach, in which national policies support and empower local leaders, grassroots organizations, and community-driven risk-reduction efforts.

Case study: Hurricane Katrina

Elected government failed to adequately prepare the Gulf Coast for Hurricane Katrina. Combined with uneven recovery efforts, perceptions of resilience shifted the focus toward community-led recovery. Responding to Katrina’s devastation truly took a village—from actor Matthew McConaughey rescuing a local anesthesiologist and fifty stranded pets from a hospital without food or running water for seven days, to community groups uniting to rebuild schools after the storm left only 17 percent of New Orleans schools operational.

Across the Gulf Coast, residents developed strong social bonds, creating resilient communities ready to support each other amid recurring disasters. Today, when storms strike neighboring areas, volunteer groups like the Cajun Navy mobilize swiftly, bringing personal “airboats, duck boats, fishing skiffs, and even kayaks” to perform search-and-rescue missions. These efforts have proven vital, especially when rising waters trap people on rooftops.

One might assume residents of New Orleans and surrounding areas have become hardened after such significant loss, but the opposite has occurred. A profound sense of community support and empathy now characterizes the region, shaping both disaster recovery and everyday interactions. The resilience cultivated after Hurricane Katrina illustrates the extraordinary power of community ties in overcoming adversity.

A barbershop in New Orleans, Louisiana, damaged by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Source Unsplash/Carol M. Highsmith.

The role of communities: Recommendations for the AANSRI

1. Develop comparative case studies that examine successful community resilience models from the United States and internationally, identifying key factors that strengthen resilience across different social, economic, and governance contexts.

2. Map vulnerabilities to understand which geographical areas need the greatest additional support from outside.

3. Conduct social research on strengthening community bonds. Explore what fosters strong, connected communities and how these factors contribute to community preparedness (how social cohesion influences readiness for crises), crisis response capacity (how networks mobilize quickly when disasters strike), and long-term recovery (how social ties aid rebuilding efforts and reduce long-term vulnerabilities).

4. Investigate how formal and informal local leadership—such as mayors, faith leaders, neighborhood organizers, and business leaders—supports resilience efforts.

Focus on which leadership traits and approaches enhance community preparedness and how leadership can be developed and encouraged at a grassroots level.

5. Develop strategic recommendations for state, national, NGO, and private-sector support.

Assess the most effective forms of external support.
Identify what state, federal, and NGO interventions are most effective in enhancing community preparedness for emergencies, supporting rapid response and recovery when crises occur, and empowering local communities rather than creating dependency.

6. Maximize impact through financial investment; research where funding and resources should be directed to generate the most significant national impact.

Assess if investment should focus on infrastructure, training, social programs, or crisis communication systems.
Understand how financial incentives can encourage community-led resilience projects.

7. Leverage technology for resilience building to bridge the gaps between national direction and community resilience. Explore the role of digital tools and innovations in strengthening resilience, including

early warning systems and crisis communication platforms;
social media and community apps for coordination during emergencies;
data-driven risk assessments to help communities prepare and adapt; and
the role of information and risk analysis at a community level.

8. Develop tools to facilitate resilience literacy in communities.

Explore how local communities access and interpret risk information most effectively.
Study how to promote better risk literacy among residents.
Investigate what information (and information-sharing structures) would improve local preparedness and response.

Empowering state and local resilience: The operational frontline

Resilience at the local and state levels plays a critical role in connecting community-based preparedness efforts with national security strategies. Local and state governments are usually the first to respond to crises, whether natural disasters, public health emergencies, or security threats. They serve as the operational backbone of resilience, coordinating between federal resources, private-sector actors, and local communities.

However, despite their central role, local and state governments often struggle with fragmented responsibilities, inconsistent funding, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Many resilience efforts suffer from a lack of coordination between different levels of government, with local and state actors frequently left out of national security planning processes. If resilience is to be truly effective, local and state structures must be better integrated, properly resourced, and empowered to act decisively.

Under President Donald Trump’s administration, there has been a notable shift in disaster preparedness responsibilities from federal agencies to state and local governments. An executive order signed on March 18, 2025, emphasizes that “preparedness is most effectively owned and managed at the state, local, and even individual levels,” thereby reducing the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) direct involvement in disaster preparations. This policy change aims to empower local entities to make infrastructure decisions tailored to their specific needs, leading to more efficient use of resources. 

This transition has raised concerns about the capacity of state and local governments to shoulder increased responsibilities without substantial federal support. Critics argue that diminishing FEMA’s role could leave communities vulnerable, especially those lacking the financial resources to invest in necessary infrastructure and preparedness measures. The executive order also calls for revising critical infrastructure policies to better reflect assessed risks, moving away from a generalized all-hazards approach. While this strategy seeks to streamline disaster preparedness, it might also result in disparities in readiness across different regions, depending on their individual risk assessments and resource allocations. New funding gaps resulting from a radical reduction of FEMA could take a long time to fill. State legislatures might not be able to act swiftly, which would incur significant interim risk.

Local and state resilience depends on four key pillars.

1. Coordination and crisis response capacity

Local and state governments must be able to act quickly and decisively in a crisis. However, many suffer from slow bureaucratic processes, unclear chains of command, and limited autonomy in decision-making. The ability to coordinate emergency response across multiple jurisdictions is essential for resilience.

2. Infrastructure and investment in risk reduction

Physical and digital infrastructure play major roles in resilience. Roads, energy grids, water systems, and cybersecurity frameworks must be designed to withstand shocks and recover quickly. However, resilience investments often take a backseat to more immediate political priorities, leaving critical infrastructure vulnerable to failure.

3. Legislation and policy support

Effective resilience building requires strong policy frameworks at the state and local levels. Laws related to disaster preparedness, building codes, emergency funding, and information sharing can significantly enhance local resilience. However, many jurisdictions lack the authority or resources to enforce such policies consistently. For example, it has proved difficult to combat China’s efforts to purchase land near US and allied military bases because, at a local level, there is less access to intelligence or technical capability to identify and manage the risk.

4. Public trust and community engagement

State and local governments must engage the public in resilience efforts. Without clear communication and public trust, emergency response efforts can face resistance or confusion. Strengthening local resilience means ensuring that citizens understand their role and have confidence in their local leadership.
Despite their critical role, local and state resilience efforts are frequently underfunded and under-prioritized.

Case study: The Ohio Cyber Reserve

In 2022, Ohio Governor Mike DeWine issued an executive order that directed the creation of a new, cabinet-level position of cybersecurity strategic advisor to guide the state’s cybersecurity efforts across agencies, including the development of the Ohio Cyber Reserve (OhCR). The OhCR was established under the Ohio Adjutant General, the executive branch of the Ohio state government that oversees the Ohio National Guard. The OhCR is an all-volunteer civilian force organized around three missions—assist, educate, and respond—which all make the OhCR an agency responsive to cybersecurity issues around the state. Further complementing Ohio’s resilience to cyber threats was the creation of the Ohio Cyber Integration Center, which sits within the Ohio Adjutant General and coordinates the state’s responses to cyber threats, serving as a central hub and coordination center. These initiatives, alongside the OhCR, all contribute to the state’s cyber resilience. They combine education and awareness with job creation and economic development to create a more resilient Ohio.

Members of the Ohio Air National Guard stage a cyber-themed photo session at Mansfield Lahm Air National Guard Base, Ohio. Source: US Department of Defense/Joseph Harwood.

Local and state resilience: Recommendations for the AANSRI

1. Map local resilience capacity and governance gaps.

Complete comparative analysis of local resilience governance. Conduct a multi-region study of how different state and municipal governments structure their resilience planning, funding, and crisis response. Identify best practices and key gaps in preparedness.
Develop a local-state resilience index. Create a standardized resilience index to measure preparedness, coordination capacity, and recovery effectiveness across different states and municipalities. This could serve as a tool for benchmarking and guiding resource allocation.

2. Design smarter national-to-local resilience strategies.

Evaluate the 2025 executive order’s impact and analyze the shifting balance of responsibilities from federal to state governments. Determine what practical policy and operational choices would support the drive to “streamline preparedness operations; update relevant Government policies to reduce complexity and . . . enable State and local governments to better understand, plan for, and ultimately address the needs of their citizens.”
Determine what functions can only be performed at the federal level (e.g., large-scale intelligence and strategic coordination) and where states can take greater responsibility.
Explore innovative financing models for local resilience. Explore alternative funding mechanisms for resilience projects, including public-private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure resilience, municipal resilience bonds, and philanthropic and impact investment strategies to support resilience initiatives.

3. Optimize crisis coordination between state and local authorities.

Understand lessons from past crisis responses by conducting case studies on successful and failed coordination efforts in state-level crises (e.g., hurricanes, cyberattacks, and wildfires). Identify systemic weaknesses and develop insights into what enables effective coordination.
Improve intelligence and resource-sharing mechanisms by examining how state and federal agencies can ensure timely information sharing, particularly in rapidly evolving crises (e.g., cyber incidents, coordinated attacks, and energy grid disruptions).

4. Simulate a malicious-origin cascading crisis affecting multiple states. While most crises occur naturally, the Colonial Pipeline cyberattack and other state-backed disruptions highlight the need to study threat-based resilience.

Develop a two-day resilience simulation. Design and execute a multi-stakeholder exercise engaging federal, state, and local authorities, community organizations, emergency responders, and defense, intelligence, and cybersecurity experts.
The simulation should test how cascading failures across sectors (e.g., energy, finance, transportation, and supply chains) impact state resilience and what coordination structures are most effective in mitigating impact. Expose any gaps in information sources, system connections, policies and regulations, or practical support.

National leadership: The strategic architecture of resilience

At the national level, resilience is about ensuring that a country’s institutions, infrastructure, economy, and security apparatus can withstand, adapt to, and recover from crises. National resilience is the product of individuals, communities, and local and state efforts that are supported and enabled at the national level. This combined effort is the strategic backbone that enables societies to function under stress, whether facing economic shocks, cyber threats, political instability, natural disasters, or military aggression.

However, governments often struggle to embed resilience into national security strategies in a meaningful way. The challenge lies in competing policy priorities, short-term political incentives, and the difficulty of justifying resilience investments when crises are hypothetical rather than imminent.

As the recent presidential executive order illustrates, much of what needs to be done sits outside of the federal and national government space. As the United States develops a new resilience strategy, it will be important to connect the dots with other areas of national security strategy, policy, and operations. Resilience work requires a fully collaborative and cross-cutting national approach. Understanding and clearly articulating and supporting the relative roles of partners at all layers of the resilience architecture is a critical foundation to success.

There will always be some strategic functions that must be performed at the center of government for the benefit of the whole nation.

1. Strategic risk management

Governments must continuously assess and articulate a strategic understanding of risks, develop national strategy, and set clear expectations about priority activities.
The national level also plays a critical role in understanding progress and adapting to events.
National governments can also inspire and engage civic efforts with effective communication strategies and exercises. (For example, Taiwan has civil defense drills to raise population awareness and preparedness.)

2. Border management and resilience

The federal government plays a unique role in securing and managing the nation’s borders as a core function of national resilience. Effective border management is essential for maintaining national sovereignty, economic stability, and public safety. Unlike other levels of governance, only the federal government has the authority and resources to coordinate national border security strategy, enforce immigration laws, and protect critical infrastructure at ports of entry. This includes
- identifying and managing transnational threats such as organized crime, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and adversary-led infiltration efforts;
- investing in infrastructure and technology;
- coordinating crisis response, including managing large-scale migration surges, health-related border threats, and disruptions to cross-border trade through coordinated federal action; and
- leading intelligence integration and federal-state cooperation by, for example, strengthening information sharing among federal agencies, state governments, and allied nations to enhance border security and crisis preparedness.

3. Resilient infrastructure, supply, and manufacturing capability

The full picture of the resilience of critical infrastructure (energy grids, supply chains, water systems, digital networks, etc.) can only be brought together at a national level where gaps can be identified and direction set.
Macro industrial strategy can have major influence on core resilience priorities. For example, incentivizing domestic manufacturing in key areas such as battery or semiconductor production, or energy production and storage, decreases reliance on politically or geographically unstable regions.

4. Political stability and institutional resilience

Resilience is not just about physical assets; it also depends on the strength of (and trust in) democratic institutions, governance structures, and public trust in leadership.

Case study: Japan’s earthquake program

Japan has a deeply embedded culture of resilience that began with the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, which left approximately 140,000 people dead. In the aftermath, Japan recognized the necessity of fundamentally reshaping its infrastructure, its national psyche, and its approach to disaster preparedness.

Japan crafted a comprehensive blueprint for earthquake resilience. The Japanese government established “Disaster Prevention Day” on September 1 of each year, commemorating the Great Kanto Earthquake and reinforcing collective memory and preparedness by requiring schools, businesses, and communities to participate in earthquake and tsunami drills. These regular drills are more than just procedures—they serve to ingrain a mindset of readiness into every individual, reinforcing Japan’s communal responsibility in disaster response.

The magnitude 9.0 earthquake of 2011, known globally for its catastrophic tsunami and subsequent Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, was another pivotal moment. Despite Japan’s advanced preparedness, the event exposed critical vulnerabilities. In response, Japan once again adapted by enhancing tsunami early warning systems, increasing the number of emergency shelters, establishing a National Resilience Promotion Headquarters to coordinate resilience-building efforts across government sectors, and implementing the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience, which promotes public-private partnerships to mitigate risks. Japan’s continuous evolution of disaster preparedness strategies, combined with community-wide participation, has created a culture in which resilience is not just practiced but lived.

Elementary school students in Tokyo wear padded safety hoods during an earthquake drill on. Source: REUTERS/Toru Hanai.

The role of national resilience: Recommendations for the AANSRI

1. Develop a strategic risk product to prioritize national resilience efforts.

To support the development of the new US risk register—a public document that outlines the US government’s assessment of risks facing the nation—compare approaches to comprehensive strategic risk products that map, compare, and prioritize different national security risks (both threats and hazards) in a way that informs whole-of-government decision-making.
Develop practical policy recommendations for how a consolidated national risk framework could drive better choices and more coherent resilience planning across agencies and stakeholders.

2. Embed resilience in national security strategy.

Investigate the role of resilience in deterrence, exploring whether adversaries are less likely to exploit vulnerabilities in highly resilient societies.
Determine what a resilient nation looks like and how a government knows that progress is being made. Develop a national resilience index that compares like-minded countries, offering a benchmark for achievement.
Explore options for implementing national resilience goals (learning from other top-down, cross-cutting policy imperatives such as the Baltic states’ whole-of-society resilience policies.)

3. Enhance government levers to strengthen infrastructure resilience.

Investigate how the state can better deploy regulatory mechanisms, incentives, and public-private partnerships that could accelerate adaptation in critical infrastructure, rather than relying solely on federal mandates and funding.
Generate innovative options for transferring resilience responsibilities away from the federal government.
Explore how legal and policy tools (for example, tax incentives, zoning laws, and procurement strategies) can be used to embed resilience requirements into infrastructure projects.

4. Harness new technologies for national resilience.

Bring together an advisory team to discuss how AI and emerging technologies can be introduced at a national level to enhance resilience (including by supporting state and local areas) through predictive risk modeling, crisis response automation, and real-time decision support.

5. Building critical skills, supplies, and industry capacity.

Learn from Ukraine what national-level influence can be exerted now to ensure that the United States can pivot in response to future demands.
Conduct an analysis of national skills and manufacturing capabilities, identifying gaps that could hinder rapid adaptation to new resilience challenges such as supply chain disruptions, pandemics, or emerging cyber threats.
Develop recommendations for how governments in free-market economies can build domestic capacity in critical industries.

6. Develop crisis simulation, scenario planning, and crisis anticipation.

Design practical resilience audit stress tests for governments, like financial stress tests, to evaluate national preparedness across multiple risk domains.
Investigate how national crisis simulations can be improved and made more accessible and engaging for the public. Determine what role technology and game culture could play in this. Decide what practical recommendations could be made to support governments in ensuring that planning goes beyond singular, expected risks to prepare for cascading and concurrent crises.
Assess how data-driven modeling and predictive analytics can improve early warning systems and real-time crisis management.

7. Explore mechanisms for better bipartisan cooperation on resilience.

Conduct a feasibility study looking at how to generate more effective political consensus on long-term resilience. Examine how a new Resilience Commission (comprising members of the executive branch, legislative branch, state and local governments, the private sector, and academia) might work.

8. Contextualize the national role in border and transnational resilience.

Develop a framework and conduct comparative assessments of border region resilience and state capability levels to map sub-national resilience.
Analyze how border and non-border regions manage shared pressures, with a focus on improving interstate or interprovincial information sharing in both federal and non-federal systems.
Examine the evolving role of private-sector actors in deploying border surveillance and detection technologies (e.g., AI, biometrics, and drones), and their implications for governance, ethics, and effectiveness.

International resilience: Rewiring cooperation for a riskier world

No resilient nation is formed in isolation. Although many of the globalized practices on which the free world has come to rely can be adapted to an era of greater self-reliance, US allies and partners are still experiencing globalized risks. In addition to international terrorism and weapons proliferation, cyber threats, pandemics, climate change, and geopolitical instability are all borderless in nature and international resilience has become increasingly critical to any response. While countries might build strong abilities to develop domestically, their ability to withstand crises often depends on global supply chains, multilateral institutions, and strategic alliances.

Global resilience is often the weakest link in the resilience chain. Nations operate with competing interests, sovereignty concerns, and economic rivalries, making it difficult to develop cohesive, international strategies for resilience building. Multilateral organizations—such as the United Nations, NATO, and the G7—play a role in shaping resilience frameworks, yet coordination remains inconsistent and enforcement mechanisms are often weak. Countries such as China and Russia that are seeking to undermine US resilience are often in the room and influencing events. The United States needs to rethink how its allies work together, plan together, and build resilience among democracies.

Much of the decision-making and investment in resilience at an international level is undertaken by the private sector and driven by commercial motivations. Binding the private sector into resilience efforts is a critical challenge facing democratic governments also seeking to enable free-market economies.

Understanding the risks the US faces can also be greatly enhanced by partnership with other nations, whether focused on threats or hazards.

The role of international collaboration in developing resilience

Alliances

Military and economic alliances, such as NATO and the Five Eyes intelligence network, offer shared security frameworks that can enhance domestic resilience through collective defense and intelligence sharing. However, these alliances were primarily designed for traditional security objectives rather than resilience-specific cooperation. Their current engagement with emerging risks such as climate change, pandemics, and cyber threats reflects an ongoing evolution, rather than a foundational mandate. The degree to which resilience coordination is embedded in these partnerships varies, with many focusing on reactive capabilities rather than proactive preparedness. Critical national infrastructure is often owned and operated by private entities that do not usually have a seat at the table in nation-nation conversations.

While multilateral alliances remain critical to building national resilience, recent shifts in US policy emphasize a more bilateral and results-driven approach to security cooperation. Traditional alliances provide valuable frameworks, but they are often slow to adapt, constrained by bureaucratic inefficiencies, and susceptible to diverging national interests. In contrast, direct bilateral partnerships allow for more agile, interest-based cooperation, ensuring that resilience efforts deliver tangible outcomes rather than being diluted by multilateral consensus building.

The challenge is to balance this bilateral model of resilience building with broader alliance structures, ensuring that the United States remains engaged in cooperative security while avoiding overreliance on institutions that might lack enforcement mechanisms or strategic alignment.

Global supply chains and economic interdependence

Supply chain security has emerged as a critical dimension of economic resilience, particularly in relation to strategic resources such as semiconductors, rare earth elements, food supplies, and energy. International trade relationships and global production networks can act as resilience multipliers by providing redundancy and flexibility. At the same time, these networks introduce systemic vulnerabilities, as demonstrated by disruptions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions, and armed conflict. The same structures that enable diversification can amplify shocks, depending on their concentration risks and governance mechanisms.

Multilateral governance and global crisis response

Global institutions such as the United Nations, World Health Organization, and World Bank play significant roles in coordinating international responses to crises. Their capacity to support resilience at the national level depends on mandates, resourcing, and institutional agility. Mechanisms like emergency funding or technical assistance are useful in supporting less well-equipped member states, but institutional effectiveness is uneven and often constrained by political fragmentation and bureaucratic inertia. In contrast, regional organizations like the European Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations have demonstrated more targeted resilience-building efforts within their jurisdictions, highlighting the potential of geographically or politically proximate frameworks to drive coordinated action.

Cybersecurity and information resilience

Digital infrastructure, data integrity, and information flows represent transnational domains in which resilience challenges are intensifying. Cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and AI-driven threats often transcend borders and operate below traditional thresholds of conflict. While initiatives such as the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace reflect growing international concern, the absence of binding frameworks or enforcement mechanisms has resulted in a fragmented global cyber landscape. National-level security priorities continue to dominate, often limiting the scope for sustained international cooperation. As interdependencies deepen, the tension between sovereignty and collective resilience remains a defining characteristic of the cybersecurity environment.

Case study: NORDEFCO, from military partnership to advancing societal resilience

The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was established in 2009, bringing together Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland to jointly enhance the defense and of these nations. NORDEFCO is, first and foremost, a vehicle to advance defense collaboration and works to strengthen the civil resilience of its member states through the Haga I and Haga II processes.

The five Nordic nations share a close history, similar languages, and a shared culture, making cooperation among them easy and natural. In its first five years, the Haga process focused on a variety of ad hoc topics that represented the national interests of each host nation. Topics ranged from preventing wildfires to strengthening search and rescue capabilities to bolstering the shared inventory of Nordic states responding to disasters.

The second Haga meeting in 2013 resulted in the development of two cross-cutting studies. The first called for a wide-ranging audit of areas for relevant cooperation, identifying strategic priorities and areas for development. The second study focused on the necessary conditions and obstacles to enhance the ability of Nordic personnel to work and deploy assets in another state as needed to respond to crises.

In 2019, the relevant Nordic ministers furthered the Haga I and Haga II declarations by redefining the original declaration’s goals and focus. The new Nordic priority areas from 2019–2021 were coordination on forest fires and wildfires; enhancing cooperation on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; and driving coordination on emergency communications. Identified future areas for cooperation include civil-military cooperation, hybrid threats, and the importance of the Nordic/Arctic region. The Haga declarations have allowed the Nordic nations to advance civil and societal resilience and bolstered their security, strength, and ability to withstand shocks and adapt to future conditions.

A Finnish soldier sits atop an armored vehicle during a military exercise near Hetta, Finland, involving Finnish and Swedish forces. Source: REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger.

International work: Recommendations for the AANSRI

1. Assess gaps in multilateral resilience frameworks and develop solutions.

Resilience strategies will need to integrate both alliance-based and bilateral mechanisms to ensure that security cooperation remains adaptable, effective, and aligned with national interests.
Analyze existing multilateral resilience efforts (e.g., the UN, Organisation for Co-operation and Development, NATO, the G7, or the D10 initiative) to identify where coordination, policy frameworks, or operational capacity are lacking.
Develop recommendations for how existing alliances and institutions could be adapted to include practical resilience-building programs, reducing the need for entirely new structures.
Understand if multilateral institutions actually adapt to the increasing speed and complexity, or if there is an alternative mechanism that could work.
Contextualize past multilateral resilience responses, identify the structural barriers slowing resilience coordination, and highlight such areas for reform.

2. Explore ways to streamline decision-making and integrate faster, more flexible collaboration models, including whether more flexible coalitions could be managed under a new agile mechanism (a Democratic Resilience Alliance) driven by the United States.

Define objectives, mode of operation, potential benefits beyond separate bilateral strands.
Assess how such an alliance would differ from existing forums (e.g., private-sector involvement as a critical partner).
Investigate potential mechanisms for joint crisis response, data sharing, and policy alignment.

3. Develop a prioritized global resilience agenda for democracies.

Identify key resilience priorities (e.g., supply chain security, cyber defense, infrastructure protection, and countering economic coercion) and analyze where bilateral agreements can deliver faster, more targeted outcomes.
Assess how governments, multilateral institutions, and the private sector can collaborate on these priorities in new ways and outside of slow bureaucratic systems.
Elevate cross-cutting issues, such as press freedom, through public convenings that raise awareness and build support for resilience as a cornerstone of US international leadership. The AANSRI is already advancing such efforts through its Reporters at Risk event series.
Investigate how private-sector actors such as insurers, technology firms, and logistics providers can be integrated into national and international resilience strategies.

4. Strengthen global risk-sharing and crisis-response mechanisms.

Explore risk-sharing agreements among likeminded nations, ensuring that critical supplies and disaster-response capabilities can be deployed efficiently across borders.
Assess the feasibility of joint stockpiles for critical resources (such as medical supplies and pandemic-response materials), strategic energy reserves for democratic states, and cybersecurity response teams and shared intelligence operations.
Examine models for multinational rapid-deployment crisis-response units, ensuring that democracies can assist each other quickly in cyber, climate, or supply chain disruptions.

5. Learn from global exemplars in resilience.

Identify nations or regions that have pioneered innovative resilience strategies, analyzing best practices such as Taiwan’s advances in resilience in response to persistent and broad Chinese aggression, Japan’s earthquake preparedness and response framework, the Netherlands’ flood-resilience and water-management strategies, Singapore’s approach to food security and urban resilience, and the Scandinavian models of energy resilience and crisis preparedness.
Assess how these models can be adapted for broader resilience strategies, ensuring that lessons from national resilience pioneers are shared among governments and international organizations.
Explore how cities might be working collaboratively on resilience at a sub-national level.

6. Advance data-driven resilience strategies at a global level.

Investigate the feasibility of a global resilience data-sharing framework, ensuring that governments and institutions have access to real-time risk intelligence.
Develop predictive analytics models for resilience assessment, using AI and big data to track emerging risks across US allies and partners.
Assess how governments can integrate resilience-focused AI tools into national and global crisis-management strategies, ensuring that AI-driven insights enhance, rather than complicate, resilience efforts.

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Conclusion

This report argues that resilience must be treated as a core pillar of national and international security alongside defense, diplomacy, and economic strength. Democratic societies are already under sustained national security pressure. These challenges are not distant and hypothetical, they are already affecting our daily lives. The volume, complexity, and diversity of risk is growing, and the potential for interconnected, concurrent and cascading shocks has increased. Resilience is now a strategic necessity and a proactive national asset.

Countries on the front line like as Ukraine, Taiwan, and Finland demonstrate how sustained leadership, public engagement, and long-term investment in resilience can significantly strengthen a nation’s capacity to endure disruption. Their models are not directly transferable; each is rooted in distinct histories, geographies, and political cultures, but they offer valuable insights for other democracies. There is much to learn through mutual exchange: not just about institutions and systems, but about how societies prepare their people for uncertainty and respond when disruption escalates into full-blown crisis. There is a window of opportunity for the US and allies to consciously invest in building ‘resilience power’ in anticipation of mounting risks. There is still time to shape the future more proactively rather than be forced to react to shocks from a position of weakness.

Much has already been done to strengthen resilience across allied nations, from new legislative frameworks and emergency protocols to expanded public awareness and civic engagement. But there is more to do. That starts with recognizing that resilience is built from the ground up, anchored in the strength of individuals whose psychological, social, and economic well-being forms the bedrock of national capability. It will require diligence, national leadership, and a long-term commitment.

The Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative will focus its next phase of work on four priorities: advancing research into individual and community resilience; exploring opportunities to embed resilience in policy and planning across sectors; convening leaders and equipping them with practical tools for resilient governance; and amplifying public understanding of resilience as a strategic imperative.

The security of the United States and the free world will increasingly depend not only on our ability to deter threats and project power externally, but on our ‘resilience power’; our capacity to withstand disruption, adapt under pressure, and bounce forward stronger.

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Task force members

Elliot Ackerman
Author and former special operations team leader, US Marine Corps

Adrienne Arsht
Executive vice chair and founder, Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative, Atlantic Council

Nabeela Barbari
Business area vice president, Intelligence & Homeland Security Division,
General Dynamics;
former director, Resilience & Response, National Security Council,
White House

Norman Beauchamp
Executive vice president for health sciences, Georgetown University Medical Center; executive dean,
Georgetown University School of Medicine

Jeanne Benincasa Thorpe
Former national security and resiliency director, Nixon Peabody LLP

Jenna Ben-Yehuda
Executive vice president, Atlantic Council

John Burnham
Lead of intel strategy and mission command integration, Accenture Federal Services; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for threat reduction and arms control,
US Department of Defense

Chris Donnelly
Principal counsellor, Earendel Associates

Stephen Flynn
Founding director, Global Resilience Institute, Northeastern University

Markus Garlauskas
Director, Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Tressa Guenov
Director, Operations and Programs, and senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Security,
Atlantic Council

Alice Hill
David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment,
Council on Foreign Relations;
Former NSC senior director for resilience policy,
White House

Jane Holl Lute
President and chief executive officer,
SICPA North America; former deputy secretary of homeland security,
US Department of Homeland Security

James Johnson
Former director, Integrated Resilience Office, US Air Force,
US Department of Defense

Jocelyn Kelly
Director, Gender, Rights and Resilience (GR2) program, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University

Marta Kepe
Senior defense analyst, RAND Corporation

Frank Kramer
Former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs,
US Department of Defense;
Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council

Matthew Kroenig
Vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Alexis Long
Chair, British Transport Police Innovation Board; Former director of security and strategy,
London Heathrow Airport; Former chief innovation officer, Transportation Security Administration,
US Department of Homeland Security

Joel Meyer
President of public sector, Domino Data Lab; Nonresident senior fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative, Atlantic Council

Andrew Michta
Senior fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Veera Parko
Ministerial advisor and strategic lead, Resilience/Preparedness, Ministry of the Interior, Finland

Ian Paterson
Chief executive officer, Plurilock Security

Tomáš Petříček
Former minister of foreign affairs, Czech Republic

Karen Schaefer
President,
KMS Consulting;
former chief of operations, Directorate of Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency

Stephen Shapiro
Senior advisor, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security,
Atlantic Council

Elizabeth Sizeland
Executive director, Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative Task Force, Atlantic Council;
Former deputy national security adviser for security, intelligence, and resilience,
United Kingdom

Caitlin Thompson
Principal, Caitlin Thompson Consulting LLC; former vice president,
Red Duke Strategies; former executive director, Office of Suicide Prevention,
US Department of Veterans Affairs

Samantha Vinograd
Nonresident senior fellow, Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative,
Atlantic Council;
National Security Contributor,
CBS News;
Former Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism and Threat Prevention,
US Department of Homeland Security

Tom Warrick
Nonresident senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council;
former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy, US Department of Homeland Security

Kayla Williams
Senior policy researcher, RAND;
former assistant secretary of public and intergovernmental affairs, US Department of Veterans Affairs

Glossary

Adaptability: The quality of being able to adjust to new, sometimes adverse, conditions with agility.

Adversarial powers: Nation-state actors that seek to undermine democracy, freedom, and free-market liberalism (such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea).

Community bonds: The factors that foster strong, connected communities. This social cohesion influences readiness for crises dictates how networks mobilize when disasters strike and explains how social ties aid rebuilding efforts and reduce long-term vulnerabilities.

Critical infrastructure: Vital sectors for the day-to-day functioning of a society, such as energy, telecommunications, water systems, transportation, healthcare, space systems, and information technology infrastructure. Threats to these systems from adversaries would disrupt basic functioning and erode public trust.

Resilience power: Internal cohesion in a society, built on mutual trust, that allows a society to work in lockstep in the face of internal or external threats. Resilience power is a key pillar of national security.

Enabler (of resilience): A key attribute or condition that allows or facilitates resiliance for an individual, society, or system.

External circumstances: Conditions that are outside of an individual’s control (e.g., early childhood experiences, education, community ties, and exposure to adversity) that influence their ability to respond to shocks.

Fragmentation: Limited coordination, especially between state and local institutions and national governments, that creates misaligned priorities during crisis response. This lack of unity can make it harder to anticipate, prevent, and respond effectively to crises.

Resilience: The ability of individuals, societies, and systems to anticipate, withstand, recover from, adapt to, and bounce forward from shocks and disruptions.

Risk: A potential situation that exposes a person or society to danger. Calculating the level of risk involves assessing the combination of the likelihood of this situation coming about (e.g., the level of vulnerability, any malevolent intent, and predictive data) together with the level of impact it would have (e.g., on personal health, economic stability, well-being, and security).

Sovereignty: A government’s ability to rule itself.

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About the author

Fellow

Elizabeth Sizeland

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative GeoStrategy Initiative

Crisis Management Cybersecurity

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As another brutal heat wave hits the US, local and national leaders need to step up

Jorge Gastelumendi — Thu, 26 Jun 2025 19:26:16 +0000

As more than 170 million Americans face a sweltering heat dome that is sending temperatures over 100 degrees Fahrenheit, it’s time to assess the power of effective climate policy and how it could make the United States safer and more prosperous.

Extreme heat is now inevitable. According to data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the United States faced around two heat waves per year in the 1960s. But in the past two decades, this average has jumped to six per year. Heat has disastrous health impacts, decreases worker productivity, and can exacerbate gender inequalities.

If there’s good news amid this heat, it’s that Americans have the information they need to act. For example, look at the heat warnings Americans have received over the past week. Meteorologists have the science and data to predict with a high level of accuracy when heat and humidity will spike. In fact, coverage of the current heat wave started even before it began. However, there’s a gap between knowing these data points and properly resourcing heat preparedness.

In large part, that’s why coordinated city-level heat preparation can keep people safe. Heat warnings might be enough to convince someone to turn on their air conditioning or not go for that midday hike. But these alerts need to be paired with a city-wide response that protects outdoor workers, fortifies supply chains and city operations, and sets up hospitals to not be overrun with patients. And for the elderly, the unhoused, and families who can’t afford to blast air conditioning if they have it, cities need to provide places to cool down and reach these vulnerable populations with medical care.

Now is the time for city officials to consider how to keep people safe.

The Atlantic Council has piloted the role of chief heat officers, partnering with cities to appoint eight of these officers across the world, including in the United States. These chief heat officers have improved and scaled local responses to heat. From launching a tree-planting initiative in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to digitally mapping the coolest, most shaded route for people to walk along on a hot day in Melbourne, Australia, these local leaders are at the forefront of innovative resilience solutions. Even if it isn’t a chief heat officer, having someone at the city level who wakes up every day—even after summer is over—thinking about how to prepare for the next heat wave is essential.

Climate change does not have borders. This most recent heat wave threatened twenty-five states in the United States alone. As Americans face continued and lasting heat, local leaders must recognize this critical opportunity for leadership. While national climate investments have decreased over the past few months, the climate crisis is heating up. Now is the time for city officials to consider how to keep people safe—not wait for the next heat wave before they act.

But this local effort cannot stand alone. Earlier this year, the US retreat on climate under the Trump administration came swift and hard, most notably in the United States’ exit from the Paris Agreement on climate change. But the country cannot afford this retreat. Even at a time when remaining resources are stretched thin, city and state governments—as well as the philanthropic and business communities—must invest in scientific analyses and preventative action that serves communities dealing with the worst impacts of the climate crisis. For local solutions to succeed, they need to be accompanied by the enabling environment and resources to make change happen.

As the effects of this latest heat wave and those to come are broadcast around the world, the costs will become increasingly visible. Now, we must work to ensure that national leaders feel the heat and invest in the solutions that work.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center.

The post As another brutal heat wave hits the US, local and national leaders need to step up appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkmenistan’s deepening water crisis could have far-reaching regional consequences

Rasul Satymov — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 20:23:38 +0000

The vast, arid landscapes of Turkmenistan, stretching across Central Asia, are facing a profound and growing threat—a deepening water crisis that casts a shadow over its future stability, as well as over the security of the entire region. While often overshadowed by other domestic problems, the struggle for water in Turkmenistan is a critical issue demanding immediate attention. Exacerbated by a changing climate, almost a century of unsustainable practices, and new regional developments, this crisis is not just an environmental problem—it’s an unfolding human tragedy that could have significant economic and political ramifications well beyond its borders.

The roots of scarcity

Turkmenistan’s vulnerability to water stress is the highest in Central Asia, a precarious position resulting from a complex interplay of factors. Much of the country’s water infrastructure is a relic of the Soviet Union, including open canals and irrigation ditches that are tragically inefficient. Estimates suggest that anywhere between 30 percent and 60 percent of the water transported through these systems is lost to evaporation or seeps into the sandy soil before reaching its intended destination. These physical conditions are compounded by systemic mismanagement. A cohesive national strategy for water conservation and distribution remains elusive, hampered by a lack of coordination among governing bodies.

This inefficiency is particularly damaging given the demands placed upon the water supply, primarily by agriculture, which consumes an estimated 94 percent of the nation’s water resources. The heart of the problem lies in the legacy of Soviet-era planning: industrial production dedicated to cotton, a thirsty crop ill-suited to Turkmenistan’s naturally arid climate. This reliance on water-intensive agriculture depletes precious reserves. A shift toward drought-resistant crops, modern techniques such as drip irrigation, and greater agricultural diversification is long overdue to alleviate the immense pressure on the water supply.

Compounding these internal challenges are external pressures. Turkmenistan relies on the Amu Darya river, which flows along its border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, for roughly 90 percent of its water. The construction of Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal upstream represents a significant new threat. By diverting substantial amounts of water from the Amu Darya for its own agricultural ambitions, the canal project could reduce the flow reaching Turkmenistan, further straining an already stressed system. The absence of robust transboundary water-sharing agreements and effective diplomatic channels risks tensions, highlighting the urgent need for dialogue, potentially facilitated by neutral international mediators, to navigate this issue peacefully.

Overlaying all these factors is the undeniable impact of climate change. Projections indicate that temperatures in Turkmenistan are set to rise faster than the global average, inevitably leading to more frequent and severe droughts, further diminishing already scarce water resources and pushing the nation closer to the brink.

The human and environmental toll

The consequences of this escalating water scarcity are already being felt across Turkmenistan. Food insecurity is on the rise, with reports indicating that 12 percent of the population faces severe challenges in accessing sufficient food—among the highest rate among former Soviet nations. Access to safe drinking water is also becoming increasingly precarious. Residents across the country, including in the capital city of Ashgabat, report frequent water cuts and shortages. The tap water that is available is often of questionable quality, forcing many to rely on more expensive bottled water.

Reduced water flow and dying vegetation leave the soil vulnerable to erosion, intensifying the dust, sand, and salt storms that plague the region. In the northern Dashoguz province, vast tracts of agricultural land are severely affected by salt storms originating from the desiccated Aral Sea, posing significant risks to respiratory health and further degrading farmland. This vicious cycle of soil salinity, exacerbated by inefficient irrigation and poor drainage, diminishes air quality and agricultural productivity. Altogether, this creates an increasingly hostile environment for both people and wildlife.

The economic repercussions are also significant. Turkmenistan’s economy relies on natural gas exports, which constitute nearly 90 percent of its export revenue. However, the natural gas industry itself is water-intensive, requiring substantial amounts for cooling systems, equipment cleaning, and extraction processes. Water scarcity could directly impede the nation’s ability to maintain current natural gas production levels, potentially impacting national revenue and the funding of essential public services.

Furthermore, the unique ecosystems adapted to Turkmenistan’s arid conditions, including the vast Karakum Desert, are under threat. Rivers, wetlands, and oases—vital habitats for diverse flora, fauna, and migratory birds—risk shrinking or disappearing entirely, leading to biodiversity loss and pushing vulnerable species toward extinction.

Finally, the crisis is beginning to drive climate migration. Faced with failing crops, soil degradation, rising food prices, and dwindling agricultural employment (a sector that employs over 40 percent of the workforce), people are increasingly forced to migrate in search of better living conditions, both within the country and abroad. This displacement adds another layer of social and economic strain.

A call to action to maintain regional stability

The water crisis unfolding in Turkmenistan is not merely a domestic issue; its ripples will likely be felt regionally and globally. Declining agricultural output could increase Turkmenistan’s reliance on international food markets, potentially contributing to fluctuations in global food prices. More critically, the potent combination of environmental degradation, economic hardship, and potential social unrest fueled by water scarcity could destabilize the country and, by extension, the wider Central Asian region. History, including the the Syrian uprising, serves as a warning of how severe drought and resource mismanagement can exacerbate existing tensions and lead to conflict. Such instability could create power vacuums, ripe for large global powers.

Therefore, addressing Turkmenistan’s water challenge is a matter of international concern. Proactive engagement from the United States and the European Union could play a crucial role in promoting sustainable solutions and regional cooperation. In addition, supporting comprehensive research and data collection on water resources, climate impacts, and agricultural practices is essential for informed policymaking. The United States and the European Union should take the lead in facilitating regional dialogues involving Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Such initiatives will be critical for fostering transboundary cooperation and preventing conflicts over shared water resources such as the Amu Darya. Furthermore, technical assistance and funding from the United States and the European Union, potentially channeled through civil society organizations, could help implement sustainable water management practices on the ground—from promoting efficient irrigation techniques to supporting public education campaigns on water conservation.

Turkmenistan’s struggle with water scarcity is a powerful illustration of the interconnected challenges facing many parts of the world in the twenty-first century, where climate change, resource management, and geopolitical interests collide. Ignoring this looming crisis is not an option. Concerted action, grounded in cooperation and sustainable practices, is essential not only to secure a livable future for Turkmens but also to maintain stability in the region.

Rasul Satymov is a researcher with Progres Foundation with a focus on climate change, energy, and water issues in Turkmenistan.

The post Turkmenistan’s deepening water crisis could have far-reaching regional consequences appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The frontier is the front line: On climate resilience for infrastructure and supplies in Canada’s Arctic

Jeffrey Reynolds, Kristen Taylor — Fri, 30 May 2025 14:49:31 +0000

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s victory in the May 2025 elections provides a clearer picture of Canada’s political future and strategic priorities. During the election campaign, Carney emphasized bolstering defense spending and increasing Canada’s presence, awareness, and infrastructure footprint in the Arctic. As Carney seeks to achieve these stated ends, he will contend with a strategic environment that looks more dangerous for Ottawa than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And he will likely struggle to reconcile the strategic importance of the Arctic with the cost of developing the infrastructure required to secure it. But as the ice retreats, so too do the barriers that once insulated Canada’s Arctic.

The frontier has become the front line.

Canada’s choice is binary: secure its portion of the Arctic or suffer the consequences of foreign powers acting with impunity in and around Canada’s Arctic. Ottawa’s central challenge, therefore, is to harden its Arctic presence with dual-use infrastructure and supply chain resilience while hostile powers increase their influence around the pole.

This task gets more difficult the longer Ottawa dithers because change manifests across many vectors concurrently. The infrastructure and supply chains critical to the region are underdeveloped and ill-suited for the future—and they do not improve with age. Climate change continues to alter the contours of the region, often to Canada’s strategic disadvantage. An ascendant generation of US strategists proclaim that the Canadian Arctic is the “new soft underbelly” of North America. And it is no longer fantasy to suggest that the Arctic is ground zero for the new ‘Great Game’ between the United States, Russia, and China.

The region has been one of strategic contest since 1921, when Joseph Stalin claimed the North Pole for the Soviet Union, a claim re-animated by Moscow in 2015. It may lack the trenches and dragon’s teeth in Europe, or the clashes between fishing vessels and coast guard ships in southeast Asia. But the Arctic is no longer a low-threat, low-force posture environment that can be defended by a couple Coast Guard icebreakers and some Canadian Rangers on snowmobiles.

It is a region of strategic consequence and likely to be more so in the coming decades, which begs the question—why does Canada lag allies and adversaries alike in both the defense and development of its Arctic territory?

The simplistic answer is that Ottawa is torn among competing interests and an inability, or an unwillingness, to marshal the domestic resources necessary to protect its Arctic from a growing cast of players keen to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in pursuit of their interests.

The Atlantic Council delved deeper into Canada’s challenge to bolster infrastructure and supply chain resilience in the region. Research included literature reviews, interviews, and off-the-record conversations with a broad range of government and private-sector stakeholders. Interviews yielded constructive, if passionate, views from respondents who expressed repeatedly how much they want Canada to secure its part of the Arctic and enable its full development.

Analysis revealed that Ottawa knows the region well; the Canadian government has few peers in understanding the Arctic and what is required to right supply chains there. Geological surveys and development plans are completed to a gold standard. Stakeholders know the problem and solution space—and have for decades. But domestic policy, not climate change or geopolitical calculus, is the primary factor influencing strategic decisions for Canada’s north.

Key players (and honorable mentions)

Climate change has made the Arctic accessible. Glacier melting has created new sea routes, extended shipping seasons, and unveiled vast natural resources. But it has also created an opening in the region for strategic contest. Three threat vectors shape the region’s security dynamics for Canada.

Russia

More than half of the Arctic Circle’s population and half its economy are Russian. Russia sits at the end of one of the Arctic’s most accessible regions. Russia is opening old bases and building new infrastructure throughout the region. It holds more than 50 percent of Arctic investment (made between 2017 and 2022), and its military doctrine treats the north as central to economic and national defense. Since 2014, the Kremlin has launched Cold War-style investments in Arctic airfields, radar systems, submarine networks, and year-round basing. Russian military planners are considering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) domes extending over the Northern Sea Route.

Moscow likely observes that Canadian defense planning remains rooted in an outdated peace dividend mindset—one that grossly underestimates the threat of state-on-state conflict in the Arctic. Canada’s lack of comprehensive undersea surveillance renders its Arctic maritime approaches effectively blind, and its military presence in the region—symbolized by a modest footprint of Canadian Rangers—leaves much to be desired in terms of deterrence or rapid response. Equipment remains outdated, modernization plans languish in bureaucratic limbo, and logistics chains are stretched perilously thin. These gaps create space for Russian forces to maneuver below the threshold of war, exploiting ambiguity and Canada’s limited detection capabilities to assert influence or project force unchallenged.

The Kremlin likes to see how Canada’s strategic dependence on the United States substitutes alliance commitments for genuine sovereign deterrence. Ottawa’s whole-of-government approach—while inclusive in theory—has fragmented decision-making in practice, rendering Canada slow and reactive at a time when speed and coherence are strategic advantages. Indigenous consultation, while legally and morally necessary, remains procedurally rigid and politicized, often becoming a brake on critical national security decisions rather than a channel for partnership and empowerment.

While Russia invests heavily in its Arctic capabilities, Canada’s Arctic capability is stuck in the twentieth century. Surveillance assets are aging, space-based platforms are insufficient, and investment in modern ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) technology remains anemic. Communications remain unreliable across vast regions, exposing both civilian and military systems to disruption. Cyber defenses—especially around critical infrastructure—are poorly funded and unevenly deployed, inviting adversaries to strike via code rather than missile.

China

China considers itself a “near-Arctic power” and its Polar Silk Road links Arctic shipping to its global Belt and Road ambitions. China’s white papers frame the region as a commons to be commercially and scientifically accessed. Icebreaker construction in Chinese shipyards matches the tempo of a nation preparing for permanent presence.

Beijing understands that Canada’s economic infrastructure in the Arctic is brittle. Melting permafrost, seasonal reliance on ice roads, and a near-total absence of deepwater ports make northern logistics vulnerable to both climate and conflict. These choke points offer asymmetric opportunities to disrupt supply chains or sabotage dual-use facilities. China could exploit these vulnerabilities by embedding itself through ostensibly civilian investments in Arctic mining, telecommunications, or transportation infrastructure—investments that are strategic positioning by other means. In such a fragile environment, any hybrid attack or technological failure could sever vital arteries with catastrophic effects.

From China’s vantage point, Canada’s Arctic declarations are noble but hollow—bold in language but weak in execution. For Beijing, which has increased defense spending every year for three decades, Canada’s plan to reach two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense spending by 2030 is symbolic. Procurement remains tangled in inefficiency and overregulation, hampering modernization and undermining operational readiness. Economic pressures, shifting political winds, and lukewarm support for military spending are likely to derail Canada’s commitments before they mature. Moreover, China likely sees Canada’s overreliance on its NATO allies as a strategic liability. The Arctic can be probed or pressured just below NATO’s collective defense thresholds—ensuring ambiguity, diffusing Western resolve, and highlighting Canada’s limited unilateral options.

Manpower shortages, insufficient Arctic basing, and the long-delayed Nanisivik port all point to structural underinvestment in hard infrastructure. These gaps offer Beijing a rich menu of asymmetric opportunities to: subvert Arctic economies through proxy investments; cultivate cultural ties through scholarships, research partnerships, and diplomatic outreach; sabotage digital and physical infrastructure through cyberattacks or dependency entrapments; and sow political dissent by financing Indigenous, environmental, or anti-militarization movements within Canada’s own democratic fabric.

The United States (and others)

For Washington, Canada’s failure to defend its Arctic territory is not merely a function of limited resources, but of deliberate strategic neglect. The refusal to acquire nuclear-powered submarines—essential for year-round under-ice patrols and true sovereignty enforcement—reveals a deeper aversion to the burdens of great power responsibility. While adversaries invest in undersea dominance and dual-use Arctic infrastructure, Ottawa opts for half-measures: diesel patrol submarines that can’t operate under the polar ice, minimal surveillance capabilities, and no permanent military basing north of 60.

The US view is shifting from a posture of “monitor and respond” to one of “prepare and deter.” Pentagon reports no longer downplay the Arctic as a region of strategic importance. Even smaller powers have taken notice. India published its Arctic strategy in 2021, emphasizing scientific diplomacy. Turkey signed the Svalbard Treaty to gain access rights to the Arctic in 2023. France and Germany are also exploring greater footprints in the region.

While the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact with Canada and Finland represents a trilateral effort to rebuild icebreaker capacity and harden the Arctic industrial base, it is not enough. Canada remains trapped in a peacetime posture and mentality—symbolic patrols and seasonal exercises—while the region becomes increasingly contested by powers that are, at best, are neutral to Canada’s concerns and, at worst, openly hostile to them.

This inertia is rooted in a political culture that prioritizes accommodation over assertiveness. Successive governments have deferred to progressive special interest groups whose influence blunts hard security policies. Environmentalist and Indigenous consultations, while important, are often weaponized procedurally to paralyze decisive action. The result is a government debilitated by process, one that speaks of sovereignty but shrinks from the instruments necessary to enforce it. Even modest defense initiatives face resistance if they challenge entrenched activist orthodoxies or require confronting Canada’s internal contradictions. This includes the legal quagmire of provincial and territorial jurisdiction in the North, which Ottawa remains unwilling to override or reform.

Perhaps most damning for Washington is Canada’s lack of strategic coherence. Ottawa provides a strategic framework for the Arctic but fails to dedicate the resources to achieve the objectives contained therein. Policy and strategy without resource commitments are unseriousness ideas. Moreover, Canada’s policies do not form a doctrine of Arctic deterrence, convey no idea on how to mobilize federal will, and fail to weave a unifying narrative that connects Arctic defense to the survival of Canada as a sovereign nation in an increasingly anarchic world.

America cannot—and will not—permit a soft underbelly to fester in a domain as critical as the Arctic. It is not inconceivable for US forces unilaterally securing parts of the Canadian Arctic in the event of a crisis. Such actions, while diplomatically uncomfortable, would be strategically necessary if Canadian gaps remain unaddressed. To be blunt: if pressed and in a fight with Russia or China in the Arctic, the US will almost certainly be “Elbows Up” in defense of North America, even if it offends Canadian sensitivities.

Five “cold kills”

Our research unearthed five factors that contribute to Canada’s Arctic inertia. Each of these “cold kills” continues to impede progress on increasing supply chain and defense resilience.

1. Lacking multipartisan consensus on the region as “ground zero” for a new “Great Game.”

Canada cannot do much in the Arctic if it lacks enduring political will to support and fund dual-use infrastructure over decades. The growing importance of the Arctic for great-power competition underscores the need for politicians, defense planners, local communities, industry partners, and other relevant stakeholders to walk in the same general direction, if not in lockstep. Despite the urgency of this task, no sustained, cross-partisan strategy for Arctic defense exists. Without it, investments, infrastructure development, and operational planning will almost certainly come up short. In 2025, Natural Resources Canada is projected to invest $12.1 million toward climate adaptation projects in the North—which is necessary, but insufficient when compared to similar efforts by other Arctic powers.

Yet, allies offer a contrast. Norway’s Arktis 2030 fund and its defense pledge of 3 percent of GDP underscore a whole-of-society approach. Finland’s NATO entry boosted its participation in Arctic exercises. Sweden utilizes Arctic data to create a stronger and better informed national defense policy. Denmark leverages Greenland’s geostrategic importance in its Arctic defense. While Canada’s Arctic is inaccessible by comparison, it can look at what NATO allies do right in the region and their whole-of-society approaches.

2. Placing too much of the strategic burden on local communities.

The Canadian government continues to place disproportionate responsibility for Arctic security on local communities, revealing a dangerous strategic asymmetry between rhetoric and capability. The Canadian Rangers, though a symbol of national resolve and cultural integration, are not a substitute for a modern, standing military presence. They are lightly armed, part-time volunteers—valuable in their knowledge of the land but structurally unfit to deter or respond to the increasing threats posed by adversarial state actors operating just beyond the line of sight. This over-reliance has created a strategic mirage: Ottawa appears engaged in Arctic defence, but the burden is unfairly borne by those with the fewest resources and the highest exposure.

In effect, Canada’s Arctic is not treated as an equal part of Confederation, but as a frontier outpost whose primary function is surveillance and symbolic sovereignty. The political imagination to raise Arctic communities to the standard of living of rural southern Canada is absent. There is no serious nation-building project underway—no long-term vision to tie infrastructure, broadband, energy, healthcare, and education in the North to the national grid of opportunity.

The region is home to significant deposits of iron ore, gold, diamonds, and rare earth elements. The Mary River Mine on Baffin Island is one of the world’s richest reserves of high-grade iron ore, producing millions of tons annually. Similarly, the Hope Bay and Meliadine gold mines contribute substantially to Canada’s mineral output. These resources are critical for economic development and for national security, given their importance in defense manufacturing and technology. Yet, the extraction and transportation of these resources are hampered by limited infrastructure that eludes further development due to lack of coordination and investment at all levels of government. While the Yukon Security Advisory Council can be a model for shared governance federal, territorial, and Indigenous jurisdictions overlap without coherent authority. The result is a bureaucratic bottleneck that limits response agility and accountability, especially in scenarios involving mass casualty events or foreign incursions below the threshold of war.

3. Misunderstanding the Arctic as a land- or maritime-centric domain, instead of a multidomain one.

Canada’s Arctic strategy remains anchored in a legacy mindset—fixated on land and maritime domains—while the battlespace has already expanded far beyond the ice and tundra. The Canadian Arctic is a multi-domain operating environment in the most rigorous sense: a crucible where air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace domains converge. Focusing primarily on ground mobility or maritime choke points is antiquated.

In an era defined by precision-guided conflict, gray zone incursions, and orbital competition, the North requires integrated deterrence across all domains. The space domain is already decisive; Russia and China have launched dual-use satellites optimized for polar reconnaissance, while Canada’s surveillance constellation remains limited and aging. Cyberspace, too, is an active front. Persistent foreign probing of Canada’s critical Arctic infrastructure—from power grids to fiber lines—underscores the need for zero-trust architectures and sovereign cyber capacity hardened against both disinformation and sabotage. The air domain, often overshadowed, remains underutilized despite offering cost-effective ISR opportunities via high-altitude, long-endurance drones and balloon-based sensors that can supplement space assets in degraded environments.

Canada must approach the Arctic as a multi-domain region. Infrastructure nodes at Iqaluit, Yellowknife, and Inuvik must be conceived not as mere logistics hubs, but as permanent and staffed bases in a broader multi-domain lattice of deterrence. Airfields should be hardened, satellites shielded, networks encrypted, and data fused in real time. The resilience and infrastructure footprint must be multi-domain: ISR in orbit, radar on ice, seaborne logistics hubs, and hardened cyber networks. It might even be cheaper to establish and easier to maintain air-based sensors to augment space-based sensors, such as high-altitude, long-endurance drones and high-altitude balloons.

4. Missing the point that infrastructure spending enables both military and local resilience.

Canada’s policy frameworks fail to grasp a foundational truth: infrastructure is not ancillary to defence; it is defence. Roads, railways, hospitals, and power stations in the Arctic are bulwarks of resilience and lifelines to national unity. The harsh environment demands more than token outposts; it demands permanence that begins with infrastructure designed for both civilian and military pursuits.

Canada’s persistent underinvestment in Arctic infrastructure can be attributed largely to sticker shock. Building in the north is expensive at the outset, but those initial costs conceal long-term value. Roads, railways, and ports that facilitate the movement of Canadian forces and provide necessary infrastructure for local communities also enhance NATO mobility and resilience.

The Grays Bay Road and Port Project is unlikely to open before 2035. Until then, the Port of Churchill remains Canada’s only Arctic deepwater port for more than 106,000 miles of coastline—and even it is more than 800 kilometres south of the Arctic Circle. The overland situation is equally stark. The long-considered Mackenzie Valley Highway remains unbuilt. Meant to replace unreliable winter roads and connect remote Arctic communities, the highway should be considered as a defense artery.

Moreover, the North needs cyber towers as much as radar domes; fibre optic cables as much as sonar arrays. Schools and post-secondary institutions—anchored by Arctic research centres—should be erected alongside hardened military installations to attract families, not just forces. In Alaska, the dual-use success of the University of Alaska Fairbanks and the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport provides a model: educational and aerospace ecosystems aligned with the broader security posture of the United States.

Still, there are signs of acceleration. The Department of National Defence has committed $230 million to extend the main runway at Inuvik Airport. The upgrades include modern lighting and arrestor systems—investments tailored for sustained military operations and a rare example of a concrete commitment in a domain often shaped by abstraction. Canada should build Arctic spaceports and drone launch facilities for persistent surveillance and communications dominance—assets that would likely qualify as defence expenditures under a broadened NATO definition. And that definition is evolving. With calls to raise the alliance-wide benchmark to five percent of GDP, the line between civil and military investment will blur. Forward-thinking allies are already redefining defence to include national resilience, critical infrastructure, and technological redundancy.

5. Failing to call out the need to achieve A2/AD capability.

Canada’s current Arctic strategy is more performative than purposeful. It remains anchored in rituals of presence rather than a doctrine of deterrence. The reasons are structural and cultural: A2/AD sounds too aggressive for a nation wedded to peacekeeping identity and constrained by intergovernmental jurisdictional frictions. But if Canada is to hold the Arctic, it must defend it—not merely inhabit it. That demands something Canada has never attempted: a comprehensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy adapted for the circumpolar battlespace.

A2/AD refers to the deployment of integrated capabilities that prevent an adversary from operating freely within a region. This includes long-range fires, persistent surveillance, advanced radar, cyber denial tools, hardened command-and-control infrastructure, and air and maritime denial platforms. Canada does not mention A2/AD in its Arctic lexicon because it fears what it implies: that the North is no longer a sanctuary but a frontier. Building an Arctic A2/AD network would require political will, sustained investment, and a strategic mindset that accepts confrontation as a precondition for sovereignty. It would also provoke diplomatic risk—Russia would label such a move provocative, and China would test the perimeter with gray-zone maneuvers masked as scientific exploration or commercial navigation. Yet the absence of such a posture risks far greater cost: a hollow sovereignty, subject to erosion by increments.

Investments in some areas do not amount to A2/AD. True, Canada’s $38.6-billion commitment over twenty years to modernize NORAD is substantial. If fully implemented, this would be the largest reinvestment in continental defense since the early Cold War. Arctic over-the-horizon radar systems will track threats from the US-Canada border to the Arctic Circle. A more powerful polar variant will extend coverage into the Arctic archipelago and beyond. Crossbow—a classified network of advanced sensors—will supplement these systems with real-time precision. And the Defence Enhanced Surveillance for Space (DESSP) project will allow space-based tracking of adversary launch and maneuver capabilities. Canada has partnered with Australia on a next-generation Arctic early-warning detection system. But even these investments are insufficient; they do not achieve A2/AD in the Arctic. Canada has ISR blind spots, insufficient logistical depth, and infrastructure degraded by thawing permafrost. RADARSAT’s capabilities are aging; the Northwest Passage is functionally unmonitored. There is no cruise missile defense layer.

A Canadian A2/AD architecture would extend ISR reach from geostationary orbit to the ocean floor. At its core: Over-the-Horizon Radar (AOTHR), high-altitude drones, and advanced satellite constellations fused via a hardened C4ISR backbone. Any credible A2/AD structure must project deterrence not only northward but outward via NORAD, integrating seamlessly with allied efforts across the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and the European High North.

Challenge and opportunity

We recommend the following six steps to shape decision-making vis-à-vis Canada’s Arctic. Addressing each of them is necessary for more resilient supply chains and robust infrastructure for defense of the Canadian Arctic.

1. Achieve enduring domestic political consensus.

Without sustained, bipartisan consensus on the strategic value of the Arctic, Canada’s northern policy will remain fragmented, underfunded, and vulnerable to reversal.

Canada should establish a nonpartisan Arctic Strategy Council, drawing on members from federal, provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments, as well as the private sector. This council could be modeled loosely on the United Kingdom’s National Security Council, with a standing mandate to oversee and report on Arctic development milestones.

To correct course, Parliament should adopt a minimum percentage of GDP for Arctic infrastructure and defense investments—similar to how NATO’s 2-percent defense spending benchmark frames national priorities. A 0.5-percent GDP floor specifically earmarked for Arctic readiness would send a powerful signal to allies, adversaries, and Canadians alike.

2. Build permanent bases and infrastructure.

Sovereignty requires presence. Canada cannot assert command over its northern territory while maintaining a transient, seasonal military posture.

Canada must develop at least two permanent Arctic bases by 2035 and reinforce the air infrastructures in Yellowknife. These installations should support multi-domain enablers: ground forces, drone squadrons, ISR satellites, and cyber defense detachments. One proposed location is Resolute Bay in Nunavut—a strategic logistics point halfway through the Northwest Passage. Another is Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories, where the Inuvik-Tuktoyaktuk Highway provides ground access to the Beaufort Sea.

Canada need not sacrifice environmental stewardship to bolster its dual-use infrastructure in the region. On the contrary, the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) offers a way to meet energy needs in a sustainable and flexible manner. These compact, deployable energy systems would enable off-grid installations to power radar stations, bases, and airstrips—allowing the Canadian Armed Forces to operate autonomously across a vast and power-starved frontier.

Canada can and should discover best practices in other nations and adopt to the fullest extent possible. The Arctic Remote Energy Networks Academy is training a new generation in clean energy implementation, building the intellectual and technical foundation for sustainable Arctic energy systems. It is one example of innovation that can help make strides in the Arctic.

3. Reorient superclusters toward strategic innovation.

Canada’s innovation ecosystem is misaligned with its strategic realities.

To adapt, Canada must integrate Arctic operational challenges into supercluster mandates. The focus of these superclusters has strayed too far from core security imperatives, and redirecting their mandate toward the defense and security sector could allow Canada to reanimate its atrophied defense industrial base, stimulate Indigenous research and development, and provide a platform for strategic innovation drawn from academic and private-sector talent.

The Global Innovation Cluster for Advanced Manufacturing could sponsor development of modular Arctic housing for deployed forces. The Digital Technology Cluster could support remote communications networks hardened against magnetic interference. And the Protein Industries Cluster could help devise shelf-stable, high-calorie rations adapted to extreme environments.

Canada should establish a national challenge prize—modeled on the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge—to spur innovation in climate-resilient infrastructure, Arctic mobility, and remote power generation. Such efforts should be coordinated by a Defence Innovation Agency akin to the United Kingdom’s Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), ensuring alignment between technological output and operational need.

4. Integrate civil-military infrastructure.

Canada must adopt a whole-of-society approach to Arctic logistics—one that erases the line between civilian and military use.

Every kilometer of highway, every meter of runway, and every watt of power grid must serve dual purposes. Similarly, the Grays Bay Road and Port Project, which aims to connect the rich mineral fields of western Nunavut with the Northwest Passage, must be prioritized for its economic benefits and geopolitical value. Its completion would give Canada a second deepwater Arctic port—an essential node for resupply, power projection, and emergency response.

Meanwhile, the feasibility of Arctic spaceports must be considered thoughtfully. With global competition accelerating in polar orbit surveillance, Canada’s geography is a latent advantage. Nunavut and the Northwest Territories are prime candidates for launching satellites into sun-synchronous and polar orbits, a domain critical for ISR.

5. Accelerate NORAD modernization and ISR integration.

Canada must modernize its Arctic surveillance and early-warning capabilities through the renewal of NORAD and deep integration of orbital, aerial, and terrestrial ISR platforms.

Canada must move decisively to modernize its contributions to NORAD and integrate a layered, multi-domain ISR architecture that meets the threats of the 21st century. The existing North Warning System (NWS)—a relic of the Cold War—is functionally obsolete. It is increasingly vulnerable to kinetic destruction, electronic warfare, and deception by adversaries leveraging hypersonic, low-flying, and space-enabled strike platforms. While Canada has acknowledged this through its stated commitment to over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) and new space-based capabilities, progress has been halting, piecemeal, and under-resourced.

Canada should fast-track its involvement in key pillars of NORAD modernization alongside the United States by:

Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR): Advance procurement and installation of Arctic-facing OTHR systems based in Labrador and Nunavut to create a persistent early-warning envelope stretching across the polar approaches. These systems must be hardened against electromagnetic disruption and integrated into NORAD’s command-and-control nodes in real time.
Ballistic Missile Defence and the Golden Dome: Canada must shed outdated policy inhibitions and join the continental Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) architecture. A Canadian contribution to a “Golden Dome” over North America—built on Aegis Ashore components, ship-based interceptors, and ground-based midcourse defence systems—would reinforce deterrence and mitigate the strategic vacuum currently inviting adversary escalation. Participation in the US Missile Defense Review and integration into layered BMD command structures should begin immediately.
Space and High-Altitude ISR: The integration of RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM) assets with Gray Jay microsatellites must be complemented by investment in high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs, stratospheric balloons, and commercial space partnerships. Persistent polar orbit surveillance is not a luxury—it is the sinew of a sovereign Canadian deterrent.

A modern NORAD without a full Canadian partner is a NORAD weakened in scope, credibility, and political cohesion. In an age of hypersonics, space militarization, and AI-driven surveillance, Canada’s northern shield must be not just symbolic but steel-wrought—an active, intelligent barrier underpinned by the best minds and machines the alliance can field. The window to shape this future is closing fast. Canada must step forward now, not as a follower, but as a co-architect of North America’s defence.

6. Integrate the Arctic with broader national and allied defense postures.

Canada’s Arctic strategy must not be treated in isolation.

Canada must integrate its Arctic strategy into a broader, assertive national defence posture—one that acknowledges the indivisibility of Canadian sovereignty and its responsibilities as a G7 power. The Arctic is not a separate theatre, but the forward glacis of the North American fortress. What begins as radar coverage over Baffin Bay ends in deterrence posture from Vilnius to the Taiwan Strait. Canadian defence policy must therefore harmonize Arctic readiness with strategic power projection abroad, ensuring the nation can respond decisively to threats—whether they emerge from the Beaufort Sea, the Black Sea, or the South China Sea.

The Arctic remains critical—but it is not Canada’s only defence priority. A myopic focus on the North risks undermining broader global responsibilities. Canada must project credible force across multiple domains and theatres. That means integrating Arctic surveillance—through over-the-horizon radar, low Earth orbit satellite constellations, and AI-driven ISR—directly into NORAD’s early warning lattice. These capabilities must be interoperable with US Northern Command, NATO’s Arctic flank, and allied sensors in the Indo-Pacific. Surveillance is not enough; it must be paired with striking power and forward basing.

Strategic mobility and offensive reach are essential. Arctic airbases must be upgraded to sustain F-35 squadrons year-round, with rapid deployment capabilities for long-range precision fires and mobile expeditionary forces. Arctic-class naval platforms should anchor presence and power projection into contested waters, with the logistical depth to pivot between the Arctic archipelago and Pacific choke points. Canadian-built UAVs and high-altitude drones should patrol both the Northwest Passage and Western Pacific, forming a twin-hemisphere presence. Above all, Canada must act as a sovereign Arctic nation capable of defending its territory, while remaining a credible contributor to the rules-based international order. The Arctic is the crucible, but Canada’s responsibilities—and its enemies—do not stop at the pole.

Canada’s Arctic infrastructure and supply chain resilience are foundational components to its basic expression of sovereignty. But the future of the Arctic belongs to those who show up first and endure longest. The question is not whether Canada can afford Arctic sovereignty, but whether it can afford its absence.

About the authors

Jeff Reynolds is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Acknowledgements

This research was made possible by the generous support of the Canada Mobilizing Insights in Defense and Security (MINDS) program.

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There is no easy fix for Haiti’s crises. But here’s where the US can start.

Camilla Reitherman — Tue, 13 May 2025 20:12:52 +0000

On May 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated Haiti’s two most powerful gang coalitions, Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif, as foreign terrorist organizations. This move—along with Rubio’s two trips to the Caribbean earlier this year—signals the Trump administration’s recognition of the growing crisis just 750 miles from Key West, Florida. Still, the imminent collapse of Port-au-Prince may soon demand a broader and more coordinated US response.

This is Haiti’s fourth year without a president, its ninth year without holding presidential elections, and its second year without a single democratically elected official in power. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, the country has witnessed a litany of crises—security, humanitarian, and political—that have internally displaced over one million Haitians, more than half of whom are children. Weakened state institutions and an under-resourced national police force have left Haitians to confront these challenges with little to no support from their government. While resilience has long been a defining trait of the Haitian people, forged through more than two centuries of adversity, the past several months have tested that endurance to its limits. Gangs have made staggering advances into densely populated areas of the capital and previously sheltered rural regions, driving a surge in violence that has claimed over 1,500 lives since January 1.

Experts warn that the total collapse of Port-au-Prince is now closer than ever. What happens if the capital falls to the gangs? Beyond a seismic humanitarian crisis, the Transitional Presidential Council—a provisional governing body formed in April 2024 with the support of the Caribbean Community and the United States—would likely unravel, taking with it any remaining hope for constitutional reform, credible elections, and a functioning central government. And as gangs expand their control beyond urban strongholds and into the countryside, the entire nation would teeter on the edge of state collapse.

While there are no immediate solutions to the crisis in Haiti, there are several tangible steps the United States can take to ameliorate the suffering of the Haitian people and help facilitate the country’s recovery. Failing to do so risks allowing the crisis to not only worsen, but spill over into the United States and throughout the region.

Ripple effects

The paramount consequence of Haiti’s potential collapse into a failed state would be the devastating loss of life and the shattered futures of hundreds of thousands of Haitians. But this fallout would not be contained within the country’s borders—the United States and the broader Caribbean Basin will inevitably feel the ripple effects of the crisis as well.

A humanitarian disaster of this scale would trigger a dramatic surge in migration to countries across the region, including to the US southern border. This coincides with the Trump administration’s revocation of Temporary Protected Status for 200,000 Haitian refugees, forcing deportations at a moment of maximum instability. The Dominican Republic, Haiti’s closest neighbor and a key US ally, would also face intensified pressure—both from refugee flows and the risk of cross-border violence. In the total absence of a functioning state, Haiti could become a staging ground for terrorist activity, drug markets, and transnational criminal networks already active in the region, further destabilizing the Caribbean Basin. With this level of insecurity just miles from the United States’ shores, the situation represents a five-alarm fire for US national security.

US foreign policy in Haiti has long been marked by intervention, mismanagement, and short-term fixes. Many experts fear that the designation of Haiti’s gangs as foreign terrorist organizations falls into the same pattern—failing to address the root causes of gang violence or consider the impact on civilians who rely on aid. And as the failure of the Kenyan Multinational Security Support mission to restore security to Haiti has made clear, even efforts with significant US backing have proved inadequate to the challenges of the moment. Past US interventions and policies toward Haiti have fueled suspicion among many Haitians and hopelessness among many US policymakers. Yet while the US government bears significant responsibility for this skepticism, it also possesses the influence to effect positive—even if incremental—change for Haiti.

How the US can help right now

The US government can take several steps in the near term to bring back a modicum of stability and prepare the nation for “the day after.” Many of the necessary policies already exist—they simply require reauthorization or targeted revisions to be effective.

Although Haiti is widely recognized as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States remains the largest market for its most profitable sector: textiles. Thanks to bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in 2006 and 2010, known as the HOPE and HELP acts, which established preferential trade terms for the sector, Haiti’s apparel exports to the United States surged from $231 million in 2001 to $994 million in 2021. Although the crisis has severely undermined textile production, these exports provide a resilient economic lifeline for what remains of Haiti’s formal economy. However, unless reauthorized, these trade preferences are set to expire in September. Rather than imposing tariffs that further destabilize Haiti’s fragile manufacturing sector, Congress should move quickly to preserve the near-shoring of US manufacturing imports by passing HR 1625—the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2025, sponsored by Representative Gregory Murphy (R-NC).

The withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) raises many questions about the future of development organizations in Haiti, as hundreds of life-saving programs are put on indefinite hold. Several voices within the Haiti policy community note that the agency’s work, despite its best intentions, sometimes created an overreliance on foreign aid within Haitian institutions. Over a century of this dynamic led Haiti to become, in the words of Haiti expert Jake Johnston, an “aid state.”

In the wake of USAID’s departure, the United States has the opportunity to sculpt a more effective aid strategy that puts the onus of development work in the hands of an ever-resilient Haitian civil society, not just foreign contractors. This strategy proved successful in the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program. And this approach serves as the foundation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA), a law passed by Congress during US President Donald Trump’s first term that prioritizes localization and reorients US foreign policy strategy in fragile states toward preventing conflict rather than reacting to it. Haiti was designated one of the GFA’s ten priority countries and the Biden administration made meaningful strides toward developing a strategy that prioritizes engagement with a broad range of trusted local partners. Renewing the GFA could build on this groundwork by channeling substantial resources into empowering local partners, thus fostering greater self-reliance within Haitian institutions. Representatives Sarah Jacobs (D-CA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) have introduced a bill to reauthorize and strengthen the GFA. Yet despite the Trump administration’s support for aid localization, momentum for renewing this policy has faltered in both the legislative and executive branches, leaving its future in peril.

A whole-of-government approach

As Georges Fauriol, an expert on the Caribbean, has described US policy toward Haiti, “the challenge is not so much the absence of a strategy as its disaggregated character.” Whether it be the State Department, the Office of the US Trade Representative, or the Department of Defense’s US Southern Command, the US government possesses no shortage of entities that conduct Haiti policy—not to mention the influence of external interest groups such as those in the US Haitian diaspora.

Although working toward the same mission, these initiatives tend to operate in silos and do not come together to form a cohesive strategy for the long-term stability of the country. This dynamic was evident during the US response to Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake, as US Southern Command-led military relief operations and USAID disaster initiatives often struggled with unclear divisions of responsibility, resulting in operational inefficiencies. The GFA and policies such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative aim to establish a whole-of-government approach to address this issue. Rather than launching new initiatives for each emerging crisis, the Trump administration should also appoint a special envoy to coordinate and leverage existing Haiti policies within the various branches, helping to shape a more coherent foreign policy for the island and the broader region.

The severity of Haiti’s ongoing crisis makes envisioning “the day after” a challenge. Yet, for countless Haitians, whether living in Haiti or abroad, this vision is worth fighting for, just as it has been during past periods of turmoil. The United States has a strategic interest in advancing a Haiti policy focused on long-term stability rather than short-term fixes. No single policy or initiative will solve the security, humanitarian, and economic challenges that have engulfed Haiti for the past four years. But failing to act at all would further jeopardize the stability of Haiti, the United States, and the region as a whole.

Camilla Reitherman is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Millennium Leadership Program.

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Özkizilcik in Dirilis Postasi: are the Druze Israel’s new excuse?

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:43:30 +0000

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US peace initiative can help bring Ukraine’s abducted children home

Kristina Hook, Iuliia Hoban — Thu, 06 Mar 2025 21:50:14 +0000

Among the many crimes Russia is accused of committing in Ukraine, few are as shocking as the mass abduction and ideological indoctrination of Ukrainian children. Ukraine has identified around 20,000 children subjected to forced deportations since the full-scale invasion began three years ago, but officials believe the true number of victims may be far higher. These allegations are so grave that the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest in March 2023 on war crimes charges.

Securing the return of Ukraine’s kidnapped children must play a part in the peace efforts recently initiated by US President Donald Trump. Speaking in February, Trump acknowledged that he was aware of the situation and said he could potentially persuade Putin to release the children as part of a negotiated settlement to end the war. “I believe I could, yes,” he told Fox News Radio host Brian Kilmeade.

Efforts to rescue the thousands of Ukrainian children held in Russia would likely receive strong public backing in the United States, including from Trump’s support base. Reverend Jason Charron, who prayed over Trump moments before his near-assassination in Pennsylvania during the 2024 election campaign, recently wrote to the US leader calling on him “to be a shield for the Ukrainian people and for the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children kidnapped by Russia.”

The Kremlin’s illegal deportations have also sparked strong bipartisan condemnation in the US political arena. Less than a year ago, a resolution slamming Russia’s “illegal abductions” as a violation of the United Nations Genocide Convention was passed in the US House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin, with support coming from leading Republicans including Speaker Mike Johnson.

Meanwhile, research backed by the US Department of State has provided grim details of Russia’s deportation operations and linked them directly to Putin. According to a report by Yale’s School of Public Health released in December 2024, Russian presidential aircraft and funds were used in a program to take children from occupied Ukrainian territories, strip them of Ukrainian identity, and place them with Russian families.

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Russia stands accused of instigating a large-scale, coordinated, and systematic policy designed to remove thousands of Ukrainian children from their homes and rob them of their Ukrainian roots via a network of camps and foster homes, where they are subjected to indoctrination and in many cases assigned new Russian names. Kremlin officials have attempted to justify the deportations by claiming to be motivated by wartime safety concerns, yet their actions still constitute violations of international law. Nor has there been any attempt to explain why children are subsequently brainwashed and forced to adopt Russian identities.

The abductions are causing profound harm to the victims, their families, and wider communities. The relatively few children who have so far returned to Ukraine have provided harrowing testimonies of their experience in Russia. Many have recounted being physically and mentally abused for their Ukrainian identity, or told that their family and country had abandoned them.

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Presently, no international legal mechanism exists to facilitate the safe return of abducted Ukrainian children. However, the United States has many cards it can play in order to achieve this goal. US sanctions against Russia are not primarily linked to individual aspects of the invasion. Instead, they are focused on the illegal act of the invasion itself, which is in violation of the United Nations Charter. US negotiators can make it clear to their Kremlin counterparts that without the safe return of all abducted Ukrainian children, the Russian invasion cannot be considered over and sanctions cannot be lifted.

Sanctions could also be used to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to continue the abductions. The United States could follow the example of the British, who imposed targeted sanctions in late 2024 against individuals identified as “perpetrators of Russia’s forced deportation and brainwashing of Ukrainian children.” UK officials described the abductions as “a systematic attempt to erase Ukrainian cultural and national identity.”

By focusing on the distressing plight of the abducted Ukrainian children, Trump could generate much-needed international confidence in his peacemaking efforts. Meanwhile, given his close personal association with the mass abductions, Putin has the ability to stop this policy and order the return of Ukrainian children. With few public signs that Russia is committed to long-term peace, initiatives aimed at identifying victims and ensuring their return to Ukraine could serve as a key US demand to test this willingness.

Before sanctions are even partially lifted, the United States should insist on concrete steps from the Russian side to end the abductions and enable Ukraine to bring all the victims home. It should be made clear that this must be verified by independent monitoring mechanisms. If progress proves possible, this could serve as a first step toward addressing other grave human rights concerns such as the widespread torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians in Russian captivity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Iuliia Hoban, Ph.D. is an expert on children and childhoods in peace and security studies and the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for vulnerable populations.

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Shawn Creamer

GeoStrategy Initiative Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

Security & Defense East Asia

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Zaaimi quoted in World Politics Review on displaced Syrian women

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:40 +0000

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Alkhatib joins TRIGGERnometry to discuss his life story

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:22 +0000

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Damon joins CSIS’ Babel Podcast to discuss the effects of war on children

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:21 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in US News on collective healing for Arab Israels on the Lebanon border

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:42 +0000

Europe Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Ian Brzezinski, Ryan Arick — Thu, 20 Feb 2025 19:56:35 +0000

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Key takeaways

Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties.
While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities.
To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.

Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” So states the NATO Strategic Concept promulgated at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, just four months after Russia’s massive escalation of its invasion of Ukraine.¹ The concept and NATO declarations not only underscore the illegality and brutality of that ongoing attack but also highlight Moscow’s use of nuclear and conventional military aggression, annexation, subversion, sabotage, and other forms of coercion and violence against NATO allies and partners.

Ever since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia’s aggression against the Alliance has steadily intensified. This led NATO leaders at their 2024 Washington Summit to task the development of “recommendations on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, taking into account the changing security environment.”² The Alliance’s “Russia strategy” is due for consideration at NATO’s next summit at The Hague in June 2025.³ This issue brief reviews Moscow’s actions affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and presents the enduring realities, objectives, and actions that should constitute the core of an effective NATO strategy to counter the threat posed by Russia.

Intensified and globalized Russian aggression

Russia’s objectives go far beyond the subordination of Ukraine. Moscow seeks to reassert hegemony and control over the space of the former Soviet Union, diminish the power of the democratic community of nations, and delegitimize the international rules-based order. Moscow aims to subjugate its neighbors and to weaken—if not shatter—NATO, the key impediment to its European ambitions.

Toward these ends and under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia:

Has illegally occupied Moldova’s Transnistria region since the early 1990s.
Invaded Georgia in 2008, has continued to occupy portions of that country, and recently increased its influence, if not control, over the nation’s governance.
Invaded Ukraine in 2014 and significantly escalated this ongoing war in February 2022.
Militarized the Arctic by increasing its military presence in the region, including through reopening Soviet-era bases and building new facilities to buttress Russian territorial claims over Arctic waters.
Leveraged trade and energy embargoes and other forms of economic pressure to intimidate and coerce its European neighbors.
Conducts an escalating campaign of active measures short of war against NATO allies and partners, including information warfare, election interference, sabotage, assassination, weaponized migration, cyberattacks, GPS jamming, and other actions.
Expanded its conventional and nuclear military capabilities, an effort that was part of President Putin’s preparations to invade Ukraine.
Violated, suspended, and abrogated international arms control agreements, including New START Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Open Skies Agreement, and others.⁴

Enduring realities

A NATO strategy to counter Russia’s aggression is long overdue. Its absence cedes to Russia the initiative, leaving the Alliance too often in a reactive, if not indecisive and passive, posture in this relationship. An effective strategy requires recognition of nine enduring realities:

First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a failure of deterrence. The weakness of the Alliance’s response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s failure to respond forcefully to Russia’s months long mobilization of forces along Ukraine’s frontiers in 2021, and NATO’s acquiescence to Putin’s exercise of nuclear coercion emboldened and facilitated Putin’s actions against Ukraine. As a result, the credibility of the Alliance’s commitment to defend resolutely its interests and values has been damaged.

A destroyed Russian tank remains on the side of the road near the frontline town of Kreminna, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Luhansk region, Ukraine March 24, 2023. REUTERS/Violeta Santos Moura

Second, Russia is at war, not just against Ukraine. It is also at war against NATO. The Alliance can no longer approach the relationship as one of competition or confrontation considering the military invasions, active measures, and other forms of violence and coercion Russia has undertaken against NATO allies and partners.⁵ As former US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun has written, “Quite simply, Putin has declared war on the West, but the West does not yet understand we are at war with Russia.”⁶ By failing to recognize this reality, NATO has ceded escalation dominance to Russia as evidenced by its limiting of support to Ukraine and its inaction against repeated Russian aggression and provocations. The Alliance must recognize and act upon the reality that Moscow has pushed the NATO-Russia relationship into the state of war.

Third, NATO faces long-term conflict with Russia. Putin cannot be expected to abandon his ambitions, even if defeated in Ukraine. Ever since Putin’s speech before the February 2007 Munich Security Conference in which he railed against the international order and NATO’s expanding membership, Russia’s campaign to subjugate its neighbors and to intimidate, divide, and weaken the Alliance has been unceasing and relentless. Nor can the Alliance assume that Putin’s successor will significantly diverge from the objectives and policies that drive Russia’s actions today. Peaceful coexistence with Russia is not attainable in the short to medium term and will be difficult to attain in the long term.

Quite simply, Putin has declared war on the West, but the West does not yet understand we are at war with Russia.

—Stephen Biegun, former US Deputy Secretary of State

Fourth, Russia will continue efforts to increase the size and capability of its armed forces. While Russian land forces have suffered significant losses in its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has reconstituted that force faster than expected. Russia’s land forces were estimated to be 15 percent larger in April 2024 than when Russia attacked Kyiv in February 2022.⁷ Earlier this year, Russia announced new ambitious plans to restructure and expand its ground forces to 1.5 million active personnel.⁸ Moreover, the Russian air force and navy have not been significantly degraded by the war against Ukraine. Russia’s air force has only lost some 10 percent of its aircraft. While Russian naval ships have been destroyed in the Black Sea, Russian naval activity worldwide has increased.⁹ Similarly, Russian nuclear forces have been unaffected by the conflict in Ukraine. Russia retains the world’s largest arsenal of deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons and continues to develop new models of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, nuclear-powered subsurface drones, antisatellite weapons, and orbital space weapons.¹⁰ With some 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) being directed to its military, Moscow is investing to increase its defense-industrial and research and development capacities.¹¹ Russia’s industrial base produces more ammunition than that produced by all NATO members and is fielding new high-tech weapons systems, such as the nuclear-capable multiple warhead IRBM Oreshnik Russia, which was demonstrated in combat against Ukraine last November.¹² In April 2024, NATO SACEUR General Christopher Cavoli testified to the US Congress that:

“Russia is on track to command the largest military on the continent and a defense industrial complex capable of generating substantial amounts of ammunition and material in support of large-scale combat operations. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal and angrier with the West than when it invaded.”¹³

Fifth, Moscow’s aggressive actions short of war will continue and escalate. Putin has yet to face a response from the Alliance that will dissuade him from further exercising information warfare, cyber warfare, energy and trade embargoes, assassination, GPS jamming, sabotage, fomenting separatist movements, and other forms of hybrid warfare. These actions are intended to intimidate governments; weaken the credibility of the Alliance’s security guarantee; create and exacerbate internal divisions; and divide allies, among other objectives. Left unchecked, they threaten to undermine the Alliance’s ability to attain consensus necessary to take decisive action against Russia.

Sixth, Moscow’s exercise of nuclear coercion will continue as a key element of Russia’s strategy and should be expected to intensify. Threats of nuclear warfare are a key element of Putin’s strategy to preclude NATO and its members from providing Ukraine support that would enable it to decisively defeat Russia’s invasion. This repeated exercise of nuclear coercion includes verbal threats from President Putin and other senior Russian officials; the launching of nuclear capable ICBMs; the use of a nuclear capable IRBM against Ukraine, the first use of such a system in a conflict; nuclear weapons exercises; and the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, according to both Russia and Belarus.¹⁴ NATO allies have repeatedly rewarded this coercion by expressing fear of nuclear war; declaring that NATO forces will not enter Ukraine; restricting NATO’s role in assisting Ukraine; limiting the flow of weapons to Ukraine; and restricting their use against legitimate military targets in Russia. Rewarding nuclear coercion encourages its repeated exercise and escalation. It risks leading Russia to conclude it has attained escalation dominance. A key challenge for NATO going forward will be to demonstrate that Russia’s threats of nuclear strikes are counterproductive, and the Alliance cannot be deterred by nuclear coercion.

NATO leaders stand together for a photo at NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington in July 2024. REUTERS/Yves Herman

Seventh, Moscow is conducting a global campaign of aggression to weaken the democratic community of nations and the rules-based international order. Over the last two decades, Russia has exercised its military, informational, and economic assets to generate anti-Western sentiment across the globe, including in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. This has included military support to authoritarian, anti-Western regimes well beyond Europe, including Venezuela, Syria, and Mali. The most concerning element of Russia’s global campaign is the partnerships it has operationalized with China, Iran, and North Korea. Russia’s “no limits partnership” with China enables Putin to mitigate the impacts of Western sanctions on his war economy. Both Iran and North Korea have provided Russia with weapons and ammunition, and North Korean soldiers have joined Russia’s fight against Ukraine. In return, Russia has supplied missile and nuclear technologies, oil and gas, and economic support to these nations that enables them to stoke violence across the Middle East, threaten the Korean Peninsula, and drive forward Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Eighth, an effective Russia strategy will require a coordinated leveraging of all the instruments of power available through the Alliance, its member states, and its key partners, including the European Union. This includes the application of diplomatic, economic, ideological, informational, and other elements of power—none of which are the Alliance’s primary capacity, military power—that can be marshaled through its members states and multinational institutions, such as the European Union, where the Alliance and its member states have influence and authority.

Ninth, NATO significantly overmatches Russia in military and economic power.
NATO Headquarters estimates the combined GDP of Alliance member states to be $54 trillion, more than twenty-five times Russia’s estimated GDP of more than $2 trillion.¹⁵ The combined defense budget of NATO members amounts to approximately $1.5 trillion,¹⁶ more than ten times that of Russia’s publicly projected defense budget of $128 billion for 2025.¹⁷ This imbalance of power favoring the Alliance will be enduring and makes the execution of an effective Russia strategy not a matter of capacity, but one of strategic vision and political will.

Core objectives

To counter the direct and significant threat posed by Moscow, a NATO strategy for Russia should be structured around four core objectives:¹⁸

Defeat Russia in Ukraine: NATO must defeat Russia’s war against Ukraine. This is its most urgent priority. Failure to do so—and failure includes the conflict’s perpetuation—increases the risk of a wider war in Europe and will encourage other adversaries around the world to pursue their revisionist and hegemonic ambitions. Russia’s decisive defeat in Ukraine is essential to return stability to Europe and to reinforce the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrent posture.
Deter aggression by Russia: A key Alliance priority must be the effective deterrence of Russia aggression against the Alliance. A robust conventional and nuclear posture that deters Russian military aggression is far less costly than an active war. Deterrence must also be more effectively exercised against Russia’s actions short of war. Failure to deter aggression in this domain can undermine confidence in the Alliance and increase the risk of war.
Contain Russia’s influence and control: The Alliance must actively contain Russia’s efforts to assert influence and control beyond its borders. The Alliance must assist Europe’s non-NATO neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia to strengthen their defenses and resilience to Russian pressure. NATO and NATO allies should also work to counter and roll back Russia’s influence and engagement around the globe.
Degrade Russia’s capabilities and determination: A core objective for the Alliance should include weakening Russia’s capacity and will to pursue its hegemonic ambitions. Denying Russia access to international markets would further degrade its economy, including its defense-industrial capacity. Active engagement of the Russian public and other key stakeholders should aim to generate opposition to Putin and the Kremlin’s international aggression.

Achievement of these objectives would compel the Kremlin to conclude that its revanchist ambitions, including the diminishment or destruction of NATO, are unachievable and self-damaging. It would diminish Russia’s will and ability to continue aggression in Europe and weaken the impact of Russia’s partnerships, including with China, Iran, and North Korea. In addition, achieving these objectives would return a modicum of stability to Europe that in the long-term would enhance the prospects for NATO’s peaceful coexistence with Russia.

Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal, and angrier with the West than when it invaded.

—Gen. Christopher Cavoli, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Recommended actions

A NATO strategy to defeat, deter, contain, and degrade Russian aggression and influence should effectuate the following actions by the Alliance, its member states, and partners:

Defeat Russia in Ukraine and accelerate Ukraine’s accession into the NATO alliance Defeating Russian aggression against Ukraine requires its own strategy, which should feature five key elements: adopting Ukraine’s war objectives, including total territorial reconstitution (i.e., the Alliance must never recognize Russian sovereignty over the territories it illegally seized from Ukraine); maximizing the flow of military equipment and supplies to Ukraine, free of restrictions on their use against legitimate military targets in Russia; imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia; deploying aggressive information operations to generate opposition in Russia against Putin’s aggression; and presenting a clear, accelerated path for Ukraine to NATO membership. NATO membership, and the security guarantee it provides, would add real risk and complexity to Russian military planning. NATO membership for Ukraine is the only way to convince the Kremlin that Ukraine cannot be subject to Russian hegemony and would provide security conditions needed for Ukraine’s rapid reconstruction and economic integration into Europe.
Fulfill and operationalize NATO’s regional defense plans. To establish a credible and effective deterrent against Russian military aggression, NATO allies must:
- Build and deploy the requisite national forces. Military plans are no more than visions in the absence of required capabilities. NATO’s European and Canadian allies need to generate more forces, with requisite firepower, mobility, and enabling capacities. In short, given European allies’ obligations under NATO’s new regional defense plans, they must act with urgency.
- Strengthen transatlantic defense industrial capacity. High intensity warfare, as seen in Ukraine, consumes massive amounts of weapons stocks, much of which have to be in a near constant state of modernization to match the technological adaptations of the adversary. Today, the Alliance has struggled (and often failed) to match the defense-industrial capacity of Russia and its partners. NATO’s defense industrial base must expand its production capacities and its ability to rapidly develop, update, and field weapons systems.
- Increase allied defense spending to the equivalent of 5 percent of GDP. To facilitate the aforementioned requirements and to address emerging challenges beyond Europe that could simultaneously challenge the transatlantic community, NATO allies need to increase the agreed floor of defense spending from 2 percent to 5 percent and fulfill that new commitment with immediacy. NATO members cannot allow themselves to be forced to choose between defending against Russia and another geopolitical challenge beyond Europe.

Terminate the NATO Russia Founding Act (NRFA). Russia has repeatedly and blatantly violated the principles and commitments laid out in the Founding Act. Russia’s actions include having invaded Ukraine both in 2014 and in 2022, using nuclear coercion and escalatory rhetoric to pressue the Alliance, and deploying nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, as both Russia and Belarus have affirmed. Consequently, NATO should formally render the NRFA defunct, including the Alliance’s commitments to:
- Adhere to the “three nuclear no’s” that NATO member states “have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.”¹⁹
- Abstain from permanently stationing “substantial combat forces” in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁰

Update NATO’s nuclear force posture. In response to Russia’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal, exercise of nuclear coercion, and adjustments to its nuclear strategy that lowers the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons, the Alliance must update its own nuclear posture. The objectives should be to provide NATO with a broader and more credible spectrum of nuclear weapons options. An updated force posture would improve NATO’s ability to manage, if not dominate, the ladder of conflict escalation, complicate Russian military planning, and thereby weaken Moscow’s confidence in its own military posture and its strategy of nuclear “escalation to de escalate.” Toward these ends, the Alliance should:
- Increase the spectrum of NATO’s nuclear capabilities. This should include a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and a ground-launched variant. The breadth and number of NATO nuclear weapons exercises, such as the yearly Steadfast Noon, should be expanded and further integrated with exercises of conventional forces.
- Expand the number of members participating in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing agreements. Doing so will expand the tactical options available to NATO and underscore more forcefully Alliance unity behind its nuclear posture.
- Broaden the number and locations of infrastructure capable of hosting the Alliance’s nuclear posture. The Alliance’s nuclear posture still relies solely on Cold War legacy infrastructure in Western Europe. Given the threat posed by Russia, NATO should establish facilities capable of handling nuclear weapons and dual capable systems, including nuclear weapons storage sites, in NATO member states along its eastern frontier.

Reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. Russia’s assault on Ukraine and its growing provocations against NATO member states and partners underscore the need to further reinforce the Alliance’s eastern frontier. To date, NATO’s deployments along its eastern flank amount to more of a trip-wire force rather than one designed for a strategy of defense by denial. To give greater credibility to the Alliance’s pledge not to “cede one inch” when considering a potential attack by Russia, NATO should:
- Establish a more robust permanent military presence along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. NATO is expanding its eight multinational battlegroups deployed to Central and Eastern Europe. But each of these deployments should be further upgraded to full brigades that are permanently stationed there. These elements should feature robust enabling capacities, particularly air and missile defenses and long-range fires. If the United States is expected to sustain a presence of 100,000 troops in Europe, the least Western Europe and Canada can do is to forward station some 32,000 troops combined in Central and Eastern Europe.
- Conduct large-scale, concentrated exercises on NATO’s eastern flank. The Alliance has commendably reanimated its emphasis on large-scale joint military exercises. However, those exercises have yet to be concentrated on NATO’s eastern flank. Doing so would enhance readiness, reassure the Alliance’s Central and Eastern European member states, and demonstrate resolve and preparedness in the face of Russian aggression.
- Upgrade the Alliance’s air defense and ballistic missile defense systems to more robustly address Russian threats. In its attacks on Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated with brutality its emphasis on missile and long-range drone strikes against military and civilian targets. As part of its efforts to upgrade its air and missile defense capacities, NATO should direct the European Phased Adaptive Approach to address threats from Russia.²¹

A Grad-P Partizan single rocket launcher is fired towards Russian troops by servicemen of the 110th Territorial Defence Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, on a frontline in Zaporizhzhia region, Ukraine January 21, 2025. REUTERS/Stringer

Expand the NATO SACEUR’s authority to order deployments and conduct operations along NATO’s eastern frontier. The Alliance’s regional defense plans are said to provide SACEUR with greater authority to activate and deploy NATO forces before crisis and conflict situations. Due to the aggressiveness of Russia’s ambitions, NATO should consider further expanding those authorities as they relate to the deployment and missions of forces along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. The actions of a deterrent force can be even more important than the magnitude of their presence.
Augment the Alliance’s posture in the Arctic. Russia has heavily militarized the Arctic, upgraded the status and capability of its Northern Fleet, and deepened its military cooperation with China in the region while the Kremlin continues to assert Arctic territorial claims that conflict with those of NATO allies. While NATO has been increasing the tempo of its Arctic operations and improving its Arctic capabilities, Russia continues to pose a significant threat in the region and possibly outmatches the Alliance in the High North. To further reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression in the Arctic, the Alliance should:
- Develop a comprehensive NATO strategy to defend its interests in the High North. Such a document would underscore the Alliance’s commitment to the region and help foster allied investments in infrastructure, capabilities, and training needed to defend and deter Russian threats in the High North.
- Establish a NATO Arctic Command and Joint Force. The Arctic poses a unique set of geographic and climatic challenges requiring tailored operational capabilities. A command and air-ground-naval force focused specifically on the High North would provide the Alliance a dedicated and tailored deterrent to counter Russian aggression in the Arctic.²²

Bolster deterrence against Russian actions short of war by strengthening resilience and through more assertive and punitive counteractions. NATO and NATO member states’ failure to respond robustly to Russia’s hybrid warfare—whether it is information warfare, cyberattacks, sabotage, assassinations, or other forms of aggression — has resulted in Russia’s intensification and escalation of these actions. The transatlantic community must strengthen its resilience against such attacks but also take stronger punitive measures against Russia if it is to persuade Russia to cease these attacks. While much of what needs to be done falls beyond the remit of NATO’s military capabilities, greater consideration should be given to how military assets can be leveraged to gather intelligence about Russian activity and provide a military dimension to the transatlantic community’s response to such provocations. For example, when a Russian ship fired a warning shot directed at a commercial Norwegian fishing boat within Norway’s exclusive economic zone or when Russia pulled out Estonian navigation buoys from the Narva River,²³ an immediate show of force from NATO could have been an appropriate response.
Strengthen the deterrence and resilience capacities of non-NATO nations in Europe and Russia’s periphery. Recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania reflect the intensity of Russia’s determination to claw back control and influence over the space of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. A key priority of a Russia strategy should be to strengthen efforts by the Alliance, its member states, and key institutional partners, such as the European Union, to reinforce the resilience and defense capabilities of non-NATO nations in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. NATO’s programs, such as the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, warrant even greater emphasis and resources, particularly in those regions.
Intensify Russia’s economic and diplomatic isolation. The current set of measures taken against Moscow in these realms have failed to sufficiently degrade Russia’s war economy and its ability to sustain its invasion of Ukraine and provocations elsewhere in the world. A key priority for NATO and its member states should be to significantly escalate economic sanctions, including the exercise of secondary sanctions to eliminate Moscow’s ability to generate international revenue from energy exports and attain critical technologies needed by its defense industrial sector.
Increase efforts to generate internal Russian opposition to the Kremlin’s revanchist objectives and greater support for democratic principles and governance. Russia has undertaken aggressive campaigns to influence the politics of NATO allies and partners. In the recent elections of Moldova and Romania, Russian intervention nearly effectuated regime change. For too long, the transatlantic community has remained on the defensive in this realm. NATO and its member states need to shift to the offensive and weaponize the power of truth to illuminate the brutal realities of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the corruption of Russian officials, and other realties of Russian governance. NATO allies must more actively support Russian stakeholders—particularly civil society—that are more aligned with transatlantic values. This is critical to degrading the political will of the Russian state to continue its aggressions.
Modulate dialogue with Russia, limiting it to what is operationally necessary. The Alliance should formally disband the NATO-Russia Council—which last met in 2022—until Moscow has demonstrated genuine commitment to a constructive relationship. Nonetheless, the Alliance should establish and/or maintain lines of communication between the NATO secretary general and the Kremlin, as well as between Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Russian General Staff, to enable crisis management and provide transparency needed for military stability. This would not preclude NATO allies from dialogues with Russia deemed necessary, for example, to assist Ukraine or pursue arms control measures.

The bottom line

As noted, NATO possesses an overmatching capacity to defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. Today, there is no better time to achieve these objectives by fully marshaling the Alliance’s assets and potential. Moscow cannot undertake an all-out military attack on NATO without risking the viability of Russia’s armed forces and thus its regime. The accomplishment of these objectives would provide stability to Europe’s eastern frontier and establish the best foundation for an eventual relationship with Moscow that is minimally confrontational, if not cooperative and constructive. However, this will take political will and resources. Russia today is determined to prevail in Ukraine, expand its military capabilities, and further leverage its partners, particularly China, Iran, and North Korea, to defeat the community of democracies and, particularly, the Alliance. Russia already envisions itself as being at war with NATO.

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Ian Brzezinski

Senior Fellow

Central Europe Defense Policy

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Ryan Arick

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

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Abolishing FEMA would hurt all Americans—particularly Trump voters

Thomas S. Warrick — Fri, 31 Jan 2025 19:21:51 +0000

On January 24, while traveling between hurricane cleanup in North Carolina and fire recovery in California, US President Donald Trump announced that he would sign an executive order to study abolishing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The agency’s main mission is to provide disaster recovery grants and other assistance vital to states, cities, and individuals recovering from hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, wildfires, earthquakes, and other natural and man-made disasters. A potential alternative, Trump said, was leaving disaster recovery up to the states, with the federal government giving states money but nothing else after a disaster occurs.

Eliminating FEMA would be a disaster, as it would surely lead to greater suffering and higher costs after disasters. In a cruel irony, moreover, abolishing FEMA would likely hurt the worst in states that supported Trump, especially Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and the Carolinas. These states went for Trump in the 2024 election and will be important politically in the 2026 midterms.

Most recent FEMA funds have gone to states that went for Trump in 2024

Size reflects total FEMA disaster grants Oct. 1, 2015 through Jan. 8, 2025; colors reflect the 2024 presidential election results.

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Disaster Dollar database. Graphic by the author, with acknowledgement to the Guardian newspaper (UK) for the concept. Grants shown include only FEMA’s Individual and Households Program and Public Assistance Program grants, not other FEMA programs. • Get the data • Created with Datawrapper

Instead of abolishing FEMA, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security and includes other missions besides disaster recovery, Trump should seek to fix the agency’s problems, make it more efficient, and change its focus to include strategic resilience—that is, saving lives and reducing property damage before disasters strike.

While FEMA does serve to get disaster relief money to the states, it does five important things that states need after a disaster and that virtually every state—but especially some red states—would have to budget for, at considerable ongoing expense, if FEMA no longer existed. Emergency management requires training and experience—it is no longer a game for amateurs.

First, FEMA has specialized experience in disaster response and recovery. It deploys hundreds of experts to states where disasters occur. If FEMA were abolished, states would have to hire and train their own experts at considerable cost to state budgets—or do without.

Second, FEMA maintains stockpiles of essential commodities needed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, which states would have to replicate or do without after a disaster.

Third, when the response to a disaster moves into the recovery phase, FEMA has special expertise in rebuilding infrastructure—expertise that states would have to replace.

Fourth, FEMA is better able than individual states to pull in expertise from other parts of the federal government to restore water treatment facilities, rebuild schools, and do the other necessary recovery work when a community gets devastated.

Fifth, at all phases of response and recovery, FEMA has the capacity to administer individual grants and account for them afterward—specialized expertise that states would have to replicate on their own if FEMA did not exist.

Additionally, and precisely because of its knowledge in response and recovery, FEMA also has more accumulated experience in how to prevent damage from disasters, and how to reduce the cost and time of recovery when disasters do occur. This expertise in resilience needs to be tapped to better save lives and reduce the cost of future disasters. This goes to the heart of what strategic resilience is all about.

Disasters can strike anywhere—but some places get hit worse

It is undeniable that disasters are getting more costly to communities. In the past six months alone, hurricanes Helene and Milton and wildfires in southern California have killed at least one hundred Americans and caused more than $100 billion in damage to homes and businesses. While hurricanes and wildfires vary in number and magnitude, they happen every year somewhere in the United States. Earthquakes and pandemics are less frequent, but whether tomorrow or years from now, they will happen. One lesson from the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of Trump’s first term is that better preparedness could have saved many more lives and helped keep the US economy going.

But the cost of disasters is not spread evenly across the country. As the map above shows, it is striking which states benefit from FEMA’s disaster grants. Of the $45.3 billion in FEMA disaster grants from October 1, 2015, through January 8, 2025 (this excludes grants to Puerto Rico and other territories), 82.8 percent went to states that Trump won in the 2024 election. The majority of FEMA disaster aid went to red states in the southeast, with the largest beneficiary being Trump’s home state of Florida, which received more than thirteen billion dollars.

Republicans who recently called for conditions on disaster assistance to California do so at their own political risk—and grave financial risk to the people they represent. In principle, disaster assistance is supposed to come fast and does not have policy conditions. In reality, it often depends on the US Congress passing a supplemental appropriation. Imposing conditions will likely have even worse consequences on Republican-led states such as Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and South Carolina, where Democrats in the future could seek payback by conditioning hurricane disaster relief on a range of policy changes from climate change to abortion policy. California may not have another wildfire season like the one this month for several years, but hurricane damage on the Gulf Coast or the southeast this or next year is a near-certainty. If Congress imposes conditions on disaster assistance, Republicans could have far more to lose in the future than Democrats.

Republicans are therefore right that there are a wealth of policy changes and investments needed in California. The same is true about Florida, Louisiana, Texas, the Carolinas, the Gulf Coast, and the Midwest. But conditioning disaster assistance on policy changes is bad for everyone. The need to approach these changes in a constructive, not confrontational, way should be one aspect of a Trump-commissioned study of what the United States needs from strategic resilience.

A bad deal for all states—red, blue, and purple

Trump’s suggestion to replace FEMA with a cash grant to states after a disaster misses the full extent of what FEMA does. The agency does give out grants to pay for rebuilding after widespread destruction from hurricanes, wildfires, floods, and tornadoes. While FEMA’s employees are not first responders—state and local governments are responsible for first response—the agency has thousands of people it can deploy who are experts in disaster response and recovery, rebuilding infrastructure, and grants management. FEMA also maintains stockpiles of emergency supplies and equipment, such as generators, and can marshal other parts of the federal government to do the essential but unglamorous work of rebuilding after a major disaster.

In contrast, when states were left to themselves during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, the result was chaos. The governor of Maryland, for example, bought 500,000 test kits from South Korea and then used the Maryland National Guard to keep them away from the federal government. Under Trump’s approach, states would likely end up bidding for scarce expertise and emergency supplies. This, too, could end up hurting a high number of Trump’s supporters, since blue states on average have larger state budgets per capita than red states and have a higher gross domestic product per capita, too.

Democratic-leaning states could have an advantage in a potential bidding war for emergency supplies

As a result, red states may lose out in bidding wars to blue states under such an approach.

One important but unstated role FEMA plays is that it allows states (red and blue) to have smaller governments than those states would need if they had to prepare for emergencies on their own. Leaving disaster assistance up to the states would mean that each state would need to replace a lot of what FEMA does with its own personnel—or let its people suffer catastrophic losses after a disaster. Hiring a national cadre of emergency response professionals that can be deployed to states where disasters occur is far more cost-effective than every state having to hire and train its own people.

Three areas for reform

The professionals at FEMA and state-level emergency managers will be the first to tell you there are more efficient ways to save lives and reduce property damage. In March 2024, the Atlantic Council hosted one such event with these professionals, and it has been exploring this issue through the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative. Trump should invite in FEMA regional leaders and state emergency managers and listen to their ideas. Many of their ideas will likely center around three key themes:

1. Congress and state legislatures, not emergency managers, are the major reason there is so much bureaucracy and inefficiency in disaster response.

FEMA spent nearly half its disaster budget eight days into this fiscal year because of hurricanes Helene and Milton. This is in part because of how disaster response is funded. State legislatures, especially in red states, have habitually underfunded emergency response and recovery. Getting a check afterward from the federal government will not make up for a shortage of expertise in the hours, days, weeks, and months after a community is devastated by a hurricane, wildfire, or tornado.

2. There is a coming insurance crisis caused by ever-increasing damage from hurricanes, floods, and wildfires.

Already, insurance rates in Florida and other Gulf states have skyrocketed, and California’s already horrible insurance situation is about to become desperate. Homeowners must have insurance, or they cannot get a federally insured mortgage to buy a house. Businesses need to have insurance to be able to stay in business, and if they can’t stay in business and don’t have insurance, unemployment skyrockets.

Two Category 5 hurricanes hitting Florida or a Gulf state in a single season or another catastrophic California wildfire season next winter could put the economies of those states, and perhaps the country, into recession. Americans living elsewhere should not be smug: they will get hit by the bills if Congress has to appropriate hundreds of billions of dollars in emergency aid. The resulting economic catastrophe would cause a terrible human toll by ruining the lives of millions of Americans—many of them in red states.

3. There is a lot that can be done by focusing on strategic resilience to save lives and reduce property damage.

A 2018 study by the National Institute of Building Sciences found that every one dollar in disaster mitigation by FEMA and a program at the Department of Housing and Urban Development saved the US taxpayer six dollars in economic losses through such measures as rebuilding damaged houses on elevated foundations to reduce damage from future storm surges. In specific areas like river flooding, the payoff was even higher. While these estimates are now seven years old, and some initial investments were made during the Biden administration, federal and state emergency managers across the United States have some excellent ideas for cost-effective ways to reduce future losses. But this requires keeping FEMA, incorporating strategic resilience into its mission, and giving the agency the authority to work with states, local governments, and the private sector to do more to protect lives and reduce property damage.

As Trump’s administration looks more into this critical issue, Trump should invite federal, regional, and state emergency managers to Washington and figure out how to improve national disaster response. Trump should not make it worse by abolishing FEMA, which would cause disproportionate harm to many of the people who voted him into office.

Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

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The US retreat on climate comes with steep costs for the economy and the American people

Jorge Gastelumendi — Tue, 21 Jan 2025 23:34:51 +0000

On its first day in office, the Trump administration has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on climate change. The United States’ repeated withdrawal (President Donald Trump withdrew in his first term, then President Joe Biden rejoined) will not halt the global efforts to meet the 2015 Paris goals to limit global temperature rise. The climate crisis has moved far beyond the capacity for the United States to solve it unilaterally. Nevertheless, this decision will make progress more challenging and implementation more tenuous since the United States is one of the largest emitters.

While the withdrawal is an important global signal and will make efforts to combat climate change more difficult, the new administration’s de-prioritization of climate action will have immediate and concrete consequences for Americans themselves. The country will bear a heavier burden of inaction as well as the losses of delayed national investment in adaptation and resilience if Trump succeeds in fully repealing the Biden administration’s climate investments.

This month provided a stark example of that opportunity cost. The Los Angeles wildfires killed twenty-seven people and burned through over 12,000 structures. The loss is visible and immediate. Notably, the true cost is still being calculated. Analysts are projecting economic losses of as much as $150 billion and anticipate more deaths as the ramifications of degraded air quality and smoke take full effect.

The deeper concern is that this withdrawal, coupled with Trump’s other executive orders to facilitate the fossil fuel industry and backtrack on climate investments, will have significant impacts on the American public, since increasing greenhouse gas emissions has a direct effect on increasing the frequency and intensity of natural disasters.

Hence, if in addition to these decisions, the Trump administration opts out of actively investing in disaster preparedness, its economic and financial losses will rise exponentially. In fact, it is estimated that each dollar spent on disaster preparedness and climate adaptation saves twelve dollars in recovery and response. Without climate-related action and resilience-building efforts, it will fall to the American taxpayer to cover that additional eleven dollars.

The United States is stepping back on climate at a critical moment for action. The public and private sectors need to be taking this moment to coordinate and align. But instead, the new administration is signaling, at least initially, a lack of political will that could set the country back both in terms of individual preparedness and long-term economic opportunity.

Other countries are seizing the economic opportunities of climate adaptation and resilience. Germany is set to invest at least €1.6 billion in artificial intelligence, including for climate efforts, by 2025; Japan has committed to doubling adaptation finance to $14.8 billion by 2025; and countries such as Uruguay, Denmark, and Lithuania are recognized for having scaled up the share of solar and wind energy in their electricity mix by at least 6 percentage points annually over a five-year span.

Trump’s recent executive orders mark not only a lack of commitment to climate action but also a backtracking on notable climate investments under the Biden administration. The private sector will likely no longer have the government’s support in fast-tracking adaptation initiatives. As other countries scale up incentives, this will make it more difficult for the United States to hold any competitive advantage in the long term.

In the short-term, however, it’s lives and livelihoods that are at risk. Without mitigation and adaptation, climate change is set to kill 3.4 million people each year by the end of the century. While the United States’ retreat from climate leadership has significant geopolitical implications, the more pressing concern is on the national impacts. Americans will face the consequences of inaction. They will have lower capacity to overcome climate shocks and stresses, putting their own health, finances, and well-being on the line. In fact, our Climate Resilience Center estimated that heat-related labor-productivity losses could cost half a trillion dollars annually by 2050 in the United States alone. Ignoring or denying the reality of climate change will not avoid its impacts.

Indeed, the world will feel the loss of US leadership under the Trump administration. Progress can—and must—continue, but the average American will feel the weight of these decisions on a personal, financial, and social level for years to come. Although Trump has made his climate stance clear in his first few hours back in the White House, there is time for his administration and the president himself to reassess and reinvest in a new way forward.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He previously served as chief advisor and negotiator to the government of Peru during the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

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Why Finland thinks Finlandization is a bad idea for Ukraine

Minna Ålander — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:38:02 +0000

As expectations mount over the prospect of fresh peace talks in 2025 to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, the idea of Ukraine’s possible Finlandization has once again resurfaced. Finnish officials have been quick to reject such suggestions, warning that forcing neutrality on Ukraine “will not bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis with Russia.”

The mood of skepticism in Helsinki is understandable. While there are some superficial similarities between the position Ukraine currently finds itself in and Finland’s predicament during the Cold War, any attempt to emulate the Finlandization policies of an earlier era would be disastrous for Ukraine.

Despite spending much of the past twenty years since the 2004 Orange Revolution pursuing Euro-Atlantic integration, Ukraine is still often incorrectly portrayed as a country occupying a geopolitical buffer zone between East and West. This is familiar to Finns, whose own country was condemned to similar geopolitical limbo during the Cold War.

Finland successfully defended its sovereignty during World War II and was not forced to become a Soviet republic. However, this was followed by the 1948 Friendship Treaty between Finland and the USSR, which established the framework for what has since come to be known as Finlandization.

For more than four decades, Finlandization served as a survival strategy for Finnish independence. In practice, this meant voluntarily taking the interests of the neighboring Soviet Union into account, both in terms of foreign and domestic policy. This approach enabled the Finns to avoid the experience of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, but the costs were nevertheless considerable. Indeed, Finlandization went far beyond mere neutrality and negatively impacted Finland for almost half a century.

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The postwar treaty that served as the basis for Finlandization stipulated that Finnish defense policy should focus exclusively on defending the country against possible attack from the west, despite the fact that a renewed Soviet invasion from the east was clearly far more likely. As a result, Finnish officials had to exercise extreme caution when addressing the security of the country’s eastern border.

Finland was also de facto obliged to seek Moscow’s consent before embarking on any efforts to increase political or economic cooperation with the West. This prevented Helsinki from participating in the initial stages of European integration. Instead, Finland was limited to membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This was viewed by the Kremlin as being sufficiently apolitical, as long as it did not disrupt the so-called “eastern trade” with the USSR as a result.

Domestically, Finlandization meant a series of restrictions and compromises on core democratic standards. Self-censorship was imposed throughout the Finnish media and information space in order to avoid any open criticism of the USSR. Finns also accepted more than two decades without any changes in the country’s leadership, as Finnish President Urho Kekkonen was regarded as an irreplaceable figure for continued good relations with Moscow. In light of these realities, it is easy to understand why the term “Finlandization” is regarded as derogatory by many Finns, who see it as a reminder of an era remembered with bitterness.

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There are also solid geographical reasons why Finlandization is not a good fit for the modern Ukrainian context. Finland’s status during the Cold War was intertwined with the broader security climate across the Nordic region. Neighboring Sweden remained neutral in part due to the “Finnish question,” with Stockholm concerned that joining NATO would leave their Finnish neighbors in jeopardy as the lone buffer state. This could potentially have created the conditions for the Soviet Union to make another attempt at occupying Finland.

Until the end of the Cold War era, Swedish policies of neutrality and Norway’s self-imposed restrictions on the presence of NATO troops or nuclear weapons on their territory were directly linked to the fate of Finland. This Nordic balancing act created an environment where the USSR was incentivized to maintain the status quo rather than risk an escalation in regional tensions if it increased pressure on Finland. This very specific set of circumstances does not apply to Ukraine. Instead, enforced neutrality would leave Ukraine highly vulnerable to further Russian aggression.

The Finlandization of Ukraine would not guarantee Ukraine’s survival as it once safeguarded Finnish independence. Today’s Ukraine cannot be expected to accept any restrictions on its ability to guard its borders, form alliances, or defend itself against Russian aggression. Likewise, any attempt to impose the kind of domestic political compromises that were part of the Finnish model during the Cold War could prove fatal for Ukraine’s democracy and European aspirations.

Anyone who is genuinely interested in finding the right formula for Ukraine should look beyond the Cold War period and focus instead on Finland’s experience since 1991. During the past three decades, Finnish integration into the Western world has demonstrated that geopolitical perceptions can change over time. Finland has proved conclusively that geography alone does not determine a country’s fate.

Finland has now joined both the European Union and NATO, and is firmly anchored within the core institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community. This is the kind of Finnish model that could actually work for postwar Ukraine. As Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo commented in November, “Finland is a member of NATO and the EU. We support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s aggression. This is the model the Ukrainians are fighting for.”

Minna Ålander is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Recruitment efforts have been conducted at Russian immigration detention centers holding migrant workers mainly from Central Asian countries. An October 2024 report by RFE/RL claimed that Russian officials have made prison conditions unbearably harsh and inhumane in an effort to pressure inmates into joining the military. “They keep you in a cold cell, you sleep on the floor with just a pillow underneath you holding plastic bottles filled with hot water to keep warm,” according to one Kyrgyz inmate.

While many foreign fighters have reported being pressured or misled by Russian recruiters, others are enticed by the promise of relatively high salaries and the prospect of a Russian passport. As of November 2024, Russia had granted citizenship to more than 3,000 foreigners in exchange for military service.

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The issue of foreign troops fighting for Russia has hit the headlines in recent weeks following news that North Korea has sent approximately ten thousand soldiers to join the invasion of Ukraine. Many see this as a watershed moment in the war, due to the number of troops involved and the official nature of the deployment. Given the vast size of the North Korean armed forces, there is clearly considerable scope for Pyongyang to send many more men.

Moscow’s enthusiasm for foreign fighters is easy to understand. As the war grinds on and approaches the three-year mark, Russia appears to be facing mounting manpower challenges. While the Kremlin does not release official information on the scale of its losses in Ukraine, most estimates indicate hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed or seriously wounded during the invasion. According to the UK Ministry of Defense, November 2024 was the deadliest month of the war so far, with Russia suffering more than 45,000 casualties.

The grim prospects for Russian troops in Ukraine are making it harder to attract volunteers. In response, the Russian authorities have recently begun offering greater financial incentives for new recruits as well as generous compensation for the families of those killed in action.

Despite these efforts, there are indications that the Russian military is now dangerously overextended. When Ukraine launched a surprise cross-border incursion into Kursk Oblast in summer 2024, Russia initially had to rely on an improvised defense made up largely of young conscripts, many of whom were taken prisoner. More recently, Russia’s inability to save its Syrian client Bashar Assad underlined Moscow’s lack of reserves.

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With his own army fully committed in Ukraine and experiencing heavy losses, Putin is running out of options as he seeks to shield Russians from the consequences of his invasion. For much of the war, the Kremlin has focused its domestic recruitment efforts on lower income and ethnic minority regions of Russia, while also enlisting large numbers of prisoners. Such tactics avoided touching more prosperous regions to prevent protests or rallies. However, these sources of manpower are not infinite.

Putin remains determined to avoid a repeat of his September 2022 mobilization order, which proved highly unpopular and led to an exodus from Russia as hundreds of thousands fled military service. With the supply of prisoners drying up and fewer Russians prepared to volunteer for a war that many see as a meat grinder, his best option may now be to seek increasing numbers of foreign troops.

The implications of foreign soldiers fighting in Russia’s invasion extend far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. Growing collaboration between the Houthis and Russia has raised alarm bells in recent weeks, with the US Special Envoy for Yemen reporting that Moscow could begin weapons transfers to the rebel group to allow it to more effectively carry out attacks on Western shipping in the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, the consequences of North Korea’s entry into the war are an even greater cause for concern. Fighting in Ukraine presents a rare opportunity for North Korean soldiers to gain valuable experience of modern warfare, including innovations such as the use of drones. Pyongyang is also expected to receive significant military support from Russia that could enhance its missile, nuclear, and naval capabilities. Unsurprisingly, South Korea is monitoring the situation with growing unease.

Russia’s use of foreign troops is a dangerous trend that promises to prolong the war and has the potential to fuel international instability. It is also a sign that while Putin is not yet running out of Russian recruits, he would prefer to seek manpower elsewhere to sustain the costly human wave tactics employed by the Russian army in Ukraine.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Ukraine’s entrepreneurial class can drive the country’s economic recovery

Anton Waschuk — Thu, 05 Dec 2024 14:35:43 +0000

As Ukraine endures the challenges of war, the country’s small and medium-sized businesses stand out as the key to future economic recovery. Quietly yet persistently, these businesses have weathered immense challenges, demonstrating resilience and ingenuity in the face of unprecedented disruption. They are not just vital contributors to today’s wartime Ukrainian economy, but can also serve as the engine that drives its revival and future growth.

The resourcefulness of Ukraine’s SME sector since February 2022 has been striking. By the end of 2023, more than three-quarters of SMEs that had suspended work at the start of the war had at least partially resumed their operations, reflecting the remarkable adaptability of the sector in crisis conditions. This ability to rebound is not just a testament to their determination; it also highlights the potential of Ukraine’s entrepreneurial class to drive the country’s economic transformation.

The Ukrainian authorities certainly seem to recognize the crucial role being played by SMEs. A national strategy for the development of the sector was approved in August 2024, while a range of individual programs have been unveiled to provide access to grants, affordable loans, and war risk insurance. Meanwhile, an SME Resilience Alliance was launched at the 2024 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, helping to further mobilize international support for Ukraine’s entrepreneurs. Private sector investments and individual international donor initiatives are also playing a pivotal role.

To fully realize the potential of Ukraine’s SME sector, partnerships with international private equity firms will be crucial. Such collaborations can help integrate Ukraine’s economy with Western markets, creating lasting economic ties and accelerating post-war recovery. By aligning with international private equity, Ukrainian SMEs can gain access to critical capital, global expertise, and expansive networks, enabling them to scale their operations and meet EU standards. These partnerships not only empower SMEs to grow but also deepen Ukraine’s economic connections with Western markets, fostering mutual benefits and laying the groundwork for sustainable, long-term economic recovery.

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Ukraine’s SMEs are now well positioned to act as engines for growth in several priority sectors of the economy that are essential for Ukraine’s recovery and successful EU integration. In the digital infrastructure domain, high-tech SMEs will play a critical role in building data centers, telecommunications networks, and energy-efficient systems.

Logistics and warehousing are key areas where expanding temperature-controlled facilities will enable Ukraine to meet EU trade standards. The construction materials and industrial production sectors hold immense potential, with SMEs poised to supply concrete, steel, glass, and eco-friendly materials necessary for rebuilding infrastructure. Given the scale of anticipated reconstruction work in Ukraine, the scope for growth and partnerships with experienced EU contractors in this segment of the SME sector is huge.

In the HR and education sectors of the Ukrainian economy, SMEs can help address the significant skills gap by training and recruiting over a million specialists needed across various industries. Similarly, healthcare modernization including clinics, hospices, and long-term care homes presents significant opportunities for Ukrainian entrepreneurs specializing in medical equipment, facility upgrades, and auxiliary services, ensuring the sector meets EU standards and serves the nation for decades to come.

Eurasia Center events

5 Garcia, “Rising Cyberthreats Increase Cyber Insurance Premiums While Reducing Availability.”

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Even amid the trauma and destruction of Russia’s ongoing invasion, it is evident that the Ukrainian SME sector offers a remarkably wide range of opportunities. Looking ahead, it is possible to envision a time when Ukrainian SMEs are listed on global capital markets, providing new liquidity for business owners, creating pathways for Ukrainian citizens and state pension funds to invest in the country’s growth, and attracting the attention of emerging market investors.

Platforms such as the Warsaw Stock Exchange have already expressed interest in facilitating IPOs for Ukrainian SMEs. This development could potentially unlock billions of dollars in capital and help further integrate Ukrainian enterprises into the global economy.

The Ukrainian SME sector is poised to be at the forefront of efforts to create a modern, innovative, postwar economy. By continuing to adopt Western management practices, leveraging financial mechanisms such as private equity capital and public-private partnerships, and embracing international collaboration, SMEs can rebuild Ukraine’s economy and drive its transformation into a hub of technological advancement.

The importance of Ukraine’s entrepreneurs goes far beyond the valuable contributions they are already making to wartime economic resilience. With sufficient support from the Ukrainian authorities and the country’s partners, the SME sector can serve as the cornerstone of Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and its emergence as a competitive force on the global stage.

Anton Waschuk is Director of Innovation, Education, and Entrepreneurship at the Ukraine-Moldova American Enterprise Fund.

The challenge with an emerging insurance market such as cyber insurance is that widespread adoption is an important prerequisite to providing benefits and collectivizing risk. Excessive premiums might drive customers away, but pricing too low or providing insufficient coverage risks unsustainable losses, pushing insurers out of the cyber market.¹¹ Cyber insurance premiums are based on predictive risk models that take historical cyber incident loss data as an input.¹² Insurers could simply use this improved data to fine-tune their predictive risk models and pad their margins, but more competitive pricing could benefit insurers relative to competitors as well as open up new segments of the cyber insurable market.

To address this data deficiency in the market, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) should encourage the private sector to aggregate anonymized historical cyber incident data to a centralized public repository so that insurers can improve their risk models and price premiums more accurately. This could yield more accurate cyber insurance premiums and expand the number of policyholders over which insurers can enforce a set of cybersecurity standards.

Alphaeus Hanson is an assistant director with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the the Atlantic Council Tech Programs. Hanson studies the decision-making of technology companies around risk and geopolitics, including the interaction between insurance companies and capital markets. Prior to joining the Council, Hanson was an analyst at Krebs Stamos Group (KSG).

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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1 Loretta Mastroeni, Alessandro Mazzoccoli, and Maurizio Naldi, “Cyber Insurance Premium Setting for Multi-Site Companies under Risk Correlation,”Risks 11 (10) (2023), https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/10/167; “Cyber Insurance: Risks and Trends 2024,” Munich RE, April 4, 2024, https://www.munichre.com/en/insights/cyber/cyber-insurance-risks-and-trends-2024.html.

2 Neeraj Kaushik, “Risks, Trends, Challenges for Cyber Insurance,” Insurance Though Leadership, January 25, 2024, https://www.insurancethoughtleadership.com/cyber/risks-trends-challenges-cyber-insurance.

3 “Assessment of the Cyber Insurance Market,” CISA, December 21, 2018, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0210_cisa_oce_cyber_insurance_market_assessment.pdf; Jamie MacColl, Jason R C Nurse, and James Sullivan, “Cyber Insurance and the Cyber Security Challenge,” RUSI, June 2021, https://static.rusi.org/247-op-cyber-insurance-fwv.pdf; Dan Garcia, “Rising Cyberthreats Increase Cyber Insurance Premiums While Reducing Availability,” GAO, July 19, 2022, https://www.gao.gov/blog/rising-cyberthreats-increase-cyber-insurance-premiums-while-reducing-availability.

4 Howden, July 1, 2024, https://www.howdengroupholdings.com/news/cyber-insurance-entering-a-new-phase-of-development-as-non-us-territories-set-to-capture-54-of-growth-up-to-2030?ref=news.risky.biz.

6 Garcia, “Rising Cyberthreats Increase Cyber Insurance Premiums While Reducing Availability.”

7 “Cyber Insurance Market to Grow at 24.5% CAGR from 2024 to 2032; Cowbell Inked Collaboration with Millennial Shift Technologies to Strengthen Industry Position,” Fortune Business Insights, April 27, 2023, https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/press-release/global-cyber-insurance-market-10725.

8 Richard S. Betterley, “Cyber/Privacy Insurance Market Survey – 2015,” Betterley Risk Consultants, June 2015, http://betterley.com/samples/cpims15_nt.pdf; Limit, “Cyber Insurance is Becoming More Expensive,” Coverager, September 20, 2022, https://coverager.com/cyber-insurance-is-becoming-more-expensive/.

9 Larry Clinton, “Cyber-Insurance Metrics and Impact on Cyber-Security”, Internet Society Alliance, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files/documents/cyber/ISA%20-%20Cyber-Insurance%20Metrics%20and%20Impact%20on%20Cyber-Security.pdf.

10 Trey Herr, “Cyber insurance and private governance: The enforcement power of markets,” Regulation & Governance 15 (1) (2019), https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12266.

11 “Cyber Insurance: Insurers and Policyholders Face Challenges in an Evolving Market,” GAO, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-477.pdf.

12 “Cyber Insurance: Insurers and Policyholders Face Challenges in an Evolving Market.”

The post The role of data in improving cyber insurance pricing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What Trump’s return as president means for COP29

Jorge Gastelumendi — Tue, 12 Nov 2024 19:09:14 +0000

BAKU—The twenty-ninth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, better known as COP29, began on November 11 in Baku, Azerbaijan. The eleven-day conference is an important opportunity to set a new global goal for climate finance and build the momentum urgently needed to protect lives and livelihoods from the effects of climate change. But in light of the election of Donald Trump to a second nonconsecutive term as US president, the pressure is on COP29 in a new way.

On the campaign trail, Trump made his climate plans clear—and they are not currently aligned with global goals and targets. Instead, he has stated that he will again withdraw from the Paris Agreement and end many of the climate policies launched during the Biden administration.

His “America first” approach doesn’t align with the scientific reality of climate change. While Trump has signaled that his administration will put boundaries on its international commitments, the consequences of climate change do not recognize national boundaries.

In recent years, the rising costs of global warming have become increasingly and painfully clear.

With the looming threat of reduced climate commitments from the world’s largest economy (in terms of nominal gross domestic product), the negotiations at COP29 will take on a new significance. In 2016, when Trump was last elected, US negotiators were unable to make strong commitments at COP22 in Marrakesh. While they participated in these negotiations, they were encouraged to avoid any legally binding commitments until the next administration came into office. As the United States begins another transition from one administration to another, the same expectations could be placed on US negotiators this year.

Notably, the outcomes on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on Climate Finance will bear the consequences of those expectations. The goal was mandated under the Paris Agreement and officially set at COP15, where developed countries agreed to mobilize $100 billion annually to enable climate action in developing countries. Now, the world is revisiting that $100 billion benchmark since the scope of the climate crisis has dramatically increased since 2009.

With a noncommittal United States, there are two likely scenarios. The first scenario is that the decision on the NCQG is deferred to next year’s COP in Brazil. The second scenario is a new, nonbinding goal that is less ambitious and that will lack a mechanism to enforce it.

In short, the wording will matter. Instead of words like “commit,” the second scenario could result in a new finance goal with more ambiguous language. Nevertheless, it would serve as an important political signal. It could be a reference point that emphasizes the value of the process and the need to accelerate climate finance. It would keep the pressure on governments, ensuring that they recognize their responsibility to mobilize financial resources toward reducing emissions and protecting people from the impacts of climate change. In its ability to set a precedent, the agreement itself can inspire action not only in the public sector but also the private sector. COP negotiators should therefore seek to make the wording that sets this financing goal as strong as possible.

In recent years, the rising costs of global warming have become increasingly and painfully clear. It is in every country’s interest—including the United States’—to increase international financial commitments. After all, every one dollar invested in prevention saves sixteen dollars in disaster response.

As COP29 begins and the world looks ahead to COP30 where substantial commitments are expected, the value of US leadership cannot be overstated. This is not just a moral responsibility, but a survival mechanism. Climate change is a global issue. If the United States refuses to cut emissions further and ends the policies and investments launched under the Biden administration, the Trump administration would put even more Americans’ health, finances, and safety at risk as they face the rapidly intensifying consequences of climate inaction.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center.

The post What Trump’s return as president means for COP29 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A path forward for Colombia’s 2016 peace accord and lasting security

US-Colombia Advisory Group, with Isabel Chiriboga and Geoff Ramsey — Tue, 12 Nov 2024 17:00:00 +0000

Foreword
Executive summary
Explainer Videos
Publication Signatories – US-Colombia Advisory Group
Introduction
Policy recommendations
Conclusion
Acknowledgments

Foreword

I am grateful to the US-Colombia Advisory Group for inviting me to share these words and for its valuable work in advancing the US-Colombian partnership.

Peace processes are constituent moments in any country, generating great expectations and hope. However, a peace accord alone—even the most innovative one—does not automatically produce the transformative changes necessary to create peace. Full implementation, in the social, political, and economic spheres, is required to consolidate peace for the decades to come.

Realism is of the essence. Peace agreements take time to implement. This is why the 2016 Peace Accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) sets a fifteen-year horizon to ensure its implementation. Eight years after it was signed, the significant and tangible progress that has taken place is a testament to the hard work and sacrifices of many. Few peace agreements indeed manage to truly consolidate as vectors of political change. It is worthy of celebration.

But the eighth anniversary of the accord is also an opportunity to acknowledge that more work needs be done to address challenges such as persistent violence in rural areas, the murder of social leaders and former combatants, the slow implementation of structural reforms, and the need to strengthen the territorial and cross-cutting approaches of the agreement.

One important lesson to emerge from Colombia is that sustainable peace is not achieved solely by the demobilization of armed groups. Despite FARC-EP’s disarmament and reintegration, dissidents and criminal groups emerged to occupy the spaces left by the former guerrillas. This underlines the need for a comprehensive approach to security, which not only creates peace, but also dismantles the illicit economies that fuel violence. Security is not achieved solely through disarmament, but also through the creation of viable economic alternatives for affected communities and the capacity of the state to consolidate its central role in the areas once occupied by armed groups.

Amid it all, prioritizing the rights and needs of victims is crucial to strengthening the legitimacy of the accord and allowing for reconciliation. Despite the difficulties and significant delays, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and reparation processes established by the accord remain one of Colombia’s greatest contributions to the practice of peacebuilding globally. The JEP’s ability to deliver justice rapidly and ensure legal security to those under its jurisdiction will be essential to the legitimacy of the peace process and the durability of peace.

As it engages other armed groups into negotiating peace settlements, it is crucial the Colombian state doesn’t lose sight of the importance of safeguarding and prioritizing the comprehensive implementation of the 2016 accord. It presents a carefully designed road map of coherent political responses to comprehensively tackle some of the main challenges that Colombia faces today: violence, insecurity, inequality, drug trafficking, and exclusion of marginalized populations. Following this road to the end will open many more such opportunities for all. But that will first and foremost require a full and successful implementation of the accord.

Dag Nylander
Director, Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF)

Executive summary

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) is often held up as one of the more successful instances of conflict resolution in history, putting an end to the longest-running armed conflict in the western hemisphere. Support for this accord, and for its full implementation, has been a cornerstone of the US-Colombia relationship since the beginning of its negotiation in 2010. When it was signed, the accord laid out a fifteen-year roadmap to implement provisions meant to reform the country’s rural economy, reduce illicit crop cultivation, provide peace in neglected areas, and establish democratic guarantees to protect the rights of social activists and victims of the conflict.

However, halfway through the accord’s implementation period, progress has been slow. According to the Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,¹ which is responsible for technical verification and monitoring of implementation of the accord, as of May 2024 the Colombian government has fully implemented 33 percent of its stipulations, while 37 percent saw “minimum”² implementation, and 20 percent are in an “intermediate” state.³ Evidence from the Kroc Institute suggests that at the current rate, the accord’s implementation will not reach full implementation before the established deadline of 2031. The delay further complicates Colombia’s search for peace amid rising security concerns in the country, in addition to posing a threat to US security interests in the hemisphere and contributing to the flow of illicit goods northward.

Through a series of consultations and roundtables with the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s US-Colombia Advisory Group (UCAG), members identified that coordination challenges both at a national and territorial level between and among institutions with a role in the implementation of the accord have hindered its full implementation. Lack of coordination was also recognized throughout the three additional constraints identified:

Proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impacts ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict.
Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups.
Lack of progress in crop substitution programs launched as a result of the accord.

Policy recommendations

Prioritize the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the accord and its ethnic focus throughout, in coordination with peace negotiations and local ceasefires, to curb existing violence in isolated regions with predominantly Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and vulnerable populations including victims from the armed conflict. Addressing the severe delays in implementing these ethnic commitments requires an overhaul of state presence through strengthened policing, judicial systems, and economic support, all tailored to meet local needs and establish trust. Additionally the Petro government should improve coordination with local leaders and leverage the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE) to secure community-driven progress. International partners, particularly the US, should provide dedicated technical and financial support to ensure sustainable implementation of the accord, with a focus on addressing specific needs of ethnic territories and creating viable economic opportunities to reduce illegal group influence.
Enhance the impact of existing, targeted development programs by increasing resource allocation and leveraging international support and local buy-in to develop targeted strategies to support newly identified conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas in Colombia. It is essential to incentivize development in conflict-affected areas, especially through the Territorially Focused Development Programs (PDETs) and Zones Most Affected by the Armed Conflict (ZOMACs) created under the 2016 peace accord. Despite their promise, these programs face funding shortages, weak institutional capacities, and ongoing security challenges that restrict effective implementation and delay critical infrastructure projects. Strengthening PDETs requires addressing resource allocation gaps, supporting local capacity-building, and prioritizing equitable development. Additionally, real-time data monitoring of conflict zones will enable targeted security and development interventions, with US support for local monitoring and evaluation actors enhancing resource distribution and operational effectiveness. By investing in community engagement and new support programs, the United States can bolster Colombia’s stability, curb the expansion of illegal armed groups, and address significant shared security concerns.
Prioritize the implementation of the 2016 peace accord before the 2031 deadline to build stronger national and international support for creating more effective negotiation structures with illegal armed groups in Colombia. President Petro’s establishment of the “Alta Instancia para la Implementación” reflects a commitment to better coordinate efforts across 54 government entities, backed by a significant budget allocation. However, poor coordination, limited budget execution, and a deteriorating security environment due to increased illegal armed group presence continue to obstruct progress. Observers from academia and civil society should support Colombia’s efforts to streamline fund utilization, ensuring the accord’s constitutional mandate is prioritized over political agendas. Successful negotiations with armed groups require a balanced, transparent approach grounded in inclusivity and monitored incentives, backed by a clear legislative framework, with insights from international partners like the US and Norway.
Support the independence and efficiency of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, an innovative and far-reaching transitional and restorative justice system in Colombia. Support for the JEP is key, yet many ex-combatants remain in legal limbo, and the JEP’s delay in resolving key “macro cases” has weakened its credibility. Additionally, the inclusion of high-profile paramilitary figures not intended for JEP jurisdiction has further eroded public trust. To enhance peace process success, U.S. agencies should support Colombia’s efforts to ensure victim and perpetrator participation in restorative justice. Improving JEP’s communication with ethnic communities, coordinating across cases, and delivering culturally sensitive reparations are also vital for effective implementation and justice for serious conflict-related crimes.

Explainer Videos

Signatories

US-Colombia Advisory Group Members

Jaime Asprilla
Cynthia Arnson
Ambassador Carolina Barco
Ambassador William Brownfield
Minister Mauricio Cárdenas
Enrique Carrizosa
Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky
Stephen Donehoo
Steve Hege
Muni Jensen
Bruce Mac Master
Paola Buendia
Minister Maria Claudia Lacouture
Ambassador P. Michael McKinley
Ambassador Mariana Pacheco
Kristie Pellecchia
Arturo Valenzuela
Kevin Whitaker

Introduction

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) is often held up as one of the more successful instances of conflict resolution in history, putting an end to the longest-running armed conflict in the western hemisphere. Support for this accord, and for its full implementation, has been a cornerstone of the US-Colombia relationship since the beginning of its negotiation in 2010. When it was signed, the accord laid out a fifteen-year roadmap to implement provisions meant to reform the country’s rural economy, reduce illicit crop cultivation, provide peace in neglected areas, and establish democratic guarantees to protect the rights of social activists and victims of the conflict.

However, halfway through the accord’s implementation period, progress has been slow. According to the Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,⁴ which is responsible for technical verification and monitoring of implementation of the accord, as of May 2024 the Colombian government has fully implemented 33 percent of its stipulations, while 37 percent saw “minimum”⁵implementation, and 20 percent are in an “intermediate” state.⁶ Evidence from the Kroc Institute suggests that at the current rate, the accord’s implementation will not reach full implementation before the established deadline of 2031. The delay further complicates Colombia’s search for peace amid rising security concerns in the country, in addition to posing a threat to US security interests in the hemisphere and contributing to the flow of illicit goods northward.

Factors that have hindered the accord’s implementation include inconsistent political will, governance and coordination challenges and institutional weakness in areas affected by the conflict, insufficient allocation of resources, and, most importantly, the persistence of the armed conflict. Violent conflict persists in Colombia on three fronts: between the state and preexisting armed actors; between the state and new emerging actors, including FARC dissidents, illegal armed groups and transnational criminal organizations; and between and among these groups. The lag in implementation as a result of these factors carries implications for the future of the US-Colombia partnership.

Given that Colombia is past the halfway mark in the set timeframe, the time is ripe for accelerating the implementation of the 2016 peace accord. A broad consensus on this fact exists among local governments, the business community, multilateral partners, civil society, and, most importantly, between Washington and Bogotá. In an era of deepening instability and insecurity in neighboring Andean countries and, more broadly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States has a clear interest in ensuring that Colombia overcomes its own security challenges and builds state presence in the areas hardest hit by violence and conflict. Indeed, the commitments that Colombia made in its 2016 peace accord have ramifications that go far beyond the initial objective of reaching peace with the FARC. If fully implemented, the accord could lay the foundation to deepen Colombia’s democracy, bring new opportunities for investment in neglected but resource-rich areas of the country, and deal a crushing blow to organized crime. Although principally a Colombian achievement, a fully implemented accord would also be a capstone of over two decades of dedicated US commitment to Colombia. Achieving this, however, will require commitment and political will from the Colombian government to prioritize the implementation—as well as coordination and continued support from the United States.

Proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impacts ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict.
Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups.
Lack of progress in crop substitution programs launched as a result of the accord.
UCAG members propose that while addressing the lag in the accord’s implementation requires a holistic approach, it is imperative to address the current rise in crime and violence in both urban and rural areas in Colombia, an issue that ranks as the number one concern of Colombians today.

This publication builds on the UCAG’s first report, “Advancing US-Colombia Cooperation on Drug Policy and Law Enforcement,” by outlining four recommendations for steps the United States and Colombia can take to accelerate the accord’s implementation and simultaneously address the underlying issue of security in Colombia and the broader region. The three core challenges are discussed below.

The proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impact ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict

General view of an area deforested by illegal mining in Puerto Guzman, Colombia February 8, 2022. REUTERS/Luisa Gonzalez

Colombia’s complex geography and richness in natural resources bring important opportunities for tourism and economic growth, but also require significant state capacity and resources to support the country’s most rural and isolated areas. State-neglected areas are where illegal armed groups thrive, enjoying full control and freedom of operation that pose extensive threats to local communities. The 2016 peace accord, while historic, only ended one armed conflict—between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, at least eight domestic armed conflicts were identified in 2024, based on their legal classification.⁷ Three of the conflicts are between the Colombian state and illegal armed groups which aim to replace or overthrow the democratic government, including the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), and the former FARC-EP (Disidencias, by its current name in Spanish). The other five conflicts exclude the state and are between new and existing illegal armed groups. (See table 1 below). All eight of the groups identified here engage in an array of illegal activities, principally narcotics production and trafficking, trade of people and illicit goods, illegal mining, and extortion. Included in these eight conflicts are groups that never demobilized when the accord was signed and those that took up arms again when they claimed the accord was violated. In its majority, these conflicts take place within marginalized and rural communities, and community leaders in these areas have suffered disproportionately. In Petro’s first two years, more than 350 social leaders and human rights defenders and at least 75 signatories of the 2016 peace accord have been murdered, and over 165 massacres have occurred.

In April 2024 700 civil society organizations presented a report to the United Nations claiming that violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups has expanded by 36 percent in the first trimester of 2024, affecting 189 municipalities (almost 20 percent of Colombian territory), with over 272 violent events being recorded during the same period. In practice, the impact of rising violence in Colombia has resulted in over 400 violations of human rights both by state and nonstate actors. Communities under threat face heightened rates of recruitment, homicides, displacement, confinement, sexual violence, and other effects. To put things in perspective, on a national level, more than 145,049 people were individually displaced in 2023, which meant an increase of 18 percent compared to 2022. Territorial disputes among armed actors also led to the confinement of 47,013 people (in 2023), representing an increase of 19 percent at the national level compared to 2022.

The forced displacement crisis in Riohacha has placed growing pressure on the resources of the Riohacha District, particularly in health, social welfare, security, and community cohesion. Displaced families face searious challenges in accessing a safe and stable environment, which heightens their need for assistance. Given the magnitude of the crisis, coordinated inter-institutional support and international cooperation are essential to alleviate the humanitarian impact.

Genaro Redondo Choles, mayor of Riohacha

This 2024 report of the Analytical Service of Colombian National Police (CEPOL) outlines that on a national level, extortion, homicides, and personal injuries have seen a significant increase in the first trimester of 2024, while crimes such as theft and kidnapping have decreased. Many departments including Arauca, located on the border with Venezuela, have suffered a wave of killings as armed groups attack social leaders in areas controlled by rival groups and who are often accused of sympathizing with the “wrong” side. The reconfiguration of nonstate armed actors extends beyond its initial reliance on drug trafficking, as such groups have diversified their operations to other forms of profitable illicit businesses such as illegal mining, human smuggling, and money laundering, exacerbating the humanitarian consequences that affect the civilian population. Their complex operations, which are related to the historical institutional weakness in the most remote areas of Colombia, show the long road that remains to achieve peace in Colombia.

Since the 1990s, violence in Puerto Tejada has escalated, with an increase in homicides linked to its role as a drug trafficking corridor and the expansion of the Cali Cartel, as well as the arrival of paramilitaries who led “social cleansing” efforts and social control actions, primarily affecting young people. Today, violence continues with the proliferation of gangs, where youth engage in theft, extortion, and drug-related activities, while data shows alarming homicide rates and a pattern of intergenerational revenge. To address this situation, it is proposed to strengthen prevention programs for children and youth, resocialization for ex-convicts, and detox programs for substance users, while seeking alliances to improve security and coexistence in the municipality.

Luz Adiela Salazar, mayor of Puerto Tejada

Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups

An indigenous man rests in a hammock inside the Casa Indigena, where he takes refuge after being displaced from his land due to clashes between illegal armed groups in his territories, in Riohacha, Colombia February 27, 2024. REUTERS/Antonio Cascio

Since taking office in August 2022, Gustavo Petro’s administration has rolled out its new strategy for peace, titled Paz Total, or Total Peace. This strategy aims to end the violence that has plagued Colombia for decades by brokering simultaneous ceasefires with various armed and criminal groups, offering judicial leniency and other benefits in exchange for permanent disarmament. However, 66 percent of Colombians say that progress on Petro’s Total Peace strategy is moving in the wrong direction and 85 percent think Colombia’s security situation is worsening, according to a June poll.

The lapsed ceasefires with the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), the AGC, the ELN, and other armed groups highlight the biggest challenge for Total Peace: The government has yet to describe an attractive incentive structure for armed and criminal groups—which reap significant profits and effectively control large portions of the country—to abandon their power and influence. The worsening violence has continued to erode public confidence in Petro’s ambitious approach. (Table 2) The government is now involved in ten sets of peace talks with more than a dozen armed groups, and Bogotá still hopes its talks with the ELN can be revived.

According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator report, 129 possible ceasefire violations were reported in 2023, including humanitarian impacts on the civilian population and offensive actions or armed incidents. The report considers not only the two official ceasefires—those of the ELN and the EMC—but also those declared unilaterally by other groups. Additionally, concerns have been raised about instances where advancing the Total Peace plan may come at the expense of certain commitments established in the 2016 peace accord. For example, the 2016 accord was intended to be the final opportunity for the FARC to surrender their weapons. However, some observers feel that by moving beyond this framework, Petro may be creating challenges for the sustainability of both the 2016 peace accord and future accords.

A key factor has been the intensification of violent competition among new and existing illegal armed groups: During Petro’s first year in office, intergroup confrontations rose by 85 percent. Given their power and influence, negotiations with some of these illegal armed groups are needed but are stalling as the government attempts to address the incentive structures of these groups. The ceasefires, when announced, have not yielded clear benefits. Meanwhile, clashes between groups and state forces have continued to disproportionately affect ethnic minorities and marginalized communities in areas most impacted by violence. In this context, the United States and other international partners must continue to pressure the Colombian government on the protections of the rights of local communities who are getting caught in the crossfire in the absence of a local strategy to tackle this.

The proliferation of armed groups in this region has trapped our communities in the crossfire. Though we are not participants in the conflict, we are suffering its
most critical impacts—our movement within our own territories is restricted due
to the presence of dominant armed groups, and we fear being mistaken as
affiliated with one side or another. Our communities must no longer be targets
of this conflict. Ceasefire violations have left us vulnerable, undermining our
access to healthcare, education, economic and social development, and even
political stability.

Ana Milena Hinojoso, mayor of Atrato

Amid widespread criticism for not delivering on the promise of Total Peace and the slow implementation of the 2016 peace accord, Petro has repeatedly highlighted the need for broader reforms (i.e., agrarian, education, health) as mechanisms to accelerate the implementation of the accord. Under the 2023–2026 National Development Plan, Colombia Potencia Mundial de la Vida, the Petro administration has highlighted the importance of fully implementing the peace accord as a key aspect of Colombia’s transformation, detailing more than 164 directives. Some of the key issues include the creation of the National System for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the strengthening of the multipurpose registry,⁸ financing for the peace accord’s Land Fund, strengthening citizen oversight, creating the National Reincorporation System and the Comprehensive Reincorporation Program, and reforming the National Drug Policy and the Victims’ Law.

However, while little progress has been witnessed overall, two notable achievements regarding Colombia’s “institutionality for peace” are worth highlighting. First, Law 2272/2022 establishes a policy called Para la Paz Total y la Seguridad Humana, which includes the implementation of the 2016 peace accord and strengthens the institutions responsible for its execution. Second, the Peace Accord Implementation Unit (UIAP) was created by decree and operates under the office of the High Commissioner for Peace, facilitating new approaches and dialogue processes with illegal armed groups. Yet, the UIAP has faced numerous challenges so far, as it is responsible for advising, coordinating, supporting, monitoring, and verifying the implementation of the accord, and has little capacity to do so.

Additionally, the newly created Ministry of Equality and Equity has had little impact on accord implementation efforts despite the fact that the government tasked it with addressing the accord’s gender and ethnic approaches. The Constitutional Court invalidated the law creating the Ministry of Equality—led by Vice President Francia Márquez—and deferred its decision for two years, allowing the ministry to operate until 2026. As of September 2024, only 13 percent of the ethnic chapter’s stipulations and 22 percent of the gender approach stipulations have been implemented. While these changes could potentially drive progress, the government’s failure to achieve tangible results in the Total Peace strategy and the 2016 accord remains an important concern.

A lack of progress in the crop substitution programs that were launched as part of the accord

A drone view shows a coca plantation at a village built by Colombian rebel group Segunda Marquetalia, in Colombia’s Pacific jungle, Colombia July 26, 2024. REUTERS/Daniel Becerril

The rollout of Petro’s ten-year National Drug Policy in November 2023 represents a shift from past administrations’ respective approaches to counternarcotics. The approach fully centers on efforts to generate greater pressure on financial structures of organized crime, as well as generating incentives for small coca-producing farmers in geographically isolated areas to replace their illicit crops with legal ones. The Petro administration has also eliminated all forms of “forced eradication,” except for coca plots classified as industrial plantations, reversing decades of Colombian counternarcotics policy that was coordinated with and extensively supported by the United States. In a practical matter, there are still no clear criteria on the identification and monitoring of industrial plantations, meaning that little eradication is taking place. According to the latest UNODC survey, cocaine production in Colombia surged by 53 percent in 2023. The increase was explained by the continued concentration of coca cultivation in areas with the highest productivity across all three stages of its production—cultivation, extraction, and processing—enabling a single hectare of coca to yield up to twice as much cocaine as it did 11 years ago. Additionally, the area dedicated to coca cultivation also expanded in 2023, increasing by 10% from 230,000 to 253,000 hectares. This growth, however, represents a slower rate compared to the previous year, which saw a 13% rise in coca plantations.

Coca prices have plummeted, and some analysts attribute the decline in prices to a variety of factors including persistent conflict in cultivation areas, which creates uncertainty and deters buyers; the saturation of drug smuggling routes out of Colombia, as evidenced by high seizures; and the oversupply and rapid growth of coca cultivation. Cartels also have altered their purchasing strategies, opting to buy counternarcotics closer to trafficking routes and from fewer locations. This shift has negatively impacted coca farmers in areas such as Putumayo. However, the UNODC notes that while Colombian cocaine prices have plummeted, global prices remain stable, and the drug is reaching new markets. A kilogram of cocaine can sell for up to $25,000 in the United States, $35,000 in Europe, $50,000 in Asia, and $100,000 in Australia, making it an extremely profitable and vibrant business, able to adapt to changes in supply, transport, and demand. Instead of attributing the decline in coca prices to oversupply, the UNODC points to a lack of consistent market controls as the main issue. This has led to a volatile market characterized by uncertainty.

Given stable cocaine prices in the global market, low coca leaf prices in Colombia lead drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) from Mexico, Europe, and other parts of the world to see the region and Colombia specifically as an area of opportunity, given the greater profit margins resulting from low coca prices and cultivation costs. While synthetic drug production, illegal mining, arms trafficking, and human trafficking contribute to the diversified operations of criminal businesses, and earned billions for transnational criminal organizations in 2023, cocaine remained the principal driver of criminal evolution and earnings, and must therefore remain a priority as enshrined in the 2016 peace accord.

A logical starting point should be Colombia’s Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos, or PNIS), which was born out of the 2016 peace accord with the goal of reducing the amount of coca crops in the country through substitution programs. The program has been lagging significantly, due to the lack of communication and follow-through from previous governments with communities in coca-growing areas, as well as insufficient budget allocation and operational capacities. The Colombian Congress has also shared concerns about the lack of progress in program implementation, amid media reports that only 5 percent of the budget allocated to the program was actually disbursed in 2023. The Petro administration has responded by appointing new directors of both the PNIS and the overall Paz Total programs this year, but concerns remain. Considering the lack of demonstrated progress on key aspects of the PNIS, the Kroc Institute cautions that the commitments at the minimum level of implementation risk not being completed by the deadline set in the final accord.

The current national government’s drug policy outlines its willingness to move forward with the PNIS, which consists of making payments of 36 million pesos—about $9,000—to persons who agree to eradicate their coca plantations. However, the government’s commitments to productive projects that define how this money will be used by families remains undefined. Only 10.8 percent of PNIS families with ethnic affiliation and 7.5 percent of the ethnic families with woman heads of household have benefited from the program. Despite these lags in implementation, the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART), through the Special Consultation Mechanism (MEC), has provided technical training to ethnic communities related to project formulation and management with private companies. Given the complex realities of coca-growing areas in Colombia, where criminal groups have strengthened their presence over the last year, it seems unlikely that even these subsidies will bring about lasting change unless there are secure conditions in the territories to do it, and unless the government defines a comprehensive and implementable set of programs to transition PNIS beneficiaries to the licit economy. Currently, there are 70,000 beneficiaries of the PNIS program, while the total number of coca growers in Colombia is estimated at 400,000. Thus, for the PNIS to continue effectively, its transition would need to encompass all coca growers across the country and be flexible enough to be consistently updated.

Policy recommendations

1. Prioritize the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the accord and its ethnic focus throughout, in coordination with peace negotiations and local ceasefires, to curb existing violence in isolated regions with predominantly Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and vulnerable populations including victims from the armed conflict.

Addressing the implementation of the 2016 peace accord’s ethnic chapter requires a fundamental overhaul of state presence and citizen security nationwide through strengthened police and justice systems in conflict-prone areas. Without such a transformation, Colombia risks slipping back into the turmoil experienced between the 1980s and the 2000s.

The ethnic chapter and approach of the 2016 peace accord is lagging behind significantly, compared to overall accord implementation. Significant obstacles such as the absence of ethnic approach mainstreaming in planning and programmatic work, the slow implementation of security guarantees for ethnic communities, and the lack of application of prior consultation for ethnic peoples have hindered its implementation. As of September 2024, 13 percent of the eighty ethnic approach stipulations had yet to reach the stage of implementation initiation, while 61 percent were at a minimal level, 14 percent were at an intermediate level, and only 13 percent were completed. Similarly, the commitments in the final accord’s ethnic chapter reflect this slow trend as well, with 15 percent of stipulations not initiated, 62 percent showing minimal progress, 15 percent at an intermediate level, and only 8 percent completed. This is concerning, particularly given that close to 20 percent of victims from the armed conflict belong to ethnic minority communities and regions, with Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations facing heightened impacts from clashes between rival illegal armed groups. The enduring conflict in regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic minorities, particularly Afro-Colombians, is intrinsically linked to cross-sectional inequality within Colombian society. The unwillingness of successive governments to acknowledge and address these realities have thus generated a disconnect between the marginalized communities and the rest of Colombia—a critical factor that perpetuates conflict.

Police officers play with children from indigenous families who take refuge in La Casa Indigena, after being displaced from their lands due to clashes between illegal armed groups in their territories, in Riohacha, Colombia February 27, 2024. REUTERS/Antonio Cascio

To address this issue, the Petro administration has tasked Márquez (who also serves as minister of equality and equity) with overseeing and coordinating the ethnic chapter and approach implementation. Last November, Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, Raizal, Palenquero, and Rrom communities, alongside the national government and others, renewed their commitment through a pact aimed at advancing effective implementation of the ethnic chapter. Slight progress was seen in commitments linked to the ethnic approach within the PNIS, completion of prior consultation processes for land registry in ethnic territories, and the establishment of a budget tracker dedicated to ethnic minority community funding. However, important challenges persist, particularly in conducting consultations and reaching accords with these communities, due to the lengthy, complex nature of the consultative process, resource constraints, and the lack of confidence of vulnerable populations in government efforts. The presence of illegal armed groups in Afro-Colombian and other predominantly ethnic minority communities have impeded both government efforts and effective implementation of projects in affected areas.

Similarly, the international community, especially the United States, must continue to steadfastly support Colombia’s peace process. This entails providing sustained technical, political, and financial assistance to prevent fragmented implementation of the accord. Long-term financial and technical support should be prioritized for the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE), the primary consultative, representative, and liaison body of the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting, and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI). The IEANPE has focused on improving the implementation of the ethnic approach and promoting the ethnic chapter’s pedagogy at the territorial level. It participated in the Pact for the Ethnic Chapter and led sessions to deepen understanding and gather inputs for reports on the implementation of the ethnic approach. Although Petro’s government allocated a portion of its implementation budget to the IEANPE in 2023 for the first time since the accord was signed, it is essential that this financial support is diversified, sustainable, and not solely reliant on government funding, which can change rapidly.

Economic development is also a key component needed for the progress of these communities and resource-rich territories. Local leaders and producers should receive the technical knowledge needed to connect their products to broader markets across Colombia and beyond: A best practice that can be applied here is cooperative farming to enhance export capacity by tapping into wholesale buyers. Ensuring financial support and tailored technical programs for local leaders, civil society groups, and grassroots initiatives in these regions will strengthen efforts to expedite the implementation of the ethnic chapter and, consequently, provide economic incentives for local communities to operate in legality at the face of the alternative, ideally creating safer conditions in neglected areas affected by persistent conflict, as well as access to quality public goods including education and health.

Community development is essential for the effective implementation of the ethnic chapter, as it bolsters the local economy and reinforces legal frameworks. By advancing initiatives such as cooperative agriculture and expanding access to broader markets, this approach fosters economic sustainability and progress in regions impacted by conflict, ensuring improved living conditions and essential services for these communities.

Gessica Vallejo, mayor of Candelaria

2. Enhance the impact of existing, targeted development programs by increasing resource allocation and leveraging international support and local buy-in to develop targeted strategies to support newly identified conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas in Colombia.

To prevent and address the recurrence of armed conflict in Colombia, it is crucial to provide incentives for development and investment in conflict-affected areas across Colombian territory. During the negotiation of the 2016 peace accord, 170 municipalities were designated as Territorially Focused Development Programs, or PDETs. These programs aim to transform the Colombian countryside and rural environment by fostering a more equitable relationship between rural and urban areas through increased government presence and investment in conflict-ridden regions. PDETs encompass a variety of development projects, such as the construction of roads and schools, improved access to electricity and critical infrastructure, and enhanced health services. Incentives for investment are provided by the government through tax credits; PDET territories also are part of larger municipal clusters that have been most affected by the conflict, known as ZOMACs (Zones most affected by the armed conflict), which provide similar incentives. Both PDETs and ZOMACs are essential components of Colombia’s 2016 peace accord, designed to address the root causes of conflict and promote sustainable development in vulnerable regions. Despite their significance, their implementation faces numerous challenges.

Funding shortages prevent the adequate rollout of development and infrastructure projects, limiting the scope and impact of PDETs in vulnerable communities. These shortages—paired with institutional weaknesses such as limited capacity, poor coordination among government agencies, and difficulties in ensuring meaningful community participation in the execution and implementation of PDET programs—have led to delays and inefficiencies. The structural inefficiencies that have hindered the progress of PDETs are now compounded by growing security concerns, as ongoing conflicts in certain regions restrict access to communities and obstruct development efforts. Strengthening PDET implementation and closing gaps in prioritization by ensuring equitable distribution of resources and assistance for all initiatives will be essential. In addition, assessing the barriers limiting the activation of ethnic people’s own initiatives and strengthening the MEC’s technical capacities for formulating projects that are likely to be funded by international actors will help close this gap.

With conflict and violence expanding into new territories across Colombia (see table 2), it is essential to utilize real-time data to monitor and analyze the growth of conflict, the presence and expansion of illegal armed groups, and the resilience of institutions in these areas. This data-driven approach will be crucial for shaping comprehensive development strategies and informed security policies. US agencies, such as the US Southern Command, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and USAID, should play a complementary role by supporting local monitoring and evaluation actors such as the CSIVI and other independent academic institutions to allocate resources more effectively, tailor security operations to local conditions, and direct development initiatives toward regions experiencing increased conflict. Proactively engaging in these efforts can prevent further instability and enhance the overall response to emerging security challenges.

The United States should seize this opportunity to deepen existing support for Colombia in developing new programs and funding lines that strengthen institutional capacities in newly conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas. This could include investing in local governance training, improving resource allocation, and addressing budget disparities to ensure that these regions receive adequate support to confront the evolving threats of crime and insecurity. However, before deploying development funds, it is imperative to engage with and listen to local communities in these newly identified areas. Building trust and understanding local needs through community consultations and advisory boards will enhance the relevance and effectiveness of development programs. In doing so, the United States will not only help to curb the rapid expansion of illegal armed groups—which drive migration northward and erode state authority across Colombia—but also address a significant national security concern that affects its own interests. Supporting Colombia in this way will help foster stability, reinforce democratic governance, and reduce the broader regional security risks posed by transnational criminal organizations.

3. Prioritize the implementation of the 2016 peace accord before the 2031 deadline to build stronger national and international support for creating more effective negotiation structures with illegal armed groups in Colombia.

One of the most commonly heard critiques of both the Duque administration and the current Petro administration is the failure to take consistent and concrete steps to implement the 2016 peace accord. When Petro took office, he promised to implement an “Alta Instancia para la Implementación,” a high-level governing body to help coordinate and articulate efforts aimed at fulfilling the implementation of the 2016 accord. This coordination is crucial due to the number of entities and sectors involved. In the National Development Plan, 50 billion pesos (close to $2.7 billion) were allocated for the implementation of the accord, a budget shared by fifty-four entities that must work together to uphold the comprehensive spirit of the accord.

The responsibility for accelerating the implementation of the accord falls under the Peace Accord Implementation Unit, spearheaded by Gloria Cuartas. Yet the unit has faced heavy criticism for its lack of action and results so far, attributed to inadequate budget execution, poor coordination among government agencies, and, most importantly, the rapid deterioration of security caused by the increased presence of illegal armed groups across the country, as well as declining confidence among demobilized individuals and communities on the ground. However, despite this criticism, the UIAP has a fundamental role. For the government’s security strategy to be effective, it is crucial to ensure that the UIAP is closely engaged in any new talks and that the funds allocated for implementing the peace accord are leveraged effectively as part of these violence prevention strategies.

To ensure the effective implementation of the 2016 peace accord in Colombia, it is crucial that observers, including academic institutions and civil society organizations, provide insights to support Colombian governmental efforts to optimize the utilization of funds that back the accord, ensuring efficient results within a strict timeline. Colombia entered the commitments associated with the 2016 accord already aware that there would be costs, both in terms of finances and government attention; it’s essential, even as the Petro administration works on its initiatives, that accord-related commitments be honored. The 2016 peace accord is a mandate in the Colombian constitution, making it a binding commitment that the current and successive administrations must continue to honor—and takes precedence over other aspirational commitments in political agendas. Therefore, entities overseeing the accord’s implementation must ensure that the government upholds this commitment, taking full responsibility for its effective execution.

The ongoing armed conflict in Colombia continues to hinder the implementation of the peace accord. While President Petro’s emphasis on negotiation is important, given the diverse range of conflicts across the country, his strategy has only yielded mixed results. To enhance the effectiveness of negotiations with illegal armed groups, the government should adopt a multifaceted approach that emphasizes inclusivity, local engagement, and transparency. It is crucial to closely monitor the incentives for armed groups and understand the power dynamics and reasons behind their reluctance to engage in meaningful dialogue. The ability to inflict harm gives illegal armed groups a significant bargaining chip, making it also hard for the Colombian state to offer anything that these armed groups want enough to loosen their grip over territories that bring in ample profits.

Negotiations with criminal groups run the risk of undermining the rule of law; therefore, any incentives used must be approached with great caution and ideally supported by a legislative framework passed by democratically elected lawmakers. A well-defined, structured negotiation strategy, rather than an ad hoc approach, is essential. Countries with relevant expertise, such as the United States and Norway, should collaborate with the Colombian government to develop this framework.

4. Support the independence and efficiency of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), an innovative and far-reaching transitional and restorative justice system in Colombia.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) is a backbone of Colombia’s 2016 peace accord. Its ability to deliver justice promptly and guarantee legal certainty to those under its jurisdiction is essential for the legitimacy and sustainability of the peace process. Particular attention should be paid to the resolution of the case to grant amnesty and guarantee legal security to demobilized FARC combatants, who were signatories of the accord for political or other relatively minor crimes, as stipulated in the final accord. Even after seven years, the overwhelming majority of these individuals still do not have their respective legal situations resolved, despite having administrative amnesties. This is a core commitment of the accord, and failure to follow through might lay ground for resentment and the resurgence of conflict in Colombia.

A police officer stands guard while a backhoe removes earth as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Unit for the Search for Disappeared Persons (UBPD) resume the search for the remains of people authorities suspect were killed between 1999 and 2004 by guerrillas and paramilitaries who dumped their bodies amid tons of rubble, in Medellin, Colombia July 26, 2024. REUTERS/Juan David Duque

Equally critical is the work of the JEP in advancing all eleven “macro cases” that it has taken on. The failure to resolve even one of these macro cases, now eight years after the signing of the accord, has damaged the credibility of the JEP and shaped public opinion about it. This is compounded by the JEP’s decision to include—and thereby protect from normal judicial processing—high-profile individuals whose cases were not intended to be treated in this manner. Both of these issues—one an error of omission (failure to resolve macro cases) and the other an error of commission (including Salvatore Mancuso, a Colombian paramilitary leader who once was second in command of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and other paramilitary leaders)—have undermined public confidence in the JEP.

To ensure the success of the peace process, it is vital that US agencies work alongside the Colombian government to support effective implementation and ensure the participation of both victims and perpetrators in restorative justice mechanisms. It is essential that the JEP, under its jurisdiction, make progress in holding accountable those responsible for the gravest crimes committed in the Colombian armed conflict, eight years after the accord was signed. It is also vital that US agencies work alongside the Colombian government to ensure effective implementation and support for victims and perpetrators’ participation in restorative justice mechanisms. Strengthening the strategy for communication and participation of ethnic peoples in all cases, but especially Case 09, will help ensure the conditions necessary for their participation in judicial proceedings to have a reparation-oriented purpose. This includes providing for culturally specific measures, such as guaranteeing interpretation during hearings and translation of essential court documents, for communities still using their native languages. It is of the utmost importance to strengthen mechanisms for coordination across cases so that the most serious and representative acts perpetrated during the armed conflict are held accountable before the JEP and that sanctions are closely related to the harm caused. Reparation under the JEP is collective and symbolic. Importantly, it is not solely the JEP’s responsibility to deliver reparations; the Colombian state and its judicial institutions also play a crucial role.

Conclusion: A call to action

The implementation of the 2016 peace accord requires political will, broader coordination, and consistent technical assistance. The persisting conflict in Colombia requires attention and a coordinated strategy that places the 2016 peace accord at its core. Tides are changing in the region, as illegal armed groups and organized crime groups are thinking creatively about how to bypass state institutions to expand their illicit empires. Meanwhile, many governments in the region are approaching the problem differently, without a clear strategy in mind. Colombia, however, has a clear roadmap with the 2016 peace accord to help territories prevent the resurgence of conflict and deal with current illegal actors. Partner governments like the United States and European countries have committed to Colombia’s security by investing millions of dollars in the peace accord—but Colombia’s government needs the political will to prioritize the accord.

Addressing the lagging implementation of the accord will not only result in greater security for Colombia but will also address persistent drivers of violence such as poverty and inequality. The security situation across Colombia is resulting in loss of territories and greater clashes among groups, with citizens getting caught in the crossfire. The expansion of multinational criminal entities also poses a threat to US national security, meaning that more actors across governments, international organizations, business communities, and foundations are motivated to unlock new and innovative ways of support. Leveraging these opportunities will be critical.

But the bottom line is that Colombia needs to continue upholding its part by prioritizing the implementation of the 2016 peace accord and showing tangible results to regain its legitimacy in the fight against organized crime.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, for their leadership as honorary co-chairs of the US-Colombia Advisory Group. It is always a true pleasure and honor to work with them and to see how successful bipartisan efforts come to fruition. Thank you to Robert Zarate, Daniel Tirosh, Lucas Da Pieve, Charles Orta, Guy Mentel, and Tom Melia for facilitating the unwavering cooperation of our honorary co-chairs.

Isabel Chiriboga, assistant director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC), was an instrumental force behind this project from start to finish. She played a key role in coordinating the advisory group, drafting the report, and organizing multiple strategy sessions. We also thank Enrique Millán-Mejía, an AALAC consultant, who provided crucial expertise and important feedback, and Isabella Palacios, AALAC young global professional, for her excellent research, editorial support and logistical support throughout the publication process. The success of this project is also thanks to the leadership of Jason Marczak and Geoff Ramsey, who worked to convene the advisory group and whose passion for a prosperous US-Colombia strategic partnership is reflected in this brief.

For decisive input, thorough research, and as an exceptional adviser on the topic, we thank Ambassador Kevin Whitaker, Ambassador Carolina Barco, and Steve Hege. We would also like to thank AMUNAFRO (Asociación de Alcaldes de Municipios con Población Afrodescendiente) and the mayors who provided decisive input and perspectives during their trip to Washington DC and after reading this publication. For their precise editorial assistance and flexibility, we thank Mary Kate Aylward and Beverly Larson and for the excellent design assistance, we thank Andrea Ratiu.

Program

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1 The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame is responsible for monitoring and technically verifying the implementation of the 2016 Colombian peace accord. The Kroc Institute’s Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) Barometer Initiative in Colombia provides summary reports and briefs on the accord’s implementation status to government officials, United Nations representatives, and other agencies. The Kroc Institute’s methodology combines qualitative analysis with empirical data to assess the implementation of the accord’s 558 stipulations, 74 subthemes, and eighteen themes.

2 meaning that some progress has been made but that more is needed to meet the timeframe.

3 meaning that full implementation is possible at the current pace.

4 The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame is responsible for monitoring and technically verifying the implementation of the 2016 Colombian peace accord. The Kroc Institute’s Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) Barometer Initiative in Colombia provides summary reports and briefs on the accord’s implementation status to government officials, United Nations representatives, and other agencies. The Kroc Institute’s methodology combines qualitative analysis with empirical data to assess the implementation of the accord’s 558 stipulations, 74 subthemes, and eighteen themes.

5 meaning that some progress has been made but that more is needed to meet the timeframe.

6 meaning that full implementation is possible at the current pace.

7 The International Committee of the Red Cross is based on International Humanitarian Law, which establishes two criteria for a situation of violence to be classified as a noninternational armed conflict: that the armed groups have a sufficient level of organization and that the hostilities between the parties reach a minimum level of intensity. Both must come together. The ICRC technically and objectively analyzes whether these two criteria are met on the basis of information collected directly in the territories.

8 A register of property showing the extent, value, and ownership of land for taxation.

The post A path forward for Colombia’s 2016 peace accord and lasting security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine needs Western support to boost its nuclear energy potential

Stephen Blank — Tue, 05 Nov 2024 19:26:36 +0000

A critical element of Russia’s strategy against Ukraine is its systematic effort to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. By bombing Ukraine’s power grid, Moscow aims to disrupt the Ukrainian war effort, cripple the Ukrainian economy, and demoralize Ukrainians. The country is currently braced for widespread blackouts during the coming winter months.

Since March 2024, Russia has decimated Ukraine’s thermal and hydro power plants. As a result, Ukraine is now reliant on the country’s nuclear industry to provide over 70 percent of its electricity needs. It is therefore vital for Ukraine to protect, sustain, and expand its nuclear power generation. Given the Soviet origin of Ukraine’s nuclear power industry, this will not be straightforward.

Obtaining parts to keep old reactors in operation while Kyiv transitions to Western nuclear technologies and expands energy production in other sectors, such as renewables, is essential. An opportunity to overcome the scarcity of parts now presents itself and must be seized to help Ukraine keep its infrastructure running and expand the country’s nuclear electricity generation as quickly as possible.

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As part of efforts to fill gaps in energy generation created by Russia’s targeted attacks, Ukraine and Bulgaria are currently pursuing a deal to transfer excess nuclear equipment intended for Bulgaria’s Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to Ukraine’s Khmelnytsky NPP. This will make it possible to complete construction of reactors three and four at the Ukrainian plant.

Once Bulgaria had ruled out beginning the process of installing Russian-produced equipment at its Belene NPP, the Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear company, Energoatom, quickly recognized an opportunity. They saw that Bulgaria was now the only country in the world with the type of excess Russian nuclear equipment needed to complete the unfinished units at Khmelnytsky NPP.

Given that Ukraine started building the two incomplete units some years ago using Russian technology, it faced two options: Abandon the units and their power generation entirely, or access the equipment possessed by Bulgaria to safely install those components in cooperation with Energoatom’s Western nuclear industry partners to increase electricity production in Ukraine. In the process, this could lead to new shared expertise that will help countries around the world reduce and ultimately end their dependence on Russia’s Rosatom.

Eurasia Center events

I. Russian information influence activities against nonproliferation

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Ongoing negotiations between Ukraine and Bulgaria highlight Russia’s declining energy clout in the Balkans, but this does not mean that the initiative is without challenges. On the contrary, a number of major obstacles are holding up completion of this vital deal. One is Russia’s long-standing influence in Bulgaria. This includes the activities of Kremlin proxies in Bulgaria who are working to sabotage the transfer of Bulgaria’s nuclear equipment to Ukraine. The second barrier is the financing of the potential equipment transfer.

For decades, Russia has exercised considerable influence in the Bulgarian energy, media, and political spheres. Moscow is not relinquishing its position without a fight, and is doing everything possible to maintain its standing as a decisive player in Bulgarian affairs.

A key component of Moscow’s strategy in Bulgaria is the systematic organization of a campaign, closely resembling efforts elsewhere including in Moldova and Serbia, to quash the deal with Ukraine, thereby preventing additional power generation in Ukraine and further eroding Ukraine’s efforts to end its dependence on Russia in the nuclear sphere. Earlier this year, when Ukrainian nuclear experts traveled to Bulgaria to inspect the equipment, supporters of Bulgaria’s pro-Russian Vazrazhdane (Revival) party clashed with the Ukrainian delegation and sought to prevent it from accessing the equipment.

The second key issue is financing, with talks already underway for almost two years. Bulgaria’s parliament is pressing the government to conclude the deal at a price of at least €600 million, the same price the Bulgarian National Electricity Company paid to Russia’s Atomstroyexport. Progress could be made if international partners provide Bulgaria with funding to invest in the expansion of its Kozloduy NPP, where Westinghouse will build reactors. The fact that Westinghouse is engaged in fuel production and reactor building in both Ukraine and Bulgaria is a potentially important point of intersection for the two countries and reflects why the United States in particular has an interest in the successful transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine.

Given that the purchase and transfer of the equipment would benefit Europe’s long-term energy security, there are European funds that could be used, including those available via the European Commission’s Ukraine Facility, which has a mandate to rebuild infrastructure and support the continuity of critical services such as energy transmission. The US could support the Europeans in this endeavor, including by allocating funding from its aid to Ukraine. However, Kyiv is likely to face significant transparency concerns and will need to instill stakeholder confidence.

The transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine would help address Kyiv’s electricity generation needs while also representing a major setback for Russia’s strategy in both Ukraine and the Balkans. Boosting Ukraine’s nuclear power capabilities would enhance the country’s economic outlook and position Ukraine to eventually replace Russia as a principal energy supplier to Europe in the postwar period. This makes Ukraine’s acquisition of Bulgarian nuclear power plant equipment a significant opportunity for the West that must not be missed.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

II. Recognizing Russian information influence activities

III. Responding to Russian information influence activities

IV. Reinforcing a community of practice

V. Considerations for implementation and the way ahead

Russian information influence activities against nonproliferation

Russia relies on a range of malign tactics to complement its conventional warfare capabilities, including information manipulation. Throughout Europe, Russia creates or amplifies false narratives that support the Kremlin’s ultimate geopolitical goals: undermining unity and security in Europe and abroad.¹ These narratives attempt to evoke emotional and psychological responses from the public with the broader aim of amplifying polarization, undermining democracy, and weakening support for international norms and institutions.

Russia’s information manipulation networks—which consist of official spokespeople, state-run media, proxy websites, social media, and other entities—aim to exploit fears and sensationalize threats through a range of information influence activities (IIA), a term we use to capture the multifaceted nature of information manipulation. IIA includes disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, and propaganda (see definitions in Table 1 and a full list of key terms in Appendix I).

Sources: Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/disinformation/; James Pammen, A Capability Definition and Assessment Framework for Countering Disinformation, Information Influence, and Foreign Interference, NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, November 2022; Dean Jackson, “Distinguishing Disinformation From Propaganda, Misinformation, and ‘Fake News,’” National Endowment for Democracy and International Forum for Democratic Studies, n.d.; “How to Identify Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation,” Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, ITSAP.00.300, February 2022; and “Understanding Propaganda and Disinformation,” European Parliament, November 2015.

Russia has perfected its use of information influence activities to achieve its geopolitical goals. Through its information networks, Russia attempts to inject narratives favorable to the Kremlin.² Russia’s tactics include saturating the information space, continuously sharing false and misleading information, and amplifying preexisting narratives.³ These narratives try to damage the credibility of political institutions and instill feelings of distrust, confusion, and fear.⁴

Historically, Russia has targeted states around the world with information warfare. In Europe, topics such as inflation, migration, and energy shortages are regular targets of Russian disinformation.⁵ To amplify its IIA, Russia uses a broad network of fake pages, social media accounts, and private messaging groups. However, authentic accounts—including many within the countries that Russia is targeting—are often just as involved in these campaigns, whether they know it or not.⁶ Media outlets within targeted countries frequently pick up, repackage, and amplify Russian narratives, furthering the impact and resonance of the Kremlin’s influence.⁷

Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in 2022 featured IIA as a prominent Kremlin tactic to augment Putin’s conventional war. Russia’s methods included frequent narratives designed to target nonproliferation norms and regimes, which continues a pattern the Soviets followed during the Cold War. These tactics mirror previous Soviet patterns of employing “active measures,” or covert propaganda and influence operations to project control surrounding CBRN weapons and erode trust in democratic institutions.⁸ As part of its active measures campaign, the Soviet Union made false allegations that the United States had developed and used biological weapons.⁹ After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia targeted the activities of the US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program by alleging the US government employed the CTR program as a cover to develop CBRN weapons throughout Europe and Eurasia, even though the CTR program was developed to curb the possible spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) throughout the region after the Soviet Union’s collapse and included Russian participation until 2014.¹⁰

Russia continues to spread unfounded allegations that ongoing partnerships between the United States and other countries are fronts for biological weapons development programs.¹¹ Russia intensified its use of propaganda and false claims that argued Ukraine was engaged in developing biological weapons to be used against Russian civilians.¹² These efforts damage the credibility of the work conducted in legitimate research facilities, undermine public trust in these institutions, and potentially jeopardize the safety of laboratory staff.

After the re-invasion of Ukraine, Russia intensified its influence operations across Europe to sway public opinion in its favor. Many of Russia’s claims included that Moscow is seeking peace, Ukraine is inherently aggressive, the West instigated the war, and the European Union (EU) and NATO are to blame for increased tensions in the region.¹³ Russia complements its conventional war in Ukraine with information warfare to fracture Western support for Ukraine, and shore up global support from nonaligned countries within multilateral organizations.¹⁴

Russia published false claims of “dirty bombs” being built in Ukraine on state-run media. In reality, the photo evidence was taken from a Slovenian reactor. Image: Deutsche Welle/Agency for Radwaste Management of Slovenia

Impact of Russian information influence activities on nonproliferation norms

Russia’s manipulation of the information space to erode support for nonproliferation includes continued support for the Assad regime in Syria through disinformation and misinformation, despite Assad’s well-documented history of using chemical weapons against civilian populations in Syria’s civil war in the mid-2010s.¹⁵ Russia has also used the information domain to spread false and misleading information related to the Kremlin’s targeted assassination attempts with chemical weapons. This included Moscow’s attack on Russian dissidents in the United Kingdom (UK), against a former KGB agent and his daughter, as well as on its own territory against prominent dissident Alexei Navalny.¹⁶

Russia combines information influence activities with disruptive behavior in multilateral institutions, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to interrupt proceedings, derail procedures, and slow down investigations.¹⁷ Russian diplomats levy false accusations against nations Moscow deems hostile to stymie progress and undermine the authority of these organizations.¹⁸ These actions are not necessarily used to persuade others to accept Russia’s arguments, but instead to create doubt and confusion, undercut the unity and effectiveness of the organizations, and weaken protections of nonproliferation norms and regimes.¹⁹ Russia’s allegations include that Ukraine is concocting plans for a potential chemical attack (articulated at the OPCW in 2022),²⁰ preparing to deploy dirty bombs and nuclear weapons (UN, 2022),²¹ and using and developing biological weapons (BWC, 2022).²²

Russia’s false claims weaken accountability and verification measures established to monitor compliance with international treaties that ban CBRN weapons and regulate the legitimate use of technologies that have a dual-purpose capacity to create such weapons.²³ These claims also undermine efforts to strengthen and modernize nonproliferation norms and regimes, especially with respect to emerging technologies. Russia’s actions also distract from the Kremlin’s own harmful activities and noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations, especially Russia’s support for and use of chemical weapons, their sympathy for other regimes that have used CBRN weapons, and their escalatory rhetoric.

Figure 1: Russia published false claims of “dirty bombs” being built in Ukraine on state-run media. In reality, the photo evidence was taken from a Russian reactor. Image: Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/fact-check-russias-false-case-for-a-dirty-bomb-inukraine/a-63590306.

Figure 2: Russia’s Foreign Ministry claimed the United States shipped chemicals to Ukraine to be used against Russian soldiers, while only providing a random assortment of graphics taken from other contexts as “evidence.” Image: Twitter/strana-rosatom.ru, http://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1630683781215526912.

In several posts on state-run media and on social platforms, the Kremlin shared so-called evidence that Ukraine was developing a “dirty bomb,” an explosive device that contains radioactive material. However, the photo—depicted in Figure 1—was taken from other websites. In this instance, the photo provided as “evidence” was taken from the Russian stateowned nuclear energy company Rosatom. In Figure 2, Russia claimed the United States was providing toxic chemicals and other CBRN-related materiel to Ukraine, which indicated a “large scale provocation.” These kinds of narratives could serve as false flag scenarios for Russia’s own potential use of CBRN weapons, which would have severe consequences for nonproliferation norms in Ukraine and more broadly in Europe.

Overall, these tactics serve as tools in Russia’s toolbox to discredit and weaken the multilateral institutions and regimes that govern nonproliferation. Russia’s persistent IIA erode trust and credibility in nonproliferation, which safeguards the international community from the development and use of CBRN weapons. The effects of Russian IIA are widespread, as evidenced by the experience of three European countries: Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. The following sections provide an overview of each country’s recent experience with Russia’s false claims associated with nonproliferation and CBRN weapons.

Slovenia

Slovenia has been an active target of Russian disinformation and information influence activities. In 2016, Russia claimed NATO would harbor a secret arsenal of nuclear weapons throughout Eastern Europe,²⁴ including in Slovenia. Russian state media organizations invested millions of dollars in Central and Eastern European countries, such as Slovenia, to influence domestic politics and exacerbate political polarization through state-run media channels, government proxies, and other systems. Many of Slovenia’s top proliferators of disinformation and other falsehoods have significant inroads and connections to Russian state-media organizations.²⁵

Several websites that maintain strong linkages to Russia and the Kremlin—including RBTH Daily, NewsFront, and Katehon—operate or are available in Slovenia and consistently post dangerous rhetoric on the EU, NATO, and the United States. Russia launched RBTH Daily, a mobile app version of its Russia Beyond service operated by the Russian state news agency that regularly publishes content in Slovenian.²⁶

Figure 3: The Slovenian government’s response to Russian disinformation about radioactive weapons being used in Ukraine. ARAO stands for Agency for Radwaste Management, which is responsible for managing all radioactive waste in Slovenia. Image: Twitter/govslovenia, https://twitter.com/govSlovenia/status/1584936237806206976.

In early 2023, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on Twitter that Ukraine was secretly building a dirty bomb and included a series of photos as evidence.²⁷ One of the photos was taken directly from a 2010 public education campaign on the Slovenian Agency for Radioactive Waste’s website. In response, the Slovenian government quickly published a statement on its official website and on social media that denied Russia’s claims and stressed that nuclear waste was stored safely in the country (see Figure 3).²⁸ Slovenian government authorities responded to these Russian campaigns and attempts to undermine its credibility with facts, data, and truthful information.²⁹

Slovakia

Russia also has frequently targeted Slovakia with IIA. Within Slovakia, pro-Russia propagandists are actively working to discredit Slovakia’s allies,³⁰ including the United States, the EU, and other NATO allies to downplay Russian aggression in Ukraine, deflect blame from historical conflicts, and denigrate responses from across the Alliance. These campaigns also attempt to erode trust in and the credibility of nonproliferation norms and regimes.

A general view of the “Foreign Ministers of Partners at Risk of Russian Disinformation and Destabilization” session at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Bucharest, Romania, November 2022. Source: Stoyan Nenov/REUTERS

For example, in May 2023, Russia spread disinformation in Slovakia regarding an alleged radiation leak as a result of an explosion of the ammunition warehouse in the Ukrainian city of Khmelnytskyi.³¹ Through its claims circulated on social media channels and with support from the Russian embassy in Slovakia, the Kremlin attempted to incite fear within targeted communities that there was a significant airborne risk of radiation spilling over into Slovakia from Ukraine.³²

In 2022, the Russian embassy in Bratislava issued several posts that claimed the United States and Ukraine were developing biological agents. The embassy—which was named by the International Republican Institute’s Beacon Project as the most virulent in circulating disinformation across Moscow’s network of diplomatic missions—alleged that the United States and Ukraine were developing biological weapons that could target specific ethnic groups, including Slavs.³³

Similar to Slovenia’s experience, the Kremlin injects pro-Russian messaging within Slovakia to amplify its geopolitical goals. One recurring target of Russian information manipulation is the bilateral defense cooperation agreement (DCA) that Slovakia signed with the United States in 2022.³⁴ After it was signed, Russian operatives began to inject falsified information that the DCA would include the deployment of nuclear weapons in Slovakia.³⁵

Slovakia’s elections in September 2023 were preceded by an influx of false and misleading messages, including those from Russia. The London-based nonprofit organization Reset recorded more than 365,000 election-related disinformation messages on Slovak social networks in the first two weeks of September, with estimates that the number would grow.³⁶

Their research found messages that violated social network terms of use and featured disinformation generated more than five times as much exposure as the average message. More than 15 percent of such content was posted by pro-Kremlin accounts.

Serbia

Serbia is one of Russia’s top targets in Eastern Europe for IIA. Serbia is deeply affected by Russian information operations that attempt to undermine perceptions of the EU, NATO, and other multilateral institutions in the region. With respect to CBRN weapons and nonproliferation, Russia has established a number of fake profiles, proxy pages, and state-run media (including Belgrade-based offices of Russia Today and Sputnik) in Serbia to share and amplify favorable stories on these issues.³⁷ Both Russia Today and Sputnik publish a constant flow of articles that relate to CBRN weapons and nonproliferation. Russia has invested resources and funds into ensuring that narratives gain a broader audience, especially in the Western Balkans, given Serbia’s relationship with Russia.³⁸ Several Russian state-sponsored or state-connected media organizations publish Serbian-language content in support of the Kremlin,³⁹ including News Front, SouthFront, Geopolitica.ru, and Katehon. For example, SouthFront has circulated several false claims, including that the OPCW neglected to share key details in their investigation on Syria’s chemical weapons program or that US accusations of Russia’s involvement in chemical attacks in Syria were an act of “whitewashing.”⁴⁰

Supporters of the opposition ‘Serbia Against Violence’ (SPN) coalition protest in front of the Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) building amid opposition claims of major election law violations in the Belgrade city and parliament races, which were the subject of frequent information influence campaigns, in Belgrade, Serbia. Source: REUTERS/Marko Djurica

However, even as Russian state-run media organizations maintain presences in Serbia, their most frequent tactic involves flooding the information space to see what resonates the most within local communities. Through these tactics, local media outlets in Serbia frequently repost and amplify Moscow’s claims laid out in state-run media, which has much more impact in reaching the public because many individuals in Serbia have greater trust in local media outlets. For example, on Serbian platforms, false claims include the story of the United States and Ukraine developing bats as biological weapons to attack Russians.⁴¹ These platforms include local media organizations, television broadcasters, radio stations, and others in Serbia that amplify, give credibility to, or create their own narratives that mirror the Kremlin’s priorities.

These narratives circulate beyond Serbia throughout the Western Balkans. Given the reach of Serbian media and historical connections with other nations in the region, many of the narratives related to CBRN weapons and nonproliferation that are shared in Serbia are picked up by other media organizations—including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia—with great effect. Russia benefits significantly from destabilization in the Western Balkans, especially when Serbia and its neighbors do not condemn Russia’s actions within the international community. As part of its broader geopolitical strategy, Russia uses Serbian media organizations as proxies to create distrust in nonproliferation regimes while degrading broader support for global nonproliferation norms.⁴²

A strategic framework to counter Russian information influence activities

Given the scope and severity of Russian threats to nonproliferation norms in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia, the project team developed a strategic framework for countering Russian IIA with the Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction. We convened private, small-group workshops with representatives from government, civil society, academia, media, think tanks, business groups, law enforcement, and other sectors in Ljubljana, Bratislava, and Belgrade in 2023.⁴³ The first series of workshops, conducted in all three cities, was designed to educate personnel who were familiar with the challenges of IIA but less knowledgeable about nonproliferation topics, especially as it relates to the risks IIA pose to the stability of nonproliferation norms and potential use of CBRN weapons. These workshops included a scenario-based exercise where attendees were asked to create a counter-messaging strategy to respond to a hypothetical disinformation campaign from an adversary that involved an anthrax leak at a secure government laboratory.⁴⁴

After these workshops were completed, the project team used the results of the discussions, our extensive research, and consultations with experts in the region to create a draft strategic framework for countering IIA. The framework is comprised of three critical elements, or pillars. As depicted in Figure 4, the three pillars are recognize, respond, and reinforce a community of practice. For the next series of workshops, the project team returned to Bratislava and Belgrade to present the draft strategic framework to similar groups of experts, both those who were present at the first workshops and new stakeholders. Participants shared their views related to the three pillars, as well as the threat of Russian IIA more generally in their countries. Their feedback was critical to finalize the strategic framework presented in this report.

Figure 4: The Atlantic Council’s strategic framework for countering Russian information influence activities.

These pillars reflect the central elements of establishing resilience against disinformation, misinformation, and other forms of IIA. As Figure 4 demonstrates, the pillars are mutually reinforcing. For example, members of a community of practice can help each other recognize possible Russian IIA and devise effective response strategies. Response options can be studied by the community of practice to understand strengths and identify areas for improvement. The next three chapters describe each pillar of the strategic framework in greater detail.

Recognizing information influence activities

Through its IIA, Russia attempts to distract from its own harmful actions and noncompliance with nonproliferation norms and regimes. These actions include Russia’s use of chemical agents as weapons, its support for other regimes who have deployed chemical weapons, and its threats of nuclear escalation in Ukraine. Russia’s long history of sowing doubt and confusion in public discourse by manipulating information goes beyond its borders. In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia, Russia has perpetuated narratives designed to undermine nonproliferation norms, including those about the development and use of CBRN weapons. The first pillar in our strategic framework is recognize, which covers strategies, methods, and tools to identify IIA. This pillar is critical to promoting public awareness of—and resilience against—Russian influence.

Key principles of recognizing information influence activities

Effective tools and methods to recognize IIA are critical to fostering greater resilience and promoting critical thinking. Many governments and organizations have prepared guidelines for how to recognize disinformation, misinformation, and other types of IIA.⁴⁵ Several of these guidelines discuss the importance of verifying, authenticating, and scrutinizing information. Some tools are tailored for academic settings or for government and multilateral institution representatives.⁴⁶ However, the wider public can use many of the same tools. Common elements include the following principles:

Check the sources of the content and authenticate legitimacy

Understanding the source of a social media post or article is a critical first step in determining whether the information is reliable. Media consumers should assess whether a source is a reputable and well-established individual, organization, media outlet, or other legitimate entity. This is especially important when considering responses to nonproliferation-related information manipulation.

The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) produced a guide titled “Disinformation Stops with You,” which recommends several useful tactics to evaluate content, including investigating the issue with other reliable sources of information and thinking before sharing the content online.⁴⁷ CISA’s guide, built around the principles outlined in Figure 5, serves as an important tool for local communities to identify forms of foreign malign influence. Ensuring accuracy and conducting diligent fact-checking can help prevent the spread and impact of IIA.

Figure 5: CISA’s “Disinformation Stops With You” project, encouraging members of the community to recognize and combat disinformation and other forms of IIA. Image: CISA, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_1115_cisa_nrmc-Disinformation-Stops-With-You_0.pdf.

Verify information within the article or publication

Cross-checking information through multiple reputable sources is instrumental in confirming the accuracy of content. Fact-checking websites and other digital literacy tools provide a methodical approach to validating the claims presented in an article. Fact-checking and verifying information also can serve as an important educational tool for individuals to learn how to critically assess information. Digital and media literacy exercises allow the public to make better-informed judgments on the credibility of content before sharing.

Apart from fact-checking websites, trusted networks can serve as another way to corroborate information before publishing or sharing content. During each workshop, participants frequently pointed to how often they rely on their own trusted relationships to screen information. Verifying content is an important step in mitigating the spread of falsehoods and minimizing the impact of Russian IIA.

Prior to circulating any media online, audiences should inspect and identify the publication date of an article or post. A frequent Russian tactic includes circulating outdated information with eye-catching headlines that mislead audiences. First Draft News published a guide to corroborating false information online that recommends examining a webpage’s metadata to verify the date of the publication matches supporting sourcing elsewhere online and in print media.⁴⁸ Checking the publication date before sharing information can be a critical step in mitigating the spread of outdated, irrelevant, and sensationalized content.

Authenticate the authorship of content

Audiences should confirm the authorship of publications, especially as IIA can involve the impersonation of credible individuals or organizations.⁴⁹ Given that authors tend to publish within their area of responsibility and substantive focus, it is important to consider how the publication fits within the author’s broader expertise. Establishing the author’s identity by verifying their credentials contributes to the overall trustworthiness of the content.⁵⁰ Validating author identities is a necessary component to combat disinformation, while building trust and support for legitimate reporting.

Inspect multimedia and other content included within the post

With the development of new and emerging technologies, fabricated and doctored multimedia content appear more frequently on various publications, including social media posts and fringe website pages.⁵¹ To ensure manipulated content is properly verified, audiences should corroborate images and video to prevent manipulation through deepfakes, AI-generated photos and videos, deceptive editing, and other forms of online personalization.

Deepfake images in particular can mislead audiences to believe falsified content is real. For example, two seemingly authentic screenshots of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaking at a press conference appear in Figure 6.

Figure 6: A side-by-side comparison of screenshots that claim to be Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The photo on the right is real; the image on the left is a deepfake. Image comparison: Snopes, https://www.snopes.com/news/2022/03/16/zelenskyy-deepfake-shared/.

Both images appear to be authentic, but upon closer examination, there are indications that the image on the right was doctored. In this instance, the image on the right is an authentic photograph, while the image on the left is an AI-generated deepfake. However, for a user who is scrolling quickly on Facebook or X (formerly known as Twitter), the difference may not be easy to discern, creating an even more challenging information environment.

Similarly, IIA rely on visually compelling or sensational images and video to evoke extreme reactions from audiences. This holds especially true for CBRN-related disinformation, which can grab attention and spread rapidly online, in print and broadcast media, and through word of mouth.⁵² As new methods for misleading audiences are developed, it is imperative for the public to ensure content has not been altered, taken out of context, or misconstrued to serve ulterior interests.

Tools to detect information influence activities

In many cases, it can be difficult to detect and identify IIA as they arise, especially as Russia deploys several kinds of narratives. As local media outlets frequently parrot Russian IIA and communities battle the constant influx of propaganda, people can unintentionally share misinformation. Several tools and methods exist to help identify and verify the accuracy of information shared online.

Fact-checking and debunking websites

Fact-checking sites and debunking organizations play an important role in assessing the accuracy of information shared online. Fact-checkers often investigate and corroborate claims made in news articles, social media posts, and official government documents.

In Europe, EUvsDisinfo,⁵³ Snopes,⁵⁴ and PolitiFact are good examples of fact-checking and debunking websites.⁵⁵ In Slovenia, Oštro⁵⁶ and its fact-checking arm, Razkrinkavanje,⁵⁷ play an important role in vetting truthful information within the public domain. In Slovakia, fact-checking and debunking webpages—including Demagog.sk⁵⁸ and Infosecurity.sk⁵⁹—frequently fact-checked the statements of candidates during the September 2023 parliamentary elections. Similar organizations also exist in Serbia, including the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA),⁶⁰ FakeNews Tragač,⁶¹ and the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK).⁶² Finally, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty plays an important regional role throughout Central and Eastern Europe through its mission of sharing truthful information and independent analysis.⁶³

Reverse image search methods

Reverse image search tools are another important tactic in verifying online information. These platforms allow users to corroborate and verify the original uses and sources of images. Many reserve image search tools also provide tracing capabilities for audiences to track where the image has been circulated and whether the photos have previously been used in different contexts. In addition, reverse image search tools can determine whether questionable content has previously been used in other contexts. Similarly, in instances where images have been created and manipulated using deepfake technology, reverse image search tools are able to uncover the original sources of images and reveal inconsistencies, such as facial features, landscape backgrounds, and other details.

Figure 7: TinEye’s reverse image search platform can help users identify existing uses of images online. Image: https://tineye.com/.

Several platforms including Google Images,⁶⁴ TinEye,⁶⁵ and ImageRaider⁶⁶ are examples of systems that can help individuals confirm the authenticity of visual content online. TinEye, as displayed in Figure 7, uses a database of over sixty-four billion images for users to cross-reference when photos have been used in other contexts. Given how technical CBRN-related topics can be for audiences, these tools are important to support efforts in debunking and combating the spread of Russian IIA related to nonproliferation.

Web browser extensions

As search engines become more sophisticated, browser extensions can be useful tools to help identify false and misleading information, especially on webpages that tend to share disinformation. Many extensions can analyze links and sources in real time, which provides important details on the trustworthiness of information online.

One example of a browser extension is NewsGuard, which provides ratings and detailed information about the news sites that users visit as they read through various webpages.⁶⁷ SurfSafe is another example that can help identify disinformation and other forms of IIA through highlighting tools on content posts.⁶⁸ TinEye, the aforementioned reverse image search tool, also offers a browser extension for verifying visual content in real time when visiting webpages.

Digital forensics tools

Digital forensics tools are more specialized software that can investigate and analyze sophisticated IIA. Many of these tools can comb through the metadata of websites, which can reveal important details of webpages and their creation, modification, and origins, especially in tracing links to other pages. Other tools, such as social media forensics technologies, can assist investigators in tracking the spread of disinformation, identifying key actors within information influence networks, and analyzing the extent of Russian IIA’s reach and impact.

Figure 8: InVID is a useful digital forensics tool that can help analyze video footage that is spread online. Image: https://www.invid-project.eu/description/.

One sample tool is InVID, a browser extension that can verify the authenticity of videos and information shared on social media.⁶⁹ The tool, as seen in Figure 8, can be used in a variety of different formats, including a browser extension and mobile phone application. Forensically is another suite of digital tools for digital forensics, including image analysis and other forms of authenticating content.⁷⁰ Both forensics analysis systems are useful in identifying manipulated content and deepfake technology.

Augmenting methods to recognize information influence activities

Our discussions with representatives in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia demonstrated that recognizing information influence activities is an important step to counter Russian influence efforts. However, these efforts need to be supported and complemented by effective responses to these campaigns. To counter Russian IIA, the recognize pillar of our strategic framework seeks to address some of the broader strategies that may be used in understanding the threat of disinformation and other forms of malign influence activity. In Chapter 3, we discuss our second pillar, responding to Russian information influence activities, which examines best practices and recent responses to Russian IIA.

Responding to information influence activities

Through our research, we identified several key principles to consider when crafting a response to Russian IIA. These principles are reinforced by examples from the United States, as well as the experiences of individuals in Slovenia, Slovakia, Serbia, and elsewhere. The second pillar in our strategic framework is respond, which covers strategies and narratives used to counter Russian IIA. Workshop participants demonstrated these principles when asked to create a response to the anthrax exposure posited in our hypothetical scenario-based exercise described in Appendix II. Several attendees also shared insights from their experiences creating responses to real-world Russian IIA, which we discuss in this chapter.

Key principles of responding to information influence activities

When crafting a response to Russian IIA, it is important to keep several key principles in mind: prioritize transparency and concise messaging, connect the ideas to the correct audience and platforms; and determine the best person to deliver the message.

Be transparent, clear, and concise

An effective response should be factual and clear, especially when addressing scientific and technical information that can be confusing to a non-specialist audience. By using clear and concise information, complex topics such as nonproliferation or chemical weapons can be distilled into digestible language that is easy to understand. Russia recognizes that CBRN-related issues and WMD threats are often not well understood among the general community, which makes them popular topics for false narratives.

Russia’s use of emotionally charged IIA has made the need for clear responses a priority. In Serbia, CRTA’s Istinomer project is at the forefront of debunking, fact-checking, and countering Russian IIA.⁷¹ Istinomer consistently monitors disinformation and misinformation on social media to determine which narratives are resonating the most within communities. Following their analysis, Istinomer staff publish short-form posts on their platform that debunk the various claims using facts. See Figure 9 for an example of how the Istinomer team debunked false and misleading claims that mischaracterized the work of US-supported research facilities in Ukraine. In each post, the Istinomer author refutes each false and misleading claim with citations, secondary sources, interviews, and further reading material, including US government reports.

Figure 9: Istinomer regularly fact-checks various forms of IIA on social media platforms using facts and transparency. Image: https://www.istinomer.rs/.

It is important for counter-messaging strategies to include these characteristics to resonate with audiences and ensure effectiveness, especially when it relates to nonproliferation-related information manipulation tactics.

Match the message to the audience and platforms

Different audiences might require tailored messaging strategies, including via different platforms. Younger audiences that receive much of their information from social media platforms may view TikTok before watching a local news broadcast. Those who spend more time driving might listen to radio news than those who commute via other means. Therefore, it is important to consider whether a counternarrative should include more visuals than text based on the intended audience and platform. Messages designed for television will require compelling audio and visual components, but messages designed for print media should focus on attention-grabbing graphics and text that clearly convey the main messages. However, all messages should include the same basic facts to promote consistency and accuracy.

Counter-messaging strategies must consider both the medium for sharing responses as well as the social media platforms themselves. For example, TikTok prioritizes short-form videos, while Instagram focuses more on photographs and other forms of visually appealing content. The combination of message and medium is especially important when considering which kinds of counter-messaging campaigns will resonate with different audiences. Two organizations in Slovenia—Danes je nov dan (Today is a new day) and Pod črto (The Bottom Line)—developed innovative methods of using storytelling to debunk false information in Slovenia using trusted voices and captivating forms of visual media. These efforts deepen the impact and reach of their organizations.⁷² One initiative, which Danes je nov dan termed Mislimetar (Figure 10), serves as an educational and entertainment mobile application that promotes media literacy and critical thinking in younger audiences.

Figure 10: A screenshot of the Danes je nov dan mobile application, Mislimetar, which serves as an important media literacy tool in Slovenia. Image: https://danesjenovdan.si/en/campaigns.

Regional differences also are important to consider. For example, in Slovakia, workshop participants said that Facebook and Telegram are more popular than Instagram or TikTok.⁷³ In Serbia, Telegram is the most frequently used social media platform, while Facebook remains a popular platform in Slovenia. Regardless of platform, it is essential to make sure credible information is available in regional dialects in addition to the main language spoken in a country to reach the broadest possible audience.

Consider who is best to deliver the message

The best person, organization, or outlet to deliver a counternarrative will depend on the country, city, or local area that the message is intended to reach as well as the specific target audience. When asked who the trusted messengers are within their communities, workshop participants in our three countries had varying answers. In Slovakia, the police and armed forces were cited as effective messengers, whereas in Slovenia, participants said a response led by the armed forces would not be well received.

The Slovak Police Force led a popular community-centered Facebook campaign titled “Hoaxy a Podvody” (“Hoaxes and Frauds”), which began in 2018. Through its platform, the Police Force led public engagement to debunk false narratives circulating online and develop an informed and resilient citizenry.⁷⁴ In 2023, the Police Force, part of the Department of Interior, kicked off a campaign called “Hoaxy Sa Na Mňa Nelepia” (“Hoaxes Don’t Stick to Me”). To move the campaign beyond the digital world, members of the community displayed buttons and stickers in public spaces in support of counter-disinformation efforts, as seen in Figure 11. The project’s community-centric focus could be a potential model to replicate in the future.⁷⁵

Figure 11: A photo from the Slovak Police Force Facebook page, which describes the “Hoaxes Don’t Stick to Me” campaign. Image: Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/hoaxPZ/.

Beyond responding: Proactive measures to prevent Russian information influence activities

Our discussions with representatives in all three countries demonstrated that responding alone is not enough to stop Russian IIA. Countries need to get ahead of possible Russian IIA campaigns, an observation shared by US government officials. For example, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) established a dedicated information resilience office in 2022 to better understand the scope of information manipulation against its worldwide countering-WMD presence.⁷⁶ This includes prebunking,⁷⁷ a term that encompasses efforts to anticipate or identify IIA early and encourage resilience among citizens to inoculate them from IIA.⁷⁸ Additionally, the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) has issued numerous reports about Russia’s attempts to spread disinformation about US and Ukrainian biosafety and biosecurity initiatives.⁷⁹ The GEC was established in 2017, but has more recently begun to explore whether sharing limited details about sensitive missions in advance can limit the effect of Russian attempts to twist facts after a mission has occurred.⁸⁰

To effectively counter Russian IIA, the respond pillar of our strategic framework takes a broad approach that incorporates elements of prebunking and early identification to promote a holistic view of response. In this way, response can be proactive or reactive, which is essential to limiting the effects of false narratives Russia spreads worldwide. In the next chapter, we describe our third pillar, reinforcing a community of practice, which encapsulates elements of the first two pillars to augment their importance to a broader audience.

Reinforcing a community of practice

A community of practice committed to identifying and countering Russian IIA is a critical component to limiting the effectiveness of Russia’s efforts to spread false messages in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. For our project, this community is defined broadly to ensure that all stakeholders are represented. Members of the public and private sectors, including government, military, law enforcement, academia, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and the media all have a role to play in recognizing and responding to Russian IIA. This third pillar in our strategic framework is reinforcing a community of practice, which covers opportunities to expand the multistakeholder community dedicated to responding to Russian IIA. In this chapter, we describe the general roles that a community of practice should serve in addition to country-specific considerations discussed throughout our workshops.

Community of practice roles

Members of the community play an important role in promoting resilience among the populations most frequently targeted by Russia’s false messages. These roles include reinforcing consistent communication, expanding social resilience, prioritizing multistakeholder engagement, and identifying methods to expand the overall community dedicated to countering Russian information influence activities.

Resource and reinforce

A vital role for the community of practice is to ensure that efforts to counter Russian IIA reach the broadest possible audience, both within a country and among its regional neighbors, when appropriate. Community members from academia and think tanks can amplify messages from government and law enforcement sources to add legitimacy to their campaigns. This cooperation requires consistent communication among the community to understand Russia’s IIA, how it affects the broader public, and what stakeholders can do to counter false narratives.

In March 2022, the Russian Defense Ministry circulated claims about US-backed Ukrainian bioweapons production efforts to justify Russia’s then-recent invasion of Ukraine.⁸¹ Officials from the People’s Republic of China and incendiary US media figures amplified these claims on a popular social media platform, Weibo.⁸² In response, prominent US officials testified before Congress about the legitimacy of US-backed research facilities in Ukraine—including those established with CTR resources—and organizations like DTRA and the GEC issued fact sheets and statements that bolstered the legitimacy of CTR’s work. Former US officials and private-sector experts wrote editorials, social media posts, and made media appearances decrying Russia’s claims, providing important alternative perspectives that bolstered official government messages. The reinforcement of the key message that the United States and Ukraine were not producing biological weapons was critical to reaching as broad an audience as possible.

Reinforcing capacity-building efforts focused on countering Russian influence efforts is a priority among stakeholders in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. However, interest in these issues must be matched by resources to maintain and create new counternarratives. Many of the workshop participants shoulder numerous work responsibilities in addition to tracking Russian IIA. One benefit of an engaged community of practice is the ability to cooperate on messaging strategies and share the resource burden, including the time it takes to craft engaging, informative narratives and discern the best platform(s) on which to disseminate these narratives. When new approaches are needed to respond to new or evolving Russian falsehoods, an active community can also ensure that key messages from past campaigns are carried over to promote consistency. Furthermore, a coordinated approach among stakeholders to amplify key messages and reduce duplication in messaging is important to reduce confusion and promote clarity.

The community of practice should also focus on enhancing social resilience through public messaging and public education campaigns. While it is more difficult to reach people who espouse aggressively favorable views of false claims, evidence-based messages can influence those who are more open-minded.⁸³ Though it might not be possible to stop Russia’s IIA, a resilient public might be less susceptible to believing or spreading false claims.

Enhancing social resilience emphasizes whole of society responses to counter Russian malign influence activities. This is a deliberately broad goal, but given the complexity of the media landscape, it is difficult to achieve.⁸⁴ A good starting point is by working through trusted messengers to understand whether false narratives have achieved support in specific parts of the community, and why those narratives were persuasive. Local journalists are especially critical because they are in closer contact with parts of the community that national outlets might not understand as well. In this way, local journalists can both contribute to an understanding of the pervasiveness of false messages and what could be effective in changing minds.

Media literacy is another critical component of enhancing resilience. Critical thinking skills that teach students to question everything they read can promote longer-term outcomes than identifying correct and incorrect statements.⁸⁵ Furthermore, engaging the public early and often can promote trust in the output of government data.⁸⁶ Such an approach has demonstrated benefits in countering public health-related disinformation and misinformation, and also applies to Russian IIA about biological and radiological weapons that prey on the health effects of exposure to toxic substances.

Employ multisectoral and multidisciplinary approaches

An important role of the community of practice is to promote effective methods to combat IIA through multisectoral and multidisciplinary approaches. For a complicated and technical subject such as biological weapons—a frequent target of Russia’s IIA efforts—it is critical to include scientists, public health experts, academics, and other experts in the development of responses. Communications experts should seek to translate scientific and technical information into digestible information suitable for a general audience. The Bioweapons Disinformation Monitor, a partnership between King’s College London and the Canadian government, publishes videos, fact sheets, and short reports that concisely explain false Russian narratives about biological weapons and the reasons why these claims are untrue.⁸⁷ In addition to producing concise, factual counternarratives, the website also promotes articles from other sources, such as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and foreign news sites to amplify the work of like-minded organizations in multiple sectors.⁸⁸

Identify opportunities for expansion

When considering other elements of society to incorporate into a community of practice, it is important to cast a wide net. In international relations theory, the concept of latent power refers to the broad range of resources available to a state that could contribute to greater military power.⁸⁹ Russia calls this the correlation of forces and means, which explains how Russia views its military expansion potential, but also incorporates elements of alliance relations, social cohesion, and economic stability that involve broader parts of society.⁹⁰ Although these theories have primarily military implications, the principle that all elements of a society can bolster one critical function applies directly to the fight against Russian IIA.

For example, Estonia has used a multisectoral approach to countering disinformation and misinformation since 2007, when it was subject to destructive cyberattacks that continue to present day.⁹¹ Media literacy is a core component of the curriculum in Estonian schools, and leaders from across Europe visit Estonia to learn more about their broad approach to establishing resilience to IIA.⁹² The need to go beyond traditional organizations tasked with identifying and stopping IIA also is understood in Slovakia. Participants at our second workshop in Bratislava suggested that engaging religious leaders and local labor officials to amplify counternarratives against false Russian claims could be effective because these leaders maintain the trust of their members.

Expansion also applies to promoting resilience across countries, not just in large population centers. In Slovakia and Serbia, political polarization and distrust of institutions hamper counter-messaging strategies and keep people with disparate views siloed from one another. Geographic differences exacerbate these silos. Participants in both countries noted that going beyond the capital allows one to reach disadvantaged communities that might be more affected by Russian information warfare preying on their existing views that the state does not look after their interests.

As the third pillar of our strategic framework, the community of practice plays an important role in reinforcing the efforts of the first two pillars to recognize and respond to Russian IIA. The linkages between the three pillars are important to ensure thoughtful, effective responses to false narratives that damage government credibility and trust in institutions. In the next chapter, we discuss considerations for implementing the strategic framework, as well as areas for investment to continue the fight against Russian IIA that target nonproliferation.

Considerations for implementation and the way ahead

Our research and discussions with stakeholders in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia illuminated several important considerations for implementing initiatives to counter Russian IIA as they relate to nonproliferation. In this chapter, we describe these considerations and include recommendations for investment, while discussing the way ahead for this project.

Implementation considerations

There are many opportunities for stakeholders within the region to design successful responses to Russian IIA. These include opportunities to strengthen transparency and access to information, expand cooperation within multistakeholder groups, and broaden existing networks to include international partners.

Maximize transparency and safeguard access to information

To improve trust in public institutions and political processes, government entities should strive to be as transparent as possible with information related to false Russian claims about CBRN weapons. Providing truthful and accurate information with proper citations and evidence can play an important role in prebunking Russian narratives. Maximizing transparency on social media platforms with respect to the activity of Russian information networks also can play an important role, especially as civil society and other organizations prioritize how to respond to Russian IIA.

Enhance cooperation with a multistakeholder community

Involving the private sector in government-led responses to Russian IIA can strengthen relationships and improve information sharing with partners outside of government. Members of the private sector can support a healthy information environment, including through their support for independent investigative journalism and objective reporting.

Another opportunity to strengthen responses to combat Russian IIA includes connecting civil society organizations and government entities with their counterparts in scientific and academic communities. Research-oriented professionals bring a wealth of expertise on technical topics, such as CBRN weapons and nonproliferation, which can augment countermessaging strategies with data-driven information.

Similarly, youth organizations can play an important role in mitigating disinformation. Dedicated engagement and educational initiatives with younger audiences can build broader resilience against Russian IIA. Youth organizations serve as an opportunity to reach unengaged youth who are not necessarily involved in countering Russian IIA more broadly. Increasing investment within younger generations also helps mitigate the brain drain phenomenon of young, highly educated people leaving Central and Eastern Europe.⁹³ This phenomenon leaves fewer in the next generation that are able to study disinformation and nonproliferation, resulting in a significant gap in substantive expertise on these issues. It will be critical to reinvest in the next generation of experts, which will allow for greater potential for locally driven development of policy solutions, especially around nonproliferation and information warfare.

Expand the community of practice to include international partners

Members of the community of practices within Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia should enforce stronger multistakeholder engagement with international partners, including neighboring countries, international organizations, and the United States. Maintaining consistent close cooperation with international partners provides opportunities to learn about other countries that might experience similar challenges with respect to Russian IIA and discuss best practices for response. These opportunities to learn from a broader range of stakeholders can build stronger alliances to coordinate responses against threats of information warfare on a larger scale.

Areas for investment

To expand societal resilience to counter Russian IIA, key stakeholders and organizations need to prioritize investing in programs to confront information manipulation in Europe. Several opportunities play an important role in building resilience and effectiveness in the long term, including: augmenting proactive measures, strengthening media literacy efforts and fact-checking programs, supporting independent media and community journalism, and prioritizing capacity building efforts.

Augment proactive measures

Attempts to more proactively counter malign influence campaigns are an important area for additional resourcing so counter-messaging strategies are not primarily reactive. The United States and NATO are exploring ways to be more proactive in sharing research and information, including exploration of prebunking initiatives, but continued cooperation will benefit NATO allies such as Slovenia and Slovakia.⁹⁴ For Serbia, cooperation with the EU, regional partners, or nongovernmental organizations could provide insights on how to incorporate proactive measures into their counter-messaging strategies.

Strengthen media literacy efforts and fact-checking programs

Greater cooperation between journalists and government representatives can improve public awareness about the threats of Russian IIA and enhance resilience. Instituting media literacy curriculum in education systems is also important to improve resilience among younger citizens, especially those who are more active on social media and exposed to a wider variety of messaging. Additionally, fact-checking programs to promote critical engagement with information from news, television broadcasts, and social media platforms can be expanded beyond education systems to workplaces, government offices, and other environments that would benefit from increased awareness.

Support independent media and community journalism initiatives

Independent media and community journalism can play important roles in combating IIA, especially through the prioritization of localized reporting, transparency, and accountability. Through strong connections to the communities around them, media and community journalism initiatives’ active engagement and collaboration with local organizations and trusted officials enhances the overall credibility of responses to Russian IIA. These organizations can highlight local solutions and positive stories that can play a role in bolstering broader support for institutions, minimizing polarization, and blunting the negative effects of disinformation.

Consider ways to measure success

Across the three countries considered for this project and in the United States, members of the communities of practice struggle with how to measure the success of responses to Russian IIA. It is impossible to isolate the effects of one message or campaign within the entire media landscape, given how much content is produced and how quickly it is distributed. It also is difficult to predict what could influence Russia to change its tactics. However, there are resources available to guide the development of attention-grabbing, impactful messages that can garner support, such as EUvsDisinfo and the Bioweapons Disinformation Monitor. Additionally, greater engagement with academia and journalism professionals can assist in developing messages backed by industry best practices and standards.

Review adequacy of cybersecurity infrastructure

In addition to concerns over false Russian narratives, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia should consider whether existing cybersecurity measures are adequate to prevent cyberattacks. In the event prevention measures fail, each country should also review whether current defenses are up to date. For Slovenia and Slovakia, NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence could be a good resource to support or inform these reviews.⁹⁵

Focus on capacity building efforts to increase effectiveness and viability across sectors

Leveraging programs to build capacity within organizations can sustain efforts, increase effectiveness, and build long-term resilience. For civil society organizations, think tanks, media entities, and others that are involved in countering Russian IIA, it is important to prioritize efforts that strengthen their overall ability to achieve success. To counter Russian IIA, educational programs—both within and outside of formal educational institutions—allow stakeholders to obtain important skills in digital literacy, cybersecurity, and critical thinking abilities. Professional development opportunities for analysts and journalists alike can strengthen the ability to use technologies and other tools to combat Russian IIA. For public diplomacy officials, training sessions that focus on strategic communications and crisis management provide important opportunities to implement standard operating procedures within their organizations. These kinds of programs play an important role in developing the necessary skills and experience to counter Russian IIA on nonproliferation.

Additionally, community engagement programs serve an important role in capacity building within the public. Organized workshops, outreach programs, and structured dialogues contribute to a broader sense of involvement among the community, which can increase buy-in and participation when combating Russian IIA. Community engagement programs can also empower local leaders and educators to play a role in disseminating truthful information and countering Russian IIA within the public.

Project next steps

For the next iteration of this project, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction will continue to examine the threat of Russian malign influence efforts that target nonproliferation norms in Eastern Europe and the responses to these threats. The Atlantic Council will monitor developments in Russia’s IIA for topics related to nonproliferation and CBRN weapons that might emerge in our focus countries to tailor the content of our private workshops accordingly. In addition, we will also support the organizations, experts, and entities on the frontlines of Russia’s information warfare to enable implementation and sustainment of the project’s overall goals.

In the next phase of our project, the Atlantic Council will continue to refine the three pillars of our strategic framework to ensure they capture the current challenges to recognizing and responding to IIA within Central and Eastern Europe, as well as any challenges to reinforcing a healthy community of practice committed to countering IIA in the region.

Finally, we will work closely with our partners at the Department of State to identify new countries that would benefit from engagement with our strategic framework.

The research team thanks the US Department of State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction for their strategic guidance and overall support throughout the project. Special thanks go to the wide range of stakeholders in Slovakia, Slovenia, and Serbia who contributed their invaluable insights to our workshops and participated in other contexts to enrich the analysis.

We would also like to acknowledge Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and Amanda Moodie of the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction for their critical contributions to our workshops in Slovakia and Serbia. Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and the Atlantic Council’s Eto Buziashvili from the Digital Forensic Research Laboratory also provided valuable peer reviews that improved our strategic framework. Within the Atlantic Council, we recognize the critical contributions of Leah Scheunemann, Zelma Sergejeva, and Kristen Taylor for their project management, research, and analytical support; Dr. Matthew Kroenig and Christopher Skaluba for their oversight of the project; and Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, Caroline Simpson, and Ursula Murdoch for their operational guidance and assistance.

This report is intended to live up to General Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues. The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to continue his nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Atlantic Council, the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, the US Department of State, or the US government.

About the authors

Fellow

Natasha Lander Finch

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Arms Control Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

Ryan Arick

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

Natasha Lander Finch is a senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously worked as a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she led and conducted research on a range of issues, including chemical, biological, and nuclear policy; counterterrorism; European security; and military and civilian workforce policy. She also held positions as an adviser within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and as the principal adviser for NATO’s Committee on Proliferation in the Defense Format.

Ryan Arick is an associate director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this capacity, he supports TSI’s work to strengthen the transatlantic alliance against emerging security threats from around the world. His research interests include NATO defense policy and transatlantic security; arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation; democratic resilience from foreign malign influence; and state fragility and conflict prevention.

‘The death of Hazaras is permissible.’ What it’s like to protest the Taliban as a minority woman.

Tamana Rezaei — Tue, 10 Sep 2024 19:45:50 +0000

After the Taliban seized control of Kabul in August of 2021, Tamana Rezaei took to the streets to demonstrate against rising gender apartheid in her country. As both a woman and a member of the Hazara minority, she faced double the danger, a story she recounts below.

My activism began in Jaghuri, Ghazni, where I was born. As a Hazara girl, I faced multifaceted discrimination and deprivation. Because there was no girls’ school in my village, I had to attend a boys’ high school. When my uncle tried to force me into marriage as an adolescent—a common tradition in my region—my mother, who herself had been a child bride, stopped it.

My mother’s resistance awakened my revolutionary spirit. The day that she prevented my forced marriage, I realized that if every woman took a stand, life would change for all women. When I was only a teenager, along with four girlfriends, I organized a group to speak to people in our village about forced marriage and its devastating consequences for women and children.

I had a measure of privilege because my father supported me, which is not always the case for girls in Afghanistan. He would lament, “I am very sorry that you were born with this talent and genius in a country like Afghanistan, where it is drowned in misogyny.” After high school, I moved from Ghazni to attend Kabul University’s law department.

As a Hazara, I have always been particularly aware of the oppression and discrimination we have continuously faced. In Kabul, my first civic action was to light candles in memory of the Hazaras who were executed or buried alive in Pul-e-Charkhi prison during the time of Nur Mohammad Taraki’s rule in 1978-79. In Dasht-e-Barchi, a Hazara neighborhood in Kabul that has been the site of many attacks and suicide bombings, my friends and I launched a campaign for girls’ education. Through these efforts, many families allowed their daughters to attend school.

Since then, I’ve participated in protests, from small university demonstrations to larger movements. In 2014, we protested the beheading of an eight-year-old Hazara girl by the Taliban in Zabul. We later organized protests against the beheading of eleven Hazara civilians by the Taliban on the Kabul highway in Bamyan. In 2015, I played a significant role in shaping the Enlightenment Movement, a youth movement formed to protest the inequities in development for Hazara communities. I later lost many friends in that movement after the suicide bombing of a peaceful protest in 2016 that killed at least eighty-five people and injured 413.

When I was young, I believed men held more power that women simply because of their gender. After becoming financially independent, I realized that power comes from working and receiving an income. “Whoever provides the bread, commands” is a saying that I now deeply understand. And this is exactly why the Taliban stopped women from working—to strip them of power and maintain the apartheid regime.

After university, I established my own law firm, where I prosecuted and imprisoned several Taliban soldiers and the organizers of suicide bombings. One case I pursued was the murder of my father in 2019 by the Taliban for building schools and educating girls in Jaghuri. The defendants were sentenced to thirty years in prison, but I received many threats from the Taliban and other groups for prosecuting such cases.

When provinces began to fall in the summer of 2021 and the Taliban released prisoners from the jails, I sought a safe haven for myself and my family and, upon advice from a neighbor who was a former soldier, burned all my documents except my university diploma. By September 2021, however, I joined the ranks of women protesters in the Hazara region west of Kabul. During our peaceful demonstrations, the Taliban beat and pepper sprayed us. When they blocked the streets, we continued our protests from home and found various ways to raise our voices, such as wearing men’s clothing, organizing theater performances, engaging in social and cultural activities, and painting on walls.

But despite our best efforts, the protesters were eventually arrested one by one. The day of my arrest was dark. It resembled a Hollywood movie scene in which military forces raid a terrorist group, except in this case, the Taliban’s target was merely a group of protesting women whose only weapons are their voices. The road was packed with military vehicles and Taliban soldiers, who pounded on the gates and forced them open by threatening to shoot us. They searched us roughly, took our phones, and interrogated us before sorting us into different groups and taking us to the Ministry of Interior. I was terrified.

The next day before sunrise, three Taliban fighters entered the room in which we were being held, mercilessly stepping on the children sleeping in front of the door. One of the fighters called my name, holding up my phone and asking, “Is this your mobile phone?” I denied it, but began to cry after seeing my father’s photo on the screen. He forced me to unlock it and began to go through my videos. After watching a video of us protesting, the fighters asked me why I wasn’t wearing a hijab and why I was shouting in the street. Then they opened my private photos.

Another Taliban member, whom the other fighters called Moin Sahib (Deputy Sir), asked me in Pashto, “Did you go to the protest yourself, or did someone encourage you?” Fearfully, I answered, “Myself.” He slapped me so hard that every time I saw him afterward, I felt like my heart was going to stop, and I trembled with fear. He began swearing at me. A Pashto-speaking female protester stepped between us and explained to the Taliban member that I didn’t understand Pashto and began translating for me. The Taliban member then opened another video that showed this same Pashto-speaking woman in it and took her away with him.

During my interrogation, the Taliban fighters told me that the death of Hazaras is permissible because they are “Rafizi,” a pejorative term they use for Shias, and all of us are absolute infidels. They said that killing us would open the doors of heaven for them. They also mentioned that if they weren’t under pressure from their higher-ups, they would have killed us right after we were arrested. In the days that followed, they would come late at night to take us to their interrogation rooms, where they would use violence to try to force us to reveal the whereabouts of the other protesting girls.

I soon began to contemplate suicide as a way out. But another one of the imprisoned protesting girls would try and press me to think of seeing my mother and my sister again, even if this prospect felt like a distant dream.

After twenty days imprisoned in Taliban jails, I was only released after heavy guarantees and a written commitment to cease activism. My mother later told me that she had fallen ill soon after my imprisonment and had gone to beg the Taliban to release me. This breaking of my mother’s pride was the hardest part of my detention and torture.

After my release from prison, I secretly left Afghanistan. It has taken and continues to take a long time to deal with what happened to me. Today, however, the lawsuits and the growing awareness among Afghanistan’s women about the Taliban’s gender apartheid are beginning to heal the wounds they inflicted on our souls and bodies. I believe that international recognition of the Taliban’s gender apartheid will eventually end its rule and open up pathways to bring its members to trial.

Tamana Rezaei, an activist and law graduate, was a barrister in Afghanistan until the Taliban took over.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. This article was edited from an interview with Rezaei by Mursal Sayas.

The post ‘The death of Hazaras is permissible.’ What it’s like to protest the Taliban as a minority woman. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cho quoted in The Economist on resilience of liberalism in China

ylee — Fri, 06 Sep 2024 15:11:54 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On September 5, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Sungmin Cho was quoted in The Economist discussing the resilience of liberalism in China. Cho noted that with growing nationalism and government suppression under Xi, support for democratic norms and values has increased over time, indicating a complex and evolving public opinion landscape.

Fellow

Sungmin Cho

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Cho quoted in The Economist on resilience of liberalism in China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Key Ukrainian front line city evacuates as Russian offensive gains pace

Maria Avdeeva — Sun, 01 Sep 2024 13:42:07 +0000

Evacuation efforts are currently accelerating in eastern Ukraine’s Pokrovsk as the Russian military draws closer. Residents are fleeing amid fears their hometown will soon become the latest in a growing list of Ukrainian cities reduced to rubble by Putin’s invading army.

Pokrovsk has long been an important Russian objective. Located on a crucial road connecting eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk province with neighboring Dnipro region, the city serves as a key logistical hub for the Ukrainian military. Russian troops have been steadily moving toward Pokrovsk for some months as Vladimir Putin seeks to consolidate his grip on the surrounding area. If the strategically important city falls, it will undermine Ukraine’s defenses while potentially serving as a gateway for further Russian gains.

Ukraine’s leaders are well aware of the stakes but have so far been unable to stop the Russian offensive. There has been considerable speculation that the recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk region was primarily intended to ease the pressure on Pokrovsk by forcing the Kremlin to redeploy forces. If this was the plan, it has not yet succeeded. Instead, the Russian army appears to be concentrating more troops for the push toward Pokrovsk, and is advancing with increasing speed.

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With the front lines of the war now less than ten kilometers from the city, Pokrovsk residents find themselves confronted by the same nightmare scenarios and impossible choices experienced by huge numbers of Ukrainians since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion two and a half years ago. The mandatory evacuation of families with children has been ordered, while a twenty-hour daily curfew has been imposed. Leaving Pokrovsk means abandoning homes, possessions, family members, and all that is familiar. Staying may well prove deadly.

Prior to the war, Pokrovsk had a population of around sixty thousand. By the final week of August, this figure had dropped to approximately half the prewar total. Thousands continue to leave every day. The roads out of Pokrovsk are jammed with cars loaded up to the roof as families evacuate with whatever they can carry. Local institutions such as hospitals and banks are shutting down and preparing to close. Those who have yet to join the exodus are stockpiling water, groceries, and humanitarian aid, while bracing for the worst.

The process of leaving Pokrovsk can be fraught with danger. Evacuation teams try to keep civilian cars on established routes in a bid to maintain a degree of security, but reports of Russian drone and bombing attacks are growing. The thunder of artillery fire in the distance adds to the sense of urgency and uncertainty.

In the city itself, it is possible to encounter extremes of distress, despair, courage, and compassion at virtually every turn. On Samarska Street, half the houses now stand empty. When I visited, one elderly lady was in the process of locking up her home while a car packed with her worldly belongings waited outside. There were also signs of daily life as remaining residents bicycled past to get water from a nearby pipe or visit the local store. Some of those leaving remained defiant, insisting their departure was just a temporary measure. Others claimed they would stay and placed their hopes in Ukraine’s ability to defend the city.

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Ukrainian and international volunteers are providing vital support for those seeking to evacuate, especially vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the elderly. These volunteers in many ways capture the indomitable spirit of wartime Ukraine and the sense of solidarity that has enabled the country to keep functioning despite the stunning violence and trauma of Russia’s invasion.

Pokrovsk railway station is one of the busiest places in the city, buzzing with activity and emotion as people wait to board evacuation trains. Railway workers wearing body armor guide passengers to different carriages based on their final destinations throughout Ukraine.

Some are preparing to go further and plan cross the border into the EU. One evacuee, who was traveling with her two children, told me she was heading to Germany and did not know what the future would hold. She was leaving Pokrovsk without her mother and grandmother, who insisted on remaining in their family home despite the rapidly approaching danger.

The harrowing and heroic scenes that are currently unfolding in Pokrovsk have already been replayed in countless Ukrainian towns and cities since February 2022. Every time the Russian army advances, ordinary Ukrainians find themselves forced to make life-changing decisions in incredibly stressful circumstances, often while having to rely on the kindness of strangers in order to survive.

This barely imaginable reality has now reached Pokrovsk. As the city prepares for the anticipated Russian onslaught, local residents are displaying the kind of remarkable resilience that has become a symbol of life in wartime Ukraine. Their desperate plight is a reminder that unless Russia is stopped, millions more will face a similar fate.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

There can be no European peace without Ukrainian victory

Olena Halushka — Thu, 29 Aug 2024 10:29:21 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has evolved into the largest European war since World War II, but two and a half years on, many are still struggling to grasp exactly what is at stake. Instead, we continue to hear calls for some kind of compromise with the Kremlin, while the international community refuses to hold Russians accountable for their crimes.

This lack of consequences is fueling a growing sense of impunity that can be seen in Russia’s actions. On the eve of the NATO Summit in July, Russia bombed Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital in broad daylight. Empowered by the absence of any discernible international response to the 2023 destruction of Kakhovka Dam, Russia targeted Kyiv’s hydroelectric dam in late August.

Since spring 2024, Russia has destroyed more than half of Ukraine’s energy generation capacity in a clear and calculated attempt to make the country unlivable. Throughout the sweltering summer months, Ukrainians have faced rolling blackouts, with electricity often only available for several hours per day. The Kremlin is hoping things will deteriorate further during the winter season, and intends to freeze Ukrainians into submission.

Despite Russia’s extensive list of crimes in Ukraine, many international voices continue to call for negotiations. These appeals are often accompanied by arguments claiming that the war is “unwinnable” for Ukraine, or suggestions that the West can promote peace simply by ending all military support to Kyiv. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

Russian officials and Kremlin propagandists make no secret of their plans to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation. In fact, they often say so explicitly. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev spelled out Moscow’s intentions in July when he stated that Russia would seek to occupy any “remaining Ukrainian lands,” even if Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed to a ceasefire deal.

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When Western commentators and politicians casually discuss ceding Ukrainian territory to Russia, they typically overlook the fact that the regions in question are home to millions of ordinary Ukrainians. Abandoning these people to indefinite Russian occupation means condemning them to the threat of kidnap, torture, disappearance, and death. Russians will continue erasing all aspects of Ukrainian identity wherever they can.

We have all seen the photos of the dead bodies in Bucha, the mass graves in the forests of Izyum, and the torture cells of Kupiansk. These are not isolated incidents or excesses. They are part of an horrific pattern that is being repeated throughout the areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control. It is grotesque to suggest that legitimizing this occupation will bring peace. And yet that is exactly what many international commentators advocate.

Ukrainians are under no illusions regarding Russia’s intentions. We have learned many hard lessons over the past decade, and have come to understand that modern Russia is fully committed to wiping Ukraine off the map.

In 2014, we lived through the occupation of Crimea and the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, and saw how the international community failed to punish Russia in any meaningful way. We witnessed the cynicism of the Minsk Accords, and watched as Russia openly prepared the ground for full-scale genocide.

It appears obvious to Ukrainians that Russia is now seeking breathing space to consolidate its territorial gains and rearm before completing the conquest of Ukraine. Why else would the Kremlin be so insistent that any peace deal must include Ukraine’s international isolation and comprehensive disarmament?

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It is vital to understand that the threat posed by Russia is evolving and extends far beyond Ukraine. Back in 2014, Russia was acting alone. Today, the Kremlin has managed to create a formidable coalition of authoritarian states that share Moscow’s goal of subverting the rules-based world order and replacing it with a lawless alternative governed by the schoolyard principle that “might is right.” The only way to prevent this axis of autocracies from becoming even more powerful is by defeating Russia in Ukraine.

Some say Russia cannot pose any real threat to Europe as the Russian army is fully engaged in the war against Ukraine. This gravely underestimates the scale of Russia’s ambitions. Putin genuinely believes he is on a sacred mission to correct the injustices of the Soviet collapse. He has repeatedly declared that he is reclaiming “historically Russian lands.” These territorial claims extend far beyond Ukraine.

Putin is now being emboldened by repeated signs of Western weakness and a lack of resolve among Ukraine’s partners. If Russia is handed victory in Ukraine, it is absurd to think they will simply stop.

Russia is already intensifying its hybrid war against the West. In recent months, details have emerged of a Russian plot to assassinate the CEO of a leading German defense manufacturer. There are also regular reports of sabotage campaigns, GPS jamming, attempted arson, cyber attacks, election meddling, and strategic corruption.

As Russia’s full-scale invasion passes the two-and-a-half year mark, it is time to acknowledge that supporting Ukraine is not an act of solidarity or charity. In reality, providing Ukraine with the military aid it requires to defeat Russia is the most effective way to prevent further escalation and avoid an even bigger war in the near future.

Kyiv’s wish list is well known. Ukraine needs more air defense systems, long-range missiles, and fighter jets. Crucially, Ukraine’s partners must lift all restructions on the use of Western weapons against military targets inside Russia and agree to shoot down Russian drones and missiles close to their airspace. Smart allies should be looking to boost Ukraine’s ability to defend itself by investing in the country’s rapidly expanding defense sector, while also bankrupting the Russian war machine by tightening sanctions on the country’s oil and gas industry.

Above all, we need to see a fundamental shift in international attitudes toward the war. The future of the world is being decided in Ukraine. It is not enough for countries to say they will stand with Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” Instead, Ukraine’s partners must define their position as “whatever it takes for victory,” and must act accordingly.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory. This article is an adapted version of an opinion piece that was first published by the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten.

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Russia’s propagandists are taking their lead from Putin himself. The Kremlin dictator has remained remarkably tight-lipped over Ukraine’s invasion, and has limited himself to only a handful of public statements. Notably, there have been no attempts to rally the Russian people against the invader or engage in the kind of historical grandstanding that Putin normally favors. On the contrary, he has opted for a strikingly understated approach. Putin initially branded the invasion a “large-scale provocation,” and has since compared the advancing Ukrainian army to “terrorists.”

In recent days, Putin has sought to underline his apparent lack of concern over the invasion of Russia by embarking on a series of routine trips. First, he flew to Azerbaijan for a two-day visit that focused on strengthening bilateral trade ties. Next, he paid his first visit to Chechnya for thirteen years. Neither journey was urgent or in any way connected to Ukraine’s ongoing offensive.

Despite this very deliberate show of indifference, there have been numerous indications that Putin is in reality extremely rattled by the Ukrainian invasion. His evident disdain over the past fortnight while listening to Russian military commanders reporting fake battlefield victories has inspired multiple memes. In one particularly revealing exchange, Putin angrily interceded during a televised government meeting when the acting governor of Kursk region dared to disclose the scale of Ukraine’s territorial gains.

This behavior is nothing new. Indeed, Putin has long been notorious for going missing during times of national crisis, and has added to this unwanted reputation with numerous disappearing acts throughout the invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the unprecedented nature of Ukraine’s own counter-invasion makes his recent posture particularly revealing.

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In the current circumstances, the Russian ruler may feel his best option is to downgrade Ukraine’s invasion to the level of border skirmish and pretend it is nothing to worry about. With the help of his formidable propaganda machine, this approach may indeed prevent panic from spreading inside Russia. Even so, there is no escaping the fact that by occupying more than one thousand square kilometers of Russian territory, Ukraine has dealt a serious blow to Putin’s strongman image and made a mockery of Russia’s claims to military superpower status. If this situation persists, it will also fatally undermine his ability to intimidate the international community.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Putin has skillfully employed nuclear blackmail together with frequent warnings of Russian red lines to deter the West from supporting Ukraine. His bully boy approach has proved highly effective, with Western leaders consistently delaying decisions on new categories of military aid for Kyiv and imposing absurd restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to use Western weapons inside Russia. However, this may be about to change. Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has demonstrated that it is possible to cross the reddest of all Russian red lines without sparking World War III. As a consequence, many are now concluding that Putin’s saber-rattling is mere bluster.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has seized on the Kremlin’s weak response to his counter-invasion. He is now arguing that the time has come to abandon the concept of escalation management entirely, and is calling on Kyiv’s allies to lift all restrictions on attacks inside Russia. “The whole naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia, which dominated the assessment of the war by some partners, has crumbled these days somewhere near Sudzha,” Zelenskyy commented on August 20, referencing the largest Russian town currently under Ukrainian occupation.

So far, the US and other key allies have yet to revise existing weapons restrictions or announce any upgrade in arms deliveries to Ukraine. But if Putin continues to downplay the invasion of Russia while failing to retaliate in a manner befitting his country’s superpower pretensions, it will be increasingly difficult to justify the excessive caution that has shaped the international response to Russia’s war. Putin succeeded in bluffing the world for almost two-and-a-half years, but Ukraine has now called his bluff in the most emphatic manner.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Many have questioned why prominent Belarusian pro-democracy leader Maria Kalesnikava, who had previously lived for many years in Germany, was not also freed as part of the trade. Kalesnikava was jailed amid nationwide protests following Lukashenka’s rigged 2020 election. One of the figureheads of the anti-Lukashenka protest movement, she has reportedly been suffering from deteriorating health for the past year and a half. Similar questions were also asked regarding fellow political prisoners Ales Bialiatski, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022, and Ihar Losik, a prominent blogger and journalist for RFE/RL’s Belarus Service.

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Four years since the sham ballot that sparked the biggest protests of Lukashenka’s three-decade reign, he appears more comfortable than ever with the idea of holding large numbers of political prisoners as hostages. This must change. With no regime-linked Belarusians in Western custody who are anything like as valuable as Krasikov was to Putin, other approaches are clearly needed to increase the pressure on Lukashenka and convince him to release political prisoners.

Economic measures can be used to target the largely state-controlled Belarusian economy, but this is more likely to have an impact as part of a long-term strategy. One alternative approach would be to engage third parties such as China, which has considerable influence in Minsk. Earlier diplomatic efforts succeeded in securing the release of US citizen Vital Shkliarau, indicating that negotiations of this nature can yield results.

Finding the right formula to keep up the pressure on individual members of the Lukashenka regime is crucial. At present, comparatively few of those involved in repressive measures are subject to international sanctions. For example, I was recently sentenced in absentia by a Belarusian court to ten years in prison alongside nineteen other independent Belarusian analysts and journalists. The judge in our case has a history of handing down lengthy sentences to prominent opposition figures, but has yet to be sanctioned.

During the past four years, only 261 Belarusians have been placed on the EU sanctions list. While the work of sanctions teams is commendable, their capacity is limited. Past experience has also demonstrated how sanctions can be sabotaged, as was the case in 2020 when Cyprus was accused of blocking the introduction of new restrictions against Belarus. There is also room to improve cooperation between Western partners, with a view to developing a more unified approach to sanctions.

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Strikingly, the quantity of Belarusians currently facing Western sanctions is far less the almost 1,400 political prisoners in the country’s prisons. According to human rights groups, tens of thousands of Belarusians in total have been detained in recent years for political reasons. Behind these arrests and prosecutions stands an army of enablers including government officials, security personnel, and judges. The vast majority of these people have yet to be held accountable by the international community for their role in the repressive policies of the Belarusian authorities.

There are some indications that Western policymakers are looking to broaden the scope of sanctions and increase individual accountability. However, while the recent round of sanctions included new measures targeting officials responsible for regime propaganda, other representatives of the Belarusian state media received international accreditation to cover the Olympics in Paris.

The West already has powerful tools at its disposal that can realistically make Belarusian officials consider the consequences of their actions. Standard personal sanctions such as travel bans and asset freezes go far beyond mere symbolism and are capable of creating problems that can have far-reaching practical implications in everyday life. However, more leverage is required in order to maintain the pressure on the regime and on the individuals responsible for specific abuses.

Looking ahead, the West needs to make the issue of political prisoners far more uncomfortable for the entire Lukashenka regime. There is no single solution to this problem; instead, a range of options should be explored including broad economic restrictions, personal sanctions, and diplomatic pressure. Crucially, sanctions should be applied to thousands of officials rather than just a few hundred. The end goal must be to significantly raise the costs of the repressive policies pursued by Lukashenka and all those who enable his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The future of digital transformation and workforce development in Latin America and the Caribbean

Isabel Chiriboga, Maite Gonzalez Latorre, Diego Area — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 14:00:00 +0000

The sixth of a six-part series following up on the Ninth Summit of the Americas commitments.

An initiative led by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center in partnership with the US Department of State continues to focus on facilitating greater constructive exchange among multisectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement commitments made at the ninth Summit of the Americas. This readout was informed by a private, information-gathering roundtable and several one-on-one conversations with leading experts in the digital space.

Executive summary

At the ninth Summit of the Americas, regional leaders agreed on the adoption of a Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation that reaffirmed the need for a dynamic and resilient digital ecosystem that promotes digital inclusion for all peoples. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the digital divide globally, but these gaps were shown to be deeper in developing countries, disproportionately affecting women, children, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable and/or marginalized individuals. Through this agenda, inclusive workforce development remains a key theme as an avenue to help bridge the digital divide and skills gap across the Americas.

As part of the Atlantic Council’s consultative process, thought leaders and practitioners evaluated progress made in the implementation of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation agreed on at the Summit of Americas, resulting in three concrete recommendations: (1) leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda; (2) strengthen public-private partnerships and multisectoral coordination to ensure adequate financing for tailored capacity-building programs, the expansion of digital infrastructure, and internet access; and (3) prioritize the involvement of local youth groups and civil society organizations, given their on-the-ground knowledge and role as critical indicators of implementation.

Recommendations for advancing digitalization and workforce development in the Americas:

Leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda.

Establish formal partnerships between governments and local and international universities to broaden affordable student access to exchange programs, internships, and capacity-building sessions in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. Programs should be tailored to country-specific economic interests and sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism. Tailoring these programs can also help enhance students’ access to the labor market upon graduation.
Ensure existing and new digital capacity-building programs leverage diaspora professionals. Implement virtual workshops, webinars, and collaborative projects that transfer knowledge and skills from technologically advanced regions to local communities. Leveraging these connections will help ensure programs are contextually relevant and effective.
Build on existing intraregional cooperation mechanisms and alliances to incorporate commitments of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation. Incorporating summit commitments to mechanisms such as the Alliance for Development in Democracy, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, and other subregional partnerships can result in greater sustainability of commitments as these alliances tend to transcend finite political agendas.
Propose regional policies to standardize the recognition of digital nomads and remote workers, including visa programs, tax incentives, and employment regulations. This harmonization will facilitate job creation for young professionals and enhance regional connectivity.

Prioritize workforce development for traditionally marginalized groups by strengthening public-private partnerships and multisectoral collaboration.

Establish periodic and open dialogues between the public and private sectors to facilitate the implementation of targeted digital transformation for key sectors of a country’s economy that can enhance and modernize productivity. For instance, provide farmers with digital tools for precision agriculture, train health care workers in telemedicine technologies, and support tourism operators in developing online marketing strategies.
Foster direct lines of communication with multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Engaging in periodic dialogues with these actors will minimize duplication of efforts and maximize the impact of existing strategies and lines of work devoted to creating digital societies that are more resilient and inclusive. Existing and new programs should be paired with employment opportunities and competitive salaries for marginalized groups based on the acquired skills, thereby creating strong incentives to pursue education in digital skills.
Collaborate with telecommunications companies to offer subsidized internet packages for low-income households and small businesses and simplify regulatory frameworks to attract investment in rural and underserved areas, expanding internet coverage and accessibility.
Enhance coordination with private sector and multilateral partners to create a joint road map for sustained financing of digital infrastructure and workforce development to improve investment conditions in marginalized and traditionally excluded regions and cities.

Increase engagement with local youth groups and civil society organizations to help ensure digital transformation agendas are viable and in line with local contexts.

Facilitate periodic dialogues with civil society organizations, the private sector , and government officials and ensure that consultative meetings are taking place at remote locations to ensure participation from disadvantaged populations in the digital space. Include women, children, and persons with disabilities to ensure capacity programs are generating desired impact and being realigned to address challenges faced by key, targeted communities.
Work with local actors such as youth groups and civil society organizations to conduct widespread awareness campaigns to help communities visualize the benefits of digital skills and technology use. Utilize success stories and case studies to show how individuals and businesses can thrive in a digital economy, fostering a culture of innovation and adaptation.
Invest in local innovation ecosystems by providing grants and incentives for start-ups and small businesses working on digital solutions. Create business incubators and accelerators to support the growth of digital enterprises, particularly those addressing local challenges.
Offer partnership opportunities with governments to provide seed capital, contests, digital boot camps, and mentorship sessions specifically designed for girls and women in school or college to help bridge the gender digital divide.

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Svetlova in Haaretz: The tragedy in Majdal exposed the trap of the Druze, and obliges Israel to stand by their side

Atlantic Council — Mon, 29 Jul 2024 14:29:32 +0000

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The world is sleepwalking into an era of extreme heat. The UN just issued a wake-up call.

Eleni Myrivili — Thu, 25 Jul 2024 18:08:33 +0000

“If there is one thing that unites our divided world, it is that we are all increasingly feeling the heat,” said United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres today as he issued a Global Call to Action on Extreme Heat. The first-of-its-kind report, which I contributed to in my capacity as global chief heat officer, emphasizes the urgent need for actionable heat-related measures and policies worldwide.

In the Call to Action, the secretary-general makes clear that governments and policymakers must protect and care for the lives and livelihoods of frontline communities, protect workers, advance the evidence base to drive innovative resilience solutions, and limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

This clear recognition from the Office of the Secretary-General is an important moment for us all. Extreme heat is often underestimated and ignored, but its impacts are unavoidable. The planet is heating up faster than we thought. We are outside scientific model predictions and extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and devastating.

Rising heat affects our major critical systems—such as water, energy, food, transportation, and communications. It also feeds mega droughts, wildfires, and storms, creating cascading and compounding crises. It’s a global crisis. But we are not ready for any of it. We’re sleepwalking.

Policies to address extreme heat so far remain scattered, disjointed, and underfunded.

In my work as global chief heat officer and first chief heat officer for the city of Athens, I have worked directly with cities and have seen the impacts of heat firsthand. Cities are heating up at twice the rate of the global average. At 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming, sixty-seven cities will experience 150 or more days per year of temperatures exceeding 35 degrees Celsius (95 degrees Fahrenheit). At 2 degrees Celsius, the number jumps to ninety-four cities. At just under 3 degrees Celsius of global warming, it soars to 197 cities. 

Policies to address extreme heat so far remain scattered, disjointed, and underfunded. But the rising temperatures mark a global crisis with local impacts. That’s why the global focus of the UN’s Call to Action is so crucial. Increasingly, our world is facing challenges that go beyond the capacity and limited mandate of single nation states. We’re facing crises, like climate change, that need international cooperation to support and facilitate equitable, multilevel, science-based decision making and solutions. The UN is the only legitimate multilateral governance structure able to address issues that need global mobilization and localized solutions. As cities take on climate change, they need support at every level.

In 2022, globally, humanity spent a little over one trillion dollars on adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change. For comparison, the world spent $11.7 trillion on COVID-19 emergency fiscal measures in 2020 alone. As temperatures rise, this funding gap is a dangerous threat. And there is another issue that needs to be urgently addressed: In 2022, about one trillion dollars went to financing emissions mitigation, while only one hundred billion dollars went to adaptation and resilience-building initiatives. We urgently need both climate adaptation and resilience financing.

The UN’s Call to Action is an important milestone for climate resilience, but it is also only the beginning. As the document explains, the world urgently needs a Global Action Strategy to “mobilize governments, policy makers, and all stakeholders to act, prevent, and reduce heat risk.” A dedicated trust fund for urban heat resilience initiatives is also needed, because cities are on the frontlines of extreme heat, and they are where more than half of the world’s population lives—a share that is expected to rise to seven-in-ten people by midcentury. Finally, more dedicated heat champions, like the community of chief heat officers established by the Arsht-Rock Resilience Center, with heat resilience departments that can articulate the challenges and co-create the best solutions are needed. These champions are critical to ensuring that the dangers of—and the solutions to—extreme heat are understood widely.

Each of these essential efforts, as well as others, requires building an international consensus around the scope of the problem and its solutions. Here, the UN’s Call to Action on Extreme Heat can help shape conversations in positive directions at upcoming conferences such as Climate Week NYC and this year’s UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29. Heat resilience must be at the top of the agenda at these and other international meetings, and work is needed at every level to ensure that cities have the support and finances they need to scale solutions.

As the Call to Action makes clear, everyone is at risk from extreme heat, and we must enable resilience at the local and international level, taking “bold decisions to change the way we live to avoid an even more scorched Earth in the future.”

Eleni Myrivili is the world’s first global chief heat officer, a role jointly created and appointed by the Atlantic Council’s Arsht-Rock Resilience Center and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat).

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I was sentenced to ten years in absentia for highlighting Belarus’s descent into dictatorship

Alesia Rudnik — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 19:48:25 +0000

At the beginning of July, I was one of twenty internationally-based Belarusian academics, analysts, and journalists to be sentenced in absentia by a court in Minsk on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government and taking part in an extremist group.

News of my ten-year sentence provoked very conflicting emotions. While many colleagues congratulated me on what they saw as tacit recognition of my efforts in support of a democratic Belarus, I have struggled to find the right words when explaining to my Belarusian relatives that we may never meet again.

The charges against me and my co-defendants did not come as a complete surprise, of course. Nevertheless, at a time when the struggle for Belarusian democracy is no longer in the international spotlight, it is important to reflect on how we arrived at this point.

Back in the summer of 2020, there were unmistakable signs of growing political engagement throughout Belarusian society. More and more ordinary people were volunteering to join the campaigns of opposition candidates in the country’s upcoming presidential election, or simply expressing their political opinions. Although I was studying outside the country at the time, I also made a conscious decision to continue writing about the political situation in my homeland.

When Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was then proclaimed the winner of a deeply flawed presidential ballot in August 2020, I was among the thousands of journalists, activists, and academics to speak up against election fraud and condemn the violent Kremlin-backed crackdown that followed. Like me, some had already left Belarus to advance their careers abroad. Others were forced to flee as the regime sought to silence domestic dissent. This large community of exiled Belarusians has continued its open criticism of the Lukashenka regime.

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Lukashenka was able to suppress the 2020 protest movement in Belarus thanks to Russian support. Ever since, he has remained heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. In exchange for this backing, he has allowed the Kremlin to expand its influence over Belarus in a process that some have likened to a creeping annexation. Lukashenka has also agreed to play the role of junior partner in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarus as a base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the first month of the invasion, the country served as a gateway for the Russian march on Kyiv, which the Kremlin hoped would be the decisive offensive of the war. Russia has since used Belarus as a training ground for troops and as a launch pad to bomb targets across Ukraine.

In 2023, Putin announced the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, further involving the country in the confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow is also accused of funneling migrants through Belarus to the border with the EU as part of its efforts to weaponize illegal immigration.

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While tensions with the West have escalated, the domestic situation in Belarus has continued to deteriorate. Approximately one thousand four hundred people remain in prison on politically motivated charges, while up to six hundred thousand Belarusians are believed to have fled the country, representing more than five percent of the overall population.

In recent years, the Lukashenka regime has signaled its intention to target critics who have left the country. In January 2023, five administrators of a Telegram channel run by exiled Belarusians were each sentenced in absentia to twelve years. Since then, several more opposition politicians and activists have been convicted in the same fashion on charges of attempting to seize power, threatening national security, and organizing extremist groups.

On January 24, 2024, I woke up to news that I also faced similar charges along with nineteen colleagues. While we were arbitrarily grouped together as analysts of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, many of us had never actually met each other. Our trial started in May. None of us were able to get in touch with assigned lawyers, receive court materials, or join the hearings online. Instead, the case proceeded amid an almost complete information blackout until we learned of our guilty verdicts and prison sentences on July 1.

When I received confirmation of my sentence, I was struck by an overwhelming sense of anger at the injustice and absurdity of the entire process. At the same time, I have also been filled with gratitude for the solidarity expressed by international organizations and colleagues.

Our trial is the latest indication of the increasingly authoritarian political climate in today’s Belarus. In my opinion, this attempt to punish critical voices located outside the country and beyond the reach of the Belarusian authorities reflects the insecurities of a man who knows he has long since lost any remaining legitimacy as ruler of the country. Lukashenka’s growing desperation makes him an even greater threat to Belarusians, and means that he is also significantly more dangerous internationally as an ally of the Kremlin.

Those inside Belarus are well aware of the Orwellian reality they must deal with on a daily basis. They know that any public opposition to the regime will likely have grave consequences. In contrast, Belarusians living abroad still have the opportunity to voice our political opinions and share information about the horrors unfolding in our homeland. It is vital we continue to do so. The fact that Lukashenka is now attempting to intimidate us confirms that our efforts are not in vain.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

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For instance, according to a 2021 IREX report, only 22 percent of university graduates find jobs in their field of study within three months of graduating. This highlights the critical need for a more responsive education system that meets the market’s needs. According to the World Bank, 2 million Iraqi children are deprived of education, presenting a significant challenge for their future prospects. In addition, literacy rates remain alarmingly low, especially among women.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has recognized the urgency of addressing these issues. The cabinet has developed Vision 2030, which prioritizes enhancing and adapting education to support economic diversification. This unprecedented framework aims to align Kurdistan’s educational system with international standards, while fostering a workforce capable of driving economic growth across sectors. A key element of this vision is establishing the Kurdistan Accrediting Association for Education (KAAE), a national accreditation body designed to bridge the educational gap and propel the region into the twenty-first century.

Because standardization can serve as leverage for reform, the KAAE seeks to establish standards to ensure that educational institutions in Kurdistan and Iraq meet rigorous quality-assurance requirements. By promoting best practices and fostering a culture of transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement, the KAAE, as a twelve/fifteen-year project, aims to support the government in establishing sound policies for educational quality, making it more relevant to the needs of the economy and society. This initiative is crucial for modernizing Kurdistan’s education system and enabling it to catch up with global advancements, as it is for Iraq and the broader region when used as a model.

Strategic investment in education

Effective implementation of the KAAE’s quality-assurance standards necessitates leveraging the expertise and experience of the international community in building the capacity of academic institutions. The United States and Iraq have a framework agreement that identifies education as a cornerstone of bilateral relations as part of the broader cultural cooperation between the two countries. It is now time to translate this agreement into action. Strengthening this partnership can have far-reaching reverberations beyond education, fostering economic development, political stability, and social cohesion. While the United States has invested significantly in Iraq’s reconstruction, this has been disproportionately allocated to the security sector. According to the Military Times, the United States has spent nearly $2 trillion on military operations in Iraq. Even a fraction of this amount, 1 percent, would have a transformational impact if directed toward educational initiatives.

Investing in Iraq’s education system offers a unique opportunity for the United States to not only support a key ally but also address the root causes of instability in the region. The United States can help build the foundation for a stable and prosperous Iraq by directing resources toward educational reform. This investment would both strengthen US public diplomacy and promote the values of democracy and human rights, which are integral to long-term peace and security. Such support includes establishing partnerships between US schools and universities and their Iraqi counterparts to implement the quality-assurance standards the KAAE sets. These partnerships could focus on building capacity and mentorship, embedding student-centered learning in curricula, and creating continuous assessment and evaluation strategies. Because the Kurdistan region has already established the KAAE, this could serve as a pilot model for Iraq as a whole, with the goal of replicating the body in other parts of Iraq.

Countries like Singapore and South Korea provide valuable lessons in how education can drive national development. Both nations have transformed their economies through substantial investments in education, focusing on skills development and innovation. For example, South Korea’s emphasis on technology and vocational training has made it a global industry leader. Similarly, Singapore’s education system, known for its rigor and focus on STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), has produced a highly skilled workforce that drives the country’s ongoing economic success.

By supporting similar models in Iraq, the United States can help foster an education system that not only equips young Iraqis with the skills and qualifications the local market and economy need, both today and in the long term, but also cultivates critical thinking and innovation. This approach aligns with the US strategy of promoting regional stability through economic development and education.

The role of education in peace and security

Enhancing education in Iraq is not just about economic growth; it is a crucial element of peacebuilding. Education fosters understanding, tolerance, and critical thinking, which are essential for mitigating conflict and promoting social cohesion. A well-educated populace is better equipped to participate in democratic processes and contribute to the nation’s development. By investing in education, Iraq can build a more inclusive society in which young people are empowered to contribute positively to their communities.

For Iraq, education is more than a policy priority; it is a pathway to peace and prosperity. The United States can play a critical role in achieving such prosperity. By leveraging initiatives like the KAAE and drawing on successful global models, Iraq can transform its education system, paving the way for a brighter future. This investment is not just about building schools; it is about building a nation with a capable and empowered citizenry.

The United States and the international community can seize this opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to a stable and prosperous Iraq, promoting a region where education empowers young people as agents of positive change.

Dr. Honar Issa is the secretary of the Board of Trustees at the American University of Kurdistan (AUK). He also serves as chair of the Middle East Peace and Security Forum.

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Feeling the heat? Biden’s proposed protections for workers are a welcome start.

Catherine Wallace, Owen Gow — Wed, 03 Jul 2024 18:47:28 +0000

As the United States enters what has been one of its hottest months of the year, the Biden administration on Tuesday took a significant step in protecting an estimated thirty-six million workers nationwide from extreme heat. This long-awaited move—for workers, companies, and advocates alike—was paired with the announcement of new research from the US Environmental Protection Agency and new investment through the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Building Resilience Infrastructure and Communities program.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has proposed new federal regulations to protect workers. When the heat index reaches or exceeds 80 degrees Fahrenheit, employers would be required to monitor workers and provide water and rest areas. At 90 degrees Fahrenheit, more protections kick in, including mandatory fifteen-minute rest breaks every two hours and monitoring employees for signs of heat-related illnesses.

Heat-related illnesses have been recognized as occupational hazards for a decade, with an estimated 2,300 workers in the United States dying from extreme heat exposure last year alone. However, this number is likely an undercount and does not capture the many more who suffered nonlethal or chronic heat-related illnesses, as well as workers who injured themselves on the job due to the heat. For instance, researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles found that workers in California are up to 9 percent more likely to suffer a workplace injury on days with temperatures over 90 degrees Fahrenheit than on days that are between 50 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit. This is a problem that will only get worse. The summer is only a few weeks underway in the Northern Hemisphere, and already more than one hundred million US residents have been exposed to extreme heat.

What comes next?

Despite the need for action, OSHA’s proposal will have significant opponents. Industry groups are gearing up for battle, arguing that the rule will be both administratively cumbersome and costly. This is a sentiment that some political leaders have already embraced. Earlier this year, both Florida and Texas enacted state-wide bans to prevent localities from instituting their own worker-protection ordinances. Both state governments are unlikely to accept OSHA’s proposal without protest. In fact, despite the persistent threat of extreme heat, only five states have extreme heat worker protections: California, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington.

The argument that extreme heat worker protections will come at a cost often ignores the very real cost of maintaining the status quo under dangerously high temperatures. Aside from the price that workers pay with their health, extreme heat in the workplace has significant economic impacts, from lost labor productivity to healthcare costs. The high and growing price of extreme heat on US residents’ lives and livelihoods illustrates not only that this new rule is necessary, but also that, on its own, it is not enough.

Since 2021, the Biden administration has worked to reestablish the role of the United States as a leader in the fight against climate change, both domestically and abroad. This new rule could help cement the United States’ leadership role on climate—but only if it is properly enforced and expanded upon. For the rule to be effective, the administration should continue significantly utilizing OSHA’s National Emphasis Program for Outdoor and Indoor Heat-Related Hazards, which gives it latitude to direct resources toward both employer education on heat safety protocols and inspections that will better ensure compliance.

The Biden administration should also leverage existing funds to ensure that workers remain safe even when they head home for the day. As temperatures rise across the United States and the world, workplace regulations alone will not be enough to adequately protect workers. Federal agencies should incentivize states to direct Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) funding toward cooling assistance in vulnerable households, and lawmakers should ensure that LIHEAP is funded adequately to cover energy needs during both the summer and winter months. Currently, only approximately 5 percent of LIHEAP’s four billion dollars in funding goes to cooling assistance (heating receives ten times as much), despite the accelerating demand for relief from high nighttime temperatures that place a significant burden on the human body, and which can lead to heat exhaustion while on the job.

Ultimately however, this issue cannot be solved at the federal level alone. It also requires efforts at the state and local level to ensure that the most vulnerable communities and individuals are being identified and solutions tailored to local contexts are being implemented. The appointment of a Chief Heat Officer (CHO), at the city, county, or state level, is one tool that can address the local challenges of extreme heat. Local governments such as Miami-Dade County, Phoenix, and Los Angeles have already taken this approach. Local climate leaders—like CHOs—are well positioned to work closely with their communities to tailor solutions to meet their specific needs and to create a unified response to build resilience to extreme heat both during the workday and off the clock.

Catherine Wallace is the associate director of strategic partnerships and advocacy for the extreme heat resilience pillar of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

Owen Gow is the deputy director for the extreme heat resilience pillar at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

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Hurricane Beryl spotlights the importance of climate adaptation in the Caribbean

Wazim Mowla — Wed, 03 Jul 2024 17:08:54 +0000

Caribbean countries are grappling with the first hurricane of the 2024 season. Hurricane Beryl, which has made history as the earliest category five Atlantic hurricane on record, has damaged infrastructure and caused widespread power outages.

Unfortunately, this is a familiar scene for the region, which routinely battles the effects of extreme weather events and climate change. Hurricane Beryl once again spotlights why focusing on the mitigation of climate change, through such methods as cutting carbon emissions, alone is insufficient. Caribbean countries must prioritize climate adaptation as the primary mechanism to withstand hurricanes and other baked-in effects of climate change.

Climate adaptation is the answer to these extreme weather events, but it requires significant investment that governments in the Caribbean cannot afford. International support, including private finance, is needed. In five months, the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29, will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan. It has been dubbed the “finance COP,” and there governments and the private sector should come together and show the commercial utility of prioritizing climate adaptation. Doing so can unlock new financing and create project pipelines that are commercially attractive to global investors.

COP29 might well be the ideal forum to strengthen these initiatives and encourage commitments from governments and the business community.

The Caribbean is often categorized as the world’s most vulnerable region to climate change. Seventy percent of the region’s population lives or works on the coast, meaning that storm surges from hurricanes affect businesses, lifestyles, and government operations. Hurricanes and strong storms also bring the tourism industry to a halt, disproportionately affecting the region’s tourism-dependent economies and severely slowing economic growth. Hurricane Maria in 2017 cost Dominica an estimated 225 percent of its gross domestic product, while Hurricane Irma in the same year cost Antigua and Barbuda more than $136 million in damages, of which the tourism industry represented 44 percent.

Strong storms damage critical infrastructure. Downed power lines cause widespread power outages, while flooded roads and bridges can prevent rescue operations. Already, Hurricane Beryl has caused power outages in Saint Lucia, and homes in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have lost their roofs. And stronger storms lead to longer recovery periods, which can increase governments’ public debt as they borrow at high interest rates from multilateral institutions to rebuild after the storm has passed. Six years after Hurricane Maria, for example, citizens in Dominica are still rebuilding.

Withstanding strong storms and other effects of climate change requires new climate adaptation projects. For hurricanes with high wind speeds (such as Beryl, which sustained wind speeds of 150 mph at its peak), it is necessary to retrofit infrastructure to be resilient. To achieve this, governments need to require building codes for new homes and infrastructure that ensure sufficient resilience across structures. To brace for storm surges, governments need to move water and energy infrastructure underground where possible to avoid damage. New sea walls and flood protection systems also need to be built.

In all, the region needs more than $100 billion dollars in investment to meet its climate adaptation goals, but it has only been approved for less than one billion dollars from various climate funds. Governments are often left to fend for themselves, taking high-interest loans (due to the classification of many Caribbean nations as middle- and high-income economies by the World Bank) since they often do not qualify for concessional financing. At the same time, governments have borne the brunt of the responsibility because these types of climate adaptation projects are not always attractive to the private sector. Retrofitting infrastructure and other climate adaptation projects, for example, have high upfront costs with little return on investment.

COP29 is an opportunity to bring the public and private sector together to unlock new financing and advance climate adaptation projects. The private sector—both in the region and around the world—has access to needed technologies and has the capacity to undertake climate adaptation projects, from providing drainage on roads and bridges to help ease flash flooding to building decentralized energy grid infrastructure to limit widespread blackouts. Climate adaptation is, after all, in the private sector’s interest. If the effects of hurricanes and climate change worsen and the region’s economies slow, then businesses’ profits will be affected.

What will it take to get the private sector more involved? Attracting private sector participation requires regulatory reforms and carve outs by governments to ensure that companies yield a return on projects. Governments can provide incentives, such as giving exclusive benefits to companies participating in projects and providing subsidies or tax exemptions on materials used. Equally important is access to low-cost finance and capital. Governments can work with institutions such as IDB Invest and global donors that provide grant finance to funnel capital to companies undertaking long-term developments while engaging with insurance agencies that can underwrite riskier projects.

Caribbean leaders have begun to explore private sector participation in climate adaptation projects, notably through the Bridgetown Initiative and the Blue Green Investment Corporation, but there is still work to be done. COP29 might well be the ideal forum to strengthen these initiatives and encourage commitments from governments and the business community. Doing so requires flexibility from both sectors and a focus on projects that are investment-friendly and can attract global donors.

In the lead-up to COP29, governments will need to begin laying the regulatory groundwork and soliciting the required technical assistance from development institutions to encourage private sector participation. Moreover, Caribbean governments should consider adding or increasing the size of the private sector groups to their delegations for COP29 to ensure they have a seat at the table and are bought into any signed agreements. Building these public-private relationships can go a long way toward showing global donors and companies the viability of investing in climate adaptation projects in the Caribbean and unlock needed capital that can save lives in the long run.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Dispatch from Taipei: Why Taiwan’s survival may depend on deterrence through resilience

Markus Garlauskas — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 19:42:13 +0000

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What a difference a year can make. Last summer, I was part of the annual Atlantic Council delegation and research trip to Taiwan that met with then President Tsai Ing-wen. Last week, I again visited Taipei with a delegation that included Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, during which we met with newly inaugurated President Lai Ching-te. I came away impressed by the progress of Taiwan’s defenses since our last visit. Taipei has continued military reforms and modernization, while shifting more attention and resources to “asymmetric warfare” approaches. And it is incorporating lessons learned from the war in Ukraine into its military planning, doctrine, and force structure. For example, after seeing the effectiveness of drones in Ukraine, Taiwan accelerated and expanded its efforts to field unmanned aerial systems. During our visit, the news broke that Washington had approved Taiwan purchasing over one thousand US-made armed drones.

I also saw momentum toward fully implementing the “all-out national defense” concept, emphasized under Tsai. Most notably, since our last visit, Taiwan followed through with executing plans to extend conscription from four months to one year. This year, a new word was also at the forefront—resilience—mentioned first by some key Taiwanese officials. Resilience was also raised by delegation members, in part because several of us had read a soon-to-be-published draft study on improving Taiwan’s resilience led by Atlantic Council Board Director and Distinguished Fellow Franklin Kramer, along with Philip Yu, Joseph Webster, and Elizabeth Sizeland. For Taiwan, resilience is a term whose exact meaning can be difficult to nail down—as we observed in our discussions—but I considered it to mean Taiwan’s will and ability to withstand Chinese coercion, as well as to adapt and sustain its defenses while under attack.

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te meets with a senior delegation from the Atlantic Council on June 18, 2024. (Official Photo by I Chen Lin / Office of the President)

These opportunities for on-the-ground observations and interactions with officials, experts, and private sector leaders in Taiwan have been enlightening. This was only my second trip to Taiwan despite a longtime personal and professional interest in this embattled island on China’s doorstep. In my US government service as an intelligence officer and strategist, I had been stationed in South Korea for a dozen years, and I had also visited military bases, diplomatic posts, and other sites around the region—but never in Taiwan. The unique “unofficial” relationship between Washington and Taipei—along with decades of US deference to Beijing’s sensitivities—has resulted in, as in my case, many career US military officers and government officials never visiting Taiwan while on duty. Despite the best efforts of the de facto US “country team,” the American Institute in Taiwan, to ensure that US policymakers and analysts are well-informed, this anomaly of so little on-the-ground exposure among US national security professionals may cloud US analysis of Taiwan issues.

In contrast, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s intentions should be clear to Washington: Xi wants to bring Taiwan under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control, by force if necessary. When Xi and his top officials plan to accomplish this goal—and through what combination of subversion, coercion, strangulation, quarantine, blockade, bombardment, and invasion—is less clear and likely depends on unpredictable variables. (The Atlantic Council is exploring this further in its “Tiger Project” covering war and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.)

Some commentators, like our own Brian Kerg, point to the challenges of a cross-strait amphibious attack on Taiwan and emphasize the importance of countering other threats. Other US experts consider invasion to be a plausible “worst case” or “most dangerous” near-future scenario that should be the focus among these various threats. These experts recommend that Taiwan and the United States accelerate their preparations to quickly counter an invasion across the Taiwan Strait as the top priority. Evocative wording plays a part in this focus. Metaphorically turning the Taiwan Strait into a “boiling moat,” as depicted by Matt Pottinger and his colleagues, or into an “unmanned hellscape,” as described by US Indo-Pacific Command’s Admiral Samuel Paparo, often drives conversations on deterrence and defense against China to begin and end with stopping a cross-strait attack. So, too, does more technical terminology, such as Elbridge Colby’s “forward denial defense.” This focus could help deter Beijing from invasion by convincing it that landings are likely to be defeated before they can gain a foothold, but this is a risky bet.

Many Taiwanese officials instead appear to be emphasizing the broader importance of preparing for a sustained defense and ensuring resilience beyond just preparing to stop a cross-strait invasion. The idea that such resilience would contribute to deterrence resonated in some discussions, but one senior nongovernment expert scoffed at the idea that Taiwan’s resilience matters for deterring Xi. He argued that only credible threats to impose unacceptable costs or outright defeat of an invasion would be sufficient. But I question what sort of punishment, short of nuclear strikes, could inflict enough costs in mere weeks if Xi believed that Taiwan was not resilient enough to last very long.

More importantly, a focus on stopping an invasion force does little to deter and defeat other forms of attack aimed at subjugating Taiwan, such as persistent informational pressure and subversion to undermine Taiwan’s will from within, slow “strangulation” through internationally isolating Taiwan and wearing it down with military threats and coercion, and a bombardment or blockade designed to rapidly break Taiwan’s will to resist. The endgame of such scenarios would be either the arrival of a Chinese occupation force, rather than an invasion force, or a political settlement in which Taipei cedes control to Beijing.

When considering how long Taiwan could resist determined military pressure, perhaps the most worrisome point is its energy sector’s near-total reliance on imports by sea combined with insufficient stockpiles. As a result, the disruption or blockade of Taiwan’s sea lines of communication could quickly cripple its electrical power grid, economy, military logistics, and food distribution.

With this in mind, I looked out the window during our late-night flight home and snapped a few photos of the dazzling lights of the Port of Taipei. The view reminded me of the contrasting nighttime satellite photos of a well-lit South Korea next to a mostly pitch-black North Korea, and I pictured how the scene could quickly fall dark under a Chinese blockade. How would the people of Taiwan react? Taiwan can and should improve its energy resilience to be able to keep the lights on even during a lengthy blockade. But thriving maritime commerce will remain Taiwan’s economic lifeblood, so its people will still have to be willing to endure great sacrifices to preserve their freedom in the event China uses force.

A view of the port of Taipei, June 21, 2024. (Photo by Markus Garlauskas)

To be fair, Taiwanese themselves—including scholars and business leaders we met—have wide-ranging views on the resilience and will to fight of the people of Taiwan. We were also struck by polling data that tells contrasting stories. First, poll after poll shows that a clear majority opposes accepting CCP rule of Taiwan. This is a strong foundation to work with. However, only just less than half of Taiwanese surveyed are “very willing” to fight to defend Taiwan. The good news is that this number can be increased. As one expert in public opinion shared with us, other polls show that Taiwanese are more likely to be willing to fight after receiving military training and if Taiwan can hold out after an initial attack.

Far more concerning, one independent poll we were briefed on suggested that Beijing and Moscow have a sympathetic ear among a large minority of Taiwanese. Given these polls and China’s unrelenting and insidious information warfare, our delegation came away concerned by the threat of subversion to Taiwan’s democracy. But in the next few years, such information warfare is unlikely to be decisive on its own. Instead, it could undermine Taiwan’s unity and will to resist if Beijing forced the issue. In short, if it came to blockade, bombardment, or invasion—accompanied by an information campaign and cyberattacks—would the Taiwanese people fold or fight? This is one question that Taiwanese institutions, such as the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, are exploring.

In unstructured discussions among members of our delegation, several of us came to the informal conclusion that leadership could be decisive in answering that question—citing positive examples present and past, including Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Winston Churchill, Ulysses S. Grant, and George Washington. The personal resilience of Taiwan’s democratically elected leadership, along with its determination to ensure continued investments in resilience, could determine Taiwan’s resilience under Chinese attack. This gives me cause for optimism.

Not all of the Taiwanese public has awoken to the rising Chinese threat, and much work remains, but Taiwan grows more resilient by the day. Taiwan’s freedom may hinge on its people’s willingness to invest and make sacrifices to prepare to face unrelenting pressure, up to and including blockade, bombardment, and invasion. Deterrence by preparing military capabilities that could deny success to Chinese invaders or threaten severe punishment will continue to be important, but these capabilities may not matter if Taiwan folds or breaks as Chinese pressure and aggression ramps up. Improving deterrence through resilience—by visibly ensuring Taiwan’s ability to absorb, endure, adapt, and resist—could be the key to Taiwan’s survival.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leading the Council’s Tiger Project on War and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. He is a former senior US government official with two decades of service as an intelligence officer and strategist, including twelve years stationed overseas in the region. He posts as @Mister_G_2 on X.

Note: The Atlantic Council delegation’s visit to Taiwan was supported by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO). This analysis was informed by the research trip and by Atlantic Council activities sponsored by the US Department of Defense. It represents the author’s views and not those of the government of Taiwan or any US government entity.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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Ukraine’s innovative drone industry helps counter Putin’s war machine

David Kirichenko — Wed, 26 Jun 2024 13:02:03 +0000

Since the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, Ukraine’s domestic drone industry has emerged as an increasingly crucial element in the struggle to resist and outmaneuver the formidable Russian war machine. Ukraine’s innovative use of drones has allowed the country to counter Russia’s far greater resources and strike back at targets everywhere from the Black Sea to oil refineries deep inside Russia itself.

For more than two years, Ukrainian commanders have been adapting to rapidly evolving battlefield conditions shaped by the use of drones. In the initial weeks of the war, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones were instrumental in allowing Ukraine to strike over-stretched Russian lines as Putin’s invading army attempted to take Kyiv. A range of countermeasures, including increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities, have since created an environment where Russian and Ukrainian forces are constantly competing to gain an innovative edge over their adversaries. Many view this military tech contest as the decisive front of the war.

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As the front line stabilized during the first winter of Russia’s invasion, trench warfare became the defining feature of the conflict, with drones filling the skies and searching for targets. This has created unprecedented visibility on both sides of the front lines and made offensive operations increasingly challenging. A large proportion of the drones buzzing above the Ukrainian battlefield in winter 2022 were Chinese in origin, which placed Russia at a significant advantage due to Moscow’s close ties with Beijing.

Meanwhile, many of the Western drone models used in Ukraine have proved costly and ineffective, according to the Wall Street Journal. Additionally, delays in military aid have underlined the risks for Ukraine of relying too heavily on the country’s Western partners. These factors have helped convince policymakers in Kyiv to concentrate on the development of their own domestic drone industry. They have been able to call upon Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector to support these efforts.

With Ukraine typically losing thousands of drones per month, keeping production costs as low as possible is vital. Flexibility in drone operations is also essential, as drone units frequently use 3D printing to modify and adapt parts to meet specific needs. With this in mind, Ukraine has adopted a decentralized approach to drone development that allows for rapid testing and deployment.

Ukraine’s emphasis on agility contrasts with the more centralized military structure favored by the Kremlin. While Russia can produce vast quantities of military equipment, comparatively slower decision-making processes and bureaucratic inefficiencies often hinder the Kremlin’s ability to respond swiftly to new battlefield realities. Many analysts believe this was a factor behind the recent appointment of a technocrat economist as Russia’s new defense minister.

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The growth of Ukraine’s domestic drone industry over the past two years has been striking, with more than 200 drone-manufacturing companies created. The Ukrainian authorities have allocated $2 billion for the production of drones in 2024, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy setting an annual production target of one million FPV drones.

Ukraine’s leaders hope more drones will mean less reliance on traditional munitions and fewer casualties. “We don’t have as many human resources as Russia. They fight, they die, they send more people, they don’t care, but that’s not how we see war,” commented Alex Bornyakov, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation.

A key element in Ukraine’s drone strategy is the BRAVE1 initiative, a government-led defense tech cluster established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the public and private sectors. This cluster has helped numerous companies cut through red tape, speeding up the implementation of new technologies to support Ukraine’s defense.

The race to innovate is relentless, with Ukraine’s steadily improving drone capabilities mirrored by Russia’s own rapidly expanding electronic warfare arsenal. Ukrainian engineers are now attempting to overcome the Kremlin’s increasingly sophisticated jamming efforts by embedding artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into drones. This innovation has already played a part in Kyiv’s long-range drone strike campaign against Russia’s energy industry, with CNN reporting that Ukraine has employed AI-enabled drones to hit targets as far away as Russia’s Tatarstan region, well over one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Ukraine’s partners certainly seem to recognize the importance of drones and have set up an international drone coalition to aid deliveries. In a further example of institutional innovation, Ukraine has this year become the first nation to establish a separate branch of its military dedicated to drone warfare.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s drone warfare strategy will continue to focus on flexibility, innovation, and the daily challenge of maintaining a technological advantage over Russia. Ukraine’s leaders know they cannot hope to defeat Russia in a traditional war of attrition, and must instead make the most of the agility and technological ingenuity that the country has demonstrated since February 2022. As Ukraine’s understanding of drone warfare continues to evolve, the outside world will be watching and learning.

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The high price of dissident art in Iran: Silence or exile

Shekufe Bar — Mon, 10 Jun 2024 16:18:04 +0000

“People of Iran are held hostage…I want to specifically talk about Toomaj Salehi, a singer who faces execution because of his artistic creation…do not allow the Islamic Republic to do this to its own people,” said Iranian director Mohammad Rasoulof during his Cannes speech on May 25.

Just a week before his Cannes debut, the internationally acclaimed filmmaker fled Iran on foot after being handed an eight-year sentence and other judgments for clandestinely making his latest movie, The Seed of the Sacred Fig. That film, which defies mandatory hijab restrictions and uses the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising as a backdrop, went on to win the Special Jury Prize at the 2024 Cannes Film Festival.

In recent weeks, the Iranian government’s unprecedented punitive measures against Rasoulof and dissident rapper Toomaj, as he is known to his followers, have ignited widespread controversy, sparking condemnations from civil rights and human rights bodies alike.

These recent decisions have set new precedents in the history of a regime notorious for its draconian punishments.

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Rasoulof’s sentencing was the harshest ever imposed on a filmmaker in the history of the Islamic Republic, topping the six years given to fellow director Jafar Panahi. Meanwhile, the death sentence issued by Iran’s judiciary for Toomaj marks an unprecedented decision against a singer.

Open criticism of the regime is what both artists have in common.

To observers, the Islamic Republic’s generic enmity toward artists is now an open secret. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, and his coterie firmly believed from the start that to cement theocratic governance, cultural reform is indispensable. Soon after, artists faced bans and expulsions over the “un-Islamic” nature of their profession and any open disapproval of the new order.

The censorship hit the music and film communities particularly hard. Before the revolution, these industries had flourished in Iran’s liberal climate during the 1960s and 1970s under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

For more than four decades, artists in these fields have been under renewed pressure. At least two prominent directors died suspiciously: Kiyumars Pourahmad in April 2023 and Dariush Mehrjui and his spouse, Vahideh Mohammadifar, in October of the same year. There have also been reports of artists diagnosed with autoimmune diseases after prison release, such as actress Taraneh Alidoosti and filmmaker Mostafa al-Ahmad. Combined with the handing down of exceptionally long terms or capital punishment to artists in the past year, this translates into an anti-art revenge campaign in response to the Women, Life, Freedom uprising.

The sustained support from film-industry professionals and musicians during popular uprisings in Iran—notably during the disputed 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement and throughout the Women, Life, Freedom movement—has positioned artists and celebrities as a thorn in the side of the regime, something intelligence agents and authorities have shown they will not tolerate.

According to reformist newspaper Shargh, within just two months after the Women, Life, Freedom uprising kicked off in 2022, nearly one hundred artists were sentenced or banned from working and leaving the country because of comments in support of the protests and defiance of mandatory hijab rules.

In October 2023, the Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture imposed acting bans on at least twenty prominent actresses, including Alidoosti, the star of Asghar Farhadi’s Oscar-winning film The Salesman. The women had either posed without hijab on social media or openly supported the protests.

Exile and boycott

The Women, Life, Freedom uprising marked the culmination of a long-running regime face-off with artists, with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and intelligence authorities spearheading the confrontation.

The escalating repression has led to many artists choosing self-exile, with Rasoulof a recent example. Indeed, of the twenty-person ban list, nearly half now reside outside Iran. This trend is part of an ongoing exodus of artists fleeing widespread censorship since the 1979 revolution.

Many independent artists who remain in Iran have suspended their activities due to working bans or personal reluctance to engage in the current oppressive political climate, which has only gotten worse since the popular uprisings began in September 2022.

The artistic community’s concerted boycott of the state-sponsored Fajr Artistic Festivals—annually held by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to commemorate the anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution—over the past two years highlights that these artists might never return to the scene as long as stifling cultural policies and hijab restrictions remain.

Oscar-winning filmmaker Farhadi’s refusal to make a movie in Iran under mandatory hijab in cinema indicates this decisive shift. He revealed the decision in an interview with French newspaper Le Monde in early 2024.

Despite this, artistic productions have not come to a standstill in Iran. Pro-regime artists and those who have never questioned authorities continue to work.

Such projects are often funded by two major media producers in Iran: the state broadcaster known as the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and the Owj Arts and Media Organization, the arts and production body of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). These state-owned entities currently monopolize hundreds of smaller media outlets and production firms, and also monitor the activities of independent media companies. IRIB and Owj productions are primarily used to spread regime propaganda.

The Owj Arts and Media Organization has strategically taken over Iran’s media-production landscape through an expanded and intricate network of connections with broadcaster IRIB and security and cultural authorities. With an estimated budget of $2 million in 2024, it funnels cultural money into various visual genres. High-profile and controversial Owj productions include the television spy series Gando, an Iranian version of the Israeli show Fauda, and musical theater Esfandiyar’s Seven Labors, based on the seminal Persian epic poem the Shahnameh.

Breaking free of long-standing taboos

Amid the boycotting of state-sponsored art by independent artists and the funneling of cultural budgets to state propaganda, a small yet burgeoning group of independent artists have pushed the boundaries of moviemaking from inside Iran.

Showing women without hijab and physical contact between men and women have been unbreakable taboos in post-revolution Iranian cinema. Yet, in the wake of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, a batch of Iranian movies—made inside Iran without observing mandatory hijab and other restrictions and without obtaining a license from the authorities—were screened at the 2023 Cannes Film Festival, and received acclaim from Iranian and international audiences. Me, Maryam, the Children and 26 Others by Farshad Hashemi and Terrestrial Verses by Ali Agari and Alireza Khatami received overwhelmingly positive reviews.

Since then, other internationally acclaimed dramas, such as My Favorite Cake directed by Maryam Moghaddam and Behtash Sanaeeha, and Rasoulof’s The Seed of the Sacred Fig, have openly traversed the Islamic Republic’s long-standing red lines and strict dress codes.

The homegrown push could be seen as an evolution of underground art, a method of creation long used to depict prohibited subjects within Iran. However, it has never been as public and transgressive as it has now become.

It could be argued that the independent artists’ intentional disengagement from all forms of state-related art, powered by the emergence of a new generation of taboo breakers in Iranian cinema, exposes the failure of regime strategies to threaten and impede Iran-based dissident artists.

Unsurprisingly, the Islamic Republic’s restrictive measures have only spurred Iranian artists to resist pressure, open radical fronts, and fundamentally subvert the ideological restrictions on artistic independence and creation that have been enforced since the 1979 revolution.

Shekufe Bar is a journalist who writes about art, culture, and society.

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National resilience is a crucial part of defense. Here are the countries doing it right.

Elisabeth Braw — Mon, 03 Jun 2024 18:30:07 +0000

National resilience has long been part of NATO’s mission; indeed, it has its very own paragraph in the North Atlantic Treaty. But for years, NATO allies neglected national resilience. Recently, however, many of them have realized that national resilience is fundamental to their security. Better yet, some are now taking innovative action to improve their resilience. Learning from the allies that are already taking action will give other allies that decide to enhance their resilience a leg up.

“In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack,” reads Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed seventy-five years ago in Washington, DC. Even though Article 3 precedes Article 5, many allies have not taken it particularly seriously—at least not since the end of the Cold War.

That’s because national resilience is harder to quantify than military defense. With the latter, the armed forces, policymakers, and even the public can assess how large and effective efforts are. Armed forces have a specific number of active-duty service members, a specific number of reservists, and specific weaponry. But the “individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” involves a plethora of skills and items that are much harder to identify, let alone measure. There are no rules governing who should participate in resilience, nor is there an official level at which a country (or organization) is considered resilient.

At the 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO leaders attempted to elevate resilience standards by adopting seven “baseline requirements.” These were: assured continuity of government and critical government services, resilient energy supplies, the ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people, resilient food and water resources, the ability to deal with mass casualties, resilient civil communications systems, and resilient civil transportation systems. Creating that list was a worthy step, though some allies have treated the baselines more like ambitions than requirements.

Some allies, though, go far beyond the baseline requirements. Indeed, they make national resilience a matter not just of infrastructure and governmental capabilities: instead, they involve the population. Two of the foremost practitioners of societal resilience, Sweden and Finland, have joined the Alliance at just the right time, because they have invaluable knowledge to share.

In the case of Sweden, its society-wide involvement in national security dates back to World War II, when the country had to meet Nazi leader Adolf Hitler’s total war by marshaling all the resources at its disposal: total defense. During the Cold War, Sweden turned these efforts into a system so well-managed that millions (in a country of some eight million at the end of the Cold War) were involved in various parts of national security: as soldiers, as reservists, as members of auxiliary defense organizations, as civilians in crucial professions (from daycare teachers to nuclear engineers), and as ordinary citizens knowing what to do in case of war, because the authorities had regularly kept them informed.

Finland, prevented by the Soviets from operating auxiliary defense organizations, focused instead on preparedness and what it called mental territorial defense: making the Finns steadfast in their support of the country. (Those interested can read more about it in The Defender’s Dilemma.) In recent years, Sweden has once again proven itself as an innovator when it comes to resilience, with initiatives such as the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, which the Civil Contingencies Agency published six years ago. Especially now that the two friends and neighbors have finally made it into NATO, other allies can pick from their collection of resilience practices and adopt and adapt the ones they like without having to spend the considerable time it takes to create such practices from scratch. Indeed, this kind of learning is already picking up speed. These days Latvia, for example, has a Sweden-like booklet called How to Deal with a Crisis.

But the much-lauded Swedes and Finns, and their Nordic and Baltic friends, are not NATO’s only resilience leaders. The Czech Republic has, through its ministry of defense, launched gray-zone exercises for the private sector. Until the Czech initiative, national-security training for companies had barely been addressed by NATO’s member states, mostly because doing so would require setting up a new format and designing the exercises. Now that the Czech Republic has done so, others can save time and effort by building on the Czechs’ initiatives.

Other allies are also taking important steps. Latvia, for its part, has introduced a defense curriculum that teaches all its high schoolers resilience skills. Germany’s Technisches Hilfswerk (THW), too, is a model worth learning from: 99 percent of those working for this federal agency, whose members help in public emergencies such as storms, are volunteers. The THW doesn’t have a national security mandate, but its model can easily be adapted to national resilience. NATO member states would also do well to learn from close friends outside the Alliance. In the Indo-Pacific, Singapore has an annual total defense day, and Australia is developing an ambitious resilience strategy.

Not every practice is applicable to every NATO country, but what matters is that solutions exist. Learning from friends willing to share best practices is the easiest and most efficient way of learning.

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the author of Goodbye, Globalization: The Return of a Divided World (Yale University Press: 2024).

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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How Cabo Verde is highlighting the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa

El Mehdi Boudra — Mon, 20 May 2024 13:34:53 +0000

A decade ago, Cabo Verde, a predominantly Christian country, restored its Jewish cemeteries under the patronage of a Muslim leader, King Mohammed VI of Morocco. This vibrant example of Africa’s historical, cultural, and religious diversity was celebrated on March 6, when an assembly of Jews, Christians, and Muslims gathered in Praia, the country’s capital, to commemorate years of efforts to conserve an essential aspect of Cabo Verde’s past. This achievement transcends a single community and embraces a larger vision of Cabo Verdean society. The Jewish cemeteries are now not merely materialized memories but pivotal platforms for fostering interfaith dialogue and, by embodying the spirit of unity in diversity, have become beacons of inspiration for generations.

The restored Jewish cemetery in Praia—more precisely, the Jewish section of an interfaith cemetery—was reinaugurated in 2013 after a collaboration between the Municipal Chamber of Praia and the Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project, with the support of Morocco’s king. The Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project worked closely with the Cabo Verdean Ministry of Communities and the National Library of Cabo Verde to coordinate the celebration, which included the unveiling of commemorative plaques and a conference at the National Library exploring the legacy of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde. This event brought together scholars, historians, and descendants of Cabo Verde’s Moroccan Jews for a dialogue about their profound historical and cultural impact.

The origins of Cabo Verde’s Jewish communities date back to the nineteenth century, starting with the arrival of Moroccan Jews from cities like Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat, Essaouira, and Gibraltar in search of economic opportunities. These communities left a lasting impression on the archipelago’s history by contributing significantly to its cultural and economic development. The descendants of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde still have their Sephardic names—such as Auday, Brigham, and Cohen—and descendants of these families speak with great pride of their Jewish ancestors and honor their legacy by preserving their Jewish heritage. The resurrection of this house of life, which was falling into disrepair and represents the Jewish Moroccan presence in this Atlantic archipelago, is a profound act that transcends merely dusting off the collective memory. Restoring the cemetery of Praia is an acknowledgment of the historical connection, the influence of the Moroccan Jewish community, and the safeguarding of their heritage and preventing it from being lost to time.

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In its steadfast pursuit of fostering convivencia and interfaith dialogue, Cabo Verde has worked to recognize and respect cultural diversity. This has been achieved by embracing Moroccan and Gibraltarian Jewish heritage as an integral part of Cabo Verde’s national heritage. In doing so, Cabo Verde commemorates the diverse heritage of its multicultural past and honors the profound bonds between Cabo Verde and Morocco today—specifically their shared values and mutual dedication to upholding the principles of religious and cultural pluralism.

This reciprocal acknowledgment and the elevation of Jewish heritage as a pivotal element of Cabo Verde’s national heritage is an expression of the commitment of Cabo Verde and Morocco to fostering peace and valuing diversity. This ten-year-old project’s continued relevance is a poignant symbol of the myriad steps taken to forge a more inclusive and cohesive society. Cabo Verde’s initiative goes beyond merely safeguarding its varied cultural and religious identity; it fortifies the bridges of comprehension and mutual respect with Morocco, underscoring the crucial role of diversity in underpinning national unity and social harmony.

Moreover, Morocco and Cabo Verde’s joint efforts exemplify the essence of intra-African collaboration dialogue, including respect for diversity and the recognition that harmonious living among communities is pivotal for societal advancement and overall stability. This approach paves the way for a peaceful and prosperous Africa, embracing inclusivity and convivencia as cornerstones for progress.

Highlighting this, Minister of Cabo Verdean Communities Jorge Santos signed the Call of Rabat for the Preservation of the African Jewish Heritage during the second annual Jewish Africa Conference in 2022. African leaders, as well as friends of the Jewish community in Africa, signed the call, which invites all parties involved—individuals, civil society, and governments—to acknowledge the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa and the need to protect and make accessible Jewish historical sites across the continent; to strengthen the sacred “chords of memory” that connect various generations and peoples to the African Jewish experience, particularly through cultural and educational initiatives; to give African youths the tools they need to preserve, propagate, and celebrate African Jewish cultures; to collaborate in the preservation, restoration, and renovation of significant Jewish sites on the African continent; and to establish a mechanism to further these objectives as well as to provide opportunities for African Jewish voices.

The Call of Rabat is a considerable effort to unite and celebrate the rich diversity of African-Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Africa’s history, culture, and religion are woven together like a complex tapestry with strands of coexistence, unity, and togetherness, as evidenced by Cabo Verde’s restoration of Jewish cemeteries. Judaism in Africa has grown from biblical times to the present, symbolizing the continent’s rare ethnic and religious diversity. Beyond bridging historical gaps, the Call of Rabat opens the door to a future in which diversity and unity combine to form a peaceful, inclusive society by bolstering the presence of Judaism in Africa.

From Rabat to Praia, a new generation of African leaders is reclaiming their Jewish history and realizing a brighter future.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative and the founder and president of Mimouna Association, a Moroccan nongovernmental organization. Follow him on X: @ElBoudra.

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Climate change doesn’t have to result in greater gender inequity in the Caribbean

Wazim Mowla — Mon, 29 Apr 2024 16:19:41 +0000

The Caribbean is one of world’s most vulnerable regions to the effects of climate change. Hurricanes and strong tropical storms, changing precipitation patterns, and sea level rise disproportionately affect Caribbean economies and citizens—and none of the latter more than its women and girls. Climate change amplifies their existing challenges, such as gender-based violence and inequities, while creating new barriers to economic opportunity and political influence. As Caribbean governments and their partners work to build a more resilient region, the challenges facing women and girls need to be taken into account and policy designs must reflect their perspectives.

The region has an urgent need to prepare for the scope of climate change. Many of the region’s countries rely on tourism to drive economic growth, with ten of the world’s twenty most tourism-dependent economies residing in the Caribbean. When hurricanes roll through the region, damaging infrastructure and halting flights, the tourism industry halts as well, diminishing economic prospects. Most Caribbean countries face the brunt of the Atlantic hurricane season, which is producing stronger and more frequent tropical storms. At the same time, most of the region’s populous cities are coastal, making sea level rise a threat to homes and the day-to-day functions of society. Further, changing precipitation patterns and higher average temperatures result in agricultural degradation and more acidic oceans, decreasing crop yields in rural areas and limiting fishery supplies.

While the entire region faces daunting consequences from climate change and related natural disasters, women and girls face disproportionate effects across four areas.

First, women and girls are “especially vulnerable to sexual violence and coercion” in the wake of a natural disaster, according to the United Nations Population Fund. This risk includes and extends beyond domestic violence, which is known to spike in crisis situations, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic in Trinidad and Tobago. Disproportionate risks mount, the World Bank notes, “in the face of uprooted housing and traditional support structures, disrupted access to services, and both structural and social obstacles to accessing food, relief, supplies, and latrines.” A lack of privacy and security in shelters is problematic, especially for young and teenage girls.

Second, women are responsible for a greater share of caregiving for families and households. After Hurricane María knocked out the power grid in Puerto Rico and made potable water scarce, it was women who bore a greater burden in doing the cooking, laundry, and cleaning to keep households going. Moreover, across multiple climate change events, when schools close, women with school-age children are often unable to return to work or attend school themselves.

Third, Caribbean women tend to work in the informal economy, including small-scale businesses and the hospitality sector, both of which are adversely affected by tropical storms. Storms can damage crops and roads, making it difficult to get produce to markets, while also leaving restaurants, shops, and hotels closed for days, affecting incomes.

Finally, women often have unequal access to finance, capital, and other assets, which can affect their resilience after a disaster. In addition, as governments finance the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure after natural disasters and fortify existing structures, there are fewer resources devoted to the education and health sectors—both of which are integral to providing care to and lifting family responsibility burdens from women.

Caribbean governments and regional partners must factor in the disproportionate challenges facing women and girls at the earliest stages of climate resilience and adaptation policymaking. Policy designs should incorporate government funding or subsidies dedicated to women-owned businesses adversely affected by climate change. Historically, Caribbean women face barriers to accessing finance and capital to start or invest in their businesses. Limited track records in operating a business relative to men and frequent climate events increase the risk profiles for women-owned firms. Here, governments can work with regional institutions like the Caribbean Development Bank to level the playing field for women-owned firms by providing grants to businesses in climate-affected sectors, like hospitality and agricultural work.

Further, resources can and should be dedicated to women-owned firms that are physically affected by climate events and to create shelters where at-risk women and girls can stay after natural disasters to limit spaces where gender-based violence can occur. This should include shelters that can care for children and allow working parents to return to their jobs to offset the disproportionate costs borne by women resulting from family responsibilities.

Involving women in policy designs also includes making them part of the decision-making process. Only women and girls can provide first-hand information to contextualize policies and streamline resources that address the unique challenges they face due to climate change. One way to do this is to incorporate perspectives from gender-focused civil society organizations.

Civil society organizations are uniquely intertwined with the realities of each country at national and subnational levels, allowing them to understand the day-to-day challenges facing women and girls across different communities. Governments can work with civil society organizations to ensure that policies are not blanket approaches but are bottom-up in nature, so that each community of women and girls receive the resources and attention they require. Regular consultation with these groups, particularly in the advent of hurricane season, during rainy seasons, and in the lead-up to drier months can provide real-time insights into the types of government resources that should be devoted to women and girls.

Given that the Caribbean is a heterogeneous region, with different climate events affecting different countries, it is essential for policy design and decision making to be country-specific as well as gender inclusive to best serve local populations. Climate change does not have to result in increasing gender inequity in the Caribbean—as long as the voices and interests of women and girls are incorporated in policy design and resource allocation in regional planning to combat climate change.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow for the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

This article is part of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s partnership with the UN Women Multi-Country Office–Caribbean.

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How the US is pitching a development finance ‘alternative’ to China’s initiatives, according to Scott Nathan

Katherine Golden — Thu, 25 Apr 2024 16:22:08 +0000

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CEO Scott Nathan on DFC’s work on energy security and other strategic priorities

An #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Scott Nathan, chief executive officer of the US International Development Finance Corporation, discusses the agency’s role in US efforts to advance global energy security and other strategic US priorities.

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The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) isn’t “directly competing” with China, according to its chief executive officer Scott Nathan, but it is “offering an alternative.”

Nathan spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Council’s Global Energy Center on Wednesday, explaining that the DFC is different from Chinese development banks or Chinese investment initiatives (such as the Global Development Initiative and Belt and Road Initiative) because it supports the private sector directly. The DFC doesn’t lend money to governments for “big and also sometimes bloated” projects that aren’t “appropriate for local laws and conditions,” he said, alluding to China’s investments that have pushed countries into deep debt.

The DFC head recalled how foreign government officials have told him that “they don’t want to be dependent on one country for their source of finance.”

“Good development is good foreign policy,” he explained. “That’s in our national interest.”

Here are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Amelia Lester, executive editor of Foreign Policy.

Standing out in the marketplace

How exactly does the DFC differ from China’s investment engines? Nathan said it’s in part because “we maintain the highest standards possible” when it comes to “environmental, social, [and] labor” practices. It is “critical,” he added, not only to support economic development but also to “promote . . . values.”
One important area is in internet connectivity—in which China is investing heavily, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The DFC, meanwhile, is supporting projects that push forward secure equipment and networks that protect privacy, Nathan said, highlighting specific DFC-supported projects in Australia and Africa that are offering an alternative to China’s services. “This is critical for growth,” he said, adding that infrastructure is “not just energy, airports, and railways. You need the infrastructure of the twenty-first century for economic development.”
Nathan explained that the DFC was created by Congress in 2018 due to a “strong sense” among both Republicans and Democrats that the United States needed to improve its economic-diplomacy game. “We needed to show up in the developing world and offer an alternative to what was being offered by authoritarian governments and our strategic competitors,” he said.
The DFC is due to be reauthorized by Congress in 2025. “There is a strong demand signal for us to do more to show up,” Nathan said. “That requires us being reauthorized; it requires continuous funding.”

Showing up for Ukraine

Nathan explained that the DFC has provided nearly $500 million in financing to businesses in Ukraine and has offered political risk insurance—which includes coverage for war-related risks—that has catalyzed more investments in Ukraine’s private sector.
The most critical tool to support Ukraine’s private sector, however, is “solid air defense,” Nathan said. It’s “hard to make decisions around investment and capital expenditure in an environment of such high insecurity.”
Nathan explained that the United States has had a long history of providing political risk insurance. Since the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (DFC’s predecessor) started offering the insurance, he said, the United States has “done over $50 billion. . . of political risk insurance” and has had “just over a billion dollars of claims.” The institutions have covered 97 percent of those claims, he added. “So it’s not only been very important for economic activity. . . but it’s been very profitable.”
Working in Ukraine, Nathan said, has shown him how important it is for the DFC to work closely with its peers, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation, and European Investment Bank.

A diversified system

Earlier this year, the DFC provided a $500 million loan to US company First Solar to build a new solar panel manufacturing facility in Tamil Nadu, India. Nathan said that the plant, which will use cadmium telluride sourced from India instead of China, “fits into the [DFC’s] supply chain diversification goals. . . We need to make sure that we’re not dependent on one country or one company for the inputs of the industries of the future.”
“If we can do this kind of thing elsewhere in the world to make sure that supply chains are broadly diversified, that helps with resilience,” he argued, adding that the United States must not “replace dependency on oil” with dependency on “a couple of nations,” as that would bring “all sorts of strategic vulnerabilities.”
“Having countries be able to be self-reliant, to have the energy they need for economic development, that promotes stability. . . that’s good for our security,” he said.
On critical minerals, Nathan highlighted several projects underway in Africa, including one on graphite in Mozambique. And, he added, as the DFC invests in that project, it will also be working with the US Department of Energy, which has loaned a company in Louisiana funds to expand its capacity to produce graphite-based materials for batteries. “It’s critical to start with the sourcing of the minerals,” Nathan said. “But there’s a whole value chain” to support.

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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‘A bad day for Putin’: US aid vote gives Ukrainians renewed hope

Peter Dickinson — Sun, 21 Apr 2024 10:15:40 +0000

Millions of Ukrainians let out a collective sigh of relief on Saturday as the US House of Representatives finally passed a long-delayed $61 billion aid bill that will provide Ukraine with a crucial lifeline in the struggle against Russian aggression. The vote came following months of political deadlock in the United States that had forced Ukrainian troops to ration ammunition and raised serious doubts over the future of Western support for the embattled Eastern European nation.

Responding to the news from Washington DC, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy sought to underline the broad historical significance of the vote. “I am grateful to the United States House of Representatives, both parties, and personally to Speaker Mike Johnson for a decision that keeps history on the right track,” he commented. “Democracy and freedom will never fail as long as America helps protect it. A just peace and security can only be attained through strength.”

In his daily address, Zelenskyy also noted the critical importance of fresh US military supplies for Ukraine’s war effort and for the entire country’s security amid an escalating Russian bombing campaign. The bill passed by the House of Representatives is “a very significant package that will be appreciated both by our soldiers on the front lines and by our towns and villages suffering from Russian terror,” the Ukrainian leader stated.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called the vote “a bad day for Putin” and “a bad day for anyone who dared to believe that America could waver when it comes to defending what and who it stands for.” Ukraine’s top diplomat also stressed the role of the bill in bolstering the US position on the international stage. “Everyone who made this decision a reality made the right choice. The United States has reaffirmed its global leadership.”

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Saturday’s vote in the United States was closely monitored by Ukrainian troops stationed thousands of miles away on the front lines of the war in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ukrainian ambassador-at-large Olexander Scherba shared a message sent to him by one soldier serving in the Donbas, who recounted the enthusiastic reaction among his comrades. “The whole unit was watching. After the vote, you could hear shouts of “YESSS!” along the entire trench.”

For many Ukrainians, the House of Representatives vote has helped rebuild faith in the country’s international partners following months of mounting frustration and feelings of abandonment. Since late summer 2023, Ukrainians have watched in dismay as their country’s survival has become hostage to US domestic politics. Meanwhile, Russia has taken advantage of Ukraine’s dwindling ammunition and air defenses to regain the battlefield initiative in eastern Ukraine and launch a nationwide bombing campaign targeting the country’s increasingly unprotected residential districts and civilian infrastructure.

With major new US weapons shipments reportedly “ready to go” once final confirmation of the aid package is received from the Senate and the White House, there are now renewed hopes that Ukraine will receive the military support it needs in order to push Russian forces back and defend the country. This boost could not be more timely, with Ukrainian weapons shortages rapidly approaching critical levels and preparations well underway for what is expected to be a major Russian offensive in the coming months.

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In the wake of Saturday’s vote, Ukrainian army medic Yulia Paievska was one of numerous prominent figures from the country’s military community to praise Ukraine’s American partners and stress the importance of their continued support in the struggle against Russia. “They have lived up to their promises, which once again proves that justice and freedom are not empty words to the American people,” she commented. “Despite all the obstacles, we advance toward victory.”

These upbeat sentiments were echoed by a number of front line soldiers quoted by CNN. “We thought our partners had forgotten about us. This news gives us a sense of support and an understanding that we have not been forgotten,” one Ukrainian intelligence officer serving on the Zaporizhzhia front noted. “When we feel support from the outside, it motivates us. After all, the military knows it cannot win with sticks and bows and arrows,” stated another.

While the House of Representatives vote clearly boosted Ukrainian morale, many in Ukraine were also realistic about the scale of the challenges that remain. With the US presidential election set to take place later this year, further large-scale US military aid cannot be taken for granted. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s European partners are working to boost defense production but have so far struggled to fill the gap created by the recent pause in US security assistance.

If Western leaders are serious about preventing a Russian victory in Ukraine, they will have to look beyond the current $61 billion US aid package and develop the necessary resources to prevail in a long confrontation with the Kremlin. “Please don’t forget that Russia’s annual military budget is more than $100 billion,” noted Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko on Saturday evening. “We have won time today, but we have not won the war. We will still need to finish the job.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Hospitals, businesses, and homeowners are now scrambling to secure generators and other alternative power sources in anticipation of further blackouts, with children forced to study online or in makeshift underground classrooms. For now, most Kharkiv residents appear intent on staying put. However, if the situation does not improve in the coming months, there may be a mass exodus ahead of the winter season. Indeed, many fear that without enhanced air defenses, conditions inside the city could become intolerable much sooner.

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The destruction of Kharkiv would certainly be a major war crime, but it would be far from unprecedented. On the contrary, the methodical depopulation of Ukraine’s second city would be very much in keeping with the destructive tactics employed by Russia ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began more than two years ago.

From Mariupol to Bakhmut, the Russian military has reduced a long list of Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble as it has slowly steamrollered forward along the largely static front lines of the war. Although it is not possible to accurately determine casualty figures in areas currently under Russian occupation, tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians are believed to have been killed in Mariupol alone.

While the Kharkiv region has been the worst hit, the recent escalation in Russian bombardments has impacted the whole country, with attacks on the power grid in particular creating unprecedented challenges for the entire Ukrainian energy sector. This appears to be the result of extensive planning in Moscow, with Russian military officials learning important lessons from the failure of their winter 2022-23 energy infrastructure bombing offensive.

“Rather than continuing to focus their attacks on Ukraine’s transmission systems, Russia has began launching massive attacks on our energy generation infrastructure,” the CEO of Ukrainian energy provider DTEK, Maxim Timchenko, told CNN. “Unfortunately, the enemy has evolved his tactics and is using high-precision weapons. The result is a huge increase in its destructive effectiveness compared to 2023.”

The timing of the current bombing campaign also suggests Moscow is looking to take advantage of growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses. With a vital aid package held up in the US Congress for more than half a year, the Ukrainian military is currently suffering from a wide range of shortages, leaving front line commanders and air defense crews with no choice but to ration dwindling supplies of ammunition.

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Ukraine’s main port city and international maritime gateway, Odesa, has been heavily targeted in recent months. Attacks on residential areas in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions of northern Ukraine have also accelerated noticeably. In early April, a massive barrage of missiles succeeded in penetrating Ukraine’s depleted air defenses close to the country’s capital, destroying the largest power plant in the Kyiv region. “Why? Because we had zero missiles. We ran out of all missiles,” a clearly exasperated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told PBS NewsHour.

Ukrainian officials are now urgently appealing for extra air defenses to help counter Russia’s bombing campaign. So far, the response has been muted, with only Germany confirming plans to hand over a Patriot system. Others, such as the Netherlands, have offered to purchase Patriot systems on behalf of Ukraine. While these steps are welcome, much more needs to be done to protect Ukraine’s civilian population and the country’s infrastructure.

Many analysts believe improved air defenses are not enough and argue that in order to effectively counter Putin’s terror-bombing tactics, Ukraine must be given the necessary long-range weapons to target Russian launch sites. However, this would require Ukraine’s partners to overcome their well-documented fear of escalation and reverse a longstanding ban on the use of Western weapons for attacks inside Russia. At present, there is little sign of that happening.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague has already issued arrest warrants for two high-ranking Russian military officers over the 2022-23 bombing of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, but this is of little comfort to the beleaguered Ukrainian population, who know it will be years before they see even symbolic justice served. Meanwhile, the current bombing campaign continues to gain momentum. This new air offensive is far more ambitious than Russia’s earlier efforts, with the apparent end goal of rendering entire Ukrainian regions uninhabitable.

Unless Ukraine’s air defenses are dramatically upgraded in the near future, the country will face a humanitarian catastrophe that could potentially define the future course of the war. Putin has been unable to defeat Ukraine decisively on the battlefield, but his bombing campaign may yet succeed in breaking Ukrainian resistance by forcing millions of civilians to flee their blacked out homes and ruined cities.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The recently signed agreement with Kyiv Oblast was not the start of Washington State’s efforts to support Ukraine. Since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Washington has provided a powerful example of the role regional governments can play in responding to global events.

In March 2022, Governor Inslee directed state agencies to begin reviewing and severing ties with Russian state institutions and companies. In the initial weeks of the invasion, local nonprofits worked together with the state’s Ukrainian diaspora community to organize the delivery of 32 tons of medical supplies to Ukraine. During 2022, Washington State officials allocated nearly $20 million to support the influx of Ukrainian refugees.

According to the Seattle Times, more Ukrainian refugees have arrived in Washington State over the past two years than any other US state. This warm welcome owes much to the state’s vibrant Ukrainian-American community, according Geoffrey Potter, director of international relations and protocol for Governor Jay Inslee. He says the new Sister State Agreement and Washington’s other efforts to support Ukraine are “an expression” of the way local residents with Ukrainian roots have become an integral part of the Washington community.

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Ukraine’s honorary consul in Seattle, Valeriy Goloborodko, believes the Sister State Agreement will pave the way for closer ties and can help “further relationships between academics, industries, and regional governments for the benefit of the people.” Meanwhile, Potter notes a number of common interests linking the Kyiv region and Washington including clean energy, forestry, and the aerospace industry.

As wartime Ukraine looks ahead toward the challenges of recovery and reconstruction, subnational diplomacy can open up a range of new business opportunities. Major Washington State-based business brands including Boeing and Microsoft are already active in Ukraine. The state’s many small businesses are also playing an important role in strengthening ties. In Tacoma, Washington-based SAFE Boats is currently outfitting eight patrol boats destined for Ukraine’s navy. BRINC Drones, based in Seattle, is supplying drones for Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression.

At a time when the issue of vital military aid for Ukraine has become hostage to domestic US political tensions, grassroots relationships can help individual Ukrainian regions bypass the kind of obstacles that might otherwise hamper progress at the national level. With this in mind, Ukraine’s regional leaders and their counterparts across the globe should now be seeking to develop stronger subnational ties that can solidify relationships for the long term.

Washington State’s agreement with Kyiv Oblast offers an attractive model that others can follow, both in the US and beyond. In Goloborodko’s view, the recently signed Sister State Agreement “is a way to show leadership in supporting democracy.” The initiative is the first of its kind for a US state, but Potter is “pretty sure” it will not be the last. “We’re forging a model for what a meaningful, substantive collaboration looks like,” he says.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Ukraine’s hunt for Patriot air defense systems is taking place against the backdrop of an escalating Russian air offensive that is capitalizing on months declining Western military support and prolonged deadlock in the US Congress over a major Ukrainian aid package. With gaps now growing in Ukraine’s air defense network and individual air defense units increasingly obliged to ration their dwindling resources, Russia has launched a series of overnight attacks in recent weeks that have decimated much of Ukraine’s power grid.

Ukraine’s second-largest city and former capital, Kharkiv, has been particularly hard hit. Located just a few dozen miles from the border with Russia in eastern Ukraine, the city has been subjected to an intensive bombing campaign since mid-March that has caused extensive damage to residential districts and civilian infrastructure. In recent weeks, hundreds of thousands have been left without power for extended periods.

The destruction in Kharkiv has been so severe that some analysts now believe Russia’s objective is to empty the city of its more than one million residents ahead of an anticipated summer offensive. “The Kremlin wants to make Ukraine’s second city unlivable,” reported Britain’s The Economist in early April.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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The latest wave of Russian missiles and drones struck targets across Ukraine early on April 11. In an indication of Ukraine’s increasingly ineffective air defenses and mounting vulnerability to Russian bombardment, all of the Kremlin’s hard-to-intercept hypersonic and ballistic missiles reportedly reached their objectives, according to the Kyiv Post.

A major power plant close to Kyiv was among those destroyed in the overnight attack, dealing a further significant blow to Ukraine’s energy resilience. The Trypilska Thermal Power Plant, the largest supplier of electricity to central Ukraine’s Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr regions, suffered a series of direct hits and was left in ruins.

“The scale of destruction is terrifying,” commented Andriy Hota, the chairman of Ukrainian energy company Centrenergo. Speaking to the BBC, Hota said the Kyiv region plant can be rebuilt with the help of spare parts from elsewhere in Europe, but warned that the facility will remain vulnerable to Russian attack unless Ukraine’s partners provide powerful air defenses. “We can repair. We can do the impossible. But we need protection.”

With each new Russian bombardment destroying more of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, there is a growing sense that time is now running out to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the country. Unless Ukraine urgently receives additional air defense systems and ammunition, entire regions could soon face rapidly deteriorating conditions without access to electricity and other basic services. This could fuel a new refugee crisis, with millions of Ukrainians entering the EU.

The collapse of the country’s power grid would also cause economic mayhem and dramatically undermine the Ukrainian war effort. This would set the stage for a Russian military victory that would have disastrous consequences for Ukraine itself and for the future of international security. Russia has so far been unable to break Ukraine on the battlefield, but there is now a very real chance that a lack of air defenses will allow the Kremlin to achieve its goals by targeting Ukraine’s increasingly undefended civilian infrastructure.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Georgia launches new push to adopt Russian-style foreign agent law

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 09 Apr 2024 12:00:24 +0000

Georgia’s ruling party is pushing ahead with plans to pass legislation tightening restrictions on civil society, despite widespread domestic alarm along with expressions of concern from the EU and US. The new law mirrors earlier draft legislation that was shelved in spring 2023 following widespread protests and comes as the country prepares for parliamentary elections in October.

The proposed legislation would oblige civil society organizations receiving more than 20% of annual funding from sources outside Georgia to openly state that they are “pursuing the interests of a foreign power.” They would be required to register as foreign agents and subjected to extensive additional reporting requirements. Organizations that fail to do so could face large fines.

Critics say the bill is very similar to Russia’s draconian foreign agents legislation, which is widely seen as a tool for the Kremlin to target potential dissidents and silence civil society. The similarities between the law proposed by the Georgian authorities and restrictions already in place inside Russia helped fuel large-scale protests in Tbilisi last year, with many denouncing what they termed as the “Russian law.”

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Renewed efforts to pass last year’s foreign agents bill have sparked fresh debate over Georgia’s future. Opposition groups see the return of the draft law as a further indication of the ruling Georgian Dream party’s intention to steer the country away from Europe and toward Russia. The move comes just months after Georgia achieved a major breakthrough by securing official EU candidate nation status in December 2023.

EU officials voiced “regret” that Georgia’s foreign influence legislation was once again under consideration despite being “unconditionally” withdrawn last year. “Transparency should not be used as an instrument to limit civil society’s capacity to operate freely,” read an EU statement. “We encourage the political leaders in Georgia to adopt and implement reforms that are in line with the stated objective of joining the European Union, as supported by a large majority of Georgia’s citizens.”

The United States also voiced its concerns over the reappearance of the contentious foreign agents law. The largely unchanged draft legislation “undermines Georgia’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and risks pulling Georgia off its European path,” commented US Department of State spokesperson Matthew Miller.

When officials from the ruling Georgian Dream party first proposed new legislation to curb foreign influence in February 2023, the backlash was so strong that the draft law was ultimately withdrawn from consideration. Thousands rallied against the bill in Tbilisi, leading to clashes with police that generated global headlines.

Criticism also came from a range of international human rights watchdogs. “The foreign agent bill seeks to marginalize and discredit independent, foreign-funded groups and media that serve the wider public interest in Georgia,” commented Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia Director for Human Rights Watch.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

The reintroduction of the foreign agents law ahead of parliamentary elections in October casts a shadow over Georgia’s democratic progress. Critics say this renewed push to pass legislation virtually identical to last year’s abandoned bill is part of the Georgian Dream party’s efforts to silence opponents. They accuse the Georgian authorities of backsliding on the core values underpinning the country’s declared goal of securing a democratic, European future.

These concerns reflect fears over Russian influence. Despite widespread public opposition to Russia’s role in the country, the Georgian Dream party has long faced accusations of seeking to foster closer ties with the Kremlin. Russia continues to occupy approximately 20 percent of Georgia, and has recently announced plans to construct a major naval base on the Black Sea coast in Georgia’s occupied Abkhazia region.

Over the past two years, the Georgian authorities have responded ambiguously to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Georgia has refused to join international sanctions or restrict trade with Russia, while Georgian PM Irakli Garibashvili echoed the Kremlin in May 2023 by claiming NATO enlargement was one of the main reasons for the war in Ukraine. Georgia also recently relaunched direct flights to Russia.

In the coming weeks, Georgia’s revived foreign influence legislation is expected to be reviewed by a parliamentary committee. A new round of protests against the law has already begun in the capital, and could serve as a focal point for opponents of the current authorities. The further passage of the law will reveal much about the Georgian Dream party’s grip on power, while also providing an indication of the country’s future geopolitical trajectory.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Sun, 31 Mar 2024 21:15:50 +0000

A series of Russian drone and missile attacks beginning March 22 has destroyed much of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The damage, which will cost billions of dollars and many months to repair, has crippled Ukraine’s ability to light and heat itself for the medium term and marks a major escalation in Russia’s ongoing invasion.

The latest wave of Russian airstrikes has been notable for its breadth. Virtually every one of Ukraine’s thermal power plants has been hit along with a series of substations. DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private power company, reports that two of its thermal power plants (TPP) are no longer operational, with repairs expected to take several years. A separate plant in Kharkiv has also been seriously damaged and will take years to repair, according to regional authorities.

The specific condition of additional Ukrainian power plants remains classified, but reports of recent blackouts in multiple major cities have underlined the extent of the threat to Ukraine’s power grid. In a move indicating the scale of the damage caused by recent Russian bombing, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has ordered an early end to the country’s heating season.

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Russian targets in recent days have included the Dnipro Hydroelectric Dam, sparking fears of a possible ecological disaster. The dam itself has not collapsed, but the power plant was partially destroyed and pollutants are now reportedly leaking into the reservoir. Even more worryingly, the nearby Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant lost grid connectivity due to the attack, putting its cooling systems at risk of stopping. Energoatom called the situation “extremely dangerous.”

In a further escalation, Russia has also expanded its air offensive with attacks on Ukraine’s natural gas storage facilities. These facilities, which house large quantities of gas for European customers, had not previously been targeted in earlier Russian bombing campaigns. Although the storage facilities themselves are underground, the pumping stations that allow for the insertion and extraction of gas are not.

On March 24, Russia launched approximately 20 missiles and drones at the Bilche-Volitsko-Ugerskoye storage facility, which represents around half of Ukraine’s total storage capacity. Ukrainian state-owned gas company Naftogaz downplayed the extent of the damage but did acknowledge that repairs would be necessary. Naftogaz officials also sought to reassure European storage customers that all obligations would be met by Ukraine, regardless of the Russian airstrikes.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

The recent wave of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy system comes amid reports that the White House has been pressuring Kyiv to stop attacking Russian oil refineries due to concerns about the possible impact on oil prices ahead of the November 2024 US presidential election. Starting in January, Ukraine began a series of long-range drone strikes on refining facilities inside Russia. These attacks have succeeded in hurting Russia’s energy-dependent economy, with disruption reported to oil and oil product exports, gasoline and other fuel supplies in Russia, military fuel supplies, and Russian income from energy exports.

Global prices for crude oil and diesel, as well as other oil products, have risen in the wake of the Ukrainian attacks. This appears to be making US politicians nervous about the potential impact on their country’s forthcoming elections. Unsurprisingly, many in Kyiv have been outraged by the reported US efforts to effectively protect the Russian energy industry at a time when Moscow is bombing Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure and plunging entire cities into darkness. Ukrainian officials have responded by insisting Russian refineries are legitimate targets.

So far, there have been no reports of European leaders seeking to deter Ukraine from attacking Russia’s oil and gas industry, but that could change as the continent faces a range of looming geopolitical and energy market problems. Russia’s gas transit contract with Ukraine is set to expire in December 2024, with the Ukrainian authorities stating they will not seek an extension. With the vulnerability of Ukraine’s gas storage facilities now an issue thanks to recent Russian airstrikes, and with instability in the Middle East making Arabian Gulf LNG both less assured and much more expensive, Europe may soon begin to pressure Ukraine, too.

Each wave of Russian airstrikes makes Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction more challenging while narrowing the options available to the country. Without crucial US military aid that remains held up in Congress, and faced with hypocritical but likely mounting pressure from Western capitals to play nice with Russia on energy infrastructure while Russia decimates Ukraine’s power grid, the path forward is unclear.

Instead of artificial restrictions on their own ability to strike back, Kyiv desperately needs adequate air defense systems so Ukraine can protect its power plants from Russian assaults. In the meantime, the many Ukrainians who are working tirelessly to maintain their country’s battered energy systems have a long road ahead of them.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The mood in wartime Ukraine: Weariness, resolve, and exasperation

Steven Pifer, John Herbst — Mon, 25 Mar 2024 21:17:11 +0000

We had the opportunity to visit Kyiv last week and met many Ukrainians, both inside and outside of government. We found them understandably war-weary but resolved to continue the fight, believing they can prevail and drive out the Russian aggressors. We also heard growing exasperation with their most important partner, the United States.

In February 2022, Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, transforming the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War into Europe’s largest and bloodiest since World War II. It should surprise no one that Ukrainians are tiring of sending their husbands, sons, wives, and daughters to spend months at a time on the front lines of the war.

Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone attacks bring the war to civilians in cities across the country. The March 20-21 overnight attack on Kyiv was the heaviest in months. We spent much of that night in a bomb shelter, getting a taste of an experience that is all-too-common for millions of Ukrainians.

At the same time, nothing suggested resolve is flagging. Ukrainians want to win and believe they can. Indeed, they see no alternative in a fight that they regard as existential; if they lose, Ukraine as they know it is gone. Most want full victory, meaning the complete recovery of their territory up to the border agreed when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. That includes the return of Crimea.

We asked about proposals suggested by some in the West who say the United States should press for a negotiation to “save” Ukraine by ceding parts of the country to Russia in exchange for peace. Few Ukrainians expressed interest. They pointed to the war crimes Ukrainians have suffered under Russian occupation and asked how they could abandon anyone to such a fate. Most also felt it would only lead to a short respite, after which a rejuvenated Russian military would resume hostilities.

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Ukrainian military officers understand they face a difficult year in 2024. They described Russian pressure along much of the front line, with a particular focus on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine. In September 2022, Putin claimed to annex these regions, even though the Russian military does not control all their territory.

The slowing of assistance, particularly from the United States, has hurt Ukrainian military operations. Ukrainian officers described situations in which their units can only fire one artillery shell for every ten the Russians fire. They lack the means to defend against devastating glide bomb attacks launched by Russian fighter aircraft, and worry that continuing Russian missile and drone attacks will exhaust their air defense capabilities.

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense officials are tracking Russian plans for new combat formations and monitoring a likely mobilization of manpower now that Putin has secured a further term in office. They believe the Kremlin retains broader ambitions in Ukraine including taking Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv.

Despite this, Ukrainian officials are showing no signs of despair. They are fortifying their defensive positions and rushing to put innovative technologies such as advanced drones into action in the field. They question whether the Russians currently have the capacity to make a major breakthrough on the ground. Given enough weapons and ammunition, many Ukrainians remain confident they can reverse Russia’s gains of the past two years.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

While expressing gratitude for US assistance, Ukrainian officials and others in Kyiv made clear their exasperation on three points.

First, with NATO scheduled to hold a summit in Washington in July 2024, Ukrainians want a definite message on their acceptance into the Alliance, and ideally an invitation. They are looking in particular to the United States, which has the most important voice within NATO. To be sure, Ukrainians are fighting for their country’s survival, but they see that fight as also defending NATO and Europe against a Russian threat that extends beyond Ukraine.

Second, Congress’s failure to pass a supplemental assistance bill for Ukraine has caused a gap in the flow of American assistance that has had an impact on the battlefield. This is reflected, among other things, in higher Ukrainian casualties. Ukrainians have become knowledgeable about how the House works, including the role of the speaker and discharge petitions, but their frustration is palpable.

Third, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Kyiv last week and left Ukrainians clearly unhappy with his request that Ukraine stop targeting oil refineries in Russia. Ukrainians accept, with some annoyance, restrictions limiting the use of US-provided weapons to targets within Ukraine. However, Ukraine uses domestically produced drones to attack Russian refineries, which are legitimate military targets. Thus far, they have struck facilities that produce seven to eight percent of Russia’s refined oil products, and many more are within range of Ukrainian drones.

There are questions about the rationale for the request to stop refinery attacks, which reportedly had to do with the price of oil. Russia mainly exports crude oil, not refined oil products; it is therefore unclear how reducing Russia’s refinery capacity would affect crude exports. As one senior Ukrainian official put it, “stop telling us not to hit targets in Russia.”

We left Kyiv inspired by Ukrainian resilience, courage, and their continued conviction that they can defeat one of the largest military powers on the planet. The United States has a vital national interest in Ukraine’s success. Were Putin and the Kremlin to become emboldened by a win in Ukraine, they would pose a far greater threat to the rest of Europe. The Biden administration and Congress should act without delay to help the Ukrainians prevail.

Steven Pifer and John Herbst served as the third and fifth US ambassadors to Ukraine.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Danilov has led Ukraine’s influential National Security and Defense Council since October 2019, and has been at the heart of Ukrainian attempts to galvanize international opposition to Russia’s invasion. He readily admits that these efforts have been consistently hampered by Russia’s sophisticated and highly effective disinformation strategies. Looking back at the past two years, Danilov says this experience has underlined the growing importance of information warfare in shaping today’s multidimensional battlefield. “We all make decisions based on the information we have. While there is now an unprecedented amount of information available, it is also apparent that this information can be easily manipulated and distorted.”

Today’s increasingly chaotic and overloaded information landscape is helping Russia conceal its true intentions in Ukraine and disguise its geopolitical ambitions, says Danilov. He frames the ongoing invasion of Ukraine as the central stage in a far broader global confrontation between the democratic world and the resurgent forces of autocracy led by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, but cautions that such clarity is often lacking during his interactions with Ukraine’s Western partners.

The 61-year-old Ukrainian Security Council Secretary bemoans the absence of a modern-day Reagan or Churchill with the necessary vision to see the Russian threat in its true historical context. Unless today’s generation of Western leaders urgently acknowledge the scale of the challenge, he predicts they will soon be confronted by a very different and more hostile international environment. “Too many countries remain stuck in an information fog and do not realize that World War III is already underway. The whole world is engaged in the current war in one way or another, even though Ukraine is the only country doing the actual fighting against Russia.”

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

With no end in sight to Russia’s invasion, the diplomatic debate in many Western capitals currently revolves around the question of Vladimir Putin’s ultimate war aims and how far he is prepared to go. To Danilov, the answer is disarmingly simple: Putin wants to completely transform the geopolitical climate and will keep going until he is stopped. If Ukraine should fall, Danilov is convinced Russia will expand its aggression further. He believes the countries most immediately at risk will be the former member states of the Warsaw Pact. “Putin made his intentions perfectly clear in his December 2021 ultimatum to the West, when he called for NATO to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. Just look at the map; it’s all there.”

Returning to the status quo of the early 1990s is unlikely to satisfy the Russian dictator, Danilov says. He argues that Putin’s foreign policy objectives ultimately stretch far beyond the old Iron Curtain and include the breakup of the European Union itself. This would allow Putin to divide and conquer Europe. “One of Putin’s key goals is the destruction of the EU. It is very difficult for the Kremlin to deal with a united Europe; this puts Russia at a significant disadvantage. Putin would much prefer to splinter the EU and negotiate with each European country separately.”

This does not mean Russia is preparing to imminently invade Belgium or occupy Brussels, of course. On the contrary, the Kremlin is far more likely to employ the kind of hybrid warfare tactics honed in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. Indeed, Danilov argues that Moscow has been engaged in an active campaign of hybrid hostilities inside the European Union for a number of years, and accuses European leaders of turning a blind eye to this unwelcome reality. “Russia’s hybrid war against the EU is already well underway, but some Western countries prefer not to acknowledge it. Putin constantly commits acts of hybrid aggression against Europe, but many Europeans are reluctant to draw the obvious conclusions as this would force them to recognize the threat and respond.”

Putin’s other great strategic priority is the dissolution of NATO. While skeptics argue that the Russian military is currently in no shape to take on NATO, Danilov believes Putin could potentially achieve his goal by discrediting the alliance rather than defeating it in a conventional war. With Western weakness increasingly evident in Ukraine, Putin may seek to test the shaky resolve of NATO leaders by staging some kind of border provocation. According to Danilov, if the alliance fails to produce an adequate response, there is a very real chance that member countries will quickly lose faith in collective security and seek alternative arrangements. NATO may be able to formally survive such a blow, but the damage to its credibility would be fatal. “When you have a maniac on the loose in your neighborhood, the task is to stop him as soon as possible and not engage in negotiations or other nonsense,” Danilov says.

Based on his own extensive interactions with NATO commanders over the past two years, Ukraine’s Security Council Secretary has full confidence in the alliance’s military leadership and believes they are under no illusions regarding both the nature of the Putin regime and urgency of the threat facing the West. However, he also stresses that the same cannot necessarily be said for Europe’s political leaders. This is a recipe for potential disaster, says Danilov. “Putin is the Hitler of our era. The current situation is strikingly similar to the 1930s, when military men warned of the mounting danger but were overruled by politicians who preferred to appease Hitler. If we make the same mistake again, it could mean the eclipse of the West.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Despite heroes like Murad and Dr. Mukwege, and other international efforts to address these issues, the prevalence of violence against women in conflict remains a harsh reality. Women often bear the brunt of violence during times of conflict, becoming victims of war. That includes sexual violence, displacement, and targeted attacks. Their bodies become weaponized, and the expressions of their tormentors’ rage and dehumanization. The impact of war on women extends beyond direct physical harm, as displacement and breakdown of social structures further expose them to vulnerabilities. Disproportionate suffering is evident in the staggering number of female refugees and internally displaced persons, who often face increased risks of gender-based violence.

This tragic cycle repeated itself on October 7, 2023 with the “systematic, targeted sexual abuse of Israeli women during the Hamas-led assault on southern Israel” aimed at terrorizing and humiliating victims and their families. There is a growing body of evidence of acts of sexual torture—including rape and gang rape, as well as mutilations and gunshots to genital areas—the facts of which have been documented in the recent report of the Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel, which was submitted to decision-makers at the United Nations (UN).

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Subsequently, there has been a disproportionate impact of war on Palestinian women in Gaza. According to the World Health Organization, women and newborns are bearing the brunt of the conflict, representing 67 percent of all casualties. UN Women has also pointed to gender inequality and the burden on women fleeing the fighting with their children, accounting for 63 percent of all deaths in Gaza. Recently, the UN has also noted credible allegations of both human rights violations and sexual violence against Palestinian women and girls in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

With cruel and almost prescient timing, just three days before the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, some 1,500 Israeli and Palestinian representatives of Women Wage Peace and Women of the Sun descended on Jerusalem and the shores of the Dead Sea, calling for their governments to find a diplomatic solution to the ongoing situation, elevate the role of peacemaking, and stop further violence. The two distinct, yet fully aligned grassroots peace organizations gathered to demand an end to the “cycle of bloodshed” consuming their communities and for their respective leaders to return to the negotiating table to secure a nonviolent resolution to their decades-long conflict.

It was a jubilant affair, but the joy was short-lived. Just three days later, Hamas militants unleashed their massacre, killing some 1,200 people in Israel, including three members of Women Wage Peace, one of whom was co-founder and Canadian-born Vivian Silver. Since then, at least twenty-seven Women of the Sun members in Gaza have been killed.

Despite this horrific backdrop, both organizations continue to forge ahead. They are focused on their respective communities, and they are also dedicated to continuing working together. One of their primary achievements has been the Mothers’ Call, a joint declaration by Palestinian and Israeli women united for a peaceful resolution and a future of peace, freedom, equality, rights, and security for their children and future generations.

As the Israel-Hamas war rages on, their cause is gaining momentum. The two organizations have been jointly nominated for the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize, acknowledging not only that women are unjustly impacted by war, but that they are also part of the solution. According to data published by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, the more women are engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, the more peace there is in the world. Negotiations go better, peace is more enduring, and more members of society reap the benefits.

Women make up 50 percent of the global population, though they are seriously under-represented in areas that have the greatest impact on all members of society. Data show that the more women are included in the economy, education, politics, and the legal system, the more prosperous, peaceful, just, and safe the world will be for children and future generations.

On International Women’s Day this year, the world needs more voices echoing the resounding calls for peace and justice in the face of ongoing conflicts. The international community must acknowledge and support those women who are fighting every day to make a difference. The recognition of Nadia Murad and the collaborative efforts of Yael Admi and Reem Hajajreh underscore the indispensable role women play in shaping a more harmonious world. Their resilience has been tested, but their unwavering commitment persists. As these women stand at the forefront of change, they serve as powerful reminders that women are more than victims of war; they are crucial architects of lasting, peaceful solutions.

Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

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Integrating AI innovations into the SME industry in the UAE

JP Reppeto — Fri, 01 Mar 2024 21:02:36 +0000

On February 21st, the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship, in collaboration with United States Embassy to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and ADGM, held a workshop exploring how women entrepreneurs in the UAE can integrate innovations in artificial intelligence (AI) to their small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

The panel, which was moderated by Sarah Saddouk, Director of Innovation at Entrepreneur Middle East IMPACT, featured three successful executives with backgrounds in finance, healthcare, and tech; all have harnessed cutting-edge AI and digital advances to drive their companies forward. Speakers included Abir Habbal, Chief Data and AI Officer at Accenture Middle East; Amnah Ajmal, Executive Vice President for market development for EEMEA at Mastercard; and Salim Chemlal, Director of Product at AI71. Tanya Cole, Senior Commercial Officer at the United States Embassy to the UAE, provided the opening remarks.

Tanya Cole opened the event with welcome remarks, noting that partnerships like the WIn Fellowship encourage innovation and sustainable growth and undergird the rich commercial exchange between the United States and UAE. She observed that one of AI’s principal benefits for SMEs is enhancing operational efficiency, allowing small teams to allocate time and resources to higher-level work like business strategy. Cole acknowledged initiatives by the United States government to promote greater global representation of women in tech but noted that stronger efforts were needed to promote gender equality in the AI sector. She concluded by encouraging the audience to continue breaking down barriers to women in STEM fields and ensuring that women continue to steer and benefit from the growth of AI.

The panelists leveraged their experience working with AI to cover several areas of concern for entrepreneurs, such as risk, regulation, scalability, and equity. They identified key trends in its uses across the private sector and provided guidance for SMEs hoping to improve their workflow with AI. The speakers also emphasized the need for women to shape the future of the field.

Main Takeaways

Amnah Ajmal pushed back on skepticism that recent advances in AI are overestimated, asserting that the increasing accessibility and efficiency of computing power make the technology commercially viable. She highlighted the relevant challenge posed by AI adoption in the private sector: the burden of unlearning and relearning technologies as they evolve and integrate into new fields. Ajmal spotlighted two trends in AI usage she observed among SMEs: risk management centered on combatting scams and fraud, and personalized marketing communications. She stated that the critical edge provided by AI is best understood in terms of scalability and speed, freeing up human capital for other tasks.

Abir Habbal explained that by keeping abreast of AI advances and integration, actors can actively shape the future of policy and governance around the technology. She distinguished between “narrow AI” capable of single tasks versus “generative AI” capable of multiple tasks at once. The latter is expected to be heavily disruptive; research conducted by her firm indicated that most professions can expect 40 percent of their working hours to be affected by AI. Habbal added that financial services have particularly high potential for AI automation, but opportunities exist in every sector.

Salim Chemlal mentioned that AI innovation should be propelled forward alongside regulation, rather than waiting for regulation before research continues, as experts have proposed. However, he also advocated for stronger international coordination to ensure AI safety, with a special emphasis on adaptability given the many variables in the field. Amnah Ajmal also offered her thoughts on regulation, proposing that businesses should gather industry stakeholders and experts, define the problem they wish to solve, and build the regulation themselves rather than waiting for a regulator to act. She added that regulators perform a service to society and governments will often embrace the suggested frameworks. Ajmal concluded by noting that traditional financial institutions have failed to uplift SMEs and women entrepreneurs, with all-women teams receiving a maximum of 2.7 percent of global VC funding.

Abir Habbal turned to the risks of AI and how regulation can help mitigate them. She explained that risks in the field include both structural issues, such as systemic biases and inaccurate results, as well as intentional misuses. With fast-evolving technologies such as AI, regulation may stifle innovation, creating a need for “sandboxes” for advanced testing. The industry’s appetite for regulation stems from a desire to effectively govern AI to manage these risks— and fear of financial and reputational harm if they are not mitigated. Salim Chemlal added that different societies should have their own AI systems, arguing that AI deployed outside of the context it was trained in (such as Western products now used in the Middle East) lack context to adequately serve their current users.

Amnah Ajmal emphasized that women must challenge the status quo in the AI field. She suggested that women are sometimes apprehensive about engaging deeply with new technologies, and she consequently urges other women in the field to be confident in their abilities. AI is trained on old data, which inherently introduces biases against women. Ajmal gave the example of office thermostats, which when adopted in the 1960s were calibrated for men; women, who radiate 35 percent less body heat, are now often left—literally—in the cold. Women should feel empowered to confidently steer the future of AI to prevent further inequity. Abir Habbal highlighted the coalescence of different skillsets in the AI field, which requires expertise in data science, engineering, business, and design. AI democratization is also on the rise, allowing users from outside the field to access and experiment with AI tools. Ajmal urged novices to utilize publicly available tools to experiment and learn more about AI.

The Way Forward

There has never been a better time for entrepreneurs in the Emirates to integrate AI into their businesses, owing to the UAE’s growing role as a global hub for AI and the country’s booming SME sector. AI adoption will remain a powerful force in the national economy in the near future, with some forecasts expecting close to 14 percent of Emirati GDP to stem from AI by 2030. Meanwhile, government initiatives continue to promote the growth of small and medium enterprises, with a set target of 1 million SMEs in the country by 2030.

AI has huge transformational power across sectors, particularly in facilitating speed and scalability. Technology may best serve entrepreneurs by freeing up human input otherwise spent on labor-intensive tasks, such as customer service or targeted marketing. However, adopters should ensure that they have defined a problem that AI can solve, as not all facets of business require automation. The risks inherent to AI, such as biases, malfunctions, and privacy concerns should also be evaluated when considering integration.

Large scale adoption of AI could worsen global gaps in digital skills between men and women, creating an imperative for women to steer the future of the technology in their country and abroad. Currently only 25 percent of AI specialists and 14 percent of cloud computing specialists are women, demonstrating that much work remains to be done to create a more inclusive field. However, the democratization of AI and the UAE’s SME boom represent an opportunity for women entrepreneurs to both capitalize on the business potential of AI and gain expertise that could positively shape the field. Since AI reflects the input and biases of its maker, better systems will require both diverse architects and inclusive design principles. Women at the helm of successful AI-augmented enterprises will be well positioned to advocate for these changes, resulting in a more equitable future for all.

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Damon quoted in Zawya on her documentary following survivors of conflict

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Feb 2024 21:20:35 +0000

Original Source

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Damon quoted in Nation News Now on Palestinian mental trauma

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Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 20 Feb 2024 21:48:02 +0000

In early February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the creation of a separate branch of the Ukrainian Armed Forces devoted to drones. Ukraine’s new Unmanned Systems Force is a military innovation reflecting the growing prominence of drones in modern warfare. Zelenskyy’s decision also underlines the importance of UAVs to the Ukrainian war effort as Kyiv seeks to maintain a technological edge over Russia while grappling with mounting shortages in artillery shells and other more traditional weapons systems.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is not the first conflict to feature unmanned aerial vehicles in significant numbers. Reconnaissance and strike UAVs were employed extensively in eastern Ukraine following the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, and in a range of other combat zones over the past decade including Syria, Libya, and the Second Karabakh War in the southern Caucasus. Nevertheless, the unprecedented numbers of UAVs used by both sides over the past two years in Ukraine has led some to call Russia’s invasion the world’s first drone war.

The ubiquity of drones in Ukraine is leading to dramatic changes on the battlefield. Fleets of UAVs have revolutionized surveillance, making it extremely difficult for commanders to benefit from the element of surprise. This helps to explain why both the Russian and Ukrainian armies are finding it increasingly difficult to mount successful offensives against defensive positions. In addition to dramatically enhancing battlefield visibility, drones also serve as precision strike weapons capable of replicating many of the functions performed by artillery and missiles at only a fraction of the price.

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Over the past two years, the Ukrainian military has managed to incorporate drones with considerable success. This has often been done on a somewhat improvised basis, with separate UAV teams independently established as part of different units. Ukraine’s expanding drone capabilities have owed much to public fundraising efforts and contributions from diverse grassroots groups including volunteer networks. Meanwhile, a startup-style drone manufacturing and modification industry has emerged from within Ukraine’s vibrant tech industry.

The results have been impressive. During a single week in early 2024, Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov reported that the country’s drone units had destroyed 73 Russian tanks along with air defense systems, fuel storage depots, and multiple other high-value targets. Longer range drones are now being used to strike strategic targets deep inside Russia including military production sites and energy industry infrastructure. At sea, marine drones have helped break the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and have forced the bulk of Putin’s fleet to retreat from Crimea.

Much of this has been possible thanks to expanding domestic production. According to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, by early 2024 there were approximately 200 companies producing drones in Ukraine, with domestic output around one hundred times higher in 2023 than during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion. As manufacturing potential continues to expand, Ukrainian officials have set a target of more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024.

Ukraine’s international partners are also focusing their efforts on helping the country stay one step ahead of Russia in the drone war. A coalition of around ten countries recently vowed to deliver one million drones to Ukraine by February 2025, while France is reportedly preparing to provide the Ukrainian military with the latest strike drone models in the coming weeks.

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Ukraine’s newly established Unmanned Systems Force must now manage this highly dynamic drone supply situation while making sure the country’s expanding UAV fleets are deployed effectively in what is a rapidly changing battlefield environment.

The creation of a separate branch of the armed forces dedicated to drones should allow Ukraine to assess developments in a systematic manner and gain an accurate overview of the most effective tactics, making it possible to create something approaching a drone warfare doctrine. This would represent a considerable improvement on today’s somewhat chaotic approach to sharing experience, which often relies on direct communication between individual drone pilots and unit commanders.

The Unmanned Systems Force could take the lead in developing a more coordinated approach to training. At present, many of Ukraine’s UAV training programs are private initiatives that typically offer valuable insights but lack any centrally established standards. Additionally, the new branch can contribute to more effective cooperation with the military industrial complex to make sure Ukrainian manufacturers are focused on producing the kinds of drones the military needs.

Zelenskyy’s decision to establish a specific drone branch of the army also creates a number of potential challenges. Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution over the past two years has often been organic in nature. On many occasions, creative solutions have been implemented with a high degree of operational flexibility by people on the front lines of the conflict. Ukrainian commanders must now make sure efforts to coordinate the country’s drone operations do not blunt this creativity or slow down reaction times by introducing new layers of bureaucracy.

There is also a danger that efforts to fill leadership and training positions within the Unmanned Systems Force could lead to the withdrawal of experienced pilots from the combat zone. One solution might be to prioritize the recruitment of wounded drone operators who are not currently able to serve in front line conditions but have valuable knowledge to share.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has turned the country into a giant war lab and confirmed the status of drones as the weapons of the future. With Ukraine no longer assured of further military aid from the US and increasingly obliged to ration ammunition, drones are a cost-effective solution that plays to the country’s tech sector strengths. President Zelenskyy and his military leaders clearly recognize this, and will be hoping the new Unmanned Systems Force can help Ukraine maximize its drone potential without becoming a bureaucratic burden.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

For existing Ukrainian citizens, acquiring a second passport would potentially open multiple doors in terms of travel, work, and study. Ukrainians have enjoyed visa-free access to the European Union’s Schengen Zone for limited time periods since 2017, and have also benefited from a range of measures to ease border restrictions since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Nevertheless, the prospect of holding an EU, US, or other Western passport would certainly appeal to many.

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While there is likely to be considerable public support for Zelenskyy’s dual citizenship proposal, any attempt at implementation in today’s wartime environment could prove highly problematic. Crucially, it remains far from clear what the initiative would mean for military service.

With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine now approaching the two-year mark, most analysts believe the conflict has evolved into a war of attrition. With its far larger population, economy, and industrial base, this places Russia at a considerable advantage. The Russian military has also demonstrated a striking disregard for heavy losses in Ukraine, repeatedly employing so-called “human wave” or “meat assault” tactics to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses by sheer weight of numbers.

Ukraine cannot afford to accept such high casualty rates. The country has a far smaller pool of military-age men to draw from, and has already experienced a major decline in population as a direct result of Russia’s invasion. Current martial law restrictions mean most Ukrainian males eligible for military service are not permitted to exit the country. However, if changes to the Ukrainian Constitution made it possible to apply for a second citizenship, opportunities may arise for Ukrainian citizens to use newly acquired passports in order to leave Ukraine and avoid conscription.

Meanwhile, a relaxation in Ukraine’s dual citizenship restrictions could also potentially result in members of the Ukrainian diaspora who took Ukrainian passports becoming eligible for military service. Any uncertainty over the status of new passport holders with regard to conscription would be likely to deter many from applying.

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The issue of military service is currently high on the Ukrainian wartime agenda amid debate over how best to bolster the depleted ranks of the army. A recent proposal by Ukraine’s military chiefs to conscript up to 500,000 civilians has met with a mixed reaction in Kyiv, with Zelenskyy refusing to offer his public support and instead calling for further details before making a decision.

Differences of opinion over the correct approach toward mobilization are believed to have contributed to mounting tensions between Ukraine’s civilian and military leadership. This was widely cited as a contributing factor behind Zelenskyy’s February 8 decision to replace Ukraine’s top general, Valery Zaluzhny. Any constitutional changes to introduce dual citizenship would further complicate an already challenging and politically sensitive situation.

President Zelenskyy’s proposal to enshrine the right to dual citizenship in the Ukrainian Constitution reflects growing awareness of the important role played by the global Ukrainian diaspora. If implemented, it would probably prove a popular measure that would significantly increase the number of Ukrainian passport holders and provide millions more people with a stake in the country’s future. However, there are a number of practical reasons why progress on this issue remains unlikely in the current wartime conditions.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Ukraine’s most recent progress is all the more notable as it has taken place amid the existential challenges of Russia’s ongoing invasion. While this has necessitated a range of wartime governance and security measures, anti-corruption efforts have continued. “The active work of Ukraine’s anti-corruption and other public authorities resulted in a growth in the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index even during the full-scale war,” Transparency International acknowledged.

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Transparency International is not the only international body to positively assess wartime Ukraine’s anti-corruption credentials. The fight against corruption has long been a key issue in relations between Kyiv and Brussels, and has traditionally been viewed as an obstacle to further European integration. However, Ukraine’s reform efforts since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion have helped convince European leaders to grant the country EU candidate status and begin official negotiations on future membership.

Speaking last summer, European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen singled out Ukraine’s efforts to advance the country’s anti-corruption agenda despite facing a uniquely challenging wartime environment. “I must say it is amazing to see how fast and determined Ukraine is implementing these reforms despite the war,” she commented. “They are defending their country and reforming.”

These positive appraisals by Transparency International and the European Union undermine the credibility of attempts by Russia and others to portray Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt. For many years, Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have routinely depicted Ukraine as plagued by endemic corruption. This has been an important element of Moscow’s efforts to discredit Ukraine’s democratic transition, deter international support, and even mute criticism of Russian intervention.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Vladimir Putin himself has often referenced the alleged excesses of Ukrainian corruption in his public speeches. In November 2023, he declared that “corruption in Ukraine is unmatched anywhere in the world.” This ignores the inconvenient reality that Transparency International actually rates Putin’s Russia as significantly more corrupt than Ukraine.

The argument that Ukraine is simply too corrupt to support has also entered the mainstream in the United States, where it is often repeated by opponents of further US military aid. These objections continue, despite unprecedented levels of institutional oversight and successive Pentagon probes confirming no evidence of corruption or the misuse of weapons.

Across the Atlantic, Russia’s few remaining friends in the EU have made strikingly similar claims regarding Ukrainian corruption. In December 2023, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban branded Ukraine as “one of the most corrupt countries in the world” while arguing against Kyiv’s further EU integration. Orban, who is regarded as Putin’s closest European ally, certainly speaks with authority when it comes to corruption. His own country, Hungary, occupied last place among EU member states in this year’s Transparency International ranking.

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In a sense, Ukraine is currently paying the price for the unenviable reputation it earned during the first few decades of independence, when corruption throughout state institutions was a far more pervasive problem than it is today. It is no accident that Ukraine’s two post-Soviet revolutions in 2004 and 2014 were both driven largely by public exasperation over widespread corruption, with millions of Ukrainians taking to the streets to vent their anger. Despite undeniable signs of progress over the past ten years, examples of institutional corruption continue to emerge, keeping the old cliches alive.

With Ukrainians now fighting for national survival and heavily reliant on international support, attitudes toward corruption have hardened further. This is fueling a climate of heightened scrutiny that has led to a series of high-profile scandals since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In summer 2023, President Zelenskyy dismissed dozens of regional military enlistment officials on charges of bribery. Perhaps the most prominent scandal involved former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov, who was forced to resign following claims of corruption within the ministry. Most recently, Ukraine’s State Security Service detained five people accused of conspiring with Defense Ministry officials to embezzle $40 million meant for the purchase of arms.

While these recent corruption scandals demonstrate that Ukraine still has a long way to go, it is worth emphasizing that they only came to light thanks to the investigative efforts of Ukraine’s own state organs and the country’s vibrant civil society. This vigilance should come as no surprise. After all, nobody is more conscious of their country’s corruption problems than Ukrainians themselves.

There is no doubt that today’s Ukraine continues to face serious corruption challenges. However, depictions of the country as irredeemably corrupt are false and misleading. The real story here is of a nation steadily emerging from centuries of imperial oppression and decades of dysfunction, with the current generation of Ukrainians determined to rid themselves of a corruption culture that is one of the most unwelcome legacies of this troubled past. Indeed, the fight against corruption is widely recognized by Ukrainians as an essential element of their country’s transformation toward a European future.

This year’s Transparency International ranking is a timely reminder that Ukraine is actually making meaningful progress in its historic struggle against corruption. While much remains to be done, the country is clearly moving in the right direction. Ukraine’s international partners are right to expect maximum accountability, but there are currently no grounds for abandoning Ukraine based on claims of corruption that are both exaggerated and outdated.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Yes, I’m ‘Trash,’ but I love Iran

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani — Fri, 19 Jan 2024 16:12:12 +0000

It’s June 2021, and I didn’t want to say goodbye. After rushed hugs, my parents stood on the curbside as my taxi to Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport veered away. Maman held tears back and smiled. I saw something break in my baba. As we waved to each other, I knew deep down I wouldn’t be able to return.

Baba died forty days after Iran’s morality police killed Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022, an incident that provoked months of nationwide anti-government protests. After years in jail as a political prisoner, losing almost all his friends to a political purge, executions, and soul-shattering isolation, when Iran was tinted red with the blood of its youth, my father’s heart couldn’t take more. He passed away.

I couldn’t even hold his cold hands for one final moment, lie to maman that everything would be alright, and touch the warm earth that embraced baba for the last time. Months later, my mother brought me a fistful of soil from his grave. My share of Iran—where I left my heart.

Days after Amini was killed, Iran-based singer Shervin Hajipour released a hit song, Baraye (“For the sake of”), based on actual tweets written by Iranians. The song captivated the nation and became the de facto anthem of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising—a love letter to Iran.

Hajipour captured the nation’s heart, and for that crime, he was arrested on September 29, 2022 and accused of “propaganda against the regime” and “inciting violence.” Almost a week after his arrest, he was released on bail as “his case went through the legal process,” according to a state prosecutor. He may have been released from jail, but, in reality, he was placed in a bigger cage and intimidated into silence.

In the following months, people watched him swallow bitter tears while standing tall and unbroken. Many Iranians felt seen by the world and found joy when he won a Grammy award for Best Song For Social Change. But Iranians’ hearts wrenched when he wrote on X, formerly known as Twitter, “I feel that I am done with this world.” Then hope rekindled in the hearts of Iranians when he wrote a little over a month later, “It took me some time, but I will be back.”

Hajipour delivered on his promise on January 12 with a new hit song that soared high in a few hours. Ashghal (“Trash”) received thirty million views and 1.7 million likes on Instagram—an extremely popular social media platform that is blocked and requires circumvention tools to access in Iran—in less than twenty-four hours after its release.

The track starts with bitter notes of solitude. “I am trash, trash who had no one to even post bail for him.” It continues with reflections on “hearts bleeding,” cut by the hollowness of prominent figures we looked up to and who didn’t show up. Then he lists the ordeal he has endured since his arrest: he has been sidelined and marginalized; refused permission to sing by authorities; and stranded in limbo between courts. But Hajipour follows this up by weaving a new path, thanking friends and family who did not leave his mother alone while he was incarcerated.

Hajipour sings of isolation, of being “thrown away like trash… Yes, we are not the same. But I am staying so you won’t stand alone. I am staying so you wouldn’t say that I bolted. I’m fine with the isolation.”

Hajipour became a star last year, chanting all of the reasons Iranians must stand up against the clerical establishment, resulting in him being labeled as an “outsider,” “enemy,” and less than “trash.” He sings, “I just wanted my town to brim with joy. I just wanted those who see us as enemies to see us as friends. No one loves us here, but God loves everyone, even trash like us.”

He wraps up the song: “Don’t tell me that I should leave my homeland. Wherever I go, my heart will remain here. I stand by my words. The son of Iran stands by his words… I’m trash, but the day you all leave, I will still be here rebuilding my town.”

‘Ordinary’ people brewing a storm

Hajipour’s 2022 hit song, Baraye, was a tapestry weaved from the dreams and pains of ordinary people posted on Twitter, now known as X, during the early days of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising and under the Persian language hashtag “For the sake of” (برای#).

Posting Ashghal to his Instagram on January 12, Hajipour wrote that, while writing the earlier track, he didn’t care about the background of people being choked with air pollution, in whose pocket poverty lives rent-free, or who mourns Iran’s ecological collapse more. He continued, “But I knew that ordinary people are the only victims of factional extremism. I knew protest is necessary for evolution; that it is impossible to solve a problem without laying it bare. I knew that we, the ordinary people, also have the right to love our homeland.”

Hajipour continues by taking a jab at political factions who think they have a “monopoly over [our] homeland”—power-hungry politicians so engrossed in petty fights with no care for Iran and its survival; factions who have been at each other’s throats with no care for the lives they trample.

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Like his 2022 hit, Hajipour’s latest sensation echoes the pain throbbing in the heart of every “ordinary” person who loves Iran. It also rebirths the hope that “ordinary” people can brew a storm.

Days before Hajipour dropped his new track, Iranian-Kurdish activist Roya Heshmati walked into a security facility with her jet-black hair not covered by the mandatory hijab. Despite pressure from officers, she refused to wear a hijab until she was violently handcuffed and a headscarf was wrapped around her head. She was then administered the lashes.

Under torture, she sang a revolutionary anthem by students from the Tehran University of Art: “In the name of woman, in the name of life, clothes of slavery have been torn, our black night shall lead to dawn, all whips will turn into axes [shattering the throne of oppression].”

Days later, another woman, Sepideh Rashnu, wrote on Instagram about life under gender apartheid, rebellion, loss, and reconciliation with her religious father in their small home village.

Months before the morality police killed Amini, Rashnu was arrested by security forces after a video of her went viral, which showed her resisting a plainclothes hijab enforcer. After arrest, her tortured body was dragged before state television cameras to make a forced confession against herself. Rashnu was subsequently sentenced to three years and eleven months in prison and deprived of the right to an education.

Despite her ordeal, Rashnu has remained defiant. Posting a photo of herself basking in the sunlight with a bright smile, she wrote that “nothing will stop her” and that she is the same person who left her village “sprinting towards the holy land of individuality”; the same person who decided to pay the exorbitant price of rebellion rather than letting her “life turn into a lifeless husk.”

Rashnu concluded that she had returned to her village but had “embraced truth,” which she would “hide from no one,” with “no more running [and] no more fear of confrontation.” She has returned to proclaim, “Glory to gates being broken, and glory to people who break them.”

Defiance trumps fear

In the face of defiance and the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, the Islamic Republic has used every trick in the book to suppress all signs of dissent, from killing hundreds of unarmed protesters on the streets to arresting over twenty-two thousand people, including at least eighty journalists. The long list of detainees, in addition to women defying gender apartheid, consists of other artists, such as musician Mehdi Yarrahi, who has been sentenced to jail and flogging for singing against mandatory hijab, and Saman Yassin, a Kurdish rapper facing charges punishable by death for criticizing the state for its oppressive policies. Dissident rapper Toomaj Salehi is also in prison for his support of protests and for shedding light on torture and abuse in the prisons of the Islamic Republic.

https://twitter.com/OfficialToomaj/status/1746237850322878966

In a message from prison, Toomaj wrote about forcing his broken body off the floor of his prison cell and exercising. “You shouldn’t let them wear you down. I am still alive. I must live! Even if I die, I must live on! I owe this to all who put their trust in me, for the sake of Iran. I have a dream. I must survive.”

According to Amnesty International, at least eight have been “arbitrarily executed following grossly unfair sham trials.” Currently, at least five more are facing death sentences in connection with the 2022 protests, while at least fifteen others are at risk of the death penalty.

The violence has wiped the smiles off the face of society and threatened to extinguish its hope, with many Iranians considering exile and immigration. However, people like Hajipour, Rashnu, and Salehi have rekindled hope within the people.

I left Iran in 2021 and also left my heart behind. Listening to Ashghal, I molded myself a new heart—mixing that fistful of soil from my father’s grave, love for my homeland, and the hope that inspiring Iranians have rekindled in me. I’m “trash,” but I love Iran.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community.

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The real reason the Saudi government is investing in sports. Hint: It’s not to impress you.

Stefanie Hausheer Ali and Jaime Stansbury — Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:57:12 +0000

Saudi Arabia’s recent sports-related investments—including over $1 billion in the Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour (if a deal is finalized) and hundreds of millions of dollars to recruit soccer stars to play on Saudi-based teams or be tourism ambassadors—have led to accusations of “sportswashing” or attempting to improve its international image through sports.

While Saudi Arabia does seek to boost its reputation as part of a broader effort to reform its economy and increase tourism, sportswashing is not the most useful way to analyze Saudi Arabia’s recruitment of top sports talent or its creation of LIV Golf.

Understanding the changes occurring in Saudi Arabia is critical for US policymakers and American companies, especially since more big Saudi sports investments are likely around the corner and Riyadh is part of a changing “middle power” geopolitical landscape. The negotiations around the PGA/LIV merger passed a December 31, 2023 deadline but are continuing, with reports that US investors may join the new entity.

Sports investments as part of the Kingdom’s broader strategy

Saudi Arabia’s big financial bets in the sports world are part of its broader Vision 2030 plan to diversify the economy away from oil, create more private sector jobs for Saudi people (not just expats), and ensure a sustainable future for the Kingdom when the oil eventually runs out.

Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) is highly motivated to achieve the ambitious goals in his Vision 2030. The current war between Israel and Hamas is unlikely to derail MBS’s focus on driving forward his reform and development agenda. Sixty-three percent of Saudi Arabia’s population of over thirty-two million is under the age of thirty, so if the reforms are not successful by the time the oil has run out, the Kingdom will face serious challenges.

MBS is focused on metrics and performance; he said in a September 2023 interview he doesn’t care about sportswashing criticism so long as his strategy yields the results he wants, such as GDP growth.

Sports for All (SFA) is the Saudi government initiative responsible for driving progress on the Vision 2030 targets relating to sports. It was launched in 2018, and it has specific strategies for every age group from young people to older adults. Interestingly, SFA specifically targets housewives of all ages and has released official regulations that require the use of feminine words whenever masculine words are used to ensure sports are presented as open to both men and women. SFA’s goals include: 1) motivating people from all walks of life and at all levels of capability to be healthier, 2) increasing community-wide physical activity level and opportunities to socialize through sports, and 3) working through the private sector to achieve the overall growth in sports and physical activities in the Kingdom.

As SFA President Prince Khaled bin Alwaleed explains, SFA’s “mandate [is] to have 40 percent of all people in Saudi active by 2030.”

Sports reforms in Saudi Arabia positively impact regular people, especially women

Many Americans still associate Saudi Arabia with three things: the September 11 terrorist attacks, its war in Yemen, and the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. Many also rightly have serious concerns about Saudi Arabia’s human rights record. So it’s unsurprising that when Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), wanted to buy the PGA in June 2023, the US public reaction was to connect this to what it knows of the Kingdom. Considering how lasting those negative associations have been, it’s difficult to imagine how an investment in a US sports tournament could “wash” that away.

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If you ask Saudis, especially women, about why their government is investing in sports, what you may also hear is that it has opened a pathway to health, fitness, and careers unimaginable a decade ago. For others, it provides opportunities to children their parents didn’t have, including exercising in school. And for many—young and old—it’s cultivating a sense of personal aspiration and civic pride as they watch their national teams compete.

When Saudi first licensed gyms for women in 2017, 40-year-old Sara Rahimaldeen was one of the first to join. As a young mom to two children, she wanted to do something to “regain her energy,” as she told one of us. Six years later, Sara now trains as a competitive athlete and has a career as a coach and personal trainer. “Now I’m changing people’s lives just as my life was changed,” Sara said.

In 2017, the right to obtain driver’s licenses opened up opportunities for female Saudi athletes. Two years later, Reema Juffali, the first Saudi woman to hold a racing license, participated in an international racing competition hosted in the country. In 2020, Saudi Arabia hosted its first professional international golf tournament—the Ladies European Tour—where Saudi women played alongside international female players. “Before we could drive, we had to go out to the outside of the city at four in the morning to run,” Sara recalled. “And it was so difficult to convince someone to take us.” Now, the government organizes public marathons through the recently launched triathlon federation, where men and women run in the streets side by side.

The same year that local municipalities issued business licenses for women’s gyms, the Education Ministry allowed physical education in schools for girls and boys. Kevin Kerns, a former American tennis player who competed in the US Open, recently started teaching tennis at schools across Saudi Arabia. He initially launched the tennis training program in thirty schools and expects to roll it out to 290 schools this year, reaching over 70,000 kids. “Tennis is more than a sport. It teaches goal setting, how to work with others, and life lessons on winning and learning. We’re teaching kids to engage in sports for a lifetime,” explained Kevin to one of us.

Changing geopolitical reality and the need for a new US approach

The United States needs to recalibrate its approach to middle powers such as Saudi Arabia to take into consideration new geopolitical and domestic political dynamics. As the United States faces more competition from China and from middle powers banding together in blocs such as BRICS—which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recently joined—it needs to recognize that trade-offs will be the new normal for successful US strategy.

Saudi Arabia’s sports investments are a useful case study of how the United States needs to alter its policy approach. Here are the critical elements of a new way forward:

The US government and human rights organizations criticized the Kingdom in the past for preventing girls from playing sports and not permitting women to work out at gyms. Saudi Arabia has radically changed its approach: gyms that allow women now abound; girls now play sports in school; and Saudi women athletes are competing internationally. The United States should see Saudi investment in sports as part of a broader win for millions of Saudi women and girls—not to mention men—in terms of personal freedom, health, and leadership development.
Sports can be a way to bridge divides, organize collaboratively, develop people-to-people networks, and improve business and government relations. This includes continuing to fund sports diplomacy programs through the State Department to train coaches and referees, as well as sharing American expertise on nutrition, sports psychology, and the entertainment infrastructure needed to support sports, to name just a few areas where partnerships can take place. These types of partnerships can be good for American companies and can also nurture important relationships that can impact societal change.
The United States often tells Saudi Arabia and other middle powers what it doesn’t want them to do. Lately, growing close to China has been a major concern. Situations—like the potential investment in the PGA Tour—where Saudi Arabia is seeking a partnership that China cannot offer and that does not harm US national security interests or go against US values should be seen as a win for the United States and an opportunity to lead.
The United States needs to consider the self-interested motives of countries rather than viewing every policy decision as a referendum on its relationship with the United States. The Kingdom saw golf as a sport ripe for a shake-up and knew, with their deep pockets, that they were well-positioned to make a move that could help them achieve their broader tourism and entertainment development goals. It’s not all about the United States: Saudi Arabia is considering similar investments in countries such as India, where PIF has “expressed an interest” in acquiring a multi-billion dollar stake in a major cricket league.
Saudi Arabia will be more persuaded by arguments that speak to their national interests rather than appeals to follow international norms or threats about withdrawing American support. Human rights violations reduce the appetite for foreign investment and association with the Kingdom. American companies and government officials can remind Saudi counterparts of the potential reputational and economic consequences if they commit such abuses. US negotiators working with PIF on the merger should also emphasize the massive negative blowback that would occur if golfers are prevented from speaking their minds or if other controversial restrictions are put in place. To avoid these issues, US negotiators should also ensure a strong governance structure for the new golf entity.

If Americans persist in seeing Saudi sports investments primarily as “sportswashing,” they will be scoring own goals. The Saudis will not end their investments in this sector or in many other sectors of the US economy, such as the 60 percent stake it holds in Lucid Motors or its significant investments in Activision Blizzard and Uber. Instead, US-Saudi tensions will cause rifts among athletes, sponsors, and fans, and may preclude cooperation that could be a win-win.

Sovereign wealth funds in the Gulf have over $5 trillion in assets, with expected upward growth continuing. If the United States wants to encourage more investment in US companies and global infrastructure projects—as the Joe Biden administration reportedly does—it is essential to understand the multifaceted motivations of these countries, as well as the human and economic potential of their citizens rather than relying solely on past negative tropes.

The PGA Tour contends that LIV Golf would have eventually run them out of business if a deal with PIF had not been reached. Saudi Arabia is flexing its sports investment muscles globally and playing the long game, like when it was the only bidder for the 2034 World Cup. Negotiating partnerships on sports that both sides can live with is an example of the kinds of trade-offs that the United States should accept to achieve its broader national security goals in this volatile, multi-polar world.

Stefanie Hausheer Ali is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council and a senior director at the international strategic advisory firm Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the author and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC.

Jaime Stansbury is a vice president at The Cohen Group and was formerly the executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Saudi Arabia. The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of The Cohen Group.

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Bayoumi in The New York Times on a paint that can reduce emissions

Atlantic Council — Wed, 17 Jan 2024 13:22:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On January 17, Imran Bayoumi, Associate Director of the Scowcroft Security Initiative, was quoted by The New York Times DealBook newsletter on one of the six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2024, a super-reflective white paint that can reflect 98% of sunlight, lowering air-conditioning needs and emissions.

[Super-reflective white paint is] one of those things that seems pretty simple, but it could have an outsize impact.

Imran Bayoumi

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

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Braw featured in CEPA’s Europe Edge on criminalizing Russia’s propaganda machine

Elisabeth Braw — Mon, 15 Jan 2024 16:16:00 +0000

Original source

On January 14, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was featured in the Center for European Policy Analysis’ Europe Edge, where she discussed Russia’s malign influence campaigns and how European nations are crafting their responses to combat their influence.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

NATO Resilience & Society

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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Ukraine’s wartime economy is performing surprisingly well

Anders Åslund — Tue, 02 Jan 2024 19:26:16 +0000

Visitors to today’s Ukraine are often surprised to find that away from the front lines, everything looks so normal. Most people in central and western Ukraine have returned home. Shops and restaurants in towns and cities across the country are open and fully stocked. Everything functions, including mobile phone networks, internet, electricity, and public transport. Foreign credit cards can be used virtually everywhere and digital banking services are both advanced and near-ubiquitous. There is no rationing, nor is there any sign of price controls. If anything, people complain that life is a little too normal.

Signs of ordinary everyday life in wartime Ukraine are a reflection of the remarkable resilience demonstrated by Ukrainians since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost two years ago. This normality is also due to the little-noticed fact that the Ukrainian economy did surprisingly well in 2023.

Ukraine’s strong economic performance is reflected in recent EU and IMF assessments. These traditionally harsh reviews now read like love letters. “Despite the war, the country has benefited from a stronger-than-expected recovery and steadfast reform momentum,” noted the IMF in an entirely typical December 2023 summary.

The Russian invasion drove Ukraine’s GDP down by 29 percent in 2022, but in 2023 the economy grew by 19.5 percent year-on-year in the second quarter and by 9.5 percent in the third quarter. Rather than an expected stabilization, Ukraine is likely to achieve annual economic growth of nearly 6 percent in 2023. Admittedly, that still means a decline of around 25 percent from the prewar level in 2021. However, given the scale of the destruction caused by the Russian invasion and the fact that Russia still occupies around 17 percent of Ukraine’s territory, these figures are nevertheless impressive.

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In the fall of 2022, many were concerned by the threat of rising inflation in Ukraine due to the EU’s failure to meet its commitments. Ukraine was forced to print money, and inflation rose to 27 percent in December 2022. The European Commission took heed and secured $20 billion in financing for 2023, covering around half of Ukraine’s budget requirements. The United States contributed another $10.9 billion, with the IMF providing $4.5 billion. In the end, Ukraine’s budget deficit of some $40 billion was more than financed. As a consequence, inflation plummeted to just five percent by October 2023.

Ukraine had budgeted for foreign financing of $41 billion in 2024, but as foreign funds may fall short, the country’s finance minister has suggested a revision down to $37 billion, not least because of greater than expected tax revenues. This revised figure may be realistic. The IMF noted that tax collections were up by 23 percent year-on-year in January-September 2023.

Usually, a country with an IMF program fails on some accounts, but that was not true of Ukraine in 2023. The IMF confirmed that Ukraine had met all quantitative performance criteria as well as all indicative targets by the end of September, and had done so with big margins, having collected much more in taxes than anticipated, while social spending continued as planned. Despite wartime conditions, Ukraine has not yet suffered from any arrears in state sector wages or pensions.

Ukraine’s National Bank has done particularly well since the start of Russia’s invasion. While inflation in Russia is currently around 7.5 percent, Ukraine’s rate has fallen to five percent. Ukraine recently cut its interest rate from 16 percent to 15 percent, while the Central Bank of Russia did the opposite.

Ukraine is maintaining a relatively open currency market with a floating exchange rate that held relatively stable throughout 2023. Ukraine’s international currency reserves are currently higher than they have ever been, at around $40 billion. The country’s banking system functions surprisingly normally. According to a recent IMF report, Ukraine’s total banking system assets and client deposits increased by 36 percent and 51 percent respectively between the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion and August 2023. Ukraine’s banks are flush with money and offer ample and cheap credits.

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Remarkably, Ukraine has carried out more systemic reforms than ever during the war. These reforms have been driven by the EU and the IMF, with keen support from the United States and the G7 group of nations.

On December 14, 2023, the EU decided to open membership negotiations with Ukraine. This landmark decision was based on Ukraine having fulfilled seven vital conditions set by the EU in June 2022. Four concerned the rule of law, while three were political. The most important conditions were the cleansing of the notoriously corrupt Constitutional Court and the similarly deficient Supreme Council of Justice, which appoints Ukraine’s judges. These steps are among the most important rule of law reforms ever implemented in Ukraine.

The EU appears to have learned from its excessively lenient earlier policies toward Bulgaria and Romania. Brussels now demands specific changes and details them. Ukraine has complied with all its demands, with President Zelenskyy signing off on the last three laws the week before the EU convened in December 2023.

In its most recent assessment, the IMF stated that the Ukrainian authorities had demonstrated “a strong commitment to reforms.” It noted that the authorities met seven of the 12 structural benchmarks for June-October 2023 on time, while four benchmarks were implemented with delays under very difficult circumstances. These were significant reforms related to corporate governance and anti-corruption measures. The law restoring asset declarations for public officials was enacted in October and public access to asset declarations was reinstated. Meanwhile, money-laundering legislation was tightened. The IMF’s key remaining demand is to render the special anti-corruption prosecutor truly independent from the prosecutor general.

Despite wartime conditions, the Ukrainian authorities are performing better than expected, both in terms of daily financial administration and advancing the country’s reform agenda. Higher than anticipated tax revenues are being collected, with pensions and wages so far paid on time. The nation’s currency reserves are larger than ever, and inflation has been brought down to five percent. Quietly, Ukraine has finally carried out important and politically challenging rule of law reforms. The Ukrainian government is to be congratulated for its considerable accomplishments on the economic front while defending itself against Europe’s largest invasion since World War II.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

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The news from Brussels has provided Ukrainians with some timely cheer amid mounting gloom due to the military stalemate in the war with Russia and signs of a weakening in Western resolve to continue backing Ukraine into 2024 and beyond. In recent months, a major new US aid package for Ukraine has become hostage to domestic politics, while internal divisions have emerged within the EU over ambitious plans to provide Ukraine with a long-term support program. Meanwhile, pledges of new aid from Ukraine’s international partners have fallen to their lowest level since the start of the Russian invasion.

These negative signals have caused considerable alarm among Ukrainian audiences, and have fueled a wave of international speculation over the potentially disastrous consequences of a Russian victory if Ukraine is abandoned. Meanwhile, the mood in Moscow has become increasingly jubilant, with Putin boasting recently that Ukraine would have “one week to live” if Western military aid came to a halt.

The EU’s decision will significantly alter the optics around the Russian invasion while providing new impetus to Ukraine’s war effort. While the start of accession negotiations does not come with any guarantees of future EU membership, it represents a major milestone for Ukraine in a geopolitical reformation that first began decades ago and has gained unprecedented momentum against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion.

Since 1991, all of independent Ukraine’s political leaders have paid lip service to the country’s European identity. However, during the early years of independence, almost nothing was done to promote Ukraine’s EU integration. This lack of progress was highlighted in 2002 when European Commission President Romano Prodi suggested Ukraine was about as plausible a candidate for EU membership as New Zealand.

Things changed in 2004 when millions of Ukrainians took to the streets to protest a rigged presidential election and defend their country’s fledgling democracy. The Orange Revolution was to prove a watershed moment for Ukraine and the wider post-Soviet region. It marked an ideological parting of the ways with Putin’s increasingly authoritarian Russia, while putting Ukrainian integration on the EU agenda for the first time.

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In the years following the Orange Revolution, Kyiv and Brussels began negotiating a comprehensive EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. By the time this document was finally ready, pro-Kremlin politician Viktor Yanukovych had become president of Ukraine. Despite favoring closer ties with Moscow, Yanukovych had made an election campaign promise to maintain Ukraine’s European integration. However, just days before he was set to sign the Association Agreement, Russia pressured Yanukovych into a dramatic U-turn. This rejection sparked a repeat of Ukraine’s 2004 street protests. After months of heavy-handed crackdowns including the killing of dozens of protesters, Yanukovych was eventually deserted by his Ukrainian allies and fled to Russia. Days later, Russian troops began the invasion of Ukraine with the seizure of Crimea.

The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2014 has driven Ukrainian support for EU integration to record highs. Prior to 2014, opinion polls often identified similar levels of Ukrainian public backing for closer ties with both Russia and the European Union. However, the past decade of escalating Russian aggression has drastically reduced any lingering enthusiasm for a return to the Kremlin orbit. Instead, recent surveys consistently indicate that around eighty percent of Ukrainians back EU membership. This shift in opinion is mirrored across the EU, where support for future Ukrainian membership has grown considerably since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Over the past decade, Ukraine’s EU aspirations have come to represent the country’s dreams of a national transformation away from the authoritarian past and toward a democratic, European future. Russia’s increasingly violent response to these aspirations has served to convince more and more Ukrainians of the need to turn decisively away from Moscow and pursue EU membership.

This sentiment is now shared by a clear majority of European leaders, who have reached the conclusion that Ukraine can no longer remain in the geopolitical grey zone and must instead be integrated into the EU. The road ahead toward eventual membership remains long and challenging, but today’s decision is a big win for Ukrainians and a huge moment in Ukraine’s historic return to the European community of nations.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Jorge Gastelumendi (@Gasteluj): Director of global policy at the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center and former climate negotiator for the government of Peru

Landon Derentz (@Landon_Derentz): Senior director of the Global Energy Center and former director for energy on the US National Security Council

Aubrey Hruby (@aubreyhruby): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and co-founder of Tofino Capital

Racha Helwa (@rachahelwa): Director of the empowerME Initiative

No ‘phase-down’ or ‘phaseout’

The compromise agreement to transition away from fossil fuels was “commendable,” Jorge tells us, but the lack of a timeline for attaining this goal “puts the world at risk of crossing the 1.5 °C warming threshold, significantly increasing the risks and impacts of climate change.”

At the same time, “the ‘success’ of COP28 was never going to be measured by unrealistic expectations around phasing out fossil fuels,” says Landon.

Among the opponents of “phaseout” language were African nations. Aubrey points out that this is because they “need to be able to harness their fossil fuel resources, namely natural gas, in order to provide electricity to the six hundred million” people on the continent who lack reliable access.

But for others, the compromise was a deep disappointment. The decision “evoked widespread frustration, notably among the small island developing states, indigenous communities, and climate activists,” Racha says.

Big wins

The compromise over fossil fuel use overshadowed what COP28 had already accomplished, says Landon: pledges on renewable energy capacity expansion, energy efficiency, and methane reduction that add up to “a global reduction in energy-related greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 of around four gigatons of CO2 equivalent.”

And in a larger sense, Landon adds, the cooperation of governments and businesses means that “the fabric” of these conferences “has been permanently altered.” A senior European official attending the conference told Landon that “COP is the ‘new Davos’ for the energy transition.”

That spirit came in the increased climate commitments from industry. “We have seen at COP28 an unprecedented participation of the private sector not only in numbers but also in real leadership,” Jorge tells us, “taking on actions and measurable commitments in the energy, insurance, and banking sectors, among many others.”

African countries were able to achieve most of their pre-COP checklist, Aubrey notes: These include the launch of the loss and damage fund, $175 million in pledges to the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa, and the Declaration on Climate and Health.

Room for improvement

But the agreement lacks quantifiable targets or substantial financial aid for adaptation, says Jorge, meaning it falls short of the “pivotal moment we need as a global community to bring climate adaptation from being a second-tier priority in the climate process” to being prioritized equally with mitigation.

Protests throughout the conference, including that of twelve-year-old Indian climate activist Licypriya Kangujam, “highlighted concerns about the influence of oil businesses on climate equity and resilience,” and encapsulated “the perspective of the upcoming generation from the Global South regarding the outcomes of this COP,” writes Racha.

Zooming out, the goal now for governments, activists, and industry should be to make sure that these promises don’t end up as just hot air. “Global meetings alone do little to change the economic and climate realities on the ground in African countries,” Aubrey tells us. “Pledges must become reality.”

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How African countries can work together to feed the continent—and speed up its development

Atlantic Council — Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:20:13 +0000

Watch the full event

AfriNEXT

The Atlantic Council and global development company DAI convened high-level experts to reframe the narrative on African successes and innovation.

Africa

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Ousman Gajigo
Director, Seeds for Prosperity

Lilac Nachum
Professor, the Zicklin School of Business at Baruch College and Strathmore University Business School

Jehiel Oliver
Chief Executive Officer, Hello Tractor

Moderator

Rama Yade
Senior Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council

RAMA YADE: So welcome to this important conversation panel about “The Agribusiness Revolution.” Agriculture should be at the heart of any development policy. When it comes to feeding people on the continent, the continent of food insecurity, this is not an outdated sector. Agriculture is an—the economic sector of the future.

Like I said this morning, 65 percent of the world’s untapped arable lands are on the continent. [The] agriculture sector is 35 percent of the [continent’s] GDP. It’s also 60 percent of the active population. Yet, food insecurity has increased. As a result of the war in Ukraine, prices of food, of production, of gasoline, of fertilizers, all the prices have surged, not to mention the extreme weather conditions combined with the weak local infrastructure—not to mention, as well, the levels of productivity, among the lowest.

On a continent where the population will double by 2050, you can imagine how the stakes are high here. And consequently, we are here today to discuss—not to discuss humanitarian assistance or short-view solutions. We are not here to debate about food security, but about food sovereignty—how Africa can feed itself and feed the world.

So I’m happy to welcome our three panelists today.

Our first panelist is virtual, Professor Lilac Nachum. She’s a professor of international business at City University New York. She’s also a visiting professor at Strathmore Business School in Kenya. Welcome, Professor Nachum.

We have also virtually Jehiel Oliver, who is the founder and CEO of Hello Tractor, an agricultural technology company that connects tractor owners with smallholder farmers. Welcome, Jehiel.

And on the stage with me, Ousman Gajigo, who is director of Seeds for Prosperity. You are a former African Development Bank manager and now at the head of this new nonprofit foundation with the goal of sustainability, improving food security in the—in the Gambia, right? And you focus on—your work focuses on vegetable gardens in rural areas in a country—a coastal country already impacted by climate change.

So we are going to discuss the extraordinary potential of the African agricultural sector, as well as the innovation being pursued in agribusiness and agritech on the continent first. And I would like to ask Professor Nachum the first question.

Professor Nachum, you published—and that’s how we met—a few months ago, earlier this year, a remarkable piece called “Africa’s Agribusiness Sector Should Drive The Continent Economic Development: Five Reasons Why.” Can you share with the audience those five reasons why Africa’s agribusiness sector should drive the continent’s development?

LILAC NACHUM: Thank you, Ambassador. It’s really a pleasure and an honor to be here.

You’ve set up the stage so beautifully by suggesting that such a large part of Africa’s population makes a living out of agribusiness and such a large share of African economies are derived from agribusiness. In parallel, the agribusiness sector of Africa is extremely underdeveloped. By all measures that we could think of it lags behind the rest of the world.

One issue that Mr. Oliver seemed to try to address, the use of machines, is just the lowest in Africa than in the world. The size of farms [is] the smallest in Africa than the rest of the world. The labor productivity in agribusiness is the lowest in Africa that—compared to the rest of the world.

So there is really—the need for food security the ambassador mentioned… I cannot agree more to this, and I’m very glad that she brings this up and places it at the center of our discussion. But simply for Africa to develop we must address the issues related to agribusiness and must upgrade and upscale the agribusiness sector.

So I think the major reason for this is that I don’t think that Africa will follow the standard process of industrialization and economic development that we have seen have worked quite effectively in other parts of the world, most lately in Asia but also previously in other parts of the world, because whereby countries move for agribusiness—low-productivity agribusiness into manufacturing and from there to services, well, this is not happening in Africa so far. And we are seeing that to the extent that people move away from agribusiness, and we have seen some movement away from agribusiness, they shift—they jump over manufacturing and are all over to—and this is not a healthy path to economic development because services do not have the ability to raise millions of people out of poverty as we’ve seen in manufacturing.

But I think—beyond that I don’t think that the manufacturing-based industrialization model is suitable for Africa and is aligned with Africa’s comparative advantages and disadvantages. I think we do need a distinctive path for Africa. There’s so much that is distinctive about Africa and it calls for a distinctive path for economic development.

And then this should be based on agribusiness and should start from agribusiness and lift agribusiness up and develop the agribusiness sector.

Now, there are three key aspects that need to happen in order for—that need to take place in order for this to happen. The first is consolidation and scaling up. As I mentioned, the size of African farms is by far the smallest in the world.

Most African farmers are substantive level. They’re not—they’re producing in ancient technologies because the size does not justify investment in more advanced technology. So upscaling is one.

The second is upgrading, which means to raise the level of productivity and move up along the supply chain from the providers of the lowest value-added activities in supply chain—basically the raw material and the fresh produce—and engage in some processing of these raw [materials] in order to upscale and move up the supply chain.

And the third and last one is export, and we have now the Africa that really signified enormous breakthrough to Africa and the opportunities that it [offers]. But Africa is a continent of fifty-five countries. Most of them are very small, fewer than ten million people. So that could not support large-scale development of the agribusiness.

There is a need, an urgent need, to export, export in Africa and export to the rest of the world.

RAMA YADE: Thank you, Professor.

LILAC NACHUM: Thank you. Over to you.

RAMA YADE: Yeah. One, you mentioned this, I mean, merging between agriculture and business. You can understand that many people may be worried, especially the smallholder farmers in Africa who don’t maybe have the means to follow this strategy you just described.

How—and I would like here to ask the next question to—on the stage here to Ousman Gajigo, director of Seeds for Prosperity.

My first question is how can you make compatible this agribusiness strategy with development needs when it comes to the smallholder farmers?

OUSMAN GAJIGO: Thank you. Actually, I think there is no tension or contradiction here. There’s actually a lot of—I mean, development and what the professor is expressing, there’s a lot of, you know, compatibility here. She’s absolutely correct that in—you know, you have many small farms in Africa. I come from a small country that is densely[populated]. So that’s high population density, land is at a premium, so land size is the limiting resource. So if every farm is working in a fragmented piece of land, you know, it’s difficult how certain kinds of technology can be used. But that, you know—you know, it—one would have to really—you know, we’ll have to fail to use our imaginations if we actually think that as a failure, because you could have cooperatives. These are—there are successful models where you can—even small-scale farmers can get together and still take advantage of technology.

And also, these are opportunities that present themself. When you have a small—you know, small farmlands, fragmented piece of, you know, farmlands, you don’t have to give up—you know, drop your hands; you could actually say, OK, instead of focusing on, you know, traditional food crops or cereals that require a large amount of land, how about high-value crops that can be grown on even small quantities of land? So these are opportunities where even small-scale farmers, those that are living in very remote areas, could be supported.

And when you—she’s also absolutely correct in saying that, you know, the situation we see right now where you have a lot of people leaving agriculture, skipping—economy skipping manufacturing and industrialization, going straight to services, it’s not really a recipe for sustainable development. And I think here you have a situation where investing in agriculture and having industrialization are actually compatible, because in order to have processing or manufacturing you need to have high productivity in agriculture to ensure that there is surplus, a reliable supply, and at, you know, high acceptable quality. And that can only happen when you have, you know, investments in agriculture, because you cannot have a viable industrial sector where inputs that are required are, you know—are not in high supply—I mean are not in, you know, sufficient supply and at high cost. Because when you have high-cost manufacturing, you will not be competitive. So having development and also having investment in agriculture, these are actually very compatible.

RAMA YADE: Mmm hmm. Speaking of which, you mentioned restoration of lost crops like one of the tools that could be used. And a few days ago in Dubai, far from here at the COP28, the Africa Center welcomed Chef Pierre Thiam, who is working to restore these lost crops. And you mentioned also cooperatives that can play a role for the small farmers. There’s also digital. And here I would like to ask Jehiel Oliver here, who is the founder and CEO of Hello Tractor, about agritech. I said earlier that your company is a technology company that connects tractor owners with small farmers. So how can—

JEHIEL OLIVER: Correct.

RAMA YADE: How can—tell us—tell us more about your work and how these two worlds can work together.

JEHIEL OLIVER: Well, I think Hello Tractor as a business cuts across many of the themes that were already mentioned by the other panelists. Our business is enabled by last-mile coordination of smallholders’ demand for equipment to increase productivity of labor, to increase profitability, to ensure smallholder farmers plant on time, intensify land under cultivation to grow their profitability. And that’s enabled through technology.

But at the very core of our business model is a very simple concept, which is, you know, the most important factor of production in agriculture is fertile land, water, sun, right? And in our business, we have across these smallholder farming systems an abundance of all three, but they need to be organized. You cannot have a small one-acre farmer owning a tractor, and you certainly can’t expect a small one-acre farmer to book tractor services even through technology like what we offer at Hello Tractor and expect the tractor owner to drive that machinery a hundred kilometers to service that one plot. But through organization, sometimes through co-ops, or sometimes organic formation of demand clusters, you can reach economies of scale so that a group of farmers—maybe a hundred farmers booking for 150, 200 acres of land—is very attractive to a machine owner.

And we use a variety of technologies to enable that transaction. We have a tractor fleet owner application that we built natively so farm equipment owners… feel comfortable sending it to far-off places, and knowing exactly what it’s doing, and making sure the operator is not defrauding them or stealing fuel or underreporting work. And you know, we have a booking application that community-based agents can use to organize those demand clusters, transparently book that demand with satellite images of the farmers’ fields to see exactly the condition of the fields, location… All of the information that you need to de-risk that decision to send your tractor to that far-off place, that is made available in the application.

But what’s enabling this entire business is the coordination of that last mile, aggregating these small acres to be large acres, and to look as closely as broad acre-growers as possible to enable to economies of scale to make the market work. That’s true for tractors. It’s true for seed [systems]. It’s true for fertilizer. It’s true for storage and market linkages. But we start with tractors, but we believe that the coordination can be leveraged across the entire agricultural industry.

RAMA YADE: Jehiel, thank you. Can you tell us more about the track record of Hello Tractor? How many countries in Africa—

JEHIEL OLIVER: Yeah, sure.

RAMA YADE: I mean, in how many countries are you operating? And how many farmers have you—have you targeted?

JEHIEL OLIVER: So we’re Africa-focused. We have over a million. We’re at about 1.1 million farmers being serviced on our platform growing on 2.6 million acres of land. We’re focusin… You talk about indigenous crops, millets and—as well. And African maize, Kenyan maize. I’m in Kenya right now…

And, yeah, we’ve recently launched a tractor finance product as well. That’s operational in three countries. But the broader business and the core kind of fleet management and marketplace, we’re in three countries across the continent.

RAMA YADE: Thank you very much.

Professor Nachum, I’m back to you. You are talking about what could be a good agribusiness strategy for Africa, but at the same time important parts of the continent from the Horn to the [Democratic Republic of the Congo] is facing a food crisis, you know, because of, like I earlier said, the war in Ukraine, et cetera. How do you—how do you appreciate the most pressing needs of the sector today? And has the sector recovered from COVID-19? We know that the impact was important. How can we ensure full restoration before deploying the strategy you just described?

LILAC NACHUM: Yeah. You know, those kind of crises… are inevitable and political crisis, that will influence the region. And the more integrated the world is, the more dependent we are on other countries for the supply of our needs, the more exposed we are to those risks. These are inevitable.

I continue to—I have always believed and I continue to believe that globalization should march ahead in spite of those terrible crises. You know, a global pandemic happened for the last time a hundred years ago before COVID-19, so—and I think that the benefits that—during the—during the hundred years that passed between the last global pandemic and COVID-19, the benefits of globalization have changed the world in such a significant way. I wouldn’t want to see us reverting from these into an ocean of self-sufficiency and not being dependent on others for the supply of anything and everything.

So we need to find ways to make ourselves more resilient to such shocks. Political shocks, well, unfortunately we’re seeing many more of them in recent—in recent years, which is unfortunate. But they are also an inevitable part of our world, and I think that they should—they, too, should not be an excuse for closing up and protection—introducing protectionist policies that will undermine all the enormous benefit that the global world provide us, including in terms of—even in terms of food supply.

What I think that we do need to do is to—in order to protect ourself against those kinds of events, to become more resilient in the sense that not being reliant on one source of supply. Like, you know, the war—the war in Ukraine became so devastating because a large part of Africa were dependent on it as their source also for supply of grain. So diversified sources of supply and be ready to—to be prepared to the opportunity that something might go wrong, you know, in one part of the world that would jeopardize the ability—its ability to supply our needs.

But I continue to subscribe heartily to the principles of comparative advantage which underline the benefits of globalization. And they apply to food as well, and maybe to food to a greater extent because of the advantages of weather—weather, land, and type of land that may some parts of the world—inherently, most of the world for the production of certain foods than others. The benefits of trading with each other, even in those things, are enormous, and you should not let them go just because of the political risk or natural disaster risks.

RAMA YADE: Mmm hmm. Thank you very much.

LILAC NACHUM: Thank you. Thank you.

RAMA YADE: Ousman Gajigo, I have—I am intrigued by—very curious of your experience as ADB manager. And if—when we compare with your current activities at the head of a nonprofit foundation, how do you perceive the support by the African development organizations on the agriculture sector? Because we know—you know, today we are here to celebrate African innovation and creativity, and we know that the African civil society is really a vibrant civil society that tries to do the job the states sometimes cannot deliver. How do you—how do you work and—how do you appreciate and how do you work with the development organizations at the state level and at the continental level?

OUSMAN GAJIGO: Yeah, no, I mean, when you look at the challenges in agribusiness, there is definitely an important role for all of these entities you’ve mentioned. Most of the time, we do focus on issues at—you know, policymakers at international level. This foundation that I work for and helped create, you know, we work with smallholders that are engaged in high-value horticulture. So mostly we’re talking about farmers that have very small land size in highly remote areas. So you think about how do we make these farmers realize high growth, eventually become commercially viable, and are connected to the markets so that the work of foundations like mine become less needed over time.

So when you look at these, I mean, you—issues like access to finance and market, access to technology become important, and these smallholders can’t make all of these investments on their own. So the role of public sector, whether national or international, become quite important.

So, for instance, at the level of the—at the level of the organization that I work in, we—of course, we help with inputs, being—make things. We help these farmers with information that, you know—because a lot of the solutions are out there. It’s a matter of sensitizing, making it available to these farmers there. But also there are investments where it is beyond the means of an individual farmer, no matter how well-connected and how well-resourced they are. So those—there are some things that have public-good aspects.

Of course, I think Oliver’s activities, like what Oliver is also doing, you know, these are examples of where things that used to be the—used to be activities on the—you know, that governments used to do exclusively, what we see that, you know, there are even now private initiatives that are addressing that.

At a continental level, you have these roles that development organizations can play that even national governments have challenges in addressing. For instance, I know both the World Bank and African Development Bank, you know, have programs like global supply finance—I mean, global supply chain finance programs, where they link global buyers of agribusiness goods with aggregators at national level, provide financing… services. And these aggregators, they’re not able to link up with small-scale farmers to make so they have access to finance and access to market. So you have, again, roles for national governments here where they can assist in making so that you have cooperatives at a level of smallholders that can make it possible for these smallholders to actually interface with these international buyers, because it’s impossible for—to have an international buyer outside working with a farmer that has less than half an acre.

So at every level you have—there is considerable scope for these entities—national level, subnational level, and international level—you know, to address the constraints that there are. Of course, I’ve only mentioned a few, but it extends beyond your finance, but you know, technical service—I mean, technical assistance, advisory services, information. So these roles are there. And you know, my work both at the World Bank and at the African Development Bank before I started this foundation informed a great deal for, you know, roles that we can play at the national level and also at even subnational level to ensure that the smallholders, we start to think about them less as, you know, humanitarian cases than as potential business opportunities.

RAMA YADE: Up to—yeah.

Jehiel, I have a question for you about the underrepresented populations and development goals, especially women and young populations. How can they be—first, in your activities, do you have—do you target them specifically to be more inclusive? And how you work and support the development goals on the continent in terms of job creation, for example, in the urban but also in the rural areas.

JEHIEL OLIVER: It is—I mean, it’s central to our work. And it’s—you know, we talk a lot about internally going beyond the rhetoric and incorporating inclusion and equity… So we talked about, for example—I’ll use a real example—our booking algorithm that connects farmers to tractor owners. Logically, you would think the bigger the field, the more attractive the booking, right, because you get more work done and you have the tractor owner more—and you’re paid by the acres. But we don’t look at that at the individual farmer level; we look at the number of acres in a specific geographic catchment area. And we built that algorithmically to ensure that we were not—we were not disqualifying smallholder farmers from accessing tractor services. That’s the bulk of the market, and so that’s a market that we need to service, and we need to be thoughtful about how we crowd them into the marketplace without putting our tractor owners at a disadvantage, right? But it’s codified in the code, right?

The same thing with our tractor finance product, right? We’ve observed—obviously, I mean, we’ve all heard of the World Bank statistics around how women are represented in agriculture but are often last in line to access resources. They’re asset-poor. They don’t have the same level of access to financing. And so we thought there is an opportunity for us to design a product that targeted specifically young people and women. How do we do that?… We were underwriting the book of business of booking agents. As they engage more and more farmers, that’s what we underwrite to qualify them for a loan. Once you reach a certain number of acres booked in the application, you qualify to become a tractor owner through Hello Tractor in our pay-as-you-go tractor finance program. Now, we hold you accountable. Once you get the tractor, we track your performance to plan. If you’re not servicing bookings, if you’re not remitting a small feedback to—by form to make sure that money is recycling, we take the tractor away. But we prioritize young people. We prioritize women. We reduce the downpayment requirements. And we do a lot of analysis to make sure that, on a risk-adjusted basis, we can scale our business.

So we got—you know, in our—in our credit team, they’re constantly updating regression models to see what is a real indicator of creditworthiness, right? If that’s what we care about—because we need to repay our investors. Our investors are commercial players, like John Deere is our largest investor. They care about things like inclusion, but they also want to make sure they get their money back. And so—but we design for the kind of inclusion that I think is going to be important not just at a social level, but realistically that’s the market. So it’s kind of weird to not design for that because the businesses that don’t are really skimming off the top, and it’s really competitive at the top. There’s not that many bankable agricultural enterprises across Africa and there’s not that many, you know, broad-acre farms across Africa. There’s not that many dudes that are creditworthy running around trying to find loans from big commercial banks. It just don’t work that way. The bulk of the market is young people who are unbanked. It’s women who are unbanked. It’s smallholder farmers who are unbanked. And if you’re not reaching it, I would question the viability and scalability of your business.

So it’s imperative, both for the social commitment but I also really believe that commercially you’re irrelevant if you can’t crack that nut. And so that’s where we focus.

RAMA YADE: Thank you, Jehiel.

And we have only eight minutes, and I would like to dedicate this remaining time to a third topic after agribusiness and development: the impact of climate change on the agricultural sector. And I’m going back to you, Professor Nachum, to ask you my first question on that.

Combating climate change in the—in the sector of agriculture is critically important. At the very moment when, like I said, in Dubai we are attending the COP28, thirty years of COP, what are the best options for the sector in Africa? What are the best practices, the inspiring models in Africa? And beyond—Aubrey Hruby, our Africa Center senior fellow, a few months ago just released a report on agritech and advanced a few recommendations about that. But on the continent of land, of water in danger and threatened by the global warming and all the extreme weather conditions, what are the best options to—in combating the climate change in the sector as of now?

LILAC NACHUM: Well, the problem of climate change, unfortunately, goes way beyond the sector, but obviously the sector will be among the—will experience the consequences of climate change probably more than any other—any other because it depends directly on the state—the state of the environment.

So I think if anything these issues call for greater specialization and more agribusiness activity that is really derived on the—that is based on the principles of comparative advantages and more efficient use of water, for example. So crop that requires more water should be grown in areas where there is just more natural water, and same on irrigation in other area where in order to address issues like water shortages crops that we—or crops or other agribusiness items that need more sun should be grown in areas where—more sunny areas, and so on and so forth. So greater sense of specialization in order to be able to provide the food security that we started the panel with, and at the same time also protect ourselves from shortages that will be caused by the—by environmental challenges. In general, I think that Africa will play a major role in the Green Revolution and the agribusiness is inevitably a part of that. So many of the resources that are needed in order to make that transformation to green energy are in Africa.

Africa provides—Africa will become a major provider of this and stand to benefit enormously from this transformation simply by being the provider, by being a source of the resources to the rest of the world. So—

RAMA YADE: Yeah. Yeah. Speaking of Africa, there’s fifty-five countries so a variety of countries. Among them those coastal states are at the forefront of the climate issues, which is the case of your country, Gambia, right?

So can you tell us more about the concrete effects of the climate change in the sector of agriculture in your country?

OUSMAN GAJIGO: Yeah. No, it’s significant. I mean, Gambia is a small country, coastal and very flat, low lying. So climate change beyond the issue of just increased, you know, variability in weather and, you know, more variations in rainfall or higher temperatures you have, like, more direct effects.

For instance, there are parts of the country where now you have saltwater intrusion where it wasn’t before and this makes groundwater irrigation, you know, increasingly threatened. So I think when it comes to agriculture and climate change it’s obviously very relevant so the issue then becomes mainly adaptation as opposed to mitigation, and for smallholder farming this is—there’s a lot that can be done. Irrigation there—this is where you also can leverage technological advances that allow you to better weather the climate effects.

So when you have small farms you have climate effect in terms of rainfall and you have—this is traditional agriculture that is rainfall dependent. It becomes more important to have, let’s say, irrigation technologies that can be right sized for small sized—for small farms.

So you have now, you know, solar-based irrigation designs that are—you know, that you can have—that are modular in design. It means can be right sized for small farms and as the farms increases they can be increased without huge increase in cost.

It means the investment costs for initial setup also can be a lot more affordable and it means in general you have sustainable use of this water that is becoming increasingly threatened.

So, yeah, so for a small country here the effects are, you know, tremendous, are real and, you know, action is needed in terms of adaptation.

RAMA YADE: Thank you very much.

My last question, and we have to wrap up because we have—this conversation should be over already—but you had Olivier—Oliver, my last question is for you.

I just mentioned the Atlantic Council and Policy Center for the New South report on agritech, and one of the recommendations of the authors was to advocate for more investments in the technology of—in the sector.

What could you say to close this discussion on your recommendations? What would you say to push the international—offering investors or American investors to invest more in a technology company in the agricultural sector?

JEHIEL OLIVER: Well, I mean, I will start with some of the statistics that you laid out eloquently at the top of the panel discussion.

We have the arable land. We have great water resources across the continent. I think for any investor investing in ag tech in Africa and really globally, I think there’s often this urgency in the venture to exit a fund. A typical fund life in venture capital is ten years. The gestation period in agriculture is much longer. Innovation cycles are longer.

So you need to select the right capital for this asset class and I’m not convinced entirely that venture capital is the right type of investment for this and I think globally ag tech has struggled a bit because of that.

So, certainly, there’s massive opportunities. You know, it took a hundred years to build Cargill, a hundred years, you know, to build John Deere, our biggest investor, and all of these same companies exist in Africa. You’re not going to get—you’re not going to get paid overnight. You have to be patient. You have to have resilience.

You have to have the qualities and the characteristics that we see in our farmers. And if—and if you bring those to bear, you will succeed because our farmers, season in, season out, they still have successful years without crop insurance, without all of the inputs, without all of these things, against climate change. They still have successful years and they largely feed and they—and if investors have those same characteristics, I would welcome them to participate in this amazing upside on this continent. If they don’t have those characteristics they should stay where they are.

RAMA YADE: … Africa cannot afford—according to what you said cannot afford to remain a promise or only a potential. It’s very important to become a reality and an achievement, especially in this sector where so urgent needs—we find so many urgent needs…

Q: Thank you so much. I really appreciate it. Moussa Kondo. I work for Sahel Institute from Mali. Thank you so much, Honorable Ambassador Yade, for moderating this session.

So I’m from a country where the climate crisis and the farmers and also talking about food is some of the most important conversation. And I’ve heard a lot of innovation around the content. When I say content, is what we produce and how we produce it. It’s good to have a lot of side innovation around it but when you—the national politics or policies or international institutions encourage a country to produce things they cannot eat directly this is a problem.

And also the product they don’t control the market. I’m talking about cotton. The past few years the countries in Sahel—Mali and Burkina Faso—have been competing being the first cotton producer, and after the prediction they don’t control the price in the international market. So that means the cotton is not transformed right and then they may lose everything in one click but for international industries where they don’t produce. One point.

The second thing, countries… they don’t have land to produce even they don’t want. So they need production from elsewhere. And Mali has, like, millions of hectares to produce. So why we don’t encourage countries lever what we have learned to produce what we can eat?

For me, this is a thing—the one thing. When you take countries like—in Asia like Thailand or Vietnam, when they’re feeding almost Africa in terms of rice, where 80 percent of consumption of rice are off the continent, many countries in the continent are based on rice. So why we don’t focus on this and how we can implement, like, fertilizing chemical product also to make this meet the need of what we want.

Thank you.

Q: I shall make it quick. My name is Simba Rasha.

And my question is, do you really think smallholder farmers are going to take us to the promised land in terms of food production in Africa? You know, it’s a fundamental question that we all have to consider and answer and digest.

Millions—billions of dollars have gone into smallholder farmers in the last twenty years in the continent. We have seen negative growth in yield and overall output on the whole. So what alternative strategies exist in order to get the yield or the dividend yield or however the production that we need for the continent? Thank you.

RAMA YADE: So maybe we can take these two questions. Yeah, OK. So the first question, how could Africans consume what they eat, what they produce, right? Maybe Professor Nachum can take that question. And the two others about the small farmers for Jehiel and Ousman.

LILAC NACHUM: I would actually like to say something to the—in regard to the second question, because if I—

RAMA YADE: Feel free. Of course.

LILAC NACHUM: I agree—I agree with the speaker that we have—we have not seen improvement in the current model has not yielded the anticipated results. There is obviously something here that needs basic repair, for the lack of a better word.

And you know, in the United States, 2.5 percent of the population engage in farming, and the US is one of the world’s largest exporter of food. So the amount of product that they produce is sufficient to feed the country and more—and more; they need to export the—they’re exporting what is left. In Africa, we have seen the situation that more than 50 percent of the population is engaged in agribusiness and Africa cannot feed itself. So there is obviously something fundamentally wrong with this model.

And I think—and I agree with the speaker that it has not—it has not changed over decades. It has remained the situation. Africa is unable to provide its own supply of food. It’s among the—the size-adjusted figures are—according to the size-adjusted figure, it’s among the continents in the world that depend most heavily on import for the supply of its own food. This is an absurd, absurd situation. There is really something fundamentally wrong here.

Now, it’s easy to identify that. And what needs to be done in order to change the situation, that’s a big challenge. But I think we need to start by identifying where are the bottleneck. What is preventing the sector from growing—from growing? What is preventing of the sector from the three—the three issues that I mentioned in the beginning, from upscaling—from scaling, from upgrading, and from exporting so they can—they can get larger markets? Where the—where the bottleneck are? What is—what are the barriers…?

We have seen similar developments happening naturally by market—in the market in other places of the world. There have been natural causes of consolidation, and then larger farmers are better able to upgrade, driving a next-step process of consolidation, and then this size enables, of course, exporting… whereby it increases itself over time. This, for some reason, is not happening in Africa.

Why this is the case is a question that I struggle a lot with and I don’t have answers. But I think that this is the question to which we need to direct our attention. So I very much—

RAMA YADE: You know—yeah, please.

LILAC NACHUM: I sympathize very much with this question, and I salute the speaker for bringing this up.

RAMA YADE: Yeah, we advanced a few answers in our recent Africa Center report on the topic, making comparisons with other countries like Cambodia, Indonesia, Colombia, or India, you know, where facing—in the past they—and even today—facing the same challenges and bottlenecks. And I think this is important to—I mean, to—you know, to take these examples, the best practices elsewhere in the world.

And the second thing is maybe take advantage of the larger regional organizations, such as the Africa Free Trade Area that has been launched in January 2021, and that will help to move to the next step when it comes to having more impact; and maybe, with the—with the partners from the European Union to the US with the Africa Free Trade Area, for example, work on the commercial needs, too, you know? So that is—that is the—a few ways that could be or tools that could be mobilized, maybe, to get—to reach the next level when it comes to the impacts of small farmers.

And the second question, Ousman, would you like to take it, about consuming what farmers produce in Africa?

OUSMAN GAJIGO: Yeah. I think the two questions are actually quite related.

I mean, they’re absolutely right. If you look at productivity, you know, feeding—you know, countries feeding themselves is quite linked with the low yield. Let’s take one example here, Mali. You know, the staple is rice. They produce a lot of rice. The global average yield for rice is about four tons per hectare. In West Africa, the average yield is about two tons per hectare. In the country where I come from, the yield is one ton per hectare; it’s actually declining over time, you know. In that situation, you can have the largest amount of arable land, I mean, you just are not—cannot keep up with population growth. I mean, the per capita cost on rice is about 115 kilograms per person per year. Given the high population growth, you know, the productivity is just not—it’s not sufficient to keep up with the demand.

Compare, let’s say, Mali with Vietnam. There you have average yield of about six tons per hectare, very productive, and a lot of them are smallholders. So the issue here is not about whether we have smallholders or not, and it’s also not to romanticize smallholders. I mean, of course you need to talk about them because the vast majority of the farmers we are talking about, the ones who is in the constraints are smallholders. But the point is, you know, not to romanticize them and to say that, you know, you need to go with that model of smallholder-centered farming to have productivity growth. No. The idea is, as the professor said, identify what the constraints are, the constraint to productivity growth. This is the key. Why the yields?

I mean, we do talk about productivity per farmer, but the key here is really productivity per land, the yield. Yeah, where you are actually talking about, you know—you know, in the context of climate change, where we don’t want to have just bigger and bigger farms that is knocking down forest, you have to have intensification. And therefore, land—even in large countries like Mali, you know, land yield—I mean, land productivity or yield is essentially the key. And things like having agribusiness as opposed to just traditional form of development-assistance agriculture, this is where we need a culture change. Governments kind of move away from just saying, OK, we have—we give imports of seeds at the beginning of the year to farmers and, you know, help them improve their productivity, but we should focus more on thinking of agriculture as a business where even, you know, small, rural, remote farmers can be linked to the market. Because governments, let’s face it, I mean, our governments are not really in a position to address a lot of the challenges. So to the extent that that is called for, you know, private businesses, you know, to the extent that that is called for organizations that are formed by, you know, non-public sector, I think this is the way to go.

RAMA YADE: OK. Thank you so much.

MODERATOR: Wonderful.

RAMA YADE: Well, but I did promise this gentleman. Can you do yours in thirty seconds? Because we have our other colleagues here. Thirty seconds, sir.

Q: Yeah, yeah. My name is John Manyerakesa. I am a farmer here in the US.

I grow African food to decolonize the African diet, and that is something that we don’t talk a lot about. Chef Pierre Thiam talked about how we can actually use our indigenous food to substitute for all these imports, $65 billion. And so my question to you, twenty years ago we had the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program. All African countries signed that they’re going to do 10 percent of their budget to agriculture. Can you tell me if you follow? What is the status of that? Because it was an African program that Africans have to have their own African agriculture program based on the African realities. What is the status of that?

OUSMAN GAJIGO: Yeah. Yeah, no, I remember looking into this and a large number of countries are very far from actually meeting their commitments. I actually had a look at the budget of my country, and I believe the share of the budget that was allocated to agriculture was way lower than 10 percent. I forgot the exact percentage.

I think—I mean, the way I look at those agreements is not so much to follow religiously the specific percentages that are—that have been agreed upon, but the concept that it is important that you focus on agricultural sector, that it’s not neglected. But you know, you could have 10 percent of the budget allocated agriculture and all of it is to recurring expenditure and almost nothing is to capital expenditure, which is what is needed in some countries—investment in irrigation, things like that. So sometimes these dollar targets, I think, can obscure rather than illuminate what the issues are.

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Entrepreneurs are changing the narrative about women’s leadership in Africa

Atlantic Council — Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:20:11 +0000

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Public Event Mon, December 11, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

AfriNEXT

The Atlantic Council and global development company DAI convened high-level experts to reframe the narrative on African successes and innovation.

Africa

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Rebecca Harrison
Chief Executive Officer and Co-founder, African Management Institute

Anita Erskine
Chief Executive Officer of Erskine Global Communications

Betty Beenzu Chilonde
Founder, Bulongo Incubator for Creative Skills

Moderator

Sarah Zaaimi
Deputy Director for Communications, Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council

SARAH ZAAIMI: Hello, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to welcome you to another panel, an exciting panel on “Advancing [Women’s] Leadership in Africa.”

Let me first start with a conundrum that I’ve been struggling with myself. Women in Africa represent half of the population, and yet they are only 8 percent of wage earners and they only bring 13 percent of the GDP. But yet, if you scratch the surface, you will find a thriving ecosystem where women entrepreneurs such as the ladies here on my left and all the attendants that you’ve been listening to throughout this conference, they show a different image of Africa. They tell a different story of Africa where women leadership is a true success story.

For example, members are also talking about this. Women entrepreneurs, for example, in Africa are over 26 percent, and that’s above the global average. And also, most of the women in Africa are self-employed, and that’s, like, over 58 percent.

So to help me untangle this conundrum and discuss this, we have a panel of trailblazers and entrepreneurs, inspiring ladies who have been working in the continent. Let me introduce to you our panel today.

So, to my immediate left, Rebecca Harrison, who’s the CEO and co-founder of [African] Management Institute. She comes to us from Kenya today. She’s been doing a tremendous job. Her institute has over fifty-thousand beneficiaries from over thirty-five countries in Africa.

Next is our host that you’ve been acquainted to throughout this morning, Anita Erskine, who is the CEO of Erskine Global Communications. She’s a media personality. She runs her own shows on the radio and TV. But she’s also a social entrepreneur, advancing women, especially young girls learning in STEM, among other things. I’ll let you discover more.

And last but not least, coming from Zambia, is Betty Beenzu Chilonde, And she’s the founder of Bulongo Incubator, but she’s also a social entrepreneur herself and a fashion designer. She’s passionate about sustainability and has been doing a lot of work on the ground.

So welcome, ladies.

Let me start with you, Anita. How can we tell a better story of African women beyond the headlines, the scary headlines of war and conflict and things we’ve been listening to? How can we scratch the surface and show the real face of women leadership in the continent?

ANITA ERSKINE: Thanks, Sarah.

I think, first of all, we can by not pretending that those negatives [don’t] exist, you know, because you don’t tell a real story by sweeping the realities under the carpet. You actually look at the problems head on. You talk about drought and flooding in Somalia, and you talk about the women who are—perhaps who bear the brunt of—you know, brunt of this. You talk about the entrepreneurial ecosystem and the women who are frontlining it, who are at the forefront of it. You talk about perhaps a corporate world, you know, technology, et cetera. And you also underline the women who have, quote/unquote, “broken the glass ceiling” to be at the forefront.

But I think, ultimately, the element of owning that narrative is also—it’s kind of like double-sided. You don’t tell Africa’s story only on the one side of talking about how beautiful and how culturally layered it is without talking about the negatives as well, so that then you own how that story is told. So when you focus on women’s leadership specifically on the continent, you also don’t focus on the CEOs, you know, and the entrepreneurs; you talk about, you know, the women who lead their communities, you know, right down there, so to speak, at the grassroot level, and the women who, you know, sacrifice everything to ensure that their children go to school. That is a form of leadership as well. You know, so make sure that you project the entire story so that somebody doesn’t have to tell the other side for you.

SARAH ZAAIMI: That’s very, very pertinent on how granular the story of Africa is. And I would just want to add to that also is that there is some kind of essentialism on the way we tell the story of Africa as if it’s one country or one culture or one thing although there are different layers and layers to this continent and sometimes many disparities and many success stories but also stories of sadness. So thank you for saying that.

I’m moving to you, Betsy. I know you care a lot about innovation and I think that’s a theme that’s recurrent throughout this conference that we’ve been hearing throughout the different panels this day. There was this study—staggering study by UNESCO in 2021 that actually most women entrepreneurs in Africa are innovating somehow. Like, I think 24 percent, they innovate in a certain way.

I think maybe it’s the reality on the ground or the… specificity of what they have been doing. How do you explain that and how do you live that throughout your own journey as an entrepreneur and a designer and someone at the forefront of innovation in Africa?

BETTY BEENZU CHILONDE: Thank you, Sarah.

I think to answer that question, really, I would say that, you know, different things happen every day as women do their businesses and go about whatever they are doing and so to remain stagnated is really, like, something bad for a woman.

As you go through challenges you have always to think about how best you can do something, how best you can deliver, how different you can do things in order to achieve, at the end of the day.

So basically I think as a person who supports innovation and who has been through certain struggles as an entrepreneur, as a woman, I think it’s important really to also educate oneself how you can do things better, you know, as opposed to just focusing in one line.

It’s always best to look around what other people are doing, what other countries are doing, how are they, you know, reaching a certain target or how are they getting or surviving. So, really, innovation in that way is continued and you keep learning like that.

SARAH ZAAIMI: No, thank you so much for that. It’s very wise words coming from someone who have been, you know, grappling with this and working with this every day.

I’m turning to you, Rebecca. I know you spent a lot of time in the continent and you have roots there working with women and trying to open new perspectives in tech, in venture capital, and other fields.

I want to go back to the fact that women are still underrepresented in businesses. In board members, for example, they make less than 8 percent in board members of businesses but they also make less than 20 [percent], 24 percent at best in parliament. So even as decision makers they are, largely, underrepresented.

How do you explain that and how do you overcome it in your day-to-day life trying to work as a social entrepreneur and also as an economic entrepreneur?

REBECCA HARRISON: Yeah. What a great question. If I could answer that we would be fixing this problem, I guess.

But yeah, I guess I wear two hats as an entrepreneur myself and then like Betty also working with entrepreneurs, and I guess when I think about women in entrepreneurship particularly, you know, capital is the issue that we often end up coming back to, that women are just so underrepresented when it comes to seeking capital and accessing capital.

And I think there’s a few—so maybe I’ll just focus my answer on that—I think there are a few challenges there. One is the pipeline building, that there aren’t—there still aren’t enough strong female-led businesses coming through the pipeline to be able to access capital, at least in theory. That’s what the male capital allocators say.

I’m not so sure it’s true. But, arguably, the pipeline is still, you know, like you were saying I think 24 percent of businesses are women-owned. Of the businesses that we support we’re almost half and we’re very intentional about that because we feel like it’s our role to build that pipeline so that investors don’t have that excuse anymore.

We know that there are great women-led businesses out there and we want to help get them ready to be able to access that capital. So that’s one is building the pipeline.

The second is I think our models of capital have been very driven. I think one of the panels this morning made this point that you can’t just kind of take a Silicon Valley VC model and kind of put that in an African context and expect it to work. It’s just—the businesses are so different. The risk profiling is so different. And a lot of the women that we work with don’t necessarily want, you know, hockey-stick growth. They’re not looking for that. They’re working—they want to build profitable, sustainable businesses that grow. They’re ambitious, but they also want to integrate that with their lives and their communities.

So I really believe we need different types of capital and we need to embrace different journeys rather than just having this kind of techbro-driven, like, VC culture that women feel alienated from and don’t even want to be a part of anyway. We need kind of different models that are—that are more inclusive of kind of the incredible women entrepreneurs out there.

SARAH ZAAIMI: As a follow-up question to that, do you think equity investment is something that needs to be incentivized and put forward, and maybe also incentivized by other allies from outside who could, you know—you know, push the governments in the continent to adopt more equitable policies towards women, especially in the startup and entrepreneurship sectors?

REBECCA HARRISON: Yeah. I mean, I think it’s something that kind of allies from all spaces can contribute to because it needs intentionality at every level, whether it’s pipeline building, whether it’s capital. I mean, just an interesting stat, we’ve seen how women entrepreneurs are much—A, they create more jobs in relation to revenue than male entrepreneurs, but they create significantly more jobs for women. So, of the entrepreneurs that we support, more—so 75 percent of them have more than 50 percent female workforce, compared to, I mean, low double digits for men. It’s just so stark it’s fascinating.

So women champion other women, typically. So if we can get more women into kind of every stage of the value chain of entrepreneur support, from kind of mentors to capital allocators to entrepreneurs themselves, you know, whatever it is, I think that’s how we’ll see change, is really—and everyone can be an ally on that wherever you are in that kind of value chain.

SARAH ZAAIMI: That’s very important, especially to find allies within other women, women elevating other women and that peer-to-peer building up to find your footprint.

I’m turning to you, Anita. I know in our initial discussions we spoke a lot about agency. I know you built your own company from, you know, the bottom up. Is the startup and entrepreneurial ecosystem in Africa hostile for women? And how can agency reverse that trend or help empower women in that leadership?

ANITA ERSKINE: I’m sorry, I think women own the startup and entrepreneurial space.

SARAH ZAAIMI: OK.

ANITA ERSKINE: No, I think we own it. And I don’t have the data in front of me, but you can challenge me. I find that so many more small organizations/startups created from, you know, fashion startups, innovative startups, tech startups… are all run by women. But you perhaps don’t know about them and see them, perhaps because women tend to focus on getting the work done. Sorry, guys; mean no harm. You know, her focus is in the back office, is in the factory, because she’s responsible for so much more than just herself. So I find that, no, the women are there.

Of course, I mean, post-COVID we’re all going into a world of telling our stories, and people becoming a lot more vocal, and people saying, well, you know what, let’s own the narrative, which I strongly—you know, I advocate for. But I think that women really do what they do best, and that is they lead. You know, women don’t necessarily stand up and shout: Hey, look at me. I’m the founder. I’m the CEO. But she will start something, even on a small scale.

And when you talk about agency, I find that a lot of the time women are over-mentored and underfunded. So when you talk about agency, you know, you tend to be—you tend to confuse that with a woman being able to start her business. No, my focus on agency, really, is her ability to not only empower herself, but ensure that she’s got a story to tell that empowers other people, ensure that she’s educated enough to make the kinds of decisions that affect her positively, ensure that she’s able to understand the business, she’s able to understand the financing behind the business, financial literacy, and that when she comes up with an idea she’s surrounded by people who only are ready to say, you know, a tap on the back—Go, Rebecca! Go, Betty!—but who are able to back that up with cash, with money.

You know, so, listen, we could talk all day about this. But I think that, to be very honest with you—and I’m very happy, Rebecca; you need to help me define the data—but I think that a lot of the entrepreneurs, a lot of the leaders in the entrepreneurial and startup ecosystem are women, and they’re getting the world to pay attention to the continent. They’re just not talking about it.

SARAH ZAAIMI: No, thank you for that myth-busting discourse.

I would like to challenge you on that. There was a recent report by Brookings that says that women in Africa tend to confine themselves to certain comfortable sectors that the society expects them to be in. I know you, throughout the sectors that you are working on, you are busting that myth as well. But is that something across the continent that you’re seeing, or is it just among the elites in certain capitals—maybe Accra or Casablanca or other place, Nairobi? But is it—is it across the continent, or is it just a bubble that we are seeing and we are just seeing through those elites?

ANITA ERSKINE: I work on a project called Africa’s Business Heroes, and every year we see about twenty-seven thousand or thirty-thousand applications from across the continent. And it would shock you how many businesses, you know, focusing on social impact work or focusing on impact at the ground level and all the way up, how many of these entrepreneurs are women. So they are not only—and they’re not only in the cities. They’re not only in Joburg or in Accra or in Nairobi; no, they are in the rural areas as well. Some of them are giving up their full-time glamorous jobs in the big cities and then moving to their hometowns to build businesses just so that they can feed and employ other women on the ground.

So, no, it’s not—you know, the bubble is not per city or is not, you know, according to, you know, the 1 percent or 2 percent from middle to high income. No. In fact, if we did our research a little bit well—and perhaps we should have, you know, prior to coming here—we’d find out that a lot of, you know, a lot of the women are, you know, grassroots-driven. And I don’t know, hundreds of women who are employed at that rural and grassroots level are employed by other women.

SARAH ZAAIMI: Just to deconstruct that a bit further with you, Betty, we chatted a bit briefly about the weight of culture, and the cultural restraints and cultural norms that sometimes would tend to belittle the work of women. That’s what you were telling me through your story and through how people perceive, for example, designers. They say, well, designer is not a real job. You know, like, there is a lot of weight of culture on women trying to lead. Can you develop more on that from your personal experience? And how did you overcome that? And what would be your advice for young women entrepreneurs having, you know, to overcome all the stigma around what they do and trying to explain themselves to the society?

BETTY BEENZU CHILONDE: Thank you, Sarah. I think I’ll also just echo what Anita has said. There are so many women, young women out there who really want to do it, who want to make it, who want to do big things out there. But then, also, speaking from experience back in Zambia, you find that, just like you have mentioned, the weight of culture. You know, there is a certain responsibility that is placed on the woman to be able to be the homemaker, OK? She’s expected to take care of the children. She’s expected to nurture everything that is around and the man is supposed to work. So you find that even as much as she wants to make it, certain responsibilities restrain her from achieving more than the male counterpart. So you find that in some way she will be trying, but there are so many challenges that are coming against her. But, true, there are so many women out there.

And also, sometimes there’s a fear that if I go against, you know, what the culture expects me to do or, you know, what—there’s this, what they call, marriage material. I don’t know how many people have heard it, but the marriage material kind of woman is the woman who is submissive, who is not out there who wants to achieve, and who—the one who is going to be listening to what others are saying and really conforming to what society wants her to do or what they believe her to be able to be in society. So as much as they want to go out there, there’s a fear that, you know, they will be seen to be less marriage material and they will not get married at a certain age, and you know, then they are not good enough women. So all those constraints really come against the woman and they are not able to go forward.

The other thing that I would want to mention also is for those that actually manage to make it, they are seen to be maybe promiscuous, you know, as to mean maybe they have achieved because they have compromised in a way. So women are expected not to achieve more because, oh, you are pretty, so because you are pretty then you went against certain things, and that’s how you’ve made it. So there’s all those challenges, really, that come against the woman. But, yes, the women are there and they are ready to do it, but we need to sort of like help them to come out of those fears.

SARAH ZAAIMI: I want also to focus on the reverse phase of culture, because I feel also it’s the African culture that sometimes allowed these women to be empowered. Because if we tap into the history of the continent, we will find lots of stories of women fighters and, you know, women fighting patriarchy or even matriarchal societies where the woman is the breadwinner or is the head of the tribe or is the healer or is highly esteemed. And that’s not something that people maybe are familiar with. So do you also think that maybe culture is what made you and empowered you to become a leader?

BETTY BEENZU CHILONDE: I would say yes and no.

Yes in a sense that, of course, the African continent has so many languages, tribes, and all those things. If I come to Zambia, I come from a tribe of the Tongas, and these are the farmers, the healers. You know, they are the ones who are seen to be providers, more like food providers and all those things. So culturally, yes, some cultures really push the woman to be out there. Like in the Tonga land, women are the ones who are seen to be workers and the men would, like, really sit back and they will marry five women, and the women will be farming and they’ll be producing food and all this. So women are seen to be assets in a sense that they are the ones who are going to come and work to provide for the family. So, yes, in that way women are seen now to push themselves to be seen as workers to lead, to be able to provide for the family, and all those things. But when you come—you bring that kind of culture back to the city, these are the women who want to achieve. They want to achieve higher grades in school. They want to be seen to be doing better than the men and all those things. So, yes, culturally I think that thing is there.

But because of a mixture of culture, there’s now so many culture mixing here and there, there are so many different beliefs and different upbringing that have sort of, like, diluted how people value things, how they value marriage. I want to say this because I’ve mentioned that you know, women don’t want to come out because they want to be married and all those things. But then, also, I would want to say that I think you know, the way people are brought up, the values that they are—are instilled in them as they are growing, also sort of like affects how they think, you know, and what they pursue. Yeah.

SARAH ZAAIMI: I want to explore that point a bit further about what values and what education do we instigate in women and plant in women that seed of empowerment and self-reliance. And I know, Rebecca, you care a lot about training, about education, about advocacy. How can we empower women to play that role through effective education? And are there any case studies or anything you care to share with us from the success stories that you’ve been—you’ve been living or implementing around you?

REBECCA HARRISON: Yeah. And I’m ambivalent on this one because I agree with you, Anita; women are empowered already. We have power and we’re doing—we’re doing it. We’re building businesses across the continent. And sometimes I feel conflicted about this. I feel like as an ecosystem we’ve responded to what’s essentially a problem with the system by telling women to be more confident, right? Like, sometimes I’m like, well, actually, women are just quite accurate at describing their business success.

So if we look, for example—when I look at the data from our businesses and we disaggregate by gender, we see that women are really good at describing accurately the performance of their business. When we ask them, you know, a few months later, how is your business doing; have you increased revenue, profit, whatever; what they tell us matches up with what we see the actual—has happened in the business. Men, on the other hand—(laughter)—consistently overestimate how well their business is doing. They always tell us their business is growing, they’re making a profit, they’re doing so well. Then we look at the numbers and we’re, like, well, some of you are, you know.

And so—and we are guilty of this as well. Not guilty. I mean, it is a real thing that we need to encourage women to take up space and to own their voice and particularly in some countries. So we have a—we have a program called Speak Up To Lead, which we often run—we don’t—we try not to run too many programs that separate out women and men because networks are so important.

But we sometimes give women—we offer women on a program this extra module on kind of finding voice and agency and speaking up to lead. But I have to say I have this ambivalence because at the same time I’m, like, you know, rather than telling women to be more confident sometimes I’m, like, men should just be more accurate. Maybe that would stop things.

SARAH ZAAIMI: Is it maybe a marketing skill that they need to present their work better to the world?

REBECCA HARRISON: Yeah. I mean, I think that there’s something in it and for sure, like, I think, you know, many women do need to be bolder at times about telling our stories. But again, like, when you look at the data on raising capital male VCs consistently ask women about risk mitigation strategies and they asked men about opportunity.

So no matter how good you are at being bold and telling your story if the system is consistently kind of asking you the wrong questions I mean, yeah, we need to get really smart about navigating that. But, yeah, I just—I really resonate with your point about kind of over mentored and underfunded, I think.

As much as we need to encourage women to get out there and own our stories, really, the system’s got to shift for us as well, I think.

SARAH ZAAIMI: On the point of over mentor them—I’m turning to you, Anita—also maybe accessing funds and capital has to do with access to networks and sometimes what’s lacking is that one contact that you meet, the someone who is willing to take the risk with you, and so what—how can we make women have more access to those networks where capital resides?

And how can women empower women and help them get that access instead of having an ecosystem where women are competing with women because there is so little capital that everyone is just preying on that 8 percent?

ANITA ERSKINE: Listen, I think women compete with women because women are told there’s only two seats in the room and half the time you really don’t want to bring the other person or the other woman who’s as good as you. Then you don’t become the first.

I love awards. I love recognition. But sometimes I think that women are made to believe and think that there can only be one winner and there can only be—you know, and you want to be the first woman to be the oil magnate. You want to be the first woman to be the diamond magnate. You want to be the first woman to tell—you know, and so the entire space is filled with you must compete for this one spot.

But if there’s a second spot do not bring someone who is as good or better than you because then you won’t be the first, and that’s the bottom line. So I feel that women are in this space. We are in the—look at us. We are here. We are in this space. And then, of course, women don’t ask each other what’s your name and what are you into and how can we—and how can we interact, how can we work together.

You know, women always wait to be asked, oh, what’s your name and half the time, you know, because we don’t have the confidence to walk across the room because the room is so cold, you know, we kind of wait and hope that someone will ask us the necessary question and with that question we can give them the right answer and with that right answer it can open a door.

But having said that, I see a shift and that’s why I love the new generation of women. The new generation of women don’t even wait to be invited. They ask and say, I am coming to. You know, the new generation of women will hop on a flight and will travel across the world because there’s something essential happening on the other side of the world.

And so access to that capital is in the rooms that we find too cold to enter and access to capital is in breaking that essence that there can only be two of us. For me, every single time I’m invited somewhere, I mean, I am known to be the S-H-I-T disturber who will always say, hey, can I have five more invitations because there are five young women who are in my program that I would love to be in the room.

We didn’t get taught how to speak in these kind of rooms. We had to discover it the hard way. And, Betty, you said it. I mean, then they say, oh, Anita, you talk too much. Oh, this one is too wild. Oh, this one is too this. Oh, you know what, she’s too aggressive.

You know, but it’s not that. It’s the self-assurance. It’s the self-knowledge. It’s the self-empowerment. It’s the self-inspiration with which I walk.

And so you have this generation of women, and so if you want to break that concept of being in the room, accessing capital and all of that then you mustn’t have a room filled with fifty-something-year-old women. You must have a room fairly balanced with fifty-something-year-old, thirty-something-year-old, twenty-something-year-old, and perhaps sometimes even late teenagers to understand how you do it, how do you move in the room, how do you shake it, how do you, you know, be so concerned that one person is Caucasian, another person is Indian.

Who cares? You know, so the perception that we can’t—you know, one, we can’t all win is absolutely wrong. Then the perception that, oh, well, if one person wins it means next year there can’t be another female winner is another wrong thing.

But it happened to us. Let us not let it happen to the generation of women that are coming.

Did I even answer the question?

SARAH ZAAIMI: Oh, yeah. You did answer exhaustively the question. Thank you for your inspirational words.

I hope that a lot of women and a lot of allies and a lot of people working on Africa would hear this message and it will resonate with them.

I’m moving again to you, Betty, to maybe talk about solutions. I think we entangled enough the challenges and the landscape itself. If we move to actionable things let’s start by government policies.

What needs to be changed, reformed? I come from Morocco and I know in the 1990s there was that quota—women quota system that really elevated women representation in the parliament by, you know, instigating a 35 percent representation in women.

There are other things that could be done in the continent. You spoke about family and about perception and culture, maybe reforming family codes and giving more margins to women could be helpful. Maybe also gender-sensitive budgeting or maybe even removing taxation on some of the startups that are women led.

What are other things that you think from your experience from the concrete challenges that you are facing every day should be made at the government level?

BETTY BEENZU CHILONDE: Thank you so much, Sarah.

I think mentorship is one thing that can work to help women be elevated. I say mentorship because, you know, just like Anita has said whenever there’s an event there needs to be a balance, OK, and this balance sort of, like, creates an opportunity for the younger generation to learn from those who have already done it before.

And I think what the government needs to do—I know back home the government has made intentional provisions for women to be in politics—for example, a certain percentage to be also, like, in parliament and all those things.

But I think when it comes to women entrepreneurship and business and all that I think maybe what other incentives that can be there really is to allow the woman to be a woman. I say that because, you know, we cannot be the same as men.

I know there’s gender equality, all those things, you know. But let the woman be the woman and when I say that, really, I mean let the woman experience being a mother, for example. Give her enough rest when she needs it. OK. When they have babies do you give them enough time for them to recover and then come back to work?

Because when you look at the work landscape you find that maybe the leave for the woman is thirty days or forty—or forty days, same as the man. But you need the woman to recover. You need her to take care of the child and come back to the same opportunities and be able to be at the same level with the men, because biologically the woman is different.

So I think that needs to be recognized. And also by virtue of having a woman obviously she needs more time. You find that certain opportunities she’s not able to take—she’s not able to take those opportunities because of maybe, you know, biological clock and things like that. So I think those things need to be considered and she needs to be given, you know, equal opportunity and, you know, be able to be who she is and still continue pursuing careers and entrepreneurship.

SARAH ZAAIMI: So it’s gender-sensitive laws and allowing women to be women.

If we turn to the international community—and I know here there are many agencies and organizations and even investors among us here in the audience and people listening to us online as well—Rebecca, what would be the incentives or the actions that these allies internationally could do to lend a hand to empower and advance women leadership in the continent?

REBECCA HARRISON: Yeah. I mean, I think it’s about bringing a gender lens across the board and kind of asking those questions about participation of women across programming. So whether that’s around kind of finance allocation where, you know, there’s pros and cons against kind of—for and against quotas, but at least like taking a really intentional view; looking at design, ensuring that kind of gender lens is built into design; that products and solutions, that we’re taking a kind of human-sensitive design approach with women at the center, actually designing for the needs of women; and then ensuring that we’re elevating women’s voices within that programming so women are actually making decisions. And the more that we have women in positions of power and influence, the more I think we’ll see that kind of, you know, trickle down throughout kind of different components of programming.

SARAH ZAAIMI: Thank you, ladies. I also wanted to thank you for the insightful case studies and testimonies and voices that you lended to this discussion.

I also wanted to give the floor to the audience here if they have any questions, comments, additions to this discussion. So we could—and then I’ll turn back to you to answer.

Q: Hi, thank you so much, ladies. This has been a very insightful conversation. My name, again, is Joy LeFour with the Valcrest Institute.

And my question, any of the panelists can take it, but I have followed Rebecca Harrison for years and I really salute your work. And all the other ladies here, thank you so much for the insights shared.

Now, in the context of advancing women leadership in Africa, can any of you tell me, how can we leverage public—the partnership between the private sector and the public sector to create a sustainable opportunity to support systems for women in Africa, and especially in the rural areas?

ANITA ERSKINE: Do you want to take that?

SARAH ZAAIMI: Any other questions before we answer, our comments?

Q: Hi. I’m Audra Killian and I’m with DAI. And so thank you so much for the insightful responses for the—to the panel.

And I think one of the things that’s clear from the panel is the amount of female entrepreneurs across the continent. I was wondering if the female leadership in the private sector has been translating to the public sector and to politics and government, not necessarily just at the high level but also at kind of like the public-facing roles? So with civil servants, at the ministry level, just because not everybody can be President Sirleaf. So I’m just wondering about has there also been, like, a gradual growth of women leaders in politics and governance. Thank you.

SARAH ZAAIMI: Anyone else before we answer? No?

OK, any one of you want to take those?

ANITA ERSKINE: I can start from the first and then come to the second.

So I think it is Rwanda that has an increasing amount of women in—

REBECCA HARRISON: Parliament.

SARAH ZAAIMI: Fifty percent. Yeah. Yeah.

ANITA ERSKINE: Fifty percent, yeah?… Sixty-one [percent]? It’s 61 [percent]? Yes. So then my automatic answer would be yes. And even when I look at back home in Ghana, every four years when we have the presidential elections and for members of parliament you see more women actively participating in wanting to be in those various rooms, so to speak. So, yes, you can see the increase.

And I think that gradually we’re being able to debunk or break down the fears and the concept that to be a woman in politics you’ve got to be the female version of Arnold Schwarzenegger. And you know, so making it a little bit more attractive for women, but also realizing that the more we wait for, you know, certain decisions to be made on our behalf, the more regression that we encounter. So I’m seeing that a lot.

And in terms of the first question about, I guess, the interface between public and private, let me just talk from the perspective of girls’ education and banning early marriage as an example, because leadership doesn’t just happen when you are born. Leadership is actually the result of where you come from, how you are brought up, who leads you, what are you protected by. And I see that a lot more African countries are beginning to fight against, for example, early marriage. A lot more are beginning to look at helping girls pursue careers in STEM because that’s where the leadership eventually comes from.

So, of course, as I said before, I don’t have the numbers in front of me, but I know even in the space that I work in in STEM or in communications or the media or across other industries that there’s a lot more government policies and conversations, you know, at the parliament level about how to get more girls educated. In Ghana we’ve got the Free SHS, which means that more girls automatically are able to go, you know, to school. But that doesn’t mean that girls don’t go to school where there is poor sanitation facilities, which eventually kind of kicks them out. So I see that increasingly we’re all becoming very conscious of how to make sure and ensure that the ecosystem, so to speak, is favorable, you know, for girls.

REBECCA HARRISON: Can I just add something on the public-private partnership? And thank you so much for the shout-out.

But we’ve—we stumbled upon a super interesting model for public-private partnership recently, which is leadership incubators. So we’ve been running a program on agricultural transformation with a partner, AGRA, where we bring together leaders at fairly senior level from public, private, and civil society and put them through a pretty intensive kind of transformational leadership experience. And what’s been so exciting and unexpected about this is how individuals connecting with individuals drives change so quickly. I mean, it’s obvious, right, but just to see this happen so quickly.

So, for example, we saw—we have the delegates working together on kind of practical action-learning projects, right? And so one project in Tanzania, we had a female entrepreneur who’s one of the leading entrepreneurs in the poultry sector in Tanzania in a group with a policymaker in the agricultural ministry, and they together worked to change Tanzania’s poultry policy just through, like a leadership project. And it really—and you know, I know that it’s ag, it’s a little bit off topic, but it really got me thinking about, you know, could we make this happen for gender? Could you get, you know, women from across public and private sector, civil society together in a really transformational leadership experience? What might that kind of generate? Could we do it for climate? So if any funders out there, you know, who want to collaborate on this—but, no, seriously, I think it’s a super exciting kind of idea to explore. If anyone, you know, wants to kind of co-create on that, would love to.

SARAH ZAAIMI: One more question and then we could turn to our guests with some closing remarks. We have under one minute.

Q: Thank you. I am Sarah from Zimbabwe. I just wanted to appreciate the panel. I enjoyed everything that you said.

I am just wondering at the top of my head if maybe you could comment on the role of men in supporting women’s leadership, because I’m thinking that we are fighting this battle because of mostly the patriarchal systems that we have. And maybe the battle is harder because some of the men are pushing back. So I feel that maybe if we don’t have them on our side or at least allowing us space, it’s going to take some time for us to be fifty-fifty at the table, be it in government, be it in the private sector, be it in the academia. So I’m just thinking, what are your thoughts on that? Thank you.

SARAH ZAAIMI: Thank you so much. I’m turning to you, Betty, if you could quickly maybe answer and also give any last remarks.

BETTY BEENZU CHILONDE: Yeah, thank you so much. I think that’s very important what you have just brought up, because as much as we talk about these things I think it’s very important for men to accept and want to support women.

What I have noticed is that men who are—who are, like, living in the diaspora are more willing to assist the women back home with home duties and also make—understanding that the women have to work and then they have to also take part in, you know, providing for the family in that sense. But when it’s back in Africa, it’s a very different story. You find that the men are not willing to assist the woman. So that becomes very, very difficult for the—for the woman.

And that actually brings out the fact that men are actually pushing back. And as much as they are talking about it on the political level and all those things, they are not willing at a personal level to accept and support the woman. So the woman has double work. They have to work, and also they have to work in the other sense. So I think it starts from accepting that the men have to accept to want to support the woman and be able to offload some of the duties that the woman is going through to be able to, you know, uplift the woman.

SARAH ZAAIMI: Any very, very last words before we close? I think we ran out of time.

ANITA ERSKINE: Oh, my husband absolutely loves the fact that I’m who I am. But, no, I mean, that’s why I said initially there’s two sides to everything. I married someone who absolutely loves the fact that I get to travel around the world and who is at home right now taking care of the kids. My daughter was unwell yesterday. He’s happy to give her her Benylin, you know what I mean? So I think there’s the other—there is the other kind of—you know, we don’t even have time to talk about the kind of man you should marry.

But just to finish off, I think that if there are women who have the money—we talked about women not being funded. Fund a women-owned business or a woman-owned business. What stops you from putting money into a woman-owned business? I think that’s a thing that is key. Two, stop trying to be the only woman in the room. And, three, gender equality doesn’t mean you get to do what the man does or, you know—you know, they say sometimes what a man can do a woman can do better. I disagree. I think women are good at doing exceptional things, some things, and women cannot do other things. Same thing with men. So if you pursue your career, pursue your dreams, pursue ambition, pursue it from the perspective of being the best woman you can, not the best woman that is better than the man in the room. And I think that’s how, then, you are able to also get the—to get the men to support.

SARAH ZAAIMI: Thank you. Thank you.

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Ukraine’s AI road map seeks to balance innovation and security

Mykhailo Fedorov — Tue, 12 Dec 2023 21:37:02 +0000

As the world grapples with the implications of rapidly evolving Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, Ukraine has recently presented a national road map for AI regulation that seeks to balance the core values of innovation and security.

Businesses all over the world are currently racing to integrate AI into their products and services. This process will help define the future of the tech sector and will shape economic development across borders.

It is already clear that AI will allow us all to harness incredible technological advances for the benefit of humanity as a whole. But if left unregulated and uncontrolled, AI poses a range of serious risks in areas including identity theft and the dissemination of fake information on an unprecedented scale.

One of the key objectives facing all governments today is to maximize the positive impact of AI while minimizing any unethical use by both developers and users, amid mounting concerns over cyber security and other potential abuses. Clearly, this exciting new technological frontier must be regulated that ensure the safety of individuals, businesses, and states.

Some governments are looking to adopt AI policies that minimize any potential intervention while supporting business; others are attempting to prioritize the protection of human rights. Ukraine is working to strike a balance between these strategic priorities.

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As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Today, Ukraine is among the world’s leading AI innovators. There are more than 60 Ukrainian tech companies registered as active in the field of artificial intelligence, but this is by no means an exhaustive list. Throughout Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector, a large and growing number of companies are developing products and applications involving AI.

The present objective of the Ukrainian authorities is to support this growth and avoid over-regulation of AI. We recognize that the rapid adoption of regulations is always risky when applied to fast-moving innovative fields, and prefer instead to adopt a soft approach that takes the interests of businesses into account. Our strategy is to implement regulation through a bottom-up approach that will begin by preparing businesses for future regulation, before then moving to the implementation stage.

During the first phase, which is set to last two to three years, the Ukrainian authorities will assist companies in developing a culture of self-regulation that will enable them to control the ethics of their AI systems independently. Practical tools will be provided to help businesses adapt their AI-based products in line with future Ukrainian and European legislative requirements. These tools will make it possible to carry out voluntary risk assessment of AI products, which will help businesses identify any areas that need improvement or review.

Ukraine also plans to create a product development environment overseen by the government and involving expert assistance. The aim is to allow companies to develop and test AI products for compliance with future legislation. Additionally, a range of recommendations will be created to provide stakeholders with practical guidelines for how to design, develop, and use AI ethically and responsibly before any legally binding regulations come into force.

For those businesses willing to do more during the initial self-regulation phase, the Ukrainian authorities will prepare voluntary codes of conduct. Stakeholders will also be issued a policy overview providing them with a clear understanding of the government’s approach to AI regulation and clarifying what they can expect in the future.

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During the initial phase, the Ukrainian government’s role is not to regulate AI usage, but to help Ukrainian businesses prepare for inevitable future AI regulation. At present, fostering a sense of business responsibility is the priority, with no mandatory requirements or penalties. Instead, the focus is on voluntary commitments, practical tools, and an open dialogue between government and businesses.

The next step will be the formation of national AI legislation in line with the European Union’s AI Act. The bottom-up process chosen by Ukraine is designed to create a smooth transition period and guarantee effective integration.

The resulting Ukrainian AI regulations should ensure the highest levels of human rights protection. While the development of new technologies is by nature an extremely unpredictable process for both businesses and governments, personal safety and security remain the top priority.

At the same time, the Ukrainian approach to AI regulation is also designed to be business-friendly and should help fuel further innovation in Ukraine. By aligning the Ukrainian regulatory framework with EU legislation, Ukrainian tech companies will be able to enter European markets with ease.

AI regulation is a global issue that impacts every country. It is not merely a matter of protections or restrictions, but of creating the right environment for safe innovation. Ukraine’s AI regulation strategy aims to minimize the risk of abuses while making sure the country’s tech sector can make the most of this game-changing technology.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for Innovations and Development of Education, Science, and Technologies, and Minister of Digital Transformation.

The United States faces an increasingly challenging international security environment with ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. Tensions are also rising across the Taiwan Strait. With Xi Jinping charging his military to give him the ability to invade Taiwan by 2027, US and allied defense strategists are rightly concerned about a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, while an invasion poses the greatest threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty, a naval blockade might be the most viable option for China.

In this installment of the Atlantic Council Strategy Papers Series, 2022-2023 Senior US Navy Fellow Marek Jestrab articulates a vision to prevent and, if needed, defeat a maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. This strategy paper demonstrates that a maritime blockade is the most strategically viable action for the PRC, that Taiwan is uniquely vulnerable to a blockade, and that a blockade is both a present and enduring challenge. The author presents specific actions for Taiwan, the United States, and like-minded nations with the goal of deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating a PRC blockade of Taiwan.

The only predictable element of warfare is that it is inherently unpredictable; a near-singular focus on a Chinese invasion by force risks catching the Taiwanese, US, and likeminded militaries unprepared in the event of a non-kinetic naval blockade.
Stephen J. Hadley, 20th National Security Advisor

Executive summary

Blockade: The most strategically viable option for the PRC

The People’s Republic of China’s intention to unify Taiwan with the mainland is clear. Leveraging decades of sustained military modernization, the PRC possesses the capability and regional overmatch of maritime capacity required to execute a blockade of Taiwan. The specific actions that the PRC could execute will be discussed as part of this paper, but the term “blockade” in the context of this strategy refers to the PRC using coercive actions to prevent merchant shipping from having freedom of navigation in the waters surrounding Taiwan, and sealing off Taiwan’s seaports to prevent merchant shipping from being able to enter or exit the island.

A blockade is the most likely and dangerous scenario, due to Taiwan’s reliance on maritime trade to sustain its economic prosperity. Moreover, a nonkinetic blockade is appealing to the PRC, as it is the lowest level of coercive action that could remain below the threshold of open hostilities and still achieve its national objectives. The PRC’s maritime threat would be a coercive act, designed to instill fear in the Taiwanese population and the merchant shipping industry.

The PRC views the existence of Taiwan as a direct threat to its national sovereignty. Because of these perceived threats, the strategic plans of the PRC call for resolution of the “Taiwan question” before China is able to achieve its desired “national rejuvenation” by 2049. To accomplish this goal, the PRC refuses to renounce the use of force to compel unification of Taiwan with the mainland.

Additionally, the Russia-Ukraine war has made clear that unprovoked invasions of neighboring countries are simple for the world population to understand, and for leaders to rally against. Unlike an invasion, a blockade does not present the same strategic-messaging flaws. Moreover, the PRC’s military strategy indicates an openness to blockades and other uses of “restraint warfare,” which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defines as seeking to avoid war first through military preparedness and powerful conventional and strategic forces that act in concert with political and diplomatic efforts to “subdue enemy’s forces without fighting.”¹

All these factors point to a maritime blockade of Taiwan as the PRC’s most strategically viable option. Therefore, what is required is a strategy specifically tailored to deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating a PRC maritime blockade of Taiwan. The major elements of this strategy include Taiwan investing in capabilities that help demonstrate the resilience to resist, the United States maintaining the capability to sustain Taiwan in the face of a blockade, and like-minded nations providing enabling capabilities and additional maritime capacity.

The focus of this paper is on a nonkinetic blockade, but it is worth noting that there are multiple scenarios in which the PRC could utilize maritime advantages in its attempt to unify Taiwan with the mainland. A fundamental challenge of these actions is that the PRC can dynamically scale the operations based on evolving conditions.

Potential blockade scenarios

Kinetic blockade: Focusing effort only on the maritime domain, and the merchant shipping that is vital to sustaining Taiwan’s economic activity, the PRC could attack to sink or disable any merchant ship transiting to Taiwan—clearly constituting an act or acts of war. A coalition response would utilize the same forces that would be vital to countering an invasion scenario and PRC maritime forces. These include long-range precision fires from land-based missile batteries, standoff attacks by aircraft and surface ships, and undersea attacks from submarines. Comprehensive missile-defeat capabilities in the space, cyber, and electronic-warfare domains would also need to be employed to assist in the survivability of merchant shipping.
Nonkinetic blockade: In this scenario, which is the focus of this paper, the PRC would use advantages of mass—enabled by having the world’s largest navy and coast guard, and a government-funded and government-controlled maritime militia—to prevent merchant shipping from entering ports in Taiwan. The PRC has used these tactics on a smaller scale in disputed maritime areas in the South China Sea.
Sporadic and tailored blockade: Utilizing some combination of the kinetic and nonkinetic actions described in this paper, the PRC could slowly erode Taiwan’s will to resist and that of like-minded nations. The PRC could conduct this effort over a longer period that is deliberately unpredictable. The merchant-shipping industry might evaluate the waters around Taiwan as unsafe and disputed, in turn causing insurance-premium increases that prevent the business case for continuing to sail merchant ships to and from Taiwan’s maritime ports.
Embargo/quarantine: The PRC could utilize its maritime forces to attempt to enforce an “embargo” that would prevent certain products from entering Taiwan. The PRC would leverage its success at shutting out Taiwan from international organizations, claiming the action as a “domestic matter” and no concern of the international community. Utilizing the world’s largest coast guard, the PRC would inspect merchant ships transiting to Taiwan or force them to divert to the mainland.

While there is no consensus on a perfect term to describe the possible coercive actions that the PRC could employ in the maritime domain, “blockade” is utilized in this paper as it is the best available and most wildly understood term.²

This paper puts forth a strategy to prevent and, if needed, defeat a PRC blockade of Taiwan. This is consistent with the US government’s existing One China Policy, with a legal basis grounded in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the US-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1978, and 1982, and President Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan of 1982.³

What is required is a strategy specifically tailored to deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating a PRC maritime blockade of Taiwan.
Commander Marek Jestrab, Academic Year 2022-23 Senior US Navy Fellow

Taiwan’s unique vulnerability to blockade

The PRC today possesses the maritime force structure needed for regional overmatch in a blockade scenario. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) commands the world’s largest navy, the world’s largest coast guard, and a massive government-subsidized maritime militia. From 2005 to 2022, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has added 135 ships to its inventory, while in the same period the US Navy added just two.⁴

Located only one hundred nautical miles from mainland China, Taiwan is uniquely vulnerable to a blockade. Taiwan’s dependence on maritime trade is evidenced by the imbalance of its gross domestic product (GDP) in relation to its port activity: Taiwan is the world’s twenty-first largest economy by GDP, yet requires the world’s sixth greatest number of port calls by container ships to sustain this level of economic activity. Taiwan’s largest vulnerability is its energy sector, as it relies on maritime trade to import nearly 98 percent of its energy.

PRC coercive actions in a maritime blockade of Taiwan

A PRC nonkinetic blockade of Taiwan would consist of a series of coercive actions that are uniquely scalable, and even reversible if the CCP does not believe they will be successful at that time. The goal of these coercive actions would be to create fear of maritime shipping and urge the Taiwan population to force negotiations in which the PRC has maximum leverage over Taiwan. A nonkinetic blockade by the PRC would likely include:

Strategic messaging to warn countries against interfering in an “internal dispute”;
Clearly visible maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and military aircraft presence;
People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) swarming and ramming merchant shipping;
Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) harassing and attempting “law-enforcement” interdictions;
PLAN ships acting as barriers to transit and clearly visible live-fire exercises;
Offensive cyberattacks on government organizations and financial institutions;
Severing or holding at risk undersea cables that connect Taiwan to the world;
Missile exercises from mainland China that land in the waters surrounding Taiwan;
Clearly visible deployment of sea mines; and
Limited covert and deniable submarine attacks on merchant shipping.

Counter-blockade response by Taiwan and the United States

A coalition response coordinated among Taiwan, the United States, and like–minded nations would be needed to restore deterrence. The desired end state would demonstrate the ability to sustain Taiwan’s economy indefinitely in the face of a PRC blockade. Senior leaders of the coalition would likely seek response options that manage the horizontal and vertical escalation of the conflict. Counter blockade actions by Taiwan, the United States, and like-minded nations would likely include:

Condemnation through coordinated strategic messaging, with a focus on the harm caused by the PRC’s actions to the global economy;
Taiwan demonstrating resilience and a will to resist, through implementing resource-rationing programs and reserve-force mobilization;
Targeted sanctions against the PRC that limit its access to global financial markets and critical technology;
Maritime ISR being continuously deployed to document the PRC’s actions;
Reflagging of merchant shipping to coalition national flags that the PRC would be hesitant to attack;
Escort of merchant shipping through the PRC forces by coalition naval warships;
Mine countermeasure forces identifying minefields for merchant shipping to avoid; and
Defensive cyber operations.

Actions to defeat the fear and coercion of a PRC Blockade

Deterring the PRC from even attempting a blockade requires a strategy that communicates to the PRC that its attempted coercive act would fail and prove to be a grave miscalculation. To communicate this message, an international coalition is required that can demonstrate the capability, ability, and will to sustain Taiwan’s economy indefinitely if it were confronted with a blockade. Implementing this strategy would require that:

Taiwan demonstrate the resilience to resist;
The United States demonstrate the capability to respond; and
Like-minded nations demonstrate enabling capabilities and maritime capacity.

To read the full strategy paper, download the PDF.

Strategy Paper Editorial board

Executive editors

Frederick Kempe
Alexander V. Mirtchev

Editor-in-chief

Matthew Kroenig

Managing Editor

Andrew A. Michta

Editorial board members

James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

Lead author

Fellow

Marek Jestrab

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Indo-Pacific

This strategy paper contains the author’s personal views, and do not represent official positions of the US Navy or Department of Defense.

The author would like to thank Matthew Kroenig, Clementine Starling, Markus Garlauskas, Joseph Webster, and Kitsch Liao for their review and feedback. The author would also like to thank Julia Siegel and Shreya Lad for their editing and administrative support.

With a Foreword by

Board director

Stephen J. Hadley

Chairman, International Advisory Board

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

1 “2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” US Department of Defense (DOD), October 19, 202, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

2 Bradley Martin et al., “Implications of a Coercive Quarantine of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China,” RAND Corp., 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1279-1.html.

3 Susan V. Lawrence and Caitlin Campbell, “Taiwan: Political and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service, April 26, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275.

4 Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, May 15, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/267.

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2023 review: Ukraine scores key victories in the Battle of the Black Sea

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Tue, 05 Dec 2023 17:14:45 +0000

Speaking at his annual Valdai meeting in October 2023, Vladimir Putin confidently declared that Ukrainian Black Sea port Odesa is “certainly a Russian city.” The Kremlin dictator has long been notorious for such casual denials of Ukrainian statehood, but on this occasion he could not have been more mistaken. While Odesa has a rich legacy of ties to the Russian and Soviet imperial past, Putin’s full-scale invasion has turned the city decisively away from Moscow and cemented its status as the southern capital of an independent Ukraine.

When Russia first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Odesa was one of the Kremlin’s key objectives. Capturing the Ukrainian port city would have allowed Moscow to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea entirely and force the newly landlocked country to accept defeat. However, the invading Russians found their path toward Odesa blocked by the Ukrainian army at Mykolaiv. Meanwhile, Odesa residents rallied to prepare the defenses of the city, fortifying beaches and coastal areas to prevent the Russian navy from attempting any amphibious landings.

Instead of becoming the jewel in the crown of Putin’s new Ukrainian empire, Odesa has now emerged as the hub of Ukraine’s increasingly successful military campaign to win the Battle of the Black Sea. This process has been underway since the early weeks of the war. The first stage involved pushing Russian warships away from Ukraine’s territorial waters close to Odesa, beginning with the April 2022 sinking the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, the Moskva.

Two months later, Ukraine liberated Snake Island, a strategically important Black Sea outpost located some 120 kilometers southwest of Odesa. By midsummer 2022, Ukrainian forces were carrying out air strikes on targets in Russian-occupied Crimea with increasingly regularity. As the largest city in southern Ukraine and the headquarters of the Ukrainian navy, Odesa was at the heart of these efforts.

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The Battle of the Black Sea has escalated significantly during 2023. While international attention has focused on the largely static front lines of the Russian invasion in southern and eastern Ukraine, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has been pushed out of the northwestern Black Sea, with most Russian warships retreating in recent months from their traditional home port of Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea.

This success has proven possible thanks to a combination of daring Ukrainian commando raids and surgical strikes against Russian air defenses, logistical hubs, and shipping. Ukraine has used innovative new naval drones and Western-supplied missiles to damage or destroy a growing list of Russian vessels and hit key targets including the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Satellite footage and international media reports in early October 2023 confirmed that the bulk of the Russian Black Sea Fleet had been withdrawn from Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports.

While it is far too early for Ukraine to declare victory in the Battle of the Black Sea, the successes achieved in the past year are arguably no less significant in terms of their impact on the wider war than the liberation of Kharkiv region and Kherson in the final months of 2022. In addition to forcing Putin’s fleet to retreat, Ukraine’s attacks on Russian-occupied Crimea have also significantly weakened the logistical networks that are essential for the resupply of the Russian army in southern Ukraine.

Crucially, Ukraine has also been able to ease the blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports. Russia began blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea coast on the eve of the full-scale invasion. This blockade was partially lifted by a UN-brokered Grain Deal in July 2022, but Russia was soon attempting to leverage its continued participation in the agreement to blackmail the international community. It came as no surprise when Putin officially confirmed Russia’s withdrawal in summer 2023, leaving the future of Ukraine’s maritime trade in doubt.

Ukraine responded to this latest setback by unilaterally announcing the establishment of a new humanitarian maritime corridor for merchant vessels sailing to and from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. This would have been unthinkable in the first months of the Russian invasion, but Ukrainian progress in the Black Sea region during summer 2023 meant a new corridor was a realistic possibility. By early December 2023, more than 200 ships had passed through Ukraine’s Black Sea humanitarian corridor, carrying over seven million tons of grains, metals, and other cargo.

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The reopening of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports creates a vital lifeline for the country’s battered wartime economy. While current monthly cargo volumes remain well below prewar averages, the steady flow of merchant shipping is providing a very welcome boost to Ukrainian GDP and bringing in billions of dollars in taxes. It is also reinvigorating the business climate in port cities including Odesa, providing work for local residents in a range of industries.

Ukraine’s progress on the Black Sea front of the war with Russia cannot be taken for granted. Despite suffering a string of naval setbacks, Russia retains the ability to attack shipping and strike Ukraine’s ports. Odesa has been bombed repeatedly since summer 2023, with attacks targeting the city’s port facilities along with the UNESCO-listed historic downtown area.

In order to win the Battle of the Black Sea, Ukraine needs to receive further support from the country’s partners. The most urgent requirement is additional air defense systems to guard Ukraine’s port infrastructure and territorial waters. Cities like Odesa much be protected if maritime trade is to continue. Longer range missiles are also needed to deter Russian warships. At sea, existing international efforts to clear the Black Sea of Russian mines are very welcome but should be significantly expanded.

Another critical factor is maritime insurance. A number of initiatives have already been launched to provide insurance coverage for cargo vessels serving Ukraine’s southern ports, but high rates remain an obstacle. While the Ukrainian authorities are attempting to address this problem, the country’s Western allies could potentially take steps to inspire far greater confidence among global insurance providers.

Keeping Ukraine’s ports open for business makes sense economically for Ukraine’s partners. It will save them money in the long run by reducing the financial burden of meeting Kyiv’s budgetary shortfalls as the war with Russia grinds on. More importantly, it also represents a significant step toward victory in the Battle of the Black Sea, which would bring Ukraine closer to defeating Russia’s invasion.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Working with Clinton and with Reema Nanavaty, director of the nearly three-million-member Self-Employed Women’s Association, the Atlantic Council has been implementing a parametric insurance program as a part of Arsht-Rock’s Extreme Heat Protection Initiative. This program protects women working in India’s informal sector from having to make an impossible choice: pausing their work during heat waves (to protect their health) or continuing to work and earn money, while putting their wellbeing at risk.

What has been winning the headlines here so far at this twenty-eighth United Nations Climate Change Conference has been the announcement on the first day of a landmark, $400-milllion loss and damage fund, a mechanism that provides financial assistance to the countries most affected by, but often least responsible for, the climate crisis. There has also been media attention on the hydrocarbon companies that have come to this conference in greater numbers than ever before—many with concrete commitments and plans to reduce emissions.

With over seventy thousand delegates and observers at COP28, actions that aim to improve lives—such as insurance programs to support workers in the informal economy, many of them women—deserve notice. For these workers especially, “their lives and livelihoods are at stake,” said Eleni Myrivili, the global chief heat officer for United Nations-Habitat and Arsht-Rock.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Nusairat join CNN to discuss the situation in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Sun, 03 Dec 2023 17:02:13 +0000

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Advancing US-Colombia cooperation on drug policy and law enforcement

Atlantic Council US-Colombia Advisory Group — Thu, 30 Nov 2023 13:00:00 +0000

A report by the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Advisory Group; honorary co-chaired by Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) and Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN)

With Geoff Ramsey and Isabel Chiriboga

Download Pdf

Executive summary

On September 7, 2023, the Petro administration presented a new strategy to combat the illicit drug trade in Colombia—at a time when illicit coca cultivation is at an all-time high. The strategy’s emphasis on rural development and on offering viable economic alternatives for illicit crop growers, as well as changing counternarcotics priorities in Washington, provide a set of new opportunities for US-Colombia collaboration.

The United States and Colombia have a thirty-year track record of collaboration on this issue. Yet there is still a long road ahead, especially considering the growing concerns over the proliferation of organized crime in Colombia and the region writ large. In this context, progress on US-Colombia counternarcotics cooperation will require a delicate balance between reducing large-scale coca cultivation and building the capacity of security services to disrupt organized criminal networks, as well as investing in the rural communities most affected by this phenomenon.

At the same time, there is a growing recognition in the United States that the illicit drug trade is a shared responsibility primarily fueled by demand. Consumption and price have remained stable in the United States in recent years. However, the current trend of falling coca leaf and cocaine prices in Colombia present a natural incentive for coca growers to find alternative forms of income, which could mean a higher rate of success for alternative development programs and crop-substitution efforts if combined with a comprehensive law enforcement strategy.

The United States and Colombia should continue to collaborate closely to address the problems arising from the supply and demand for illicit drugs in this global context. This is crucial considering the emergence of new drug markets in West Africa and Europe, as well as the connections of certain trafficking organizations to fentanyl production. These dynamics, as well as a lack of state presence and the absence of economic alternatives in many parts of rural Colombia, have created longstanding challenges for both countries. Moving forward, it is crucial that both nations align their strategies to make the most impactful use of US assistance. The recommendations presented here are meant to bolster the approach to a decades-old problem.

US-Colombia Advisory Group recommendations

1. Enhance international cooperation efforts to dismantle organized crime groups and bolster interdiction operations.

Under Colombian law, any individual arrested by a Colombian authority at sea must be presented to a judicial officer within forty-eight hours. In practice, this means that offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) must leave their station. During that time, there is a gap in maritime coverage. The United States can support Colombia by offering essential equipment and training to incorporate advanced technology into OPVs. This could involve leveraging video processing techniques to facilitate due process during apprehensions at sea, thus negating the need for the vessel to return to port, while ensuring the protection of the rights of the accused and full compliance with Colombian law.

2. Define precise and inclusive guidelines for the manual eradication of “industrial” plantations, while working to develop additional metrics to measure progress.

In replacing coca and other illicit crops with other industrial-scale agricultural yields, several factors should be considered. These include the type of industrial crops best suited for coca-growing areas, the presence of an external market for large-scale production, and the fulfilment of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards overseas so that these products can have a guaranteed market access. To comply with these requirements, the Colombian government should promote public and private alliances to produce industrial-scale crops with SPS standards approved.

3. Strengthen coordination efforts between national and local governance on rule of law and state presence in conflict-torn communities.

The Petro administration should enhance coordination efforts between the national government and local authorities. While the current drug and security strategies outline fundamental areas for progress, they can better incorporate perspectives from local government at the level of cities and municipalities. These include persistent budgetary concerns exacerbated by growing migration pressures and the need for greater coordination on the implementation of nationwide policies.

4. Expand and strengthen US-led capacity-building programs for the prevention and detection of money laundering and financial crimes, with a focused emphasis on cyber-based illicit transactions.

Certain sectors, including banking, gold mining, legal advisory, and real estate are particularly vulnerable to money laundering. To address this, Colombian law enforcement, military forces, and intelligence units should enhance existing partnerships with their US counterparts to significantly upscale training and capacity-building with an emphasis on cyber-based illicit transactions. Special attention should be given to small financial cooperatives and credit providers, which are at a higher risk of unwittingly facilitating illegal transactions.

5. Advance the implementation of a holistic bilateral counternarcotic agenda through a careful balance of effective drug policies.

The United States and Colombia should prioritize policies that will mitigate the escalating violence and security challenges Colombia faces. This includes enhanced cooperation efforts on real-time intelligence sharing on drug trafficking including routes, money laundering, and key individuals, and promoting advanced technologies for surveillance, interdiction, and data analytics to combat traffickers. Once the security situation is under control cooperation should focus on making those conditions sustainable through long-term social programs.

6. Work with affected communities to develop an environmentally sustainable approach to transition to legal crop cultivation while mitigating further environmental damage.

The United States could be a key partner in accompanying the Colombian government in shaping the preservation of the Amazon, as it will require restructuring a portion of Colombia’s debt to allocate the saved funds toward initiatives focused on forest preservation, sustainable land use, and community development. To achieve this, both countries can begin by collaborating on a detailed framework that outlines specific conservation targets and reforestation goals to then decide on the allocation of saved debt funds toward a combination of projects, particularly in areas with coca cultivation.

7. Advocate for the creation of a multilateral trust fund that can provide sustained funding for crop substitution and alternative development programs to curb the growing illicit drug-production trend.

Colombia’s new anti-drug strategy carries an estimated cost exceeding $21 billion over the next decade. To secure international support and incentivize donors to contribute to the long-term success of crop substitution and an alternative development program, we propose the establishment of a trust fund led by a recognized international financial institution. Given that the World Bank has a proven track record of efficiently mobilizing resources through trust funds,¹ it may be best suited to leverage its extensive convening power on both the international stage and within individual countries.

About the US-Colombia Advisory Group

Since its founding in 2017, the Advisory Group has been co-chaired by Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). This year, upon Senator Blunt’s retirement, Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) assumes the honorary chairmanship alongside Senator Cardin.

Senators Cardin and Hagerty are both members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where, in addition to other assignments, Senator Cardin serves as Chairman and Senator Hagerty as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on State Department & USAID Management, International Operations, & Bilateral International Development. The two senators bring additional regional and global expertise to their honorary co-chairmanship: Senator Cardin is a member of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, & Global Women’s Issues; and Senator Hagerty is a member of the Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific, & International Cybersecurity Policy.

In 2023-2024, the Advisory Group will provide a concrete plan on how to navigate the potential changes in US-Colombia relations. A new administration in Colombia represents a unique opportunity to work with an increasingly diverse set of actors in the public, private, and civil society sectors to deepen US-Colombia economic and diplomatic ties. The Advisory Group will advance concrete recommendations where the United States and Colombia can advance long-lasting peace and socio-economic prosperity that mutually benefits each country.

About the writers

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Ramsey is a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela and has traveled regularly to the country for the last decade. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Ramsey directed the Venezuela program at the Washington Office on Latin America where he led the organization’s research on Venezuela and worked to promote lasting political agreements aimed at restoring human rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law. Prior to that, he carried out research and reporting on security and human-rights issues in Colombia, Uruguay, and Brazil with InSight Crime and as a consultant for the Open Society Foundations. His work has been published or cited in Foreign Policy, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Economist, and other major media outlets. Ramsey earned a master’s degree in international affairs from the American University School of International Service, as well as a bachelor of arts in international studies with a minor in Spanish from American University.

Isabel Chiriboga is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile. She also helps steward the Center’s Advisory Council. During her time at the Atlantic Council, she has supported the work of the US-Colombia Advisory Group, the US-Chile Integration Program and the center’s programming around the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings. Her work has been published in Foreign Policy, Miami Herald, The National Interest, Global Americans and the New Atlanticist. Prior to her time at the Atlantic Council, Chiriboga worked as a research assistant at the London School of Economics’ Department of International Relations conducting research on the impact of land inequality in Argentina’s democratization. Prior to that, she worked at the embassy of Ecuador in Washington, where she supported the trade agreement negotiations process between Ecuador and the United States. Originally from Ecuador, Chiriboga has lived in the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom. She has a bachelor’s degree in international economics and international affairs from Trinity University. Chiriboga also completed a year-long study abroad program at the London School of Economics.

About the Center Director

Jason Marczak is the Vice President and Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, joining the center in 2013 for its launch. He has more than twenty years of expertise in regional economics, politics, and development, working with policymakers and private-sector leaders to shape public policy. Marczak has also been an adjunct professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs since 2016. Among his previous positions, he served as director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas in New York City and co-founder of Americas Quarterly magazine. Marczak is a frequent English- and Spanish-language contributor to major media outlets, and a sought-after speaker, and has testified before the US Congress on key regional developments. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Tufts University and a master’s degree in international affairs and economics from the Johns Hopkins University Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

US-Colombia Advisory Group

We are beyond grateful to our US-Colombia Advisory Group members for their passion, commitment, expertise, and leadership. Members who provided crucial input and have decided to have their names associated with this report are listed below.

Honorary Co-Chairs

The Hon. Ben Cardin
US Senator (D-MD)
United States

The Hon. Bill Hagerty
US Senator (R-TN)
United States

Members

Alejandro Mesa

Ambassador Anne Patterson

Ambassador Carolina Barco

Ambassador Kevin Whitaker

Ambassador P. Michael McKinley

Ambassador Paula Dobriansky

Ambassador Rand Beers

Ambassador Roger Noriega

Ambassador William Brownfield

Angela Tafur

Cynthia Arnson

Felipe Ardila

Josefina Klinger

Juan Esteban Orduz

Kristie Pellecchia

Minister Maria Claudia Lacouture

Minister Mabel Torres

Minister Mauricio Cardenas

Michael Shifter

Muni Jensen

Stephen Donehoo

Steve Hege

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Adrienne Arsht for her generous support, without which the work of this Advisory Group would not have been possible.

Foremost, thank you to Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) for their leadership as honorary co-chairs of this group. It is always a true pleasure and honor to work with them and to see how successful bipartisan efforts come to fruition. Thank you to Robert Zarate, Nick Checker, Lucas Da Pieve, Michael Manucy, Tom Melia, Brandon Yoder, Stephanie Oviedo, and Aidan Maese-Czeropski for facilitating the unwavering cooperation of our honorary co-chairs.

Isabel Chiriboga, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC) program assistant, was an instrumental force behind this project from start to finish. She played a key role in coordinating the Advisory Group, drafting the report, and organizing multiple strategy sessions. We also thank Enrique Millán-Mejía, AALAC consultant, who provided crucial expertise, important feedback, and logistical support for this project, and Lucie Kneip for her research and editorial support throughout the publication process. The success of this project is also thanks to the leadership of Jason Marczak and Geoff Ramsey, who worked to convene the Advisory Group and whose passion for a prosperous US-Colombia strategic partnership is reflected in this brief.

For decisive input, thorough research, and as an exceptional adviser on the topic we thank Ambassador Kevin Whitaker. For their precise editorial assistance and flexibility, we thank Cate Hansberry and Mary Kate Aylward and Beverly Larson. We would also like to extend our thanks to Nancy Messieh, Andrea Ratiu, and Romain Warnault for their design of another Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center publication.

New Atlanticist Nov 13, 2023

What Colombia’s ambitious new anti-drug plan means for US relations

By Lucie Kneip and Geoff Ramsey

The Colombian government recently unveiled a new ten-year drug strategy, attempting to break from a half-century of policies that have failed to curb coca production.

Americas Colombia

New Atlanticist Apr 21, 2023

Can Colombia and the United States get on the same page?

By Atlantic Council experts

The two countries find themselves at odds on counternarcotics policy, but in synch on climate. Our experts break down the presidents’ Oval Office meeting

Colombia Latin America

Sep 29, 2021

US-Colombia Advisory Group

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Advisory Group, is a nonpartisan, binational, and multi-sectoral group committed to advancing a whole-of-society approach to addressing the most vital policy issues facing the US-Colombia relationship—with a recognition of the broader implications for bilateral interests across the region more broadly.

The post Advancing US-Colombia cooperation on drug policy and law enforcement appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Expert panel: How will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine develop in 2024?

Benton Coblentz — Sat, 25 Nov 2023 16:39:03 +0000

As winter arrives, Ukrainian officials are reflecting on the 2023 counteroffensive and attempting to anticipate the next stage of the war with Russia. In Washington, despite a strong bipartisan consensus in favor of continued military support for Ukraine, the House of Representatives has yet to vote on a new aid package following a series of delays.

To unpack recent developments and analyze what impact they will have on the war during the coming year, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center hosted a virtual event in late November featuring an expert panel and moderated by Shelby Magid, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

As fighting continues in Ukraine into the winter months without any sign of coming breakthroughs on the front lines, some experts argue that the war has now reached a “stalemate.” Shifting front lines, however, are only one indicator of success on the battlefield. In the estimation of retired US General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, “the battlefield is not a stalemate. The battlefield is dynamic.”

One theater where this dynamism has been on stark display is the Black Sea. Alina Frolova, Ukraine’s former deputy minister of defense and current deputy chair of the Center for Defense Strategies, recalled how Ukraine has “fully collapsed” Russian control of blockade operations on the Black Sea, opening up sea corridors through which Ukrainian grain is now able to reach global markets. She also noted that Ukraine had significantly limited Russia’s use of ballistic missiles launched from the sea, which will be especially crucial in countering another Russian wintertime barrage against Ukrainian cities. Frolova pointed out that Ukraine accomplished all this in the Black Sea without even having a navy.

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Ambassador John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, noted shortcomings in the military aid being provided to Ukraine. “The Ukrainians were not armed by the United States and its allies in a way that would have made a large success [in the counteroffensive] possible,” he commented. This is a major reason Ukraine’s victories at sea have not been as dramatically replicated on land. “Certainly,” said Herbst, “the Biden administration’s overall policy has been adequate,” but not sufficient to guarantee Ukrainian victory on the battlefield.

Delays in the delivery of certain key advanced weapons such as tanks and long-range missiles have raised broader questions over Western policy toward the war. Ukrainian MP Oleksandra Ustinova reported that while the West delayed decisions and deliveries of military aid, “the Russians used this time to mine all the occupied territories.”

Many commentators believe advances in defense tech will ultimately prove decisive in the current war. Clark emphasized that Ukraine and its partners are “in a very rapid technological race that is affecting every army in the world.” Technology is changing the way countries wage war, and the biggest testing ground for these new strategies, tactics, and systems is Ukraine. In providing future assistance, Frolova noted that Ukraine’s partners might need to revise current military aid policies in line with Ukraine’s changing requirements and broader technological developments on the battlefield.

One priority is localizing Western weapons production in Ukraine, so that Ukrainian industry and Western companies can work together to build, develop, and service the weapons Ukraine needs. With a highly educated and skilled workforce and, as Frolova noted, “plenty of specialists who can easily join up and multiply production many times,” Ukraine can play an integral role in the production and maintenance of Western weapons.

Many Western defense companies understand these opportunities and some have even begun investing in Ukraine. For example, German company Rheinmetall has launched a joint venture in Ukraine. “We have big capacity to produce our own weapons,” said Ustinova. However, she noted that US arms manufacturers currently face significant restrictions. Given greater flexibility to invest, Western defense companies can make Ukraine an integral part of their supply chains.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

In conjunction with specific policy changes, continued assistance from the US and its allies is crucial. In Washington, progress on aid has been stalled due to delays in Congress. In October 2023, US President Joe Biden proposed a package that would pair aid to Israel, Ukraine, and funding for the US border. Despite bipartisan support in Congress for Ukraine and Congressional leadership’s public commitments to hold a vote on aid, Herbst noted that “a very small group in the House” is holding assistance hostage.

Clark expressed concern about the flow of assistance to Ukraine from the United States, both in terms of financial support and military equipment, noting that both components are vital to maintain Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian aggression. This assistance is an investment not just in Ukraine’s security, but in the security of the United States and its partners, he noted. Herbst reminded the audience that if Putin succeeds in subjugating Ukraine, “Russia is coming for NATO.”

Despite political obstacles, Herbst underlined that American public support for Ukraine remains robust. The current delay in Congress, however, not only threatens Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and make progress on the battlefield, but also calls US commitments around the globe into question. Ustinova noted that “China, Iran and other autocracies are watching” the foot-dragging in Washington, which only emboldens authoritarian leaders.

How will the Russia-Ukraine War develop in 2024? General Clark noted that the decisive moment in this war could come “at any point, either through leadership failure, lack of logistics support, technological breakthrough, or failure of political will.” By strengthening their commitment to Ukraine at this critical turning point, Western leaders can help ensure that when that breakthrough comes, it will be in Ukraine’s favor.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Aura Sabadus — Mon, 13 Nov 2023 22:55:14 +0000

As bitter fighting continues along the front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine, an ominous mood hangs over the entire country as Ukrainians brace for a repeat of last year’s winter bombing campaign targeting Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. While the Ukrainian authorities have had over half a year to prepare for a new wave of Russian air strikes, the country’s energy network remains vulnerable.

Last winter’s Russian campaign of missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure began in October 2022 and continued until March 2023. It plunged much of the country into extended periods of darkness, leaving millions of Ukrainians without access to electricity, heating, and water amid freezing temperatures and harsh winter conditions.

The physical damage inflicted on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure last winter has been estimated by the United Nations at $10 billion, with the bulk of the damage reportedly at electricity generating power plants and transmission lines. This has badly undermined Ukraine’s overall energy capacity. For example, before the onset of last winter’s bombing campaign, Ukraine had an estimated 13.6 gigawatts (GW) of thermal capacity, but only 4GW remained in spring 2023.

Ukraine has been actively preparing for another winter of infrastructure attacks. Repair works have continued since spring 2023, while Ukrainian energy sector traders have been busy securing coal and gas stocks for the coming winter season. By the start of the heating season in early November, Ukraine had accumulated 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in storage, significantly more than last year’s figure of 14.7 bcm. State energy company Naftogaz has also been working to increase domestic production, commissioning 54 new production wells during 2023. This has helped Ukraine achieve unprecedented levels of self-sufficiency and has freed the country from earlier dependence on comparatively expensive European imports.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, has defied all odds by rebuilding some of its lost wind generation capacity in locations close to the front lines. Company officials pledge to expand this renewable energy capacity further. Helpfully, the Ukrainian grid operator, Ukrenergo, and its neighboring EU counterparts have also been working to increase border transmission capacity. This will allow Ukraine to access enough electricity imports to power two million homes.

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Despite significant efforts to prepare for winter, Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure remains in many respects more vulnerable than last year. Much will depend on the delivery of sufficient additional air defense systems in the coming weeks. These are needed to protect the entire civilian population along with power plants and transmission lines across Ukraine. At present, only Kyiv benefits from a genuinely comprehensive anti-missile shield, but there are at least another 45 Ukrainian cities with a population of over 100,000 in need of protection.

The situation is further complicated by rising levels of domestic energy consumption in wartime Ukraine. Last year, demand for electricity fell to around half of prewar levels. This drop was due to a combination of factors including the destruction of Ukraine’s industrial base, the Russian occupation of around 20 percent of the country, and the departure of over seven million people who fled the invasion and entered the EU as refugees.

This reduction in consumption made it easier for Ukraine to maintain energy supplies to the remaining population. However, demand has been steadily rising by around 2-3 percent per month in 2023 as the Ukrainian economy stabilizes and millions of Ukrainians return home from the European Union. Amid signs of economic recovery, the IMF recently upgraded its 2023 GDP growth forecast for Ukraine to 4.5 percent. Ukraine is therefore likely to face greater demand for electricity this winter, but will be dependent on a damaged and reduced energy network.

Eurasia Center events