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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Putin is dramatically escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population because he cannot win the war on the battlefield. When he first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin was expecting a quick and complete victory. Instead, his army has become bogged down in a brutal war of attrition that will soon enter a fifth year.

Despite pouring vast resources into the invasion and placing his entire country on a war footing, the Kremlin dictator has been unable to secure a decisive breakthrough. Many in Moscow had hoped the return of Donald Trump to the White House would transform the military situation, but even a dramatic decline in US aid for Ukraine over the past year has failed to turn the tide in Russia’s favor. Putin’s army captured less than one percent of Ukrainian territory during 2025, while suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties. At the present glacial pace, it would take Russia decades and millions of men to fully subjugate Ukraine.

In his official statements, Putin continues to project confidence and boast of his invading army’s success. However, with so few genuine victories to toast, this has often meant inventing imaginary advances. Putin’s habit of exaggerating Russian gains came back to haunt him in late 2025 when he repeatedly claimed to have captured the Ukrainian city of Kupyansk, only for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to personally visit the city and record a selfie video exposing the Russian ruler’s lies. This embarrassing episode underlined the growing credibility gap between Putin’s bold talk of inevitable Russian victory and the far more sobering battlefield reality of minimal Russian gains and disastrous losses.

With no obvious route to military victory, Putin is now openly embracing a strategy of terror tactics against Ukraine’s civilian population. He hopes that by weaponizing winter and putting millions of lives at risk, he can finally break Ukrainian resistance and force Kyiv to capitulate. Europe has not witnessed criminality on such a grand and terrible scale since the days of Hitler and Stalin.

So far, the international response to Russia’s winter bombing campaign has been utterly inadequate. While many of Kyiv’s partners have rushed to provide humanitarian aid, no additional costs whatsoever have been imposed on the Kremlin. Instead, it is Ukraine and not Russia that is reportedly being asked to make concessions. Unless this changes, the normalization of Russian war crimes will continue and Putin’s sense of impunity will become even more deeply entrenched. It will then only be a matter of time before other civilian populations experience the horrors currently taking place in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure have been a routine feature of the war ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. According to Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal, every single energy-generating facility in the country has been bombed. “There is not a single power plant in Ukraine that has not been hit by the enemy since the beginning of the war,” he commented last week. “Thousands of megawatts of generation capacity have been knocked out. Nobody else in the world has ever faced a challenge like this.”

Russia’s current aerial offensive began to escalate noticeably during the final months of 2025 ahead of the cold season. As temperatures plummeted in early January, there was a further intensification of attacks on Ukraine’s power and heating infrastructure, with large numbers of drones and missiles concentrated on specific cities to overwhelm air defenses. The timing of Russia’s bombing campaign leaves no room for reasonable doubt; this was a premeditated attempt to target the Ukrainian population by weaponizing the winter weather.

The Kremlin’s goal is easy enough to decipher. By making Ukrainian cities unlivable and threatening to freeze millions of civilians, Moscow aims to break Ukraine’s resistance and force the Kyiv authorities to accept peace on Russian terms. In other words, the present bombing offensive is Putin’s response to US President Donald Trump’s peace efforts. Rather than agree to a ceasefire or offer concessions, Putin uses terror as a negotiating tool to secure Ukraine’s surrender.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

The targeting of Ukrainian civilians is not limited to attacks on critical infrastructure. According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 2025 was the deadliest year of the invasion for Ukrainian civilians since 2022. In a report released in early January, United Nations officials confirmed that more than 2500 Ukrainian civilians were killed in 2025. This was 31 percent higher than the figure for the previous year and 70 percent more than in 2023. A separate assessment by European governments reached similar conclusions and found that the scale of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians increased whenever the Trump administration attempted to advance peace negotiations.

The rising civilian death toll in Ukraine is largely due to increased Russian bombing of Ukrainian cities. Moscow’s mounting air offensive owed much to a spike in domestic drone production, which has made it possible to launch hundreds of drones at Ukraine in a single night. Russia has also been accused of conducting a large-scale campaign of individual drone strikes against civilians in southern Ukraine that terrified locals have branded a “human safari.” UN investigators reported in October 2025 that Russia’s targeted drone strikes on civilians were a crime against humanity.

Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians have increased amid mounting frustration in Moscow over the slow pace of the invasion. Despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout 2025, Putin’s army failed to achieve any significant breakthroughs and gained less than one percent of Ukrainian territory while suffering heavy losses. With little immediate prospect of military success, Putin seems to have decided that his best chance of victory lies in terrorizing the civilian population.

So far, Russia’s terror tactics do not appear to be working. A nationwide poll conducted in mid-January by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that a majority of Ukrainians continue to reject the Kremlin’s territorial demands in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, more than two-thirds of Ukrainians do not believe the present round of US-led negotiations will result in a lasting peace. Instead, most Ukrainians remain convinced that Russia aims to continue the war.

Today’s arctic conditions will eventually give way to milder weather, but the damage done to Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure in recent weeks will take months to repair. Nor is there any reason to believe that Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians will abate. On the contrary, the Kremlin is likely to escalate further in a bid to demoralize, destabilize, and depopulate the country. By seeking to freeze millions of Ukrainians, Putin has underlined his readiness to target civilians as he seeks to impose an imperialistic vision of peace through submission.

Yuliya Kazdobina is a senior fellow at the “Ukrainian Prism” nongovernmental analytical center.

Teams of engineers are working around the clock to repair damaged facilities, fix power lines, and reconnect Ukrainian homes and businesses to the electricity grid. However, repeated Russian attacks are making it increasingly difficult to patch up battered equipment and find the necessary replacement component parts.

The bombing campaign appears to have been timed to coincide with the coldest period in over a year, with temperatures plummeting to minus fifteen Celsius (five degrees Fahrenheit) for extended periods of time. “ They deliberately waited for freezing weather to make things worse for our people. This is cynical Russian terror specifically against civilians,” stated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

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This is not the first time Russian President Vladimir Putin has attempted to weaponize winter in his war against Ukraine. Russia launched a major air offensive against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in October 2022, establishing a pattern that would be repeated each year as the cold season approached. While this tactic is not new, the present destruction of the Ukrainian power grid is widely recognized as the most severe of the entire war.

In Kyiv and other cities, the Ukrainian authorities have established so-called Points of Invincibility in heavily populated areas featuring heating and internet access along with electricity sources that can be used to charge up personal devices and power banks. Visitors can also expect hot drinks and a warm welcome.

Throughout Ukraine the buzz of generators has become the background noise of the winter season. Many Ukrainians have installed backup power sources in their homes, which are typically able to provide electricity for a limited period of time. Portable gas stoves are also a common feature as people adapt and improvise in the extreme conditions caused by Russia’s bombardment.

With millions of Ukrainian civilians at risk of being trapped in freezing darkness for days at a time, the potential for a humanitarian catastrophe is obvious. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has already urged residents of the Ukrainian capital to temporarily leave the city if they are able to and move to less affected areas where power and heating are more readily available. With the present cold snap set to last for at least another week and further Russian attacks widely expected, fears are now mounting over a possible winter exodus to neighboring EU countries.

That may be exactly what Putin has in mind. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukrainian civilians in a bid to break Ukraine’s resistance and depopulate large parts of the country. In addition to attacks on energy, heating, and other critical infrastructure, Russia has also launched large-scale drone strike campaigns designed to make entire towns and cities unlivable. A recent United Nations probe into Russia’s campaign of drone attacks throughout southern Ukraine’s front line regions concluded that Moscow’s actions amounted to the crimes against humanity of “murder and forcible transfer of population.”

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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As Russia attempts to freeze Ukrainians into submission, Kyiv desperately needs a wide range of international support. This includes alternative energy supplies to replace domestic gas production damaged in Russia’s attacks, along with spare parts to mend the country’s power stations and associated infrastructure.

Ukraine also urgently requires additional air defense systems and interceptor missiles. At present, Ukraine’s existing air defenses are struggling to cope with the dramatically increased intensity of Russia’s aerial attacks, which now routinely feature hundreds of drones along with dozens of cruise and ballistic missiles.

Most of all, Ukraine needs to be able to strike back. However much Ukraine’s network of air defenses improves, the sheer scale of the Russian bombardment means that a percentage of missiles and drones will inevitably reach their targets. The only truly effective defense is deterrence. In other words, Russia’s attacks will continue until Putin is restrained by the knowledge that Ukraine has the capacity to reply in kind.

The next few weeks will be among the most challenging of the war for Ukraine’s civilian population that will test the country’s famed resilience to the limit. “I think the Russians want to break us. They want to make Ukrainians angry and unhappy. They think this will make us go out on the streets and protest but that won’t happen,” Kyiv resident Valentina Verteletska told Britain’s Guardian newspaper. “This makes us tougher and more determined. War doesn’t make people bad or good but it amplifies who you are. It allows people to show who they are inside and we have seen a lot of people volunteering to help their neighbors.”

Many believe Russia’s wintertime bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure now represents Putin’s best chance to achieve some kind of breakthrough at a time when his army is struggling to advance on the battlefield. Russia gained less than one percent of Ukrainian territory in 2025 despite suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties, and is still fighting over villages located within walking distance of the front lines at the start of the invasion in February 2022.

Despite this lack of progress, Putin remains committed to his original invasion objective of extinguishing Ukrainian independence and forcing the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He clearly has no qualms about targeting millions of Ukrainian civilians in pursuit of this criminal goal. “You can see with your own eyes what is going on,” commented Kyiv building manager Oleksandr Matienko. “They are trying to kill us. They can’t win any other way. So they are willing to do anything to destroy Ukraine.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Evidence of Belarusian involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine is not new, of course. On the eve of the invasion, Lukashenka allowed Putin to station tens of thousands of Russian troops in Belarus. The country then served as the main gateway and logistics hub for Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive to seize Kyiv in spring 2022. The Lukashenka regime is also implicated in the Kremlin campaign to abduct and indoctrinate thousands of Ukrainian children.

Reports of Lukashenka’s ongoing involvement in the Russian war effort come amid speculation of a potential thaw in diplomatic relations between Belarus and the United States. In December, 123 political prisoners were freed by the Belarusian authorities, with the US easing sanctions measures in exchange. This followed two smaller scale trade-offs earlier in 2025 as the Trump administration seeks to increase diplomatic dialogue with Minsk as part of ongoing efforts to broker a negotiated settlement to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Despite these headline-grabbing humanitarian steps, there is little sign of a more comprehensive shift in Minsk away from domestic repression or any reduction in support for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy agenda. On the contrary, the available evidence indicates that while Lukashenka may seek increased engagement with the West, he has no intention of turning away from Moscow or ending human rights abuses inside Belarus.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

By continuing to provide Moscow with its full backing, Belarus enhances Russia’s ability to wage war in Ukraine. This is undermining the Trump administration’s efforts to end the Russian invasion and secure a lasting peace settlement. Belarus also remains deeply implicated in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and stands accused of weaponizing everything from migrants to balloons against its EU neighbors.

US outreach to Minsk over the past year has secured the release of many prominent prisoners, but continued arrests mean that the overall number of political detainees in the country remains high. Naturally, Lukashenka is happy to reengage with American officials in order to secure a relaxation of sanctions pressure, but there are also concerns that the current approach risks incentivizing hostage-taking.

Yes, a less isolated and more neighborly Belarus remains a worthwhile goal, but in the current circumstances, Lukashenka has little motivation to compromise. He is looking at possible gains without actually reducing the current level of repression in Belarus.

Sanctions relief would be a significant gain for Lukashenka. In exchange for that, the US should be able to achieve some limits on Belarusian facilitation of Kremlin aggression in Ukraine or, at a minimum, a notable decrease in the number of political prisoners in Belarus.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Recommendations for the United States and its partners

Pause all major non-protest-related policy initiatives. Now is not the time for renewed nuclear negotiations or military strikes. The Biden administration famously paused negotiations about resuming the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action during the protests in response Mahsa Amini’s death. This does not mean diplomacy is dead, but any hypothetical nuclear talks between Washington and Tehran need to be postponed indefinitely. This is also not the time for Israel (or the United States) to restart military attacks. The Iranian people deserve the time and space to see these protests through. In June, the Iranian government benefited from an ill-conceived Israeli strike on Evin prison that attempted to liberate, but ended up killing, a number of prisoners. It is vital to not give the government a similar propaganda victory.
The US government should designate a new Iran envoy. The Trump administration should immediately name or designate an envoy or senior official to engage with the Iranian diaspora and to more broadly focus on all aspects of Iran policy full-time. Regular engagement with this community and other Iran-focused government and nongovernment contacts is important to emphasize that the administration is serious about the Iranian people. This individual would not replace US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff but would report to him and other senior officials who remain focused on wider-ranging issues. Full-time attention on the portfolio would also help provide an internal advocate within an administration focused on budget cuts for low-cost, high-reward spending to advance a broader Iran policy, such as internet circumvention funding.
Partner governments should fund Iran initiatives that the administration ended. At the height of the Mahsa Amini protests, thirty million Iranians used US-funded circumvention services. Some of these services are being temporarily funded by private enterprises. Over the long-term, they require consistent support from a government entity. The same is also true of the Iran human rights programs that the current administration proposed cutting in its entirety in the Congressional Budget Justification. If the administration does not reconsider its cuts, other foreign governments would have an opportunity to pick up the technical and moral leadership that the United States has relinquished.
The international community should unite in backing the Iranian people. We authors have heard directly from Iranians who participated in past protests that a unified signal from the international community not only helped buoy sentiment within the movement but also served as a deterrent against human rights abuses by the regime. For instance, Iran significantly decreased its executions of drug offenders following sustained international pressure. Joint statements, including those issued by the Group of Seven and United Nations, have the best chance of impacting Iranian behavior.
Create a nimble emergency funding mechanism. During the Mahsa Amini protests, several Iranian advocacy groups suggested to us that there was need for urgent funding, and they proposed possible emergency initiatives such as setting up funds to help pay striking workers living wages. Although we supported these ideas, the Biden administration was not nimble enough to fully evaluate and fund them in a timely manner. The United States or other partner nations should consider establishing a fund or program to explicitly facilitate crisis response operations. If the United States is unable or unwilling to fund it, the Treasury Department should, at a minimum, issue (or reissue) guidance to allow private individuals and organizations quick and legal ways to send money to protestors.
Increase human rights sanctions. The United States and partner governments should move quickly to issue targeted sanctions against human rights abusers and those involved in the crackdown against protestors. The 2024 bipartisan MAHSA Act provides the Treasury and State Department with new sanction authorities. To date, not a single designation has been imposed under this authority. Implementing MAHSA sanctions now—ideally in coordination with actions from our foreign partners—would send a symbolic, but powerful, message that the international community condemns Iran’s crackdown on protestors.

Recommendations for nongovernmental actors

Minimize partisan politics. Iran policy has long been a victim of brutal partisan politics in Washington. Support for the Iranian people should be an approach that both parties should be able to get behind, as it aligns with US interests and values.
More constructive engagement with the diaspora. As admittedly non-Iranian Americans involved in Iran policy, we authors will never fully understand the intricacies of the diaspora. From our past experiences, the online and in-person abuse directed at other members of the diaspora and at proposed policies limited government-diaspora engagement, and hindered the diaspora’s ability to effectively advocate for policy changes.
Provide clear and tangible recommendations. During the Biden administration, then-Vice President Kamala Harris led efforts to support the Iranian people’s call for the regime to be removed from the UN Commission on the Status of Women. This was a direct result of lobbying by civil society. Once the Harris team had a clear recommendation and knew it aligned with US policy priorities and values, the United States successfully led the campaign to remove Iran from the Commission.

A final recommendation for everyone: Keep the focus on Iran

The Iranian people themselves are bravely leading the current protests. It is essential to keep the focus on them, rather than on Washington politics and social media, to ensure the Iranian people get the support they need at this critical juncture.

Abram Paley is an incoming nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He most recently served as acting special envoy for Iran from 2023 to 2025 and, before that, Middle East advisor to Vice President Kamala Harris.

Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council. He most recently served as director for Iran at the National Security Council in the Biden White House and a member of the Trump administration’s Iran negotiating team.

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What’s in the new US defense bill for Ukraine?

Doug Klain — Thu, 18 Dec 2025 21:31:45 +0000

On December 17, the Senate voted to send the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to US President Donald Trump’s desk for his signature. The bill includes provisions to authorize new military assistance for Ukraine, provide stronger oversight of the Trump administration’s arms sales and intelligence support for Kyiv, and support for efforts to return abducted Ukrainian children from Russia.

In a sharp decrease from the past level of military assistance for Ukraine, the NDAA includes $400 million in funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) for new arms intended for Ukraine for 2026 and 2027. To put this into context, the April 2024 Ukraine supplemental aid bill included nearly $14 billion in USAI funding.

Even so, the bill is a significant step given that Washington has ended almost all direct assistance to Ukraine. The Trump administration still holds billions in authority for USAI but hasn’t made use of the program, instead opting to sell arms to Ukraine via European allies.

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In June, the Department of Defense redirected 20,000 anti-drone air defense interceptors specially made for Ukraine under USAI to Israel and US forces in the Middle East. Congress is now using the NDAA to make it more difficult for the Pentagon to repeat this, while also requiring that any arms redirected into US stocks are ultimately replaced for Ukraine.

Though Congress doesn’t expect the White House to make use of USAI in the near future, the NDAA modifies the program so that these funds will now remain available until 2029. As the Trump administration looks for ways to both revitalize the US defense industrial base and provide Ukraine with credible security arrangements, USAI could make a return as a useful way to bolster Ukraine’s defenses.

During 2025, the Trump administration has sought to pressure Ukraine with the prospect of withholding US intelligence support. The NDAA creates strict new reporting requirements to discourage any such moves. As recently as November, the White House said that unless Kyiv agreed to a new US proposal to end the war, it would stop sending weapons and providing the intelligence Ukraine uses in its defense, including to detect Russian air raids.

The new legislation requires the US Secretary of Defense to submit reports to Congress within 48 hours of any decision to “pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or materially downgrade intelligence support, including information, intelligence, and imagery collection,” to Ukraine. This does not concretely prevent the administration from ending intelligence support, but it is a clear signal from Congress that any action to do so would be met with sharp political backlash.

The NDAA also creates significant new reporting requirements related to the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), the primary mechanism for arms sales to Ukraine. In order to increase the transparency of the PURL system, Congress will use its oversight power to mandate quarterly reports.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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The NDAA includes the Abducted Ukrainian Children Recovery and Accountability Act, a bipartisan bill introduced by Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) to support efforts to locate, return, and rehabilitate Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. The mass abduction of Ukrainian children has united Republicans and Democrats in Washington. In early December, Congress held a hearing with Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States and experts working to rescue and rehabilitate abducted children.

The bill authorizes the State Department and Department of Justice to assist Ukraine in locating and returning Ukrainian children as well as prisoners of war and civilian detainees, and to support the rehabilitation of returned children and seek accountability for the Russians who abducted them. It also authorizes the Secretary of State to provide support to Ukraine’s government and civil society groups in providing rehabilitation services for victims.

The NDAA includes the best legislative support from Congress that Ukraine has received all year. At the same time, it also underscores the dramatic reduction in overall US support for Ukraine during 2025.

As it stands, unless Congress exercises its foreign policy powers, efforts to end Russia’s invasion will be stymied by limited US assistance to Ukraine. However, there are some signs that Congress is taking critical steps forward. Recently, Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA) reportedly worked with Democrats to advance a discharge petition to force a vote on Russia sanctions and potential new military assistance to Ukraine. If passed, new Russia sanctions could deliver a much-needed shot in the arm to the Trump administration’s peace efforts.

While it includes measures that will be welcomed by Kyiv, the NDAA’s Ukraine provisions are largely about mitigating potential harm from the Trump administration. In order to provide significant new material assistance to Ukraine, Congress will need to advance other legislation that it has so far kept on ice while awaiting approval from the White House.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the deputy director for policy and strategy at Razom for Ukraine, a nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

‘Young people have a unique energy’

Jaffer began by recounting her story. As a young reporter at the Cape Times during South Africa’s apartheid regime, she was only twenty-two when in 1980 she was detained after reporting on a police shooting. Held in prison without trial, she was physically assaulted, psychologically tortured, and threatened with sexual violence. After two months of pretrial detention, she was released and charged with possession of a banned book.

Instead of retreating, Jaffer leaned deeper into the work of resistance, leaving her job at the Cape Times to become an anti-apartheid activist and unionist. In 1986, after editing community and trade union papers, she was detained again—this time, while she was several months pregnant. She was released shortly before her baby’s birth, only to be rearrested nine weeks later and jailed again with her infant. Held in solitary confinement and denied medical care, she nearly lost her child.

Holding up the cover of her memoir, Our Generation, Jaffer shared a photo from the book with Paryani, pointing to an image of her as a young mother with her infant daughter. The fight against apartheid, Jaffer said, was not just about individual acts of bravery but also about the collective defiance of women—young and old, mothers and daughters—that contributed to the system’s fall. “Looking back now, despite the pain,” Jaffer said, “I am proud to have been part of something that resulted in the freedom of all South Africans. It was worth it.”

Since then, Jaffer has written three books, and she now has her own website and runs a program where she mentors young journalists and gives them the opportunity to write on a multimedia website. Jaffer played a key role in South Africa’s first democratic elections as part of the Independent Media Commission.

Jaffer reflected on the power of youth, which she said carried with it fearlessness, the sense of justice, and the belief in change. “Young people have a unique energy,” she said.

Paryani, a twenty-seven-year-old activist from Kabul, has become one of the most visible faces of Afghanistan’s protest movement. Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Paryani, alongside her sisters, took to the streets of Kabul to protest the regime’s decrees banning girls from attending school and imposing repressive dress codes on women. Together, they chanted “naan, kaar, azad”—bread, work, freedom—a slogan that has since become a powerful symbol for the resistance of Afghan women, both inside the country and in exile.

Her defiance carried a heavy price. In January 2022, a video of Paryani went viral on social media in which armed men pound on her door while she pleads shakily, “Come back in the morning. My underage sisters are with me, come tomorrow. I cannot talk to you now.” Her plea went unanswered; Tamana and her sisters were taken. No one knew where they were, and the Taliban denied detaining them.

Like many women in Afghanistan, Tamana and her sisters were forcibly disappeared—snatched from their homes in the middle of the night, sometimes with their children, sometimes with their husbands and entire families. In prison, she was separated from her sisters, beaten, psychologically tortured, and threatened with sexual violence. Under intense international pressure, they were released in February 2022 but were silenced with threats and had their passports confiscated.

After several attempts to leave the country, in October 2022 Paryani and her family managed to flee to Germany, where exile brought safety but not peace. In exile, she has continued to fight for global awareness of the gender apartheid imposed by the Taliban. In 2023, she staged a hunger strike in Cologne to draw attention to the plight of women in Afghanistan, which ended with her hospitalization. Her struggles have left her with a lingering sense of abandonment: “I tried everything to draw the world’s attention to the struggle of women in Afghanistan,” she said. “And the world turned a blind eye.”

The trauma she endured in Afghanistan continues to surface, she said, even more acutely now that she is no longer in survival mode. She added that she frequently wakes from nightmares filled with the cries of those she heard being executed in the prison in Kabul after dawn prayers.

Passing the torch

As Paryani spoke, her voice broke. “Will I live to see the liberation of my country?” she asked.

Jaffer responded by telling Paryani that healing is not a luxury, but a necessity. “You have been in the belly of the beast,” she said. “You have endured what many fear the most. The scariest and cruelest part is behind you. Now you must take care of yourself—not just for your own survival, but so you can continue to lead this movement.”

Jaffer told Paryani that one of the biggest mistakes she had made when she was younger was trying to carry on without seeking help. The trauma, left unaddressed, eventually caught up with her. “It paralyzed me,” she said. “Had I known then what I know now, I would have begun healing much earlier.”

The struggle for liberation, Jaffer insisted, is not a sprint. It is a long, painful journey, said Jaffer, and it demands not only courage and sacrifice, but also reflection, self-care, self-love, and resilience. And most importantly, she added, it requires community.

“Tamana,” Jaffer said, “don’t let what they did to you silence you. Share your story. Ask for help. Simplify the message so others can join. Personalize your struggle. Your pain is real, but it’s also powerful. It can move hearts and minds. And this pain will carry you towards what you are burning for—liberation.”

Paryani, who had arrived at this meeting with her notebook and pen, eager to absorb every tip and tactic to end gender apartheid, now wept uncontrollably. Not out of sorrow, but because she was confronting a difficult realization: dismantling gender apartheid takes time. While it demands sustained activism and a burning passion, it equally requires the continuous inner work of healing—the labor that builds not only resistance, but the resilience that is necessary to sustain it.

Farhat Ariana Azami is a social worker and advocate for the rights of women and girls, as well as refugees. She serves as president of the Afghanistan Solidarity Group, an Austria-based association that provides homeschooling for girls and develops sustainable livelihood projects for women in Afghanistan.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

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Returning Ukraine’s abducted children should be central to any peace plan

Kristina Hook — Wed, 03 Dec 2025 21:30:17 +0000

This week, the US Senate is holding a landmark Congressional hearing on Russia’s mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Most will understandably frame the issue as a grave human rights crisis, but it is also much more. Rescuing Ukraine’s abducted children can help pave the way for peace, while allowing Russia’s crimes to go unpunished would set a disastrous precedent for global security.

Russia’s systematic removal, indoctrination, and militarization of Ukrainian children goes to the heart of the broader security dilemma that must be resolved before the war in Ukraine can end. Any credible conversation about peace negotiations or security guarantees for Ukraine must begin with a demonstration that the United States and its allies can meaningfully influence Russian behavior. Ensuring the safe return of these children is a concrete way to do that.

The scale of the crime is staggering. Ukrainian authorities have verified 19,456 children taken to Russian or Russian-occupied territories, while independent experts estimate the actual number of victims may exceed 35,000.

What is indisputable is that Russia’s mass deportations are now among the best-documented crimes of modern warfare. Among numerous other investigations, the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified at least 210 facilities inside Russia or Russian-occupied territory where deported Ukrainian children have been sent for “re-education,” forced assimilation, and in many places, military-style training.

The evidence is overwhelming and includes coerced relocations, illegal adoptions and naturalization under Russian citizenship, ideological indoctrination aimed at erasing Ukrainian identity, and numerous violations of international law. This is not incidental collateral damage. It is a deliberate state policy of population transfer and Ukrainian national identity destruction; a Russian program that mirrors the legal definitions of numerous atrocity crimes, including genocide.

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So far, it has only been possible to rescue a small fraction of abducted children. As of November 2025, 1,859 children have returned to Ukraine, while international experts estimate that 90 percent of the burden of rescue currently falls to Ukrainians themselves.

Moscow’s refusal to facilitate repatriation and its ongoing efforts to conceal identities and locations underscores the impossibility of any stable post-war order without addressing this crime. Humanitarian language alone obscures a critical truth: The forced transfer of children is not a peripheral human rights issue; it is a central obstacle to any credible security settlement in Europe.

For months, United States and European officials have been exploring frameworks for eventual peace talks with Russia and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. But these conversations often treat Russian atrocities, including child deportations, as adjacent to the real business of hard security. This is a mistake.

Russia’s abduction of children is a window into its strategic intent. The Kremlin campaign to kidnap young Ukrainians and turn them into Russians reveals that Moscow’s war is not merely about territory but about imperial restoration. If Vladimir Putin only sought to adjust borders, the millions spent on relocating, indoctrinating, and militarizing thousands of Ukrainian children would make little sense.

Putin’s ominous intent becomes clearer when viewed alongside Russia’s broader atrocities. The Russian ruler clearly seeks to diminish the demographic future of an entire neighboring nation, while preparing the next generation for future Russian military aggression.

The issue of abducted Ukrainian children is especially relevant for Ukrainians as they debate painful political compromises, territorial concessions, and security guarantees premised on Western assurances. If world leaders cannot secure the return of the most vulnerable victims of Russia’s aggression, how could Ukrainians trust that those same leaders can prevent Russia from reigniting the war or committing new atrocities?

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Western policymakers insist that any post-war settlement must include credible enforcement mechanisms. But credibility is not defined by rhetoric; it is a matter of capability and political will. Right now, both are in question.

If the United States, with its immense military, diplomatic, and economic power, cannot compel Russia to return thousands of abducted Ukrainian children, it becomes harder to argue that Washington can deter further aggression or prevent violations of a future peace agreement. Ukrainians understand this reality well.

Demonstrating US leverage over Russia is therefore not merely symbolic. It is a strategic prerequisite to any durable peace. The United States has untapped tools at its disposal. These include sanctioning individuals and institutions directly involved in the abduction of Ukrainian children, while supporting multilateral accountability efforts. It should be also possible to condition further diplomatic engagement on verifiable steps toward repatriation. Meanwhile, the United States could lead a coordinated information effort to identify children and counter Russian concealment tactics.

These measures are proportional responses to atrocity crimes recognized under international law. The forcible transfer of children is a premeditated crime designed to shatter Ukraine’s future. A successful effort to bring Ukrainian children home will demonstrate that the United States can influence Russian behavior. This is a critical condition for any effective peace initiative.

Securing the return of abducted children would also help to build the trust needed for Ukrainian society to accept Western-backed security frameworks. After many failed efforts to constrain Russian aggression, Ukrainian society needs to know that Western promises are not empty.

Ignoring the issue, or relegating it to the humanitarian margins, undermines the very negotiations that the Trump administration is seeking to advance. Ending the war requires Ukrainian faith in international guarantees.

Child abduction is among the clearest moral red lines in global conflict. Failure to uphold this red line in Ukraine will invite repetition elsewhere. If Russia can abduct tens of thousands of children with impunity during a major European war and face no real consequences, then no norms protecting children in conflict can hold anywhere.

This week’s hearing marks an opportunity for Congress, the Trump administration, and Ukraine’s other partners to clarify that returning abducted Ukrainian children is not optional, negotiable, or separate from security discussions. It is central.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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One of the most striking provisions in US President Donald Trump’s recently unveiled 28-point Ukraine peace plan was a full amnesty for all parties for their actions during the war in Ukraine and an agreement not to make any claims or consider any complaints in future. While Trump’s initial plan has already been subject to multiple revisions, the idea of a blanket amnesty has sparked alarm and outrage among Ukrainians, with critics viewing it as a move to pardon all Russians responsible for war crimes in Ukraine.

The Trump peace plan first emerged just days after a Russian missile strike on a residential building in Ternopil that killed more than thirty people including seven children. Many Ukrainians recalled this attack following the publication of Trump’s plan, noting that it served to highlight the injustice of offering an amnesty for the vast quantity of crimes committed since the start of the full-scale invasion almost four years ago.

Some have also pointed out that failure to prosecute war crimes in Ukraine could have disastrous implications for the future of global security. “It would ruin international law and create a precedent that would encourage other authoritarian leaders to think that you can invade a country, kill people and erase their identity, and you will be rewarded with new territories,” commented Ukrainian Nobel prize winner Oleksandra Matviichuk.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Addressing Russian war crimes in Ukraine is not only a matter of providing justice for victims. It is also essential in order to prevent further Kremlin aggression. While the legitimacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal continues to provoke discussion, few would argue that it provided important lessons for Germany and sent an unambiguous message that international aggression ends in defeat and accountability.

Russian society has never experienced anything comparable to Nuremberg. They was no accountability for the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, or the invasion of Afghanistan. Since the fall of the USSR, there have been no systematic investigations into crimes committed during Russia’s Chechen wars, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, or the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

This absence of accountability has fueled a sense of impunity in the Kremlin and throughout Russian society that has been instrumental in creating the political climate for the current attack on Ukraine. Unless addressed, this historically rooted sense of Russian impunity will inevitably fuel further aggression.

Advocates of the US-led peace initiative have suggested that the priority now should be securing peace rather than seeking justice. In reality, however, the two goals are interlinked. It is delusional to think that any future treaty obligations or declarations of non-aggression from Russia’s leaders can be trusted, especially if they are not held to account for the crimes of the past four years.

It is important to recognize that many of the 28 points featured in the United States plan are realistic and could serve as the basis for a viable peace settlement. At the same time, it is also abundantly clear that the proposed amnesty for war crimes will only embolden the Kremlin. If adopted, it would encourage Russia to continue the invasion of Ukraine or escalate elsewhere in the Baltic region, the southern Caucasus, or Central Asia. That is clearly not in the interests of the United States, Europe, or the wider international community.

It is therefore vital to thoroughly investigate all war crimes committed in Ukraine and establish the facts in a manner that challenges Russia’s sense of impunity and allows for the rehabilitation of victims. The Nuremberg Tribunal did not succeed in ending wars of aggression, but it did establish a precedent of legal responsibility. If we now forego this principle of accountability entirely, progress toward a safer world will not be possible.

Ivan Horodyskyy is an associate professor of the School of Public Management at the Ukrainian Catholic University.

The authors have traveled regularly to Syria over the past year, visiting with local security officials and activists across much of Homs, Hama, Tartous, and Latakia studying the challenges and successes of local peace-building in the wake of dictator Bashar al-Assad’s fall. Civil peace committees and similar systems have consistently stood out as an important aspect of trust-building and dispute resolution. While they have proven highly effective in some areas, they are only present in a few parts of the country. At times, they face opposition from government officials. Still, they offer one important model for dealing with the country’s decades of deeply rooted social divisions and the bouts of intercommunal violence that continue to leave Syrians dead.

The role of civil peace committees

Damascus formed a National Civil Peace Committee in the aftermath of the March 6 coastal massacres, theoretically tasked with preventing violence and easing intercommunal tensions through mediation. In June, this committee made headlines when news broke that one of the Assad regime’s most notorious criminals, Fadi Saqr, had effectively joined the committee. His inclusion reflected Damascus’s choice to try and maintain calm via close engagement with former regime-affiliated security and military officers, who some members of the new government argue will help prevent their former colleagues from engaging in renewed insurgent activity.

This controversial national body, however, has nothing to do with the civil peace committees organically forming at the local level in several municipalities across Syria. These committees vary in size, function, and form, but they all seek to prevent violence and improve communication at the hyper-local level. This often involves connecting locals to the new security apparatus via trusted community figures.

It is difficult to say with certainty how many civil peace committees are active in Syria, since many do not conform to the name even when they function in a similar capacity. Most of the more structured and explicitly named committees are concentrated in the southwestern Damascus suburbs, Homs, and Syria’s coast—reflecting both the concentration of strong activist networks and complex sectarian communal dynamics.

There are, however, core commonalities among the groups. Committees are usually formed around a council of local notables. Their success is largely dependent on two factors: 1) the attitudes and acceptance of local security officials and 2) the initiative and determination of local civil society. At their core, these committees facilitate communication between the security officials and locals who are too afraid to communicate with them directly. One Christian activist in Baniyas explained the importance of this role to the authors succinctly:

“Fear is rooted in isolated violations and a rejection of government narratives . . . direct government outreach cannot fix this fear because locals don’t trust the government’s words or actions. Rather, they need civil society intermediaries.”

Due to their organic formation, each civil peace committee has its own culture and practices. In Jaramana, according to one member, the civil peace committee is very strong, includes representatives of all sects, and even has its own security force. In Alawi communities, the committees’ main roles are improving communication between locals and security officials and working with officials from Syria’s General Security Service, the country’s core internal security force, to address concerns and violations. Local officials use the committees to disseminate information, conduct peaceful disarmament campaigns, and gather complaints about misconduct of government personnel.

In other places, such as Homs and parts of Damascus, committees are equally focused on resolving intercommunal and housing, land, and property (HLP) disputes. For example, the committees in the suburbs of Daraya, Moadimiyah, and Sahnaya worked together to return civilians kidnapped and arrested during the violence there in May and to stop the attacks on the nearby Alawi suburb of al-Somoriyeh in September.

Expansion of informal intermediaries and religious bodies

More common than the formal civil peace committees are informal networks and individuals who do the same work as committees but under different names. Many of these networks are built around religious figures, as opposed to the aforementioned committees built around activists and administrative leaders of local towns. For example, in Homs, a small network of Christian priests, Sunni sheikhs, and Alawi leaders work together with the city’s mukhtars and security officials to resolve disputes and calm intercommunal tensions. While not a formal committee or council, these men are able to use their personal connections to each other and their respective communities to resolve many smaller issues.

In Homs’s Old City, the Syriac Orthodox Santa Maria Church is the main actor for settling disputes involving the neighborhood’s Christian population. The church’s leader, Father Yuhanna, has helped mediate disputes that occur between the residents and others in the city, but he also helps ease tensions when security officials conduct arrests or investigations of Christian men in the area. These religious and community leaders interact directly with the city’s security officials and the governorate’s political affairs director to discuss the implementation of laws and issues of government abuse.

In Salamiyah, the long-standing National Ismaili Council plays the same role through its various subcommittees. This council has been crucial for bridging the gap between the new government and the Ismaili population more generally, as well as the Alawi and Shia populations in Salamiyah specifically.

But in other places, the intermediary networks are much weaker and rely on only one or two individuals. This is particularly true in the coast, where Alawi communities face a double hurdle: a lack of historical civil society and extreme distrust and fear between themselves and the new government. Still, in some places, such as Tartous’s Sheikh Badr and Latakia’s Beit Yashout, there are individual men and women who do the same work as civil peace committees: improving communication between locals and security officials and resolving arrest- and security-related disputes.

For example, the mayor of Beit Yashout serves as a key communication node between the district security official and the local towns and villages. Whenever news of a large security convoy entering the area emerges, locals quickly message the mayor, who in turn calls the district security official to convey their concerns and learn what is happening. He then sends messages to a wide network of local leaders and media activists, sharing what the official told him and urging calm (the authors witnessed this first hand during a visit in September). He also regularly sits with security personnel at checkpoints to help encourage closer relations between them and the locals. In a region wracked with fear, these basic actions are critical for reducing tensions and preventing reckless actions by terrified locals and security forces.

Reconciliation committees

Both the formal civil peace committees and informal networks are new phenomena which have been met with mixed reactions by local officials. But there is a third type of dispute resolution mechanism, which has for decades been a staple of Syrian society: the reconciliation committee (majlis al-sulhi). However, these committees differ significantly from civil peace committees both in scope and the type of communities they serve.

Reconciliation committees focus almost exclusively on HLP issues for displaced people. The bulk of the dispute resolution conducted by the bodies are between those community members who were displaced and those who remained under the regime. They are most commonly found in Sunni communities in Idlib, Hama, and Homs, and they rely heavily on close family and communal ties for mediation. Nonetheless, these committees have long been embraced by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-backed Salvation Government in Idlib, setting a precedent for the new government’s acceptance of such civil peace-oriented systems. This acceptance should now be extended to the civil peace committee model.

Creating opportunities for peace

Creating lines of communication may be the most important function of these different systems. They often provide the only means of engagement with the authorities in places where many people are too afraid to approach officials on their own. These committees and networks also play a central role in resolving intercommunal and community-state disputes before they spiral into serious violence, as happened in Hamrat Amurin in September.

Much of the work of civil peace committees is initiated by motivated individuals who take it upon themselves to advance intercommunal trust-building. Many Ismaili and Christian activists who have been involved in these networks since December have stressed the same thing to the authors across multiple field trips—that local groups must assert themselves to the new government and force it to work with them. This approach has proven to work, but it is also a difficult concept for many activists, especially those from the Alawi community, to embrace when there is so much fear and distrust, and inconsistent government treatment of civil society more broadly.

Thus, most activists working in civil peace and dispute resolution issues emphasize the need for officials to genuinely engage with their work while giving them the space to operate freely. Members of multiple committees also discussed with us the need for logistical support to expand their networks, linking committees across districts to help share experiences and strategize communication and dispute resolution approaches. Such regional networks would give rural areas a more grounded view of the situation in other regions, undermining the chokehold that social media misinformation has on much of the country.

Inconsistent government limitations

Yet despite the benefits of this system, many civil peace activists across the country are still facing obstacles from the new government. While committees in places such as Qadmus, Damascus, and Salamiyah have seen many successes, the experiences of cities such as Baniyas, Masyaf, and Dreikish show how reliant this system is on a cooperative local government.

In Baniyas, a civil peace committee was formed after the extreme violence the city experienced on March 6, bringing together prominent Sunni and Alawi activists and religious leaders. Yet while it gave space for the Alawi community to voice complaints and work with local officials, their demands have been consistently ignored. The committee has been described by some former members as essentially being a mouthpiece for the local government, with no real agency of its own.

Masyaf’s short-lived committee faced a more direct challenge from its local government. In June, activists in the city gathered more than five hundred people to hold the country’s first-ever local elections for a civil council. Prior to the election, the organizers had received approval from the district director, Muhammad Taraa, to create the new body. Yet as soon as it was formed, Taraa began to oppose it. After sidelining and ignoring the new council for a month, Taraa called on the Hama Political Affairs Office to order its disbandment. Civil peace work in the district has now gone partially underground, with only a small civil peace committee now working exclusively on securing the release of ex-regime soldiers from the district’s rural villages who were captured by opposition forces during the final battles of the war.

Tartous’s Dreikish District has largely been another success story for the role of civil peace committees, but recent pressure from some local officials may undermine the positive steps that have been made. Like with the Ismailis in Qadmus, a small group of respected and educated Alawi leaders formed a committee in Dreikish the day after the regime fell. These men worked closely with Damascus’s newly appointed security official, fostering a deep bond of trust that endures today. However, the official was later transferred out of Dreikish, and his replacement was executed by local insurgents on March 6. The committee members were able to save the lives of the rest of the General Security officers that night, but the murder of the official has resulted in new pressure on the area since March. Now, two of the districts’ security officials still work closely with the committee, while a third views the body with distrust and refuses to engage with it. Committee members stress the importance of the close personal relationship they had built with their first official as well as the official killed on March 6, and the role these personal friendships and animosities play in the effectiveness of their work today.

Even when local government officials do embrace these committees and informal networks, their ability to address local grievances remains limited. These systems almost always engage with security officials—representatives of the Interior Ministry charged with overseeing the Internal Security Forces. Thus, issues such as the behavior of checkpoint personnel, detentions, and communication are more easily addressed, but these local officials have no say over the more pressing structural issues such as economic recovery, the settlement problem, political demands, and services. The inability of local security officials to address these topics limits the trust-building impacts of their engagement.

Empowering committees

Despite the potentially significant benefits of an expanded and empowered civil peace committee network in Syria, this system is largely isolated to addressing the symptoms of social discord. These committees should form one part of a broader approach to civil peace, bridging organizations and wider Syrian society with good governance practices to gradually break down the anger and loss felt between Syrian communities. One former civil defense member in Aleppo, who now works on humanitarian and civil peace issues, described the problem to the authors this way:

“Civil peace itself is not a means but an end. . . it is not possible to make people accept this idea so quickly. . . but the government is burning this by trying to make everyone accept each other in a few days. They don’t understand civil peace. . . In all of Syria, there are civilian intermediary offices working between General Security and the people. . . But these offices solve the problems only after they occur. We have to focus on dealing with the source of conflict, not just one symptom.”

Some committees and civil peace activists fear that expansion could result in backlash from the government. Licensing issues and anxiety offer state monitoring stem from the government’s unclear and discouraging policies toward civil society. Instead, Damascus should understand the benefits these committees can provide as allies for civil peace.

The Syrian government should create and enforce a clear policy for how its security and political officials engage with civil society organizations that work on civil peace and sectarian issues. This policy should encourage the creation of independent civil peace committees across districts and sub-districts experiencing sectarian tensions, particularly in the coast, Homs, and rural Hama.

Damascus should ensure that officials engage with these committees in a genuine and honest manner to maintain their trust with their own communities, without which these committees are entirely ineffectual. Lastly, Damascus should expand the type of officials and government bodies that engage with these systems to begin addressing non-security-related local issues. This would increase peoples’ trust in both these intermediaries and the local government, while also providing more senior officials with granular insights into the needs of these area.

International organizations can support this work by funding trainings and dialogue sessions that bring together committees and activists from different parts of the country to share their experiences and best practices. Countries such as Turkey and Qatar that provide training to Syria’s Ministry of Interior personnel can also support these local peace efforts by including civil engagement and communication courses when training security officials.

Despite their mixed track record, these committees have laid forth a blueprint for preventing intercommunal violence and trust-building with the new government. Now they should be expanded across more areas and empowered by Damascus to operate freely rather than hindered. Taken together, this approach will help prevent further conflict while strengthening the new government’s ties to local communities across the country.

Gregory Waters is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Kayla Koontz is a PhD candidate at the Carter School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a researcher at the Syrian Archive.

The post How Syria’s grassroots civil peace committees can help prevent intercommunal conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While Trump talks peace, Putin is escalating efforts to erase Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 27 Nov 2025 13:53:15 +0000

US President Donald Trump has this week declared “tremendous progress” toward ending the war between Russia and Ukraine. This upbeat assessment comes following a sudden flurry of diplomatic activity sparked by a 28-point peace proposal that caught almost everyone by surprise, marking a new twist in Trump’s longstanding efforts to broker a peace deal.

Not everyone shares the US leader’s optimistic outlook. Skeptics note that while the United States and Ukraine have now reportedly agreed upon the broad outlines of a future settlement, there is very little to suggest that Russia is similarly interested in peace. On the contrary, the Kremlin has responded to Trump’s latest overtures by ruling out any major concessions and signaling that Moscow remains firmly focused on the maximalist goals of the invasion.

As talks between American, Ukrainian, and Russian officials continue, Russian President Vladimir Putin has underlined his true intentions by issuing a presidential decree calling for an escalation in efforts to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian identity from the approximately 20 percent of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control.

The decree, entitled “Russian National Policy Until 2036,” was published on November 25 and is set to come into force in January 2026, Reuters reports. It calls on the Russian authorities in occupied Ukraine to “adopt additional measures to strengthen overall Russian civic identity.” The policy document also praises the invasion of Ukraine for “creating conditions for restoring the unity of the historical territories of the Russian state.”

This bureaucratic language is an attempt to sanitize the Kremlin’s ongoing campaign to erase Ukrainian national identity. Throughout Russian-occupied regions in the south and east of the country, Moscow has instituted a reign of terror against the civilian population while systematically targeting the symbols of Ukrainian statehood, language, heritage, and culture.

Wherever Russian troops advance, local populations are subjected to large-scale arrests, with anyone deemed a potential threat to the occupation authorities likely to disappear into a vast network of camps and prisons. Victims typically include elected officials, journalists, religious leaders, activists, and military veterans. A UN investigation published in spring 2025 found that these detentions constituted a crime against humanity.

Those who remain are pressured to accept Russian citizenship or face being deprived of access to essentials such as healthcare, pensions, and banking services. In line with Kremlin legislation adopted earlier this year, property owners who refuse Russian passports can be evicted from their homes and deported. Meanwhile, schoolchildren are being taught a heavily militarized Kremlin curriculum that demonizes Ukrainians while praising Russian imperialism and glorifying the invasion of their country. Any parents who resist these policies risk losing custody of their children.

The most notorious element of Moscow’s campaign to extinguish Ukrainian identity is the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, around twenty thousand victims are believed to have been taken to Russia and subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian identity. In 2023, the International Criminal Court of The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin over his personal involvement in these child abductions.

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Russian policies in occupied Ukraine serve as a chilling blueprint for Putin’s future actions if he is able to establish control over the entire country. Indeed, Russia is already actively seeking to depopulate large parts of Ukraine that remain beyond Moscow’s grasp. In front line areas throughout southern Ukraine, the Russian military has embarked on an unprecedented campaign of targeted drone strikes against the civilian population that has killed hundreds and been branded a “human safari.” A recent United Nations probe concluded that these attacks are war crimes with the goal of making whole towns and cities unlivable.

Likewise, during 2025 Russia has intensified the missile and drone bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian population and the country’s critical infrastructure in an apparent attempt to spark fresh waves of refugees. Due in part to these attacks, Ukrainian civilian casualties rose by 27 percent during the first ten months of the year, according to the United Nations Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.

Putin’s posture during peace talks has raised further fundamental questions over his willingness to coexist with an independent and sovereign Ukraine. Ever since the initial round of negotiations in spring 2022, Russia has consistently demanded the comprehensive demilitarization of Ukraine. This has included calls for strict limits on the size of the Ukrainian army and the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess, along with a ban on NATO membership or any other form of military cooperation with Western partners.

Russia’s insistence on an internationally isolated and disarmed Ukraine remains at the heart of the current negotiations. This should serve as a massive red flag for anyone who still believes that Putin is ready for peace. The Russian dictator obviously has no intention of abandoning the reconquest of Ukraine and aims to resume the invasion in more favorable circumstances once Ukraine has been stripped of allies and rendered defenseless.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Putin’s determination to continue the invasion of Ukraine should come as no surprise. While Trump sees the current war as a geopolitical real estate deal, Putin believes he is on an historic mission to reverse the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire. This explains his otherwise inexplicable obsession with ending Ukrainian independence, which Putin has come to view as the ultimate symbol of modern Russia’s humiliating fall from grace.

On the eve of the full-scale invasion, Putin called Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” But his desire to extinguish Ukrainian statehood goes far beyond any toxic feelings of shared kinship. For Putin, the consolidation of a democratic, European Ukraine poses an existential threat to authoritarian Russia that could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in an imperial retreat that begin with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Haunted by the people power uprisings that brought down the USSR, he will do almost anything to prevent a repeat.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began with the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin’s crusade to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit has come to dominate his reign. In pursuit of this goal, he has sacrificed Russia’s relationship with the democratic world, while also doing untold damage to the country’s economic prosperity and international standing. After everything that has happened, he can hardly now accept a peace deal that leaves 80 percent of Ukraine permanently hostile to Russia and firmly embedded in the West. Putin’s propaganda machine is perhaps the most powerful in the world, but even his most skilled media managers would struggle to spin such an outcome as anything other than a disastrous Russian defeat.

Putin’s latest presidential decree demanding further efforts to create a Ukraine without Ukrainians underlines the absurdity of attempts to find any meaningful middle ground between Moscow and Kyiv. With a compromise peace out of the question, Putin’s plan is to keep fighting while hoping to outlast the West and exhaust Ukraine. He will continue to engage in negotiations with the United States as a tactic to stall further sanctions and divide his enemies, but there is virtually zero chance of Russia voluntarily accepting any deal that guarantees the continued existence of a Ukrainian state.

This does not mean that Putin cannot be forced to end his invasion. But it does mean that current efforts to broker a negotiated settlement are doomed to fail. Putin is convinced that in order to correct the historical injustices of the past three decades and safeguard Russia’s place in the world, he must destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. It is delusional to think that a man committed to criminality on such a grand scale could be swayed by talk of sanctions relief and minor territorial concessions.

Instead, the objective should be to increase the economic and military pressure on Putin until he begins to fear a new Russian collapse in the tradition of 1917 and 1991. This will require the kind of political courage from Ukraine’s partners that has been in short supply since 2022, but it is the only way to secure a sustainable peace in Europe. Putin dreams of taking his place in Russian history alongside Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Joseph Stalin, but he most definitely does not want to share the ignominious fate of Czar Nicholas II and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Every city the Russian military bombs, every child it kidnaps, every Ukrainian life it destroys today can only be understood within the long genealogy of Russia’s imperialistic state ideology. For centuries, this violent brand of expansionism has been directed at Ukraine.

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The present full-scale invasion of Ukraine will soon pass the four-year mark, but the war did not begin in 2022. It was preceded by eight years of warfare in eastern Ukraine following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. This has been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights, which has ruled that Russia has been conducting sustained military operations in Ukraine since at least 2014. But even this is only the most recent chapter in a far older story.

During the eras of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the authorities consistently pursued policies aimed at dismantling Ukrainian identity. Tactics included banning the Ukrainian language, repressing cultural and religious leaders, and imprisoning advocates of Ukrainian independence.

Most devastatingly, Stalin and his regime engineered an artificial famine in the 1930s that killed at least four million Ukrainians in less than two years. Today, this deliberate mass starvation of Ukrainians is known as the Holodomor (“killing by hunger”). No outlier, the Holodomor was central to a broader Soviet campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and other assertions of political autonomy. The lawyer who coined the term “genocide,” Raphael Lemkin, identified this attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation as the “classic example” of Soviet genocide.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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What unites these episodes is not only the violence itself but the ideology behind it. Moscow’s long history of crimes in Ukraine reflects an imperial worldview that treats human beings as resources to be harnessed for the state and as obstacles to be eliminated in the pursuit of total domination.

This ideology has evolved over time, but its core logic has remained remarkably consistent. Crucially, it has never faced sustained, meaningful repudiation by the international community. Because it was never confronted, Russia’s imperial ideology has been allowed to regenerate. A clear line of impunity links Stalin’s starvation of Ukrainian society in the 1930s to today’s Kremlin rhetoric insisting Ukraine is not a real nation at all.

This continuity is not abstract; it directly shapes present-day atrocities. When a state views humans as raw material for empire, the kidnapping and forced Russification of thousands of Ukrainian children becomes an acceptable instrument of policy rather than an aberration. This logic also applies to other aspects of the current invasion including filtration camps, torture chambers, rape and sexual violence, and mass deportations, along with the systematic destruction of Ukrainian cultural and religious life throughout every area under Russian control.

Ukraine’s top prosecutor notes that the number of open war crimes investigations has reached 178,391 documented cases. Indicating deliberate Kremlin policy, the former US ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice recently stated that Russian atrocities in Ukraine are “systematic” and have been identified “literally everywhere that Russia’s troops have been deployed.”

The current actions of Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine are the same state practices that have long defined Russian imperial rule: Absorb what can be absorbed, erase what cannot, and turn the conquered into fuel for the next stage of expansion.

Russia’s genocidal intent is not limited to eliminating Ukrainian identity. Putin’s extreme ideology drives him to pursue the incorporation of Ukrainians into Russia’s war machine against the West. The danger is not only the destruction of Ukraine as a nation, but the possibility that Russia will assimilate as much of Ukraine’s territory, cutting-edge technology, and population as it can before continuing further.

Contemporary Russian rhetoric makes this explicit. Strikingly, the Putin era has witnessed the resurgence of the slogan “We can do it again.” Originally graffiti scrawled on the Reichstag by Red Army soldiers in 1945, the popularity of this phrase surged after Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea to become a menacing mantra of modern Russian nationalism that signals a society intent on conquest and domination.

The atrocities we are witnessing today in Ukraine reflect centuries of Russian impunity. Impunity not only allows perpetrators to continue; it invites them to escalate. Russia’s imperial ideology has never been confronted with the kind of accountability needed to dismantle it. As long as this ideology persists unchallenged, the threat will not stop at Ukraine’s borders.

The international community now finds itself confronted with the consequences of a genocidal worldview that has been left intact for generations. The urgent question is not only how to halt Russia’s genocidal actions against Ukrainians today, but how to ensure that the world finally repudiates the extremist ideology that made this war possible. Without that repudiation, millions of Russians will remain convinced that they can, in fact, “do it again.”

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Once the group pushed into El Fasher, reports and footage circulating across social media and television revealed widespread killings of civilians. Around 1,500 people were killed and some ninety thousand displaced, with another fifty thousand fleeing violence in the neighboring North and South Kordofan provinces, according to the Sudan Doctors Network and the United Nations.

El Fasher had long been one of the most violent fronts in the devastating conflict between Sudan’s national army and the RSF. In April, the paramilitary group had intensified its offensive on the city, shortly after being driven out of the capital, Khartoum.

The world’s most serious humanitarian crisis

For years, the genocide unfolding in Sudan barely registered on the world’s radar. The international community remained more focused on crises in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine. But the fighting and killing in Sudan never stopped.

In a country in tatters, where there is no systematic record of the dead, casualty estimates vary. Some sources suggest that the number hovers somewhere around 150,000. However, human rights organizations believe that the real toll of the civil war is likely much higher. The conflict has displaced about fourteen million people out of a population of fifty-one million. Half of them are refugees in neighboring countries. As of April 2025, twenty-five million Sudanese were facing acute famine—and according to Doctors Without Borders, over 70 percent of children under the age of five were acutely malnourished. Among those who fled El Fasher, 35 percent suffered from “severe acute malnutrition.”

With severe damage to its hospitals and water supply, Sudan now faces one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises—one that some experts say even eclipses the emergencies in Gaza and Ukraine. Still, El Fasher is not the first, but merely the latest genocidal campaign in the country.

Naming the genocide

Engaging in war crimes and crimes against humanity, RSF soldiers have carried out child abductions, mass rape, sexual slavery, and village burnings for years, mostly in Darfur in western Sudan. Even as far back as 2001, the predecessor of the RSF—a militia known as the Janjaweed—repeatedly looted homes and engaged in gang rape in the region. Between 2003 and 2008, the group killed hundreds of thousands of non-Arab civilians. The campaign displaced around three million people and was described as a “genocide” by US President Joe Biden just before leaving the White House and as a “ethnic cleansing” by international observers. Against this background, Darfur is not a newly emerging hotspot. Home to several long-persecuted non-Arab tribes—Fur, Masalit, Berti, and Zaghawa—it is, in fact, again becoming one.

The Zaghawa, who are the majority group in El Fasher, rallied to the army in late 2023 after the RSF committed massacres against the Masalit and other non-Arab communities in the city of El Geneina in West Darfur. In a report released in May 2024, Human Rights Watch documented these killings as ethnic cleansing. The report cited the testimony of a seventeen-year-old boy who described the murder of twelve children and five adults from several families: “Two members of the RSF… tore the children from their parents and, as the parents began to scream, two other members of the RSF shot and killed the parents. Then they piled the children up and shot them. They threw their bodies into the river, along with their belongings.”

African apathy—and cynical regional powers

With its paltry communiqués, a powerless African Union has, for two years, contented itself with calling for an end to the fighting or expressing its concern about the humanitarian crisis, without ever sending a single African head of state to the front lines in Khartoum or to visit the victims of the El Geneina massacre.

In a press release marking two years of conflict, Amnesty International noted that “the world has only contributed 6.6% of the funds needed to address the humanitarian catastrophe raging in the country.” Observers usually recommend enforcement of the arms embargo, increased emergency humanitarian aid, and justice for the victims. However, there is one issue on which the United Nations Security Council and the mediators remain discreetly, if not embarrassingly, silent: the armed support that the belligerents receive from regional powers.

Egypt, Iran, Turkey, China, the UAE, and even Russia and Ukraine have all turned their attention to Sudan, siding either with the SAF or the RSF. Drones, gold, military intelligence, and mercenaries are all being used to intensify the violence of the war, while the meddling regional powers deny any involvement. Motivations for their involvement include securing the Nile’s waters, controlling the eight hundred kilometers of Sudanese Red Sea coastline, and the mineral resources of eastern Sudan. Sudan has also accused Chad and Kenya of being parties to the conflict. At the London Sudan Conference on April 15, the second anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef reiterated these allegations.

Clearly, the complex web of geostrategic interests in the region makes any mediation difficult, with Sudan even considering taking action against the UAE before the International Court of Justice for supplying the RSF with weapons.

The people as a solution

As it stands, Sudan is trapped in a dangerous regional power play and is threatened with partition. Should the country fall apart, this would not only destabilize the African continent but also endanger the exceptional Sudanese cultural heritage.

Any solution in Sudan must run through its civil society and, ultimately, its people. They are strong in part because of—and shown by—their history. With eight borders and a geostrategic position between the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, Sudan is a crossroads of African cultures, religions, and civilizations. The country still bears a name that means “land of the Blacks,” despite the attempts to erase its African roots carried out by the Islamist regime of long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir. Sudan, which rivaled ancient Egypt, eventually conquered and ruled the Egyptian throne, becoming the twenty-fifth dynasty of pharaohs. All this happened a long time ago, under Black African leadership, before Christians and Muslim Arabs expanded their influence in the country.

This history and legacy help explain the political resilience of the Sudanese people and the dynamism of Sudan’s civil society. Bashir’s ousting in 2019 would not have been possible without democratic resistance, embodied by civic organizations such as the Sudanese Professionals Association, the nonviolent Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, and the grassroots Girifna movement.

Today, as in the past, the Sudanese people—rather than an apathetic international community or meddling regional powers—could once again be the decisive force for change. Empowering civil society and grassroots organizations should therefore be the starting point for any diplomatic initiative.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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How we women of Afghanistan are defying Taliban repression

Sara — Wed, 19 Nov 2025 16:39:05 +0000

“Sara” is a pseudonym for a woman inside Afghanistan who has participated in efforts to document the Taliban’s oppression of Afghan girls and women, and whose name is being withheld for security reasons. Her story, translated from Farsi, offers a rare firsthand account of the daily struggles, grave risks, and violence that Afghan women endure to fight for their rights.

AFGHANISTAN—In the four years since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, the regime’s atrocities have stripped away every space I once knew—invading both the public and private spheres of my existence. I had no choice but to resist. In writing this article, I hope not only to document my ongoing experience, but also to reflect the voices of my Afghan sisters as we struggle together to defy our oppressors and their attempts to erase our humanity.

After their first press conference in August 2021, the Taliban made its vision clear. The group’s leaders shut schools, imposed a mandatory hijab, and banned women from working in nearly all jobs except those in primary education and healthcare. Since that time, their repression has only increased, as their supremacist ideology cannot coexist with a society where women are equal, educated, and free.

The systematic, institutionalized discrimination and oppression enforced by the Taliban is not a cultural or religious act and should not be disguised or excused as such. In October 2024, the Taliban’s minister for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice even ruled that adult women may not let their voices be heard by other adult women—not even to recite the Quran or perform religious recitations. While claiming to rule based on Islam, the Taliban has effectively criminalized our expression of faith, denying us the right to practice our religion freely.

My fellow detainees and I were kept for hours in the blazing summer heat, subjected to humiliating, hateful insults by our captors.

From the beginning, many of us Afghan women have taken to the streets to defend our rights, enduring beatings, arrests, torture, duress, and death. Over these past four years, we have also endured a profound form of social and psychological death, battling severe mental-health challenges, poverty, unemployment, despair, and hopelessness. Each new Taliban restriction pushes women and girls further into confinement, reducing us solely to the roles of caregivers, homemakers, and reproducers.

The big dreams I once carried—including the goal of one day leading my country—were taken from me overnight when the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan. So I joined the protests. For me, protesting is not just a form of reaction but a deep affirmation that I have agency and the will to survive. But I’ve paid a high price. When the Taliban first arrived four years ago, I joined a protest outside my office. The next day, my office manager told me, “Having you here is too much of a risk. It’s better you find another place to work.” I left my job that day feeling isolated and vulnerable. Unemployment only added to my struggles. I have also had to relocate numerous times due to the Taliban’s threats to harm me and my family, moving between neighborhoods and districts throughout Kabul and several times heading to other provinces.

In those early days of the Taliban takeover, we found the courage to stand firm in our beliefs. We understood that we were facing a terrorist group establishing a regime without limits to its repression and violence. During one of our first peaceful protests against the mandatory hijab order, we were attacked by the Taliban. The protest descended into chaos as we were met with gunfire and beatings. I was eventually detained with other women, captive to Taliban military officials who had no respect for our dignity, our rights, or any law. My fellow detainees and I were kept for hours in the blazing summer heat, subjected to humiliating, hateful insults by our captors. After hours of physical and psychological torture, the Taliban officials forced us to pledge that we would no longer participate in protests. What they planted in us that day was not fear but an even deeper determination to resist this regime’s dogmatic misogyny, which views us as less than human.

When the Taliban militarized our streets, we took our resistance indoors: writing, chanting, and singing “Bread, Work, and Freedom,” so our voices, criminalized by the Taliban, could awaken the world’s conscience. Many of us began running underground schools, some resisted online through art, and others began secretly documenting the Taliban’s atrocities in the hope of one day holding the group accountable by bringing cases against the Taliban at the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, codifying gender apartheid as a crime against humanity under international law, or through another international mechanism.

The documentation work to which I contribute involves recording Taliban decrees and abuses—along with the personal experiences behind them—to preserve the truth and ensure that victims’ voices are not silenced. This work is a response to the reality that here, inside Afghanistan, there is no functioning justice system. That is why we must turn to international law to hold the Taliban accountable. As those who participate in this work take on the risks of doing so, I urge policymakers to fulfill the promise of international law by drawing on documentation as evidence to pursue accountability for the Taliban’s crimes.

The totality of the Taliban’s atrocities can only be fully understood through a framework of gender apartheid, and the international community should acknowledge that these atrocities are crimes against humanity. Today, what we see is the slow, soft recognition of the Taliban regime by other countries. But it is accountability, not recognition, that is needed.

We are fighting for our rights. We need all people of conscience to act in solidarity, amplify our cause and our call, and work together for our shared humanity.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

Sara’s story was translated by Metra Mehran, the gender and policy advisor for the Strategic Litigation Project and a member of the End Gender Apartheid campaign.

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How we women of Afghanistan are defying Taliban repression

Sara — Wed, 19 Nov 2025 13:13:00 +0000

My fellow detainees and I were kept for hours in the blazing summer heat, subjected to humiliating, hateful insults by our captors.

We are fighting for our rights. We need all people of conscience to act in solidarity, amplify our cause and our call, and work together for our shared humanity.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

Sara’s story was translated by Metra Mehran, the gender and policy advisor for the Strategic Litigation Project and a member of the End Gender Apartheid campaign.

The post How we women of Afghanistan are defying Taliban repression appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Charai for Newsmax: Trump Only Leader Who Can End Genocide of Christians in Africa

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Nov 2025 04:26:02 +0000

Orginial Source

The post Charai for Newsmax: Trump Only Leader Who Can End Genocide of Christians in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The UN’s Western Sahara vote marks a diplomatic ‘Green March’

Sarah Zaaimi — Fri, 14 Nov 2025 18:04:18 +0000

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted last month for a historic resolution regarding the disputed territories of Western Sahara, endorsing the Moroccan 2007 autonomy proposal, which puts the territories under the kingdom’s sovereignty. The landmark vote comes after years of increased international momentum around the autonomy plan and lays the foundation for a resolution for the Sahrawi people, who have been held hostage to Moroccan-Algerian regional rivalry for fifty years.

Last month’s vote—which constitutes a rupture from the status quo of the international community’s decades-long balancing act between Moroccan and Algerian interests—came days before the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the 1975 Green March. The event saw a peaceful, Moroccan-led march of 350,000 people lead to the liberation of Western Sahara from Spanish colonialism.

When Spain withdrew, Morocco asserted historical claims of sovereignty over the territories, while the Polisario Front declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and sought full independence. The ensuing war and its 1991 cease-fire left the region divided by a fortified berm and a frozen political process.

Originally brought to the UN in 1963 as a decolonization issue, Western Sahara remains one of the world’s most protracted, unresolved conflicts.

Persistent challenges remain after last month’s landmark vote. Importantly, the Polisario Front has categorically rejected the UN resolution, stating that “it violates the territory’s decolonization status and undermines the UN peace process by supporting Morocco’s autonomy plan.”

But today, Morocco is nevertheless experiencing a similar dynamic to that hopeful moment in 1975, with the success of a series of well-orchestrated diplomatic victories, “marching” intently toward a lasting resolution of the conflict.

A man shows a card with the image of King Hassan II of Morocco that accredits he took part in the Green March 30 years ago during a ceremony marking that event in El Aaiun, Western Sahara, on November 6, 2005. Photo by REUTERS/Juan Medina.

This resolution marks a decisive turn in the future of the dispute, as it eliminates the possibilities of a partition or a referendum, focusing instead on crafting “genuine” autonomy and on the practicalities of the advanced regionalization plan under Rabat’s flag. The document expresses “full support of the Secretary General and his Personal Envoy in facilitating and conducting negotiations taking as basis Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal” and “calls upon the parties to engage in these discussions without preconditions, taking as basis Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal.”

The other previous proposals by the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) since the 1991 cease-fire, including a territorial partition or a referendum, were becoming increasingly obsolete and impractical in the eyes of key political players, given the demographic complexities on the ground. Drawing a line in the sand dividing Western Saharan people—who are a transnational community extending from Mauritania to northern Morocco, Algeria, and Mali—would only compound colonial border disputes, which led to the current conflict in the first place.

Similarly, a referendum is nearly impossible. Western Saharan people are not indigenous to the current disputed territories, and any voting lists would have to take into consideration the Hassani people’s movement since the fourteenth century. Not to mention, there is much ambiguity around the populations, which over the past fifty years moved to the Moroccan-administered territories (around 80 percent of the disputed land) and the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria.

The UN is playing catch-up

While this recent shift is deemed a turning point in the semantic sense, the UN is barely catching up with the fast-evolving realities on the ground. The Moroccan autonomy plan has been gaining momentum since 2020, when US President Donald Trump’s first administration recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and stated that the conflict can only be resolved within that framework.

Soon after, France and Spain—the former colonizers of the region, both at the very source of the current territorial disputes due to the legacy of colonial borders—decided to side with Morocco. Other key international allies have since joined this new momentum in favor of Rabat, including the United Kingdom, Belgium, Israel, and numerous Arab, Latin American, and African countries that opened diplomatic representations or undertook significant investment projects in Western Sahara in support of the Moroccan stance.

The second Trump administration has taken a more assertive approach, largely advocating for the autonomy proposal and offering to host mediations between the parties to the conflict. Trump’s current cabinet has been pressuring the UN, Morocco, and Algeria to push for a fast and sustainable deal—likely seeing resolution to the Western Sahara dispute as low-hanging fruit that Trump can add to his arsenal of peace trophies, according to sources from the current administration.

The United States in September signaled to UN Special Envoy for Western Sahara Staffan de Mistura that the only way forward for the conflict was under Moroccan sovereignty. Washington’s UN funding cuts added more pressure on MINURSO. MINURSO, which was becoming outdated and dysfunctional within the current context, had no other option but to play along to survive.

A firmer US leadership to harness peace

The United States has, meanwhile, been directly pursuing its own mediation efforts outside the corridors of the UN. Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior advisor for Africa, has prioritized the conflict and led several bilateral negotiations to address the dispute with North African leaders over the summer. He has also repeatedly reiterated Washington’s support of Morocco’s claim to the territory, even promising to open a consulate in Dakhla, Western Sahara, to cement this position.

Additionally, US Peace Envoy Steve Witkoff recently revealed in a televised interview that a Morocco-Algeria peace deal could be imminent. The interview, which was conducted alongside Jared Kushner—another strong Rabat advocate in the Trump administration and the de facto broker of the Morocco-Israel peace deal—reveals firmer US leadership aimed at advancing peace in North Africa, starting with Western Sahara.

The United States has been holding the pen on this recent UNSC resolution and trying to shape the conversation in line with its vision of the dispute. An earlier draft leaked to the media this week disclosed a more decisive tone in favor of Morocco and a less nuanced vision for the future of MINURSO, limiting the mission’s renewal to only three months.

Another less-known fervent supporter of Moroccan territorial integrity is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Abu Dhabi put its full diplomatic weight behind this new resolution by fielding multiple calls with UNSC permanent members, including France and Russia, to ensure their support of the US-proposed draft, according to my discussions with diplomatic sources.

Besides the UAE’s long-term push to build a pan-Abrahamic bloc in North Africa with Morocco, Mauritania, and Sahel countries, its president, Mohamed Bin Zayed, also has a lesser-known connection to the dispute. Indeed, the UAE president had lived and spent his formative years at the Royal Academy in Morocco. At age fourteen, he became one of the youngest participants of the 1975 Green March to Western Sahara alongside members of the Moroccan kingdom’s royal family. Once more, the UAE is walking along its historical ally, pouring thirty billion dollars in investments into the North African country and becoming the first Arab state to open a consulate in Laayoun, Western Sahara, in 2020.

The challenges ahead for an autonomy plan

Now that the diplomatic dust has settled, all eyes are on Morocco and whether it can practically operationalize its autonomy plan.

Rabat has been heavily investing in ambitious infrastructure and strategic projects in Western Sahara. Projects include the Atlantic Initiative, which is promising economic prosperity and integration for Western Sahara with landlocked Sahel neighbors. Additionally, the Dakhla Atlantic Port, a $1.2-billion project, is estimated to handle 35 million tons of goods a year starting in 2028. Other strategic projects include significant investments in adventure and business tourism infrastructures.

However, economic prosperity alone cannot guarantee a sustainable and genuine autonomy plan. Morocco will have twelve months to deliver a detailed, advanced regionalization workplan that outlines the territories’ governance and economic management through elected local representatives. This will also require constitutional reforms and a referendum on the Moroccan side, but, more importantly, an agreement from the Polisario Front to sit at the negotiation table and to operate under the Moroccan flag—a distinct challenge given their rejection of the resolution.

Sahrawi refugees attend the military parade celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Polisario Front and the outbreak of the armed struggle for the independence of Western Sahara in Aousserd in Tindouf, southwest of Algiers, Algeria, May 20, 2023. Photo by Amine Chikhi/APP/NurPhoto via Reuters.

Meanwhile, serious diplomatic moves are at play. The Moroccan king recently visited the UAE. Additionally, there are signs of appeasement between Algeria and France, with Algeria’s recent pardon of detained French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, a prominent advocate of a Moroccan Western Sahara.

King Mohamed VI also clearly stated in his address following the vote that he wants “no winners or losers” in this conflict and invited “his brother,” the president of Algeria, to revive the Maghreb Union together. These are all positive signals for meeting Witkoff’s prediction of a Morocco-Algeria peace deal within the next sixty days.

The UN Western Sahara resolution is an essential milestone in US leadership, aligning the international community with “the most credible and realistic” solution to end the fifty-year-long agony of the Sahrawi people. Still, much needs to be unpacked at the levels of local governance, economic resource management, and local culture promotion to achieve “genuine autonomy,” and to organize a second, peaceful Green March.

Sarah Zaaimi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Her research focuses on North Africa, the Western Sahara conflict, and Arab-Israeli normalization.

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A little-discussed point in Trump’s Gaza plan could be an opportunity to build interfaith understanding

Peter Mandaville — Mon, 10 Nov 2025 20:32:21 +0000

Inside US President Donald Trump’s twenty-point peace plan for Gaza is a call, largely unnoticed and buried towards the end of the text, for a new interfaith dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians.

More specifically, point eighteen reads:

“An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.”

Most have glossed over the point, likely dismissing it as rhetorical padding or meaningless fluff. They are wrong to do so. In fact, engagement with religious actors will be a crucial aspect of long-term peacebuilding in Israel and Palestine. If implemented wisely, Trump’s point eighteen could make a real contribution to peace. Implemented poorly, however, it risks becoming another exercise in empty symbolism.

Point eighteen can’t be about returning to the interfaith status quo. During a memorable conversation last year in Bethlehem, Palestinian pastor Mitri Raheb told me that when it comes to interfaith dialogue in Palestine and Israel, “the current paradigm is broken.”

The juncture the region faces today thus provides an opportunity to take up the challenge of bridging religious divides and to explore what a new model for effective local religious peacebuilding might look like—by questioning many underlying assumptions and learning from what has and hasn’t worked in the past.

At its heart, of course, the Israel-Palestine conflict is not a religious dispute. It’s a conflict over territory. Yet that land—Jerusalem, Hebron, Bethlehem—carries immense religious significance for Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike. Sacred geography makes the conflict not only political but also existential, rooted in identities, rituals, and sacred narratives. Sites like the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif are not just bargaining chips in negotiations. They are living spaces of prayer and devotion.

One thing Palestinian and Israeli religious leaders all agree on—as I’ve learned from many conversations with them—is that official negotiators have consistently marginalized their respective voices in efforts to achieve peace over the years. The assumption by political leaders—Israeli, Palestinian, and international alike—has been that religion is about absolute truths unamenable to the kind of transactional logic needed to negotiate peace. While this perspective is understandable, it couldn’t be further off the mark. Religious leaders possess unique forms of moral authority and social capital that no politician or diplomat can replicate.

For example, in the summer of 2017, Jerusalem teetered on the brink of spiraling into violence after Israel installed new metal detectors at the entrances to the Temple Mount or Ḥaram al-Sharif, leading to rapidly escalating protests and clashes. What ultimately helped defuse the crisis was not the local security forces or another round of shuttle diplomacy from foreign envoys but quiet intervention by local rabbis and Muslim scholars. Sustainable peace will ultimately require communities on both sides to embrace narratives that allow for coexistence—narratives that must be articulated in religious as well as political terms if they are to take root.

The inclusion of point eighteen in Trump’s plan is, therefore, a welcome development. But there is a significant risk of it being implemented in a manner that would be feckless at best and possibly even damaging.

The Abraham Accords—a geopolitical framework painted in religious overtones—supercharged an already burgeoning cottage industry of religious diplomacy largely centered on the Gulf Cooperation Council region. With the encouragement and endorsement of the United States, countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have organized a continuous parade of interfaith summits focused on peace, tolerance, and coexistence—many of them generating lofty-sounding declarations and charters affirming shared values and universal fraternity across faith divides.

These interfaith summits suffer from two shortfalls. First, the inspiring and, to be sure, very welcome words they produce are rarely followed by concrete plans to transform them into actions or deeds. This is not surprising because genuine social transformation of the kind that would be needed to realize their aspirations is deeply threatening to the governments whose patronage makes these convenings possible. For example, in some cases, it would require regional leaders to shift away from deeply entrenched policies of discrimination against their own religious minorities. Declarations of tolerance and coexistence make for excellent public relations, but they demand nothing of the signatories and change nothing on the ground.

Second, the religious leaders who attend these conferences, many of whom dwell at the top of their respective denominational hierarchies, are without doubt among the most eminent clergy in the world. Because of this, however, very few of them possess organic connections to or trust within communities on the ground. Many of them are also closely tied to one or another government, constraining their credibility and sometimes tainting them by association with official policies that often promote something very different from tolerance and coexistence. When a government-appointed mufti or state-approved bishop speaks about peace, communities struggling under occupation or siege have every reason to question whether these figures truly represent their interests or merely provide religious cover for political agendas.

The danger, then, is that point eighteen becomes the pretext for yet another round of comfortable interfaith conferences that produce ethereally beautiful statements wholly divorced from the local conflict settings in which communities struggle daily for peace with and through religion. This risks creating “peace theater”—performances of reconciliation designed more for international consumption than for any genuine transformation of relationships. Already, there are worrying signs that things once again may be heading in that direction.

Instead, point eighteen should lead back to the always-difficult work of ground-level interfaith peacebuilding in Palestine and Israel. This work has been going on for decades, often quietly and at great risk to those involved. It has involved rabbis, imams, priests, and lay religious leaders meeting in living rooms, walking the streets of contested neighborhoods together, and standing guard at each other’s holy sites during times of heightened tension. It has meant religious educators developing curricula that teach the history and theology of the other, and religious leaders jointly confronting extremism within their own communities. And it has often seen women of different confessional backgrounds risking everything to reach across lines that no one else is willing to cross.

This grounded religious peacebuilding has both done good and caused harm. On the one hand, it has prevented violence at flashpoint sacred sites, but on the other, it has masked and reinforced sharp inequities and power asymmetries. When interfaith dialogue occurs between parties in profoundly unequal positions—with Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and Israelis enjoying full sovereignty—there is always a risk that such engagement normalizes injustice rather than confronting it. These are not reasons to abandon interfaith peacebuilding, but they underscore why such work must be undertaken with careful attention to context, power dynamics, and the complex ways religion can both challenge and legitimize oppression. Once-celebrated initiatives such as the Seeds for Peace camps that brought young Israelis and Palestinians together have come under criticism for ignoring power imbalances between the participants.

If, against all odds, the current cease-fire does somehow produce the contours of a new political and security framework acceptable to all parties, religious leaders will have a crucial role to play in providing legitimacy for those arrangements. Political agreements, no matter how carefully negotiated, remain fragile abstractions until they are embraced and internalized by communities. Religious leaders can help translate the language of diplomatic protocols into the idiom of lived faith—explaining why a particular compromise is not a betrayal but rather an expression of religious values, or how a specific security arrangement honors rather than violates sacred obligations.

Most importantly, in the long run, sustainable coexistence will require a religious grammar that can only come into existence through the collective work of rabbis, imams, and clergy living and working on the front lines of broken and traumatized communities. This theology will not emerge from conference halls in Abu Dhabi or Riyadh. It will be forged in the much more difficult and dangerous spaces where people live with the daily consequences of this conflict—in Jerusalem and Hebron, in Gaza and the West Bank, and in villages and cities where the work of building peace means risking accusations of collaboration and betrayal from one’s own community.

The region doesn’t need more gleaming Abrahamic baubles; it needs a fraught, hopeful, and seemingly impossible new theology born from the rubble of Gaza. Point eighteen could facilitate that work—but only if it is implemented with genuine commitment to supporting grassroots religious peacebuilding rather than staging another round of well-catered interfaith spectacles. The choice between these two paths will determine whether this provision becomes a meaningful contribution to peace or simply another missed opportunity.

Peter Mandaville is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. He is also a professor of international affairs in the Schar School of Policy and Government and director of the Abu Sulayman Center for Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University. From 2024 to 2025, he served as the director of the Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships and senior advisor for faith engagement at the United States Agency for International Development.

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Angelina Jolie highlights the horrors of Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 10 Nov 2025 14:41:39 +0000

Hollywood star Angelina Jolie paid a surprise visit to Ukraine in early November in a bid to help raise international awareness about escalating Russian war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.

Plenty of A-list celebrities have come to Ukraine since the outbreak of hostilities in 2022 to show their support for the country, but Jolie’s appearance was no mere photo opportunity. Instead, she traveled to the front line cities of Kherson and Mykolaiv in southern Ukraine to see for herself how Russia is systematically targeting the civilian population in a deadly campaign of drone strikes that has been likened to a ‘human safari.’

“The threat of drones was a constant, heavy presence. You hear a low hum in the sky. It’s become known locally as a ‘human safari,’ with drones used to track, hunt, and terrorize people, constantly,” the American actor wrote in a post describing the Ukraine trip to her 15.8 million followers on Instagram. “I was in protective gear, and for me, it was just a couple of days. The families here live with this every single day. They’ve moved their schools, clinics, and daycare into reinforced basements, determined that life will go on. It was hard but inspiring to witness. Many people spoke to me about the psychological burden of living under continual threat, and the deeper fear of being forgotten by the world.”

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Jolie’s visit struck a chord with the Ukrainian public at a time when concerns are mounting that the country’s fight for national survival is slipping out of the international headlines. With the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion now approaching, Ukrainians are painfully aware that global audiences have become jaded by endless war coverage and are now no longer shocked or even particularly surprised by reports of fresh Russian war crimes. The high-profile actor’s decision to personally visit some of the most dangerous places in Ukraine was therefore welcomed as a particularly timely and meaningful gesture.

Many Ukrainians praised Jolie for exposing herself to considerable risk in cities that few international guests dare to visit. “Much respect and many thanks for your kind heart, Angelina Jolie!” commented the deputy speaker of the Ukrainian parliament Olena Kondratiuk. “Angelina Jolie went to Kherson, where Russian drones hunt civilians daily. That takes courage,” wrote Ukrainian journalist Svitlana Morenets. “I can’t help but praise her selflessness and kindness in choosing to help draw attention to Ukrainian civilians, especially children, suffering from the war.”

Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk called Jolie “one of Hollywood’s bravest hearts” and expressed her hope that press and social media coverage of the star’s trip could help educate international audiences about “the cynical drone safaris on civilians that the Russians love to do.” Fellow Ukrainian civil society activist Olena Tregub said she had been personally moved by Jolie’s visit and noted that it sent a “powerful message” to the local population that they have not been forgotten.

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Angelina Jolie is not alone in attempting to focus international attention on Russia’s ‘human safari’ tactics in Ukraine. A United Nations probe recently addressed the issue and confirmed that the Russian military is purposely targeting Ukrainian civilians in a coordinated campaign of drone killings with the aim of depopulating large parts of the country. In an October report by the UN Human Rights Council-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, investigators concluded that Russia’s actions in southern Ukraine amount to the crimes against humanity of “murder and of forcible transfer of population.”

The UN investigation covered Russian drone activity across three provinces of southern Ukraine including the regions visited by Jolie. It found evidence of systematic attacks against civilians including drone strikes on pedestrians, public transport, essential infrastructure, and emergency services workers, leading to the deaths of at least 200 people since July 2024. As a result of this relentless and coordinated bombing campaign, some of the targeted areas are now said to be “almost entirely vacated.” Crucially, the drones used in these attacks all featured video cameras allowing operators to methodically select and track victims, leaving no room for doubt regarding the deliberate nature of the killings.

Russia stands accused of committing a staggering quantity of war crimes in Ukraine, ranging from the destruction of entire towns and cities and the bombing of vital civilian infrastructure, to the mass detention Ukrainian citizens and the torture of prisoners. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges for his personal involvement in the mass abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children, which may qualify as an act of genocide.

So far, there has been little concrete progress toward holding Russia legally accountable for the invasion. Ukraine and the Council of Europe signed an agreement in summer 2025 to establish a special tribunal, but is remains unclear when further steps can be expected. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has signaled that the United States will no longer back international efforts to prosecute Putin. Despite these setbacks, Russia’s ‘human safari’ is worthy of special attention as it provides such conclusive proof of the Kremlin’s intention to kill Ukrainian civilians.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an attempt to shatter the existing international order and rewrite the rules of war. If Western leaders fail to impose additional costs on the Kremlin over the deliberate use of drones to hunt down civilian populations, this will set a potentially disastrous precedent that could soon be extended to the rest of Ukraine and beyond. Angelina Jolie’s efforts to highlight this crime against humanity will not prove decisive, but her celebrity intervention has at least made it more difficult for others to claim they did not know.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Matt Kroenig

If there is a strategy, it’s not clear to me. Maybe there is, but it just hasn’t been articulated. A good strategy starts with clear goals. So, what is it that they’re trying to achieve? It seems like there are at least two possibilities—and, of course, it could be both.

One is that this is about removing Maduro from power, and that could make sense. Maduro has obviously been an anti-American dictator, not good for Venezuela or the United States. Option two is that this is about border security and stopping narco-trafficking.

So, what are the major steps to achieve these goals? The military buildup has been the most prominent recent element. Is this just about striking drug boats? Seems like it’s more than that. If it’s about removing Maduro, then is the hope that he’ll self-deport? Senators Rick Scott and Lindsey Graham were on the Sunday shows last week with similar talking points about how Maduro should just go to Russia or China. Or is it possibly preparing for strikes on the mainland, maybe against Maduro himself? The United States has had a long-standing policy against assassinating foreign leaders, but Trump doesn’t seem to mind breaking norms.

Jason, how do you hear that from a regional standpoint?

Jason Marczak

The president has said that his top goal is stopping the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. And in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago in particular has been quite supportive of the strikes on the alleged drug-carrying vessels.

I think it’s also a signal to other countries in the region and around the world of how serious this administration is on security and stopping the flow of drugs. There have been other countries in the hemisphere where the administration has been putting pressure to do more to stop the flow of drugs into the United States, such as Colombia with the sanctioning of President Gustavo Petro and the decertification of Colombia as cooperating with the United States on drug-control strategy.

At the same time, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been very clear on this from his days as a senator. The secretary wants to see the dictator Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela out of power. Given [Rubio’s] Cuban ancestry, it’s very personal to him as well—the rise of dictators and what that means for the people and the erosion of civil liberties that we’ve seen across Venezuela hits home for Rubio. As the president mentioned on 60 Minutes, he does want to see Maduro go. He does see his days as numbered. The question is, to what extent will the United States go to actually advance the removal of Maduro?

I do expect there to be limited strikes at some point on Venezuelan territory, linked to the illicit drug trade.

At the same time, Maduro is seen across the region as a cancer. The erosion of the Venezuelan economy, the erosion of civil rights, the erosion of political freedoms—that has led to the largest mass-migration crisis that this hemisphere has seen. And the implications of that are not just migrants coming to the US southern border. There are migrants coming to parts of the region that have never seen such numbers of migrants—Chile, for example.

Lastly, there are a number of indications that the Western Hemisphere will figure more prominently in [the Trump administration’s forthcoming] National Defense Strategy (NDS) than in previous defense strategies. And security and stability in our hemisphere requires Nicolás Maduro not being in the Miraflores Palace in Venezuela; he creates instability across the broader region.

Matt, this is your wheelhouse. Is this Caribbean buildup a soft launch of that strategy?

Matt Kroenig

Every national defense strategy essentially starts by saying the homeland is the most important. And I think that’s true for any country and any leader. What I’m hearing is that this NDS will start by saying the homeland and the Western Hemisphere are priority number one, but then the Indo-Pacific and China are number two, and so on.

But you do already see more of a focus on the Western Hemisphere than in past administrations, and clearly, with this military buildup, we haven’t seen anything like this in many years.

Coming back to something that Jason said, there are different camps within this administration who may see this issue differently. Jason is absolutely right that Rubio has long been calling for the removal of Maduro, and he’s obviously empowered as secretary of state and national security advisor. There are probably others in the administration, more in the MAGA restraint camp, who are more worried about border security and the flow of drugs but are probably opposed to military conflict against Venezuela directly. This is a group that’s been criticizing US policy toward Iraq and Afghanistan over the years for failed military intervention. So for now, the camps are aligned in favor of greater pressure against Venezuela, but I doubt that there’s a coherent strategy that they’ve all signed off on.

This military buildup comes as Trump just returned from Asia, where he presided over a peace agreement between Cambodia and Thailand. He frequently talks up his role as a peacemaker. Are we seeing a foreign policy doctrine emerge at this point from Trump?

Matt Kroenig

Well, he’s always used the term “peace through strength,” and I think both parts of that phrase are important. It’s peace through deterrence. He is skeptical of long, drawn-out military campaigns like [those in] Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, but is willing to use short, sharp, decisive force. We saw the strikes against Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in the first term. We saw the strikes against Iran’s nuclear program this summer.

And so, for him, strikes against drug infrastructure in Venezuela, as Jason just alluded to, or maybe even against Maduro or regime targets themselves, is not inconsistent with this idea of peace through strength. What I would not expect to see, though, is some kind of Panama or Grenada situation of a full-scale, boots-on-the-ground, regime-change operation. It’s hard for me to see the Trump-Vance administration going for that kind of military action.

Jason Marczak

I fully agree with Matt, and this is consistent with everything that I’ve been hearing as well. There’s a high potential that we’re going to see limited strikes in Venezuela but, again, no commitment of any type of US forces in a way that would put American troops in harm’s way. Although [it’s] outdated, Venezuela does have an air-defense system. The Russians were tweeting the other day that they’re willing to come and assist the Venezuelans as needed, although I doubt that Russia has any capacity to do so at this point. But the question is: For Trump, does Maduro actually need to be removed from power for him to claim success?

Jason Marczak

There have been a number of different attempts at overthrowing Maduro over the years, and they are squashed pretty quickly. For one, you have Cuban agents who are embedded across the Venezuelan military and can quickly report any rebellious activities. And over the last twenty-five years, Venezuelan officials have also ensured that there is minimal communication among different military units to make it more difficult for a mass uprising. The most notable attempt to remove Maduro was five years ago—termed Operation Gideon—but the former Venezuelan troops never made it past the shores.

One of the ways that Maduro maintains that grip over the military is through the illicit activities that enrich the regime and thereby enrich the generals. So if we are able to significantly degrade Venezuela’s ability to engage in illicit activities—whether it’s drug trafficking, gold mining, arms trafficking, human smuggling, you name it—then Maduro has less resources to be able to pay off his generals, and that can hopefully lead to a desire from the armed forces to find a different path than one that’s dependent upon Maduro.

The context in Venezuela is really important as well. Unlike other countries where the US has intervened in order to topple a dictator without a clear democratic successor, there are clear leaders in waiting. There was a presidential election a year ago, in which Edmundo González, according to all voting sheets that have been made public, was elected as president. And he’s currently living in exile. María Corina Machado, who won the Nobel Peace Prize, is there in Venezuela fighting for the government that was actually elected a year ago. Venezuela also has its own vast critical resources and oil reserves to provide key economic resources, and there is a regional desire to help to promote stability [in the country].

Now, Maduro has supposedly offered to leave power. The administration has said that those offers have been rejected. But what we would need to avoid, in the case of Maduro leaving power, is that another one of his henchmen just assumes the presidency. There is robust support for the democratic opposition in Venezuela, but it’s about making it clear to the Venezuelan military as well that their future rests on respecting a transition that adheres to democratic principles.

Matt Kroenig

Jason was talking about other contexts. I’ve worked on US policy toward Iran for more than twenty years, and we have seen uprisings against the regime there, but the reality has been that the regime has been willing to kill to stay in power. That could also be a critical issue in Venezuela. As long as the security forces are willing to kill innocent civilians to keep Maduro or his successors in power, the US ability to engineer regime change from afar is limited.

Just Maduro himself leaving is probably not enough to get the goals that the Trump administration is looking for.

Jason Marczak

Picking up on Matt’s point, in the hopeful event that Maduro leaves, it needs to be made abundantly clear to the Venezuelan military the severe consequences of killing to remain in power. Most of these forces are not loyal to Nicolás Maduro. Many are either scared of being thrown in jail if they go against Maduro or are directly benefiting from the illicit financial resources that Maduro procures and then doles out to military officials. If those resources are drying up, well, do you want to take additional action to perpetuate a regime that’s falling? Or do you want to be on the right side of history?

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Gen Z protests have spread to seven countries. What do they all have in common?

Will Mortenson — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 20:21:16 +0000

The phenomenon of young people driving consequential political change is not new.

During the Arab Spring in 2011 and 2012, many large-scale demonstrations were led or at least widely participated in by youth. More recently, young voters helped unseat the party that had governed Botswana since independence and caused the vote share of South Africa’s African National Congress party to fall below 50 percent for the first time since the end of apartheid. Youth protesters in Bangladesh, too, ousted the government of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in July 2024.

Even against this backdrop, however, the global scale and impact of the Gen Z protests in the past year is unprecedented.

In Kenya, protests against rising prices, youth unemployment, and corruption broke out after the announcement of new tax hikes in 2024, with further protests taking place in July. In Indonesia, young people have been protesting against high allowances for members of parliament and widespread food poisoning brought about through the government’s school meals program. In the Philippines, public demonstrations sparked by the misallocation of flood relief funds began in September.

And there’s more. Outraged by government bans on social media, young people in Nepal burned the parliament building and ousted the sitting government on September 9. The same month, Peruvian youth protesting against increased crime and corruption sparked conversations about government overhaul. Morocco’s “Gen Z 212” movement, (named after the country’s international dialing code), took to the streets to express their frustration with government funds being directed toward preparations for the 2030 World Cup rather than public services. Just last month, demonstrations by disillusioned youth in Madagascar sparked by water and electricity failures sent the president into exile and prompted a military-led government overhaul.

The root causes of public upheaval vary widely across these seven countries, as do the countries’ political contexts and the ultimate outcomes of their youth-led protest movements. Moreover, these seven countries are by no means the only nations around the world that have experienced mass protests led by young people dissatisfied with the political status quo in the past few years, as evidenced by youth-led protest movements in Serbia and South Korea.

Even so, the past year’s Gen Z protests are worth analyzing together for what they have in common, as these movements are influenced by one another and were all initiated by youth adept at using technology to organize. And, as the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes demonstrate, there are other broad similarities that warrant further examination.

What do the data tell us?

For starters, six of the seven countries score well above their respective regional averages in the political rights component of the Freedom Index, indicating that these countries protect freedom of association, expression, and access to information better than their neighbors. The only exception is Peru, which only recently saw its political rights score dip below the Latin America and the Caribbean regional average.

Secondly, these countries all perform below the regional average on at least one key metric of prosperity, whether that be income, health, or education.

Nepal and Madagascar score higher than their regional averages on political rights

Nepal and Madagascar score lower than their regional averages on income

If people are prone to comparing their conditions to those of their counterparts in neighboring countries, then the data indicate that conditions for protests may be largely defined by an appreciation for relatively high levels of political expression and a frustration with relative shortfalls in income levels, health standards, or education quality.

Lastly, and critically, these countries all have notably high youth populations. In all seven countries, the median age is lower than the global median and the percentage of the total population between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four is higher than the global average.

What the data show, then, is that all these countries have a lot of young people with an understanding of democratic rights, expectations of government accountability, and legitimate grievances related to the lack of government service provision.

Pair that with a growing confidence in their ability to drive change due to youth protests that came before and access to technology that allows them to easily communicate and organize, and you get the globally connected youth movement that has sprung up in recent months.

A force for positive change, or a temporary disruption of the status quo?

Attempting to find explanations for why these youth-led protests are happening is important, but assessing their impact is even more critical. Of the seven countries where protests have occurred or, in the cases of Morocco and Peru, are still occurring, two have experienced full regime change.

In both Nepal and Madagascar, the head of state was removed and replaced with interim governments organized by military figures. Perhaps one explanation for the protests leading to regime change in these two countries is that, in both cases, the military stood by and allowed protests to oust the sitting government before ushering in transitional governments of their liking. In both countries, the political influence of the young people who instigated the upheaval has diminished as new governing regimes have taken shape. Youth in Madagascar have expressed frustration with a career politician and former opposition leader being chosen to lead the country’s National Assembly, and Nepalese protest leaders say they have been frozen out of the transitional government.

The effects of the Gen Z protests in countries that have not experienced regime or leadership change have been mixed. In Kenya, protesters succeeded in convincing President William Ruto to withdraw his contentious tax bill but failed to bring about the systemic change that many wanted. The Moroccan government has responded to protests by pledging to increase health and education spending, but protesters remain unsatisfied.

If the aftermath of the Arab Spring and last year’s revolution in Bangladesh are any indication, establishing more accountable democracies through youth mobilization will prove exceptionally challenging. It is too early to tell whether the recent youth protests will truly bring about the systemic change that young people are demanding, but breaking with history will undoubtedly require young people to sustain the tremendous organized effort they have undertaken.

What’s next?

As the effects of Gen Z protests continue to materialize, there are two important questions to consider.

First, can young people use their numbers and organizational power to make government more democratic, more accountable, and less corrupt in the long term?

Only time will tell whether the answer to this question is yes or no.

The second question is perhaps more interesting: Based on the characteristics of the countries where Gen Z protests have occurred, is it possible to predict where they will happen next?

While exact predictions are impossible, the number of countries with characteristics like those of the seven examined above is limited. For example, Honduras has a high youth population, scores well above the regional average on political rights, and scores well below regional income and education averages. Côte d’Ivoire also has a high youth population, scores well above the average Sub-Saharan African country on political rights, and scores below the regional average on health and inequality. If the governments of either of these countries are widely blamed for corruption or failure to deliver services among younger people, youth populations may well follow the example their counterparts around the world have set. In Côte d’Ivoire, initial frustration over the results of last month’s presidential election could serve as a flashpoint for prolonged unrest.

Côte d’Ivoire scores higher than the regional average on political rights

Côte d’Ivoire scores lower than the regional average on life expectancy

Broadly, the data show that countries within the “low freedom” and “low prosperity” categories that have high youth populations and relatively well-protected political rights, and that perform relatively poorly in at least one indicator of prosperity, appear more prone to Gen Z demonstrations.

This is not to say that Honduras, Côte d’Ivoire, or other countries that share similar characteristics are destined for a youth uprising. But it certainly should not come as a surprise if the movement of youth-led protests spreads further across the developing world.

Protesters in Madagascar took inspiration from the Gen Z movement in Nepal, which was in turn inspired by demonstrations in Indonesia. With protests in Peru and Morocco continuing, it is possible that the wave of Gen Z frustration with a lack of government effectiveness and accountability is only just getting started.

What is certain is that increased access to technology and global information has empowered youth in limited, flawed, and unaccountable democracies to attempt to incite change through organized protest.

The voices of these young people are undoubtedly being heard; whether their demands will be met remains to be seen.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

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UN report: Russia targets civilians in systematic bid to depopulate Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 28 Oct 2025 17:48:29 +0000

Russia is deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilians in a deadly drone strike campaign that aims to depopulate large parts of the country, according to a new United Nations report. The probe by UN human rights investigators found that Russia’s actions in southern Ukraine amount to the crimes against humanity of “murder and of forcible transfer of population.”

Fresh details of Russia’s war crimes against Ukraine’s civilian population were presented this week in a new report produced by the UN Human Rights Council-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. The investigation focused on Russian drone attacks in an area spanning more than 300 kilometers on the right bank of the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine including parts of the Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv provinces. Based on large quantities of publicly available video evidence and interviews with over 200 Ukrainian citizens, the report concluded that Russia was guilty of “systematically coordinated actions designed to drive Ukrainians out of their homes.”

Russian military drone operators in southern Ukraine were found to have routinely targeted individual Ukrainian civilians along with public transport, cars, private homes, and civilian infrastructure in a bid to establish a “permanent climate of terror.” At least two hundred Ukrainian civilians have reportedly been killed in these drone attacks since July 2024, while thousands more have been injured. Some are the targeted areas in southern Ukraine are now “almost entirely vacated.”

The UN investigation identified numerous instances on Russian attacks on first responders, including the bombing of ambulances and fire brigade crews attempting to provide emergency aid following earlier strikes. With sudden death from above now an everyday fact of life for the local population, residents of southern Ukraine say they feel hunted and refer to the relentless Russian drone attacks as a “human safari.”

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The drones deployed by the Russian military in this bombing campaign feature video cameras allowing operators to carefully select and track victims, confirming the deliberate and calculated nature of the killings. “All the types of short-range drones used in these attacks are equipped with live streaming cameras that focus on particular targets, leaving no doubt about the knowledge and intent of the perpetrators,” the UN report confirmed.

Russian intent it further underlined by the widespread practice of posting ghoulish video footage online celebrating drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians. These posts are often accompanied by menacing language and warnings for remaining Ukrainian residents to flee the area. “Russian military units often release videos of drone-eye views of civilians being killed, to be posted online by the units or groups affiliated with the Russian army, apparently as a means of amplifying the threat,” reports the New York Times.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

This new UN report underscores the industrial scale and systematic nature of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Moscow’s efforts to displace the civilian population in the Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv provinces are only one part of a broader Kremlin campaign to render much of Ukraine unlivable. This depopulation strategy is designed to fuel anti-government sentiment within Ukrainian society and increase the pressure on the Kyiv authorities to capitulate, while also generating fresh waves of Ukrainian refugees and setting the stage for further Russian advances.

In addition to the human safari tactics employed in regions of southern Ukraine located close to the front lines, Russia is engaged in a nationwide bombing campaign of civilian infrastructure that aims to deny Ukrainians access to basic amenities such as heating, electricity, and running water. These attacks are part of a long-running airstrike offensive that escalates each year on the eve of the winter season as Russia seeks to weaponize subzero temperatures and freeze the Ukrainian population into submission.

Since the beginning of the current year, Moscow has also increased the terror bombing of residential districts and other civilian targets such as hospitals and kindergartens in cities across Ukraine. This is fueling a climate of fear and has resulted in a series of mass casualty attacks including a ballistic missile strike targeting Palm Sunday churchgoers in Sumy and the bombing of a park and children’s playground in Kryvyi Rih. Ukrainian civilian casualties surged by 31 percent year-on-year during the first nine months of 2025 due to this intensification of Russian drone and missile strikes.

In a separate probe conducted earlier this year, UN human rights investigators determined that Russia is also guilty of committing crimes against humanity targeting the civilian population in occupied regions of Ukraine. A report released in March 2025 found that Moscow’s large-scale program of illegal detentions and mass deportations throughout areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control was “perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amounts to crimes against humanity.”

These United Nations findings make a complete mockery of Russia’s attempts to deny targeting Ukrainian civilians. While Kremlin officials frequently assert that the Russian army never deliberately conducts strikes on non-military objects and respects the human rights of noncombatants, overwhelming evidence identified by United Nations investigators demonstrates that Russia is in fact engaged in systematic and centrally coordinated efforts to attack Ukraine’s civilian population.

Russia’s use of drones to conduct a “human safari” in southern Ukraine marks a grim new milestone in the long history of Kremlin war crimes against civilians. UN investigators have now recognized this lethal drone campaign as a crime against humanity. Putin’s decision to target the Ukrainian civilian population in this coordinated manner is a reminder that the current Russian invasion is not only an attempt to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation; it is also an attack on the fundamental principles of international law.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Midwifery was not Farida’s dream. She had been a law student with aspirations to become a defense lawyer when the Taliban’s restrictions on women’s education forced her to change majors. She entered midwifery instead, but even that door soon closed. “Mine was the last class to graduate from this program,” she says.

Since the collapse of Afghanistan’s economy following the Taliban takeover, most patients can no longer afford private hospitals. Regime-run maternity wards are overwhelmed and lack even basic supplies. “Women must bring their own necessities for childbirth,” Farida explains. “Seeing them waiting for hours in the winter cold for a sonogram is truly painful.”

With midwifery education banned, the shortage of skilled workers has reached crisis levels. In one ward, “only three midwives handle all deliveries, leaving women without safe care,” Farida says. Family planning has collapsed too. “Some secretly used hormonal drugs, but now there’s no access,” she says. “The only option left is condoms, yet many husbands forbid them, and mullahs denounce them as un-Islamic.”

She recalls one woman in her forties: “She wanted a tubal ligation because her husband insists on more children. But all medical procedures to prevent pregnancy are forbidden.” Acts of violence against women multiply under Taliban rule: an act of violence from inside the home is reinforced by another from a regime that controls women’s bodies.

A head midwife adds: “We see rising domestic violence. Men can now act with more impunity. Pregnant women come in on the verge of losing their babies, or even their own lives, because of beatings.”

Restrictions on women’s movement without a mahram (male guardian) have driven up home births, which are often unsanitary and deadly. Fatal bleeding, infections, and cases of surgical gauze left inside women’s bodies are rising.

And yet, despite this desperate need, female graduates are prohibited from working. “The health system is collapsing, but the Taliban issue work permits to doctors from abroad, in countries such as India, while Afghan women sit at home,” Farida says bitterly.

Amina’s story: Weaving hope amid oppression

“Talking about the last four years is like flipping through a diary filled with pain, passion, and resilience,” says Amina, the owner of a small clothing brand.

In 2019, she started her brand in a tiny room with two sewing machines and a few meters of fabric. A psychology graduate, she poured her creativity into garments. “Every stitch was a story of women striving to be seen,” she says.

On August 15, 2021, Amina was at her workshop when her family called: the Taliban had entered Kabul. She locked up and rushed home. “They didn’t just take my job,” she recalls. “They stole my dreams, my goals, and part of my existence. I felt like a broken soul.”

A month later, she cautiously reopened her shop, hiring back both male and female workers. Within just a few days, Taliban officials raided it. They insulted and humiliated her employees for working in mixed spaces. She tried separating the workshops by gender but in the end was forced to close her shop entirely and continue only online.

Her ordeal didn’t end there. “One day, while I was traveling with my brother to Shahr-e-Naw to deliver clothes, a Taliban soldier stopped us. He told my brother, ‘A man whose sister drives should die of shame.’ When my brother defended me, they took us both to their station. I had to sign a pledge never to drive again.”

Last month, she saw Taliban forces detaining women in markets, restaurants, even on the streets. “I’ve seen them beaten, dragged by their hair, and thrown into vehicles. I have not left home in weeks.” Still, she clings to the hope that one day she will live without fear—that the walls of her home will no longer feel like a prison.

Samira’s story: A teenage girl caught between a nightmare and hope

“It was noon. My English class was at one, and I was slowly getting ready,” recalls Samira, a young woman from Herat who was barely sixteen on August 15, 2021. “That day was not like others—rumors echoed everywhere. Fear was in the air. Some couldn’t believe Afghanistan would fall so easily. Neither could I. How could we return to the days in A Thousand Splendid Suns?” she says, referring to the 2007 novel by Afghan-American author Khaled Hosseini, which depicts women’s experiences under the first Taliban government.

At 12:45 p.m., a friend called her, urging her to come to class. As she headed out, her family blocked her path, warning that the Taliban was near the city. “I became angry. I thought: Impossible! This generation won’t surrender so easily.”

By 2:00 p.m., another call confirmed the chaos. “Gunfire was echoing, fear spreading,” she remembers. “My friends said their brothers scolded them for going to class. We knew then our happiness was over, and pressure from the Taliban, and our own families, would only intensify.”

As she and her family fled the city center, two images stayed with her. One was across from her school on Mstufiat Road—a police ranger wearing a uniform that reminded her of the Afghan flag, along with officers pacing anxiously, their eyes fixed on an uncertain future. The other was the school itself. “I didn’t know my last day there would truly be the last,” she says quietly.

“I miss everything, my friends, teachers, exams, even the blackboard,” she says. “Four years of my life disappeared into a corner of my home. That day was the end. I never saw the ranger or those officers again. I never thought I would long for such ordinary moments, but I do.”

***

Farida, Amina, and Samira’s voices reflect only a fraction of the immense crisis facing the women of Afghanistan today. Deprived of education, employment, and autonomy, they endure collapsing health services, closed schools, and growing violence. Every day brings new restrictions—on their bodies, their work, their presence in society.

These are just three stories. In every province, countless women face even deeper pain and despair under a system of gender apartheid unparalleled in the world today.

Amid this suffering, it is important not only to document that grim reality but also to honor Afghan women’s persistence: their fight to preserve dignity, resist erasure, and hold onto hope under the harshest of conditions. Confronting this crisis demands more than sympathy; it requires global solidarity and the creation of safe structures for the women and girls of Afghanistan.

Mursal Sayas is a human rights advocate and the founder and CEO of Women Beyond Borders / Les Femmes Au-delà des Frontières. She is also the author of Qui Entendra Nos Cris?

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

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Russia’s ‘human safari’ in southern Ukraine is a warning to the world

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 20:57:59 +0000

On October 20, pensioner Larisa Vakulyuk was killed by a Russian drone while tending to her goats in the Ukrainian city of Kherson. The murder of the 84 year old Ukrainian grandmother was a deliberate act carried out by a Russian drone operator using a video camera to hunt his victim. There can be no realistic doubt that he knew exactly what he was doing. One week earlier, Russian drones attacked a United Nations convoy traveling in the nearby area, damaging two clearly marked lorries carrying humanitarian aid. “This is a reminder of the incredible dangers Ukrainians face every day to feed themselves,” commented UN World Food Program Country Director for Ukraine Richard Ragan.

These two incidents are part of a comprehensive Russian bombing campaign targeting the civilian population in the Kherson region of southern Ukraine. Kherson lies on the right bank of the Dnipro River, directly across the river from territory currently under Russian occupation, placing it well within range of Russian drone operators. Since summer 2024, Russia has been conducting an unprecedented drone offensive designed to terrorize local residents and render the entire region unlivable. The indiscriminate nature of these attacks and the scale of the killings have led some to label the campaign a human safari.

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Anyone approaching Kherson is immediately made aware of the threat from above. The entrance to the city is marked by signs reading “Warning! Danger! Enemy Drones.” Meanwhile, major roads leading into the heart of Kherson and the Dnipro River are covered in improvised netting in a bid to offer some basic protection against the ever-present threat of Russian drones.

For local residents, Russia’s human safari has made sudden death from above an everyday fact of life. During the first nine months of 2025, more than a hundred people were killed and over one thousand were wounded in drone attacks. Those who remain say they feel hunted whenever they dare to leave their homes and venture out into the open air. A United Nations report released in May 2025 concluded that the Russian drone attacks were part of a systematic, coordinated state policy and constituted a crime against humanity.

The Russian side does not appear to have any serious reservations about the routine targeting of Ukrainian civilians in this manner. On the contrary, video footage of drone attacks on the Kherson population are posted online on an almost daily basis and are typically met with overwhelming approval. Nowhere is deemed off-limits by Russian drone teams. Targets have included private homes and residential buildings, cars, buses, and pedestrians. On numerous occasions, ambulances have been targeted as they have attempted to provide emergency care for victims of earlier attacks.

The hardest hit communities are those located along the banks of the Dnipro River and therefore closest to the Russians. In these riverside districts, Russian drones are a more or less constant feature circling in the sky and waiting to attack anything that moves. This makes it extremely difficult to repair damaged infrastructure or deliver essential supplies such as food and medicine. Instead, life has ground to a halt.

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Combating the Russian drone menace is a relentless technological struggle as each side races to innovate and evade the latest countermeasures. In practical terms, it is often difficult for the Ukrainians to cope with the very large numbers of drones deployed by the Russians. The present interception rate in late October of around 80 percent may sound impressive, but this means that 20 percent of drones are still getting through.

Kherson’s current predicament should set alarm bells ringing across Europe and beyond. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely recognized as the world’s first drone war. Moscow’s human safari tactics in Kherson offer a chilling window into what this could mean when military drone technologies are unleashed against civilian populations.

Based on what is known about the Russian human safari campaign in the Kherson region, it should now be abundantly clear that drones can potentially paralyze the life of any modern city. They can be used to leave the population without access to electricity, water, and heating, while also disrupting core supply chains and even preventing people from setting foot outside.

Few countries are currently ready to address this threat. Indeed, the recent appearance of small numbers of Russian drones in Polish airspace and above strategic sites such as airports across Europe has highlighted how unprepared many NATO members are to face the rapidly evolving challenges of drone warfare.

These challenges are nowhere more immediately apparent than in Kherson, which has been living with the horrors of Russia’s human safari for more than a year. The fate of Kherson should serve as a warning to the wider world about the threat posed to civilians by military drone technologies. As countries seek to protest their populations, Ukraine’s unrivaled experience will prove priceless.

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov is Deputy Head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration.

Craig Jackson — Wed, 01 Oct 2025 19:58:50 +0000

On October 2, 2020, Belarusian human rights defender Andrei Chapiuk was arrested as part of a sweeping crackdown on the country’s civil society following mass protests in the wake of a presidential election that was widely considered fraudulent. Chapiuk is a volunteer for the Belarusian NGO Viasna, one of many civil society organizations specifically targeted by the Belarusian authorities and falsely accused of orchestrating mass demonstrations against Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Like many Viasna staff and volunteers, Chapiuk faced trumped up charges and was tried in a closed session of the Minsk Municipal Court. He received a fine and a six-year sentence. In April 2025, Chapiuk was released.

More than 1000 political prisoners remain behind bars in Belarus, including other Viasna staff and volunteers such as Ales Bialiatski, Uladzimir Labkovich, Valiantsin Stefanovic, and Nasta Loika. Viasna volunteer service coordinator Marfa Rabkova was arrested two weeks before Chapiuk and is also still in prison. The UN Special Rapporteur monitoring human rights in Belarus has consistently called on the Belarusian authorities to cease the persecution of human rights defenders and others in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of civil and political rights.

This month marks five years since Chapiuk was imprisoned. From exile, Chapiuk spoke to Human Rights House Foundation to discuss life after prison in a new country and reflect on the realities facing his colleagues still behind bars. When asked about life following his release, Chapiuk says the impact of prison is only truly understood once a person is free. “Everything surfaces, the whole experience of imprisonment. It’s like the body finally feels it can release everything that’s been piling up.”

Freedom, Chapiuk argues, brings a painful clarity to what has been taken away. “Six months, one year, then three; those numbers felt oddly insignificant because you were always surrounded by people who had served longer. Once you’re free, you realize how long that time really is.”

Chapiuk remains deeply concerned for his friends and colleagues who are still unjustly imprisoned, such as Marfa Rabkova. “Masha has missed so much over this period, left so much behind. There are health problems, too. I think it will feel even heavier when she’s released.”

The longer you’ve been inside, says Chapiuk, the harder it is to adjust to the new realities of freedom. “You step out into a world you last saw during COVID. People in masks. Now there’s a war. Belarus feels emptier. Technology has leapt ahead and you’re supposed to just jump right back in.” The arrival of artificial intelligence especially struck him. “In prison, we heard rumors. Once free, I was amazed at how cohesive and powerful these tools are.”

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Chapiuk says that political prisoners in Belarus now face restricted access to books and education. “When I arrived in 2023, inmates could still apply for secondary education. Months later, the authorities cut it off entirely, especially for those of us on the extremism list. Then they started confiscating foreign language books, even personal ones.”

The confiscation of books is used as a form of punishment. “People tried hiding their own books but staff still found and confiscated them. The mindset in the system is that prisoners must suffer constantly. And since political prisoners tend to value books and education, the system decided to eliminate those.”

While discussing what life might have been like if he had not been arrested in 2020, Chapiuk is adamant that there really was no alternative. “Historically in Belarus, after civic activity, repression follows. I expected something to happen after the 2020 protests, but not the scale. Given the situation in Belarus, I’d likely have ended up either imprisoned or forced into exile anyway.”

On the subject of exile, we discuss Chapiuk’s decision to leave Belarus after his release. Faced with constant harassment and the likelihood of rearrest, he felt that fleeing Belarus was the only option. “The police presence in Belarus is constant. Former prisoners are subjected to mandatory check-ins twice a month, weekly lectures, and home visits, often late at night with flashlights in your face.”

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In early 2022, news of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine reached Belarusian inmates via state media. “Only later did I learn the truth about occupied cities and mass casualties. There was constant fear that Belarus would be dragged in and that we prisoners would be used as cannon fodder,” Chapiuk recalls. He says that even the prison guards seemed unsettled, secretly following independent news sources and perhaps worrying about what role they might be forced to play should Belarus enter the war.

International attention has become a complex issue for Belarusian political prisoners in recent years. Relatives of prisoners often ask human rights organizations not to make posts marking detention anniversaries or birthdays, as such attention can lead to reprisals inside prison. At the same time, Chapiuk argues that media coverage can make a difference. “After reports of abuse, inspectors arrive at colonies or jails. Prisons often hide people in punishment cells, but overall, high-profile prisoners are sometimes mistreated less to avoid trouble.”

Chapiuk emphasizes the importance of keeping the health of political prisoners high on the agenda. “The more medical units are checked, the more violations are documented, the better for inmates in the long run. Prison healthcare is terrible everywhere.”

Letters were once a lifeline for political prisoners in Belarus but are now heavily censored, says Chapiuk. Nevertheless, he urges people not to give up and to continue writing. “Even if letters don’t reach us, the authorities see the activity. It shows we’re not forgotten.”

The families of political prisoners also face pressure and can be targeted by the Belarusian authorities. Chapiuk recalls the case of one co-defendant’s mother who was given a prison sentence for simply sharing information about her son. “The state has built a second ring of repression to cut off information flows.”

Chapiuk is deeply troubled by the idea that the suffering of Belarusians will be forgotten and that no one will be held accountable for the years of abuse, despite the extensive documentation of human rights violations by Belarusian civil society. Recent prisoner releases have given him hope, despite the fact that these releases have often been followed by forced exile. “It would be better if people were freed earlier, not just at the end of their terms. But still, each release matters. It means someone can finally live freely again and feel what freedom really is.”

Craig Jackson is senior communications officer at the Human Rights House Foundation.

URUMQI, China – Police officers guard an area near the international grand bazaar in Urumqi in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on July 5, 2013. (Kyodo) ==Kyodo NO USE JAPAN

Beijing, for its part, views the majority of Uyghurs as a security threat following several small-scale attacks by the TIP in the early 2000s, and it claims that its harsh measures in Xinjiang are meant to eradicate terrorism.

The TIP is a jihadi group primarily composed of Uyghurs from the Western Chinese province of Xinjiang; estimates of its size range from 1,500 to four-thousand fighters. Beijing’s oppressive policies against the Uyghurs underpins and helps to fuel their goal of establishing an Islamic Uyghur separatist state in Turkestan, in northern central Asia—including parts of China’s Xinjiang Province. Although the TIP has not yet made any territorial claims to establish Islamic Turkestan, its attacks against Chinese interests in Afghanistan demonstrate its capabilities and intent to pose an ongoing threat to China. These attacks drive the cycle in which Bejing paints all Uyghurs as terrorists then cracks down on Muslims in Xinjiang, providing TIP with leverage to generate propaganda and continue attacks.

Furthermore, the TIP has longstanding links to al-Qaeda, with its former leader serving on al-Qaeda’s Shura council during the 2010’s. This alliance, underpinned by a shared Salafi ideology and commitment to violent jihad, ultimately led to a brigade of about 2,000 Uyghur TIP members fighting alongside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), al-Qaeda’s affiliate in northern Syria, in the Idlib province during the Syrian Civil War.

Although the TIP aligned with al-Qaeda after ISIS and al-Qaeda split in 2014, ISIS is currently targeting the group for recruitment and partnership, likely as part of a broader recruitment campaign. ISIS-K is recruiting from multiple disaffected groups across Central Asia and Afghanistan, including Tajiks, disillusioned former Taliban fighters, and other ethnic minorities to bolster its capability to conduct external operations. To date, ISIS-K’s recruitment efforts targeting minorities have been successful, as evidenced by the arrests of Tajiks and other Central Asians for their 2023 involvement in several attack plots against soft targets in Europe. To maintain cohesion amongst these disparate groups, ISIS-K portrays itself as the sole protector and promulgator of Salafi Islam, routinely promoting its views of a global caliphate. ISIS-K’s narrative of protecting Islam, establishing a global caliphate, and killing all takfiris (infidels), including the Chinese, is a key narrative in its current push to attract Uyghur recruits.

There are two key drivers for ISIS-K’s drive to recruit TIP members and Uyghur jihadis more broadly: first, it pragmatically seeks to expand its ranks with experienced fighters from Syria. Even though the recent recruitment poster was broadly aimed at all Uyghur Muslims, it is likely that ISIS seeks to capitalize on the flow of Uyghur jihadis from Syria. The TIP brigade that fought alongside HTS in Northwest Syria is now facing pressure from the new Syrian government to leave the country. As recently as last December, reports indicate that TIP representatives held discussions with the Taliban about transferring Uyghur foreign fighters to Afghanistan from Syria, leveraging al-Qaeda’s (and by extension, the TIP’s) historical ties to the Taliban. This group of fighters represents a prime recruitment opportunity for ISIS-K: the TIP’s experience fighting in some of the most intense battles of the Syrian Civil War could provide ISIS-K with battlefield proficiency, which many of its other, younger recruits lack.

Although the TIP has historically aligned with al-Qaeda, TIP’s new alignment with ISIS-K is driven by changes in the global terrorist environment. Its expulsion from Syria, al-Qaeda’s diminishing influence, and ideological overlap are all factors that may nudge the TIP to expand cooperation with ISIS-K. ISIS-K has established itself as an effective jihadiorganization with a worldwide reach, which regularly substantiates its calls to violence against takfiris and positions it to attract currently-unemployed jihadis from other groups. Ideologically, the TIP’s narrow focus of incorporating China’s Xinijang Province into Islamic Turkestan meshes with ISIS-K’s goal of developing a global caliphate and presents an area of overlap that ISIS-K can leverage to recruit TIP fighters. Should ISIS-K and the TIP formally align, the establishment of Islamic Turkestan under an alliance with ISIS-K could expand the caliphate into Central Asia.

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Second, ISIS-K is well-positioned to capitalize on the Taliban’s recent turn against the TIP. The Taliban seeks to court Chinese investments in Afghanistan, but China views the TIP’s presence in Afghanistan as a threat to its interests—and has pressured the Taliban to crack down on Uyghur militants. The TIP’s presence in Afghanistan has been detrimental to the Taliban’s relationship with China; for example, in February, the UN reported that the TIP maintains a presence in Badakhshan, a mountainous province bordering China that has long been a hotbed of terrorism. Since 2001, a wide variety of terror groups have established training camps in Badakhshan, including ISIS-aligned militants, allowing the province to become a critical location for cross-training among terrorist organizations. China had previously pressured the Taliban to remove the TIP from Badakhshan, but the Taliban’s spotty counterterrorism record—along with ISIS-K’s entrenchment in the province—indicates that the Uyghur group is sharing territory with, and likely building ties to ISIS-K. As the Taliban cracks down on its former ally, the TIP, ISIS-K’s burgeoning recruitment efforts indicate it is primed to bring TIP fighters into the fold to expand its own ranks.

The burgeoning ISIS-K/TIP partnership is likely to further threaten Chinese interests. As China continues to expand its investments in Afghanistan, including a recent promise to develop the Belt and Road Initiative there, Chinese workers and representatives are likely to face attacks from both TIP and ISIS-K members. China’s repeated human rights violations against Uyghurs in Xinjiang fuel the TIP’s anger and provide ISIS-K with propaganda material to continue to recruit disaffected Uyghurs and TIP members alike. Finally, as China pressures the Taliban to crack down on the TIP, those fighters may join forces with ISIS-K, which has taken up the cause of Islamic militancy against China—continuing to drive the cycle of violence.

Morgan Tadych is an open-source intelligence professional, Army veteran, and Atlantic Council Counterterrorism Project member. She spent much of her military career researching strategic Eurasia issues and deployed to conduct counterterrorism missions, and is currently pursuing a graduate degree in the field.

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Ukrainians believe there can be no lasting peace without security

Yaroslava Shvechykova-Plavska — Thu, 25 Sep 2025 13:35:56 +0000

Ever since US President Donald Trump initiated peace talks with Moscow in early 2025 in a bid to end the war in Ukraine, there has been much debate over the peace terms Russian President Vladimir Putin may be prepared to accept. In order to reach a lasting settlement, however, it is also vital to understand Ukraine’s expectations for any potential agreement.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian perceptions of victory have evolved in line with the country’s changing fortunes on the battlefield. During the initial weeks of the war, any notions of victory were primarily associated with national survival. The immediate objective was to stop the Russian advance on Kyiv and save the Ukrainian capital, thereby thwarting the central objective of Putin’s invasion and safeguarding Ukrainian statehood.

Ukraine’s spring 2022 victory in the Battle of Kyiv was followed by a series of further military successes later that year, including a stunning counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region and the liberation of Kherson. This led to growing public confidence that Ukraine’s territorial integrity could be fully restored within the country’s internationally recognized borders. As the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion approached, a consensus began to take shape across Ukraine that victory meant the complete end of Russian occupation and the return of all territory to Ukrainian control.

One year later, the costly failure of Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive led to a noticeable lowering of expectations. With the terrible human cost of the war continuing to mount and little progress to report on the battlefield, perceptions of victory began to shift once more. While the desire to liberate the entire country remained strong, many Ukrainians began to acknowledge that temporary territorial concessions may prove necessary in order to end hostilities. This helped to refocus attention on the need to establish a lasting peace.

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For the past year, Ukraine’s main demand has been for credible security guarantees to remove the threat of future Russian aggression. This is widely recognized as essential for the country’s continued viability as an independent state. While Ukraine’s eventual objective remains NATO membership, the current goal is to secure commitments from the country’s partners that confirm Kyiv’s irreversible Euro-Atlantic integration and convince the Kremlin to abandon its imperial agenda. Only then will genuine peace be possible.

In addition to expectations regarding security guarantees, Ukrainians also seek accountability for war crimes committed during Russia’s invasion. Many in today’s Ukraine feel that justice should be central to any postwar settlement. They argue that the immense sacrifices of the war must not be in vain, and believe Russia needs to pay for the devastation it has caused in Ukraine.

Calls for a just peace settlement create significant challenges for Ukraine’s political leadership. If the Ukrainian authorities fail to address demands for accountability, this could fuel political divisions and lead to social tensions, especially among veterans, military families, and communities most directly affected by the invasion. Any peace deal that feels like a betrayal could destabilize the entire country and radicalize Ukrainian public opinion, with unpredictable and potentially dangerous consequences for Ukraine.

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As Ukraine prepares for a fourth wartime winter, Ukrainians continue to debate what would represent acceptable peace terms. It is currently possible to identify some key trends. While there has been a clear move away from the optimistic interpretations of victory that dominated the debate during the first year of the war, relatively few Ukrainians appear ready to accept peace on Russian terms. Instead, there is a sense that Ukraine must find ways to fight on if necessary until it can reach a settlement that safeguards the country’s future freedom and security.

Ukrainians are acutely aware that Russia remains determined to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. They understand that the war will not truly be over until the Kremlin has been decisively deterred from pursuing its imperial ambitions.

While any progress toward a ceasefire would likely receive widespread support from the Ukrainian public, this would not satisfy their demands for a longer term solution to the threat posed by Russia. Indeed, some believe a pause in hostilities that did not lead to a more permanent settlement could create new risks and undermine the sense of common purpose that has played such an important part in maintaining Ukrainian public support for the war effort.

With the recent US-led peace initiative now running out of steam and Europe deeply reluctant to risk direct military confrontation with Russia, there is a growing realization among Ukrainians that no external actor can fully guarantee Ukraine’s security. International support has been absolutely vital since 2022 and remains indispensable, but there can ultimately be no substitute for a strong and self-sufficient Ukrainian military backed by a resilient and united population.

Ukrainians recognize that they cannot allow their national survival to hinge on the ever-changing political and geopolitical dynamics in Western capitals. Instead, Kyiv must look to strike a balance between long-term international security partnerships and powerful domestic deterrence. Peace with Putin’s Russia is possible, but it must be peace through strength.

Yaroslava Shvechykova-Plavska is a lecturer at the Educational and Scientific Institute of International Relations at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. This article is based on the Security Guarantees for Ukraine project, undertaken with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. It represents the views of the author and does not reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, Tibetan irregulars fought a decades-long insurgency against China’s occupation. It wasn’t until 1974, and at the Dalai Lama’s request, that they finally laid down their arms. The legacy of this armed resistance continues to inspire generations of Tibetans, both inside Tibet and in exile, to resist Chinese oppression in other, non-violent ways.

Likewise, Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 spurred a nationwide resistance movement to take root, paving the way for Ukraine’s remarkable stand in February 2022. After more than three and a half years of full-scale war, Ukraine’s will to resist remains unbroken.

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I’ve spent the past thirteen years embedded in the Tibetan and Ukrainian freedom struggles, wanting to understand how these two nations summoned the will to defy the empires that meant to destroy them. This quest has taken me to the ends of the earth and to the extremes of the human experience. I dodged Russian snipers on Ukraine’s battlefields and crossed remote Himalayan passes that soar as high as jetliners fly.

Along the way, I met Ukrainian university students who adapted small commercial drones to kill their Russian enemies, and shared tea with Tibetan monks and nomads who had fought on horseback, armed with swords and World War I-era rifles, against China’s mechanized invasion. Throughout it all, I’ve been consistently surprised by all the similarities these two stories share.

Whether I was talking to a 20-year-old Ukrainian soldier or an 80-year-old Tibetan veteran, I kept hearing the same humble explanations for their actions, such as the shared sentiment that they had “no other choice.” For many of those I have met, going to war for their homeland’s freedom wasn’t really a decision at all. It was automatic and instinctual, like an immune system response. Their country was invaded and innocent people were dying, so they had to fight. Simple as that.

Ukrainian soldier Denys put it to me like this: “Wars aren’t won by surrendering. You have to fight. If you don’t fight, you won’t be supported by anyone. Because it’s your own freedom and you have to fight for it.”

Kelsang Tsering, a former Buddhist monk who served in the Tibetan resistance from 1955 to 1974, had a similarly matter-of-fact explanation for his decision to resist China’s occupation. “I saw what China was doing in Tibet and it made me so angry, I had to fight,” he said.

Tsering and I spoke over tea one evening at his home in a Nepalese refugee settlement. A flickering fluorescent lamp lit the room. A picture of the Dalai Lama hung on the wall. Tsering’s wife sat on the floor, legs folded, spinning a prayer wheel while she chanted a Buddhist mantra. I asked Tsering if it was difficult for him to take a life in combat, given that he was once a Buddhist monk who eschewed all violence, even the killing of an insect.

“In the beginning, I was thinking we were monks, and so we shouldn’t kill,” he answered. “But when I recalled all the abuses, all the terrible things the Chinese did, I forgot my hesitation. After seeing so many bad things, I forgot that killing was a sin.”

Such moral certitude echoes what I’ve heard from many Ukrainians. “The Russians came to our country and killed our people. It’s our country, our land, our families. For us, it’s very clear. We kill them, or they kill us,” a Ukrainian special operations soldier named Serhii told me.

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China and Russia are on the march against the US-led world order. Yet, the way I see it, America’s military might isn’t the only obstacle holding these aggressive, wannabe empires at bay.

By refusing to surrender their identities and submit to imperial rule, the Tibetan and Ukrainian nations defy the fantasies of civilizational greatness, detached from historical reality, that the Chinese and Russian regimes depend on for their domestic legitimacy. The authoritarians in Beijing and Moscow see such expressions of independence and self-determination as existential threats to their grip on power. Their retaliation has been brutal.

Russia launched its disastrous full-scale invasion in 2022 to destroy the Ukrainian state and extinguish Ukraine’s national identity entirely. China, for its part, has spent decades trying to erase Tibet’s culture and ethnicity. Today, after seventy-five years of occupation, Tibet is a nightmarish Gestapo state for the Tibetans living there, a chilling portent of what Ukrainians are fighting to prevent from happening in their homeland.

The irony, of course, is that the Ukrainian and Tibetan nations are more unified today than they ever were prior to being invaded. Rather than break Ukraine’s spirit, each new Russian atrocity reinforces the resolve of the Ukrainian population to resist. As for Tibetans, a people once divided by regional dialects and cultures, they’ve now coalesced around a single version of their language and national identity, at the heart of which is their universal devotion to the Dalai Lama.

The price of freedom is set by those who wish to destroy it. And yet, as the Dalai Lama said in a speech not long after the Soviet Union collapsed, “brute force, no matter how strongly applied, can never subdue the basic human desire for freedom.” In today’s troubled world, that’s a message worth remembering.

Nolan Peterson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US Air Force Special Operations pilot.

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Gender Apartheid

This year, the SLP has continued working with Afghan and Iranian women’s rights defenders in a legal and political campaign pursuing the codification of the crime of gender apartheid under international law. Since the UN Sixth Committee decided in November to move forward to negotiations on a treaty focusing on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, the SLP’s advocacy with states’ permanent missions to the UN in New York—led by SLP Senior Legal & Policy Advisor Alyssa Yamamoto—has sought the inclusion of the crime of gender apartheid. To further highlight the push for codification to member states, SLP Director Gissou Nia spoke in March at a panel event on the sidelines of the sixty-ninth session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, “Addressing Gender Apartheid: Towards an Integrated System of Protection.”

In April, the SLP convened a “Symposium on Confronting Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan” at Stanford University, co-hosted with the Malala Fund and the Stanford Program in Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. The two-day conference aimed to unpack the policy and legal impacts of gender apartheid codification, including its implications for humanitarian, security, economic, and political engagement. The symposium featured panels with leading Afghan academics, policy experts, and activists, and the symposium’s keynote address was given by new SLP Distinguished Fellow Beth Van Schaack.

SLP team members and panelists at the “Symposium on Confronting Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan.”

Shadow report submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women

In June, the SLP, together with Foley Hoag LLP and the Civic Engagement Project, co-submitted a shadow report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the Taliban’s continued perpetration of gender apartheid in Afghanistan. The submission analyzed the scope of the legal decrees issued by the Taliban, which have effectively deprived women of all status in the country, and sets out general recommendations in response to the Taliban’s systematic and pervasive erosion of the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan.

Read more about recent developments for the campaign to recognize and codify the crime of gender apartheid, written by our experts

Metra Mehran in Amnesty International: “Afghanistan: A Call to Global Conscience on International Women’s Day”

Metra Mehran in the New York Times: “What’s Best for Afghanistan? Not the Taliban.”

Azadah Raz Mohammad and Akila Radhakrishnan in OpinioJuris: “The Growing Imperative to Recognize and Codify Gender Apartheid: Demonstrating the Need and Responding to Critics (Part I)”

Azadah Raz Mohammad and Akila Radhakrishnan in OpinioJuris: “The Growing Imperative to Recognize and Codify Gender Apartheid: Demonstrating the Need and Responding to Critics (Part II)”

Law, technology, and human rights

This year, SLP Senior Law & Tech Advisor Lisandra Novo has continued advancing research on the intersection of law and technology, focused on spyware accountability and multilateral cybersecurity negotiations. In May, she attended the 2025 NATO International Conference on Cyber Conflict in Tallinn, Estonia, and presented her article on the Russian-led initiative at the UN to set up a global convention on the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of cybercrime. Her ongoing research identifies possible mitigation strategies for states to address the human rights and cybersecurity risks associated with the treaty. She also attended, as an invited member of civil society, a side event in March organized by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the government of Vietnam on the future signing ceremony of the UN Cybercrime Convention. As part of the SLP’s work on this convention, she has actively participated in the Stakeholder Working Group on Cybercrime, a multistakeholder group monitoring the development and implementation of the convention, convened by the Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice. She has also represented SLP at various spyware accountability civil society convenings, including several focused on developments related to the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process.

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Accountability now: Liability for spyware harms

A virtual event to explore existing avenues to pursue accountability for past and ongoing spyware abuses.

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In August, the SLP, along with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, hosted a joint event exploring existing avenues for pursuing accountability for past and ongoing spyware abuses. The event was hosted in anticipation of a new report from the SLP, “Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.” This report, authored by Novo, explores how theories of civil liability can be tested in spyware cases to bring civil cases in the United States and United Kingdom.

read the report

Iran Digital Archive Coalition

The SLP continued its work with partners in the Iran Digital Archive Coalition to create the Iranian Archive—a repository of digital evidence documenting human rights abuses and international crimes committed during the Islamic Republic of Iran’s crackdown on the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. In January, the Investigations Lab at UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, a coalition partner, released two reports (the latest in an ongoing series) demonstrating the importance of digital evidence in future human rights accountability. In March, Novo traveled to Brussels with Azadi Archive and Mnemonic, other coalition partners, to jointly present on the Iran Digital Archive Coalition in an immersive show at the CEPS Ideas Lab 2025, where they engaged with members of the European Parliament about the coalition’s work documenting serious crimes in Iran and the need for accountability.

Learn more about the Iran Digital Archive Coalition

SLP Deputy Director Nushin Sarkarati and other members of the coalition contributed pieces to a Just Security blog series discussing the coalition’s work documenting and analyzing serious crimes committed during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement and the work of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Read the experts’ contributions below.

Jessica Peake, Nushin Sarkarati, and Kelly Liu in Just Security: “Safeguarding Evidence: The Coalition that Preserved Content from Iran’s ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ Protests”

Sara Hossain, Viviana Krsticevic, and Shaheen Sardar Ali in Just Security: “A Roadmap for Justice in Iran: An Update from the UN’s Fact-Finding Mission”

Andrea Richardson and Alexa Koenig in Just Security: “Open-Source Information Provides Powerful Evidence of Gender Crimes in Iran and Beyond”

Syria Victims Fund

Following the fall of the Assad regime, the SLP has continued its efforts to advocate for a Syria Victims Fund—an intergovernmental mechanism designed to ensure that proceeds from legal actions related to Syria’s conflict are redirected to benefit victims and survivors of international law violations. In May, the SLP team and Syrian partners finalized a policy brief offering recommendations for the Syria Victims Fund’s design, governance, functionality, and operations, drafted by consensus by a working group of nineteen diverse Syrian civil society leaders, victim representatives, and experts. The SLP and partners are now sharing the policy brief with civil society partners for further awareness-raising, and with state representatives to garner support for establishing the Syria Victims Fund.

Additionally, in March, former SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow Joumana Seif gave remarks at the United Nations Security Council, where she urged the international community to support post-conflict Syria. In her speech, she called for investments in development and reconstruction, services for victims of gender-based violence, and support for a transparent, holistic transitional justice mechanism—one focused on what victims and survivors need to rebuild their lives.

The SLP will continue to work with Syrian partners to advocate for the Syria Victims Fund to provide interim reparative measures to victims in the near-term, in conjunction with and complementary to a holistic national transitional justice program that ensures the full, meaningful, and equal participation of diverse Syrian civil society.

In March, former SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow Joumana Seif gave remarks at the United Nations Security Council on the political transition in Syria.

Ukraine Accountability

SLP Staff Lawyer Celeste Kmiotek and Nonresident Senior Fellow Haydee Dijkstal have continued their work examining the Islamic Republic of Iran’s complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity for its provision of drones to Russia for use in aerial attacks in Ukraine, in partnership with the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR). In January, they submitted their findings and analysis to an international accountability mechanism and met with states and other stakeholders in February to discuss next steps. Kmiotek discussed this work in February, on a panel co-hosted by IPHR and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) called “Missile Terror in Ukraine: Paths to Prevention and Accountability for Russian War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.”

Panelists at “New findings: Russian aerial attacks amount to extermination and persecution.”

In June, the SLP and the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, together with IPHR and IHRC, hosted a hybrid panel event on new findings and policy implications surrounding Russian aerial attacks against Ukraine over the last three years. Authors of IPHR and IHRC’s newly published report on the Russian aerial campaign presented their legal analysis, finding that these aerial attacks amount to several crimes against humanity, including those of murder, extermination, persecution, and other inhumane acts. Ambassador William B. Taylor, a distinguished fellow with the Eurasia Center, and Michael Cecire, a security and defense researcher from the RAND Corporation, spoke about what these findings mean for policy discussions.

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Advocacy for the Uyghur community

The SLP continued its work, led by SLP Senior Legal & Policy Advisor and China Lead Rayhan Asat, regarding human rights abuses against the Uyghur population in China. In January, the SLP submitted an updated assessment to twenty-five UN mandate-holders detailing China’s human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China, including documentation and testimonies of deaths and economic extortion in the XUAR. As part of her ongoing advocacy, Asat traveled to meet with high-level representatives of the governments of Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Canada, and Chile to discuss the material within the UN assessment and urge them to take action within multilateral bodies regarding the widespread violations of human rights in the XUAR.

In April, Asat spoke at a panel event in New York hosted by the International Peace Institute and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, titled “The Ongoing Mass Atrocity Crimes Against the Uyghurs and How the UN Can Respond.” The event focused on the role of the UN to respond to and prevent mass atrocities in the Xinjiang region and featured a screening of the Emmy-award winning film Reeducated. At the event, Asat spoke on the importance of multilateral action in protecting Uyghur rights in China: “I urge UN member states to explore a Third Committee complaint against China . . . International law can only flourish when we utilize it; otherwise, we are robbing the international system of its development. We must use the system for the Uyghur cause as we have done for other atrocity crimes.”

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Europe needs a new approach to Belarus focused on practical outcomes

Valery Kavaleuski — Wed, 17 Sep 2025 18:28:22 +0000

More than five years since pro-democracy protests threatened to topple the regime of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, relations between Belarus and the country’s European neighbors remain locked in a downward spiral that is only adding to the instability of the wider region.

When Lukashenka resorted to a brutal crackdown against protesters in 2020, the West responded with sanctions and withdrawal. The aim was to impose penalties on the Belarusian ruler and ensure his political and diplomatic isolation. Five years on, it is now abundantly clear that this has failed to prevent Belarus from sliding further into dictatorship.

Today, large numbers of Belarusian political prisoners remain behind bars amid a political climate that is more repressive than ever. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has capitalized on Lukashenka’s predicament to strengthen its grip on Belarus and involve the country in Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. Belarus is now not only a nation with a weakened civil society and undermined sovereignty that is moving further away from democracy; it has also become a threat to international security.

If Europe maintains its present policies, it is safe to assume that relations with Belarus will remain on the current trajectory. This may suit Lukashenka, who has managed to stabilize his rule and minimize the threat posed by his exiled opponents. It would certainly suit Russia, which has used the last five years to strengthen control over Belarus and weaponize the country against its European neighbors.

However, regional security would be further undermined, with broader Euro-Atlantic strategic interests also likely to suffer. This would be particularly unwelcome at a time when the democratic world already faces growing challenges from an emerging alliance of autocratic powers including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

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The Belarusian role in European security should not be underestimated. Following the watershed events of 2020, Lukashenka abandoned his earlier geopolitical balancing act and became a loyal supporter of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Belarus served as a crucial launchpad for the February 2022 full-scale invasion, and has since agreed to host Russian nuclear weapons. Moscow also uses the country as a proxy in its hybrid war against the European Union, including the weaponization of migrants along the Belarusian border with the EU.

It is important to stress that the current standoff between Belarus and Europe is complex and multifaceted, with a number of overlapping but distinct elements. These include European criticism of widespread human rights violations in Belarus and alarm over the country’s deepening military cooperation with the Kremlin. There are also broader concerns related to international migration and regional stability.

If European leaders want to make any meaningful progress on these issues, they will need to move away from the current explicitly confrontational stance and adopt an alternative approach that creates room to engage on matters of mutual interest. Sanctions will remain a necessary tool against those supporting the war in Ukraine, but this approach in general has already proven to have limited impact on Minsk. A more outcome-oriented strategy that envisages a revived diplomatic presence and pragmatic engagement would enable Europe to address its concerns while maintaining constructive pressure on the Lukashenka regime.

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The United States has recently demonstrated that it is possible to achieve progress with Belarus by focusing on a humanitarian agenda. US Special Envoy Keith Kellogg visited Minsk in June 2025 after months of preparations, resulting in the release of fourteen political prisoners. US President Donald Trump has directly discussed prisoner releases with Lukashenka, signaling a readiness to prioritize engagement over isolation in his approach to Belarus. A further US visit to Minsk in September led to the release of 52 prisoners in return for lifting sanctions on national aviation company Belavia.

An updated EU strategy toward Belarus should pursue reduced confrontation by focusing on a number of deliverables. The top priority must be saving lives by securing the release of more than 1000 political prisoners. This will require active diplomacy, measured communication, and a readiness to compromise. It will also be necessary to engage on practical matters such as finding a resolution to the migrant crisis on the Belarusian border with the EU, restoring severed air and rail transportation ties which have restricted mobility for Belarusians across Europe, and ending repressions in Belarus.

In parallel to any increased diplomatic engagement, the European Union and individual European nations could also consider expanding their involvement in social programs for Belarusians. A more people-oriented approach could help rebuild relationships by providing support for vulnerable Belarusians who have suffered as a result of cuts to foreign aid in recent years.

Security issues will inevitably be at the heart of any reset between Europe and Belarus. Lukashenka openly underscores his role as Vladimir Putin’s closest wartime ally and junior partner in Moscow’s confrontation with the West. While Europe currently has little chance of breaking up this unequal partnership, confidence-building measures could help to reduce mutual suspicions and pave the way for a more constructive dialogue addressing key security concerns.

Belarus is a strategically important European nation that no European leader can afford to ignore. The country’s descent into international isolationism and authoritarianism is a European problem that poses difficult questions for the EU in terms of border security and foreign policy credibility. Evidently, the positions adopted in 2020 have not produced the desired results. It is therefore time to consider new approaches and initiatives.

A smarter Belarus policy does not mean abandoning a critical and clear-eyed view of the country’s situation. Engagement does not equal appeasement. Instead, the goal should be an outcome-driven strategy that seeks practical and pragmatic solutions to specific problems while providing incentives for more fundamental shifts in Minsk. Ignoring Belarus or treating it as a lost cause will only amplify current geopolitical challenges while deepening the existing human rights problems in the country.

Valery Kavaleuski is head of the Euro-Atlantic Affairs Agency. He previously served as a Belarusian diplomat and as foreign relations lead to Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

It is out of those spaces that the foundations of the model now used by my charity, the Rahela Trust, are built: deeply communal, quietly strategic, and anchored in dignity.

In provinces across Afghanistan, young women are receiving small, one-time stipends of fifty US dollars each and building micro-initiatives, a process facilitated by a young female scholar who identifies five young women with different skills or interests. The program’s model works within the restraints of Taliban restrictions, with mentors and instructors holding underground courses in private homes or rotating locations.

From these efforts, women are raising chickens, crafting art, tailoring clothing, and creating jobs for one another. But the money is only part of the story. What transforms these efforts is mentorship: older students, diaspora professionals, and other mentor figures offering not just guidance but partnership. It’s about solidarity and unlocking their talents within their community groups—building moral strength, confidence, and practical skills in managing local resources. Their skills grow organically through this hands-on, learning-by-doing approach. And Rahela Trust is not alone; similar initiatives, such as ACDEO, which is improving both education and economic access across Afghanistan, and Empowerment for Her, a women-led charity in Denmark, are contributing to the same vision of women’s empowerment.

Zahra, a twenty-three-year old student in Baghlan, used her funds from Rahela Trust to start a poultry initiative with five friends. (The names of Zahra and other participants from the Rahela Trust who spoke for this article were changed to protect their identities.) “Each member of the team has a specific role,” she said. “We’ve learned to delegate, manage resources, and plan for the future.” While their chickens have yet to produce a profit, significant growth in other areas has already begun. “We’re learning teamwork, responsibility, and how to build something with our own hands, even from a small amount of money,” Zahra explained. The vision is that, despite living under a gender apartheid regime, the success of their small businesses can help transform their villages, cities, and ultimately, the future economy of their nation.

In another region, a group of girls founded a pyrography business after seeing this style of wood-burning art at an exhibition in Kabul. With simple tools and a cooperative model, they produced their first five orders within a month. “For me, this is more than just a business,” Fatima, a participant said. “It is a bridge between art and empowerment.”

Perhaps most inspiring is Homa’s story. A student of Islamic studies, Homa used her stipend to launch a small textile venture that now employs five women—each with a role in production, marketing, or logistics. Their modest operation has already begun generating profits that allow the women to support themselves. “All members are pleased with their work and are happy that they can now meet their daily needs,” she shared.

This model of mentorship and micro-enterprise was not adopted from elsewhere—it was developed by the women of Afghanistan out of resistance to the first Taliban regime’s imposition of a system of gender apartheid. In those years, underground learning spaces and quiet community fora became lifelines for women denied access to public life. Organized under the guise of health trainings, tailoring courses, or other permissible activities, community fora created safe spaces for women to exchange knowledge, share resources, and support one another. Both the fora and underground schools survived through careful planning, constant relocation and, above all, the courage of those committed to education and freedom.

Drawing from those roots, the model the Rahela Trust combines education and peer mentorship with small-scale business initiatives designed to foster independence and leadership. It is a framework that sees education and economic empowerment not as separate paths, but as deeply intertwined. It emphasizes leadership, resourcefulness, and the power of collective learning. With only a small amount of money, young women are supported not just in starting businesses, but in taking control of their own futures.

Today, more than a dozen online mentoring classes are running, with courses on subjects including leadership, small business management, mental health counseling, job hunting, and résumé writing. The courses offered depend on the needs assessment conducted each quarter. Perhaps what is most powerful about this model is that it grows from within: many of the girls and young women who receive mentorship go on to mentor others in their households or wider communities. The impact goes far beyond income and creates a ripple effect—it rebuilds confidence, nurtures agency, strengthens community solidarity, and quietly pushes back against a system determined to suppress them.

Amid gender apartheid, these stories are not just inspiring, they are political. They are a powerful reminder that transformation doesn’t always begin with loud declarations or sweeping policies. Sometimes it begins with a conversation around a kitchen table, a lesson in how to bake bread in a tandoor oven, or a student teaching her sister what she learned online that morning.

Even under the weight of repression, girls in Afghanistan are rewriting the narrative of their country—patiently, creatively, and together. We must listen closely.

Rahela Sidiqi is a social community development expert and founding director of Rahela Trust and Omid International.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

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Fighting corruption strengthens Ukraine in the war against Russia

Matthew H. Murray — Thu, 11 Sep 2025 20:17:19 +0000

In recent months, Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to US-led peace efforts by escalating attacks on Ukrainian civilians and seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. The Russian ruler refuses to even meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for talks, attempting instead to portray him as the illegitimate leader of an irredeemably corrupt government. Moscow’s goal is to delay meaningful negotiations and weaken Western resolve to support Ukraine in the hope that this will cause the Zelenskyy government to fall and derail the entire Ukrainian war effort.

Putin’s uncompromising stance reflects his commitment to extinguishing the threat posed by a free and democratic Ukraine. The Russian leader was driven to invade primarily because he saw an independent Ukraine slowly but steadily building the institutions of a functioning democracy right on Russia’s border. This represented an existential challenge to Putin’s own regime, an autocracy fueled by systemic corruption and dependent on repression.

Faced with Russia’s determination to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation, Ukrainians could be tempted to delay the fight against corruption at home in order to first defeat Russia. In reality, however, this is a false choice. Ukraine has been locked in a struggle against both Russian imperial aggression and domestic corruption for more than a decade. From the 2014 Revolution of Dignity to the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022, Ukrainians have been battling not only to defend their land, but to build a country that belongs to its citizens rather than oligarchs and autocrats. The fight against Russia and the fight against corruption are two fronts of the same war.

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Recent events in Ukraine underscore just how wrong Putin is to question the nation’s fundamental commitment to democracy. Over several days in July, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in cities across the country, braving the threat of Russian missiles and drones to demonstrate against their leaders. They were not protesting wartime hardships or economic woes, though both are deeply felt. These protests were driven by a more fundamental desire to safeguard the country’s anti-corruption institutions against efforts to turn back the clock and undo the progress achieved since the Revolution of Dignity.

These recent protests were sparked by a government move to strip Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies of their independence. The Ukrainian authorities may have been attempting to use wartime exigencies to bring anti-corruption bodies under their control and prevent the possible prosecution of high-level officials. If so, this was a major miscalculation. Within hours of a parliamentary vote placing key anti-corruption institutions under the authority of the prosecutor general, Ukraine’s first major protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion were underway.

International stakeholders including the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and Ukraine’s G7 partners also reacted swiftly. The EU publicly demanded the full reversal of the legislative changes, stressing that independent anti-corruption institutions are a prerequisite for Ukraine’s EU accession. To exert concrete pressure, Brussels suspended €1.5 billion in macro-financial assistance that was already in the pipeline for Ukraine.

The IMF echoed these concerns, indicating that Ukraine’s compliance with anti-corruption commitments was essential for ongoing financial support. Similarly, G7 officials issued a statement urging the Ukrainian authorities to protect the autonomy of anti-corruption bodies, warning that continued support from international partners depended on upholding the rule of law.

Bolstered by this international support, Ukraine’s civil society won the day. Zelenskyy moved quickly to reverse course, proposing new legislation that reinstated the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies. The lesson was clear: There can be no trade-offs for Ukraine when it comes to combating corruption, just as there is no room for half measures in the fight against Russia.

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Ukraine’s July 2025 protests reaffirmed a commitment to grassroots democracy that has defined the country’s post-Soviet experience. During the Revolution of Dignity, millions of Ukrainians rallied not merely to remove an unpopular president who was viewed as a surrogate of Russia, but to demand a system of government where institutions work for the public good rather than the benefit of the few. This has served as a vision for the country’s future ever since. Even now, amid the largest European invasion since World War II, Ukrainians continue to demand accountability while working to create a truly democratic society rooted in the rule of law.

Ukraine’s courage, ingenuity, and resolve in the war against Russia draw heavily from the sense of empowerment that sprang from landmark events like the Revolution of Dignity and subsequent democratic reforms such as the decentralization of power. This has helped give Ukrainians more confidence in their ability to shape their communities and their country, fostering solidarity and promoting engagement in public life.

Greater Ukrainian agency has translated into remarkable resilience on the battlefield and beyond. Local initiatives, volunteer networks, and territorial defense units have all thrived because the Ukrainian authorities ceded space for society to organize itself. When power flows from the ground up, a nation becomes so much more than the territory it defends. This has helped make Ukraine capable of fighting back against a far larger adversary.

Ukrainian society’s lack of tolerance for corruption is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the defense sector, where the stakes could not be higher. As Ukraine fights for its very existence, citizens and soldiers alike have demonstrated zero patience for anyone accused of exploiting the war for private gain. Wartime corruption scandals related to military procurement have provoked widespread outrage across the country. The public response has often been swift and unrelenting with investigations launched, resignations demanded, and reforms accelerated.

Despite the success of this summer’s protest movement, the battle to protect Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture is far from over. As Ukraine moves forward, its commitment to safeguarding the autonomy and integrity of anti-corruption organs will be tested by adversaries who are as persistent as they are resourceful. In parallel to the ongoing Russian invasion, Moscow will continue to push the message that Zelenskyy’s government is illegitimate, while also promoting perceptions of Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt.

Putin’s fear of Ukraine’s emerging democracy is the root cause of the war. Unlike Russia’s traditionally authoritarian and highly centralized system of government, Ukrainian democracy pulses with the will of the people. It is a highly dynamic and decentralized political culture that derives its strength from the grassroots level. Time and again, Ukrainians have reminded Zelenskyy and his predecessors that true power lies not at the highest levels of government in Kyiv, but with the Ukrainian people. The anti-corruption reforms of the past decade manifest this reality. They have set an example that resonates far beyond Ukraine’s borders and helps generate strong international backing for the country.

As peace negotiations continue to unfold and Ukraine’s partners seek a security formula to prevent further Russian aggression, the fight against corruption will fortify Ukrainian sovereignty. Each advance in transparency and the rule of law strengthens Ukraine’s standing, both at home and abroad, while exposing the malign intent of Russia’s disinformation. In the end, Ukraine’s freedom will not be secured solely by military victories, but also by a new social contract under which every Ukrainian knows that no one is above the law.

Matthew Murray is an Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. He is the former Chair of the Selection Commission for the Head of the US National Agency for Corruption Prevention, and former Deputy Assistant US Secretary of Commerce for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

“How is the situation, Father? What happened?” he asked.

Like Dimitri, the Safita priest quickly dismissed the leaflets as a pro-Assad trick, insisting everything remained stable within the city.

Despite this bravado, the conditions of Christian communities across the country remain varied, and the opinions of religious and community leaders deeply mixed. In May and July, I visited Christian towns across western Syria, where I heard about their concerns for the future and their relationships with neighboring Sunni and Alawite communities. Responses spanned the entire spectrum, from complete rejection to passionate support for the new government.

The Sunni Angle

Suqaylabiyah was once known for its powerful Russian-backed pro-Assad militias. But the militia leaders are now widely believed to live in Moscow, having fled the country days before Assad himself.

With the militias gone, the new religious and civilian leaders in Suqalyabiyah cooperate closely with new Damascus-appointed officials. Here, a young Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) officer, Fayez Latouf, serves as the head of the broader administrative district. Within the town itself, a long-time Christian Free Syrian Army commander, Amjad Haddad, serves as the mayor. The town’s main commercial street remains open well after midnight with young people sitting at cafes, drinking tea and alcohol.

When asked about the cultural freedoms of the town’s Christian population, one young woman explained to me that when Latouf first arrived, he considered limiting the town’s bars, but that the community simply went to him and stood their ground, demanding that he respect their culture and rights. According to both the woman and Father Dimitri, Fayez has since been extremely cooperative with the Christian social and religious leadership, fostering a safe environment in the city.

Father Dimitri believes Haddad is a significant reason for the speed with which his town accepted the new government and engaged in close cooperation with the new local authorities.

“We are lucky to have Amjad among us to explain how the Sunnis are and ease our initial fears,” he explains, citing Haddad’s more than ten years fighting alongside Sunni revolutionaries. When Haddad returned to Suqaylabiyah, he played a key trust-building role between the community and the new authorities.

Familiarity with Sunnis, or the lack thereof, appears to be an important factor in how Christians perceive the new government. In the city of Latakia, Christians and Sunnis have lived together for centuries. This historic proximity has resulted in close relationships between the two religious groups, even among otherwise deeply conservative Sunni fighters.

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Ali Hamada, for example, returned to his home in Latakia on December 8 of last year, twelve years after being exiled. He has been a long-time supporter of HTS, but upon his return, he quickly established an armed neighborhood watch group consisting of Christians and Sunnis protecting each other’s holy places during their respective holidays. In my conversation with him, Hamada is very open in his sectarian disdain of Alawites and Shia, but talks at length about the important social and religious ties between Sunnis and Christians.

One Christian activist in the city, Tony Daniel, echoes these sentiments. A political activist and ex-Assad detainee, Tony works with multi-sect civil society groups in the city and its countryside that aim to connect locals to the government and vice versa.

“Christian Syrians were a tool by the Assads,” he explains. “Most of us left Syria under the Assads, but many Christians are now afraid of this government because Assad told everyone that if Muslims take over, they will oppress you.”

This fear was a major obstacle that Tony and other activists worked on in those first weeks after December 8. He cites the new government’s quick engagement with Christian leaders across the country and their ability to ensure safe Easter celebrations as important milestones.

“The government protects us and we pray and dress how we want,” Tony says.

But, he adds, “Christians are afraid of the constitution now.”

While Tony does not believe the new government will persecute Christians, he cites the lack of democratic safeguards in the March constitutional declaration as a significant problem. “When I see and hear [al-Sharaa] talk, it is beautiful words, I trust [al-Sharaa] and most of the government, but when I see this constitution and the way some militias act it is not the same.”

Based on my visit to these areas, this lack of trust in the new government is much more pronounced in the Christian communities that are more isolated from Sunnis. The towns of Mashta Hilou and Wadi Ayoun, located just east of Safita and surrounded by Alawite villages themselves, are prime examples of this dynamic. Here, Christian priests and civil society activists are much more cautious about the new government and fear that Sunni religious figures are taking too much power.

“We get our news from social media,” explains a doctor and influential community leader in Mashta Hilou in May. “This has caused a lot of frustration within our community and the spread of false news.”

He cites a lack of clarity on new laws and an increase in petty crime, all resulting in a deepening distrust of local security officials. This animosity has only grown as the officials responsible for Mashta Hilou continue to sideline Christian civil society organizations, hardening the barriers between the government and locals.

This dynamic stands in stark contrast to Suqaylabiyah and Latakia, where local officials have engaged extensively with Christians and, as a result, have assuaged many of their fears. Without this, those in Mashta Hilou are left to draw their own conclusions.

“I see what ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham] did to Christians in Iraq,” says the doctor, “and so I make an assumption given Sharaa’s background, and the lack of implementation of his promises.” Misinformation and false claims on Facebook about new government policies rooted in Islamic law have all fueled a belief that Damascus will soon impose Sharia law upon the country.

Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa attends an interview with Reuters at the presidential palace, in Damascus, Syria, March 10, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

As one priest in Mashta Hilou puts it, “if Sharia Law is implemented, then Christians will be immediately discriminated against.” Like the doctor, the priest also cites al-Sharaa’s “history in ISIS” as a cause for concern. Al-Sharaa was originally a member of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of ISIS, but he explicitly rejected merging his Syrian group with ISIS in 2013.

“We are more comfortable around Alawites,” the priest admits, “because even though they were raised on shabiha [Syrian term for pro-Assad thugs] behavior, they are not religious.”

The behavior of some religious extremists among the government’s rank and file fuels these concerns. Several Christians on the coast cited instances of harassment by soldiers for wearing a cross, or wounded fighters who refused to be treated by female nurses.

The head priest of Wadi Ayoun says much the same—otherwise quelled fears “renewed” after March 6.

However, the decrease in violence in the region since March and the reopening of roads to other parts of Tartous and Homs have helped reduce local fears once again.

“The government must ensure our genuine safety,” the priest says, “protect everyone’s rights and create a civil state.”

Unclear security threats

Until the June 22 attack in Damascus, these security fears were largely rooted in distrust over the new government’s militant Islamist background and the violations being committed against Alawites. These fears were generally more common in communities with poorly performing local officials or those that were isolated from other Sunnis. Even amid their hesitations and criticisms of the new government, everyone interviewed in Mashta Hilou and Wadi Ayoun in May admitted that the security situation was very good at present.

Yet, minor incidents have occurred occasionally across the country, underlying the threat posed by armed extremist Sunnis operating outside of the government. On December 18, armed men shot at a church in Hama. Five days later, a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah was burned by a foreign fighter. On February 17, a group of youth destroyed crosses in a cemetery in rural Homs. On April 6, assailants attempted to burn down a church in Damascus. On May 17, the car of a Christian family in Hama city was burned, and threatening leaflets were left in the area. On June 8, a church in Homs city was shot at.

Syrian security forces secure the area near St. Joseph Church at Bab-Sharqi neighbourhood, following the suicide bombing at the Mar Elias Church on Sunday, June 22, 2025, according to Syria’s health ministry, in Damascus, Syria, June 23, 2025. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi

But it was the June 22 terror attack in Damascus that truly shook Syria’s Christians. Even a month later, Suqaylabiyah’s Father Dimitri admitted that his congregation is only now beginning to return to Sunday services. “We have reached a very good place in this area and deal with the government and security forces easily, thanks to their engagement with our religious and civilian leaders.” Nonetheless, the Father says that the bombing caused widespread anger and fear in the town that he and other leaders are still struggling to address.

For some Christians, the Damascus bombing played no role in their opinions—they had already given up on the new government. When asked about local governance, a couple who live in a small village just outside Tartous city engaged in a multi-hour tirade against the new authorities, blaming them for everything from the lack of functioning water lines to what they perceived as an “Islamification of coastal Sunnis, citing some Sunni friends’ adoption of the hijab.

While they deny that any Christians have been harassed in their area, they are terrified that this calm will change at any moment. At the same time, their village has rejected any General Security deployment within it, and they claim that even if there were Christian security members, “they would still be instructed to harass us.”

Complex dynamics in Idlib

Perhaps the most complex Christian dynamics exist in Idlib, where the small number of Christian families remaining in six villages along the governorate’s western edge have had a complicated, evolving relationship with the new authorities. These villages were first freed from the regime in late 2012 by neighboring Free Syrian Army factions, whose leaders quickly engaged in dialogues with the local priests. Yet the situation deteriorated over the ensuing years, with criminal FSA-affiliated and Islamist gangs robbing and kidnapping locals amid regime airstrikes. In 2014, ISIS briefly captured the region from the Syrian opposition. According to one local priest, the terror group quickly put an end to the random crimes through their excessively violent punishment of thieves, but also heavily limited their religious freedoms. Crosses were not allowed to be displayed, church bells could not be rung, and women were required to wear headscarves.

None of this changed when ISIS was evicted in 2015 and Jabhat al-Nusra—the predecessor to HTS—took charge. It would not be until 2018 when the HTS-affiliated Syrian Salvation Government was formed that HTS leaders began to address these years of violations. By now, most of the people in the six villages had fled to Europe or regime-held areas, and a variety of foreign and Syrian fighters had seized most houses and lands. Al-Sharaa’s chief religious official, Sheikh Abdul Rahman Atoun, who now serves as the head of Syria’s Supreme Fatwa Council, began to personally engage with Father Hanna Jalouf, who was later named Bishop and vicar of Aleppo by the Vatican.

Years of dialogue saw the gradual return of homes and property first to those Christians who still resided in Idlib, and then to caretakers within the community for the property of those who had fled. In late 2022, Atoun finally issued a fatwa legalizing public religious practices for Christians. By this point, HTS had greatly improved security in the area, eliminating violent threats against Christians. As Jalouf told me in a meeting in Idlib that year, significant progress had been made in their inter-faith relations, with some property disputes being the only remaining issues.

By July 2025, these property disputes were still not fully resolved. Almost all homes in five of the villages have been returned, but in one village, Yacoubiyah, many homes are still occupied. Meanwhile, in the three Christian villages on the edge of the Hama plains, most of the farmland remains under the control of the Uyghur foreign fighter group Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

As with the Christian communities elsewhere, priests and locals in these villages paint a complicated picture of their current situation.

“There is a huge difference in the amount of freedom here and other parts of Syria,” says one elderly woman in Judayda as she described their more socially oppressive environment.

“Only two foreign families remain in our village—without permission, or paying rent. They have not caused issues, but no Christian will go close to them out of fear. Last week, a woman and her husband were walking on the street without a headscarf, and someone from the [foreign] family spat in their face. It was just a family member, not a fighter.”

In Qunaya, the village’s priest emphasizes the danger these foreign fighters pose to the community.

“We don’t speak with these families occupying our houses,” he said in July. “We just work through the government, as we did before December.”

He says all the farmland in this area has been returned to the Christian families, and believes the authorities will soon return the last stolen homes. He adds that although the community has a good relationship with the officials in Idlib and Damascus, “it just takes time because they are trying to remove these people without using force.”

Despite this, both the priest and the woman from Judayda insist that the security situation in their areas is good, differentiating between the harassment from locals and the treatment of the authorities. “Here in Idlib we are very safe and don’t have these kinds of attacks targeting our churches,” they say, highlight the trust that has grown over the years between their community and HTS’s security services.

“After the attack in Damascus, we were mentally exhausted,” the woman says. “We were afraid of going to the churches, but we still went because the General Security is guarding them.”

Stuck in the middle

For some Christians, the violence that has persisted in the shadow of Assad destroyed any opportunity for their trust in the government. The March 6 insurgent uprising on the coast and the subsequent massacre of Alawite civilians by armed Sunnis and government forces shattered the cautious optimism in the brief period of relative peace following the fall of Assad.

One activist in the city of Baniyas had been optimistic for his country’s future, despite the sectarian challenges, before March 6. “No matter what, Syria is my country, I will send my children away for a better life, but I will never leave,” he said defiantly in February.

But the brutality of the March 6 massacres broke any confidence he had that Damascus could contain the sectarian violence left in Assad’s wake. “I don’t care anymore,” he said in May, “I am doing everything I can to leave this country.”

In other places, Christian leaders have taken on a mediation role, doing their best to lower tensions. In Suqaylabiyah and Latakia, for example, Christian priests and activists have begun serving as mediators for Alawites from the countryside, utilizing their close connections to local officials. In return, they try to show their Alawite neighbors that minorities can work with the new government, slowly building trust between the two sides.

One fact is clear: there is no one Syrian Christian experience. Like every Syrian community, some Christians are fearful, others optimistic, and some have lost all hope. While it is clear there is no systematic targeting of Christians by the new government at large, Damascus still has a long path towards earning the whole community’s trust.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive and an independent analyst whose research focuses on the development and reform of security institutions, local governance initiatives, and sectarian relations.

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Warrick joins Al-Jazeera to discuss the possibility of a major increase in US humanitarian aid to Gaza

Atlantic Council — Thu, 21 Aug 2025 14:56:32 +0000

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Alaska Summit: Trump wants a real estate deal. Putin wants an empire.

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 14 Aug 2025 20:50:02 +0000

As he prepared for this week’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska, US President Donald Trump appears to have sought inspiration from his earlier role as a New York real estate mogul. Ukraine and Russia will need to engage in “land swaps,” he said when news of the summit first broke. Since then, he has described Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine as “prime territory” while vowing to try and get some it back. “In real estate, we call it oceanfront property. That’s always the most valuable property,” he commented on August 11.

Trump’s real estate metaphors are part and parcel of his public persona and should not be taken at face value, of course. Nevertheless, his apparent belief that territorial concessions can bring peace suggests a fundamental misreading of Russia’s war aims. Trump may like to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a particularly acrimonious boundary dispute, but Putin most certainly does not share this view.

The Kremlin dictator isn’t fighting for mere land in Ukraine. He is fighting to extinguish Ukrainian independence altogether. Putin regards this as a decisive step toward reversing the verdict of 1991, reviving the Russian Empire, and establishing a new world order. Anyone who wishes to end the war in Ukraine must first reckon with the sheer scale of these imperial ambitions.

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Trump is far from alone in failing to grasp why Putin went to war. Even now, more than three and a half years since the outbreak of hostilities, many in the West still struggle to appreciate the dominant role played by historical grievances and unadulterated imperialism. In order to understand Moscow’s true motivations, it is vital to detach oneself from the Western perspective and view the invasion through the prism of modern Russian history.

For Putin and millions of his fellow Russians, today’s war is inextricably linked to the humiliations of the Soviet collapse. This fact is often lost on Western audiences, who are inclined to assume that most Russians welcomed the demise of the totalitarian USSR. In reality, the breakup of the Soviet Union was a immensely traumatic experience for the vast majority of the Russian population, who saw their country reduced almost overnight from global superpower to banana republic. Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Russian Empire in its Soviet form lost around one-third of its territory and almost two-thirds of its population, with the remainder plunged into desperate poverty. Rarely in history has an empire imploded so suddenly or completely.

As a KGB officer in East Germany, Putin had a front row seat for the early stages of this collapse. He was in Dresden when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, and would bitterly recall the imperial paralysis he encountered as Soviet power began to unravel. “Moscow is silent,” the young Putin was told as he sought instruction during those tumultuous days. This disaster has haunted the Russian ruler ever since, shaping his worldview and making him determined to ensure that Moscow would never be silent again.

The trauma of the Soviet collapse helps to explain Putin’s Ukraine obsession. Like many of his compatriots, Putin has always regarded Ukraine as part of Russia’s historical heartlands and has never truly accepted Ukrainian independence. This did not present any real problems during the early years of the post-Soviet era, as the newly independent Ukraine remained firmly locked within the Kremlin orbit. However, once Ukraine’s own nation-building journey began to gain momentum in the 2000s, the country’s efforts to embrace a democratic European identity placed it on a direct collision course with Putin’s own rapidly evolving imperial agenda.

The watershed moment came in 2004, when a Russian-backed plot to rig Ukraine’s presidential election and install a Kremlin-friendly candidate backfired and provoked massive street protests that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. With millions of Ukrainians rallying in defense of democracy, the authorities backed down and ordered a rerun of the vote, which was duly won by the pro-Western opposition candidate.

Among international audiences, Ukraine’s democratic breakthrough was viewed as a continuation of the freedom wave that had swept through Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall and transformed the region. Russia’s leaders were also painfully aware of the parallels between Ukraine’s revolution and the people power uprisings that had sparked the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The Orange Revolution had a particularly profound impact on Putin himself. He took the revolution personally, having inadvertently helped provoke the protests by traveling to Kyiv on the eve of the election to lecture the Ukrainian public on how to vote. Putin now became increasingly paranoid about the prospect of a similar people power uprising in Moscow and began accusing the West of attempting to foment “color revolutions” against him. Three months after the Orange Revolution, he made his new political position clear by delivering a landmark speech describing the fall of the USSR as a “geopolitical catastrophe.”

From this point on, Putin’s hostility to Ukraine would only grow. He saw the country’s democratic transformation as a direct threat to his own authoritarian regime. If left unchecked, Ukraine’s fledgling democracy could prove contagious and serve as a catalyst for the breakup of the Russian Federation itself. Having already witnessed the power of grassroots democratic uprisings in the late 1980s, Putin had no intention of risking a repeat. Instead, he became fixated with the idea of subverting Ukrainian democracy and reasserting Russian control over the country.

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Throughout the decade following the Orange Revolution, Putin sought to undermine Ukrainian independence via massive campaigns of political and economic interference. When Ukrainians defied the Kremlin and took to the streets once more in the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Putin responded by seizing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Much to his frustration, this limited military intervention failed to derail Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. On the contrary, it united Ukraine and dramatically strengthened Ukrainian national identity. Faced with the prospect of losing Ukraine altogether, Putin then took the fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Since 2022, Putin has provided ample evidence of his intention to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. In the 20 percent of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, all traces of Ukrainian identity are being ruthlessly erased amid a reign of terror involving mass arrests and deportations. A United Nations probe has concluded that Russia is guilty of committing crimes against humanity throughout the occupied regions of Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s eliminationist agenda in occupied Ukraine mirrors the rabidly anti-Ukrainian rhetoric that dominates contemporary Russian political discourse and shapes the country’s information space. Putin himself routinely insists that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), while many of his Kremlin colleagues openly question Ukraine’s right to exist.

Moscow’s uncompromising position during recent peace negotiations in Istanbul has further underlined Putin’s maximalist war aims and confirmed his refusal to coexist with a separate and sovereign Ukrainian state. Russia insists that postwar Ukraine must agree to be partitioned, demilitarized, and internationally isolated before a ceasefire can be implemented. It does not take much imagination to predict what Putin intends to do once rump Ukraine has been rendered defenseless in this manner.

Having positioned Ukraine as an intolerable “anti-Russia,” it is difficult to see how Putin can now settle for anything less than the end of Ukrainian statehood. Any negotiated settlement that safeguarded the survival of an independent Ukraine would be regarded in Moscow as a major defeat. This makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker a compromise peace. After all, there can be no meaningful compromise between Russia’s genocidal objectives and Ukraine’s national survival.

On the eve of the Alaska summit, both Washington and Moscow appeared to be actively downplaying expectations. This is probably wise. The first bilateral meeting between the US and Russian leaders during the full-scale invasion Ukraine is clearly a significant event, but at this early stage in the negotiating process, Putin’s undiminished imperial aspirations leave little room for Trump’s fabled dealmaking skills.

Ultimately, if Trump wants to end the bloodshed in Ukraine, he must speak to Putin in the language of strength. The US leader undoubtedly has the tools to do so, but he has so far sought to avoid a direct confrontation with the Russian dictator. Unless that changes, the war will continue. Putin currently has no intention of abandoning an invasion that he views in sacred terms as an historic mission, and will not be persuaded by the promise of minor territorial concessions, even if what’s on offer happens to be “prime real estate.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Throughout history, women have been at the forefront of resistance against oppressive regimes, often at great personal risk. In Afghanistan, despite extreme Taliban restrictions, women continue to organize. They have protested in Kabul, Mazar, and Herat, demanding their rights to education, work, and dignity. Underground schools have emerged, secret economic initiatives have been developed, and digital activism continues to challenge Taliban censorship.

Their fight is not new. South African women, too, were central to the struggle against apartheid, refusing to be silenced despite state-sanctioned brutality. In 1956, twenty thousand South African women—Black, Indian, and Colored (a South African term for multiracial)—marched to Pretoria to protest “pass laws” that restricted their movement. “Women didn’t just stand behind the struggle; we were at the front. We organized, we led, and we shaped the movement,” recalls Fester. She emphasizes that activism must “start where women are—in their homes, villages, and everyday lives.”

Mubarez echoes this for Afghanistan: “Change doesn’t come from the top. We have to raise awareness at every level of the community, using different methods that speak to people’s realities.”

Gender apartheid: A systematic erasure

The women of Afghanistan have long navigated a deeply patriarchal society. But even in the face of repression, they have consistently resisted, even during the first Taliban regime, which imposed a system of gender apartheid that barred them from education, employment, and public life. After the Taliban was overthrown in 2001, their continued advocacy led to fragile legal and constitutional protections, enabling access to schools, workplaces, and political participation. With the Taliban’s return, those hard-won gains have been dismantled. Today, women in Afghanistan are being systematically erased—excluded from public spaces, denied legal recognition, and stripped of institutional protections. This deliberate exclusion reflects gender apartheid: an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination of one group or groups over another aimed at maintaining control.

Similarly, under South Africa’s apartheid, Black, Indian, and Colored women faced compounded oppression. “Apartheid deliberately excluded us from political, economic, and social life. Black women, especially, were made invisible,” says Fester. Black South Africans were forcibly removed from participation in all spheres of public life. Black women were doubly marginalized, only permitted to reside in urban areas if registered as wives of legally entitled men.

Like the South African apartheid regime, the Taliban’s system of gender apartheid uses economic, legal, cultural, and social levers to normalize exclusion. “It’s the daily small things that entrench oppression. Over time, these become invisible, accepted as normal,” Fester explains. Mubarez highlights a parallel in Afghanistan: “Women do the hard work—in agriculture, livestock—but they don’t see the benefit. The money goes to the men. This keeps them dependent and powerless.”

Guerrilla education and resisting indoctrination

Oppressive regimes fear education because it fosters critical consciousness. In apartheid South Africa, the Bantu Education Act deliberately undereducated Black children. Women responded by creating “guerrilla schools” in homes and churches, teaching history, politics, liberation ideals, and critical thinking. “Education is not just about literacy. It’s about developing awareness, questioning injustice, and building the courage to resist,” says Fester.

The women of Afghanistan are employing similar tactics. Despite Taliban bans, underground schools and digital learning persist. But education must go beyond literacy, fostering critical thinking and reinforcing that education, work, and agency are fundamental rights—not Western imports.

Vocational training, while valuable, can reinforce traditional gender roles if not paired with rights education. “If we only teach women embroidery and sewing, we limit them. Women are capable of so much more,” Mubarez emphasizes. Empowering women through knowledge ensures that even vocational skills become a pathway to independence, not containment.

Intersectionality and the need for unity

Apartheid South Africa institutionalized division through rigid racial categories. “Apartheid deliberately divided people—Black, Colored, Indian—to prevent unity. It was a divide-and-rule strategy to keep us weak,” says Fester. Black South Africans faced the harshest oppression, but all groups were pitted against each other to fracture resistance. These divisions were compounded by intersecting harms and inequalities—economic marginalization, gender-based discrimination, and geographic segregation—that shaped how apartheid was experienced across different communities, deepening exclusion and reinforcing systemic control.

South African women recognized that fragmentation only served the regime. The United Democratic Front brought together Black, Colored, and Indian people, along with white allies. “We realized unity was our strength. We built alliances across race and class to fight a system that wanted us divided,” Fester reflects.

That unity, she recalls, was built over years of organizing and strategic alliances, beginning with the revival of the United Women’s Organisation in 1981. Despite apartheid’s rigid racial divisions, it brought together women from all legally defined racial groups to focus on education, empowerment, and women’s rights. While white women were privileged under apartheid, they too faced patriarchy. In 1983, women’s groups joined with men’s and youth organizations, trade unions, religious bodies, and cultural groups to form the United Democratic Front, uniting diverse communities in a shared struggle. By 1992, these strategic alliances expanded into the Women’s National Coalition, an organization with many differences but united by one goal: securing women’s and human rights in South Africa’s new constitution. To achieve this, they conducted nationwide consultations in rural farms, cities, religious institutions, and unions, gathering women’s demands into the Women’s Charter to present to political leaders in the negotiations.

Afghanistan faces similar divisions. The Taliban’s gender apartheid intersects with ethnic, sectarian, and geographic discrimination, further marginalizing groups such as the Hazaras, who are targeted for both their gender and ethnic identities.

Mubarez stresses the need for tailored engagement: “In rural areas, mullahs and elders have more sway than an educated person with a PhD. The community accepts their speech more. We should tactically use these figures to raise awareness before introducing ideas of gender justice.” She adds, “Different levels of the community need different methodologies. What works in universities or cities won’t work in villages.”

Fester notes that unity requires strategic alliance-building: “Men are not the enemy—it’s patriarchy and negative interpretations of religion that oppress women. We must find allies.”

The path forward: Resilience, strategy, and solidarity

South Africa’s anti-apartheid movement showed that sustained, strategic resistance can dismantle entrenched systems. “We had to be smart. We worked on issues that mattered to people—like water access or bread prices—and through these, we built a political movement,” Fester explains.

Mubarez links economic independence directly to addressing gender-based violence: “This mentality that the man has the right to control all the money keeps women dependent. This financial problem is also a root cause of domestic violence and forced marriages.”

Women in Afghanistan are already resisting—through underground schools, economic initiatives, and digital activism. Their demands are clear: Naan, Kaar, Azadi (Bread, Work, Freedom).

But they cannot succeed alone. Global solidarity was critical to dismantling South African apartheid. The women of Afghanistan deserve the same commitment. Every day under Taliban rule is a day too many. The women of Afghanistan will reclaim their rights—not as victims, but as leaders of their own liberation. The question is whether the world will stand with them or allow gender apartheid to continue unchecked.

Farhat Ariana Azami is a social worker and advocate for the rights of women and girls, as well as refugees. She serves as president of the Solidarity Group, an Austria-based association that provides homeschooling for girls and develops sustainable livelihood projects for women in Afghanistan.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

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Trump should insist on the return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 14 Aug 2025 12:25:41 +0000

As the leaders of the United States and Russia prepare to meet in Alaska on Friday to discuss ending the war in Ukraine, the White House has stated that Russia’s abduction of over 20,000 Ukrainian children “remains a concern” for President Trump. Unless the fate of these abducted children is addressed during the summit, it is difficult to imagine any meaningful progress toward a lasting peace.

Moscow’s mass abduction of Ukrainian children hit the headlines once again in early August amid reports that the Russian authorities had published an online catalog of Ukrainian children available for adoption. The database, which features photos, names, and descriptions of almost three hundred Ukrainian minors, was condemned as further evidence of the Kremlin’s state-sponsored campaign to kidnap young Ukrainians and send them to Russia.

“These children are presented like products in an e-commerce store, searchable by age, gender, eye and hair color, health status, and even personality traits,” commented Mykola Kuleba, the CEO of Save Ukraine, an organization engaged in efforts to rescue Ukrainian victims of Russia’s abduction campaign. “Russia isn’t even trying to hide it anymore. It’s openly trafficking Ukrainian children.”

Russia stands accused of kidnapping tens of thousands of Ukrainian children since the onset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Victims have typically been taken from orphanages in occupied regions of Ukraine or removed from the care of relatives. In some instances, Ukrainian children were enticed by the promise of free vacations at summer camps before disappearing.

Once they have been taken to Russia, many abducted Ukrainian children have recounted their experience of ideological indoctrination at “reeducation camps” as part of a process designed to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian identity. Thousands are also reportedly being forced to join Russian paramilitary youth organizations with the aim of turning them into future soldiers for Putin’s war against Ukraine and the wider Western world.

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The mass abduction of Ukrainian children is recognized internationally as one of the gravest Russian war crimes committed during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Some analysts believe it may qualify as genocide in line with the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention, which identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five recognized acts of genocide.

In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for his personal role in the mass abductions. While there is little chance of Putin being prosecuted for war crimes in The Hague, the arrest warrant has proved hugely embarrassing for Russia and has made it difficult for the Kremlin dictator to travel internationally, as ICC member countries are now technically obliged to arrest him. This has prevented Putin from attending annual BRICS summits in South Africa and Brazil in recent years.

Putin’s fears of possible arrest for his involvement in the mass kidnapping of Ukrainian children may have influenced the choice of Alaska as the location for this week’s summit. The United States has not signed up to the ICC and is therefore under no obligation to detain the Russian leader. Alaska borders Russia itself and can be reached without crossing the airspace of ICC member states, making it a particularly suitable venue from Putin’s perspective. It is crucial that the issue of child abductions now remains on the agenda when the two leaders sit down for talks on Friday.

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The international community has been outspoken in its condemnation of the Kremlin’s kidnapping campaign. In early August, representatives from a coalition of 38 countries issued a joint statement calling for the immediate return of abducted Ukrainian children while demanding that the Russian authorities “cease to alter the identity of children, including changes to their citizenship, placement in Russian families or institutions, ideological indoctrination, and exposure to militarization.”

In the United States, Senator Richard Durbin introduced a Senate resolution in spring 2025 condemning Russia’s illegal abduction of Ukrainian children. Meanwhile, Republican Senator Chuck Grassley and Democratic Senator Amy Klobuchar have recently cosponsored the Abducted Ukrainian Children Recovery and Accountability Act to potentially provide enhanced US support for Ukraine as it seeks to identify and rescue kidnapped children.

President Trump has indicated that he will work to support the return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia, and has said he believes he can influence Putin on the issue. However, the Trump Administration has also cut funding to a key initiative tracking young Ukrainian victims of Russia’s deportations. Friday’s summit now presents Trump with the ideal opportunity to show that he remains committed to ending the abduction of Ukrainian children.

Rescuing Ukraine’s kidnapped kids would be a meaningful step toward a lasting settlement to end Europe’s largest war since World War II. It is also a relatively realistic objective at a time when there appears to be very little prospect of Putin or any other Russians facing justice for war crimes committed in Ukraine. By pressing Putin to return the thousands of Ukrainian children abducted since 2022, Trump can demonstrate that Russia will face a degree of accountability for the crimes of the invasion. Until Ukraine’s stolen children come home, Russia’s sense of impunity will only grow.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Throughout the past month, images of decomposing bodies in an outdoor morgue, hospital corridors filled with wounded civilians, and families fleeing for safety have shaken Syrian society as well as the international community, both of which are closely watching the transitional government led by interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa. To protect the progress the interim government has made toward peace—and to keep these local grievances from triggering further regional instability—the United States and other international partners must act.

A two-fold humanitarian crisis

Impacts on civilians—both Druze and Bedouin—have been substantial, as both communities have found themselves caught in the crossfire of escalating violence. The result is a two-fold and deeply fragmented humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, the Israeli strikes have introduced a new dimension to the conflict, reinforcing patterns of regional instability. These developments underscore how local unrest, such as the escalation in Sweida, can intersect with broader geopolitical dynamics.

The United Nations (UN) estimated that as of August 5, over 191,000 people—over a third of Sweida governorate’s population—had been displaced. Half of this group remains within Sweida’s borders, particularly in the Salkhad and Sweida districts. Hundreds of Bedouin families who were trapped in Sweida since the onset of the violence have been evacuated by the Syrian government, with over an estimated 1,500 people having moved to Daraa and rural Damascus.

Even before the recent clashes, two-thirds of Sweida’s population relied on humanitarian aid—an enduring effect of the last decade and a half of conflict in Syria. Civilians have since faced chronic power and water outages, the burning and looting of their homes, as well as shortages of medicine, fuel, and food. Health services, already limited, continue to be overwhelmed. The World Health Organization confirmed five attacks on healthcare professionals and infrastructure in Sweida in July, including the killing of two doctors, obstruction and targeting of ambulances, and temporary occupation of hospitals by armed groups—events which harken back to some of the darkest periods of the Syrian conflict.

Among the most jarring news was a Syrian Arab News Agency report, citing the Ministry of Defense, that hospital rooftops were being used by snipers from “outlaw groups” targeting government forces. At the same time, other reports, including one by the BBC, feature testimonies from hospital staff and volunteers who saw Syrian government forces attacking, and in some cases killing, Druze patients. These conflicting accounts underscore not only the brutality of the violence but also the deep confusion, fragmentation, and erosion of trust that now characterizes the humanitarian response in Sweida.

Politicization of aid

The days that have followed the clashes in July have revealed a deeply fractured and politicized humanitarian landscape, which directly affects the coordination and delivery of aid into Sweida province. Access to the city became heavily restricted, which led to allegations of a government-imposed siege on Sweida. However, Sweida’s governor, Mustafa al-Bakour, recently denied any allegations of a siege on Sweida city and the existence of obstacles to traffic movements or the entrance of humanitarian organizations.

Several humanitarian agencies—including the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent—have reportedly managed to deliver much-needed aid to parts of Sweida province as well as populations displaced to Daraa and rural Damascus. However, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said on July 27 that access for these convoys remained constrained as intermittent violence led to roadblocks and a general sense of insecurity.

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Conversations I had with aid workers and civilians attempting to deliver relief reveal that these barriers are due to a chaotic patchwork of access permissions from local power brokers and armed groups. As one aid worker reported, “Sometimes people go to the checkpoints and are allowed in. Sometimes they aren’t—it really depends on who is manning the checkpoint.” Syria’s Information Minister Hamza Mustafa claimed that humanitarian aid heading to Sweida has not stopped, while also pinning the blame for the shortage of supplies on “outlaws seeking to exploit our people’s suffering for their own purposes.”

At a July 29 event, Syrian Minister of Health Musaab Nazzal Al-Ali recounted how he and the country’s minister of social affairs and labor were at the head of a convoy on the second day of fighting, and they “were prevented from entering Sweida, and we received warning messages and were banned from entering.” He also talked about how, two days later, another convoy he accompanied was prevented from entering until the convoy was permitted to enter under the auspices of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. This lines up with reports that community leaders in Sweida, such as Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri, have rejected aid channeled through the Syrian government, which they view as complicit in the violence.

As shown by these accounts, aid convoys, which should be neutral, were caught in a broader battle over political recognition. This ultimately delayed life-saving assistance, including bread and fuel, and exacerbated a crisis that is already deeply complex, multi-faceted, and politically charged.

That these aid convoys were turned away also signals a breakdown of legitimacy that extends far beyond policy disagreements and reflects a critical disintegration of command and control (even within the Druze community itself), as well as contention over who holds authority to allow aid through. They show that there is a crisis of trust and legitimacy in Syria’s transition and its state institutions. Aid delivery has become a political fault line in the larger debate over who is trusted to lead Syria’s recovery.

Progress on political priorities, whether through constitutional reform or international diplomacy, will be hamstrung by these unresolved local crises of credibility. That is because these crises, such as the one in Sweida, are emblematic of a wider legitimacy crisis.

Syrians across all communities experienced a Syrian state under the Assad regime as predatory or absent. The reported violence of rogue actors among the interim government’s security forces has only reinforced public perception that there is a long road ahead to rebuild trust and credibility in the new state. As interim Syrian authorities work to establish security and services across Syria, public trust is essential. Yet, as shown in Sweida, that public trust is at risk. Acknowledging this “draining trust,” Syria’s UN special envoy, Geir Pedersen, emphasized the need for “major course corrections on security and the political transition” in Syria.

The bottom line is that fractures in Syria’s fragile social contract have wider ramifications: Domestic collapse can lead to regional escalation, increasing the risk of a broader breakdown.

Priorities for US diplomats and policymakers

The United States and Syria’s international partners must act quickly, not only to prevent further bloodshed in Syria but also to advance progress that has been made toward peace and accountability. This is not about choosing sides in Syria’s complex sectarian landscape: It is about preventing a humanitarian catastrophe from metastasizing into regional instability.

On July 16, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged the long-standing rivalry between the communities in Sweida, but made little mention of how the United States would strategically support the humanitarian response, especially given recent US foreign aid cuts.

First, Washington and other international partners (including UN agencies and international nongovernmental organizations) should facilitate unhindered humanitarian access, particularly in areas where Druze leadership controls access to aid. They can do so by supporting the interim Syrian authorities’ efforts to facilitate the delivery of aid—including trauma care, food, shelter, and non-food items—while simultaneously working to rebuild trust with local leaders through sustained, transparent, and community-led engagement. To do so effectively, the United States, as well as humanitarian actors including international nongovernmental organizations, must emphasize that humanitarian aid must remain neutral and apolitical. The focus must remain squarely on saving lives and restoring basic services, regardless of political or territorial control.

Second, Washington should use diplomatic pressure to push interim authorities in Damascus to reel in rogue members of the security forces—including any implicated in war crimes during the episodes in Sweida, Syria’s coast, or during the fourteen years of Syria’s civil war. Trust among all Syrian civilians, as well as Syria’s neighbors, in the new Syrian state will remain fraught in the absence of an accountable and professional military. As my colleague Ibrahim Al-Assil outlined, this includes encouraging regional stabilization talks, especially with Turkey, Jordan, and Arab Gulf states, to contain the fallout.

Third, Washington should continue to encourage Syrian interim authorities to make right their promises to pursue transparent investigations into violations in Sweida, including attacks on health infrastructure and civilian displacement, while amplifying the work of Syrian civil society in documenting abuses and calling for justice. The way recent massacres along the Syrian coast were brushed aside with little investigation or accountability does not bode well for how the violence in Sweida will be addressed, further deepening public mistrust in state institutions and reinforcing a pattern of unaccountability.

Sweida is not an isolated tragedy—it is a litmus test for Syria’s fragile political transition and for the international community’s resolve to respond to the unfolding humanitarian crisis. The Trump administration has often framed Syria policy around counterterrorism and containing Iranian influence, but the Sweida crisis reveals how the United States has a vested interest in ensuring localized grievances don’t unravel broader regional stability—undermining both regional security and long-term US strategic interests.

Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

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Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever during wartime

Olena Halushka — Tue, 05 Aug 2025 20:13:31 +0000

The Ukrainian Parliament voted last week to reverse controversial legislative changes that threatened to deprive the country’s anti-corruption institutions of their independence. This apparent U-turn by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy came after thousands took to the streets in Ukraine’s first major public protests since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago.

The scandal surrounding efforts to subordinate Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies to the politically-appointed Prosecutor General was part of a broader trend that has sparked concerns over potential backsliding in the country’s reform agenda. Additional factors include the failure to appoint a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, investigations targeting prominent anti-corruption activists, and alleged attempts to undermine the work of other key institutions like the High Qualification Commission of Judges.

The recent wave of nationwide protests in defense of the country’s anti-corruption reforms served as a timely reminder that Ukraine’s democratic instincts remain strong, even amid the horrors of Russia’s invasion and the escalating bombardment of Ukrainian cities. The message to the government was clear: Ukrainian society is determined to defend the democratic progress secured over the past eleven years since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This includes safeguarding the independence and integrity of the watchdog institutions established in the wake of the revolution.

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The readiness of Ukrainians to rally in support of the country’s anti-corruption reforms undermines efforts by detractors to portray today’s Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt and unworthy of international support. In reality, Ukrainians are more committed than ever to the democratic values that have shaped Ukraine’s national journey throughout the turbulent past few decades.

Meanwhile, the anti-corruption bodies established since the 2014 revolution are evidently effective enough to target senior figures close to Ukraine’s political leadership. They have also won the respect of the country’s vibrant civil society and are regarded as an important element of Ukraine’s reform agenda by much of the population.

It should come as no surprise that so many ordinary Ukrainians view the fight against corruption as crucial for the country’s future. After all, efforts to improve the rule of law are widely recognized as central to Ukraine’s European ambitions.

Over the past decade, anti-corruption reforms have helped the country achieve a series of key breakthroughs along the path toward EU integration such as visa-free travel, candidate country status, and the start of official membership negotiations. Ukrainians are well aware of the need to maintain this momentum, and remain ready to pressure the government on anti-corruption issues if necessary.

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Since the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine’s reform progress has been closely monitored and fiercely guarded by Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian public combines a strong sense of justice with a readiness to act in order to preserve fundamental rights. They are backed by a seasoned and self-confident civil society sector, along with an independent media ecosystem that refuses to be silenced.

Over the past decade, Ukraine’s ability to adopt and implement reforms has often depended on a combination of this grassroots domestic pressure together with conditions set by Ukraine’s international partners. These two factors remain vital in order to keep the country on a pathway toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration.

Some skeptics have suggested that the fight against corruption is a luxury that Ukraine cannot afford while the country defends itself against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Such thinking is shortsighted. Faced with a far larger and wealthier enemy like Russia, Ukraine must make every single penny count.

In peacetime, corruption can undermine the business climate and hinder the country’s development. The stakes are far higher in wartime, with corruption posing a threat to Ukraine’s national security. It is therefore crucial to increase scrutiny and reduce any graft to an absolute minimum. Meanwhile, the long-overdue reform of specific sectors such as the state customs service and tax administration can generate important new revenues that will provide a timely boost to the Ukrainian war effort.

The success of Ukraine’s recent protest movement is encouraging and underlines the country’s status as a resilient young democracy. At the same time, it is too early to declare victory.

In the coming weeks, Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners will expect to see a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine appointed, along with the appointment of four Constitutional Court judges who have passed the international screening process. Efforts to pressure civic activists and the country’s independent media must also stop.

Speaking on August 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a point of attacking Ukraine’s anti-graft agencies. He obviously recognizes that strong anti-corruption institutions serve as important pillars of Ukraine’s long-term resilience and represent an obstacle to Russia’s plans for the conquest and subjugation of country. The Kremlin dictator’s comments should be seen as further confirmation that Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever in the current wartime conditions.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

This campaign of classroom indoctrination is only one aspect of the Kremlin’s comprehensive Russification policies in occupied Ukraine. Since February 2022, the Russian authorities have conducted mass arrests of anyone deemed a potential threat to the occupation, with thousands of Ukrainian officials, activists, community leaders, veterans, and patriots disappearing into a vast network of prisons. A recent UN probe has classified these large-scale detentions as a crime against humanity.

Ukrainian civilians still living in occupied Ukraine are being forced to accept Russian citizenship or lose access to essential services such as pensions and healthcare, along with the ability to run a business or hold a bank account. Beginning in September, new legislation will make it possible for the authorities to expel anyone without Russian citizenship from their own homes and deport them.

Meanwhile, public symbols of Ukrainian statehood, heritage, and culture are being methodically removed and replaced by the trappings of an imported Russian imperial identity. Likewise, the demographic makeup of the occupied Ukrainian regions is being systematically transformed by Kremlin programs that aim to attract migrants from across the Russian Federation.

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The hard line Russification policies currently being implemented in the 20 percent of Ukraine under Russian occupation offer a chilling blueprint for the rest of the country if the invasion succeeds. Indeed, it is now be abundantly clear that Putin’s ultimate objective is a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

This should come as no surprise. For years, Putin has insisted Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has accused Ukraine of being an illegitimate state occupying historically Russian lands. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he began referring ominously to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia,” while describing the country as an “inalienable” part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space. More recently, he underlined his contempt for Ukrainian independence by declaring: “All of Ukraine is ours.”

Putin’s Ukraine obsession has been one of the dominant themes of his entire reign. This reflects the Kremlin dictator’s desire to reverse the 1991 Soviet collapse and his fear that the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood could spark the next stage in a Russian imperial retreat that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

For Putin and millions of his fellow Russians, the emergence of an independent Ukraine is a bitterly resented reminder of their own country’s post-Soviet humiliation, while Ukrainian society’s efforts to embrace a democratic European identity offer alarming echoes of the pro-democracy movements that led to the fall of the USSR. For the past two decades, Putin’s top priority has been making sure Ukraine’s turn away from authoritarianism does not serve as a catalyst for similar democratization demands inside Russia itself.

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During the early years of his reign, Putin attempted to return Ukraine to Moscow’s orbit via a combination of political interference, economic leverage, and soft power tools including the Kremlin-controlled Russian media and the Russian Orthodox Church. When this strategy failed, he opted to launch the limited military intervention of 2014, which began with the seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.

Once it became apparent that even the partial occupation of Ukraine would not derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Putin appears to have concluded that he could no longer take the risk of allowing an independent Ukraine to exist at all. This set the stage for the full-scale invasion of 2022 and laid the ideological foundations for the Kremlin’s current efforts to extinguish Ukrainian national identity entirely.

Unless Putin is stopped, there can be no serious doubt that millions more Ukrainians will be robbed of their identity and subjected to Putin’s ruthless brand of Russian imperial indoctrination. During recent bilateral peace talks in Istanbul, Kremlin officials underlined their determination to secure Kyiv’s complete capitulation. Moscow’s terms include the revival of Russian dominance over every aspect of Ukrainian public life and the dramatic reduction of the Ukrainian military. It does not take much imagination to anticipate exactly what kind of treatment Russia has in mind for the civilian population if Ukraine compiles with these demands and is left defenseless.

Putin’s calculated campaign to erase the identity of the largest country situated wholly in Europe makes a complete mockery of efforts to portray the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a conventional armed conflict with limited goals. This is no mere border dispute or rational response to legitimate Russian security concerns; it is a classic war of colonial conquest with the explicit intention of destroying Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

If it is allowed to continue, the magnitude of this crime will dwarf anything seen in Europe since World War II. This will fuel Putin’s sense of impunity and whet his imperial appetite, creating the conditions for further previously unthinkable acts of international aggression. It will then only be a matter of time before other “historically Russian” nations are subjected to the horrors currently being inflicted on Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukraine’s democracy is the key to the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration

Alyona Getmanchuk — Wed, 30 Jul 2025 22:04:59 +0000

For decades, I’ve been working to promote and defend Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic path as part of the country’s vibrant civil society. When I first began advocating for potential Ukrainian NATO membership, I kept hearing that it is not just an army but an entire country that joins the alliance. This is why Ukraine’s membership bid extends beyond military interoperability to also encompass the far broader concept of democratic interoperability.

Since Ukraine’s integration into NATO has been politically stalled, the EU accession process has become the primary track helping Ukrainians to ensure their country’s democratic interoperability. This is especially true given that the European Union has traditionally been the main driving force for the transformation of the wider region.

Ukraine has experienced this firsthand. The most important reforms carried out in Kyiv over the past decade have almost all been tied to Ukraine’s EU integration. This has included the launch and development of the country’s independent anti-corruption infrastructure.

Attempting to advance toward European Union membership in the present conditions is exceptionally challenging. Ukraine is the first country ever to approach the democratic transformation necessary for EU accession while fighting a full-scale war. No other European nation has ever joined in such circumstances.

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While Ukraine currently faces a range of unique challenges, this cannot justify neglecting democratic principles. On the contrary, defending the democratic gains of recent decades is vital if further progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration is to be achieved.

Ukraine is home to one of the most dynamic and demanding civil societies in the world today. The country has staged two revolutions since regaining independence. Both were in support of Ukraine’s European and democratic path. Meanwhile, there have been no protest movements or grassroots campaigns in favor of authoritarian rule or alignment with Russia, even at times when public attitudes toward Moscow were very different.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s swift response to last week’s protests in defense of the country’s independent anti-corruption institutions shows that Ukraine’s democratic instincts are as strong as ever. The next big test for Ukrainian democracy will be Thursday’s parliamentary vote on a presidential bill that aims not only to ensure the independence of anti-corruption bodies, but also to make them more effective.

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Ukraine may not yet be an ideal democracy, but Ukrainians have clearly identified the democratic direction they want their country to move in. This is not because the EU demands it, but because it is the future the Ukrainian people wish for themselves and for their children.

Ukrainians understand that only a democratic Ukraine, fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, can be truly safe from further Russian imperial aggression. By embracing democratic values, Ukraine moves decisively away from the Kremlin’s authoritarian alternative and can no longer be treated as a “mini-Russia.”

There is also growing awareness that while Ukraine currently deserves the support of its partners as the victim as unprecedented international aggression, continued assistance will depend on the extent to which the rule of law prevails and the principles of transparency and accountability are upheld.

The heroism and sacrifices of recent years have unquestionably consolidated Ukraine’s commitment to democratic values. The deaths of so many Ukrainians in the fight for a democratic European future weigh heavily on every single question related to the country’s adherence to democratic norms and practices. Understandably, families and friends who have lost loved ones will not allow their sacrifices to be in vain.

After defending their homeland against authoritarian Russia’s full-scale invasion for more than three and a half years, Ukrainians now firmly believe they have earned the right to be seen as the front line of the democratic world. They know that Putin’s imperial ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine, and see how other autocratic regimes like China, Iran, and North Korea are aiding the Russian war effort. Ukrainians feel they are fighting on behalf of all freedom-loving nations, which makes it even more important for them to preserve and strengthen their country’s democracy.

Alyona Getmanchuk is Head of the Mission of Ukraine to NATO-designate.

Safeguarding Uyghur human rights: The US should leverage economic statecraft tools to end Uyghur forced labor

Nazima Tursun — Tue, 29 Jul 2025 18:43:04 +0000

Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China has intensified its draconian repression of the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group with origins in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Also referred to as the Uyghur Region or East Turkestan, it is home to an estimated twelve million Uyghurs.

Since China began its policy of mass internment in 2017, an estimated two million Uyghurs have been arbitrarily detained in state-run internment camps, where they are subject to political indoctrination, torture, organ harvesting, and forced repudiation of their religious and ethnic identities. According to the United Nations, these abuses may constitute crimes against humanity. Several governments, including the United States, have determined that China is actively committing genocide against the Uyghurs.

Despite international calls for China to cease its human rights abuses, the government is instead furthering its repression of the Uyghurs. For those who narrowly avoid detainment in internment camps, another stark fate awaits them: subjection to China’s state-sponsored forced labor programs.

Through sanctions and the adoption of anti-forced labor legislation, the United States has led the global effort to combat China’s forced labor practices. While these measures have moved the needle in the fight against forced labor, widespread tariffs and the absence of new punitive measures targeting forced labor may cause progress to stagnate. As tensions grow and global economic uncertainties unfold, the Trump administration must ensure that it does not lose sight of Uyghur human rights. The United States can help curtail China’s forced labor practices and uphold its precedent of promoting Uyghur human rights by doubling down on its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and imposing additional anti-forced labor measures.

Which industries are exposed to Uyghur forced labor?

Forced labor plays a central role in China’s campaign of repression. Two systems of forced labor exist in China, which primarily target the Uyghurs. The first system exploits detainees in China’s internment camps for labor. The second system—conducted under the pretense of “poverty alleviation”—involves transferring large numbers of Uyghurs from rural regions to factories and fields across China. In both instances, authorities use intimidation and abuse to coerce individuals to labor. Following their subjection to China’s labor programs, workers face abusive working conditions, inadequate pay (if any), rigid surveillance, political indoctrination, and mandatory Mandarin lessons—a systematic effort to erase Uyghur language and culture.

Crucially, industries and supply chains across the world risk exposure to Uyghur forced labor. The Uyghur Region is deeply integrated in the global economy, accounting for roughly 20 percent of the world’s cotton, 25 percent of the world’s tomatoes, 45 percent of the world’s solar-grade polysilicon, and 9 percent of the world’s aluminum. Given that a sizable portion of the world’s production takes place in the Uyghur Region, goods that are produced through Uyghur forced labor inevitably enter international supply chains and end up in stores and households across the world.

Though forced labor touches industries ranging from automotive to pharmaceuticals, it is especially pervasive in the apparel and agriculture industries. Under conditions that raise concerns of coercion, nearly half a million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities are transferred each year to work in cotton fields. In China’s tomato fields, workers are subject to torture, with testimonies of beatings and electric shocks administered to those who fail to meet high daily quotas. Evidence of forced labor has also emerged in the seafood industry, where Uyghurs work in Chinese processing plants that supply seafood to the United States—seafood that ends up in federally-funded soup kitchens, school lunches provided by the National School Lunch Program, and even US canned fish donations to Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force identified several industries where forced labor is deeply entrenched as high-priority sectors for enforcement. This is an important designation. However, without sustained effort and vigorous screening, products made with forced labor will continue making their way into our homes and taint everything from the clothing we wear to the food we eat.

How has the United States responded to Uyghur forced labor?

Escalating human rights abuses against the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have prompted governments across the world to act. The United States, as one of the leading forces opposing China’s human rights abuses, has leveraged its robust economic statecraft toolkit to institute punitive measures on individuals and entities complicit in the persecution of Uyghurs. The United States has notably imposed 117 sanctions on entities and individuals, issued investment bans on eleven companies, and implemented numerous export and import controls.

To directly combat China’s forced labor practices, Congress passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), a landmark legislation that stands as the most powerful tool globally to address Uyghur forced labor. The UFLPA was signed into law in 2021 and prevents goods made with Uyghur forced labor from entering the United States by utilizing a rebuttable presumption that any goods produced in the Uyghur Region are done so under forced labor conditions. The enforcement of UFLPA calls for sanctions on individuals and entities complicit in forced labor, and it also expands the Department of Homeland Security’s UFLPA Entity List—an import blacklist of companies with ties to Uyghur forced labor. Last updated in January 2025, the UFLPA Entity List now includes 144 entities, a marked increase from the initial twenty entities in 2022.

The UFLPA is the first law globally that counters Uyghur forced labor tangibly, comprehensively, and with meaningful economic impact. Since UFLPA’s implementation in June 2022, the US Customs and Border Protection has seized a staggering $3.69 billion worth of goods for investigation and denied shipments totaling nearly $1 billion in value entry into US markets.

Ultimately, sanctions and forced labor laws like the UFLPA have prompted companies to comply with human rights standards. Mounting pressure and increased scrutiny from the United States and the international community have led major multinational companies to withdraw from the Uyghur Region over forced labor concerns, despite firm retaliation from Beijing. By implementing the UFLPA, the United States has also set a positive precedent with numerous countries, including Canada and European Union members, adopting their own policies targeting forced labor.

Where do we stand now?

The global response to US measures countering Uyghur forced labor is evidence that pressure works. Although substantive progress has been made in the effort to combat forced labor, the Trump administration’s tariff policies may hamper further progress. On the one hand, the administration’s elimination of the de minimis exemption could help minimize a key loophole in UFLPA enforcement. Under the exemption, Chinese imports valued under $800 were allowed to enter the United States while avoiding import duties and strict customs scrutiny, limiting CBP’s ability to enforce the UFLPA. This loophole has been exploited by Chinese companies complicit in forced labor, such as Shein and Temu, which have built their entire business models around the exemption.

While the closure of the de minimis loophole could prove fruitful, the administration’s global reciprocal tariffs pose other concerns. Steep tariffs imposed on major US trading partners could inadvertently incentivize companies to look for areas in their supply chains where they can cut back on costs. This is especially concerning if these companies overlook ethical labor considerations in search for alternatives in countries like China that are laden with abusive labor practices. Additionally, imposing widespread tariffs may lead to instances of tariff evasion and could cause issues for forced labor screenings due to the obfuscation of product origins. Compounding these concerns, additions to the UFLPA Entity List have stalled since the Biden administration’s last update in January.

With the focus of world affairs shifting to spotlight trade turbulence and growing diplomatic tensions, efforts to counter forced labor and advance human rights cannot afford to lose momentum. As companies and countries navigate global uncertainties, it is imperative that the Trump administration takes a hard stance against Uyghur forced labor and ensures unabated continuity in US enforcement of anti-forced labor measures. It can do so by introducing and ramping up additions to the UFLPA Entity List. The United States could also impede China’s forced labor practices by passing the reintroduced No Dollars to Uyghur Forced Labor Act in Congress, which seeks to prohibit US contracts with companies tied to forced labor in the Uyghur Region. To ensure these measures are implemented effectively, US agencies charged with leading Uyghur-focused initiatives must be staffed with specialists who possess a deep understanding of the state-sponsored forced labor and persecution that take place in China, and who have the expertise to help identify and address sanctions evasion.

Amid geopolitical uncertainties, Uyghur human rights must be safeguarded as an enduring priority. The United States needs to act swiftly, decisively, and meaningfully to ensure that they are.

Nazima Tursun is a former young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

New Atlanticist Jun 30, 2025

Less investment, less influence: Why the US risks losing ground in the Indo-Pacific

By Lize de Kruijf and Nazima Tursun

The US withdrawal of foreign aid to Indo-Pacific countries creates space for China to expand its influence in the region.

Defense Policy Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Nov 26, 2024

China’s atrocity crimes in Xinjiang are entering an even darker phase. The UN must act.

By Rayhan Asat

The suffering of the Uyghur people continues in Xinjiang, and the United Nations has a responsibility to act on its recommendations.

China Human Rights

EconoGraphics Nov 4, 2024

How data control is driving a new US-China economic divide

By Jesse Sucher

China’s increased restrictions on corporate and financial data make it difficult for the United States and allies to enforce economic statecraft tools like sanctions and supply chain safeguards.

China Economy & Business

Economic Statecraft Initiative

Housed within the GeoEconomics Center, the Economic Statecraft Initiative (ESI) publishes leading-edge research and analysis on sanctions and the use of economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives and protect national security interests.

Learn More

The post Safeguarding Uyghur human rights: The US should leverage economic statecraft tools to end Uyghur forced labor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

‘I can barely stand or make it through the day’: First-hand views of Gaza’s starvation

Arwa Damon — Tue, 29 Jul 2025 13:39:06 +0000

“I’m hungry,” a message comes through from a staffer working for my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).

“I swear to you, I can barely stand or make it through the day.”

Hunger pounds the brain, louder than the Israeli drones overhead. Weakened bodies stumble through the streets with empty pots looking for a community kitchen that—at best—is doling out a broth, faces contorted in agony in a crush of bodies. Babies born relatively healthy with pinchable cheeks are wasting away, their mothers’ bodies too weak and malnourished to provide breast milk, and hospitals lack the appropriate replacement formula.

My INARA team recently sent me videos from Gaza of a distribution of fresh vegetables. This is not aid that managed to get in, but local produce from the few greenhouses that are still accessible. The prices are astronomical. The parcels, each with six kilograms (roughly thirteen pounds) of fresh vegetables, cost around $120.

I’m struck by how the little children are grinning as if it were Halloween and they are just about to dive into a major candy haul. Only it’s not a chocolate bar they pull out, it’s a cucumber. And there is nothing imagined about the horror scenes or the skeletal figures around them; it’s all real.

“Thank you, thank you, my daughter, we’re hungry all the time, all day. I didn’t eat at all yesterday,” an elderly woman says to Yousra, INARA’s Gaza program coordinator.

The reality of starvation

This is the reality across swaths of Gaza, as the Israeli government deliberately starves the Palestinian enclave, a reality just recognized by two Israeli human rights organizations. B’tselem’s report is entitled “Our Genocide,” and Physicians for Human Rights recently published its findings in “Genocide in Gaza.”

Israel has systematically denied the entry of aid, created roadblocks to ensure that the little that does get in is not safely accessible, and perpetuated false narratives intended to discredit the humanitarian community and justify its blocking of aid. This includes repeatedly stating that Hamas steals the aid and that aid organizations are working with Hamas.

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While nothing could be further from the truth, these claims led to the creation of an aid distribution mechanism—the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF)—that meets none of the standards recognized by the vast majority of the humanitarian sector.

Israel has manufactured the perfect insidious storm to ensure Gazans’ slow and agonizing end, even though its own military, as reported by the New York Times, “never found proof that the Palestinian militant group had systematically stolen aid from the United Nations,” citing two senior Israeli military officials and two other Israelis with knowledge of the issue.

According to a United Nations (UN) statement on July 27, “Of the seventy-four malnutrition-related deaths recorded this year, sixty-three occurred in July, including twenty-four children under five. Many died before reaching medical care, their bodies showing signs of severe wasting.”

In the twenty-four hours since that statement was released, another fourteen people, including two children, died of malnutrition.

Malnutrition means the body isn’t getting the nutrients it needs—such as proteins, vitamins, and minerals. This weakens the immune system, slows wound healing, impairs growth, and causes muscle wasting and organ dysfunction. Over time, major systems—like the heart, liver, and brain—begin to fail.

Starvation is the extreme end of malnutrition. Without enough calories, the body begins to break down its own fat, muscle, and eventually organs for energy—essentially, the body starts to “eat itself.” This leads to multi-organ failure and death if not reversed.

Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks that launched the war in Gaza, the Gaza Health Ministry has recorded at least 147 deaths due to malnutrition, among them eighty-eight children. As horrific as that is, the number is likely much higher. This is because malnutrition not only first targets the young, but also those with pre-existing chronic or congenital conditions. And much of the time, their deaths are attributed to the condition, rather than malnutrition.

I remember a child I met last November, on my last trip to Gaza before Israel denied my entry. He was emaciated, malnourished, and living with cerebral palsy. We helped the family gain access to RTUF, or ready-to-use therapeutic food. I remember the way I smiled a few weeks later, when I received a photo of the little boy looking much healthier. Two months later, right before the cease-fire, when Israel had again tightened the aid screws, the child died. While it’s difficult to pin his death solely on malnutrition, studies show that children with cerebral palsy can live between thirty and seventy years, assuming they have the proper care.

Even those people in Gaza with a salary, for example, those in the journalism, medical, or humanitarian sectors, cannot get enough to eat without risking their lives. Hospitals in Gaza are reporting that their doctors and nurses are struggling to stay on their feet, fainting while trying to save the lives of their patients.

In a recent interview, Doctors Without Borders CEO Avril Benoit spoke about how one of their own was killed trying to deliver food aid. Of their one thousand staff who are Palestinian, most are on one meal a day, if that. 25 percent of those being admitted to Doctors Without Borders facilities are malnourished, with the majority being between the ages of six months and five years.

“We’re twenty-one months into this and everything we’re seeing now is entirely predictable,” Benoit said.

Not only is the scale of this suffering predictable, it was preventable. Humanitarian organizations have been warning about starvation in Gaza at different points over the last nearly two years now, as Israel would strangle aid, only to loosen its grip just enough to keep the population barely alive. But nothing compares to what we have seen in the last months.

In March, Israel completely shut off all humanitarian aid access. For nearly two months, nothing entered the Gaza Strip.

In May, the United States and Israel backed GHF in starting its distributions, replacing the pre-existing and proven-to-work system of at least four hundred distribution points set up by established humanitarian organizations with just four. Access requires people to cross through Israeli red zones where both the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and guns for hire foreign GHF contractors open fire using machine guns, drones, and tanks as a means of so-called “crowd control.” According to the UN, more than one thousand people have been killed, and more than seven thousand have been injured, just trying to get food.

The IDF has issued statements strongly “rejecting the accusations” that its forces deliberately fire on civilians coming to collect aid.

Those civilians who do survive, often empty-handed, describe the process as sick and twisted.

On its second day of operation, I received a message from a friend’s cousin who had tried to collect aid. “I heard bullets whizzing past my ear,” he wrote. “Panic erupted as everyone around me started running, seeking shelter behind a broken wall. The gunfire continued to hit the wall, and we were terrified, unsure of whether to flee or stay put.”

Palestinians walk with sacks of flour delivered after trucks carrying humanitarian aid enter northern Gaza on July 27, 2025, coming from the Zikim border crossing. (Photo by Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto)

Tens of thousands of mostly men gather at night, waiting to move forward to collect desperately needed food aid. They wait for the signal. Gunshots ring out, people freeze, and some get shot. They move forward. More shots. They freeze. They make a run for it, tearing and grabbing at the aid that has been set out.

In a recent piece by the Israeli paper Haaretz, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers themselves described how they had nicknamed it “Operation Salted Fish”—the name for the popular children’s game “Red light, Green light.” The piece chronicles how IDF soldiers and officers say they were ordered to fire at will, at unarmed crowds, even when no threat was present.

In an interview with the BBC, a former contractor delivered a scathing and incriminating similar testimony. A Green Beret veteran of the US military, he stated that “in my entire career I have never witnessed the level of brutality and use of indiscriminate and unnecessary force against a civilian population, an unarmed starving population.”

Similarly, a report by Sky News features a former GHF security guard claiming it is a “sadistic death trap” where “snipers open fire randomly on crowds.”

The GHF, and false claims about Hamas interception

The GHF was founded under the false premise repeatedly presented by Israel that humanitarian organizations are infiltrated by Hamas, and that Hamas is stealing the aid for its own financial benefit and to use aid as a means to exert control over the population. These claims were repeated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who also denied that Gazans are starving.

“Israel is presented as if we are applying a campaign of starvation in Gaza,” he said. “What a bold-faced lie. There is no policy of starvation in Gaza, and there is no starvation in Gaza”, even as TV and social media screens show images of babies with sunken cheeks and hollowed-out eyes.

Netanyahu’s comments were followed by what appeared to be a rebuke by US President Donald Trump, who called on Israel to let in “every ounce of food” and stated that “some of those kids, that’s real starvation stuff . . . you can’t fake that.”

Earlier this month, in a briefing to the press, the European Commission spokesperson Eva Hrncirova stated that “we don’t have any reports of Hamas stealing the aid.” More recently, even a US government review found no evidence of widespread looting of aid by Hamas.

We in the humanitarian community have repeatedly stated that Hamas is not stealing our aid. That is not to say that looting has not always been a massive challenge; it has. But it was largely being carried out by armed gangs that emerged in the lawlessness and that operate in the Israeli-controlled “red zone” wastelands. I wrote about this in a CNN op-ed as far back as a year ago.

Much of that looting was taking place at the Kerem Shalom or Karam Abu Salem crossing in southern Gaza. We had long speculated that the only way for armed gangs to exist in this area would be with Israel’s knowledge. In June, Netanyahu admitted himself that Israel has been arming gangs, most notably a notorious clan operating in the Rafah area, where much of the looting takes place. He defended the decision, stating these clans were helping in the fight against Hamas.

Just getting trucks cleared into Gaza by Israel is a lengthy and laborious process itself. Anything entering Gaza must get pre-approved. We must submit packing lists, and Israel can arbitrarily decide to remove items (in the past, sugar was one such example) or determine that entire pallets are not necessary (as late as last year, it was educational materials). The trucks get scanned and searched by the IDF before entering Gaza, where they are offloaded. At this point, organizations are notified that they can come and collect.

The uphill battle of aid delivery

In a recent post on X, the Israeli Foreign Ministry stated that the UN was refusing to distribute aid and instead was coming to collect supplies.

If only it were that simple. To reach our pallets, which arrive at three crossing points along the Israel-Gaza border, organizations must cross through the “red zone.” As of this writing, more than 85 percent of Gaza is either a “red zone” or under evacuation order, meaning that movement within those areas necessitates coordination with the Israelis.

In practice, this looks like a movement request being submitted, along with vehicle descriptions, license plates, driver names and IDs (any of which can be rejected or approved and then rejected at the last minute), waiting for it to be approved, waiting for on the day of the movement the “green light” to be able to proceed to a “holding point” and then waiting for a “green light” again. The process is then reversed to cross the red zone again.

Just this past Friday, for example, out of fifteen movement requests, only a third were facilitated by Israel, as is detailed by the UN’s Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. It also cites the example of one aid agency that waited for nearly eight and a half hours for the “green light” to move its trucks from the crossing to its warehouse. However, at that point, they were informed by the Israeli authorities that they had to use a different route and change the warehouse for drop-off, as the original site had been subject to a displacement order that same day.

This is just one example of what happens—and has been happening all along for the last twenty-one months—on a daily basis.

With the conditions that Israel created now, with these levels of starvation, trucks that do manage to navigate all the obstacles face swarms of hungry Gazans who will, out of desperation, loot whatever is being carried. And if they gather too close to the “red zone,” the IDF is all but certain to shoot, as happened in July when crowds gathered after hearing a UN convoy carrying flour was coming through. Dozens were gunned down. Israel claimed it fired “warning shots.”

Under increasing pressure over the weekend, Israel agreed to resume airdrops and open so-called “humanitarian corridors.” It implemented a “tactical pause” in bombings for ten-hour stretches in specific areas not considered the red zone—parts of Mawasi, Deir al-Balah, and Gaza City.

The initial airdrops—carried out by Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—amounted to a couple of trucks at best and injured at least ten people. Aid agencies are warning that this is a grotesque distraction, not to mention highly inefficient and costly.

A C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft drops humanitarian aid on the northern Gaza Strip on July 27, 2025. Two Jordanian and one Emirati plane drop 25 tonnes of humanitarian aid over the Gaza Strip, Jordanian state television reports on July 27, 2025. (Photo by Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto)

Air drops cannot and will not meet the needs of the people, nor will they even begin to stem the starvation. It is absurd to any observer that air drops are the only solution that the international community can come up with when the World Food Program has enough food either in the region or en route to the region to feed all of Gaza for three months.

However, Israel’s weekend announcement does seem to have come with a slight easing of restrictions. UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher said that initial reports indicated that roughly one hundred trucks had been collected.

“A moral crisis that challenges the global conscience”

But nothing will change unless Israel allows aid to be properly scaled up and delivered in a safe and humane manner.

In addition to that, you cannot just turn on the tap of food and reverse what has been done. The images we are seeing now are a result of weeks and weeks of limited calories and limited nutrients. They have no reserves of fat in their bodies, and their immune systems are destroyed. Children and adults need specialized treatment.

It can take several weeks to “stabilize” this level of malnutrition among children and others or they risk facing lifelong consequences.

“This is not just a humanitarian crisis. It is a moral crisis that challenges the global conscience,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres recently stated.

It often seems that it is only those in Gaza who have any moral conscience left. I’m reminded of another video that the INARA team sent me. A mother had arrived hysterical at our clinic, her kids were starving, her twin babies had screaming red diaper rash, and one of her boys had an upcoming birthday. He had asked his mother not for a cake, but for bread; it had been weeks since they had last been able to find some.

Yousra, INARA’s program coordinator, returned the next day with a couple of loaves she had been able to find, stacked them on top of each other, and placed a candle on top.

“I had to do it, I had to give him a little joy,” she messaged me.

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need lifesaving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

The post ‘I can barely stand or make it through the day’: First-hand views of Gaza’s starvation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

An open wound, a fading light: Marking eleven years since the Yezidi genocide

Pari Ibrahim and Murad Ismael — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 14:40:25 +0000

The Yezidi community remains shattered eleven years since the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) launched its genocidal assault against our community in Iraq. As the Middle East continues to experience shockwaves from ongoing conflict and an evolving geopolitical landscape, the priorities of the United Nations (UN), Western states, and Iraq have shifted.

One consequence of this shifting landscape has been an erosion of international attention on Yezidi issues, despite the enduring failure to achieve a successful resolution to Yezidi suffering in the aftermath of the Yezidi Genocide. More than 2500 Yezidis remain missing, according to assessments from the Free Yezidi Foundation, and many are believed to be in Syria. While Yezidis had hoped that regime change might lead to the return of many of our missing, this has not been the case. There is still no coordinated, systematic effort to identify and rescue the missing; rather, only sporadic rescues. The window of opportunity to save the missing may be closing. Absence of justice, poor living conditions in Sinjar, lack of employment opportunities, political marginalization, and protracted displacement all continue to plague the Yezidi community.

Last year, as we marked ten years since the Yezidi Genocide, we published a comprehensive report reviewing key challenges and policy priorities. One year later, little progress has been achieved.

Sinjar

Yezidis were driven from their homeland in Sinjar by ISIS in 2014, and while a significant number of Yezidis have returned home, many have not. As of 2024, approximately 150,000 Yezidis remain in displaced persons camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, according to the Hague-based International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. While the Iraqi Government has publicly pushed for the closure of internally displaced people (IDP) camps by July 2024, it seems to have reached an accommodation with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to pause the closures and slow the return process generally. Authorization letters for return do not seem to be issued, and only individuals returning through a US funded International Organization for Migration (IOM) program seem able to go back home. With limited support in Baghdad or Erbil, dwindling foreign aid, and spiking regional instability, a comprehensive voluntary, dignified return of Yezidis to Sinjar appears unlikely.

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The so-called Sinjar Agreement, widely promoted in Iraq and by international actors ostensibly to address instability, rebuild Sinjar, ensure security, and facilitate the return of those displaced by ISIS, has proved highly problematic due to the exclusion of the Yezidi community in shaping the agreement and its implementation. If implemented according to the current arrangement, many of the Yezidis affiliated with militias from Sinjar who joined just to defend their homeland, would be expelled, as outlined in the Sinjar Agreement. A just and logical political resolution to the current situation is required, including the demobilization and integration of Sinjar’s militia members into Iraq’s formal security architecture and empowering an elected mayor of Sinjar with meaningful decision-making authority, which would be more likely to encourage reconstruction, development, security, and ultimately, return.

Instead, Sinjar remains unstable. Its economy has collapsed, services are lacking, and most of those who returned are jobless and uncertain about the future. Despite calls for reconstruction, the Iraqi government pledged only $38 million for Sinjar and the Nineveh Plains. The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement has ceased supporting returnees, citing the lack of funds to cover the meager stipend it was providing to Sinjar returnees.

As the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (or PKK) moves to disarm, further geopolitical shifts may affect the security situation in Sinjar. Fundamentally, the Iraqi state must establish and maintain stable, predictable, legal police and security forces, ideally drawing from Yezidi and other residents of Sinjar.

National & regional geopolitics

Perhaps most importantly, Yezidis lack political weight and influence. Like other communities, Yezidis depend on a minimum level of political representation to ensure that our voices and needs are not made invisible.

Previously, Yezidis had one quota seat in Iraq’s parliament, reserved for the Yezidi electorate. In the election upcoming in November, that quota seat can be voted upon by citizens throughout Iraq, not only Yezidi voters. This means that powerful political blocs can influence the seat. We and many in the Yezidi community expect that the seat will go to a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) backed group. The PMF has its own political agenda and has steadily expanded its influence over Sinjar’s politics.

While Baghdad has approved mayoral appointments across most of the Nineveh governorate’s districts and subdistricts, approvals for mayorships in Yezidi-majority areas have largely stalled. While Baghdad and Erbil have continued negotiations aimed at resolving other issues like budgetary or oil and gas disputes, in Sinjar, positions remain frozen.

Further, Iraq’s parliament in January passed an Amnesty Law that may result in the release of thousands of convicted ISIS members. While Iraqi judicial proceedings are highly problematic, amnesty of ISIS members responsible for atrocity crimes is not a reasonable solution and undermines any sense of justice or fairness in Iraq from the perspective of genocide survivors.

Yezidis are also affected by Baghdad’s declining relationship with the UN. The Iraqi government’s decision to shutter the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Daesh/ISIS (UNITAD) has left ISIS-related evidence in a basement at UN Headquarters in New York, without a clear path toward evidence-sharing and case building against ISIS perpetrators.

Iraq seeks to wind down the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) by the end of 2025, effectively ending meaningful UN engagement in Iraq. While we have been disappointed with the UN in some respects, it was at least a regular presence ostensibly designed to promote international norms, the rule of law and accountability, and protection of all citizens, including minorities like Yezidis.

In Syria, President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former leader of al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, now leads the state—with relative support, including in the form of sanctions relief, from the United States and Europe, despite his extremist roots. The future of this new government with a Jihadist history is uncertain, but at the time of writing, the atrocities already committed against Syria’s Druze and Alawite communities are alarming for any ethnic or religious minority. Given the crimes perpetrated by ISIS, which grew strong in Syria, an extreme Islamist government in Damascus poses an existential threat to Yezidis in both Syria and Iraq.

Taken together, the developments in Iraq and the wider Middle East currently portend an ominous future for Yezidis. In our conversations with Yezidis living in IDP camps or in Sinjar, it is rare to find optimism among our people in Iraq. Almost everyone would prefer to leave Iraq and live abroad.

Policy changes in both Iraq and the wider international community, as recommended in our report last year, could help to reverse this trend. But without political strength or the active support of the international community, this is extremely difficult to envisage.

Changing US priorities

The United States has, in previous years, played a unique and irreplaceable role in Iraq. Attention to human rights, including of minority communities, the rule of law, the pursuit of justice, and combating extremism have helped Yezidis in the path to recovery, even if in small ways. The absence of a US foreign policy that prioritizes these issues presents serious threats to our communities and many others, and the US policy position regarding Yezidis is currently uncertain. Over the last decades, promotion of religious freedom and protection of religious minorities was a bipartisan US priority supported by most of the world. While the United States has the right to promote its own interests, we believe advancing fair and just societies around the world increases everyone’s security and prosperity.

Conversely, the spread of sectarian violence, Islamist extremism, and corrupt governance makes the region dramatically less safe and more difficult—resulting in costly military intervention and reducing the prospect of regional economic growth and stability.

We call on US, international, and domestic Iraqi actors to reaffirm their commitment to Yezidi recovery, to common principles of justice and fairness, and to help our community achieve dignity, safety, and a future in the Yezidi homeland.

Pari Ibrahim is the founder and executive director of the Free Yezidi Foundation. She has led efforts to amplify the voices of Yezidi survivors, promote accountability for ISIS crimes, and advance women’s empowerment.

Murad Ismael is the co-founder and president of Sinjar Academy and a co-founder of the Sinjar Crisis Management Team.

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To stand up for religious freedom, the US should support the Dalai Lama’s succession plan

Peter Arvo — Tue, 15 Jul 2025 13:47:40 +0000

On July 2, the Dalai Lama made official what many have long assumed: The institution of the Dalai Lamas will continue after his death. Using traditional methods, his organization, the Ganden Phodrang Trust, will have exclusive authority to identify, confirm, and appoint his reincarnation—the fifteenth Dalai Lama. Importantly, he has declared that the successor will be born in a free country—meaning neither Tibet nor any other region under Chinese control.

When that time comes, the United States and its partners and allies should continue to speak out, fund counter-disinformation efforts, and stand unequivocally behind the Dalai Lama’s succession plan. In doing so, the West will continue to defend not just one people’s faith, but also the principle that spiritual authority cannot be dictated by political power. It’s also in the United States’ geopolitical interest to defend the Dalai Lama’s succession from Chinese manipulation, as this can help prevent the spread of Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) influence throughout the region’s large Buddhist populations.

For human dignity and democratic values

Supporting Tibetan religious freedom is a defense of human rights as outlined in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is also a matter of Tibetans’ long-term development and well-being. Western support for religious freedom reinforces the global norms of human dignity and democratic values that are proven to be remarkable drivers for prosperity and stability. The historical lack of sufficient support for Tibet from the international community is an alarming example of what happens when religious and political repression goes unchecked—it erodes cultural identity, undermines community resilience, and enables authoritarian consolidation.

The Dalai Lama’s renewed focus on succession is playing out against the backdrop of the CCP’s continued cultural genocide of the Tibetan people. For the fifth year in a row, Freedom House has listed Tibet as scoring zero out of one hundred in its index, tied for the least free place on Earth. In the past several years, the CCP has gone to new lengths to Sinicize Tibetan culture, even officially renaming Tibet as “Xizang.” Nowhere is this suppression more acute than in the sphere of religious freedom.

As former supervising attorney for the Office of Tibet in Washington, DC, I’ve witnessed the extraordinary lengths Tibetans go to preserve their faith—from risking deadly crossings over the Himalayas to reach religious freedom in India, to building Tibetan charter schools in the United States—to ensure that their beliefs are passed on to the next generation. However, the crux of China’s strategy to curtail resistance to its religious persecution is its long-standing attempt to isolate Tibetans from the Dalai Lama.

As the living embodiment of Avalokiteśvara, the patron deity of Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama holds unparalleled religious and cultural significance for his followers. Yet many Tibetans are forbidden by the CCP from owning his image, uttering his name in public, or following his teachings. These acts can result in beatings, imprisonment, or worse. The CCP’s aggressive campaign is designed to repress and reshape Tibetan Buddhism under state control. Central to this effort is Beijing’s insistence on installing its own successor to the Dalai Lama.

A long history

Historically, Dalai Lamas were selected by a search committee composed of high-ranking monks and officials, including the Panchen Lama, a figure spiritually intertwined with the Dalai Lama who has historically played an important role in identifying and legitimizing the next Dalai Lama. This search committee would use traditional spiritual methods to identify the next reincarnation. Yet for more than two centuries, rulers of China have unsuccessfully sought to assert control over Tibetan reincarnations to exercise political control over Tibet and Tibetan Buddhist followers across the region. It wasn’t until well after the 1949 invasion of Tibet, however, that the CCP began institutionalizing control through regulatory mechanisms requiring state approval for recognizing reincarnate lamas.

In 1995, the Dalai Lama recognized Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, who was six years old at the time, as the eleventh Panchen Lama. Three days later, the boy was abducted by Chinese authorities and has not been seen since. In his place, Beijing appointed Gyaincain Norbu, a figure widely viewed by Tibetan Buddhists as illegitimate. However, this maneuver has allowed China to exert control over the lineage of the Panchen Lama.

A divided future

As a result of the CCP’s actions, it is all but certain there will be two competing fifteenth Dalai Lamas: one recognized by the Tibetan Buddhist community in exile, and another installed by Beijing. This duality is not just a theological matter but a geopolitical flashpoint. The CCP will likely use its appointed figure to exert spiritual influence over Tibetan Buddhists and reinforce its political claims to Tibet. While the current Dalai Lama has been an incredibly potent unifier for his people both inside and outside Tibet, struggling peacefully against the CCP’s Sinicization policies, the introduction of two competing Dalai Lamas will likely fracture Tibetan unity and risk a cultural identity crisis.

Inside Tibet, for example, the presence of a CCP-backed Dalai Lama may coerce some to accept Chinese authority, especially if that figure endorses Beijing’s claims. Outside Tibet, the global Tibetan Buddhist community is likely to reject such manipulation, deepening internal divisions. It also threatens broader global discord, as Tibetan Buddhists, Chinese Buddhists, and religious practitioners worldwide are drawn into this contested succession.

Anticipating this crisis, the United States has taken proactive steps. The Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 and the Resolve Tibet Act of 2024 both establish that the United States will not recognize any Dalai Lama selected by Chinese authorities. These laws reaffirm that succession is a religious matter to be decided solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community, and they allocate funding to counter Chinese disinformation and support the Tibetan government-in-exile. They even contain provisions for the sanctioning of Chinese officials interfering in the succession of the Dalai Lama. But as Beijing ramps up its efforts to install its own Dalai Lama, the United States must continue its support for Tibetan Buddhists’ religious freedom.

Cohesive support

In the face of the CCP’s attempts to control the Dalai Lama’s succession, robust Western engagement will be vital. Religious freedom is not only a pillar of human dignity but a deterrent against authoritarian overreach. By supporting the Dalai Lama’s succession, the West will support a peaceful people who have resisted violent retaliation, even under profound oppression. Such support also undermines China’s religious and political overreach, discouraging other authoritarian regimes from co-opting religious figures for political purposes.

Backing the Dalai Lama’s chosen successor will also reinforce strategic partnerships, especially in Asia. India, which hosts the Tibetan exile community and is in a soft power competition with China over the claim to Buddhism, affirmed earlier this month that the Dalai Lama alone holds the authority to determine his successor. Similarly, countries with substantial Tibetan Buddhist communities, such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Mongolia, will be wary of a CCP-appointed religious figure holding significant sway over large portions of their populations. While these countries have so far remained largely silent after the Dalai Lama’s succession announcement, perhaps for diplomatic reasons, the time will likely come when they will look for partnerships and countermeasures.

Despite the extraordinary resilience of the Tibetan people, China’s decades-long campaign of propaganda and suppression continues to erode religious authenticity and community cohesion. Without strong, sustained international support, Beijing may succeed in redefining Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism under state authority. The United States has already taken important steps to come to the defense of Tibetan Buddhists’ religious freedom and to counter the CCP’s attempts to gain regional influence through religious repression. Washington and its allies and partners must not waver in these efforts; they must redouble their commitments.

Peter Arvo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center and the former supervising attorney with the Office of Tibet in Washington, DC.

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Two US policy options for Venezuela: Shaping reform vs. ‘maximum pressure’ toward regime collapse

Venezuela Solutions Group — Thu, 10 Jul 2025 12:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The first Trump administration drafted a framework for encouraging a democratic transition in Venezuela; with a few updates, it represents one policy path the second Trump administration could take.
Nicolas Maduro’s recent promotion of a longtime rival may be a sign of how few friends he has left, raising the possibility that he may be more susceptible to the second option: a “maximum pressure” campaign.
Whether Washington opts for incentives or a hard line, the goal should be to keep presenting dilemmas that make a democratic transition more appealing than the status quo.

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US policy toward Venezuela is at a crossroads, with a degree of uncertainty still hanging over the new administration’s approach. The White House faces a choice: Should the United States try to use sanctions leverage to obtain limited concessions from Maduro on energy security, migration, and democratic reforms? Or should it bet on a return to “maximum pressure” in the hope of deepening existing fissures among Venezuela’s ruling elites and hastening a more immediate transition?

This issue brief, informed by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Solutions Group, explores two options through which the Trump administration could adopt an “America First” policy towards Venezuela.

Option I: Shaping incentives for an economic and democratic opening

The Trump administration could leverage sanctions on individuals and the energy sector to attempt to push Maduro toward political and economic reforms that advance the administration’s stated interest in Venezuela accepting deportees from the United States. This would involve shaping incentives for Maduro and his inner circle to extract concessions that could move Venezuela toward a gradual opening.

Policy recommendations:

Adapt the first Trump administration’s Democratic Transition Framework to lay the foundations for creative power-sharing arrangements.
Advance migration policy cooperation and refrain from exacerbating outbound migration.
Issue conditional sanctions licenses in exchange for economic and political benchmarks.
Expand the footprint for US and Western-aligned energy firms in Venezuela while displacing Russia, China, and Iran.

Option II: Broad pressure to advance regime collapse

Alternatively, the Trump administration could revise its previous policy of maximum pressure, especially if Maduro does not cooperate with policies to reduce outbound migration and the influence of US geopolitical rivals. This involves using pressure mechanisms including sanctions, indictments, and law enforcement to attempt to provoke a fissure in Maduro’s inner circle. Divisions in Caracas could break the government’s hold on power and incentivize a democratic transition in which a new coalition in power is more willing to work with the United States on migration and security interests.

Policy recommendations:

Remove all licenses allowing oil companies to operate in Venezuela.
Pursue investigations and prosecutions against government officials tied to money laundering, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities.
Tighten enforcement of secondary sanctions on Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran- based organizations.
Ramp up individual sanctions.
Bolster the Venezuelan democratic opposition and civil society.

View the full report

About the Venezuela Solutions Group

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s (AALAC) Venezuela Solutions Group focuses on advancing a peaceful, democratic solution to Venezuela’s crisis as well as furthering policy coordination between the United States and allies in Europe and across the Americas.

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The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Exploring the global digital ID landscape

Coley Felt, Will LaRivee — Thu, 10 Jul 2025 11:00:00 +0000

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Executive summary

In an increasingly digital world, digital identity systems represent a fundamental transformation in how personal information is authenticated and managed, shifting from traditional physical identification methods to electronic credentials that enable access to digital services across government and private-sector platforms. These systems utilize authenticated credentials that verify individual qualifications and personal information to establish trusted digital documentation, spanning use cases from health certificates to mobile identification for travel security and banking verification.

The worldwide adoption of digital identity systems varies significantly across regions and implementation approaches. Estonia’s comprehensive e-ID system, mandatory for all residents, demonstrates transformative societal impact by connecting organizations through distributed databases and blockchain technology. India’s Aadhaar program serves a massive population, proving that large-scale digital identity systems can operate in developing countries while bringing previously undocumented populations into formal economic systems, albeit not without criticism. The European Union’s eIDAS framework mandates that all member states offer digital identity wallets to citizens and businesses, creating interoperability across member states. The African Union has faced infrastructure and data protection challenges, while the United States remains fragmented with individual states implementing mobile driver’s licenses without federal coordination.

Digital identity systems offer a breadth of benefits including enhanced convenience, improved access for underserved populations, stronger privacy protections through data minimization principles, and significant cost savings for organizations. These systems hold tremendous potential to transform the delivery of government services and industry interactions, though there are potential risks and limitations to be considered.

Despite promising advantages, limitations across technical, political, and social spheres present an array of challenges. Technical limitations include interoperability between different systems, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and accessibility barriers in regions with limited digital infrastructure. Political obstacles include insufficient regulatory frameworks, lack of adherence to international standards, and coordination issues between jurisdictions. Social limitations center on concerns over public trust, particularly regarding surveillance and privacy, along with unequal access that can further marginalize vulnerable populations including refugees, elderly citizens, and those with limited digital literacy.

Successful implementation of digital identity systems requires coordinated efforts across sectors. Governments must adopt user-first design principles, ensure interoperability through technical standards, tailor systems to local contexts, and establish effective public-private partnerships. Private sector actors should prioritize transparency, data security, and accessibility while implementing privacy-enhancing technologies. Civil society organizations play crucial roles in public education and representing user interests.

As digital identity systems become the cornerstone of personal identification, effective implementation depends on building systems that genuinely serve user needs while maintaining robust protections against misuse and public trust through transparency and accountability measures, particularly ensuring the protection and well-being of marginalized and disadvantaged populations.

View the full report

About the authors

Staff

Coley Felt

Assistant Director

GeoTech Center

Artificial Intelligence Cybersecurity

Fellow

Will LaRivee

Resident Fellow

East Asia Security & Defense

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The GeoTech Center champions positive paths forward that societies can pursue to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

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Five questions (and expert answers) about the ICC arrest warrants against Taliban leaders for crimes against women and girls

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 09 Jul 2025 16:05:41 +0000

Is the tide turning for justice? On Tuesday, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague issued arrest warrants for the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, and the group’s chief justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani, for crimes against humanity of persecution against women, girls, and others. Since retaking the country in August 2021, the Taliban has imposed strict controls on women and girls through repressive decrees and brutal enforcement, with no sign of easing up. To answer our burning questions about these warrants, we turned to our experts on international law and gender apartheid.

1. What do we know about the Taliban leaders targeted by the ICC?

Akhundzada has been supreme leader of the Taliban since 2016. A reclusive figure, he has maintained a low public profile, rarely appearing in media and seldom leaving his stronghold in southern Afghanistan. He joined the Taliban in 1994 and quickly ascended its ranks, serving in various judicial and religious roles. During the Taliban’s initial rule (1996–2001), he was appointed chief justice of the Sharia Courts, where he reinforced the Taliban’s repressive policies toward women and the broader population of Afghanistan. Since the Taliban’s renewed takeover of the country in August 2021, despite his limited public appearances, Akhundzada has issued more than one hundred decrees and edicts concerning the status of women and girls that systematically curtail their fundamental rights, institutionalizing a system of gender apartheid. Among the Taliban leaders, Akhundzada is infamous for his strict interpretation of Islamic law, leading to stringent policies, including the banning of girls’ education beyond sixth grade and the reintroduction of public executions and floggings.

Haqqani is affiliated with the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania, a powerful Deobandi madrassa in Pakistan, (not to be confused with the Haqqani Network, the military faction of the Taliban). He led the Taliban’s negotiating team during the Doha peace talks in 2019-2021 and is among the Taliban’s highest-ranking religious figures. He shares similar religious views as Akhundzada and has played a key role in drafting and interpreting the Taliban’s legal and judicial policies based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law. He has been influential in shaping ideological and legal decisions of the Taliban group, particularly those affecting the rights of women and girls. 

—Azadah Raz Mohammad is a legal advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. She has worked on humanitarian and human rights–related projects in close collaboration with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Afghan Ministry of Justice, among others.

2. What is the practical impact of these warrants for the Taliban?

The ICC’s announcement comes at a time when the international community has slowly started to normalize and accept the Taliban’s draconian regime. The request for arrest warrants is an important reminder to the international community about its obligation under international law conventions to tackle impunity and not to recognize the Taliban, whose members have been deemed criminal actors, as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In addition, to fulfill its mandate, the ICC is dependent on the cooperation of its member states to implement the arrest warrants once they are issued. Members of the international community should assist the court in arresting the alleged perpetrators and fulfill their obligations under the Rome Statute so that justice can be served. 

The arrest warrants are a good start, but the ICC should do more—expeditiously pursue charges against more senior Taliban leaders, expand the scope of charges to include the full panoply of crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Afghanistan since 2003 (when it became a state party to the Rome Statute), including the concept of gender apartheid.

—Azadah Raz Mohammad

3. What impact will this have for women and girls in Afghanistan right now?

As we near the fourth anniversary of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, the arrest warrants offer a glimmer of hope after empty assurances, rhetorical condemnations, and elusive justice. It’s a first step to holding the Taliban to account, validating the tireless efforts of the women and girls of Afghanistan to document, resist, and dismantle the Taliban’s systematic gender-based oppression. The immediate impact isn’t just symbolic solidarity. The finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the crime against humanity of persecution is being perpetrated paves the way not just to potential individual criminal liability for Taliban leaders, but also the responsibility of other states, including in facilitating asylum and resettlement (as already determined by the European Court of Justice).

The women and girls of Afghanistan are not the only ones impacted. The Pre-Trial Chamber recognized a broad scope of victims, including LGBTQI+ persons. This is a watershed moment in international criminal law: the first time that an international tribunal has confirmed that gender persecution encompasses the protection of sexual orientation and nonconforming gender identities. 

—Alyssa Yamamoto is a senior legal and policy advisor to the Strategic Litigation Project. She previously served as legal advisor to the United Nations special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism.

4. What’s next for the ICC case?

The next step is to wait for Akhundzada and Haqqani to turn themselves in to The Hague, or for a cooperating state to do so. Once the accused have made an initial appearance, then a confirmation of charges hearing would follow. The confirmation of charges document is ICC parlance for an indictment, and the hearing is a pretrial step that resembles a “mini-trial” before the trial. Should charges be confirmed against any of the accused, they would then appear for trial.

The key question is whether these arrest warrants can actually be enforced, given that Taliban leaders voluntarily turning themselves over is highly unlikely and their international travel ranges from limited to nonexistent. But politics can change and what was once viewed as impossible can quickly become possible. The handover of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on crimes against humanity charges to the court earlier this year is a prime example of how shifting political winds can present opportunities to secure defendants in dockets.

While some courts of an international character or trying international crimes have held trials in absentia—which is how the Special Tribunal for Lebanon could try Hezbollah operatives or France could try a Mauritanian military officer for torture—the International Criminal Court requires physical presence at trial (with limited exceptions for virtual participation from disruptive defendants). However, the Appeals Chamber at the ICC recently upheld a Pre-Trial Chamber ruling that charges could be confirmed against notorious Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony even in his absence, and that the Rome Statute animating the ICC can do so where an accused has “fled or cannot be found.” Given that Akhundzada rarely leaves his stronghold in southern Afghanistan and his whereabouts are elusive, that may be an option that would at some point allow victims’ participation in court, should all other avenues of securing his presence in The Hague be exhausted.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project. She previously worked on war crimes and crimes against humanity trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court.

5. What’s next for activists and the international community? 

Amid worrying movements towards legitimization and normalization of relations with the Taliban, activists should use the arrest warrants as both a guardrail and a galvanizing tool. The international community should unite in support for the arrest warrants, including their enforcement. But this is just one piece of the puzzle. The international community must also pursue the full panoply of justice avenues available to hold the Taliban to account, including universal jurisdiction cases, the potential International Court of Justice case, and ongoing efforts to accurately reflect in international law the totality of gendered harms being perpetrated, namely through codification of gender apartheid as a crime against humanity.

As the Pre-Trial Chamber has rightly articulated, at stake are “not only direct acts of violence, but also systemic and institutionalized forms of harm, including the imposition of discriminatory societal norms.” This is the crux of the Taliban’s existential project of domination that must be expressly named and squarely addressed in all justice and accountability efforts going forward.

—Alyssa Yamamoto

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New findings: Russian aerial attacks amount to extermination and persecution

Fatima Khan and Winnie Zheng — Tue, 08 Jul 2025 18:28:46 +0000

On June 25, 2025, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and Strategic Litigation Project, together with the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School (IHRC), hosted a hybrid panel discussion on new findings and policy implications surrounding Russian aerial attacks against Ukraine over the last three years. The event was moderated by Strategic Litigation Project Staff Lawyer Celeste Kmiotek.

In his introductory remarks, IPHR Project Director for Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus Simon Papuashvili discussed the situation on the ground in Ukraine, stating that “Putin is not interested in peace; he is committed to a long brutal war. The only way to stop him and to safeguard Ukraine and Western allied security is by sustaining and strengthening military, financial, and political support for Ukraine.”

Russian aerial attacks as crimes against humanity and war crimes

In the first portion of the event, IPHR and IHRC panelists discussed the findings of their newly published report, “Airstrikes and Atrocities: A Legal Assessment of Russia’s Aerial Campaign in Ukraine,” in which they demonstrate that these aerial attacks amount to several crimes against humanity, including those of murder, extermination, persecution, and other inhumane acts as well as war crimes, including those of intentionally directing attacks against civilians, civilian objects, and other specially protected objects, and of disproportionate attacks and starvation. To introduce this portion of the event, Team Lead of Ukraine Legal Team for IPHR, Anastasiya Donets discussed her team’s work in Ukraine and the specific need to work on investigating aerial attacks. “Russian attacks have escalated dramatically since early 2025, which coincided with the beginnings of the peace talks with Russia, and we do not think it’s a coincidence,” said Donets.

The report aimed to advance justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine, to complement Donets’ fact-finding work at IPHR with IHRC’s legal analysis, and to “develop the jurisprudence around war crimes and crimes against humanity,” as IHRC Director and Clinical Professor of Law at Harvard Law School Susan Farbstein explained. In doing so, the report showcases that international law still matters and that it is possible to prosecute these kinds of cases. Oceania Eshraghi, a member of the clinical team that authored the report, discussed the primary findings of the report as well as the process of using IPHR’s evidence to build legal arguments, saying that the team wanted to focus on “highlighting the crimes against humanity of extermination and persecution.”

During the harsh winter months, Russia’s actions have led to prolonged power outages lasting for weeks, creating life-threatening conditions for civilians. These blackouts not only hinder access to essential information but also disable air raid sirens, leaving Ukrainians unaware of imminent attacks and without guidance on evacuation routes. These conditions “represent a deliberate effort by Russia to create unlivable conditions for Ukraine’s civilian population, consistent with the crime [against humanity of] extermination” Eshraghi said. She continued: the report establishes the crime against humanity of persecution by demonstrating how “Russia’s actions have resulted in the clear deprivation of Ukrainians fundamental rights, most notably the right to life, the right to education, and the right to cultural participation.” This deprivation “has been carried out with the requisite discriminatory intent, specifically targeting individuals because of their Ukrainian identity.”

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Eshraghi continued by outlining two overarching patterns in the Russian attacks: “first, attacks on critical energy infrastructure including electric grids and power grids. And second, attacks on civilians and civilian objects with the use of precision guided weapons.” She concluded the objective of the attacks was to “disrupt and destabilize the entire energy system in Ukraine on such a scale that it inflicts significant harm on the civilian population.” Furthermore, Russia has destroyed or damaged over “seven hundred medical facilities and over 1,500 schools or colleges, often in areas where there’s not [an] identifiable military target nearby.” This illustrates the Russian military’s intention to “terrorize and demoralize the Ukrainian population to ultimately encourage their surrender or their [decision to] flee.”

Donets implored the US government to implement a strong sanctions bill against Russia that is currently under consideration in Congress and has bipartisan support. She emphasized that “a bill that mandates, rather than leaves room for, sweeping sanctions for Russia, will demonstrate that atrocities described in today’s report come at a high cost and so does Russia’s mockery of US-led peace talks.”

The policy implications of Russia’s total war

The second half of the event consisted of a panel discussion on the policy implications of Russia’s total war, featuring Eurasia Center Distinguished Fellow Ambassador William B. Taylor and Security and Defense Researcher at RAND Corporation Michael Cecire. When asked about the path forward, Ambassador Taylor emphasized the real-world implications for Putin of international accountability: “He is an indicted war criminal by the International Criminal Court . . . he has not been able to travel to some places. He’s turned down, had to skip meetings because of it.” Additionally, he stated that “[Ukraine’s] defense industrial base which gives them agency has been dramatically expanded, not just drones, but [also] on the artillery [and] vehicles. This is a really important point that Ukrainians [can] say no. The Ukrainians have agency. Someone mentioned the minerals deal… that resulted in actually a pretty good agreement. The Ukrainians can say no; they now have the ability to prosecute.”

Next, Cecire offered questions to consider in policymaking: “How does our policy allow or at least not appreciably respond to these destructive measures? What are the downstream effects on our credibility? What are the downstream effects on the United States’ national security interests? And frankly, our moral credibility and standing?”

Donets added: “It’s really important to not only focus on the horrific things that Russia’s invasion brought into Ukraine and into the world . . . [but to also] focus on Ukrainian resilience. Focus on the future and the opportunities that this horrible war created. One of these opportunities is making international law more effective for who it was created for: civilians.”

The event concluded with a moderated question and answer session in which audience members posed questions about political messaging, the criteria for selecting case studies, and accountability measures within different jurisdictions, both domestically in Ukraine and through the International Criminal Court. Farbstein highlighted that the immediate focus is on demonstrating that accountability is attainable, which can in turn motivate broader action and engagement from the international community. This approach aims to show that justice is possible, encouraging others to meaningfully advocate for accountability on behalf of victims of crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Fatima Khan is a summer intern with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Winnie Zheng is a summer intern with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

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Charai in National Interest: Canada Can Learn from Trump’s Native American Policy

Atlantic Council — Mon, 07 Jul 2025 17:30:59 +0000

Original Source

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How centering Afghan women and youth now can help challenge oppressive regimes in the future

Quhramaana Kakar — Wed, 02 Jul 2025 13:50:40 +0000

Afghanistan, home to over forty million people, today stands under the rule of an ideological movement that has transitioned from an insurgency to a de facto government. The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 did not result from a popular mandate but from a confluence of systemic failures. Chief among these was a strategic recalibration by the United States and its allies, culminating in a negotiation process in Doha that excluded meaningful participation by the Afghan people. The resulting agreement, reached in their absence, further weakened an already fractured and often corrupt political elite, accelerating the collapse of governance. In prioritizing geopolitical interests, diplomacy, and regional engagement, Western powers effectively abandoned their commitments to human rights and the will of the Afghan population. This retreat enabled the Taliban to reimpose a repressive regime marked by sweeping restrictions on women’s rights and freedoms.

This time, however, the Taliban’s approach is more calculated. Its goal is not merely to rule but to sustain its rule. Unlike in the 1990s, when the curtailment of women’s rights and suppression of civil liberties were driven primarily by rigid ideological interpretations rooted in the teachings of madrassas in Pakistan, the current restrictions are a fusion of ideology and political strategy. The Taliban now understands that restricting education, civic participation, and the political awakening of youth and women is essential to neutralizing long-term threats to its grip on power.

Informed by the trajectories of other ideological regimes—particularly that of the Islamic Republic of Iran—the Taliban appears to have some absorbed important lessons. After the 1979 revolution, Iran imposed strict religious codes and social restrictions yet allowed continued access to education for women. Over time, this decision inadvertently enabled the rise of an educated and politically conscious population—one that today represents a significant challenge to the Iranian regime. The Taliban, however, has chosen the opposite path: to deny women access to education and employment altogether, effectively cutting the roots of future opposition before it can grow.

From the outset, policies restricting girls’ education, women’s employment, and youth expression have not been temporary or incidental. Rather, they are integral to a broader strategy of ideological entrenchment and political consolidation. The excuses provided by some in the regime—the notion that Afghan society is not prepared to accept women in public and in leadership roles, logistical limitations, or undefined “Islamic frameworks”—are tactical deflections meant to obscure the Taliban’s true intent: to silence the country’s most capable agents of transformation.

Yet, despite the regime’s efforts, the people of Afghanistan, particularly its women and youth, continue to organize, advocate, and strategize, both within the country and across the diaspora. They are risking their lives protesting, documenting human rights violations, educating girls in underground schools, and building solidarity across communities and borders. These individuals and communities are not merely resisting; they are actively reimagining a future Afghanistan.

What needs to be done

Legal, diplomatic, and political pressure on the Taliban must be sustained, particularly around issues of human rights, gender equality, and inclusive governance. At the same time, the path forward must also include constructive, meaningful, and targeted engagement that centers the Afghan people themselves. Recognizing and supporting the agency of Afghans, especially women, youth, and civil society actors, must become a strategic pillar of international policy toward Afghanistan.

Afghans inside the country, as well as those in exile, are actively envisioning and building models for a peaceful, inclusive future. Their efforts represent the most credible and locally grounded alternatives to the Taliban’s extremism and authoritarianism. Ultimately, it is about building on the resilience and leadership that persist within Afghan communities despite repression and exclusion.

One example of this is the Strategizing a Seat at the Table (SSTI) initiative, facilitated by Women for Peace and Participation, an organization which I founded in 2012 and where I currently serve as director. This initiative brings together hundreds of Afghan women, including young women from both within and outside the country, in a series of strategic dialogues aimed at shaping policy, proposing solutions, and advocating for inclusion. It is rooted in an ecosystem model that emphasizes complementarity, where different positions, experiences, and capacities across the population of Afghan women are leveraged to advance a collective agenda. This agenda is not limited to women’s inclusion, encompassing other historically excluded groups in Afghan society. Building on this foundation, SSTI trains women in negotiation, mediation, and advocacy; connects them to international platforms; and supports grassroots projects in healthcare, education, and community resilience. By engaging with key forums like the exclusionary Doha Process, United Nations bodies, and local mechanisms, it offers a flexible framework that enables Afghan women not only to participate—but to lead.

Initiatives like this one are part of a growing movement connecting Afghans inside and outside the country to reimagine leadership, redefine governance and assert a new vision for Afghanistan. Media outlets such as Rukhshana and Zan Times amplify voices across generations to advocate for women’s rights and social justice. Organizations like Rawadari document atrocities and pursue justice through international legal accountability mechanisms. Meanwhile, the Women Advocacy Committee of the Women and Children Research and Advocacy Network has established a platform in Canada to represent women leaders and organizations in exile. Women’s Rights First, a women-led organization, promotes gender justice, expands women’s access to justice, and strengthens accountability for human rights violations in Afghanistan.

On the ground in Afghanistan, despite severe repression, women-led resistance continues. These protest movements take many forms: some publish anonymous videos, others run underground schools, and many engage in decentralized, grassroots organizing to resist the systematic erasure of women’s presence, rights, and agency.

Investing in Afghanistan’s future

The Taliban’s model of control today is not simply a product of ideological conviction—it is a deliberate political strategy aimed at long-term dominance. Educated youth and empowered women pose a threat not just because they oppose the Taliban, but because they embody an alternative vision for the nation: one rooted in rights, human dignity, participation, and accountability.

If Afghanistan is to reclaim its aspirations for freedom, equality, and an end to gender apartheid, it will do so through the leadership of those the Taliban seeks to silence. Ensuring these voices are protected, amplified, and resourced is not just a moral imperative, it is the only viable path forward.

Quhramaana Kakar is a peace strategist, mediator, and leadership expert with over two decades of experience advancing women’s inclusion in peacebuilding and women’s socioeconomic empowerment expert across conflict and post-conflict contexts, particularly in Afghanistan. She is the founding director of Women for Peace and Participation and a senior strategic advisor to the Women Mediators across the Commonwealth network, and a fellow at the Centre for Women, Peace and Security at the London School of Economics.

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Putin cannot attend BRICS summit in Brazil as he fears arrest for war crimes

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 26 Jun 2025 20:53:05 +0000

Russian president Vladimir Putin will not attend next week’s annual BRICS summit in Brazil due to concerns over an International Criminal Court warrant for his arrest in connection with alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov has confirmed. “This is due to certain difficulties in the context of the ICC requirement,” Ushakov commented. “In that context, the Brazilian government could not take a clear position that would allow our president to participate in this meeting.” Instead, the Russian leader is expected to join his BRICS colleagues via video link.

Putin has officially been a war crimes suspect since the ICC named him in a March 2023 arrest warrant over to the mass deportation of Ukrainian children. Russia stands accused of abducting and deporting tens of thousands of Ukrainian children, with many victims reportedly subjected to ideological indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian national identity. These mass abductions may qualify as genocide according to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention, which identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five internationally recognized acts of genocide.

As a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC, Brazil would be obliged to arrest Putin if he entered the country. Addressing the ICC warrant in 2023, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva initially dismissed talk of detaining the Russian president, before backtracking and distancing himself from the issue. “If Putin decides to go to Brazil, it’s the justice system that will take the decision over whether he should be arrested, not the government or congress,” Lula stated.

Putin faced similar uncertainty two years ago ahead of the annual gathering of BRICS leaders, which was then being hosted by South Africa. The South African authorities reportedly came under considerable pressure from their Russian colleagues to provide assurances that the Kremlin dictator could travel to the August 2023 event without fear of arrest. “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting president would be a declaration of war,” commented South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in the build-up to the summit. The Africans were ultimately unable to offer any guarantees, forcing Putin to abandon his plans to attend.

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In addition to Putin, the ICC has also issued arrest warrants for a number of senior Russian officials since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2024, the court announced charges against former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Russian army chief Valeriy Gerasimov, Russian Air Force long range aviation chief Sergei Kobylash, and Russian Black Sea Fleet commander Viktor Sokolov in connection with the deliberate targeting of Ukrainian civilians and the bombing of Ukraine’s civilian power grid.

While these charges have been welcomed in Ukraine and elsewhere as a step toward justice, there is currently thought to be little prospect that any of the named Russian war crimes suspects will be forced to appear in The Hague. Instead, the ICC arrest warrants serve primarily as an inconvenience and a reminder that efforts are underway to hold high-ranking Russian officials accountable for crimes committed during the invasion of Ukraine.

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While the wheels of justice continue to turn slowly at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Kyiv is also pursuing alternative formats to prosecute Kremlin officials for the invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed an agreement on June 25 with the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe, the continent’s leading human rights body, to establish a special tribunal that will charge Russia’s national leaders with the crime of aggression.

Once operational, this special tribunal could theoretically put senior Russian figures including Putin on trial, but this will require a boldness that has often been absent from Europe’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. “It will take strong political and legal courage to make sure every Russian war criminal faces justice, including Putin,” Zelenskyy noted in Strasbourg.

Despite mountains of evidence supporting allegations of Russian war crimes in Ukraine, it may still be many years before Putin or any other senior Kremlin officials face even symbolic justice. This has left Ukrainians feeling understandably frustrated and deeply disillusioned. They will take little comfort from the fact that Vladimir Putin is now unable to travel internationally without first considering whether he risks being arrested for war crimes. Nevertheless, the Kremlin ruler’s inability to attend flagship events like next week’s BRICS summit in Brazil is a personal embarrassment for Putin and a significant blow to Russia’s international prestige.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Since the Russian takeover of Crimea, the peninsula’s sizable Crimean Tatar population has been collectively and systematically persecuted for their perceived opposition to the occupation. For the Crimean Tatars, this mirrors the pain of past experiences with Russian imperialism. Following the Russian conquest of Crimea in the late eighteenth century, the native Crimean Tatar population was subjected to decades of harsh policies by the Russian imperial authorities, leading to a mass exodus.

Worse was to follow. In February 1944, the Soviet authorities carried out the deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar population to Central Asia. More than 200,000 people were forced to abandon their ancestral homeland overnight, with tens of thousands dying in a brutal deportation process and during the initial years of exile.

The deportation of the Crimean Tatars is one of the Soviet Union’s most notorious crimes against humanity. Ukrainian parliamentarians recently appealed to the international community to recognize the deportation as an act of genocide.

In the twilight years of the Soviet era, the Crimean Tatars were finally allowed to begin returning to their homeland. This process gained momentum following Ukrainian independence, with Crimean Tatars accounting for around 15 percent of the peninsula’s more than two million population on the eve of the 2014 Russian invasion.

The current wave of persecution targeting the Crimean Tatar population of Crimea began during the early days of the Russian occupation, with reports soon emerging of Crimean Tatars being threatened, kidnapped, and killed. The body of Crimean Tatar activist Reshat Ametov was discovered on March 15, 2014. He is widely seen as the first victim of the Russian occupation.

Since 2014, hundreds of Crimean Tatars have been arrested on what human rights activists say are falsified charges. Members of the community are currently thought to represent more than half of Crimea’s political prisoners. In 2016, the self-governing body of the Crimean Tatar community, the Mejlis, was officially outlawed and branded an “extremist organization.” Russian raids and detentions in Crimean Tatar districts have become a grim feature of everyday life during more than a decade of occupation.

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In addition to facing restrictions on their human rights and political freedoms, Crimean Tatars living under Russian occupation are also currently limited in their ability to honor their culture or express their identity. Indeed, they are not even permitted to stage public memorial events commemorating the victims of the Soviet era deportation. Meanwhile, Crimean Tatar heritage is being erased across the peninsula.

Crimean Mufti Ayder Rustemov is one of many from the Crimean Tatar community who view the current policies of the Putin regime as a continuation of earlier attempts to suppress the indigenous population and russify Crimea. “The goal of Russia has not changed, only the form has changed,” he commented in May 2025.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has dominated the international headlines in recent years and drawn attention away from the ongoing human rights abuses being committed by the Russian authorities in occupied Crimea. However, the situation remains dire. In Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom in the World report, political rights and civil liberties in Crimea received a score of just one out of a possible 100.

As discussion continues over possible deals to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Crimean Tatars have been alarmed by reports that the United States may be prepared to recognize Russia’s occupation of Crimea in order to secure peace. US recognition of Russia’s claim to Crimea would represent a major blow to the inviolability of borders, which has served as a core principle of international law for decades. It would also legitimize the further persecution of the Crimean Tatar population.

Any lasting peace must guarantee the security and human rights of Ukraine’s Crimean Tatar population and allow them to live freely in their own homeland. This should include the release of all political prisoners, an end to infringements on political and religious freedoms, and full legal protections for Crimean Tatar heritage and identity.

Russia’s war against Ukraine began in February 2014 with the seizure of Crimea. The persecution of the Crimean Tatars is a constant reminder of this crime and must be addressed before the war can be brought to an end.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

US secures release of Belarusian prisoners but pressure must continue

Hanna Liubakova — Tue, 24 Jun 2025 21:10:34 +0000

The release of prominent Belarusian political prisoner Siarhei Tsikhanouski last weekend took everyone by surprise. It was a rare moment of optimism that offered hope for the future, while also serving to highlight the plight of the more than one thousand Belarusians who are still imprisoned in the country on politically motivated charges.

Tsikhanouski was one of the most high-profile figures to be jailed in summer 2020 during the run-up to Belarus’s presidential election. Following his imprisonment, Tsikhanouski’s wife Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya ran as a candidate in his place and emerged as a serious threat to the rule of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Forced into exile in the days following the fraud-marred vote, she has spent the past five years leading the Belarusian opposition movement while raising international awareness about the struggle for a democratic Belarus. Seeing an emaciated but free Tsikhanouski finally embrace his wife was a powerful image.

The couple’s reunion on Saturday in Lithuanian capital Vilnius was facilitated by United States diplomatic efforts. Tsikhanouski was one of fourteen Belarusian political prisoners to be released as a result of US Special Envoy Keith Kellogg’s visit to Minsk and meeting with Lukashenka. Among those freed were RFE/RL journalist Ihar Karnei and university lecturer Natallia Dulina.

Tsikhanouskaya expressed her thanks to US President Donald Trump, Kellogg, and other American officials for their role in securing freedom for some of Belarus’s most well known political prisoners. However, she also made a point of underlining that many more Belarusians remain incarcerated on politically motivated charges. “We’re not done. 1,150 political prisoners remain behind bars. All must be released,” she commented.

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The decision to free some of Belarus’s most prominent political prisoners last weekend was not an act of mercy. It was a calculated move by Lukashenka in pursuit of international legitimacy. The Belarusian ruler has found himself diplomatically isolated since launching a brutal crackdown on protests over his country’s contested 2020 presidential vote, and has become heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival.

It appears that he now wants the United States to soften their stance and recognize him as a potentially useful partner in a difficult region. The goal is normalization on Lukashenka’s terms, with a reduction in international pressure on the regime without any fundamental changes to his repressive system.

Officials in Minsk have made no secret of their desire to discuss sanctions relief and broader engagement with the United States. Lukashenka has also expressed an interest in joining US-led peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. This is a clear signal that he seeks to reposition himself not as a Kremlin satellite, but as a legitimate regional player worthy of diplomatic recognition.

There is no real evidence that Lukashenka is genuinely distancing himself from Moscow. Since 2020, he has allowed Russia to dramatically expand its influence throughout Belarus in a process that some have likened to a creeping annexation. In 2022, Lukashenka let Russia use the country as a gateway for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He remains one of the few international leaders to regularly meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Just before Kellogg’s visit, Lukashenka met with Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, and pledged that “Belarus is, has always been, and will be with Russia.” Joint military exercises with the Russian army are scheduled to take place in Belarus in September, while recent satellite imagery indicates that Russia is upgrading its nuclear infrastructure at a site in Belarus.

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While Lukashenka’s attempts to portray himself as an independent geopolitical actor remain deeply unconvincing, diplomatic efforts by the United States and other democratic allies are yielding results. The fourteen people freed on Saturday were the latest among more than 300 political prisoners to be released by the Belarusian authorities since summer 2024. These political detainees have been used by the Lukashenka regime as bargaining chips to gain favor during negotiations with the international community.

Many of those previously released were already nearing the end of their sentences. Those who remain in Belarus following release reportedly face constant surveillance, pressure to collaborate with the security services, and the threat of re-arrest for any public dissent. Others, like those released last weekend, have been effectively forced into exile and stripped of their citizenship in practice, if not yet officially.

Meanwhile, the situation for those still imprisoned is more critical than ever. Since 2020, eight Belarusian political prisoners have died in custody. Others have died soon after release, often as a result of untreated illnesses or human rights abuses suffered during their incarceration. At least 206 of those currently imprisoned are known to have serious medical conditions. For others, there is no end in sight. Prisoners like Viktoria Kulsha, a 43-year-old mother sentenced in 2021 for moderating a Telegram chat in support of anti-regime protests, continue to face new charges despite being scheduled for release.

The release of fourteen Belarusian political prisoners is welcome news. But the 1172 who remain behind bars deserve more than symbolic gestures. They need a strategy that targets the system responsible for their incarceration. Without this additional pressure, each carefully staged prisoner release risks consolidating Lukashenka’s grip on power and enabling him to manipulate the West while keeping his authoritarian regime intact. The United States clearly has significant leverage over Lukashenka and should not be afraid to use it.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Organizers, comprising a blend of regional volunteers and international groups against Israeli occupation, said they were taking matters into their own hands “because Arab governments haven’t pushed enough” to end the war between Israel and Hamas.

The regional-based “Soumoud” (Steadfastness or Resilience in Arabic) Caravan—comprising volunteers from Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Libya—was supported by various Tunisian civil society groups and rights organizations, including the Tunisian Labor Union and National Bar Association. The activists who started their protest journey in Tunis on June 9, had been planning to travel along the Libyan coast and cross into Egypt though the country’s northwestern Saloum border, before trekking the Sinai to el-Arish to join other international activists on a Global March to the Rafah border crossing—a major entry point into southern Gaza where a sit-in had been planned June 15 to 19.

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The second international march, organized by the Global Coalition Against the Occupation of Palestine—a coalition of rights groups, trade unions, and solidarity movements from over thirty-two countries—mobilized thousands of rights campaigners from more than fifty countries to participate in the rally.

More than 55,000 Palestinians have been killed since the start of Israel’s war on Gaza following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, and much of the enclave’s 2.1 million people have faced the threat of famine under Israel’s suffocating blockade. Israel says it is blocking aid to put pressure on Hamas to release the remaining hostages still held in Gaza.

A statement released by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry on June 11 welcomed foreign delegations but cautioned that anyone traveling to Sinai must obtain prior government permission and comply with Gaza border regulations.

Organizers of the Steadfastness Convoy, meanwhile, said they had met with the Egyptian ambassador in Tunis prior to their departure to coordinate their entry into the country but had since received no word from the embassy. This was despite also sending an official letter to the embassy requesting support from the Egyptian authorities for their mission.

But Cairo was skeptical and made it clear that it opposed the march.

Egyptian opposition

Cairo does not wish to provoke the ire of the Israeli government, which has made clear it is opposed to any mass mobilization at Rafah. If the Egyptian leadership had given the march the green light to proceed, the move would have certainly escalated tensions between Egypt and Israel, and subsequently, between Cairo and Washington. Worse still, it may have caused instability at the border if Israel had attacked the march.

Israel Katz, Israel’s defense minister, made his country’s position clear when he publicly called on Egypt to block the Steadfastness Convoy. Katz said, “I expect the Egyptian authorities to prevent the arrival of Jihadist protesters at the Egypt-Israel border and not to allow them to carry out provocations or attempt to enter Gaza.”

However, there are also internal factors behind Cairo’s decision, foremost among them being the authorities’ fear of Egyptian protesters joining the foreign participants. Many Egyptians watching the scenes of bloodshed from Gaza over the past twenty-one months are ashamed of their own helplessness and their government’s failure to stop the war. Their frustration and despair could spark a new wave of unrest that may prove difficult to contain.

The Egyptian government has cracked down on protests of any kind, criminalizing demonstrations held without prior authorization from the interior ministry. At a time of rising domestic discontent over soaring prices of food, fuel, and basic commodities, the authorities fear any mass mobilization, as protesters may end up directing their anger at the government, prompting renewed turmoil and political instability.

Cairo did, however, allow a rare but small pro-Palestinian protest to be held outside the Journalists Syndicate on June 12, possibly to allow pro-Palestinian activists to let off steam. Alternatively, the rally could have been a test balloon by the government to gauge the level of public anger over the Gaza war. Mahienour el-Masry, a rights lawyer who took part in the rally, said the protesters called on the government to allow the solidarity convoys to travel to the Rafah border crossing; they also called for the crossing to be opened to allow aid to enter Gaza.

Some government loyalists in the media painted the solidarity convoys as a ploy meant to embarrass Egypt and implement Israel and Washington’s plan of displacing Palestinians. They questioned why the activists had chosen to travel to Gaza via Egyptian land instead of sea. Others warned that the convoys are a threat to Egypt’s national security. The convoys also stirred controversy on social media with some internet users suggesting that Islamists organized the Steadfastness caravan in a bid to sow dissent in Egypt, and others shared videos of some of the convoy’s participants lambasting the Egyptian president for not allowing the convoys to pass through.

Major General Samir Farag, a military strategist and former Head of the Armed Forces Morale Affairs Department, told me that some of the activists had obtained tourist visas prior to their arrival in Egypt but had not disclosed their plan to participate in the march to Gaza.

Farag said, “Egypt has enough internal problems; we don’t need more challenges. We don’t know who these activists are or what they are bringing into the country. The march should have been coordinated with the authorities beforehand.”

While the convoy’s passage through Western Libya has been smooth, traversing eastern Libya—which is under the command of General Khalifa Haftar—proved more challenging. On June 12, Haftar’s security forces stopped the caravan in Sirte, demanding additional security clearances before it was allowed passage to Benghazi. Phone lines and internet services were cut off in the area, leaving the protesters incommunicado. The moves were likely at Cairo’s behest—Egypt has been a staunch supporter of Haftar, who shares Cairo’s anti-Islamist stance.

Yasmine Hamrouni, a spokesperson for the Steadfastness Caravan, finally returned my calls on June 17. She told me that the activists had decided to return to Tunisia after it became clear they would not be granted access to Benghazi or Egypt. Both the Libyan National Army and the Egyptian authorities had joined forces to block the march to Rafah.

Even if the marchers had gotten clearance from the Egyptian authorities, the Israeli Defense Forces would have likely thwarted their efforts. Eight of the twelve activists who were on board the Madeleine Freedom Flotilla, which had also attempted to break the siege on Gaza, remain in detention in Israel, their fate uncertain. Israel deported the remaining four activists.

Like the Freedom Flotilla, the Global March too has been stopped in its tracks. Both attempts, however, signal that international pressure is mounting on Israel to break its blockade on Gaza, described by United Nations spokesperson, Jens Laerke, as “the hungriest place on earth.”

Whether or not Israel will bow to international pressure and alleviate the widespread shortages of food, fuel, and basic commodities will largely depend on neighboring countries, especially Egypt’s willingness to cooperate with international rights campaigners. For now, it appears that the Egyptian leadership is not taking any chances and will not hesitate to resort to violence to block “any attempts to destabilize the country.”

As Farag insisted to me: “Egypt’s security comes first.”

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, focusing on Egypt, economics, energy, water access, and women’s issues.

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Russia’s shadow army: Central Asian migrants are dying in Ukraine

Muhammad Tahir — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 12:48:57 +0000

The war in Ukraine has many fronts—but one of the most insidious runs deep inside Russia itself: through detention centers, migration offices, and construction sites, where thousands of Central Asian migrants are being recruited—or coerced—into dying for a war they never chose.

According to Hochu Zhit (“I Want to Live”), a project by Ukraine’s Defense Ministry, more than three thousand Central Asians are now serving in Russia’s military. The project’s finding is no revelation for those like myself who have tracked this issue closely for some time. Rather, it is a grim confirmation of what we have long seen in pieces: body bags quietly sent home, pleas for help from the trenches, and recruitment videos shot behind barbed wire.

Russia primarily draws on domestic recruits, especially ethnic minorities from its own regions. However, if figures from Hochu Zhit are accurate, Central Asians now represent the second-largest group of known foreign nationals fighting in Russia’s war in Ukraine—second only to the roughly eleven thousand North Korean troops, most of whom have reportedly vanished from the battlefield in recent weeks, following the reported deaths of nearly half that number in combat.

Russia’s disposable soldiers

The numbers recorded in the Hochu Zhit report are staggering:

1,110 Uzbek nationals enlisted; 109 confirmed killed.
931 Tajiks; 196 dead.
360 Kyrgyz citizens; 38 dead.
170 Turkmen; 27 dead.

These are not professional soldiers. They are more likely former cleaners, street sweepers, construction workers—undocumented migrants, often trapped in legal limbo, lured with false promises of fast-track Russian citizenship or pulled straight from prisons and detention centers.

Their legal vulnerability is the Kremlin’s most effective weapon. Nowhere is this more evident than at Moscow’s Sakharovo migration center—ground zero for recruitment efforts from Central Asia.

In September 2022, on the same day that the Duma passed a law fast-tracking citizenship in exchange for military service, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin launched a targeted enlistment campaign aimed at migrants.

In parallel, the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group—whose late leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin claimed in May 2023 that twenty thousand of its fighters, half of them convicted prisoners, were killed in the battle for Bakhmut—also reportedly recruited from Russia’s regions, using similar promises to entice new recruits.

Luring vulnerable Central Asians has long been a core part of this strategy. At the time of the law’s passage, Andrey Krasov, deputy chair of the Duma’s Defense Committee, framed it as a privilege, stating confidently: “A comparable number of Central Asians will want to serve, seeking citizenship or career advancement.”

What Russian authorities presented as a privilege quickly revealed itself to be a trap.

In May 2022, an Uzbek man from the Ferghana Valley appeared on camera in Luhansk wearing a Russian military uniform, stating that he had been recruited because of his prior service in Afghanistan. It was later revealed that he was paid just $590 a month under a three-month contract—only a fraction of the $4,000 monthly salary promised by Moscow’s street-level recruiters.

For him—and likely many others like him—the front line becomes a one-way ticket. By the time they arrive, it’s already too late to turn back. The promised pay rarely materializes, and most won’t live long enough to collect the money or the citizenship that they were offered.

A war built on the margins

There are an estimated 12 million-14 million migrant workers in Russia, and as many as 10.5 million are from Central Asia—a significant number of them undocumented and unprotected by labor or residency laws. It’s a legal gray zone, perfectly engineered for exploitation.

For Valentina Chupik, a Russian lawyer born in Uzbekistan, the pattern is painfully clear. “Labor migrants are treated as cannon fodder,” she told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in September 2022. “It’s called voluntary service, but migrants know that refusing can mean deportation—or far worse.”

The human loss has been staggering. A June 3 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that there nearly a million total Russian casualties in Ukraine, including as many as 250,000 deaths. No Russian or Soviet conflict since World War II has come close.

And yet, the Kremlin’s war machine grinds on. As the report demonstrates, the hidden strategy is clear: Spare the sons of the elite and conscript the invisible—prisoners, the rural poor, ethnic minorities, and foreign migrants with no voice and no leverage.

According to the CSIS report, Russian President Vladimir Putin views many of these recruits as expendable and politically safe. Central Asian migrants, stripped of rights and silenced by fear, fit that role with chilling precision.

A few on the other side

While it is rare, a handful of Central Asians have also joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine—not for promises of lucrative payments or citizenship, but, as they say, out of principle.

Zhasulan Dyuisembin, a Kazakh national, is one of them. In June 2022, he told RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, Azattyk: “Russia is terrorizing Ukraine. My children have Ukrainian blood—I have to protect them.”

Another well-known figure is Kudaabek uulu Almaz, who initially came to Ukraine from Kyrgyzstan as a migrant laborer but decided to stay once the war broke out.

In May 2022, after Kyrgyz security services opened a criminal case against him, Almaz responded with a defiant video message. “Fascist Russia invaded Ukraine, killing civilians,” he said. “Having witnessed this lawlessness—and knowing the truth is on Ukraine’s side—I couldn’t leave. I’m a man.”

In a video that surfaced on YouTube on November 21, 2022, Almaz is seen flanked by armed fighters and introduced as the founder of the Turan Turkic Legion.

Central Asian governments officially oppose their citizens fighting for Russia and have taken steps to penalize both recruiters and fighters. However, these efforts often fall short—or are undercut as authorities turn a blind eye—while Russia continues to openly recruit and send their nationals to the frontlines in large numbers.

That silence likely reflects both political and economic dependence on Moscow—and a willingness to sacrifice the vulnerable for the sake of convenience as the war rages on.

The real tragedy

As Putin intensifies his assault on Ukraine, Russia further demonstrates that its system of military recruitment is deliberately designed to exploit the powerless. And the most vulnerable among them are Central Asian migrants, stripped of rights, options, and any safe way out.

They lived in Russia’s shadows, building its cities. In death, they vanish entirely—sent to the front with promises of pay or papers that are broken more often than kept. Many never live to claim either.

This war doesn’t just expose how far Putin is willing to go—it lays bare a profound moral collapse: where citizenship is traded for cannon fodder and economic desperation is weaponized as a matter of policy. The result is that entire communities are pulled into a war they neither started nor had the power to refuse.

If the Hochu Zhit figures are accurate, then the truth is inescapable: Putin is waging a war buttressed by an invisible army of the coerced and forgotten. Central Asians are dying in droves, while their leaders too often do too little to protect their citizens from abuse and exploitation on foreign soil.

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a veteran journalist and media strategist.

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Putin’s peace plan is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood

Tetiana Kotelnykova — Thu, 12 Jun 2025 20:06:24 +0000

The memorandum presented by the Russian Federation during recent bilateral talks with Ukraine in Istanbul was described by Kremlin officials as a constructive step toward a possible peace agreement. However, the demands outlined in the document tell an altogether different story. Russia’s memorandum makes clear that Moscow does not seek peaceful coexistence with an independent and sovereign Ukraine. Instead, the Kremlin’s goal evidently remains the systematic dismantling of Ukrainian statehood.

One of the key demands detailed in the Russian memorandum is the requirement for Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from four Ukrainian provinces that Moscow claims as its own but has so far been unable to fully occupy. For Kyiv, this would mean abandoning dozens of towns and cities along with millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation. It would also dramatically weaken Ukraine’s defenses and leave the rest of the country dangerously exposed to further Russian aggression.

Handing over the city of Kherson and the surrounding region would be particularly disastrous for Ukraine’s future national security. This would grant Russia a foothold across the Dnipro River in the western half of Ukraine, placing Odesa and the country’s other Black Sea ports in immediate danger. The loss of Zaporizhzhia, one of Ukraine’s largest cities with a prewar population of around seven hundred thousand, is similarly unthinkable.

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Territorial concessions are only one part of Russia’s comprehensive plan to undermine Ukrainian statehood. The memorandum presented in Istanbul calls for strict limits to be imposed on the size of Ukraine’s military along with restrictions on the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess. Ukraine would also be banned from joining any military alliances or concluding bilateral security agreements with other nations. This would transform Ukraine into a disarmed and internationally isolated buffer state with no means to defend itself, leaving it entirely at Putin’s mercy.

Beyond the battlefield, Russia’s memorandum proposes a series of sweeping changes to Ukraine’s internal political and cultural landscape that would allow Moscow to reestablish its dominance over the country. Key demands include official status for the Russian language, the reinstatement of the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal privileges, and a wholesale rewriting of Ukrainian history in line with Kremlin narratives.

One of the most sinister aspects of the Russian peace proposal is the call for a complete ban on all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties. This rather vague wording is open to interpretation and could easily be used to silence Ukrainian politicians opposed to Russian influence. Given the Kremlin’s long record of labeling anything that contracts Russian imperial orthodoxies as “extremist” or “fascist,” the idea of outlawing “nationalist” political parties represents an obvious threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty and the country’s democratic political system.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Moscow’s memorandum was presented at a time when Russia is escalating its invasion of Ukraine. In recent months, Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities have increased significantly, leading to a sharp rise in the number of killed and wounded civilians. Along the front lines of the war, the Russian military is currently engaged in what most analysts believe are the early stages of a major summer offensive that seeks to break Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops are advancing in the east and have recently crossed the border in northern Ukraine to open a new front in the Sumy region.

The Ukrainian authorities cannot accept the punishing terms being proposed by Russia. Indeed, no sovereign state could do so and expect to survive. The real question is how the international community will respond. Russia’s memorandum is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood and the return of the country to Kremlin control. It makes a complete mockery of recent US-led calls for a compromise peace, and demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that Russia has no interest in ending the invasion.

This should be enough to persuade Western leaders that progress toward peace will only be possible if they increase the pressure on Putin. At present, the Russian leader clearly believes he is winning and is confident of outlasting the West in Ukraine. In order to change this calculus and force a rethink in Moscow, Kyiv’s partners must impose tougher sanctions on Russia while boosting military support for Ukraine. In other words, they must speak to Putin in the language of strength, which remains the only language he truly understands.

Russia’s recent memorandum sends an unambiguous signal that Moscow is undeterred by the current Western stance and remains fully committed to its maximalist goal of erasing Ukraine as a state and as a nation. If Western leaders wish to avoid this catastrophic outcome, they must convince Putin that the alternative to a negotiated peace is a Russian defeat.

Tetiana Kotelnykova is a graduate student at Yale University specializing in European and Russian Studies with a focus on conflict, postwar recovery, and regional geopolitics. She is the founder of Brave Generation, a New York-based nonprofit organization that supports young Ukrainians affected by war and invests in the next generation of Ukrainian leadership. She also leads the Ukrainian Recovery Youth Global Initiative.

It was not always this way. When the modern square first began to take shape in the nineteenth century, it was a relative backwater in an elegant and aged city where the center of gravity remained firmly fixed elsewhere. Tellingly, when Ukrainian officials gathered in Kyiv on January 22, 1919, to publicly sign the unification act between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, they chose to stage this historic event on Sophia Square rather than Maidan.

As Kyiv rose from the ashes following World War II, the square became more architecturally impressive and gained in logistical importance, but it continued to lack the aura attached to the city’s true heirlooms. Instead, Maidan remained a fairly identikit Soviet public space noted for its large fountains and even larger Lenin monument.

Maidan first became associated with political activism during the dying days of the Soviet Empire in 1990 when it hosted a two-week student protest dubbed the Revolution on Granite that played a significant part in Ukraine’s independence struggle. At the time, it was known as October Revolution Square. Maidan would receive its current name on August 26, 1991, two days after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, but it would be many years before the square began to earn its current reputation as a genuine symbol of Ukrainian statehood.

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During the first decade or so of Ukrainian independence, Maidan was anything but inspiring. The square remained largely empty, with no monuments or memorials to celebrate the newly independent state. Instead, the cult of communism was replaced by crass commercialism. On the spot once occupied by Lenin, a giant TV screen was installed broadcasting an eclectic mix of adverts, pop videos, cage fights, and catwalk shows. Taxi drivers would line up nearby and watch absentmindedly while waiting for new fares.

High above Maidan, the skyline was dominated by the Hotel Moscow. In 2001, the Ukrainian authorities finally decided that this branding was probably inappropriate for a country looking to shake off the shackles of empire, and the hotel name was duly changed from Moscow to Ukraine. Likewise, a colossal Soviet hammer and sickle was allowed to loom large over Maidan until 2003, when it was belatedly removed from the facade of the Trade Union building. The continued prominence of the Soviet crest made a mockery of Independence Square and spoke volumes about the often ambiguous attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood that characterized the early post-Soviet period.

The first big turning point in Maidan’s transformation came following Ukraine’s November 2004 presidential election. Amid massive public anger over a crude Kremlin-backed bid to steal the vote, huge crowds flooded into Kyiv from across the country and congregated on Maidan, establishing a tent city and a round-the-clock presence. This protest movement lasted for over two months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Millions of Ukrainians participated. They eventually succeeded in overturning the rigged election and forcing a rerun which was won by the opposition candidate, representing a watershed moment in modern Ukrainian history.

Maidan itself was synonymous with the Orange Revolution and occupied a central position in the mythology that grew up around it. From that moment on, Maidan became not just a place but also an event. To stage a Maidan meant to organize a grassroots protest and hold power to account. This was a particularly terrifying concept for the neighboring Russian authorities. Dread of a Moscow Maidan soon began to haunt the Kremlin, feeding Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and laying the foundations for the horrors that were to follow. The Russian propaganda machine promptly adopted Maidan as a buzzword signifying wicked foreign plots, and continues to use it two decades later without any need for further explanation.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Turkmenistan’s deepening water crisis could have far-reaching regional consequences

Rasul Satymov — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 20:23:38 +0000

The vast, arid landscapes of Turkmenistan, stretching across Central Asia, are facing a profound and growing threat—a deepening water crisis that casts a shadow over its future stability, as well as over the security of the entire region. While often overshadowed by other domestic problems, the struggle for water in Turkmenistan is a critical issue demanding immediate attention. Exacerbated by a changing climate, almost a century of unsustainable practices, and new regional developments, this crisis is not just an environmental problem—it’s an unfolding human tragedy that could have significant economic and political ramifications well beyond its borders.

The roots of scarcity

Turkmenistan’s vulnerability to water stress is the highest in Central Asia, a precarious position resulting from a complex interplay of factors. Much of the country’s water infrastructure is a relic of the Soviet Union, including open canals and irrigation ditches that are tragically inefficient. Estimates suggest that anywhere between 30 percent and 60 percent of the water transported through these systems is lost to evaporation or seeps into the sandy soil before reaching its intended destination. These physical conditions are compounded by systemic mismanagement. A cohesive national strategy for water conservation and distribution remains elusive, hampered by a lack of coordination among governing bodies.

This inefficiency is particularly damaging given the demands placed upon the water supply, primarily by agriculture, which consumes an estimated 94 percent of the nation’s water resources. The heart of the problem lies in the legacy of Soviet-era planning: industrial production dedicated to cotton, a thirsty crop ill-suited to Turkmenistan’s naturally arid climate. This reliance on water-intensive agriculture depletes precious reserves. A shift toward drought-resistant crops, modern techniques such as drip irrigation, and greater agricultural diversification is long overdue to alleviate the immense pressure on the water supply.

Compounding these internal challenges are external pressures. Turkmenistan relies on the Amu Darya river, which flows along its border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, for roughly 90 percent of its water. The construction of Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal upstream represents a significant new threat. By diverting substantial amounts of water from the Amu Darya for its own agricultural ambitions, the canal project could reduce the flow reaching Turkmenistan, further straining an already stressed system. The absence of robust transboundary water-sharing agreements and effective diplomatic channels risks tensions, highlighting the urgent need for dialogue, potentially facilitated by neutral international mediators, to navigate this issue peacefully.

Overlaying all these factors is the undeniable impact of climate change. Projections indicate that temperatures in Turkmenistan are set to rise faster than the global average, inevitably leading to more frequent and severe droughts, further diminishing already scarce water resources and pushing the nation closer to the brink.

The human and environmental toll

The consequences of this escalating water scarcity are already being felt across Turkmenistan. Food insecurity is on the rise, with reports indicating that 12 percent of the population faces severe challenges in accessing sufficient food—among the highest rate among former Soviet nations. Access to safe drinking water is also becoming increasingly precarious. Residents across the country, including in the capital city of Ashgabat, report frequent water cuts and shortages. The tap water that is available is often of questionable quality, forcing many to rely on more expensive bottled water.

Reduced water flow and dying vegetation leave the soil vulnerable to erosion, intensifying the dust, sand, and salt storms that plague the region. In the northern Dashoguz province, vast tracts of agricultural land are severely affected by salt storms originating from the desiccated Aral Sea, posing significant risks to respiratory health and further degrading farmland. This vicious cycle of soil salinity, exacerbated by inefficient irrigation and poor drainage, diminishes air quality and agricultural productivity. Altogether, this creates an increasingly hostile environment for both people and wildlife.

The economic repercussions are also significant. Turkmenistan’s economy relies on natural gas exports, which constitute nearly 90 percent of its export revenue. However, the natural gas industry itself is water-intensive, requiring substantial amounts for cooling systems, equipment cleaning, and extraction processes. Water scarcity could directly impede the nation’s ability to maintain current natural gas production levels, potentially impacting national revenue and the funding of essential public services.

Furthermore, the unique ecosystems adapted to Turkmenistan’s arid conditions, including the vast Karakum Desert, are under threat. Rivers, wetlands, and oases—vital habitats for diverse flora, fauna, and migratory birds—risk shrinking or disappearing entirely, leading to biodiversity loss and pushing vulnerable species toward extinction.

Finally, the crisis is beginning to drive climate migration. Faced with failing crops, soil degradation, rising food prices, and dwindling agricultural employment (a sector that employs over 40 percent of the workforce), people are increasingly forced to migrate in search of better living conditions, both within the country and abroad. This displacement adds another layer of social and economic strain.

A call to action to maintain regional stability

The water crisis unfolding in Turkmenistan is not merely a domestic issue; its ripples will likely be felt regionally and globally. Declining agricultural output could increase Turkmenistan’s reliance on international food markets, potentially contributing to fluctuations in global food prices. More critically, the potent combination of environmental degradation, economic hardship, and potential social unrest fueled by water scarcity could destabilize the country and, by extension, the wider Central Asian region. History, including the the Syrian uprising, serves as a warning of how severe drought and resource mismanagement can exacerbate existing tensions and lead to conflict. Such instability could create power vacuums, ripe for large global powers.

Therefore, addressing Turkmenistan’s water challenge is a matter of international concern. Proactive engagement from the United States and the European Union could play a crucial role in promoting sustainable solutions and regional cooperation. In addition, supporting comprehensive research and data collection on water resources, climate impacts, and agricultural practices is essential for informed policymaking. The United States and the European Union should take the lead in facilitating regional dialogues involving Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Such initiatives will be critical for fostering transboundary cooperation and preventing conflicts over shared water resources such as the Amu Darya. Furthermore, technical assistance and funding from the United States and the European Union, potentially channeled through civil society organizations, could help implement sustainable water management practices on the ground—from promoting efficient irrigation techniques to supporting public education campaigns on water conservation.

Turkmenistan’s struggle with water scarcity is a powerful illustration of the interconnected challenges facing many parts of the world in the twenty-first century, where climate change, resource management, and geopolitical interests collide. Ignoring this looming crisis is not an option. Concerted action, grounded in cooperation and sustainable practices, is essential not only to secure a livable future for Turkmens but also to maintain stability in the region.

Rasul Satymov is a researcher with Progres Foundation with a focus on climate change, energy, and water issues in Turkmenistan.

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“Yes, really”: American private military companies (back) in Gaza

Alia Brahimi — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 19:22:18 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 11 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by international lawyer and former senior UN human rights official Craig Mokhiber to discuss Israel’s militarization of aid in Gaza and how US private military companies (PMC) and individual contractors could be held legally liable for their association with violations occurring in the Gaza Strip.

Craig offers his assessment of why the Israeli-led Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) was established, its rejection by the UN and the international aid community for weaponising hunger, as well as the international laws it is breaching. He describes the cruelties and dangers inhering in this new aid system and outlines how individuals, including PMC employees, may be held legally accountable for their participation in the GHF and their association with the IDF’s wider alleged war crimes.

“This is not an aid operation. It is an extension of the unlawful Israeli occupation and its plans for the ethnic cleansing of Gaza.”

Craig Mokhiber, international lawyer and former senior UN human rights official

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About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Trump’s Russia policy must be rooted in realism

Agnia Grigas — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 20:50:06 +0000

US President Donald Trump has recently changed his tone toward Russian president Vladimir Putin, suggesting that he has “gone crazy” and is “playing with fire.” This highlights the ongoing difficulties of negotiating with the Kremlin. While the Trump administration broadly favors a realist approach to international relations, a more pragmatic assessment of Russia’s capabilities and objectives could better equip the US to achieve its stated goal of bringing the war in Ukraine to an end.

Almost three months ago, Ukraine accepted a US proposal for a thirty-day unconditional ceasefire. So far, Russia has refused to do likewise. Instead, the Kremlin continues to demand a series of preconditions. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets. When Trump recently backed Putin’s proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian leader then boycotted the subsequent Istanbul talks, sending only a lower-level delegation.

Within the Trump administration, key figures such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have all articulated their support for a realist view of international relations. This implies sidestepping abstract ideological objectives and focusing on tangible power factors such as economic size, population, geography, and military strength.

The realist viewpoint is reflected in Hegseth’s assertion that Ukraine returning to its pre-2014 borders is “unrealistic.” It can also be seen in Trump’s statements that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “does not have the cards” in negotiations with Russia, an assertion that seems far less certain in the wake of Ukraine’s successful recent strikes on Russia’s long-distance bombers.

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Some advocates of foreign policy realism argue that the US should seek to accommodate Russia, even at Ukraine’s expense. However, this approach tends to exaggerate Russia’s strengths, while underestimating the importance of the Kremlin’s imperial objectives and the relevant fact that Russian national security doctrine identifies the US as its principal adversary. A more comprehensive realist analysis of Russia reveals that, despite its assertiveness, Moscow’s power is in fact often overstated, while its appetite for compromise is limited.

Compared to the United States, Europe, and NATO, Russia simply does not “hold the cards,” to use Trump’s phrase. Its $2 trillion economy ranks outside the world’s top ten, trailing behind the US, China, Germany, Japan, India, and others. Although Russia has weathered sanctions, the prolonged war since 2022 has left its economy overextended and vulnerable.

The Russian population of 145 million is shrinking and ranks ninth globally, far behind the US and the collective European Union. Militarily, Russia’s large conventional forces have under-performed during the invasion of Ukraine while sustaining heavy losses. Russia’s $146 billion military budget, though substantial relative to neighboring states, pales in comparison to the $968 billion US budget in 2023, or even the collective defense spending of EU member states.

Russia remains a formidable nuclear power and frequently reminds the international community of this fact. Since the very first days of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in regular nuclear saber-rattling. But while Russia is the only nuclear power to make such threats, Putin has repeatedly failed to act when his red lines have been crossed by the Ukrainians, and has been publicly warned by his Chinese allies not to cross the nuclear threshold.

Since 2022, Russia has lost much of its energy leverage and is no longer Europe’s key energy supplier. Meanwhile, the United States has consolidated its position as a leading global energy exporter, particularly in liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is enabling Europe to diversify away from Russia while starving the Kremlin of vital revenue and geopolitical influence.

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In realist terms, Russia’s power surpasses that of its immediate smaller neighbors but falls well short of the US or the European Union as a whole. Countries in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe view Putin’s ambitions through a realist lens based on centuries of painful experience with Russian imperialism. They understand that Putin’s current goal of reasserting Moscow’s dominance over the territories of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire is deeply rooted in the Kremlin’s perception of Russian national interests.

President Trump should not fall into the same trap as his predecessors. Past US administrations, from George W. Bush onward, have sought to normalize relations with Moscow but have consistently underestimated Russia’s enduring imperialist objectives. In 2001, Bush famously called Putin “trustworthy” and said he has been able to “get a sense of his soul.” And yet before the end of Bush’s second term, Putin had become increasingly hostile to the West and had invaded Georgia. US President Barack Obama then pursued a “reset” in relations with Russia, only for Putin to invade Ukraine in 2014.

US President Joe Biden initially adopted a similarly optimistic stance toward Moscow, emphasizing the importance of predictable relations with Russia. In May 2021, Biden canceled sanctions on the Kremlin’s Nord Stream II gas pipeline. The following month, he met Putin in Geneva for a bilateral summit that was widely viewed as a further concession to the Russian leader. Less than a year later, Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Looking back, it is clear that US policy toward Russia has often been shaped by the optimism of incoming administrations rather than a sober, realist understanding of Moscow’s longstanding ambitions. A deeper grasp of Russia’s objectives and capabilities could help the Trump administration, alongside European leaders, to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine and achieve a durable peace. Approaching the Kremlin from a position of strength, through the implementation of new sanctions on Russia and sustained military support for Ukraine, would be essential tools in securing that peace.

Agnia Grigas is senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.”

The fall of Assad has opened a door. But can Syria seize the moment?

Qutaiba Idlbi, Charles Lister, and Marie Forestier — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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For more than a decade, Syria’s crisis has caused unimaginable suffering inside the country and a constant stream of strategically significant spillover effects across the Middle East and globally. However, this dynamic changed in late 2024, when armed opposition groups in Syria’s northwest launched a sudden and unprecedentedly sophisticated and disciplined offensive, capturing the city of Aleppo and triggering an implosion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the space of ten days, Assad’s rule collapsed like a house of cards, dealing a crippling blow to Iran’s role in Syria and significantly weakening Russia’s influence.

Now, for the first time in many years, Syria has a chance to recover and reintegrate into the international system. If the United States, Europe, Middle Eastern nations, and other stakeholders embrace the right approach, support the right policies, and encourage Syria’s transition to move in the appropriate direction, the world will benefit—and Syrians will find peace. The work of the Syria Strategy Project (SSP) and the policy recommendations in the report “Reimagining Syria: A roadmap for peace and prosperity beyond Assad” present a realistic and holistic vision for realizing that goal.

This report is the result of intensive joint efforts by the Atlantic Council, the Middle East Institute (MEI), and the European Institute of Peace (EIP), which have been collaborating since March 2024 on the SSP. At its core, the project has involved a sustained process of engagement with subject-matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and across the Middle East to develop a realistic and holistic strategic vision for sustainably resolving Syria’s crisis. This process, held almost entirely behind closed doors, incorporated Syrian experts, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders at every step.

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UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 29 May 2025 21:46:50 +0000

Russia is guilty of committing crimes against humanity in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region, according to a new report by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. The report comes following an extensive investigation into a campaign of Russian drone strikes on Ukrainian civilians over a ten-month period beginning in July 2024, with the probe focusing on an area of southern Ukraine stretching more than 100 kilometers along the right bank of the Dnipro River around the city of Kherson.

Members of the UN Commission determined that Russia was engaged in the deliberate targeting of civilians and concluded that the drone attacks were “widespread, systematic, and conducted as part of a coordinated state policy.” The report detailed how civilians were targeted “in various circumstances, mainly when they were outdoors, both on foot or while using any type of vehicles,” and noted that on a number of occasions ambulances had been struck by drones in an apparent bid to prevent them from reaching victims and providing vital medical assistance.

During the ten-month period covered by the United Nations probe, Russian drones killed almost 150 Ukrainian civilians in and around Kherson, while leaving hundreds more injured. The constant threat of attack has created a pervasive climate of fear throughout the region, with people afraid to leave their homes. Terrified locals say they feel hunted and refer to the drone attacks as a “human safari.”

In addition to daily drone strikes, Russia has sought to maximize the psychological pressure on residents of the Kherson region via social media channels. UN investigators reported that video footage of drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians is regularly disseminated on Russian Telegram channels, some of which have thousands of subscribers. This video footage shows drone strikes along with the resulting deaths and destruction in the style of video games, often accompanied by background music. Meanwhile, menacing messages posted on Telegram call on Ukrainians to flee the region. “Get out of the city before the leaves fall, you who are destined to die,” read one message quoted in the UN report.

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This is not the first time UN investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine. A March 2025 UN report reached a similar conclusion regarding the Kremlin’s large-scale program of detentions and deportations targeting Ukrainians living under Russian occupation. “The evidence gathered led the Commission to conclude that the enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amount to crimes against humanity,” the report stated.

Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued a number of arrest warrants for senior Russian officials in relation to alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine including the targeted bombing of civilians and critical civilian infrastructure. The most high-profile ICC arrest warrant is for Vladimir Putin himself, who is wanted for his alleged involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

At least 20,000 Ukrainian children are believed to have been kidnapped since the start of the full-scale invasion and taken to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian national identity. The nature and scale of these mass abductions may qualify as an act of genocide according to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention.

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Russia’s deadly “human safari” drone campaign against the civilian population in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is part of the Kremlin’s strategy to make the area unlivable. The city of Kherson was occupied by the advancing Russian army during the first days of the full-scale invasion and was officially annexed by Russia in September 2022. However, Kherson and the surrounding area were liberated by the Ukrainian military soon after. The scenes of joy that accompanied the liberation of Kherson were deeply humiliating for Putin, who had personally proclaimed the city to be “forever” Russian just weeks earlier.

This setback forced Putin’s invading army to retreat across the Dnipro River, creating a major physical obstacle for the Russian invasion and limiting the occupied zone of Ukraine to the eastern half of the country. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to insist that Kherson and the surrounding region are now part of the Russian Federation and must be handed over within the framework of a future peace deal.

Ukraine has completely ruled out any such concessions. This is hardly surprising. While some temporary territorial compromises may prove possible during peace negotiations, Ukraine’s stance on Kherson is unlikely to change. After all, allowing the renewed Russian occupation of Kherson would be suicidal for Kyiv. It would present Russia with a priceless foothold across the Dnipro River that could be used as a gateway to seize Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and complete the conquest of the country.

For now, Russia appears to have little chance of seizing Kherson militarily or of acquiring the city at the negotiating table. Instead, Moscow seems to be intent on terrorizing local residents and forcing them to flee. Putin claims that the population of the Kherson region are Russians, but he has no qualms about his soldiers using drones to hunt and kill them mercilessly. This tells you all you need to know about Putin’s cynical posturing as the protector of the Russian people in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukrainian detainees are being systematically subjected to torture and other human rights abuses, according to an international investigation led by the French group Forbidden Stories together with thirteen media outlets including Britain’s Guardian newspaper, the Washington Post, and Le Monde. While it is not possible to calculate exactly how many Ukrainian civilians have been abducted in the occupied regions, UN officials have concluded that the large scale and systematic nature of the disappearances qualifies as a crime against humanity.

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Those who remain in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control face a regime of forced russification encompassing everything from language and the media to education and religion. Place names have been changed to reflect the new Russian realities, with the curriculum in local schools transformed in line with the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian imperial dogmas. Parents who attempt to shield their children from classroom indoctrination are being threatened with loss of custody.

Ukrainian residents in the occupied regions of the country have also come under increasing pressure from the Kremlin to accept Russian citizenship. Anyone who refuses to take a Russian passport risks losing access to a range of essential services including healthcare. They also face restrictions on property rights along with the ability to run a business and use banking services.

This passport campaign has intensified significantly in recent months, with Russian President Vladimir Putin issuing a decree announcing that Ukrainians living under Russian occupation have until September 2025 to accept Russian citizenship or face possible deportation from their own homes. Understandably, Moscow’s ruthless tactics are proving difficult to resist. Kremlin officials claim that by March 2025, Russian passports had been issued to approximately 3.5 million people in occupied Ukraine.

Moscow is accused of engaging in religious persecution throughout the occupied regions, with all Christian denominations other that the Kremlin-linked Russian Orthodox Church facing various degrees of restrictive measures and oppression. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials stated in spring 2025 that the Russian occupation authorities have killed dozens of clergy members over the past three years while damaging or destroying hundreds of churches.

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Russia has been careful to prevent information about conditions in occupied Ukraine from reaching the outside world. All independent media sources have been shut down throughout the occupied regions, and have been replaced by new Kremlin-controlled outlets. Individual journalists have frequently been among those targeted for oppressive measures including physical abuse and imprisonment.

One of the few reporters to shed light on the horrors unfolding in Russian-occupied Ukraine was Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna, who visited areas under occupation on multiple occasions before being captured by the Russian authorities in summer 2023. Roshchyna died after a year in Russian captivity. When her body was returned to Ukraine in early 2025, it showed signs of torture.

From a military standpoint, it may not currently be feasible to liberate all of the Ukrainian regions held by Moscow. Nevertheless, the crimes being committed by the Kremlin in occupied Ukraine are unprecedented in modern European history and cannot be ignored.

It is vital that the human rights of Ukrainians living under Russian occupation feature prominently in any peace process. This includes the rights of those currently being held in Russian jails. Ukraine’s Western partners must maintain or increase sanctions pressure, while also expanding support for Ukrainian civil society and raising awareness about Russia’s actions among international audiences.

Looking ahead, longer term investments are also needed to help document war crimes and support Ukrainian victims of the Russian occupation. Ultimately, the most meaningful response to Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian identity is to make sure Ukraine is in a position to not only survive but thrive as an independent European nation.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

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Based on current trends and previous displacement waves, at least two hundred thousand Ukrainian civilians living close to the current front lines of the war could be forced to leave their homes by fall 2025. This is not speculation; it is informed by experience gained during Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Since the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian organizations have been on the front lines of the humanitarian response. They have provided essential aid, temporary housing, psychological support, and ongoing reintegration counselling to help Ukrainians displaced by Russia’s invasion rebuild dignity and restart their lives.

Ukraine’s civil society has worked wonders over the past three years but cannot realistically hope to absorb another 200,000 diplaced people without international support. The situation is even more alarming due to the recent closure of USAID, which was a major player in the humanitarian response to Russia’s invasion. With Putin’s troops already advancing, Ukraine’s Western partners must not ignore the looming danger.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 3.6 million people remained internally displaced within Ukraine as of early 2025. Most are women, children, and elderly individuals. Many have already been forced to flee multiple times. This population of displaced people may soon become considerably larger.

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Compounding the crisis, European governments are beginning to phase out temporary support programs for Ukrainians. While the EU recently agreed to extend temporary protection through 2026, enforcement is sometimes patchy. Meanwhile, there are indications across Europe that resettlement fatigue is growing.

In the UK and US, political rhetoric on the topic of Ukrainian refugees has shifted ominously. Most recently, reports emerged that the Trump administration is exploring options to repatriate Ukrainians who entered the United States following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

If these trends continue, millions of Ukrainians could find themselves trapped between advancing Russian forces and a closing window of international asylum. While Ukrainians in the east of the country flee Putin’s invading army, many Ukrainian refugees may be forced to return home with uncertain prospects.

If the overstretched Ukrainian military is unable to contain Russia’s summer offensive, the fallout will reverberate far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The displacement of at least 200,000 more civilians would severely strain humanitarian corridors, destabilize border regions, and sow chaos in Ukrainian cities already struggling to absorb previous waves of refugees.

Ukraine’s Western partners still have time to prevent this, but they must act with a sense of urgency. While the Trump administration has been clear that it does not plan to provide Ukraine with further military aid, it should continue sharing intelligence with the Ukrainians while confirming its readiness to sell arms to Kyiv. Europe must speed up the delivery of promised weapons and should expand supplies significantly to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield.

In parallel, European countries should take steps to provide reassurance and protect the legal status of Ukrainian refugees. Donor organizations can help by strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian civil society groups that have demonstrated agility, transparency, and high levels of local trust.

The next phase of Russia’s invasion is not just being fought on the front lines of the war. It is taking place across the country in bomb shelters, train stations, and temporary accommodations. Russia is trying to break Ukrainian resistance by making large parts of Ukraine unlivable and destabilizing the country. Ukraine’s partners can do much to counter these efforts, but they must act now before the military and humanitarian situation deteriorates further.

Viktor Liakh is president of the East Europe Foundation. Melinda Haring is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior advisor at Razom for Ukraine.

Charai in National Interest: The Washington Embassy Murders and the Rising Threat of Antisemitism

Atlantic Council — Fri, 23 May 2025 17:37:53 +0000

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Putin aims to destroy Ukraine and has zero interest in a compromise peace

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 21 May 2025 20:51:25 +0000

US President Donald Trump came away from Monday’s phone call with Vladimir Putin expressing confidence that the Russian leader wants peace, but few others appear to share this optimism. Many senior Western figures were reportedly unimpressed by Putin’s vague references to a “memorandum on a possible peace agreement” and believe he is still engaging in stalling tactics. “Putin is clearly playing for time. Unfortunately we have to say Putin is not really interested in peace,” commented German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.

Trump’s latest call to Putin also prompted fresh questions over the US leader’s handling of the faltering peace process. Britain’s The Economist pondered Trump’s “strange reluctance to get tough with Putin,” while Washington Post columnist Max Boot led a chorus of voices accusing the Kremlin strongman of manipulating his American counterpart. “While Trump’s lack of success in peacemaking might not doom Ukraine, it certainly dispels the president’s pretensions to being a world-class deal maker,” argued Boot. “Putin is playing him for a fool, and Trump doesn’t even seem to realize it.”

The mood was very different in Moscow, with the Kremlin-controlled media trumpeting the call as a significant success for Russian diplomacy. In his daily press review, BBC correspondent Steve Rosenberg reported that many of Russia’s leading news outlets were “crowing” over the contents of the Trump-Putin conversation. “It looks like Russia has won the latest round of global poker,” commented one newspaper. “Donald Trump’s stance couldn’t be more advantageous to Moscow,” observed another.

It is no surprise to see mounting unease in Western capitals over the US push to end the Russia-Ukraine War. Since Trump first initiated peace talks in February, Ukraine has agreed to an unconditional ceasefire and signaled its readiness to make major territorial concessions. In contrast, Russia has consistently rejected calls for a ceasefire while proposing new conditions of its own and creating various obstacles to any meaningful progress. At one point, Putin even claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy lacked the legitimacy to sign off on a peace deal and suggested placing Ukraine under United Nations administration.

Recent diplomatic developments have further underlined Russia’s reluctance to end the war. When the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, and Poland delivered a ceasefire ultimatum to Putin in early May, the Russian ruler responded by calling for the first bilateral talks with Ukraine since spring 2022. However, Putin then chose not to attend the bilateral meeting in Istanbul that he himself had proposed, preferring instead to send a low-level delegation. This was widely interpreted as a “slap in the face” for Ukraine and the collective West.

Putin’s representatives during last week’s negotiations in Istanbul sought to emphasize Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise, calling on Kyiv to officially cede four entire provinces to Russia including a number of major Ukrainian cities that the Kremlin has so far been unable to seize militarily. If Ukraine refuses to do so, they warned, Russia will increase its demands to include six Ukrainian provinces. “We fought Sweden for twenty-one years. How long are you ready to fight?” the head of the Russian delegation reportedly commented, in reference to the eighteenth century Great Northern War. “Maybe some of those sitting here at this table will lose more of their loved ones. Russia is prepared to fight forever.”

While Putin rarely makes such thinly veiled threats, he continues to insist that any settlement must focus on eliminating what he refers to as the “root causes” of the war. This is generally understood to mean Ukraine’s international neutrality and disarmament, along with the reestablishment of Russia’s former imperial dominance in every sphere of Ukrainian public life, from language and education to national memory and religion. Any Ukrainian leader who agreed to such terms would be signing their country’s death sentence.

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Trump’s efforts to talk up the prospects of a negotiated peace and his attempts to entice Putin with commercial incentives suggest a fundamentally flawed understanding of Russia’s war aims in Ukraine. The US leader seems to sincerely believe that Putin can be persuaded to end his invasion by the promise of limited territorial gains and future economic prosperity. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth.

Putin is not fighting for Ukrainian land; he is fighting for Ukraine itself. He views the current war in the broadest of possible historical terms and sees the destruction of the Ukrainian state as a sacred mission that will define his entire reign and shape Russia’s future for decades to come. It is ludicrous to suggest that he could be swayed from this messianic vision by mundane talk of trade deals and sanctions relief.

Putin’s thirst for historical revenge can be traced back to his traumatic experience during the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Putin did not personally face the grinding poverty that millions of his compatriots endured in the 1990s, Russia’s national fall from grace nevertheless made a profound impression on him. Ever since, he has been haunted by fears of a further imperial collapse and driven by a determination to reverse the verdict of 1991. This has fueled his revanchist brand of Russian nationalism, and helps to explain his otherwise inexplicable obsession with Ukraine.

Throughout his reign, Putin has made no secret of his bitter resentment over the breakup of the USSR, which he has called “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century” and “the disintegration of historical Russia.” Crucially, he views Ukraine as a central and indivisible part of this fabled “historical Russia.” Indeed, the Ukrainian capital Kyiv occupies pride of place in his imperial mythology as “the mother of all Russian cities.”

To Putin, the emergence of an independent Ukraine is a symbol of Russia’s post-Soviet humiliation and a potential catalyst for the next stage in his country’s retreat from empire. According to this twisted imperial logic, if a province as quintessentially Russian as Ukraine is allowed to break away and establish itself as a modern European democracy, the entire Russian Federation will be in danger of disintegrating. Likewise, Putin is convinced that if Ukraine can be returned to its rightful place within Greater Russia, the injustice of 1991 will be undone and Russia will resume its position among the world’s Great Powers.

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Putin has been attempting to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit ever since the 2004 Orange Revolution, which he personally helped spark by clumsily intervening in Ukraine’s presidential election. The violence of these efforts has escalated in direct proportion to the strengthening of modern Ukraine’s own national identity. At first, Putin pursued his imperial goals in Ukraine through control of the country’s political, business, cultural, and religious elites. When this failed, he ordered the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Once it became apparent that even this partial occupation of the country would not derail Ukraine’s national consolidation, Putin made the fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

The rising tide of Russian aggression against Ukraine has been accompanied by ever more extreme anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. For years, Putin has publicly insisted that Ukrainians are Russians (“one people”). On the eve of the current invasion, he published an entire essay denying Ukraine’s right to exist. Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly labeled Ukraine as an artificial country built on stolen Russian land, a Nazi invention, and an intolerable “anti-Russia” created for the purpose of undermining Russia itself. Ukrainians who insist on their own national identity are typically portrayed as traitors undeserving of sympathy or mercy.

This dehumanizing propaganda has laid the ideological foundations for the crimes that are currently being committed by the occupying Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin is able to establish control, Ukrainian patriots and community leaders are routinely detained and incarcerated in a vast network of prisons and camps. While the number of victims remains unknown, UN officials have concluded that the large scale and systematic nature of the disappearances qualifies as a crime against humanity. Those who remain are subjected to a reign of terror and forced to accept Russian citizenship while submitting their children to indoctrination. Meanwhile, all traces of Ukrainian national identity, culture, and statehood are being ruthlessly erased. Many experts believe these actions qualify as genocide.

Putin is understandably happy to exploit the Trump administration’s enthusiasm for peace talks. This allows him to buy time, divide the West, and reduce the flow of weapons to Ukraine. But it is already abundantly clear that he has no real interest in ending his invasion. Indeed, he dare not stop. Any peace deal that secures Ukraine’s survival as an independent state would be viewed in Moscow as a major defeat. Rather than taking his place alongside Stalin, Peter the Great, and Ivan the Terrible as one of Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin would be remembered in Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine. He would rather fight on indefinitely than accept such a fate.

Trump deserves considerable credit for seizing the initiative and attempting to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, his current approach is obviously not working. The time has now come to stop seeking compromises with the Kremlin and start speaking to Putin in the language of strength. This means tightening sanctions on Russia and targeting the many countries that continue to fuel Putin’s war machine. Above all, it means significantly increasing military aid to Kyiv and boosting Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia on the battlefield. Putin has staked his entire reign on the destruction of Ukraine. He will not back down unless forced to do so. Peace will only come when Ukraine is too strong to be subjugated.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

For the past one and a half years, the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School and the International Partnership for Human Rights have documented and analyzed Russia’s aerial attacks in Ukraine. This research is based on extensive fieldwork, witness interviews, open-source intelligence, and forensic analysis.

After reviewing hundreds of Russian drone and missile strikes, researchers narrowed the focus down to twenty-two key attacks and identified two patterns that illuminate their impact: Attacks on energy infrastructure and on densely populated areas. The legal memorandum resulting from this work concludes that Russia’s bombing campaign amounts to the crimes against humanity of extermination and persecution.

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For three consecutive winters, Russia has bombed Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in a bid to deprive the civilian population of access to heating and electricity at a time when the days are short and temperatures are typically well below freezing. These attacks have had a devastating impact on the Ukrainian power grid, with around half of Ukraine’s entire prewar energy-generating capacity destroyed by summer 2024.

As well as targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure, Russia has also launched waves of drones and missiles at Ukrainian towns and cities throughout the invasion, causing widespread destruction and loss of life. There have been a number of particularly deadly attacks in recent weeks, including a ballistic missile strike on a playground in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, Kryvyi Rih, that killed eighteen people including nine children. On Palm Sunday one week before Easter, Russia launched a targeted strike on Sumy city center as civilians made their way to church, leaving thirty-five dead.

In addition to killing and injuring civilians, Russian aerial attacks also create untenable living conditions for the wider civilian population. They leave people traumatized and fuel intense feelings of insecurity, while disrupting access to heating, power, water, healthcare, and other essential resources.

While estimating the true toll of these attacks is challenging, the number of displaced Ukrainians indicates the sheer scale of the humanitarian crisis. According to UN data from February 2025, Russian’s invasion has forced 10.6 million people to relocate, with 6.9 million recorded as refugees living outside Ukraine. Meanwhile, around 12.7 million Ukrainians are in need of humanitarian assistance, including nearly two million children.

Russia systematically and deliberately deprives civilians of objects essential to their survival and inflicts conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction, which constitutes the crime against humanity of extermination. Statements by Russian officials, such as calls for Ukrainians to be left to “freeze and rot,” corroborate this conclusion.

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Russia’s aerial terror campaign, as well as the Kremlin’s actions in the occupied regions of Ukraine, have intentionally deprived Ukrainians of their fundamental rights to life, health, education, and culture, thus constituting the crime against humanity of persecution. The crime of persecution requires special discriminatory intent to target Ukrainians as a distinct group. This intent can be seen in Moscow’s branding of Ukrainians as “Nazis” who must be “destroyed.” such language underscores that Russia is attacking the very existence of Ukrainians. Targeted Russian attacks on educational and cultural facilities across Ukraine are further evidence of this intent.

Additionally, throughout the regions of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, the Russian occupation authorities are reportedly enforcing russification policies that aim to extinguish any trace of Ukrainian national identity or statehood. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and subjected to anti-Ukrainian indoctrination. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in relation to the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

Holding Russia accountable for the ongoing air offensive against Ukraine is particularly important as this form of prohibited total war, where everything and anything including vital infrastructure and civilian populations are targeted to achieve victory, looks set to return. Technological advances are transforming the modern battlefield to essentially include entire countries and their civilian populations. Against this backdrop, Russia’s use of long-range drones and missiles to terrorize Ukrainian civilians is likely a taste of things to come.

To date, no international tribunal has held individual perpetrators responsible for international crimes resulting from unlawful aerial attacks. The International Criminal Court has taken an important initial step by issuing arrest warrants against four senior Russian officials for their roles in attacking Ukrainian civilians and energy infrastructure, but further measures are needed.

Failure to hold Russia accountable today will fuel tomorrow’s wars and embolden Putin’s fellow autocrats to embrace similar tactics against civilian populations. It is vital to make sure long-term security is not sacrificed in order to reach some kind of compromise with the Kremlin to end the bloodshed in Ukraine. By focusing on accountability for Russia’s aerial attacks, the international community can set a meaningful precedent that could help protect civilians around the world for years to come.

Anastasiya Donets leads the Ukraine Legal Team at the International Partnership for Human Rights, an independent non-governmental organization. She was previously an assistant professor in the International Law Department at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University in Kharkiv. Susan H. Farbstein is a clinical professor of law at Harvard Law School, where she directs the International Human Rights Clinic.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In order to avoid the geopolitical uncertainties and internal instability of a frozen conflict, Ukrainian sovereignty must remain non-negotiable. This means rejecting any potential peace deal built on territorial concessions, restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military, or limitations on the country’s ability to form international alliances.

Instead, Ukraine needs concrete and comprehensive security guarantees from the country’s partners. With this in mind, many civil society representatives warn against repeating the mistakes of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear arsenal in exchange for toothless security assurances that failed to prevent Russia’s invasion.

Ukraine’s future security also depends on a strong military. Many women within the country’s civil society have sought to communicate this to their colleagues in the international feminist movement, which has often traditionally championed disarmament and non-violent conflict resolution. They stress that a durable peace cannot come at the expense of security or Ukraine’s fundamental right to exist.

Speaking during a recent visit to the United States, Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Oleksandra Matviichuk emphasized that safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty is about much more than protecting the country’s physical borders and also involves millions of human lives. Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are currently enduring the kidnapping of children, forced deportations, prison camps, sexual violence, widespread human rights abuses, and the methodical erosion of civil liberties. These are not isolated crimes. Instead, Russia is accused of seeking to systematically erase Ukrainian national identity in a campaign that many believe amounts to genocide.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Ukrainian civil society leaders have stressed the need for broad inclusion in peace negotiations and post-war recovery processes. Their calls are backed by the experience of peace initiatives elsewhere. Research indicates that peace efforts are up to 64 percent less likely to fail in instances when civil society representatives are invited to participate in talks. This has been the case in places like Northern Ireland and South Africa, where a combination of official diplomacy and civil society dialogue helped forge lasting peace.

Excluding Ukrainian civil society from peace efforts could undermine the human dimension of the process and remove accountability from the equation. While defining what justice should look like at the local, national, and international levels will be an ongoing discussion requiring the involvement of diverse stakeholders, Ukrainian civil society activists emphasize that justice must remain at the heart of any peace agreement.

Demands for accountability are widespread throughout Ukrainian society. More than 70,000 war crimes have been documented since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, including a large number of cases involving conflict-related sexual violence. Civil society activists have been at the forefront of efforts to secure justice for war crimes while also working for the protection of displaced people and the return of abducted Ukrainian children. Their demands include ensuring that the perpetrators of war crimes do not enjoy immunity, and that frozen Russian assets be directed toward rebuilding Ukraine and supporting victims.

Many Ukrainian civil society leaders believe the pursuit of justice in response to the crimes committed during Russia’s invasion is not only a national priority. Instead, they say Russia’s actions elsewhere from Syria to Africa reflect a wider pattern of impunity and argue that addressing this problem is a global imperative. As Oleksandra Matviichuk bluntly puts it, “Unpunished evil grows.”

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern history that has directly undermined the foundations of the existing international order. Ukrainian activists recognize the scale of the challenge this represents, but argue that international law must be revitalized rather than being abandoned entirely. They see this moment as a critical test for the global community. How the world responds to Russia’s alleged war crimes will set precedents that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Failure to act decisively now will not only undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Ana Lejava is a Policy Officer at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security at Georgetown University.

Experts react: Trump just announced the removal of all US sanctions on Syria. What’s next?

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 13 May 2025 20:51:11 +0000

“We’re taking them all off.” US President Donald Trump announced on Tuesday that Washington will remove all US sanctions on the Syrian government. The announcement comes five months after the overthrow of dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime, in a snap opposition offensive led by new President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s militant group.

The new Syrian leadership and its supporters have pushed for sanctions relief to help rebuild from the rubble of more than a decade of civil war—accompanied by promises of establishing a more free and tolerant Syria. But skepticism remains regarding al-Sharaa’s past links to al-Qaeda and communal massacres against minority groups that have taken place since he came to power.

How will the removal of US sanctions affect Syria’s economy and future US-Syria relations? And what are the wider implications for the region? Our experts offer their insights below.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

Daniel B. Shapiro: Trump is making a smart gamble, Congress should back him up

Sarah Zaaimi: A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Thomas S. Warrick: Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

Amany Qaddour: Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

Alan Pino: A clear signal to Iran

Kimberly Donovan: Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Celeste Kmiotek: Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable

Maia Nikoladze: This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Ömer Özkizilcik: This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Sinan Hatahet: Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Diana Rayes: A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

Elise Baker: Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

Lize de Kruijf: Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria

This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region

Trump’s decision to lift US sanctions on Syria is a pivotal shift that could define his legacy in the Middle East. The move signals an opportunity to secure a long-term US victory in Syria by stabilizing the region, countering rivals such as Russia and China, and opening economic opportunities for US businesses.

Trump has long portrayed himself as a dealmaker, and his record on Syria supports that image. Unlike the Obama and Biden administrations, Trump responded decisively to al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks in 2017 and 2018, launched airstrikes to deter further atrocities, and cooperated with Turkey in 2020 to halt the Assad regime’s and Russia’s assault on Idlib. He also signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which crippled the Assad regime financially, leading to its fall last December. Now, however, those same sanctions are undermining the prospects of Syria’s new post-Assad regime government, which is attempting to rebuild and distance itself from Iranian and Russian influence.

The current sanctions are weakening a new government that seeks US and Gulf support. If these sanctions were to stay in place, Syria’s economy would remain in free fall, making it increasingly reliant on Russia, China, and Iran. This would open the door to renewed extremism, regional instability, and the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Lifting sanctions will allow US companies to compete with Chinese firms for contracts in Syria’s expected $400 billion reconstruction effort. It will also enable Trump to leverage Gulf funding, create jobs in both Syria and the United States, and demonstrate Washington’s role as a stabilizing force. A prosperous Syria would reduce refugee flows, weaken Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and eliminate Syria as a threat to Israel—a country with which the new Syrian leadership seeks peaceful relations.

The new Syrian government is not without flaws, but it has made pragmatic moves. It started reintegrating territories with the Syrian Democratic Forces, cracked down on drug trafficking, made efforts aimed at protecting minorities, and distanced itself from Hezbollah and Iranian forces. These steps show a willingness to cooperate with the West and align with its goal of regional stability. If Trump follows through, he could secure a rare bipartisan win, outmaneuver Russia, and reshape the future of Syria in a way that serves US interests and regional peace.

—Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Council’s work on Syria.

Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

I am hearing that the lifting of US sanctions on Syria took some members of Trump’s own administration by surprise. Since January, Syria has been a counterterrorism file, not a political one. Al-Sharaa received a list of milestones from the US administration this spring, and meeting these would have meant a gradual rollback of sanctions. So this sudden lifting must feel like a new lease on life for the Syrian ruler.

But this sudden decision to lift sanctions should not be interpreted as a sign that the United States is making Syria a priority. In fact, it indicates the opposite. Both Saudi leader Mohammad bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have had to promise Trump that they will hold al-Sharaa accountable and will shoulder the burden of reconstruction. The United States has never colonized or invaded Syria, and the United States committed a lot of manpower and funding into supporting opposition to al-Assad under the first Trump administration. It is hard to make an argument that the United States has any obligation to fund Syria’s reconstruction. That responsibility will fall to those who pressed Trump to lift sanctions.

Going forward, there are three things to watch:

One, watch for Saudi Arabia’s deal with al-Sharaa. He will owe them big time for making this happen. (Erdogan will argue that he is owed as well, having greased the skids on a phone call with Trump just before his meetings in Riyadh.) Expect Saudi Arabia to require that foreign fighters be ejected from senior government roles and demand that Iran is kept out of Syria. Look for Saudi companies to be granted the contracts to undertake reconstruction projects in Syria, an easy give for al-Sharaa and a no-brainer in this situation.

Two, for Europe especially, watch Russia. Moscow may find it easier to establish its interests in Syria now. Saudi Arabia and Israel will see a Russian presence as a way of counterbalancing Turkey’s influence in Syria.

Three, watch for shifts in Iran’s foreign policy. Syria is now proof that Trump will in fact lift sanctions under certain conditions—if your leadership promises to change its stripes and favored foreign partners vouch for you. Expect to see a charm offensive by Tehran.

— Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Previously, she was the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, leading the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

Trump is making a smart gamble

Trump’s announcement that he will provide sanctions relief to Syria is a gamble, but it is the right one. The collapse of the Assad regime, whose brutality, misrule, and collaboration with malevolent regional actors destroyed Syria, has given long-suffering Syrians a chance to build a different future.

The road to recovery will not be an easy one. Many are rightly suspicious of Syria’s new acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and others in his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, due to their violent jihadist past. As one cannot look inside another’s soul, it is unknown if they have truly shed their extremist ideology amid a rebranding since coming to power in December.

What can be judged are actions. So far, al-Sharaa has said and done many of things Western and Arab nations have called for. He is making efforts to be inclusive, including appointing women and minorities into his cabinet. He says strict Sharia law will not be imposed. He has begun negotiations with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces on their peaceful integration into Syrian national institutions. He claims to want Syria to pose no threat to any of its neighbors, including Israel, and he wants to keep Iran from re-establishing influence in Syria. He is aligning himself with moderate Arab states and US partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

These words and actions must be tested and verified over time. But to have any chance to succeed in stabilizing Syria, the new government needs resources to make the economy function. Reconstruction and resettlement of refugees, not to mention restoring services disrupted by years of civil war, will be expensive. Without a significant measure of US sanctions relief, none of this is possible. It would nearly guarantee Syria’s descent back into chaos and provide fertile ground for extremists.

Congress should work with Trump on crafting sanctions relief such that, if necessary, sanctions can be restored. But Trump is right to seize this opportunity.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.

A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Lifting sanctions presents a tremendous opportunity to revitalize the Syrian economy and provide a genuine chance for the al-Sharaa government to implement the vision for social unity it has advocated since December. However, the United States should make sure not to give carte blanche to the new Syrian regime and lose all of its leverage over a ruler who has only recently self-reformed from a dangerous radical ideology, especially when it comes to managing ethnic and religious diversity.

Al-Sharaa has publicly and repeatedly pledged to build a nation for all Syrians, regardless of their identities. He also appointed a Christian woman to his newly announced government and welcomed a delegation of Jewish religious officials to return for the first time since their synagogue was closed back in the 1990s. Still, his first five months in power have also been marked by violent confrontations with certain religious minorities and the ascension to power of foreign fighters with questionable pasts. Back in March, over one thousand Alawites were killed in a violent crackdown on the minority’s stronghold on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, the Druze remain divided, and many refuse to turn in their arms, fearing the escalation of sectarian tensions.

Similarly, many other sects remain anxious about their future, including Christians and Twelver Shia, who saw the lowering of the Sayeda Zainab flag—a revered pilgrimage site on the outskirts of Damascus—as a sign of the prevalence of a monochrome orthodox version of Islam. Another worrying signal was the sweeping authority provided to the presidency in the new Syrian constitution, which also excluded mention of minority rights and societal diversity, making Islam the only supreme law of the land.

Al-Sharaa and his entourage have a historic chance to start anew and build a plural and inclusive Syria for all its citizens. Until then, Washington and its allies should continue monitoring the state of minorities in this complex sociocultural context and signal to the new lords of the land that lifting sanctions is a provisional chance and not an unconditional license to lead Damascus into another sectarian spiral.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on minorities and cultural hybridity. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

No one can say that Trump does not listen to Arab leaders—clearly, he does. Arab leaders were united in telling Trump and his administration that the United States should lift sanctions against Syria to help move the country toward peace with all its neighbors.

Officials in the Trump administration had different views on how to respond to al-Sharaa’s statements calling for peace with Syria’s neighbors and openness to the West. But no one expected Trump to announce the lifting of sanctions on this trip. As recently as April 25, a senior administration official said that the new Syrian government needed to combat terrorism, prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria, expel foreign fighters from Syria’s government and security apparatus, destroy all chemical weapons, adopt nonaggression policies toward all neighboring countries, and clear up the fate of missing American Austin Tice. “We will consider sanctions relief, provided the interim authorities take demonstrable steps in the directions that I have articulated,” he said. “We want Syria to have a second chance.”

On March 20, I and other US experts on the Middle East called for Syria to express interest in joining the Abraham Accords. I think that al-Sharaa’s April 19 offer to discuss joining the Abraham Accords did exactly what it needed to do: It broke through to get Trump’s attention.

Trump is now willing to give Syria a second chance. Sanctions against terrorist groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which brought al-Sharaa to power (with support from Turkey), are likely to remain in place. Syria needs to make substantive progress on sidelining extremists within al-Sharaa’s ranks and engaging in serious talks (either direct or indirect) with Israel that could eventually lead to joining the Abraham Accords. Trump could change his mind tomorrow, but for now, it is clear Trump is listening.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

What a monumental shift for Syria—one of the most significant since the December fall of the Assad regime.

Having just returned recently from the country, I could clearly see that the humanitarian situation has stagnated. The Trump administration’s massive US Agency for International Development (USAID) cuts—amid already dwindling funds for Syria—have had a catastrophic impact. The soul-crushing sight of destroyed buildings across the country as a result of the regime’s brutality was still visible in so many of the previously besieged areas like Douma and Harista of Eastern Ghouta. The Assad regime’s deprivation, oppression, and collective punishment of millions has left the country in a state of decay.

In my view as a humanitarian and public health practitioner, sanctions have been one of the most critical hindrances to early recovery. Syria’s health sector is decimated after over a decade of destruction to critical civilian infrastructure like hospitals and clinics—not to mention schools and marketplaces— from aerial attacks by the regime and its allies.

As long as sanctions are in place against the new government in Syria, the recovery of the country is impossible, and civilians will continue to the pay the price, just as they did under the Assad regime. Beyond the need for Syria’s early recovery and reconstruction from a physical infrastructure standpoint, the country needs to heal. This is an opportune moment to capitalize on this shift. The politicization of aid throughout the entirety of conflict has translated to the suffering of millions. Now is the time to move beyond that politicization of aid and recovery efforts and give Syrians the chance to start the healing process. Lifting sanctions will allow for that and bring Syria back from being a pariah state.

—Amany Qaddour is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is also the director of the 501(c)(3) humanitarian nongovernmental organization Syria Relief & Development.

A clear signal to Iran

Trump’s decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria provides a needed lifeline to Syria’s struggling economy, aligns Washington’s Syria policy with that of regional Arab powers, and pointedly signals a determination to prevent Iran from rebuilding its presence and influence in this key country.

Popular unrest—including increasing criticism of al-Sharaa and his new government—has been growing in Syria over the poor economy and living conditions as the country attempts to recover from over a decade of civil war. The lifting of US sanctions opens the way for an infusion of regional and international aid, investment, and expertise to help the al-Sharaa government begin rebuilding the country and heading off the political instability that could otherwise arise.

Removing sanctions also shows US support for efforts by Washington’s Arab partners in the Gulf, Egypt, and Jordan to reintegrate Syria into the moderate Arab fold after decades of alignment with Iran. The controversy over the invitation of al-Sharaa to the Arab Summit in Baghdad because of his and his follower’s past ties to al-Qaeda makes clear that Syrian reintegration will need to proceed slowly, based on a demonstrated commitment to eschew all ties to terrorism and apply equal justice to all minorities in Syria.

Finally, Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria puts down a marker that Washington is not only determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but to check Iranian efforts to try to restore its badly weakened resistance axis aimed at threatening Israel and wider reigonal domination.

—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the United States will end sanctions on Syria is a major foreign policy shift. Lifting sanctions on Syria is complicated and will require strategy to determine which sanctions to pull down and when, as well as what measures implement to enable the snap-back of sanctions should the situation in Syria deteriorate.

Syria has been on the US state sponsor of terrorism list since 1979 and is subject to sanctions and export controls pursuant to numerous executive orders and legislation for a range of issues including human rights abuses, smuggling Iranian oil, and supporting terrorist groups. A further complicating factor is that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which overthrew the Assad regime, is leading the interim Syrian government. HTS, formerly known as al-Nusrah Front and once al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and other governments. HTS is also designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations (UN), a designation that all UN member states must comply with, including the United States. The UN designation of HTS and al-Sharaa include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo.

Trump’s announcement is a welcome shift in US foreign policy. The Syrian government and the Syrian people will need sanctions lifted to have a chance of rebuilding the country. This is a delicate and complicated situation on top of a complex sanctions regime. To move forward with this shift in foreign policy, as a next step, the United States will need to consider which sanctions it is willing to lift on Syria to meet specific goals and it will need to start engaging with the United Nations to consider if and how sanctions should be lifted on HTS.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division.

Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable

Trump’s removal of sanctions on Syria is a welcome development. As many organizations have argued, while the sanctions were a tool meant to influence Bashar al-Assad and his regime, they instead became a tool “to punish the Syrian people and hinder reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and prospects of economic recovery.”

However, from the information available, it is unclear how the United States will approach targeted sanctions designating individuals and entities for human rights abuses under executive orders related to Syria (as opposed to broad-based sectoral sanctions). While these designations, too, must be lifted when an individual no longer meets the relevant criteria, this does not mean that Washington should embrace impunity. Namely, the US must not allow al-Assad and his allies who have been designated for serious violations of human rights to walk away without consequences. While al-Assad may have fled Syria, he has yet to provide redress for a “horrifying catalogue of human rights violations that caused untold human suffering on a vast scale.”

Lifting targeted sanctions could allow al-Assad, for example, to enter the United States, to access previously frozen US assets, and to engage in transactions involving the US dollar. Instead, Washington could pursue targeted designations under other relevant programs, such as the Global Magnitsky program for serious human rights abuse. The Trump administration could additionally use this moment as an opportunity to re-commit Washington to pursuing domestic criminal accountability for atrocities in Syria and other accountability avenues.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Trump’s announcement on lifting Syria sanctions is a surprising and welcome alignment of Washington’s sanctions strategy with that of the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom. European officials have been calling on Washington to remove sanctions on Syria because multinational companies and large banks will not enter the Syrian market as long as US secondary sanctions remain in place.

While the specifics of the US sanctions removal plan are yet unknown, Washington should use the EU and UK sanctions-lifting playbook. In February, the European Council announced that the EU would lift sectoral sanctions on Syria’s energy and transport sectors, delist four Syrian banks, and ease restrictions on the Syrian central bank. However, EU sanctions against the Assad regime, the chemical weapons sector, and the illicit drug trade, as well as sectoral measures on arms trade and dual-use goods, will remain in place. Last month, the United Kingdom followed suit and lifted sanctions on the Syrian central bank and twenty-three other entities. Like the EU, the United Kingdom still maintains sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit drug trade.

Washington should replicate the EU’s and United Kingdom’s gradual approach to lifting sanctions. This means starting with the finance and energy sectors to create a favorable environment for multinational companies to enter the Syrian market. At the same time, the United States should promote the dollarization of the Syrian economy, provide financial assistance, and help the Syrian government establish regulatory oversight to prevent the diversion of funds from reconstruction efforts.

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center.

This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Trump’s decision to lift all sanctions on Syria carries profound significance for the Syrian people. It offers them a genuine opportunity to rebuild their country and begin the process of recovery. While the sanctions were originally enacted with the intent of protecting civilians and deterring the Assad regime from further war crimes, over time—especially following al-Assad’s fall—they became a major hindrance, primarily harming ordinary Syrians.

Yet, beyond its humanitarian implications, this move also marks a geopolitical win for the United States. By removing sanctions, Washington enables its allies to invest in Syria, preventing Damascus’s potential reliance on China and Russia, both of which could potentially circumvent sanctions to gain influence. This declaration by Trump should not merely be viewed as a lifting of punitive measures; it is also the first step toward formally recognizing the interim Syrian authorities as the legitimate government of Syria.

Regionally, the end of sanctions represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As the principal supporters of the new Syrian government, both nations worked in tandem to persuade the Trump administration to shift its stance—initially marked by hesitation—toward greater engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Their coordinated diplomatic efforts played a pivotal role in shaping this policy reversal.

This shared success could also pave the way for deeper regional collaboration between Riyadh and Ankara, highlighting the potential of US allies in the region when they act in concert. Syria is slowly but steadily turning from a regional conflict zone into a zone of regional cooperation.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs.

Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Washington’s decision to lift its sanctions on Syria emerges within a geopolitical context marked by unprecedented regional alignment around the newly formed Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This government has uniquely achieved consensus among historically divergent regional powers, long characterized by strategic competition over regional hegemony. Al-Sharaa’s administration has been credited with fostering this consensus through a national vision, closely aligned with regional objectives aimed at overall stability, collective benefit, and cooperation, rather than the zero-sum dynamics that al-Assad used to impose on his direct and indirect neighborhood.

However, two regional actors remain notably wary despite the broader regional consensus. Iran—an ally of the ousted Assad regime—views the consolidation of authority by the current government in Damascus as potentially adverse, perceiving it as a direct challenge to its strategic and security interests in the Levant. Israel, similarly, remains skeptical due to ongoing security concerns and its direct military involvement within Syrian territory.

From a practical standpoint, lifting sanctions must be matched by corresponding bureaucratic agility. This includes swift administrative measures that enable Syrian public and private institutions to comply with international legal frameworks effectively. The cessation of sanctions should not only be a political gesture but also a procedural and institutional reality. To achieve this, regional governments alongside European and US counterparts, must proactively facilitate knowledge transfer, reduce procedural hurdles, and accelerate essential reforms. Such reforms represent a fundamental prerequisite to ensuring that the lifting of sanctions translates into tangible economic and political progress for Syria.

—Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

This policy shift has already brought what feels like a collective sigh of relief for a population weighed down by a humanitarian and development crisis. Today, the majority of Syrians live below the poverty line. More than 3.7 million children in Syria are out of school—including over half of school-age children. Only 57 percent of the country’s hospitals, including only 37 percent of primary health care facilities, are fully operational Despite widespread need, humanitarian aid is lacking—largely exacerbated the Trump administration’s now-dropped sanctions and its enduring foreign aid cuts.

Sanctions relief is a critical first step in stabilizing essential systems, particularly the health sector, which the Syrian government has identified as a national priority. It will help restore access to essential medicines, supplies, and equipment. This shift will also unlock broader international investment, encouraging governments and private sector actors to reengage in Syria as a key regional player. Infrastructure firms, pharmaceutical companies, and development partners that have long been on standby now have an opportunity to support early recovery and rebuild systems that sustain daily life.

This policy change is also seismic for Syrians who have been displaced for decades around the world. Supporting early recovery efforts through sanctions relief will enable safe and voluntary returns while contributing to broader regional stability, and countries hosting Syrian refugees should follow Trump’s lead.

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is currently a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

With the downfall of the Assad regime, sanctions imposed “to deprive the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians and to pressure the Syrian regime to allow for a democratic transition as the Syrian people demand” are no longer appropriate, and are in fact hindering much needed rebuilding and recovery in Syria. But lifting sanctions alone is not enough.

Over the past fourteen years, the United States and other Western countries have been profiting from enforcing sanctions against Syria. Where companies and individuals have violated Syria sanctions, the United States and other countries have taken enforcement action, levying fines, penalties, and forfeitures in response. The proceeds are then directed to domestic purposes, with none of the recovery benefitting Syrians.

Now is the time to change this policy. Syria is finally ready for rebuilding and recovery, refugees are returning, and victim and survivor communities are beginning to heal. In addition to lifting sanctions on Syria, the United States and other countries should direct the proceeds from their past and future sanctions enforcement to benefit the Syrian people and help victim and survivor communities recover. This can be done by listening to the calls from Syrian civil society and establishing an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund, which the European Parliament has endorsed.

—Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project. She provides legal support to the project, which seeks to include legal tools in foreign policy, with a focus on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human-rights violations, terrorism, and corruption offenses.

Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria

The United States lifting sanctions on Syria is a necessary first step, but it is not enough to unlock the meaningful foreign investment that Syria needs for its recovery and reconstruction. After years of conflict and isolation, Syria needs more than an open economy—it must rebuild trust and demonstrate long-term stability. Investors will not return simply because sanctions have been lifted—they need assurances of stability, legal protections, and clear signals from the international community.

Private investors often follow the lead of governments and multilateral institutions. Countries that receive significant foreign aid post-conflict also tend to attract more private capital. Europe and the United Nations have begun developing a positive economic statecraft approach, pledging billions in grants and concessional loans to support Syria’s recovery. However, the United States has yet to commit financial support this year, citing expectations that others will shoulder the burden. This creates a leadership vacuum and leaves space for geopolitical rivals to step in.

Countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and China have already begun doing so, rapidly expanding their influence in Syria through investments in oil, gas, infrastructure, reconstruction projects, and paying off Syria’s World Bank debt. In exchange for financial support, they are gaining access to strategic sectors that will shape Syria’s future—and the broader dynamics of the region. If the United States is absent from Syria’s recovery, its risks ceding long-term influence to adversaries. 

Reconstruction is not only a humanitarian imperative—it is a strategic opportunity. The lifting of sanctions opens a door, but a coordinated positive economic statecraft response—including tools like World Bank risk guarantees and US development finance—is necessary to ensure Syria’s recovery aligns with broader international interests.

—Lize de Kruijf  is a project assistant with the Economic Statecraft Initiative.

The post Experts react: Trump just announced the removal of all US sanctions on Syria. What’s next? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The father of ‘soft power,’ a supreme intellect, and an eternal optimist: The Atlantic Council remembers Joseph Nye

Atlantic Council — Tue, 13 May 2025 17:38:26 +0000

Joseph S. Nye Jr., the public servant and professor who coined the term “soft power” to describe US cultural influence around the globe, died on May 6. Nye served on the Atlantic Council’s board of directors from 2014 until his passing. He was an active contributor to the Atlantic Council’s work, including an essay for our New Atlanticist section in August drawing from his memoir, A Life in the American Century. He concluded the article by striking an optimistic note:

“Some historians have compared the flux of ideas and connections today to the turmoil of the Renaissance and Reformation five centuries ago, but on a much larger scale. And those eras were followed by the Thirty Years’ War, which killed a third of the population of Germany. Today, the world is richer and riskier than ever before.

I am sometimes asked whether I am optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the United States. I reply, ‘Guardedly optimistic.’ The United States has many problems—polarization, inequality, loss of trust, mass shootings, deaths of despair from drugs and suicide—just to name a few that make headlines. There is a case for pessimism. At the same time, we Americans have survived worse periods in the 1890s, 1930s, and 1960s. For all its flaws, the United States is an innovative and resilient society that, in the past, has been able to recreate and reinvent itself. Maybe Generation Z can do it again. I hope so.”

Below, members of the Atlantic Council community reflect on the impact Nye made on both our work and the wider world.

Click below to jump to an expert reflection:

Matthew Kroenig: “In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Chuck Hagel: “He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

Jan Lodal: He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Paula Dobriansky: “His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Daniel Fried: “He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

“In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Just recently, our CEO Fred Kempe applied the “Joe Nye rule” as a guide to the Atlantic Council’s geostrategy work. He advised that our regular, private Strategy Consortium convenings bring together the caliber of strategic thinkers who will entice people like Joe Nye to remain engaged.

We are deeply saddened to learn of Nye’s passing and that his participation in our convenings will no longer be possible. He was a longstanding Atlantic Council board director and a regular participant in our private Strategy Consortium meetings for many years, most recently in December 2024 on the topic of anticipating a future Trump administration national security strategy. He also contributed to our strategy work in other ways, authoring forwards for our Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series and articles for our website.

He was a towering intellect and a resolute and courteous commentator on global affairs. He brought penetrating insights to our meetings and did not shy away from expressing disagreement, but always in a generous way, intending only to elevate the discussion and improve the quality of the work.

In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist about American power, alliances, and global engagement. Even though he is no longer with us, Nye’s strategic clarity, civility, and optimism will continue to inspire the Atlantic Council.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

“He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

We have lost an exceptional human being. He brought clarity to so many complicated issues over the years. We all learned from him and benefitted from his wisdom and knowledge and unpretentious style. He’ll be missed by many.

—Chuck Hagel is a member of the Atlantic Council international advisory board, a former US secretary of defense, and a former US senator from Nebraska.

He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Joe’s contributions to his students, his family, and world peace and security were unparalleled. His impact will be felt indefinitely.

Joe was also a magnificent personal friend and colleague. We survived numerous hikes to the top of the mountains in Aspen after the exhilarating discussions he had organized for the Aspen Strategy Group. He asked me to take over the group when he had to step down, which I was honored to do. I then imposed on him to join my team as assistant secretary for international security affairs under Bill Perry in the Clinton administration. He was the best ever in that storied office.

Joe actually changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts—”soft power” being perhaps the most memorable. He was a devoted husband to his dear wife, Molly, and a great art dealer from whom we obtained twelve paintings that grace our walls and remind us daily of Joe. We will miss him greatly.

—Jan Lodal is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, a former principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, and a former senior staff member of the National Security Council.

“His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Joe Nye was an extraordinary scholar, intellect, professor, and public servant. He was a prolific writer whose books, articles, and op-eds advanced innovative ideas and provided cogent analyses of complex national security issues. Described as a “towering figure in international affairs,” he produced writings that have had a profound impact on policymakers both at home and abroad. He was widely known for having conceived the “soft power” approach in US foreign policy, which promotes American power through influence, persuasion, and diplomacy.

Joe’s service at the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and as chair of the National Intelligence Council was distinguished and results-driven. During his tenure at the State Department as deputy to the under secretary for security assistance, science, and technology, he chaired the consequential National Security Council interagency group on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

I have long admired Joe’s achievements in foreign policy and public service. On a more personal level, I was also proud to have been his colleague and friend. He touched my life in so many ways. While at Harvard for my master’s and Ph.D. degrees, Joe was not only my professor there, but a wonderful mentor. One of his many admirable qualities that I loved was his desire to have a good lively policy debate. He always brought opposing points of view into a discussion and relished a vibrant exchange of opinions. His calm demeanor in the midst of bureaucratic squabbles or crises was exemplary.

I will miss him terribly, but I am gratified that his policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure. He was indeed a giant in international affairs and leaves a remarkable legacy.

—Paula J. Dobriansky is the vice chair of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former US under secretary of state for global affairs.

“He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

Joe Nye was the rare combination of government foreign policy practitioner with political thinker and public scholar of the first order. He has been called a “neo-liberal.” But that term, like its twin “neo-conservative,” is more of an epithet than a useful guide. Roughly put, Nye believed that the rules-based international system that the United States created and led for three generations after World War II was a good thing—that it had more potential to generate prosperity, avoid world war, and advance American values and thus American interests than the competition. Because the competition in the twentieth century was fascism and communism, Nye’s judgment was a sure thing.

But Nye’s optimistic view now seems eclipsed by the dark neo-nationalism espoused by many in the United States and indeed across Europe. When some in the Trump administration, including US President Donald Trump, call for seizing Greenland, they seem to argue that only physical control of (and raw power over) territory can secure US interests, that there is no place for cooperation between nations to achieve goals that benefit both. That’s not a new view; it’s a mere repackaging of old European, great-power imperialism that brought disaster in its time and could bring disaster in ours. Such thinking would reduce the United States to a mere grasping, greedy superpower, a larger version of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, seeking to dominate through force and fear.

Nye’s views are now, more than ever, worth considering. He was no naif about the need for power in the international arena. But he acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right. When he spoke of such things, he meant it: artful, creative, committed, and realistic in the best sense. What a compelling and inspiring legacy he leaves behind.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

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Gazans fear famine amid Israel aid block: ‘I don’t want to be a number’

Arwa Damon — Mon, 12 May 2025 16:37:00 +0000

Humanitarian aid into Gaza is being blocked by a democratically elected nation state, Israel, and is fully supported by the world’s self-declared greatest democracy, the United States. Indeed, the imagery and stories coming from the Palestinian enclave leave one feeling like we exist in the realm of the inhumane absurd.

For more than two months now, nothing has entered Gaza. Not a single grain of rice or bag of flour. The only thing standing between Gaza’s 2.2 million starving people on the brink of famine and three thousand trucks packed with humanitarian aid is Israel.

“It’s a humanitarian catastrophe. Catastrophe on the true meaning of the world. We never could have ever imagined this.”

The voice note comes from one of the social workers assisting with the International Aid Network for Relief and Assistance, my non-profit organization that works in Gaza.

“We had been distributing rice, a serving of rice just to try to ease the hunger in the bellies of the children at the camps we work in,” she continues.

“But we had to stop now because there’s no rice left.”

I am not disclosing the names of those quoted, due to safety concerns in the aftermath of Israel’s targeting of humanitarian aid workers. Although even with the precaution of anonymity, one colleague remarked: “Israel knows who we all are anyway.”

It has been more than two months since Israel broke the ceasefire deal, resumed its bombing campaign of Gaza, and declared that no aid would enter the Strip. Well before the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, Israel controlled everything that entered or exited Gaza, even at the Rafah crossing at its border with Egypt.

The Israeli cabinet has started deliberations on resuming aid operations but under a framework that would “by-pass Hamas”, which would perhaps make sense if Hamas controlled the aid, only it doesn’t.

I have been to Gaza four times since the launch of the war in Gaza, on humanitarian missions with INARA, and would have gone on my fifth mission in February had Israel not denied me entry. I am hardly the only one, there has in fact been a troubling increase in denials of humanitarians and medics on missions to Gaza over the last three months.

I have been to warehouses, out in the field on distributions, and in sector meetings. Israel has long maintained that humanitarian aid entering Gaza is “controlled by Hamas.” The humanitarian community has categorically stated over and over that Hamas does not control the aid, despite allegations that the militant group has stolen some of it. But it is worth noting that if Hamas has been stealing or hoarding aid, it’s not from humanitarian organizations’ warehouses or distribution points.

This framework and its mechanisms would see private security contractors, or the military, establish “Israeli hubs” for distribution. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) issued a statement on behalf of all its partners slamming this plan.

“It is dangerous, driving civilians into militarized zones to collect rations, threatening lives, including those of humanitarian workers, while further entrenching forced displacement,” UNOCHA said in a statement.

“Humanitarian action responds to people’s needs, wherever they are.”

Most of us have set up distribution points close to the communities we serve, or, similar to our work at INARA, we deliver directly into the camps we work with. The population of Gaza is not mobile. Cars and buses don’t function; there is no fuel. People have to walk or take donkey carts to get anywhere. It’s not logical to expect someone to walk hours to get to a set distribution point in an active military zone and then haul an up to fifty-kilogram food parcel back to their tent.

Even assuming that someone was able to get the food box back to their tent, what are they supposed to cook with? Gaza has gone without cooking gas for months People try to gather wood, some are even burning books and trash to light a fire to cook on, but they are often unable to source enough. This is why functional community kitchens is so critical, but we have no idea how or if they will even be supplied.

But this is not a battle space that is ruled by logic. Equally ludicrous is Israel’s claim that “there is plenty of food in Gaza.”

There isn’t. The World Food Program does not state that its warehouses are empty, bakeries do not shut down, and children do not claw at scraps of food at the bottom of a pot when food is plentiful. What has been distributed to community kitchens will be depleted in the next few days.

It is no secret that Israel has weaponized humanitarian aid to ostensibly pressure Hamas, and the government itself has stated that it’s basically enforcing a “starve or surrender” policy.

Rule 53 of International Humanitarian Law specifically states, “The use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is prohibited.”

Israel is countering this by citing Article 23, which states that consignments may be prevented if there are concerns they may not reach their intended target or benefit the enemy. This is again based on the false premise that Hamas controls the aid. If this were the case, aid organizations like ours would have been unable to deliver assistance when Israel was permitting entry. We especially would not have been able to deliver during the ceasefire, when Hamas re-emerged onto Gaza’s streets.

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There already is an International Criminal Court warrant, issued back in November of last year, for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, which includes among the alleged crimes “the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare.”

Last week, the International Court of Justice began its deliberations on Israel’s restrictions on aid and aid operations at the request of the UN General Assembly. The deliberations will likely take months. Israel boycotted the sessions and called the whole thing a “circus”.

Israel recently rejected a Hamas offer of a five-year deal that would see it cede political power, countering with a forty-five-day ceasefire proposal and the provision that Hamas agree to disarm, which Hamas in turn rejected.

While ceasefire talks sputter, Israel is doubling down. The government just approved a “conquest” plan to expand its operations in Gaza, calling up additional tens of thousands of reservists, and enraging the Israeli population, who are growing increasingly incensed with their government’s refusal to do what it takes to get back to a ceasefire that will see the remaining hostages released. Tens of thousands of Israelis have been demonstrating on a regular basis, demanding that their government not continue to endanger the hostages’ lives.

For Palestinians, time is running out— a warning that has been echoed at some of the highest ranks of international organizations, including the World Health Organization.

“We are breaking the bodies and minds of the children of Gaza. We are starving the children of Gaza. We are complicit,” Deputy Director General Michael Ryan told reporters at the WHO’s headquarters. “It’s an abomination .”

When I speak to Palestinians in Gaza, I hear the strain in their voices—the subtle tremors as they fight not to crack under mounting hunger after a year and a half of military bombardment.

“Arwa,” they say. “I don’t want to be a number.”

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The new pope is American. He is also Peruvian. Why does it matter?

Martin Cassinelli — Fri, 09 May 2025 19:35:40 +0000

As global headlines celebrate the election of Pope Leo XIV—Robert Francis Prevost—as the first American pope, another nation three thousand miles south of the United States loudly claims him as one of its own. Though born in Chicago, Pope Leo XIV spent over two decades living and working in Peru and became a dual US and Peruvian citizen in 2015, forging a personal and spiritual bond with the Andean country that remains little known to the wider world. His identity as a dual citizen could be a defining characteristic of his papacy and, if channeled in his work, could shape US–Latin American relations.

The election of a pope thrusts a previously little-known figure onto the world stage and places significant geopolitical influence in his hands. As head of state of the Holy See, the pope oversees a vast diplomatic network and holds a moral authority that resonates across both the spiritual and political spheres. Each new pontiff brings a unique imprint to the role. Pope Francis, for instance, drew deeply from his experience working with marginalized communities in Argentina—a perspective that shaped the priorities and tone of his papacy from the beginning. In his first speech to the world as the new pontiff, Pope Leo XIV addressed the crowds in Spanish and greeted “his beloved Diocese of Chiclayo in Peru,” perhaps an early sign that his US–Peruvian identity will leave an imprint on his papacy.

This unique combination of identities could represent more than just mere symbolism. It may also help Pope Leo XIV reframe the US–Latin American relationship in more humane and values-driven terms. To do so, he will need to pick up where Pope Francis’s social justice work left off, but better communicate the shared humanity of people across the hemisphere to a US audience, who increasingly disapproved of Pope Francis and his views during his papacy.

Two decades in Peru

As a missionary and priest in towns and cities across Peru, Pope Leo XIV worked with marginalized communities during some of the country’s most turbulent decades. The 1980s and 1990s in Peru were marked by hyperinflation, an internal armed conflict between Maoist guerrillas and the Peruvian military that left an estimated seventy thousand people dead , and a dramatic erosion of the rule of law. During this period, he became a vocal advocate for vulnerable populations and sought to hold those in power accountable for the lives lost amid the violence and political breakdown.

In 2015, Pope Francis appointed him apostolic administrator of the Diocese of Chiclayo, a coastal city in Peru, a role he held until 2023. In this position, he became known for his closeness to rural communities and his support for social programs, including efforts to combat child malnutrition. As more than 1.5 million Venezuelan migrants escaped to Peru seeking asylum during his eight years in the Diocese of Chiclayo, Prevost showed care and defended their right to migrate. In 2023, he also publicly condemned the violent crackdown by Peruvian security forces against protesters, reinforcing his long-standing commitment to human dignity and justice. To this day, many Peruvians remember him as a priest who never hesitated to walk alongside the country’s poorest and most forgotten.

The unlikely blend of US and Latin America

One of the most distinctive aspects of Pope Leo XIV’s leadership may be his ability to bridge two regions across the same hemisphere. Within the Vatican, he was informally known as the “Latin American Yankee,” a nickname that captures both his dual identity and his capacity to bridge a hemisphere that increasingly finds itself at odds. While the Catholic Church is rarely seen as a central force in US–Latin American relations—with the notable exception of Archbishop Óscar Romero’s outspoken role in El Salvador’s civil war between the US-backed right-wing government and leftist guerrillas in the 1970s—it retains profound cultural and political influence in both places. The church shapes civic life, public debate, and electoral outcomes.

A pope who understands both the hopes of a campesino (small-scale farmer) in northern Peru and the concerns of a middle-class worker in the US Midwest is uniquely positioned to act as a moral and diplomatic bridge. To do so, he will need to carefully weigh his rhetoric on US politics, particularly on immigration, and forge a message of peace that cuts across political divides in the United States—no small feat at a time of increasing political polarization. As a result, Pope Leo XIV could help inspire a shift toward a US–Latin American relationship grounded not just in transactional interests, but in dignity, shared values, and common humanity.

Martin Cassinelli, a native of Peru, is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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The 2025 Distinguished Leadership Awards: Honoring leaders who demonstrate ‘the true meaning of bravery and service’

Atlantic Council — Fri, 09 May 2025 03:12:51 +0000

“Tonight, we are gathered not only to celebrate global leadership, but to honor extraordinary courage,” said Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the Distinguished Leadership Awards in Washington, DC, on Thursday. “The kind that changes the course of history and reminds us all of the true meaning of bravery and service.”

Before a crowd of high-level attendees from government, business, the military, civil society, and the media, the Atlantic Council honored six leaders who have shown such courage through their service, leadership, and activism.

Stephen Hadley, a former US national security advisor and an executive vice chair of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors, was honored for his decades of public service across three US administrations. 

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković was recognized for his efforts to advance Croatia’s economic development and his role in advancing the country’s accession to the European Union.

General (ret.) John W. “Jay” Raymond was honored for his pioneering role as the first chief of space operations for the US Space Force.

Victor Pinchuk, a Ukrainian businessman and philanthropist who founded EastOne, YES, and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation, was awarded for his support for Ukrainian soldiers and civil society since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Judy Collins, a Grammy Award-winning and Academy Award-nominated singer and songwriter, was honored for her work promoting mental health awareness, civil rights, and environmental conservation. 

The final honorees of the evening were Ukrainian war heroes and veterans who have risked their lives to defend their country’s sovereignty and freedom from Russian aggression.

“Seldom has so much been at stake for the liberties and the collective interests of people and cultures and countries everywhere,” said Atlantic Council Chairman John F.W. Rogers. “Against this backdrop, the Atlantic Council continues its commitment to meet these challenges of the moment and to help chart a path forward.”

Below are more highlights from the ceremony. 

Judy Collins: “Music is, I think, the heart of most things in life”

Introducing Collins, Atlantic Council Executive Vice Chair Adrienne Arsht said that in addition to her decades-spanning career as a singer and songwriter, “her artistry extends far beyond the stage and the recording studio,” citing her mental health awareness and environmental advocacy.

Arsht said that Collins was “an outstanding humanitarian” defined not only by her “unmistakable voice,” but also her “unwavering compassion.”

“In this room,” Collins said, “there is so much energy, and so much intelligence, and so much vision. And I’m sure we can solve these things that are going on in the world.”

“Music, is, I think the heart of most things in life,” said Collins. “We have work to do, we have celebrations to make, and music helps us to do it.”

After accepting the Distinguished Artistic Leadership Award, she performed the Stephen Sondheim song “Send in the Clowns,” which was a Billboard-charting hit for Collins in 1975.

Stephen J. Hadley: “Don’t turn your back on those principles that gave us eighty years of peace and prosperity.”

“When the United States does not lead, either nothing happens or bad things happen,” said Hadley in a discussion with Rogers on the United States’ role in the world after accepting the Distinguished Service Award. “And I think this is a lesson that’s been lost on the American people.”

“If you want to really advance the peace, prosperity, safety, and security of the American people,” said Hadley, “you need a strategy. You need to define what you want, how you’re going to get there. Otherwise, you’re going to flounder.”

Noting that there are many US government agencies and departments that work on foreign policy, Hadley emphasized the importance of getting them to coordinate and cooperate toward the same objectives. “Good process does not dictate good policy,” he said, “but good policy is harder to achieve without good process.”

“You need to take the time to build a bipartisan support for foreign policy initiatives,” Hadley said, to ensure that they “last across administrations and so they can stay in place long enough to produce the results that they’re intended to produce.”

Hadley called the debate over whether the United States should pursue its values or its interests abroad “a false choice.” Advancing US values, he said “makes a world that is more congenial to American interests and is more congenial to the prosperity, security, and safety of the American people.”

Addressing policymakers who take a more transactional and less values-based view of US foreign policy interests, Hadley said: “Don’t turn your back on those principles that gave us eighty years of peace and prosperity. There’s a lot still relevant here today.”

In a pre-recorded video message, former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who served with Hadley during the George W. Bush administration, praised Hadley for serving with a “steady hand” and a “complete commitment” to the United States’ role abroad, as well as for carrying out US policies with “principle and with values at the center of them.”

Andrej Plenković: “We remain committed to preserving the transatlantic bond”

Plenković, receiving the Distinguished International Leadership Award, said his nine years in office have been “shaped by a growing number of global crises,” as “governing today is no longer a matter of routine decision-making—it is an ongoing exercise in resilience and crisis management.”

Plenković described his government’s “vision” as making Croatia stand among the “most advanced, stable, and prosperous nations,” but noted that the country’s path to this goal “has not been easy.”

Croatia began this journey “from the ashes of war and destruction” in the early 1990s, he said, but the country’s “determination was forged” in this difficult past.

“Croatia, as a committed transatlantic ally, will continue to stand with America,” Plenković said. He told of influential Croats who made their mark in the United States, including Medal of Honor recipient Peter Tomich, winemaker Mike Grgich, oil explorer Anthony Lucas, sculptor Ivan Meštrović, and inventor Nikola Tesla.

Together, he said, the United States and Croatia are “committed to preserving the transatlantic bond as the cornerstone of a free and democratic world.”

“Anything less,” said Plenković, would “weaken both Europe and the United States and only embolden those who challenge our shared values. This truth holds in Ukraine today, as it did in Croatia in the ‘90s, and wherever freedom is under threat.”

In his introductory remarks, former Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango praised Plenković for bringing “continuity, stability, and a clear strategic vision” to Croatia, citing the country’s recent accession to the Schengen Area and strong economic growth.

John W. Raymond: “To effectively operate in the space domain we must have global partners”

In accepting the Distinguished Military Leadership Award, Raymond said that it was in recognition of “the nearly sixteen thousand civilian and military guardians” who volunteered to join the US Space Force after it was established in 2019, adding that because of their service “our nation and our allies are better postured to meet the incredibly complex strategic environment that we face.”

“To effectively operate in the space domain, we must have global partners,” said Raymond, noting that the Space Force expanded Combined Space Operations to include Five Eyes members as well as other allies and partners and has strengthened its ties with NATO.

The force has also partnered with the US commercial space industry, which Raymond said “provides us and our allies and partners great advantage.”

Noting that US war plans “are all sized assuming we have access to space,” Raymond warned that given the threats being developed by US adversaries, “this is a flawed assumption. We no longer have the luxury of taking space for granted.”

Amid these growing threats, Raymond said that space capabilities can enhance overall deterrence and that “if we can successfully deter conflict from beginning or extending into space, then we have a chance of deterring conflict from spilling over into other domains.” The space domain, he said, “represents our best hope.”

Raymond was introduced by former House Armed Services Committee Chairman William “Mac” Thornberry, a major advocate for the Space Force’s establishment. Thornberry said Raymond’s early precedent-setting moves for the Space Force “set the new service on a path that grows more crucial and also more contested every moment.”

Victor Pinchuk: “Security guarantees are vital”

Pinchuk said that on first learning he would be honored with the Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award, he thought to himself that “this is the wrong time for a Ukrainian businessman to get an award” given the continued suffering of the Ukrainian people during wartime.

However, he concluded that “if I go to Washington, I can be useful,” as this would allow him to speak to a US audience about “Ukrainian heroes” fighting against Russia, “express our deep gratitude to the United States” for military assistance, and emphasize the importance of a security guarantee for a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Pinchuk highlighted the bravery of two Ukrainian veterans in the audience. Dmytro Finashyn, he noted, lost his arm in combat but returned to service first as an intelligence officer and then as an adviser to the interior minister on veterans’ affairs. Liudmyla Meniuk, Pinchuk told the audience, joined the army at age fifty-two after her son was killed in the war, later becoming the first Ukrainian woman to lead an armored unit.

Pinchuk said he was grateful to the United States for its support for Kyiv and thanked US President Donald Trump for recently authorizing a weapons sale to Ukraine. He called the US-Ukraine minerals deal “momentous,” adding that he called it the “Minerals for Peace Accord.”

“Ukrainians understand, an end to the war now is possible only in a not perfect way,” he said, adding that no one would be completely satisfied with the peace settlement and that “some goals maybe will take many years to achieve.”

However, Pinchuk emphasized that when Russian leaders speak of addressing the “root cause” of the war in negotiations, what they mean is “the existence of Ukraine” as a free and democratic country with the rule of law. “It is the ‘mistake’ of the existence of Ukraine that our enemy wants to ‘address,’ which means—remove, delete, annihilate.”

“This is why security guarantees are vital,” said Pinchuk. “And nobody in the world can imagine such guarantees” without the participation of the United States, he said.

“Victor is truly Ukraine’s renaissance man,” said David M. Rubenstein, co-founder and co-chairman of the Carlyle Group, while introducing Pinchuk. Rubenstein commended him for his philanthropic work helping Ukraine, which since Russia’s full-scale invasion has included the creation of programs that operate rehabilitation centers for wounded Ukrainian veterans and provide mental health services to returning soldiers.

Ukrainian war heroes and veterans

Speaking on behalf of the delegation of nine Ukrainian soldiers and veterans being honored for their service, Daniel Salem thanked the United States for its “crucial support” for his country’s war effort.
“The cancer—the second name for war—spreads beyond the Russian-Ukraine war,” Salem said. “It spreads all over the world.”
“The people that you see in front of you are representative of a strong nation, like yours,” Salem told the audience. “An honorable nation, like yours. People with dreams, as you do have dreams. And we all know that in the way of achieving your dreams you must apply discipline, commitment, consistency. Because without commitment, you don’t know how to start, and without consistency we won’t know how to finish.”
Ukraine, Salem said, had already proven “that we are the home of the brave.” With US help, he added, Ukraine will be able to say it is “the land of the free.”

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Putin’s parade cynically exploits WWII to justify his own criminal invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 08 May 2025 02:13:09 +0000

Dozens of foreign leaders are expected in Moscow on May 9 for the largest international event in the Russian capital since Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine more than three years ago. Officially, they are gathering for a military parade to mark eighty years since the World War II victory over Nazi Germany, but it is already apparent that the shadow of Russia’s current war in Ukraine will loom large over the entire spectacle.

The guest list for Friday’s Victory Day parade on Red Square reflects the dramatic geopolitical realignments that have taken place since 2022, and underlines the widening rift between Putin’s Russia and the democratic world. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s showpiece annual parade had been attended by many Western leaders including US President George W. Bush. This year, however, the guest of honor will be Chinese President Xi Jinping. He will be joined by the Brazilian president along with a host of Central Asian and African leaders. The sole representative from the European Union will be Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Visiting dignitaries will be treated to a bold demonstration of modern Russia’s military might. The mood is expected to be far detached from the kind of somber tones more typically associated with World War II memorials elsewhere. Friday’s parade has been been carefully choreographed to emphasize Russian strength while projecting Putin’s supreme confidence in eventual victory over Ukraine.

The link to today’s war will be hammered home by the participation of numerous Russian military units accused of committing war crimes in Ukraine. Putin may also choose to surround himself with alleged war criminals from the ranks of his invading army, as he did last year. In his official address, it will be genuinely shocking if Putin does not attempt to draw direct parallels between the struggle against Nazi Germany and his own ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine.

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Even without the involvement of Russian troops fresh from the front lines of the current war, it would be virtually impossible to separate Putin’s parade from the Kremlin propaganda justifying the invasion of Ukraine. Ever since Russia first set out to subjugate Ukraine more than ten years ago, the Kremlin has portrayed its escalating invasion as a continuation of the World War II fight against Germany, with Ukrainians cast in the role of modern-day successors to the Nazis. Despite an almost complete lack of evidence to support these absurd and obscene claims, the “Nazi Ukraine” narrative continues to resonate among a Russia population that has been utterly saturated in an extreme form of World War II mythology that often borders on religious fanaticism.

From the very first years of his reign, Putin has sought to place the Soviet Union’s World War II experience at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. For the Kremlin, this emphasis on the immense suffering and ultimate triumph of the Soviet war effort has served as the ideal ideological antidote to the horrors of Stalinism and the humiliations of the Soviet collapse. It has proved a highly effective strategy, helping to rebuild Russia’s battered national pride and giving new meaning to the country’s twentieth century totalitarian trauma.

Putin’s war cult has centered around Victory Day, which has emerged over the past 25 years as by far the most important holiday on the Russian calendar. Many outside observers assume Victory Day always enjoyed similar prominence, but that is not the case. In fact, Stalin himself discouraged commemorations and made May 9 a working day in 1947. It remained so until the mid-1960s, when Victory Day was declared a public holiday. Nevertheless, there was none of the pomp and fanfare currently associated with the anniversary of the Nazi surrender. In the 46 years between the end of World War II and the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow hosted a grand total of just four Victory Day parades.

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Putin’s cynical exploitation of World War II has also shaped Russian rhetoric on the international stage. This has been most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine, which Kremlin propaganda has consistently portrayed as a Nazi state. Russia’s lurid claims have proved remarkably resistant to reality, with even the 2019 election of Jewish candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy as president of Ukraine failing to force a change in tactics. Instead, Putin and other leading Kremlin officials have resorted to ever more ridiculous mental gymnastics as they have struggled to explain how a supposedly Nazi country could elect a Jewish leader. In one particularly notorious incident during the first months of the invasion, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots by declaring that Adolf Hitler also had “Jewish blood.”

When Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the fateful morning of February 24, 2022, it came as no surprise that he identified “denazification” as one his two key war aims. The true meaning of this chilling phrase has since become abundantly clear; “denazification” is actually Kremlin code for “de-Ukrainianization,” and reflects Putin’s end goal of a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

In areas of Ukraine that have fallen under Kremlin control since the start of the invasion, the occupation authorities are systematically wiping out all traces of Ukrainian history, culture, and national identity. Thousands of children have been abducted and subjected to indoctrination in a bid to rob them of their Ukrainian nationality, while anyone seen as potentially loyal to Ukraine has been detained and dispatched to a vast network of prisons where torture is reportedly routine. Europe has not witnessed atrocities on this scale since World War II.

For decades, most European countries have marked the end of World War II with solemn memorial services while collectively vowing “never again.” Under Putin, Russians have come to embrace an altogether more menacing form of militant remembrance accompanied by the unofficial slogan “we can repeat it.”

Putin has already succeeded in weaponizing the memory of World War II to consolidate his grip on power, garner domestic support for his expansionist foreign policy, and dehumanize his enemies. He is now poised to use this week’s Victory Day parade in Moscow to legitimize the criminal invasion of Ukraine among his foreign guests and place it in the same context as the fight against Hitler. This is staggeringly disrespectful. It is also historically illiterate. If anyone today is guilty of echoing the crimes of the Nazis, it is Putin himself.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Muhammad Tahir

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US-led peace talks hampered by Trump’s reluctance to pressure Putin

Olivia Yanchik — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 21:20:14 +0000

During the 2024 election campaign, US President Donald Trump famously vowed to end the Russian war on Ukraine “in 24 hours.” Three months into his presidency, the US leader now appears to be rapidly losing patience with a faltering peace process that is showing few signs of progress. Trump stated on April 18 that he wanted a ceasefire agreement in place quickly and would “take a pass” if Moscow or Kyiv “make it very difficult” to reach a peace deal.

Trump’s latest comments reflect mounting US frustration. Speaking on the same day in Paris, United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the US may soon “move on” from efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine if there is no progress in the coming days. “We are now reaching a point where we need to decide whether this is even possible or not,” Rubio told reporters.

It is not difficult to see why the Trump White House is feeling discouraged. While Ukraine agreed to a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire on March 11, Russia has so far refused to follow suit. Instead, the Kremlin has offered a long list of excuses and additional conditions. This has led to accusations that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no real interest in peace and is deliberately engaging in stalling tactics in a bid to drag out negotiations and continue the war until he has political control of Ukraine.

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Critics of Trump say he has been too reluctant to pressure Putin and has done little to convince the Kremlin dictator that the time has come to abandon his invasion. They claim Trump has consistently signaled his readiness to offer Russia concessions while adopting a noticeably tougher stance toward Ukraine. This has included multiple statements blaming Ukraine for Russia’s invasion.

Since the very early stages of Trump’s peace initiative, the US has ruled out the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO. This was recently underlined by US envoy General Keith Kellogg, who confirmed that NATO membership for Ukraine was “off the table.” Kellogg’s comments were welcomed by the Kremlin. “Of course, this is something that causes us satisfaction and coincides with our position,” noted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

The US has also made clear that it expects Europe to play a leading role in any peace settlement, including the provision of security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent any future repeat of Russia’s current invasion. This is part of a broader foreign policy transition that looks set to see the United States reduce its historic commitment to European security in order to focus more on Asia.

After taking office in January, Trump threatened to target Putin’s energy sector and extended some existing sanctions, but he has so far chosen not to impose any additional economic measures against Moscow. When Trump unveiled landmark new tariffs in early April, Russia was one of the few major economies not on the list.

US officials said the decision not to impose tariffs was because bilateral trade had already effectively stopped due to sanctions imposed following Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, trade with Russia is greater than trade with a number of countries subject to the new tariffs. Meanwhile, Trump and other US officials have frequently talked up the prospect for greater economic cooperation between Russia and the United States.

In the diplomatic arena, the Trump White House has sought to avoid direct criticism of Russia in favor of more neutral messaging that prioritizes the need for peace. This approach has seen the United States siding with Moscow at the United Nations and voting against UN resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. US officials also reportedly refused to back a statement by the G7 group of nations condemning Russia’s recent Palm Sunday attack on the Ukrainian city of Sumy, which killed dozens of civilians.

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The Kremlin has responded approvingly to the dramatic recent shift in the United States approach toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In early March, Russian officials noted that US foreign policy now “largely coincides with our vision.” However, while Putin has good reason to welcome the Trump administration’s stance on Ukraine, he has so far shown little interest in reciprocating by offering any concessions of his own. Far from it, in fact. Since the start of bilateral talks with the United States in February, the Russian military has significantly increased its bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities. In recent weeks, Russian forces have launched a major new spring offensive in Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s negotiating position in ongoing US-led talks is similarly hard line and reflects Russia’s continued commitment to ending Ukrainian independence. Moscow’s demands include official recognition of Russian control over four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, a complete end to all Western military support for Kyiv, and the drastic reduction of the Ukrainian army to a mere skeleton force, apparently with the intention of leaving Ukraine defenseless against a future phase of Russia’s invasion.

Russia’s uncompromising current approach reflects Putin’s conviction that he can eventually outlast the West in Ukraine, and that by saying no, he will push Trump to offer more concessions. So far, Putin’s logic appears to be working. Trump’s efforts to win over the Kremlin seem to have convinced many in Moscow that they are now firmly on track to secure an historic victory and have no reason to offer any meaningful concessions. If Trump is serious about achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine, he must demonstrate that he is prepared to turn up the pressure on Putin and increase the costs of continuing the invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Ukraine’s domestic legal system has been overwhelmed by the scale and the gravity of the war crimes allegations against Russia. For example, since the onset of the full-scale invasion in 2022, more than 156,000 investigations into potential war crimes have been opened. As of March 2025, only around 150 verdicts had been reached, mostly in absentia.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has taken some bold steps to help secure justice for Ukraine, most notably charging Russian President Vladimir Putin for his involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While this is certainly welcome, the ICC can only be expected to handle a small number of cases involving the most senior Russian officials.

Meanwhile, recent US cuts to international assistance threaten to impact existing efforts to hold Russia responsible for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. This has underlined the need to explore alternative formats that can help Kyiv overcome existing gaps in capacity-building.

One possibility would be to broaden the mandate of a proposed special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s leadership for the crime of aggression. Ukraine and its partners recently agreed to establish a tribunal in hybrid format with international and domestic components operating under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

While there is significant international support for efforts to put Russia’s military and political leaders on trial for the crime of aggression, the potentially political nature of this charge has raised some concerns. Expanding the mandate of a future tribunal to include other serious crimes could help garner more support and address any reservations regarding political legitimacy.

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Another possibility would be to expand international partnerships within Ukraine’s domestic legal system to enhance its ability to address alleged Russian war crimes. This hybrid approach would build on existing practice that has seen a number of countries providing investigators, prosecutors, forensic specialists, and other experts in recent years.

Foreign investigators and prosecutors could be formally inserted into specialized units at the investigative and prosecutorial level to work alongside their Ukrainian colleagues. This would significantly increase capacity, while also potentially improving the quality of investigative efforts. Further down the line, it may prove possible to introduce foreign judges in a similar manner.

This approach could draw on past experience and current international efforts, including those related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Central African Republic (CAR). If tailored to meet the specific requirements of the Ukrainian justice system, this could serve as an improvement over the well-meaning but somewhat scattershot efforts of Ukraine’s partners to date.

Some skeptics have suggested that any new justice mechanisms for Ukraine would compete with the ICC in terms of jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Advocates counter that new mechanisms could in fact coexist with the ICC, complementing rather duplicating the work being done in The Hague.

ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan has voiced support for the work of the CAR Special Criminal Court and recently endorsed the idea of a hybrid mechanism for the Democratic Republic of Congo. If applied effectively, this approach could make it possible for Ukraine to prosecute the kind of mid-level perpetrators who are beyond the mandate of the ICC.

Adopting new approaches to the issue of accountability for alleged war crimes committed during the Russian invasion of Ukraine can bring hope for justice and lay the foundations for a sustainable peace. A strengthened Ukrainian justice system could also play an important role in the country’s postwar progress on the path toward EU membership and further Western integration.

Nadia Volkova is the founder and head of the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG). Eric Witte is an independent international justice consultant who has worked at the International Criminal Court and Special Court for Sierra Leone. Arie Mora is an advocacy manager at the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG).

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The war crimes accusations leveled against the Russian authorities in occupied Ukraine extend far beyond the detentions highlighted by UN investigators. The most widely publicized charges relate to the mass abduction and ideological indoctrination of vulnerable Ukrainian children. Russia is believed to have kidnapped tens of thousands of young Ukrainians and placed them in camps or foster homes, where they are often subjected to brainwashing programs designed to rob them of their Ukrainian identity and transform them into Russians. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for his role in these mass abductions.

Throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, the authorities are working methodically to remove all symbols of Ukrainian statehood and erase any traces of Ukrainian national identity. The Ukrainian language has been suppressed along with Ukrainian literature, history, and cultural heritage. Schools now teach a Kremlin-approved curriculum that glorifies Russian imperialism while demonizing Ukraine. Any parents who attempt to resist the indoctrination of their children risk losing custody.

Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are being pressured into accepting Russian citizenship. Those who refuse to take Russian passports are denied access to basic services such as healthcare and pensions, and are unable to register their property with the occupation authorities. This so-called passportization campaign recently entered a new phase, with the Kremlin announcing that anyone who fails to acquire Russian citizenship within the next six months will be subject to potential deportation from their own homes.

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Fears over the future fate of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country were heightened recently by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s apparent endorsement of sham referendums staged by the Kremlin in 2022 to justify the seizure of Ukrainian lands. “There have been referendums where the overwhelming majority of the people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule,” he told Tucker Carlson in an interview that set off alarm bells across Europe.

The furor over Witkoff’s comments was hardly surprising. Russia’s fig leaf referendums in occupied Ukraine had been roundly rejected at the time by the vast majority of the international community, including many of Russia’s traditional supporters. “The United States will never recognize these illegal attempts to seize territory that does not belong to Russia,” the US State Department declared.

The September 2022 ballots lacked even a basic semblance of legitimacy, with voting taking place at gunpoint. Indeed, in many instances, the captive population were visited in their homes by election officials accompanied by armed soldiers. Such Kafkaesque scenes are nothing new for the Kremlin, which has been staging similarly farcical “referendums” to justify acts of international aggression since the Stalin era. Prior to Witkoff, however, no senior Western official had attempted to offer their stamp of approval.

The new UN report detailing Russian crimes against humanity in occupied Ukraine is particularly timely. Peace talks initiated by US President Donald Trump in recent weeks have focused largely on the possible partition of Ukraine, with negotiating teams working to determine potential boundaries. But while Trump talks of “dividing up the lands,” millions of lives are also at stake. It is therefore crucial to highlight the horrors unfolding in Russian-occupied Ukraine and the crimes being committed by the Kremlin. While it may not be militarily feasible to liberate these regions at present, safeguarding the basic human rights of Ukrainian residents living under Russian occupation should be an important aspect of any negotiated settlement.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The enforced adoption of Russian citizenship is just one of the many tools being employed by the Kremlin to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine. Wherever Russian troops advance, local populations are subjected to mass arrests designed to root out any potential dissenters. Those targeted typically include elected officials, military veterans, religious leaders, civil society activists, teachers, journalists, and patriots. Thousands have been abducted in this manner since 2022 and remain unaccounted for, with many thought to be languishing in a network of prisons in Russian-occupied Ukraine and Russia itself.

Those who remain are subjected to terror tactics in conditions that Britain’s The Economist has described as a “totalitarian hell.” All public symbols of Ukrainian statehood and cultural identity are being systematically dismantled. The Ukrainian language is suppressed, while any Christian denominations other than the Russian Orthodox Church face persecution or worse.

Moscow’s efforts to erase Ukrainian identity begin in the classroom. In schools throughout the occupied regions, Ukrainian children are being taught a new Kremlin-approved curriculum that praises Russian imperialism and glorifies the ongoing invasion of Ukraine while demonizing the entire concept of a separate and independent Ukrainian state. Any parents who dare to resist risk losing custody of their children.

The Kremlin is also accused of kidnapping tens of thousands of Ukrainian children from occupied regions and deporting them to Russia, where they are subjected to ideological indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian roots and impose an imperial Russian identity. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin due his personal involvement in these mass abductions of Ukrainian children.

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The actions of the Russian occupation authorities are entirely in line with the vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric coming from Putin himself and other officials in Moscow. Putin has long insisted that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Six months prior to the full-scale invasion, he took the highly unusual step of publishing a lengthy history essay that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood.

As Russian troops prepared to invade in February 2022, Putin sought to justify this act of international aggression by describing Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” He has since compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has declared occupied Ukrainian territory to be “Russian forever.”

The Russian establishment has enthusiastically followed Putin’s lead. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has stated that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” Meanwhile, poisonous anti-Ukrainian language has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.”

This week’s presidential decree threatening to deport Ukrainians from their own homes is the latest reminder that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no mere border dispute or attempt to address legitimate security concerns. It is a colonial war of the most brutal kind that aims to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. In the heart of Europe and before the watching world, Putin is openly pursuing policies that almost certainly meet the definition of ethnic cleansing and may qualify as genocide.

The grim reality of Russia’s invasion should weigh heavily on the US officials who are currently charged with drawing lines on maps and attempting to create a realistic framework for a possible ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine. While diplomatic compromises and temporary territorial concessions are now clearly inevitable, any future peace deal must also take into account the fate of the millions of Ukrainians who are likely to be left under Russian occupation.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Silencing Voice of America will only strengthen autocrats around the world

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 18:53:47 +0000

United States President Donald Trump has moved to shut down a series of prominent US-funded international media outlets including Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as he continues efforts to cut government spending and reshape US foreign policy. In a March 15 statement, the White House said the decision “will ensure that taxpayers are no longer on the hook for radical propaganda.”

Critics fear the move will strengthen the position of authoritarian regimes around the world while leaving millions of people in closed societies without access to independent information. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty CEO Steve Capus called the step “a massive gift to America’s enemies.” He warned that the shutdown would make the United States weaker and would be celebrated by “the Iranian Ayatollahs, Chinese communist leaders, and autocrats in Moscow and Minsk.”

Russian opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza was one of numerous activists from the front lines of the fight against resurgent authoritarianism to voice their alarm over the closures. For many people living in authoritarian societies, outlets like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have provided an objective and trustworthy alternative to what is often a heavily censored domestic information space. Kara-Murza suggested the demise of these outlets would be toasted in Moscow and beyond. “One more champagne bottle opened in the Kremlin,” he quipped.

As expected, the shutdown of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America was enthusiastically welcomed on prime time Russian state TV. Margarita Simonyan, who heads Russia’s flagship international media platform RT and state-owned media group Rossiya Segodnya, called the news an “awesome decision by Trump.” Meanwhile, fellow Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov took time out from fantasizing about a nuclear attack on Britain to mock the more than one thousand journalists now facing an uncertain future. “You are nasty, lying, deplorable traitors to the motherland. Go and die in a ditch,” he commented.

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For decades, authoritarian regimes ranging from Nazi Germany to Communist China have griped against the influence of US-funded independent media outlets, and have adopted various measures to try and block them. Voice of America was first set up in 1942 at the height of World War II, while Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was established in 1950 during the early years of the Cold War to provide uncensored information to people living behind the Iron Curtain.

Initially focused on radio broadcasts, these outlets and their numerous affiliates have evolved over time to become multimedia platforms reaching hundreds of millions of people every week. This has never been a purely altruistic endeavor; advocates maintain that providing access to objective information abroad strengthens the US position internationally.

Until their dramatic recent shutdown, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and many other regional pro-democracy platforms such as Radio Free Asia were all overseen by the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM). While often the subject of debate in the United States due to allegations of political bias and doubts over their continued effectiveness, recent studies have indicated that they remained widely recognized by international audiences as important sources of unfiltered information.

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Despite being funded by the US government, the network adhered to a code of journalistic integrity and objectivity similar to the charters governing the work of other state-funded media such as the BBC. This independence from governmental editorial oversight had on occasion led to issues with United States officials. Some within the Trump White House attempted to justify the decision to cut funding by claiming that these state-funded broadcasters had become overly politicized and were no longer representative of the values the new administration wished to project.

The international impact of the USAGM stable of media outlets is perhaps most immediately apparent in the number of journalists jailed or otherwise targeted by authoritarian regimes for their professional activities. At present, ten journalists and staff members from USAGM-affiliated outlets are being held in countries including Belarus, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Myanmar. Following news of the shutdowns, Ukrainian journalist Stanislav Aseyev posted that while imprisoned by Russian forces in eastern Ukraine, he was subjected to electric shock torture specifically because he had previously worked for Radio Liberty.

The timing of Trump’s decision to shut down the United States international broadcasting network could hardly be worse. In today’s increasingly multipolar world, the information space is an critical front in the escalating global struggle between rival democratic and authoritarian camps. This has long been recognized by China and Russia, with both countries committing vast annual budgets to support sophisticated international media activities in a variety of guises. The US was previously seen as the world leader in this soft power contest, but that is suddenly no longer the case. Generations of autocratic regimes never did manage to silence Voice of America, but the Trump administration has now done so themselves.

Mercedes Sapuppo is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A light in the darkness: Why RFE/RL matters now more than ever

Muhammad Tahir — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 15:34:50 +0000

It was in the middle of a bitterly cold night in 2014 when my phone rang. At first, I ignored it. Then came a second call, and a third. The persistent buzzing was enough to jolt me awake. When I finally answered, a distressed female voice met me on the other end.

“They’re kicking me out of my home. I have two kids. Nowhere to go. I live in Mikrorayon,” she said, her voice breaking under desperation. She was referring to one of countless Cold War–era housing blocks built by successive regimes across the Soviet nations. Behind her, frantic voices clashed.

I knew that sound well. It was the sound of fear.

This was not unusual. As the director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Turkmen Service, locally known as Azatlyk, I often received such calls—cries for help in a country where independent journalism is considered a threat.

Turkmenistan, like many of the authoritarian regimes RFE/RL has covered, was built on the iron grip of a single ruler. Dissent was crushed, voices silenced, and truth distorted. RFE/RL was for many the only major source of news free from government manipulation.

The woman on the phone, whom I will call Maya, was a young widow with two children, the youngest just six months old. That night, city officials had come to demolish her home under the national leader’s so-called “beautification” campaign in the capital city Ashgabat.

When she saw the municipal workers approaching her home, she slammed the door shut, pressed her back against it, and, in that moment of desperation, reached for the only thing she believed could bring hope and protection: RFE/RL.

After gathering details, we did the only thing we could: We made a call to the local municipality. It was a simple act of journalism. We asked why a young widow with children was being thrown onto the streets in freezing temperatures.

That call was enough. The officials withdrew—not out of mercy, but out of fear. It was fear that the leader of the nation might catch wind of the story—that, as in many similar cases, he might view it as a stain on his image and make those responsible pay the price.

This is the power of RFE/RL. It is not just a news organization, but a shield for those whose own governments have abandoned them. In Turkmenistan, as in many of the places the organization serves, there are no fair and impartial courts to turn to, no free press to expose wrongdoing, no way for many citizens to hold power accountable. Without RFE/RL, Maya’s story would never have been heard. And she would have been just another forgotten casualty of authoritarian rule.

In recent days, however, the Trump administration has raised the specter of a world without RFE/RL. On March 15, the US Agency for Global Media terminated the funding grant for RFE/RL, endangering the organization’s ability to provide journalism for millions of people who would struggle otherwise to get access to news that is not controlled by an authoritarian government.

What’s the price of truth?

The recent decision to cut funding for RFE/RL along with its sister networks—Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting—is not just a financial cutback. It is a major blow to the millions who rely on it.

For decades, these networks have signaled that the United States has not turned its back on those living under the rule of autocrats and radical extremists. They have served as a voice for the silenced, a bridge connecting the oppressed to the world beyond their borders.

RFE/RL’s annual budget was $142 million in fiscal year 2024. That is slightly less than the cost of three Apache helicopters, the same type of aircraft that was lost in large numbers over two decades of war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, with little lasting progress to show for it.

With that single investment, RFE/RL reaches nearly 47 million people each week, broadcasting in twenty-seven local languages across regions spanning from Russia to the Balkans, from Iran to Central Asia, and all the countries in between.

In the tribal regions of Pakistan, where the Taliban’s grip remains strong, the alternative to RFE/RL’s Pashto-language Mashaal Radio is what locals call “Mullah Radio”—an extremist-run broadcast spewing radical propaganda.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service exposed war crimes while Russian state media flooded the airwaves with propaganda. Now, as Russia tightens its grip on Central Asia and China expands its influence in the region, RFE/RL remains an important line of defense against a rising tide of disinformation.

Hope, even in darkness

When I first joined RFE/RL in 2003, it had already been the lifeline for millions behind the Iron Curtain for over half a century. I remember when former Czech President Václav Havel visited RFE/RL headquarters. He spoke of growing up under communism, of listening to RFE/RL in secret, and of how those broadcasts carried the hope that one day freedom would come.

Havel wasn’t alone. Generations of dissidents, reformers, and ordinary citizens across Eastern Europe and Central Asia have similar stories. They drew strength from the words they heard in the media outlet’s broadcasts.. And when the Iron Curtain finally fell, they didn’t just see journalists at RFE/RL—they saw the voices that had never abandoned them.

Now, if the voice of RFE/RL and its sister networks is silenced, then what will fill the void? Chinese state media? Russian disinformation? The Taliban’s “Mullah Radio?” These forces have long pursued this outcome—weaponizing intimidation, censorship, harassment, and violence. Yet so far they have failed. The leaders of Iran, China, Russia, and Belarus are likely cheering the position in which these channels now find themselves. With no counterbalance, the propaganda of these regimes could go unchecked.

This outcome also would contradict the Trump administration’s own stated commitment to free speech, depriving millions of access to independent journalism. In many of its broadcast regions, RFE/RL remains one of the last sources, if not the only source, of truth.

History has shown that when free media disappears, oppression often takes its place.

For Maya, and for the millions like her, RFE/RL must endure.

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former RFE/RL executive who dedicated eighteen years to advancing independent journalism and press freedom in some of the world’s most restrictive environments.

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Inside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s diplomatic offensive with Syria’s Christians and Ismailis

Gregory Waters — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 17:48:44 +0000

Shortly after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) drove Bashar al-Assad out of Syria last year, the group pledged to respect the rights of minorities. Yet, since HTS took control over much of the country, some across the international community have raised fears that Syria’s new leaders—with their jihadist backgrounds—might erode minority rights or exclude these communities from the political transition process. These fears have been newly flamed by the massive, targeted violence against Alawites on Syria’s coast during the second week of March. Nevertheless, there have been some signs for optimism about the inclusion of at least some minorities in post-Assad Syria.

This analysis draws on my conversations with members of these groups as well as HTS leadership over the past several years as a consultant with the International Crisis Group and an independent researcher. The people I spoke with were granted anonymity given the tenuous security situation in the country and their ongoing political work.

There are legitimate reasons for worry, specifically about the future of the Alawite community. In March, Alawite insurgents linked to the former regime launched a coordinated attack against security forces. Government forces, independent armed factions, and Sunni vigilantes mobilized in response, engaging in nearly four days of mass executions, killing more than six hundred Alawite civilians and detained insurgents. The insurgency by ex-regime elements is still ongoing.

This violence and the state’s inability to control both its own forces and the independent forces has reignited fears over minorities’ safety, but these devastating events should not be viewed as indicative of the fate of other minorities. The violence is rooted in the fact that, over Syria’s brutal civil war, Alawite men formed the core of the regime’s fighting forces and intelligence apparatus and that the Alawite sect has come to be linked to the regime via both Assad’s policies and Sunni extremist narratives. These political and social dynamics do not apply to other minority groups.

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For the other minority groups, there are positive indications that they will be included in post-Assad Syria. Even before entering Damascus, HTS had been reaching out to Syria’s minorities in Idlib for sensitive, but successful, diplomatic engagement for five years. Christian leaders in Idlib told me in a meeting in 2022 that HTS had consistently reached out to them, first through senior religious figures and then through dedicated political attachés. HTS appointed these individuals—and thus engaged with these communities—directly, rather than through the Syrian Salvation Government that HTS and other opposition groups had formed to administer Idlib. These political attachés came to serve as advocates for the local communities, representing their demands to the Salvation Government and HTS security forces.

Through this, Christians in rural Idlib gradually regained control over their homes and farms and restarted public prayers. Additionally, security forces halted attacks on Christian communities. The engagement process was long and arduous, and, as HTS leaders told me in 2022, early on they were fearful that they’d face backlash from hardliners and populists in Idlib. However, as the years passed and the Christian community grew ever more integrated into Idlib’s society and the local government, HTS’s fears gradually ebbed.

Growing from this experience, HTS engaged with Syrian community and diaspora leaders just days into its final military offensive in late 2024. This diplomatic offensive helped ensure that HTS could sweep through Syria without taking many minority regions by force. The discussions, which took place primarily during the first week of December last year, resulted in a particularly strong relationship between HTS and Syria’s Christian and Ismaili minorities and also ushered in a new era of relations with groups previously seen as close to the regime.

A diplomatic offensive, from Nubl and Zahraa . . .

For example, the collapse of the regime in Aleppo in November last year spread panic through the nearby Shia towns of Nubl and Zahraa—once lynchpins of the regime’s defensive lines. Local Facebook pages claimed that two thousand Shia civilians had fled their homes, seeking shelter first in Aleppo and then in the town of Safira, where Hezbollah and Iran had built a strong militia network. By December 1, Safira came under at least partial opposition control, and regime forces abandoned the displaced people, resulting in widespread panic on Facebook over the fate of the civilians. On December 2, negotiations officially began between HTS and leaders from the displaced community to return them to their homes in Nubl and Zahraa, according to what an individual who facilitated the talks told me.

The negotiations began after members of the displaced community were able to reach one political activist living abroad, who told me that he helped establish a line to HTS’s political bureau and helped mediate. This initial experience quickly evolved into a small, multi-sect organization of activists representing a range of communities still under Assad’s rule—particularly the Ismaili-dominated cities of Masyaf and Salamiyah—all eager to assist in the peaceful handing over of their communities.

. . . to eastern Hama

This diplomatic approach expanded as HTS advanced on northern Hama. The city of Salamiyah, lying east of Hama, played a crucial role in the regime’s defense as it hosted the headquarters of several important regime militias operating in the countryside. But it also had a vibrant revolutionary movement dating back to the 1980s, particularly led by its Ismaili majority. “Ismailis have always opposed the regime,” one Ismaili activist told me, “but we work through political and civil means, not arms.” Salamiyah is also home to the Syrian National Ismaili Council, which supports and guides the Ismaili community across Syria. These factors opened the door to negotiations with HTS.

I spent several days in Salamiyah in early February, meeting with National Ismaili Council leader Rania Qasim and other security and civil society officials in discussions about the negotiations and resulting relations with HTS. According to Qasim, on December 2, HTS’s political bureau contacted her to initiate talks. The talks were led by Qasim and a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation, an international Ismaili humanitarian organization. The negotiations also included a coordination committee formed by the Ismaili Council’s Emergency Operations Center. Qasim told me that she and the other leaders of the negotiations saw themselves as participating in such talks on behalf of all communities across the Salamiyah region, not just Ismailis.

According to Qasim, the discussion focused on the fate of regime fighters in the region and on how HTS would enter the city of Salamiyah. The council, according to the people I spoke with, refused to provide cover for any criminals in the city, agreeing instead to HTS’s general taswiya (settlement) policy—employed nationally after the fall of Assad—that saw a grace period for all armed men to turn in their weapons and receive temporary civilian identification documents, but it did not provide them with blanket amnesty. In return, it was agreed that pro-regime fighters would lay down their weapons while HTS units simply drove through the main street on their way south to Homs. The coordination committee also agreed it would send a delegation to the outskirts of Salamiyah to meet the HTS convoy and escort them through the city.

These negotiations marked a significant first step in HTS’s relationship with the Ismaili community in Salamiyah. According to Qasim, the council spent the three-day negotiation repeatedly announcing to Salamiyah residents, “the council and the community will not fight; if you want to fight, it will be your own decision.” This message was carried even to some of the most infamous Alawite villages, such as Sabburah, where two pro-revolution Alawite ex-political detainees then worked within their village to ensure the local fighters agreed to lay down their weapons. Yet the Ismaili Council itself has never been affiliated with any armed faction and had no communication with regime military leaders; Qasim emphasized that at no point did they negotiate with or on behalf of any armed regime faction.

Instead, HTS leaders had to trust that the Ismaili Council had the influence needed to pacify the regime militias and ensure HTS’s safe entry into the city and surrounding villages. In fact, there was only one small skirmish—in the village of Tal Khaznah, on the road south to Homs—but otherwise, the handover of eastern Hama on December 4 was peaceful, local security officials and members of the Ismaili Council told me. According to Ismaili leaders in Salamiyah and Tartous, the Assad regime responded to these rapid negotiations by sending security officials to the Ismaili Council in Tartous and threatening them, telling them that their relatives in Salamiyah were “traitors.” However, the regime collapsed before these officials could follow through on any threats.

I was told that throughout this three-day negotiation period, other negotiations also took place on a more individual basis. Opposition fighters from both HTS and other factions who were from Salamiyah had begun reaching out to friends and families in their villages. One young commander remembered calling his family as his unit approached eastern Hama and asking them to connect him with the village’s mukhtar, telling me, “why would I want to risk fighting my father or brother?” He now leads a general security detachment in the countryside around his mixed-sect village, where he sees himself as bound to protect all locals no matter their sect.

The handover of the Salamiyah region was only the beginning of talks between HTS and the Ismaili Council, according to the Ismaili leaders I spoke with. The national council oversees seven regional branches, including ones in Tartous and Masyaf. With the regime still in control of western Syria, the Ismaili Council began negotiating on behalf of communities there. For its part, HTS ended its operations on the Masyaf front the same day it liberated Hama city, pausing its westward advance at the edge of the Ismaili- and Alawite-inhabited foothills. Ismaili leaders also told me that they began to share their positive experiences engaging with HTS with their contacts in the heavily pro-regime Christian towns of Muhradeh and Suqaylabiyah, which had ceased fighting but remained besieged by HTS. Those towns quickly concluded their own negotiations, which saw the peaceful entry of HTS units.

A foundation for a new Syria

The initial negotiations appear to have laid a strong foundation of trust that has extended beyond Salamiyah. According to the head of the Tartous Ismaili Council, HTS’s local military official met with the council the day after entering Tartous. The council was then invited to a general meeting between local representatives and HTS officials, was given a new line of communication with HTS’s political representative, and finally was welcomed to meetings with the new administrator of Tartous governorate. All of this evolved over just ten days. As one Ismaili official in Tartous described it to me, “It seems that the new government truly respects and has a special relationship with the Ismaili community. This came as a huge shock because we had never spoken with them before and had the same fears as the Alawites until December.”

HTS’s diplomatic offensive demonstrates the leadership’s political approach, which evolved over years of engaging with the Christian and Druze communities in Idlib. HTS leaders had justified these new policies to me years ago as a political necessity for one day governing a country as diverse as Syria and for legitimizing the movement among minority communities who only knew of the organization from its days as an al-Qaeda affiliate, then called Nusra Front. This understanding that Syria cannot be ruled as an Islamist Sunni country (but instead must be led as a country of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds) has begun to shape the post-Assad era—at least at a local administration and security level.

The initial Salamiyah negotiations laid a strong foundation of cooperation that has continued to grow, ensuring the Ismailis across Syria “feel confident we will be fully represented in the constitutional process,” as a leader from the Tartous office told me. In Salamiyah, the Ismaili Council now plays a central role in the region’s administration, facilitating civil-political engagement, running a volunteer security force to assist local police, and hosting a security committee consisting of both civilian and military representatives to address security gaps and any violations committed by government forces.

Such relations have grown even stronger in the coastal city of Qadmus. According to two local Ismaili activists I spoke with, a small Ismaili volunteer force has been supporting the undermanned government police forces in Qadmus since December. Government forces have even provided these volunteers with small arms, while a new Ismaili-run local council has worked closely with the regime-era mukhtar—also an Ismaili—to coordinate services and administration with the HTS-appointed regional director. The council has also engaged in outreach with the Alawite villages around Qadmus, serving as a bridge between the new local administration and the Alawites.

Despite these efforts, their close relationship with the new government has made the Ismailis in Qadmus a prime target for pro-Assad Alawites, who killed two Ismaili security volunteers in late February and an Ismaili Council member and two government police officers on March 6. When the March uprising began, the Ismailis tried to protect the government forces in the town, eventually negotiating for their safe exit from the area after being besieged by insurgents. However, as a result, they faced widespread threats—by Alawites both in person and over WhatsApp—for “siding with the government,” local residents told me. Security forces eventually peacefully reentered Qadmus, and according to the locals I spoke with, the experience has only strengthened their ties with Damascus. Many Ismaili men have now volunteered to support government security forces, with at least some applying to become official security officers. Meanwhile, local security officials are discussing extending salaries to the entire volunteer force. Despite the events of the past week, the city’s local council continues to serve as an intermediary between local security forces and the Alawite villages, as the former works to negotiate the handover of weapons and wanted criminals.

Meanwhile, Christian civil society leaders in Syria’s tense coastal region also described a strong working relationship with local HTS-appointed administrators and security officials. Although they still have concerns centered on basic services, the economy, and the constitutional process, several activists and local Christian leaders told me in February that they did not fear direct attacks from the new government but rather worried about being caught in the growing violence between Alawites and government forces. Christian leaders across Syria were among the first men engaged by pro-opposition security forces in the days after Assad’s fall, with Facebook pages publishing pictures of meetings between military and political leaders and religious figures in rural Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. As the violence on the coast escalated in March, the head of Aleppo’s Catholic community, Bishop Hanna Jallouf, reiterated the importance of a united Syria, affirmed the good treatment of Christians across the country, and called for a continuation of efforts to fully integrate all minorities into the political process.

These new interfaith and civil-centric networks and relationships will play a central role in shaping post-Assad Syria. However, the new government should do more to engage and empower groups such as the Ismaili and the Christian communities. It should do so both on a local and an international level, by working with groups such as the Aga Khan Foundation (to give Ismailis assurances) and even the Vatican (to do the same with Christians). Such efforts would help expand the local trust built with these groups into genuine representation in Damascus and would give real reason for optimism about the future of Syria’s minorities.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, and a research analyst at the Counter Extremism Project.

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Nia joins Voice of America to discuss Iran’s human rights violations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:43:36 +0000

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Dijkstal quoted in Middle East Eye on the treatment of Ahmed al-Doush

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:42:38 +0000

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Pavia joins i24 News to discuss Tunisia’s crackdown on opposition figures and political opponents

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:43 +0000

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Asat quoted in ABC News on the deportation of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand to China

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:42 +0000

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Asat quoted in Breitbart on Thailand’s deportation of 40 Uyghurs

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:41 +0000

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Vladimir Putin does not want peace. He wants to subjugate Ukraine.

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 13 Mar 2025 20:54:16 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has offered an evasive initial response to US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire proposal, backing the idea in principle while listing a series of additional demands that make any meaningful progress unlikely. Officials in Kyiv will be hoping Putin’s reluctance to embrace the US-led ceasefire initiative will help convince their American colleagues that the Kremlin dictator is not genuinely interested in ending the war.

Many in Ukraine have been dismayed by recent US suggestions that Russia is ready for serious peace talks, and have pointed to the Kremlin’s consistently hardline negotiating position as proof of Putin’s determination to fight on. They argue that the current debate over possible compromises and territorial concessions reflects a fundamentally flawed understanding of the maximalist motives behind Russia’s invasion.

Ukrainians feel they have a far more realistic view of Russia’s true intentions. They are convinced Putin will never be satisfied with limited territorial gains because he is not actually fighting for land in Ukraine. Instead, he is waging a war against the very existence of a separate Ukrainian state and nation. This chilling objective undermines the entire concept of a compromise peace. Put simply, there can be no meaningful middle ground between Russian genocide and Ukrainian national survival.

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The Trump White House is not the first to misjudge the extent of Putin’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine. On multiple occasions, the preceding Biden administration declared Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a “strategic failure” while pointing to the extremely high cost paid by the Kremlin in terms of military casualties and economic damage. This practical assessment of the invasion assumes that Putin is guided and constrained by the same logic as his Western contemporaries. In reality, however, he is not.

While democratic leaders must worry about approval ratings and economic indicators, Putin has removed virtually all possible sources of domestic opposition and is free to focus on securing his place in Russian history. Since the early years of his reign, he has made no secret of the fact that he views the collapse of the USSR as a tragedy, and regards the post-Cold War world order as an injustice. Crucially, Ukraine has come to embody both of these grievances. Putin firmly believes he cannot hope to achieve his historic mission of reversing the verdict of 1991 and reviving the Russian Empire without first extinguishing Ukrainian independence.

Putin’s obsession with Ukraine has become increasingly apparent over the past two decades as his campaign to subjugate the country has escalated from political interference to military intervention. In 2004, his efforts to rig Ukraine’s presidential election and install a Kremlin-friendly candidate backfired disastrously and helped spark the Orange Revolution. Ten years later, he responded to another Ukrainian pro-democracy revolution by seizing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine.

In the years following the onset of Russia’s military aggression, it gradually became more and more obvious that the limited invasion of 2014 was not delivering the desired outcome of a pro-Russian Ukraine. On the contrary, Russia’s attack was only strengthening Ukraine’s commitment to turn westward and pursue a Euro-Atlantic future. Rather than acknowledging the counter-productive consequences of his military campaign, Putin chose to raise the stakes even further by launching the largest European invasion since World War II.

Over the past three years, Putin has become increasingly open about his intention to erase Ukraine altogether. He has declared occupied Ukrainian regions to be “Russian forever,” and has compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian ruler Peter the Great. Vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so normalized in the Russian state media that UN officials believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.” Meanwhile, throughout areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, Russia is systematically suppressing all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Despite the horror and trauma of the Russian invasion, Ukrainians have so far refused to back down. This defiance is a personal humiliation for Putin. It directly undermines his carefully crafted strongman persona, and makes a complete mockery of his insistence that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people.” Rather than securing his place among the most celebrated rulers in Russian history, Putin is now at risk of being remembered as the man who lost Ukraine.

Losing Ukraine is Putin’s worst nightmare. Ever since witnessing the collapse of Soviet power while serving as a young KGB officer in East Germany, he has been haunted by visions of people power movements overthrowing empires. This helps explain his increasingly violent opposition to the robust and often unruly democratic culture that has taken root in post-Soviet Ukraine. Since the 2004 Orange Revolution, he has viewed the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy as an existential threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s retreat from empire.

Putin knows that the invasion of Ukraine will define his entire reign and decide the future fate of the Russian Federation. While he may be prepared to discuss a strategic pause in hostilities if ceasefire terms can be made to favor Moscow, he will never accept the existence of a separate and genuinely independent Ukrainian state on Russia’s border. This does not mean that current US-led peace efforts are entirely futile, but it is vital to recognize that freezing the conflict along the current front lines will not be enough to end the war.

For decades, Western leaders have made the mistake of viewing Putin through the prism of their own political pragmatism, while underestimating the importance of his revisionist imperial ideology. After three years of total war in the heart of Europe, there is no longer any excuse for such wishful thinking. Putin has bet everything on the destruction of Ukraine and is confident he will be judged favorably by the tribunal of history. Unless he is deterred by the overwhelming might of the collective West, he will continue to wage war against Ukraine until he achieves his chilling goal.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 17:40:50 +0000

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US peace initiative can help bring Ukraine’s abducted children home

Kristina Hook, Iuliia Hoban — Thu, 06 Mar 2025 21:50:14 +0000

Among the many crimes Russia is accused of committing in Ukraine, few are as shocking as the mass abduction and ideological indoctrination of Ukrainian children. Ukraine has identified around 20,000 children subjected to forced deportations since the full-scale invasion began three years ago, but officials believe the true number of victims may be far higher. These allegations are so grave that the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest in March 2023 on war crimes charges.

Securing the return of Ukraine’s kidnapped children must play a part in the peace efforts recently initiated by US President Donald Trump. Speaking in February, Trump acknowledged that he was aware of the situation and said he could potentially persuade Putin to release the children as part of a negotiated settlement to end the war. “I believe I could, yes,” he told Fox News Radio host Brian Kilmeade.

Efforts to rescue the thousands of Ukrainian children held in Russia would likely receive strong public backing in the United States, including from Trump’s support base. Reverend Jason Charron, who prayed over Trump moments before his near-assassination in Pennsylvania during the 2024 election campaign, recently wrote to the US leader calling on him “to be a shield for the Ukrainian people and for the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children kidnapped by Russia.”

The Kremlin’s illegal deportations have also sparked strong bipartisan condemnation in the US political arena. Less than a year ago, a resolution slamming Russia’s “illegal abductions” as a violation of the United Nations Genocide Convention was passed in the US House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin, with support coming from leading Republicans including Speaker Mike Johnson.

Meanwhile, research backed by the US Department of State has provided grim details of Russia’s deportation operations and linked them directly to Putin. According to a report by Yale’s School of Public Health released in December 2024, Russian presidential aircraft and funds were used in a program to take children from occupied Ukrainian territories, strip them of Ukrainian identity, and place them with Russian families.

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Russia stands accused of instigating a large-scale, coordinated, and systematic policy designed to remove thousands of Ukrainian children from their homes and rob them of their Ukrainian roots via a network of camps and foster homes, where they are subjected to indoctrination and in many cases assigned new Russian names. Kremlin officials have attempted to justify the deportations by claiming to be motivated by wartime safety concerns, yet their actions still constitute violations of international law. Nor has there been any attempt to explain why children are subsequently brainwashed and forced to adopt Russian identities.

The abductions are causing profound harm to the victims, their families, and wider communities. The relatively few children who have so far returned to Ukraine have provided harrowing testimonies of their experience in Russia. Many have recounted being physically and mentally abused for their Ukrainian identity, or told that their family and country had abandoned them.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Presently, no international legal mechanism exists to facilitate the safe return of abducted Ukrainian children. However, the United States has many cards it can play in order to achieve this goal. US sanctions against Russia are not primarily linked to individual aspects of the invasion. Instead, they are focused on the illegal act of the invasion itself, which is in violation of the United Nations Charter. US negotiators can make it clear to their Kremlin counterparts that without the safe return of all abducted Ukrainian children, the Russian invasion cannot be considered over and sanctions cannot be lifted.

Sanctions could also be used to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to continue the abductions. The United States could follow the example of the British, who imposed targeted sanctions in late 2024 against individuals identified as “perpetrators of Russia’s forced deportation and brainwashing of Ukrainian children.” UK officials described the abductions as “a systematic attempt to erase Ukrainian cultural and national identity.”

By focusing on the distressing plight of the abducted Ukrainian children, Trump could generate much-needed international confidence in his peacemaking efforts. Meanwhile, given his close personal association with the mass abductions, Putin has the ability to stop this policy and order the return of Ukrainian children. With few public signs that Russia is committed to long-term peace, initiatives aimed at identifying victims and ensuring their return to Ukraine could serve as a key US demand to test this willingness.

Before sanctions are even partially lifted, the United States should insist on concrete steps from the Russian side to end the abductions and enable Ukraine to bring all the victims home. It should be made clear that this must be verified by independent monitoring mechanisms. If progress proves possible, this could serve as a first step toward addressing other grave human rights concerns such as the widespread torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians in Russian captivity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Iuliia Hoban, Ph.D. is an expert on children and childhoods in peace and security studies and the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for vulnerable populations.

Since February 24, 2022, reserves of the Russian Central Bank have represented the largest frozen pool of Russian sovereign assets. Kyiv has consistently called for their full transfer to fund the Ukrainian war effort and compensate for war damage inflicted by Russia. G7 countries have repeatedly reaffirmed their stance that the frozen assets will remain immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it has caused in Ukraine.

This position has effectively placed responsibility on Ukraine and Russia to negotiate a political settlement including war reparations. Over the past three years, significant work has been undertaken to elaborate legal grounds for the confiscation of the frozen Russian assets in Ukraine’s favor, but no decisive action has been taken to seize them outright.

Instead, as a temporary measure, Ukraine has received interest accrued on these funds, which were placed in deposit accounts in 2024. Additionally, G7 leaders agreed to provide a $50 billion loan to be repaid in the coming years using proceeds from the frozen reserves. This arrangement represents a substantial achievement. It has also fueled speculation that the Russian assets will remain untouched until the loan is fully repaid, which could take 10 to 15 years.

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The start of peace talks in Saudi Arabia, spearheaded by the United States, has shifted the political calculus surrounding the use of the frozen Russian funds. Potential proposals to channel them into Ukraine’s reconstruction, including reconstruction projects in Russian-occupied territories, would mark a striking departure from previous policy. While this would no doubt be framed as a pragmatic step toward resolving the conflict, many would see it as a major concession to Moscow.

At first glance, this approach may appear designed to set a balance between competing interests. In reality, it risks undermining the very principles on which the international response to Russia’s aggression has been built.

Since 2022, there has been broad consensus that Russia, as the aggressor state, bears full responsibility for the consequences of the war, including the obligation to compensate for all damages, irrespective of the circumstances under which they occurred. This has been reaffirmed in a UN General Assembly resolution, one of Ukraine’s key diplomatic achievements at the United Nations.

Any compromise that allows Russia access to its frozen reserves, even indirectly, would set a dangerous precedent for the division of responsibility over war-related damages. While some might argue that the money ultimately belongs to Russia and that partial access does not amount to a strategic loss for Ukraine, this perspective ignores a fundamental reality: These frozen assets were supposed to serve as leverage to compel Russia to accept its legal obligations, including reparations. Allowing Moscow to regain control over even a fraction of the frozen assets would weaken that leverage and allow the aggressor to benefit at the expense of its victims.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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The core issue remains clear. Any model for unlocking Russian sovereign assets must prioritize justice for Ukraine and the victims of Russian aggression. Allocating these funds to be used by the aggressor state without a formal reparations agreement would contradict the principles of accountability.

Since May 2022, Ukraine has consistently advocated for the creation of an international compensation mechanism based on the vision that victims of aggression must be the primary beneficiaries. The fate of the frozen Russian $300 billion has always been at the center of this process, as these funds were considered the main source for financing reparations. Under a framework led by the Council of Europe and supported by a coalition of international partners including the United States, a Compensation Fund could serve as the primary instrument for distributing these assets to those who have suffered direct harm from Russia’s aggression.

While the mechanism requires further refinement, supporters believe this format is the best path toward ensuring meaningful redress. The recently established Register of Damage for Ukraine, which is tasked with registering all eligible claims to be paid out through a Compensation Fund, is an initial step in this direction, demonstrating a tangible commitment to prioritizing victim compensation.

Transferring Russia’s frozen reserves to a future Compensation Fund appears the most logical and legally sound course of action. Moreover, the European Union, which administers $210 billion of the $300 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank reserves, reportedly backs the move. Without this transfer of assets, the entire idea of a reparations mechanism for Ukraine would be undermined.

While the operational details of any future decisions can be refined through multilateral negotiations with the participation of Ukraine and the EU, the guiding principles appear clear. These should include the use of frozen Russian assets to serve the interests of Ukraine as the victim of aggression. The primary purpose of these funds should be direct compensation for war damages suffered by Ukrainian individuals, businesses, and institutions. Meanwhile, any decision on their use must be grounded in principles of justice, ensuring that responsibility for war-related damages is not shifted onto Ukraine, and that a victim-centered approach remains at the core of the process.

Ivan Horodyskyy is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and director of the Dnistryanskyi Center for Politics and Law.

Egyptian senator: The mass displacement of Gazans will only fuel Hamas’s extremist ideology

Mohamed Farid — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 14:51:46 +0000

As negotiations for the second phase of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas approach, significant challenges are emerging mere days before the first phase’s March 1 deadline.

Despite the significant weakening of Hamas’s military capabilities after fifteen months of conflict, the group’s political control over Gaza remains intact, complicating any roadmap for postwar recovery. This deadlock largely stems from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s extended military campaign in Gaza and his government’s lack of any clear strategy for the strip’s day after. Netanyahu has failed to pursue a sustainable political path that could bring stability to Gaza and ensure Israel’s long-term security. Instead, recent rhetoric from Netanyahu’s government seems to have doubled down on the Trump administration’s proposal of displacing the entire Palestinian population of Gaza as a potential avenue to address the crisis. Any Israeli move in this direction would escalate the conflict, not resolve it.

Moving forward with the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza would only fuel support for Hamas’s extremist ideology and exacerbate tensions throughout the region. For a sustainable peace, the Israeli government must agree to a postwar governance framework for Gaza that provides an alternative to Hamas and allows Palestinians to govern themselves.

The absence of a postwar plan for Gaza

Since the war began, Israel’s primary objective has been to dismantle Hamas and secure the return of the hostages taken on October 7, 2023. While Israel has successfully degraded Hamas’s military infrastructure and eliminated some of its top leaders, the group continues to wield control over Gaza, raising questions about the effectiveness of Israel’s approach.

The main Israeli failure lies in the absence of a credible governance alternative for Gaza. Netanyahu’s rejection of any role for the Palestinian Authority in postwar Gaza has created a power vacuum that Hamas continues to exploit. Without a clear plan for Gaza’s postwar governance, the Israeli military effort alone cannot achieve long-term stability for the enclave or for Israel. US, Israeli, and regional leaders have all made clear that they view Hamas rule over Gaza in the war’s aftermath as unacceptable. This month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Hamas “pure evil” and said it must never govern Gaza again. Last year, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry described Hamas as “a faction outside the Palestinian consensus.” Yet despite this rhetoric, the failure to establish a viable alternative governing structure for Gaza risks prolonging Hamas’s control by default.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Instead of removing Palestinian civilians, remove Hamas

By Daniel B. Shapiro

Drawing inspiration from an approach that worked in 1982, US President Donald Trump should put forward a landmark plan to rid Gaza of the terrorist organization.

Conflict Israel

Netanyahu’s political calculations

With the fragile cease-fire hanging by a thread and mounting pressure from the families of Israeli hostages, Netanyahu appears to be prioritizing his own political survival over a sustainable peace settlement. Indeed, at various points during the current phase of the cease-fire, he has both threatened a renewed military offensive—despite the Israeli military’s claims in September that Hamas’s military wing had been defeated—and embraced Trump’s proposal for the mass displacement of Gaza’s population.

Further, Netanyahu appointed his close political ally, Ron Dermer, as the lead negotiator for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire, replacing Mossad head David Barnea. This decision centralized authority over the cease-fire talks within Netanyahu’s inner circle, giving him greater oversight and influence over the negotiation process and the flexibility to shape the narrative and outcomes of the cease-fire in a way that aligns with his political agenda.

Netanyahu’s direct involvement is particularly significant given his track record of altering cease-fire terms to serve his political interests, which has repeatedly led to the breakdown of prior rounds of negotiations. Prolonging the war in this manner has jeopardized the hostages, whose lives are further endangered every additional day they spend in Hamas captivity. This was made painfully evident by tragic incidents such as Hamas’s execution of six hostages, including American-Israeli Hersh Goldberg-Polin, in September, just days before Israeli forces arrived and discovered the victims’ remains.

Moving ahead with the plan for the mass displacement of Gazans would align with the hardline stance of prominent members of Israel’s far-right, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, a member of the Knesset who resigned as national security minister in protest of the January cease-fire agreement. Both figures hold significant sway over the stability of Netanyahu’s fragile governing coalition.

However, forcing civilians out of Gaza would neither weaken Hamas nor bring security to Israel. On the contrary, it risks intensifying radicalization and reinforcing extremist narratives, potentially destabilizing the broader region. By intertwining his own political survival with a dubious military strategy, Netanyahu’s approach threatens to further escalate regional tensions, making a sustainable resolution even more elusive.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Reconstruction will fail unless these two challenges are addressed

By Ahmed F. Alkhatib

Gaza’s reconstruction will require creativity and an understanding that there is no simple US real-estate solution for the strip.

Israel Middle East

How mass displacement would fuel radicalization

The argument for mass displacement is fundamentally flawed because it blames Palestinian civilians for Hamas’s actions. In reality, Gazans have suffered under Hamas’s authoritarian rule, where dissent is crushed and civilians are used as human shields.

The idea that Palestinians are a homogeneous block that supports Hamas is simply not accurate. The only Palestinian legislative election in which Hamas participated, in 2006, showed a divided electorate, with Hamas winning 44.45 percent of the vote and Fatah garnering 41.43 percent. Since then, Hamas has ruled Gaza by brute force and coercion after taking over the enclave militarily in 2007. More recently, an Arab Barometer poll that was conducted just before the October 7 terrorist attacks indicated that 72 percent of Gazans believed Hamas was corrupt while 44 percent expressed no trust in the group. Considering how brutally Hamas suppresses dissent, one can only imagine how low support for the group in Gaza really is. Further, nearly half of Gaza’s population is under eighteen, meaning Hamas is the only government many Palestinians have ever known.

Therefore, blaming the whole population of Gaza for Hamas’s actions is not just a moral failure. It is also a strategic mistake. It shifts the focus away from the real issue: Hamas’s reign of terror. Treating civilians as perpetrators rather than victims feeds extremist narratives, fueling radicalization and hatred. If the goal is to eradicate extremism, foster stability, and achieve long-term security for Israel, then the focus should be on freeing Gazans from Hamas’s oppression, not displacing them.

Displacement would spread Hamas’s influence across the region, solidifying its image as a “resistance movement” rather than exposing it as a failed terrorist entity. This move would inflame tensions across the Middle East, destabilize neighboring countries, and fuel anti-Israel sentiment around the world.

History shows that forced displacement breeds extremism. The Nakba of 1948 created generations of refugees who would became the backbone of militant movements. This includes the late high-ranking Hamas officials Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, both of whom were born in refugee camps in Gaza after their families were displaced during the Nakba. A similar mass expulsion today would reinforce the idea that violence is the only way to reclaim lost land, further entrenching cycles of radicalization.

Breaking Hamas’s grip

Defeating Hamas militarily is not enough. To truly end its control over Gaza, Hamas must be defeated strategically by degrading its legitimacy and freeing Gazans from Islamist authoritarianism. This cannot be achieved by weakening the so-called “Axis of Resistance” alone, but only by breaking Hamas’s grip on power.

Gaza’s reconstruction is impossible as long as Hamas controls the strip. The group has repeatedly manipulated international aid to build its military capabilities, fueling radicalization and extremism. Without a postwar governance framework liberating Gaza from Hamas’s influence, Gazans will continue to suffer under a humanitarian catastrophe.

This cannot be achieved through forced displacement or by obstructing efforts to establish a legitimate and credible alternative to Hamas. For long-term stability to be achieved, international actors must support the development of Palestinian institutions capable of effective governance. This requires fostering an Arab-led, Palestinian-owned transitional process with a nonpartisan, technocratic government that can implement the rule of law and carry out structural reforms in education, law enforcement, and media. Economic development initiatives must also be prioritized to reduce extremism by creating real employment opportunities.

Gaza’s reconstruction must be designed to empower civilians, not Hamas or its backers. The only way to defeat extremism is by offering Gazans hope, opportunity, and the means to govern themselves responsibly.

Netanyahu’s failure to agree on a clear day after plan for Gaza has prolonged Hamas’s rule and exacerbated the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians. By embracing mass displacement, he is not solving the crisis but escalating it. This strategy threatens to radicalize a new generation of Palestinians, solidifying Hamas’s narrative of resistance and fueling long-term instability.

Achieving security and stability requires a strategic shift from military dominance and displacement to cooperation with Arab countries, empowering Gazans through governance reform and economic opportunity. A credible political alternative to Hamas is essential for lasting peace.

Ignoring this will only perpetuate cycles of violence, deepen regional instability, and ultimately undermine Israel’s security. The future of Gaza lies not in forced migration but in breaking Hamas’s grip on power and creating opportunities for Gazans to build a better future.

Mohamed Farid is a member of the Egyptian Senate.

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Putin uses NATO as an excuse for his war against Ukrainian statehood

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 12:15:19 +0000

As speculation swirls over the possible terms of a US-brokered peace deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Kremlin is insisting that above all else, the future Ukraine must be neutral and demilitarized. This is nothing new. Vladimir Putin has been citing Ukraine’s demilitarization as his key war aim since the very first morning of the invasion. Demilitarization also featured prominently in abortive peace talks held during the initial weeks of the war, with Russian representatives demanding an approximately 95 percent reduction in the size of Ukraine’s army, which was to become a skeleton force of just fifty thousand troops.

Calls for a demilitarized Ukraine have remained a central feature of Russian rhetoric throughout the past three years of the invasion, and have been accompanied by demands that Kyiv accept permanent neutrality and rule out the prospect of joining NATO or concluding military alliances with any Western powers. Russian officials have also consistently stated that postwar Ukraine must be banned from receiving weapons or training from the West. Most recently, the Kremlin has rejected the idea of deploying Western troops in Ukraine as peacekeepers to monitor a potential ceasefire agreement. In other words, Putin’s preferred peace terms envision a disarmed and defenseless Ukraine with virtually no army of its own and no chance of receiving any meaningful military aid from the international community.

Putin may currently find it advantageous to entertain talk of peace, but his insistence on Ukraine’s unilateral disarmament reveals what he really has in mind for the country. The Russian dictator is obviously preparing the ground for the eventual resumption of his current invasion, which he fully intends to continue as soon as he has rearmed and circumstances allow. Why else would the demilitarization of Ukraine be seen in Moscow as such a priority?

No serious military analyst would argue that Ukraine poses a credible security threat to Russia itself. Likewise, no Ukrainian politician or public figure has ever harbored any territorial ambitions against their country’s far larger and wealthier neighbor. On the contrary, the sole purpose of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is to defend the country against Russian attack. The Kremlin’s emphasis on disarming Ukraine should therefore be seen as a massive red flag for the Trump White House and the wider international community that signals Putin’s determination to complete his conquest and extinguish Ukrainian statehood altogether.

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There are worrying signs that this is not yet fully understood in Western capitals. Instead, US President Donald Trump and senior members of his administration have recently begun shifting responsibility for the war away from Russia and echoing the Kremlin’s own longstanding efforts to blame the invasion on NATO expansion. Predictably, Russian officials including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have welcomed this dramatic change in the US position regarding the causes of the war. However, Russia’s whole NATO narrative suffers from a number of obvious flaws that should spark skepticism among even the most credulous consumers of Kremlin propaganda.

According to Putin, Ukraine’s deepening ties with NATO forced him to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022. In reality, Ukraine’s prospects of joining the alliance were virtually nonexistent at the time, and had not significantly improved since Kyiv was first fobbed off with platitudes at a landmark NATO summit way back in 2008. Even the Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 failed to produce any change of heart among alliance members, with key NATO countries including the United States and Germany openly expressing their opposition to Ukrainian accession. Indeed, on the eve of the full-scale invasion, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz assured Putin that Ukrainian NATO membership was out of the question for at least the next 30 years. This makes it difficult to accept Moscow’s claims that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations represented some kind of immediate danger to Russia.

There are also good reasons to question whether the Kremlin genuinely views NATO as a threat to Russian national security. Thanks to founding member Norway, the alliance has shared a border with Russia ever since its establishment in 1949. More recently, the accession of Poland and the Baltic states at the turn of the millennium dramatically expanded Russia’s shared border with NATO and placed the alliance a few hundred kilometers away from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This close proximity to Russia’s two biggest cities did not lead to any discernible rise in border tensions.

The most revealing evidence of Russia’s true attitude toward NATO came in 2022 when Finland and Sweden reacted to the invasion of Ukraine by ending decades of neutrality and announcing plans to join the alliance. Putin responded to this landmark decision by declaring that Russia had “no problem” with the accession of the two Nordic nations, despite the fact that Finnish membership would more than double Russia’s border with NATO, while Swedish membership would turn the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Putin has since underlined his indifference to this expanded NATO presence on his doorstep by withdrawing most Russian troops from the Finnish frontier and leaving this supposedly vulnerable border zone largely undefended.

So far, nobody has been able to adequately explain the glaring inconsistency in Putin’s logic. He appears to be unfazed by the presence of NATO troops along the Russian border in Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. And yet at the same time, he expects us to believe that the faint prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance at some point in the distant future is sufficiently alarming to justify the largest European invasion since World War II. Militarily, this makes no sense. The only reasonable conclusion is that Putin’s objections relate specifically to Ukraine and not to NATO in general. He knows perfectly well that the alliance poses no security threat to Russia itself, but does not want to risk a growing NATO presence that might prevent him from achieving his expansionist objective of subjugating Ukraine.

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While Putin moans to foreign leaders about the inequities of NATO expansion, when speaking to domestic audiences he is typically far more candid about the imperial ambitions that shaped his decision to invade Ukraine. For much of his reign, Putin has insisted that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly accused modern Ukraine of being a invented nation occupying historically Russian lands. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he published a rambling 5,000-word history essay that many likened to a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. During the first summer of the war, he compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great.

Putin’s frequent denials of Ukraine’s right to exist have set the tone throughout Russian society. Poisonous anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.” Meanwhile, senior Kremlin officials have sought to demonstrate their loyalty to Putin by echoing his vicious attacks on Ukraine. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has declared that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” These are not the words of rational politicians addressing legitimate national security concerns.

This genocidal rhetoric is being more than matched by the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin has been able to establish control, Russian troops have systematically detained local officials, military veterans, journalists, religious leaders, civic activists, Ukrainian patriots, and anyone else deemed to be a potential threat. Thousands have disappeared into a vast network of prisons amid a climate of fear that has been described by Britain’s The Economist as a “totalitarian hell.” Many more, including thousands of children, have been subjected to forced deportation and sent to Russia. Those who remain are being pressured to accept Russian citizenship, while all reminders of Ukrainian statehood, culture, and national identity are being methodically removed. Needless to say, anyone who dares speak the Ukrainian language risks severe punishment.

These horrors make a complete mockery of attempts to appease the Russians with limited territorial concessions. US negotiators need to recognize that Putin is not fighting for land. He views the current invasion in far broader terms as an historic mission to erase Ukraine from the map of Europe. In Putin’s chilling worldview, extinguishing Ukrainian statehood is a vital step toward the reversal of the Soviet collapse and the revival of the Russian Empire. He has pursued this messianic vision with increasing violence ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, and is now closer than ever to realizing his goal.

This is why peace negotiations with Russia must focus primarily on establishing long-term security guarantees that are sufficiently credible to convince the Kremlin. Anything less will be viewed in Moscow as yet more proof of Western weakness and interpreted as a tacit invitation to go further. After all, that has been the pattern ever since the Russian invasion first began in 2014. Putin’s campaign to destroy Ukraine has been gradually unfolding in plain sight for over a decade and already ranks among the worst crimes of the twenty-first century. If Western leaders choose to ignore this and push ahead with a bad peace while leaving Ukraine without the support and security it needs to survive, they will be complicit in all that follows.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Damon quoted in Fars News on the process of medical evacuation of Palestinian children

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:33 +0000

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Alkhatib joins TRIGGERnometry to discuss his life story

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:22 +0000

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Alkhatib joins i24 News to discuss the humanitarian conditions in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:13 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in Jewish News on his Gaza views

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:12 +0000