Both the negotiations and military operations against the SDF have relied heavily on the relationships the new government has built with the international community in general, and the US government in particular. These relationships are a result of a strong focus in 2025 by Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani on re-connecting Syria to the international world. Now, in 2026, Syria’s government must turn inward, prioritizing further domestic reforms and improvements. Chief among these are continued security reforms, economic development, and writing a new constitution.

Changing domestic perceptions

On November 25, thousands of Alawis took to the streets across western Syria. It wasn’t just the first Alawi demonstration since the fall of Assad; it was the first time the community had voluntarily held a protest to voice their demands in Syria’s modern history.

One resident of rural Jableh described the event to me a few days later with a proud smile on his face,“ I am fifty five years old, during my entire life any protest here was forced by the regime,” he said. “Yesterday was special, it was by our own free will, we said our demands and returned to our homes relaxed.”

The demonstrators had three demands: rejecting sectarianism, releasing the Alawi soldiers captured during the final weeks of Assad’s reign, and implementing federalism in the coast. The demonstrations were guarded against Sunni counter-protestors by the new government’s General Security Forces.

In the hours and days afterwards, many Alawi activists and residents of the coast—those who did and did not participate—spoke to me with pleasant surprise about the security forces’ professional conduct. Other commentators noted that it was the first time in Syria’s history the government had protected people criticizing it.

“So many were terrified of how the government would respond,” remarked a media activist from rural Jableh, “but we made our speeches and we were safe, and now the area feels relaxed for the first time.”

Several Alawi activists who had previously distrusted security forces told me that the day was a potential turning point in how they view local government forces.

“We trust the Ministry of Interior now, even if we don’t trust the government politically,” added the activist.

It was a stark change from the first months after Assad fell, when members of the nascent General Security forces were frequently accused of robbings and beatings, engaging in sectarian harassment, and at times executing Alawi civilians and ex-regime soldiers during raids on insurgents.

Their discipline in these most recent protests was a result of a year of reforms and institution building, reflecting broader developments across all Syrian ministries. This first year focused on rebuilding core state institutions, from security to basic administration.

Rebuilding government institutions

Outside of the public’s view, Syria’s new government spent much of its first year rebuilding the basic bureaucratic capacities of the state, which had been left gutted and derelict by the Assad regime. Regulatory agencies, courts, and basic services departments all needed to be repaired, staffed up, and streamlined. Critical but mundane state functions like water well licensing and civil registries took much of the year to rebuild. By the fall of 2025 many of these offices had begun functioning again, though often inundated with paperwork and requests from their communities.

In Homs, for example, the central court processes nearly two thousand cases a month involving administrative registrations such as property transfers, birth and death certificates, and marriage and divorce papers, a senior official told me in December. Of the twelve sub-courts across the Homs countryside, those in Palmyra and Qusayr remain non-functional due to physical damage while the courts in Talkalakh and Hassiyah are only partially functioning, having received only basic emergency repairs, according to the same official.

The massive task of (re)building the state forced the new authorities to adopt a pragmatic approach to employment. Most government employees today are the same people who were employed under the old regime. Even the Ministry of Interior (MoI) has retained non-Sunni administrative staff across several departments. Yet, every ministry still had to investigate and purge corrupt, regime-era employees or those who had criminal records, according to my discussions with officials from multiple ministries. Replacing these individuals with a qualified workforce has taken time. For the Ministry of Justice, it has been training a new batch of government judges and lawyers throughout the second half of 2025, with the first class slated to finish by early 2026.

Partial security reforms

These core state-building steps have begun to bear fruit in recent months. Governorate-level institutions have now expanded into the countrysides, and basic services like electricity have improved across both cities and the countryside (though to a lesser extent in the latter). Parallel to this, the new government had also undertaken the monumental task of creating new security and military forces. The MoI and Ministry of Defense (MoD) faced unique challenges and circumstances, each pursuing its own path and ultimately resulting in divergent outcomes. The MoI, responsible for civil policing and internal security, had to rapidly expand its forces while immediately dealing with the triple threat of ongoing Islamic State attacks, inter-communal and vigilante violence, and a growing ex-regime insurgency. The MoD, on the other hand, has had to merge dozens of armed factions with a long history of competition and violations against civilians into a single army.

Security reforms have been centered around internal accountability and coordination mechanisms. For example, Damascus formed the Military Police and Military Intelligence to monitor, investigate, and arrest security members implicated in crimes, and created additional command layers to strengthen command and control. Despite these structural improvements, Syrian opinions of the two security branches remain mixed. One year on, the MoI is generally viewed as responsive and professional, based on my months of fieldwork. Nearly every one of the activists and civilians that I have worked with over the past year have spoken about the improved professionalism and the positive engagement by most local MoI officials. Nonetheless, many remain unsure if this improvement is structural or simply, “a response to American pressure.”

Yet the army is widely distrusted due to its role in the March coastal massacres and July Sweida massacres. While its conduct has markedly improved during the fighting against the SDF in Aleppo and the northeast, many Syrians still distrust army units, especially compared to the MoI. Most army units have been pulled away from civilian areas, yet the presence of small bases on the outskirts of some rural areas remains a major complaint.

One man in southern Tartous governorate put concisely a feeling many have expressed to me in recent months: “Please just replace the army with general security checkpoints.”

Key goals in 2026

The first year of liberation saw the foundation laid for a new Syrian state. The two most important projects were the aforementioned security reforms and al-Sharaa’s tireless campaign to reconnect the country with the international community. Hundreds of diplomatic meetings in Damascus and international visits have succeeded in removing the final major sanctions against Syria and its leaders. Now, the country’s new government must prioritize three key domestic files: the economy, the constitution, and civil peace.

In September, I attended a meeting with al-Sharaa in which the president emphasized the importance of providing jobs and economic security to the entire country. Al-Sharaa has repeatedly linked economic development to social stability, something echoed by most Syrians I have met. Damascus is now largely unfettered in this pursuit as it enters its second year post-Assad, but it must begin to make tangible progress on the ground where most Syrians feel there has been little to no economic improvement.

The second most common complaint I’ve heard from Syrians is the lack of a new constitution or transitional justice for regime-era criminals. These two developments are directly linked and will likely be the two biggest milestones of 2026. Serious transitional justice steps have been delayed by the lack of a new constitution, as the current regime-era constitution lacks the necessary legal codes for trying regime officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Therefore, the first test will come when al-Sharaa appoints the remaining one-third of the People’s Assembly, whose first two-thirds were elected by committees across the country in August. The People’s Assembly will then be tasked with drafting a new constitution. The composition of the al-Sharaa-appointed third and the contents of this constitution will be closely judged and must reflect a commitment to equal rights under a civil state. Once ratified, this new constitution will allow for the full transitional justice process to unfold.

Despite the significant structural improvements that have been within government institutions over the past year, major fault lines remain within the society. These divisions are more nuanced than simple sectarian divides and are unique to each locality. For this reason, a local approach to national dialogue and inter-communal peace is required. The improvements that have been made within the MoI must be joined by improvements in local dialogues, particularly in coastal and central Syria, led by civil society and influential locals with the support of local security officials. These can take the forms of civil peace committees, civil councils, or civil and humanitarian work that brings together members of diverse communities.

Local security and political leaders will play a key role in addressing the grave security threats and civil strife prevalent across many regions. But their efforts are limited at times by ineffective or oppressive local officials, who can be damaging to trust building. This year should be one of local dialogue, both within communities and between them, with an expanded effort from the central government in Damascus as well as Syrian and international non-governmental organizations to work on social cohesion and civil peace. This requires consistent government engagement with local civil society as well as tangible changes on the ground regarding economic and security concerns.

The government would be remiss to view these solely as state-building files. Syria faces ongoing internal and external security threats exacerbating a fragmented society reeling from sixty years of Assad regime crimes. These three files are the foundations of Syria’s near future. Damascus should support the work of local and national activists, whether in civil peace initiatives or humanitarian outreach, to strengthen its approach to the constitutional drafting process and to local civil peace. Syria’s new government may feel confident in the real progress it has made in rebuilding the state after one year of liberation, but it cannot underestimate the difficulty it faces in gaining the trust of the country in year two.

Gregory Waters is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and writes about Syria’s security institutions and social dynamics.

The post Why Syria’s government must turn inward in 2026 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As of January 13, the Human Rights News Agency, a US-based human rights group, estimated that the death toll has climbed above two thousand since the start of the protests on December 28 last year. This is while the Iranian government, as it has done previously, enacted a complete internet blackout, where the entire nation continues to remain under the world’s largest digital prison.

“I saw snipers in our neighborhood—in all these years I’ve never seen such scenes,” said Sahar, a doctoral student in the Saadat Abad neighborhood in Tehran, in a brief phone conversation via Starlink satellite connection.

Her voice was more distraught than in our previous conversations earlier in the week. She also explained how, since Saturday, fewer people have been going on the streets. “At first, there were families, old, young, but now everyone’s terrified, given the bloodbath.”

So far, Tehran’s crackdown on the demonstrations appears to have turned into a bloodbath, in which the only victims appear to be ordinary Iranian people—those who for long have been paying the price of the brutality of the Islamic regime, topped with the global isolation resulting from decades of sanctions and pressure imposed by the United States and its allies.

Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump may have a real opportunity to be an effective dealmaker with Iran. However, if he is serious about a durable, win-win outcome for both the United States and Iranians, there is only one asset worth betting on: the Iranian people.

Today, Iranian society is more unified against the Islamic Republic than at any point since 1979. Nearly three weeks into the latest nationwide protests, this time ignited not by a single spark but by the country’s wider economic freefall, Iranians have taken to the streets in extraordinary numbers.

Speaking shortly before the regime’s blackout began, Sepideh, an Iranian journalist who has been arrested multiple times and isn’t using her last name for security concerns, explained how she believes Iran is at one of the “most dangerous junctures” in its modern history.

“There is zero possibility of reform within this regime,” she told me. “But history also shows that the [United States], the UK, and Israel don’t prioritize the Iranian people either—only their own interests. This is what makes me afraid of what’s coming.”

Asked about Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last monarch, she says with a deep sigh that “he has some supporters because there is no strong domestic opposition, as those voices have been crushed domestically over the years. But I struggle to believe in someone backed by foreign powers, tied to monarchy, and unable to form a coalition.”

Some others express a more fatalistic openness, including Sahar, who—prior to the internet blackout—told me how many Iranians “believe anything after this regime will be better. We want a complete separation of religion and state. This deck of cards needs to be reshuffled.”

These voices capture the nuances within the Iranian society today—united in its rejection of the Islamic Republic, deeply wary of foreign agendas, and desperate to reclaim agency over their own future.

For the United States, meaningful support for the Iranian people requires resisting the impulse to frame their uprising through the language of takeover or intervention, and instead prioritizing concrete protections for civilians in light of the brutal repression inside Iran. This means keeping Iran connected to the world, shielding protesters and journalists from digital isolation, and ensuring that accountability efforts target perpetrators of violence rather than a population already trapped between domestic repression and coercion from abroad.

Furthermore, it means treating internet access as humanitarian aid—funding circumvention support, satellite connectivity where feasible, and protection for independent journalists. This can help to ensure that the regime cannot repeatedly convert blackouts into a weapon of mass impunity.

An open, empowered Iranian civil society would not be a liability to US interests; it would be one of Washington’s greatest assets.

If the goal is to empower Iranians rather than freeze them into permanent victimhood, economic engagement must run alongside pressure on the state. This does not mean enriching the regime or reopening a flood-gate of funds to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-backed entities. Rather, it means expanding lawful, carefully assessed, people-to-people commerce that bypasses state hijacking and manipulation.

This includes enabling small and medium-sized Iranian businesses, freelancers, and entrepreneurs to access global markets; lifting travel bans for Iranian students, artists, medics, scientists and civil society members while banning entry to government-affiliated individuals; widening licenses that allow US and European firms to provide cloud services, payment rails, logistics support, and professional tools directly to Iranian users; and supporting diaspora-led investment vehicles that fund Iranian startups, cooperatives, and cultural industries without routing capital through regime-controlled entities. Such engagement gives Iranians income, skills, and stake—converting isolation into leverage and dignity rather than dependency.

Despite decades of sanctions, Iran has cultivated one of the most educated populations in the region and a resilient tech ecosystem that mirrors Silicon Valley’s platforms under far harsher conditions. Iranian youth have built local equivalents of Amazon, Uber, YouTube, and DoorDash with little capital and almost no global access. With the right engagement, Iran could generate trillions in long-term value—benefiting not only Iranians but also US businesses and consumers. A reintegrated Iran, charged by its people, would open a new frontier in trade, education, technology, and culture.

Meanwhile, none of this negates Iran’s military capacity. After more than four decades of isolation, Iran recently went head-to-head with the world’s most powerful militaries. Even Israeli defense analysts were surprised by some of its capabilities—proof that such sophistication does not emerge from a broken society. Beneath the Islamic regime’s aggression lies decades of scientific and technological investment made by the Iranian people themselves, who—if empowered and allowed self-determination—could become Washington’s strongest allies in the region.

Trump’s rhetoric amplifies the contradictions Iranians already live with. His warnings to Tehran and expressions of solidarity have landed with equal parts validation and fear. For some protesters, his words signal that their struggle is finally seen as entwined with an uncertainty of what’s to come. For others, Washington’s bombast risks giving the regime a pretext to paint the Iranian people’s unified dissent as foreign-engineered. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s accusations that protesters act “to please Trump” reveal just how threatening even rhetorical pressure can be to a regime terrified of losing control—one that’s now at its weakest point than ever before.

Iranians understand the stakes. They have watched Russia and China extract economic leverage from their isolation, and they fear becoming yet another bargaining chip. As Behzad, an Iranian journalist who is going by his first name for security purposes, told me, “everyone wants a piece of Iran. Sometimes I wish we lived in a poorer, smaller country; so at least we could live freely—far from domestic corruption and foreign interference.”

Still, across class, gender, and belief, Iranians remain united in one demand: the dismantling of the current regime. They do not ask the United States for bombs or saviors. They ask for surgical, effective, and thought-through support that enables them to reclaim their own agency in the absence of the current regime.

If Trump is serious about peace, stability, and a lasting legacy, the path forward does not run through air strikes or transactional deals with a failing theocracy. It runs through the Iranian people who, if given the chance, could build one of the world’s most dynamic democracies and one of Washington’s most valuable partners.

Tara Kangarlou is an award-winning global affairs journalist, author, and humanitarian who has worked with news outlets such as NBC, CNN, CNN International, and Al Jazeera America. She is also the author of the bestselling book The Heartbeat of Iran, the founder of nonprofit Art of Hope, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, teaching on humanized storytelling and journalism.

The post Voices from Iran: As rejection of government reaches all-time high, Iranians also wary of foreign intervention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The outbreak of violence killed more than twenty people, according to media reports, and displaced thousands of Aleppo residents.

It’s the latest iteration of conflict in a consequential and difficult year for Syria, as the country seeks to build stability after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and over a decade of brutal and factionalized civil conflict.

Our experts unpack why violence erupted, what it means for Kurdish and wider minority safety and integration under the new Syrian government, and how Washington is engaging.

1. What is the political and military background of this conflict?

On April 1, Damascus and the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG)-dominated SDF agreed on a localized integration arrangement covering the two SDF-held neighborhoods of Aleppo city. Despite the initial atmosphere of goodwill, SDF-affiliated Asayish forces that remained in these neighborhoods obstructed the implementation phase and refused to subordinate themselves to Aleppo’s Internal Security Forces, as stipulated in the agreement. 

On multiple occasions, Asayish units attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure, triggering violent clashes. Throughout this period, Damascus repeatedly agreed to cease-fires in an effort to preserve negotiations over the broader March 10 integration agreement with the SDF. However, after the deadline of the integration deal expired, final US-mediated talks in Damascus failed, and Asayish forces again targeted civilian infrastructure, and the Syrian army opted to launch a limited military operation.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

For the last fourteen years, the Kurds enjoyed de facto autonomy, and they currently control a large chunk of eastern and northeastern Syria. An agreement inked in March last year, which the Kurds reluctantly agreed to under immense external pressure, was meant to see the SDF and the Kurdish civilian institutions integrated into the Syrian state. It has effectively gone nowhere, with both sides blaming each other.  

The fighting in Aleppo broke out just days after negotiations stalled again and came to an end after external forces, notably the United States, intervened, preventing a potentially greater bloodbath. Turkey stated it would take action—if needed—on behalf of the Syrian government, and Israel threw its weight in behind the Kurds.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).

2. What does the withdrawal of SDF-affiliated units mean for stability in Aleppo?

The withdrawal does bring with it a sigh of relief for the residents of Aleppo. But taking stock of the destruction, for those who lost loved ones, it’s hardly a win. The days-long fighting further ripped open one of the many fissures that the Syrian government says it has been trying to repair as it attempts to consolidate power under Damascus. The Kurdish population—who largely remain wary of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government—might just prove to be the toughest to win over.  

While an even worse scenario has been avoided for the time being, if anything, the fighting is evidence of how much more work lies ahead for Syria and how its path to “stability” will not necessarily be free of suffering.

—Arwa Damon

3. What does the dismantling of the Kurdish military presence in Aleppo mean for SDF status in Syria?

Losing Aleppo weakens the SDF’s negotiating position significantly. Damascus will never support the SDF in retaining an autonomous military or administrative structure in the northeast, but al-Sharaa has repeatedly said that Kurdish language and cultural rights will be enshrined in the future constitution. The current government is already highly localized, and we will likely see the same model applied to the northeast with or without a peaceful integration of the SDF.

—Gregory Waters is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and writes about Syria’s security institutions and social dynamics.

4. How credible are government assurances of inclusion and rights protections to Kurdish communities?

The components of the new Syrian government have a mixed track record of treatment towards Kurds. The factions that came from Idlib, most notably Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, have no serious history of ethnic targeting of Kurds, while several Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, which now serve in parts of the new army, have been sanctioned for years for systematic abuses against Kurds in northern Aleppo. It is now up to Damascus to ensure these ex-SNA factions no longer abuse or exploit Kurdish communities.

—Gregory Waters

There were no reports of large-scale violations by government security forces during the fighting in the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiye neighborhoods, unlike the abuses that occurred in coastal areas or in Swaida last year. This demonstrates progress in managing security operations in areas where diverse communities live. Another episode of violence and killings would be too costly politically for Damascus. In Aleppo, security forces have been overall mindful to show that they are able to protect the Kurdish community.

—Marie Forestier is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She is also currently a consultant for the European Institute of Peace.

Related reading

MENASource

Jul 24, 2025

In a sectarian Syria, the winners should refrain from taking all

By Marie Forestier 

To avoid the complete supremacy of HTS-supporting Sunnis, it is crucial to adopt power-sharing mechanisms ensuring inclusiveness

Democratic Transitions International Norms

5. What does the Aleppo violence imply for future negotiations with other armed groups?

The issue in Aleppo is distinct from more general political or ideological dissent in Syria because it involved an armed group that controls territory. However, the government’s slower, methodical approach to the dispute this week, mixing continued diplomatic outreach with military pressure, shows a more mature leadership in Damascus compared to how it approached similar dissent in Swaida in July.

—Gregory Waters

Related reading

MENASource

Jul 22, 2025

Why the violence in my hometown, Swaida, goes beyond ‘rivalry.’

By Majd AlGhatrif

US officials described the events as “a rivalry” between Syria’s Druze and Bedouins. But this framing strips the crisis of its historical and political context.

Civil Society Conflict

The operation in Aleppo was not a response to dissent, but rather a consequence of the deadlock of negotiations. A significant part of the Syrian population would like to see Kurds and the northeastern region fully integrated into the new Syria. The positive outcome of the military operation in Aleppo—at least from the government’s perspective—and the way security forces managed it raise the question of a possible replication of a similar operation in other areas in the northeast.

—Marie Forestier

6. How does the confrontation fit into the broader Turkish-Israeli rivalry over Syria?

Israel and Turkey hold fundamentally opposing views on Syria. Ankara sees the evolving situation as an opportunity to promote stability through a strong and centralized Syrian state, while Israel views such an outcome as a strategic threat and prefers a weak and fragmented Syria. 

During the clashes in Aleppo city, both countries once again positioned themselves on opposite sides. The intensity and limited duration of the fighting did not allow for direct or indirect intervention by either actor. Nevertheless, Turkey publicly signaled its readiness to support the Syrian army if requested, while Israel called on the international community to protect the Kurds. This contrast underscores Turkey’s greater capacity to intervene in northern Syria, as well as the constraints on Israel’s options. 

In light of the outcome in Aleppo city, Turkey’s vision of a unified Syria appears to have scored a tactical victory. At the same time, the episode served as a reminder that Turkish-Israeli competition over Syria—rooted in irreconcilable strategic perspectives—will persist.

—Ömer Özkizilcik 

7. Where does the United States stand in all of this?

The escalation highlights two key realities for US policy in Syria. First, US mediation efforts aimed at facilitating integration and supporting a unified Syrian state have failed. Washington repeatedly brought Damascus and the SDF to the negotiating table and attempted to steer the process in a constructive direction, yet no breakthrough was achieved. 

Second, the crisis has created a new opportunity for the United States. The exposure of the SDF’s fragility in Aleppo city may increase its willingness to make concessions and accept Damascus’s terms. If Washington seeks to prevent a broader military escalation in northeastern Syria, it can once again convene talks and press the SDF to adopt a more pragmatic stance. Should the SDF demonstrate genuine willingness, the United States could play a constructive role in facilitating integration and rebuilding trust between the parties.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

Related reading

MENASource

Nov 21, 2025

Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks

By Merissa Khurma and Giorgio Cafiero

The decision is a shift in the country’s alignment—from Russian and Iranian spheres of influence to one in NATO and GCC regional orbits.

Democratic Transitions Middle East

8. Did disagreements among SDF factions contribute to the violence?

The exact degree of internal disagreement within the SDF—and the extent of central command control over Asayish forces in Aleppo—remains contested. Nonetheless, it is evident that multiple decision-making centers are involved. Following the escalation, Damascus and the SDF agreed, under international mediation, to evacuate all Asayish forces from the contested neighborhoods. Some Asayish units, however, refused to comply and instead chose to fight. 

According to Turkish intelligence sources cited in the media, this decision followed orders issued by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) cadres in Qandil, reportedly led by Bahoz Erdal. This suggests a rift between the Syrian branch of the PKK, which dominates the SDF, and the PKK’s central leadership in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq. 

A second layer of fragmentation became visible on the battlefield itself. While the Syrian army initially pursued a limited operation, cohesion within the Asayish ranks collapsed, with many fighters deserting or laying down their weapons.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

The post Eight questions (and expert answers) on the SDF’s withdrawal from Syria’s Aleppo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Although the protests are inspiring and potentially historic, some of the developments are being overshadowed by the United States. On January 2 (and again two days later), US President Donald Trump issued an unspecified threat to the regime not to use further violence against its citizens. It is admirable that the Trump administration is focusing attention on the Iranian people, but it is also inconsistent with the administration’s past decisions to cut funds for vital internet circumvention services in Iran and avoid speaking out against the regime’s human rights violations.

The United States should not miss this opportunity to reaffirm support for the Iranian people as a centerpiece of a more comprehensive approach to its Iran policy. With this context in mind, and drawing on our past experiences serving in various capacities for the US government working on Iran—including during the Mahsa Amini protests—we authors suggest a few key policy recommendations.

Recommendations for the United States and its partners

1. Pause all major non-protest-related policy initiatives. Now is not the time for renewed nuclear negotiations or military strikes. The Biden administration famously paused negotiations about resuming the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action during the protests in response Mahsa Amini’s death. This does not mean diplomacy is dead, but any hypothetical nuclear talks between Washington and Tehran need to be postponed indefinitely. This is also not the time for Israel (or the United States) to restart military attacks. The Iranian people deserve the time and space to see these protests through. In June, the Iranian government benefited from an ill-conceived Israeli strike on Evin prison that attempted to liberate, but ended up killing, a number of prisoners. It is vital to not give the government a similar propaganda victory. 
2. The US government should designate a new Iran envoy. The Trump administration should immediately name or designate an envoy or senior official to engage with the Iranian diaspora and to more broadly focus on all aspects of Iran policy full-time. Regular engagement with this community and other Iran-focused government and nongovernment contacts is important to emphasize that the administration is serious about the Iranian people. This individual would not replace US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff but would report to him and other senior officials who remain focused on wider-ranging issues. Full-time attention on the portfolio would also help provide an internal advocate within an administration focused on budget cuts for low-cost, high-reward spending to advance a broader Iran policy, such as internet circumvention funding.
3. Partner governments should fund Iran initiatives that the administration ended. At the height of the Mahsa Amini protests, thirty million Iranians used US-funded circumvention services. Some of these services are being temporarily funded by private enterprises. Over the long-term, they require consistent support from a government entity. The same is also true of the Iran human rights programs that the current administration proposed cutting in its entirety in the Congressional Budget Justification. If the administration does not reconsider its cuts, other foreign governments would have an opportunity to pick up the technical and moral leadership that the United States has relinquished.
4. The international community should unite in backing the Iranian people. We authors have heard directly from Iranians who participated in past protests that a unified signal from the international community not only helped buoy sentiment within the movement but also served as a deterrent against human rights abuses by the regime. For instance, Iran significantly decreased its executions of drug offenders following sustained international pressure. Joint statements, including those issued by the Group of Seven and United Nations, have the best chance of impacting Iranian behavior. 
5. Create a nimble emergency funding mechanism. During the Mahsa Amini protests, several Iranian advocacy groups suggested to us that there was need for urgent funding, and they proposed possible emergency initiatives such as setting up funds to help pay striking workers living wages. Although we supported these ideas, the Biden administration was not nimble enough to fully evaluate and fund them in a timely manner. The United States or other partner nations should consider establishing a fund or program to explicitly facilitate crisis response operations. If the United States is unable or unwilling to fund it, the Treasury Department should, at a minimum, issue (or reissue) guidance to allow private individuals and organizations quick and legal ways to send money to protestors.
6. Increase human rights sanctions. The United States and partner governments should move quickly to issue targeted sanctions against human rights abusers and those involved in the crackdown against protestors. The 2024 bipartisan MAHSA Act provides the Treasury and State Department with new sanction authorities. To date, not a single designation has been imposed under this authority. Implementing MAHSA sanctions now—ideally in coordination with actions from our foreign partners—would send a symbolic, but powerful, message that the international community condemns Iran’s crackdown on protestors. 

Recommendations for nongovernmental actors

1. Minimize partisan politics. Iran policy has long been a victim of brutal partisan politics in Washington. Support for the Iranian people should be an approach that both parties should be able to get behind, as it aligns with US interests and values.  
2. More constructive engagement with the diaspora. As admittedly non-Iranian Americans involved in Iran policy, we authors will never fully understand the intricacies of the diaspora. From our past experiences, the online and in-person abuse directed at other members of the diaspora and at proposed policies limited government-diaspora engagement, and hindered the diaspora’s ability to effectively advocate for policy changes.
3. Provide clear and tangible recommendations. During the Biden administration, then-Vice President Kamala Harris led efforts to support the Iranian people’s call for the regime to be removed from the UN Commission on the Status of Women. This was a direct result of lobbying by civil society. Once the Harris team had a clear recommendation and knew it aligned with US policy priorities and values, the United States successfully led the campaign to remove Iran from the Commission.

A final recommendation for everyone: Keep the focus on Iran

The Iranian people themselves are bravely leading the current protests. It is essential to keep the focus on them, rather than on Washington politics and social media, to ensure the Iranian people get the support they need at this critical juncture.

Abram Paley is an incoming nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He most recently served as acting special envoy for Iran from 2023 to 2025 and, before that, Middle East advisor to Vice President Kamala Harris.

Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council. He most recently served as director for Iran at the National Security Council in the Biden White House and a member of the Trump administration’s Iran negotiating team.

The post As Iran protests continue, policymakers should apply these key lessons appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The ongoing protests in Iran demonstrate the Iranian people’s courage, tenacity, and yearning for freedom. The protests also expose the Iranian government’s inability to meet the economic, social, and political demands of its people.
• It is not possible to predict how the ongoing protests will end, but the status quo in Iran is not sustainable.
• Protest size in Tehran, the development of a viable alternative, and regimes fissures will be key indicators to watch in determining the trajectory and effectiveness of the demonstrations.

WASHINGTON—The Iranian regime appears to be at its weakest point in its nearly half century in power. For the past two weeks, Iranians throughout the country have taken to the streets in protest over Iran’s deepening economic crises, stirring up memories of the Mahsa Amini protests of 2022-2023 and the Green Movement demonstrations of 2009-2010. This is compounded by a record level of inflation, a potentially existential water crisis, and an open admission from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that his government is incapable of meeting the needs of its own people. Moreover, these protests follow a series of strategic setbacks for the regime, including Israel’s near destruction of Iran’s foreign proxies, the Assad regime’s fall in Syria in December 2024, and the devastation of the twelve-day war in June 2025. 

Yet, this confluence of factors has been partially overshadowed by US President Donald Trump and his increasingly interventionist administration. Trump’s social media post on January 2 offering lethal protection to Iranian protesters if the regime cracked down on them was shocking even before this week’s events in Venezuela. Although I initially saw Trump’s post as a rhetorical and cost-free gesture, it cannot be dismissed entirely considering that the Trump administration was willing to attack Venezuela and arrest former Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro earlier this month. Indeed, Trump’s threat could increase turnout at the protests. In theory, hesitant Iranians might be more likely to protest if they might have some form of US support. 

As the protests continue, it is worth following several important indicators that may determine how they differ from past mass movements in Iran, what trajectory they may take, and what they might mean for the Islamic Republic’s future.

Mass protests are, of course, not new in Iran. They have played a critical role in shaping Iran’s modern political landscape, helping to bring the current regime to power in 1979 and consolidate its rule. In the 1990s, protests evolved to challenge the regime’s governance. The 1999 student protests and the 2009 Green Movement primarily focused on regime reform, with the latter adopting the slogan “Where is my vote?” Since the December 2019 Bloody Aban uprising, which began following an increase in fuel prices, there has been a significant shift in the tone and objective of protests. Initially sparked by social or economic issues, mass protests in Iran have morphed into broader and prolonged anti-regime demonstrations, with protesters increasingly chanting “Death to Khamenei!” 

Here is what to watch as the current protests unfold:

1. The size of the protests in Tehran

The 2009 Green Movement protests challenged the rigged presidential election and, for the first time in Iran, used social media to draw millions to the street, mainly in Tehran. Iran ultimately employed brutal repression and detained opposition leaders to quell the movement. Subsequent protests have had a wider geographic scope and more aggressive platform—revolution, not reform—but have not drawn the same volume of people to the streets. Absent massive, sustained protests in Tehran, it is difficult to envision the regime falling or making major changes.

2. Opposition unity and a viable alternative

There is no elected leader that the opposition fully supports who could take power immediately after a potential transition. Perhaps the imprisoned former official Mostafa Tajzadeh or the deposed Shah’s eldest son, Reza Pahlavi, could become a transitional leader following the fall of the current government. Pahlavi has a devoted following among certain segments of the diaspora and appears to have name recognition inside Iran, given some videos coming out of the country. However, he is also a controversial figure, and his supporters were partially blamed for sabotaging attempts to unify the Iranian diaspora opposition in 2022. Infighting within the Iranian diaspora has continued during this round of protests, but one interesting development is the near-unanimous perspective from social media that Iran will never be the same. Maybe that is progress.

Nonetheless, the lack of a viable alternative has undermined past protests in Iran. There may be a thousand Iranian dissident activists who, given a chance, could emerge as respected statesmen, as labor leader Lech Wałęsa did in Poland at the end of the Cold War. But so far, the Iranian security apparatus has arrested, persecuted, and exiled all of the country’s potential transformational leaders. 

3. Regime fissures (and defections)

Iran has done a masterful job maintaining regime unity and avoiding high-profile defections. Regime survival is always the paramount consideration, perhaps partially because the country’s leaders don’t have anywhere to go. Russia would likely harbor certain elites, as it took in Bashar al-Assad after his flight from Syria. But the mid-level security officials implementing the crackdown would have no safe refuge. This is why the work my Atlantic Council colleagues at the Strategic Litigation Project are doing is so important. Exposing and holding officials responsible for crackdowns raises the costs of individual actions. This may contribute to additional regime fissures and security defections in this round of protests.

All of this is to say that despite working on Iran policy for nearly twenty years, it is not possible to predict how the ongoing protests will end. I see the same images and reports as everyone else, and I can ask individual Iranians for their assessment. But I don’t know whether this is the protest that brings down the regime, or whether the Islamic Republic will be able to successfully repress these protests as it has done before.

Regardless, the protests are important. They once again demonstrate the Iranian people’s courage, tenacity, and yearning for freedom. The protests also expose the Iranian government’s inability to meet the economic, social, and political demands of its people. They are a clear directive sent up from the streets and heard around the world that the status quo in Iran is not sustainable.

The post What to watch as anti-regime protests engulf Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 9th, 2025, Global China Hub Assistant Director Caroline Costello published an op-ed in Foreign Policy about China’s role in fueling illegal logging in Africa.

The post Caroline Costello in Foreign Policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

New president, new pressures

José Antonio Kast will head to La Moneda in March 2026. Chile’s president-elect won the second round of the election with 58.2 percent of the vote—winning by a margin of more than 16 percentage points. The day after the election, Kast met with outgoing President Gabriel Boric and emphasized afterward that he will advance a “government of national unity on priority issues: security, health, education, and housing.”

Kast will enter office with a slew of economic pressures in his inbox: slow growth, weak investment, stagnant productivity, high inequality, limited social mobility, and regional gaps. The labor market remains segmented, with low female participation and high informality. Along with these economic pressures, security and rising crime rates dominated the electoral campaign and addressing them will be central to Kast’s government plan.

In 2024, Chile’s economy showed signs of stable but uneven recovery, with moderate 2.6-percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth driven largely by mining, easing inflation, and falling poverty, while unemployment and informality remained elevated and investment growth lagged. Looking ahead to 2026, growth is expected to remain steady at 2.6 percent. Alongside a narrowing fiscal deficit and inflation stabilizing, this suggests a macroeconomic environment that is steady but still dependent on restoring investment momentum.

Chileans want to see changes and expect Kast to deliver some economic wins quickly. But the ability to do so goes hand in hand with addressing the increased rates of crime and violence. Kast’s campaign focused on the security of the country with proposals such as his Plan Implacable,  which aims to “restore state authority and curb organized crime” through tougher penalties, more federal control over prisons, and stronger security operations, while also reasserting state authority in areas where criminal networks have expanded. This plan might be among the things on which Chileans want Kast to take action first. However, Kast and his administration need to balance what they want and what they can actually get done, especially regarding migration and deportation.

A challenging congress

The first one hundred days of the Kast administration will test the executive’s ability to move legislation that supports faster growth, rebuilds investor confidence that has been weakened by security concerns and political fragmentation, and signals a clearer economic direction.

That said, Kast takes office with a congress that leans right but does not give him full control. Right and far-right parties aligned with Kast hold seventy-six of the 155 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, with his second-round opponent Jeannette Jara’s left and far-left coalition of Unidad por Chile controlling sixty-one. The swing party of Franco Parisi, Partido de la Gente, holds fourteen seats.

Kast will need a simple majority to pass most legislation. But constitutional amendments and reforms of the electoral system would require two-thirds of votes in the congress. Kast’s coalition cannot reach either threshold on its own, and must work with partners to move any major bill forward. This makes the Partido de la Gente especially important. Because no bloc controls a majority, its fourteen deputies are in position to decide whether a proposal advances or fails. Its votes can tilt negotiations, shape the final text of legislation, and determine how governable the next term becomes.

Passing legislation through the lower house will be easier, but major legislation such as Kast’s proposed mass deportations will need broader support. The evenly split senate will require him to work with the traditional right as well as swing actors to move legislation. As such, Kast will be faced with increased pressure to deliver short-term results on crime and economic growth, signaling early whether his administration can translate public demand for order and stability into a more predictable environment for investment, something US investors typically look for before committing capital in Chile.

How Chile’s investment environment has shifted

Since the mid-1980s, Chile has implemented significant reforms that opened its economy and encouraged foreign investment. These included changes in the financial and social markets, such as Law No. 20.848 of 2015 establishing the framework for foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as other tax and labor reforms. However, social unrest in 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic, two failed constitutional reform attempts, and rising crime have affected investor confidence.

The foundation for investment in Chile lies in democracy, rule of law, and a predictable regulatory environment. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has indicated that Chile’s growth might be reaching a ceiling, making continued reforms—such as streamlining permits, encouraging innovation, digitalizing paperwork, simplifying regulations, and removing bottlenecks—essential for reigniting momentum.

What makes Chile an attractive destination for US investors

Several conditions strengthen opportunities for US investment in Chile. Together they shape a more attractive environment for long-term investment is likely to be a priority for the incoming Kast government.

• Chile is a key tech hub in Latin America. This is because of its stable economy, strong startup ecosystem, skilled workforce, advanced digital infrastructure, and government-backed innovation programs. Successful tech projects require a strong and solid workforce. According to CBRE’s Scoring Tech Talent 2025 report, Santiago has the third-highest tech talent pool in Latin America, with more than 143,000 professionals. This positions Chile as an attractive hub for companies to expand. That said, most initiatives are heavily concentrated in Santiago, emphasizing the need for additional training in both the northern and southern regions to ensure successful new project implementation.
• US companies benefit from working with reliable local partners, in part because Chile has clear rules for contracts and strong institutions and because local firms usually have long experience navigating permitting, local procurement, cultural nuances, and sector-specific regulations. These conditions create an environment where these partnerships give foreign investors a dependable base of support on the ground.  
• Investors trust Chile because its infrastructure is strong, and its politics stay steady. In 2024, Chile received $15.3 billion in FDI, one of the highest inflows in recent years. A big share of that comes from reinvesting earnings, which shows that companies already in Chile are confident enough to expand. The government agency InvestChile closed 2024 with a portfolio of $56.2 billion in foreign-backed projects, with US companies investing the largest share at $20.5 billion. Major investments target clean energy: green hydrogen, mining, and infrastructure. These numbers show that foreign investors, especially those from the United States, believe in Chile’s long-term stability and the clarity of its rules. They see a country where projects can start quickly and scale up, thanks to predictable regulations and reliable systems. That confidence in both infrastructure and political stability strengthens the case for more investment.

The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)’s mandate prioritizes investments in markets that offer predictability, stability, and clear rules, conditions that have historically made countries like Chile attractive for engagement. The DFC, a US federal agency, was created under the 2018 Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, which merged the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) with USAID’s Development Credit Authority. Its core purpose is to mobilize private capital to advance US development and foreign policy objectives by leveraging financial tools such as loans, equity investments, guarantees, and political risk insurance to support private-sector-led solutions in markets where commercial finance is limited or unavailable.

In December 2025, Congress reauthorized and modernized the DFC through the FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), extending its authorization through 2031, and significantly expanding its scope and authorities. Under this reauthorization, the DFC’s investment cap (Maximum Contingent Liability) was raised to $205 billion, and the agency gained new tools, including a $5 billion equity revolving fund and increased equity investment authority. The legislation also broadened DFC’s ability to invest in more countries and sectors while placing limits on financing in the wealthiest countries, ensuring that no more than 10 percent of its portfolio may support high-income markets, with specified sector exceptions such as energy, critical minerals, and information and communications technology.

While Chile’s high-income status means that large-scale DFC engagement is still limited compared with developing markets, the agency can support selected projects in strategic areas, including clean energy, critical minerals, infrastructure, and technology, particularly where there is a clear economic or strategic rationale and consistent with the statutory constraints on participation in wealthy countries.

Addressing bottlenecks to further FDI in Chile

Following the presidential election, Chile enters a new political phase with renewed attention on how the next administration will translate campaign promises into policy. Chile continues to take steps to strengthen its investment environment, while facing persistent bottlenecks that shape foreign investor confidence and will influence the country’s economic direction in the months ahead.

• Regulatory delays are a major concern and become impediments. Permitting and environmental review processes can take several years. However, the Framework Law on Sectoral Authorizations (Law 21.770)—better known as the Ley de Permisología, which creates the Framework Law on Sectoral Authorizations (LMAS)—was enacted and posted in September 2025. The goal is to update and speed up the permit process to encourage investment. The law creates a single digital portal called SUPER to manage permits simultaneously, introduces simplified procedures for low-risk projects, and establishes administrative silence. Streamlining and updating procedures are expected to drop processing times between 30 percent and 70 percent without lowering regulatory standards. This will also be a step forward for attracting foreign investment.
• Policy uncertainty remains a concern for long-term investors. Over the past decade, shifts between governments of the right and left have created questions about the direction of future regulations. Relations between Santiago and Washington are expected to further deepen under a new administration. Kast will need to show that he can meet public expectations for stronger growth and higher investment. Here, it’s critical to balance the demands of [JF1] parties across the political spectrum as this congressional balancing act is what’s needed to advance legislation reassuring to investors. Although Chile has struggled lately to attract FDI, the United States remains its second-largest source, with a strong presence in energy, data centers, and mining.
• The economy also plays a major role in the current political moment. Chile has experienced slow growth for several years and unemployment sits at about 9 percent. Investment remains stagnant, with inflation and high living costs shaping daily choices for many Chileans. Voters widely see the current government as falling short in addressing these issues. The national budget was also a central topic of conversation during the election. The legislative commission in charge of reviewing the annual budget recently rejected the proposal for 2026; Kast will now likely express his approach to next year’s spending plan in the short term. That said, his proposal of gradual elimination of property taxes on primary residences, starting with those on homeowners over sixty-five, would reduce government revenue, meaning the 2026 budget will need to account for this shortfall. The administration will need to balance funding public services and implementing the policy in a fiscally responsible way.
• Security is another major risk. While Chile remains relatively safe in comparison to select other countries, crime has risen in recent years—including organized crime, drug trafficking, and violence in northern regions and Santiago. Researchers estimate crime costs the country nearly $8 billion annually, discouraging some foreign investment. Kast made public safety a core part of his platform through the previous mentioned Plan Implacable, which includes tougher penalties for organized crime, high-security prisons, expanded self-defense laws, protections for law enforcement and judicial actors, and targeted border security measures with his Plan Escudo Fronterizo.

Sectors in Chile with investment potential

• Information technology (IT): Chile’s IT sector is expanding rapidly, driven by high internet penetration, widespread mobile connectivity, and growing demand for digital services. Key emerging sectors include fifth-generation (5G) deployment, big-data analytics, and artificial intelligence (AI) integration, supported by initiatives such as Chile Digital 2035 and the National AI Policy. To accelerate growth, Chile can build on existing programs by expanding Chile Digital 2035 and Digital Talent for Chile, increasing investment in digital infrastructure, scaling training and education initiatives, and deepening public-private partnerships to ensure broader access to advanced IT solutions, close the skills gap, and achieve full digitalization of public services.
• Critical minerals (copper and lithium): As the world’s largest copper producer, supplying 24 percent of global output, and home to 41 percent of lithium reserves, Chile is a strategic source of materials essential for clean technologies. These include electric vehicles, energy storage, and digital infrastructure. With public policies promoting sustainability and high environmental standards, Chile is positioning itself to attract investment that advances technological innovation, supports the global energy transition, and fosters inclusive economic growth. China currently dominates global demand for Chilean copper and lithium, but Kast could attract more Western-aligned investment by promoting legal certainty, officering incentives, and fostering partnerships with companies that meet high environmental and governmental standards.
• Water management and drought mitigation: Chile is increasingly leveraging public-private partnerships to improve water management and climate resilience. Investments focus on both traditional infrastructure, such as dams, and natural solutions including reforestation and wetland restoration. There is demand for technologies that enhance water efficiency, like advanced treatment and recycling systems, data-driven water management tools, and construction waste reduction. Sustainable agricultural practices that conserve water and lower input costs also present promising opportunities. Water management could become a strategic priority for Kast, with the advancement of such projects allowing the administration to deliver visible results, balance regional needs, and contribute to Chile’s robust agriculture sector.
• Seismic-resilient infrastructure: Situated on one of the most active fault lines in the world, Chile experiences frequent earthquakes, including several above magnitudes of eight. Critical infrastructure—such as ports, airports, and energy facilities—requires modern seismic design. There is strong demand for engineering and technology services in risk modeling, resilience planning, and early warning systems. Opportunities include digital twins, smart sensors, and integrated solutions to strengthen utilities, transportation networks, and urban development.

How can the new Kast administration help unlock Chile’s economic potential and attract investment?

• Visit Washington before the March 11 inauguration. This would reinforce Chile’s shared interests in economic security and investment cooperation, present project pipelines aligned with DFC priorities and clarify Chile’s commitments in areas such as energy transition and trade. Early engagement would allow Chile to secure a proactive position in shaping US investment decisions, demonstrate commitment to close cooperation with the United States, and build political support in the US Congress and executive branch for stronger bilateral financing ties. When in Washington, use the visit to generate broader public interest in the importance of Chile as a strong US partner.
• Identify emerging skills and priority growth sectors in Chile and encourage private-sector programs that link education directly to industry needs. Kast can do this by providing tax incentives and speeding up the processing of paperwork for companies involved in workforce training. Scholarships, vocational training, apprenticeships, and partnerships with universities that teach technical skills can help equip students and current workers with the skills required for mining, technology, energy, and other strategic industries.
• Maintain continuity in key policies on permitting reforms. This applies to policies such as the Ley de Permisología, which aims to streamline and coordinate environmental and sectoral permitting across government agencies, and they should be expanded to ensure that the ministries and offices involved are actively collaborating with each other. If government entities are not coordinating—for example, in the processing of environment permits—the procedures for key sectors such as mining and technology will continue to be delayed. Demonstrating consistency will reinforce Chile’s reputation as a stable investment destination and encourage both new and reinvested capital.
• Avoid over-centralizing these initiatives in Santiago. This can be done by collaborating with regional partners or established private-sector actors to develop and train local workforces. This could include local recruitment, training programs at regional universities, and ongoing partnerships between the government and private sector.

These measures strengthen security in ways that matter for investors by creating clearer rules, steadier institutions, and stronger local trust. When the government improves workforce training and expands formal job opportunities, it reduces pressures that fuel crime in regions tied to mining and energy. Better coordination on permits lowers chances of corruption or operational disruptions because companies face fewer conflicting decisions from different agencies. Together, these steps create a safer and more predictable environment for investors. 

Conclusion

Chile remains a trusted and stable partner for the United States. Its democratic values, institutional strength, and openness to trade make it a strategic destination for US investment. But sustaining and expanding this partnership will require continued economic reforms and political engagement between both countries to ease processes for doing business, improve regulatory efficiency, enhance human capital, and foster political stability toward a robust, long-term strategic partnership. As Kast prepares to take office, he has an opportunity to set a foundation to ignite Chile’s economic growth and attract investment. And with the Western Hemisphere as a top priority for Washington, Chile has the potential to be an even more strategic partner to the United States.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors alone. Some of the investment opportunities discussed in this issue brief were informed by an October roundtable discussion on US-Chile investment relations, which included the participation of US and Chilean private-sector leaders, public-sector representatives, and multilateral organizations. The roundtable was organized in partnership with AmCham Chile and with the support of MetLife. Neither were involved in the production of this issue brief.

Maite Gonzalez Latorre is program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

Learn more

The post First hundred days: How Kast can accelerate US investment in Chile appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Many political and security leaders remain unconvinced that employment should be its own goal or that employment is central to immediate security. While US President Donald Trump’s twenty-point peace plan for Gaza refers to employment in broad terms, it is only referenced as an outcome of investments and large-scale development, but employment is not viewed as a goal in and of itself.

For example, point number ten states that “many thoughtful investment proposals . . . will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for the future of Gaza.”

Gaza cannot function without guaranteed pathways to work. To disarm Hamas, there must be a fiscal strategy alongside effective street-level security. Most critically, the best way to undermine Hamas’s power on the ground is to employ the people Hamas pays today. Security requires a fiscal plan; in Gaza, Hamas controls labor, resources, and opportunity, eliminating competition. To break this chokehold, Gaza requires deliberate intervention to generate employment across sectors.

Hamas and Gaza’s employment crisis

Before the launch of war in 2023, Gaza already faced some of the worst labor conditions in the region. Hamas-led public sector employment accounted for nearly one-third of all those working in the Strip, according to the Ramallah-based Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. In 2017, the average monthly household expenditure in Gaza was 934 dinars, or roughly $1,300. Meanwhile, Hamas is paying young fighters up to three hundred dollars per month, according to Wall Street Journal reporting citing Israeli officials—an amount that pays for a crucial portion of those expenses. Additionally, the patronage network system of Hamas meant that those in the militant group’s networks were able to access aid, resources, and other market goods in a way that those unaffiliated could not, something that has continued throughout the war as well.

This meant that the few available jobs or reliable opportunities inside Gaza were disproportionately Hamas-affiliated—whether related to civil service or fighting. Against this backdrop, youth unemployment reached as high as 70 percent in Gaza, and overall unemployment reached 80 percent.

Today, close to 70 percent of Gaza’s population is homeless or displaced, with no clarity on when they will return to stable housing. This has made the need for new employment even more urgent.

When more than a million people have no work, no prospects, and no timeline for rebuilding their lives, the outcome is predictable: Many will return to the only functioning economic structure available, which is dominated by the Hamas-led network. Gaza’s geographic isolation exacerbates this, as the majority of Gazans have never left the Strip. Without jobs, mobility, or legitimate income, dependency becomes permanent.

If Hamas were no longer the leading source of employment, its patronage networks would weaken, reducing its control over communities’ access to salaries, goods, and services. Peacebuilding experience shows that employment changes daily incentives. People with families, stability, and predictable income see militancy as a high-cost and less rational choice.

Ignoring the central variable

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) belief that it has sufficient institutional capacity to rehabilitate Gaza, as its prime minister wrote recently in its economic plan, is troubling to most long-term analysts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Almost every major Arab country and Western ally has made it clear through numerous UN resolutions and diplomatic statements (including most recently in Trump’s twenty-point plan and the New York declaration by Saudi Arabia and France) that the PA requires significant reformation before it can take on control of Gaza.

In the PA’s recently released economic plans, unemployment is treated only as a minor humanitarian issue, rather than a development factor or as a central determinant of whether a cease-fire can hold or Gaza returns to terrorism and war. Specifically, the plan suggests providing $4.2 billion in cash assistance for food, supplies, minor reconstruction, and housing support. Yet, the plan’s development of employment schemes and workforce participation receives only $500 million—far short of what is required for serious job creation.

To underscore just how ill-prepared PA thinking is regarding employment outcomes, to match the current income provided by Hamas employment, the plan would need several billion dollars annually to enable workers to earn the same as they do now from Hamas coffers, as either civil servants or fighters. Yet the PA plan, similar to the Trump plan, does not explicitly focus on the details of making new workforce access available or on pursuing long-term job creation through strategic development, nor does it seek to put significant resources towards the goal of earned income. Instead, it commits Gaza to being an aid-dependent economy, in which international investors are expected to operate without a reliable labor force. This is a direct path back to patronage, dependency, and long-term instability.

Employment as a human rights and security imperative

In my book, What Role for Human Rights in Peacebuilding, I argued that peacebuilding has traditionally overemphasized political rights, institution-building, and security-sector reform while relegating economic, social, and cultural rights to a secondary status. Yet, human rights are interconnected and cannot be pursued as separate goals. Political participation cannot be realized when people are uneducated, unhealthy, unhoused, or unemployed. Civil and political rights must be linked to economic, social, and cultural rights for transitions to be viable.

The models often employed in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process do not address foundational gaps in economic, social, and cultural rights, especially in the area of long-term employment. Unless international leadership takes seriously the central role employment plays in deradicalization and stabilization, Gaza’s reconstruction will replicate past failures. Employment is a framework for disarmament, but only when sustained for the long term—not when limited to temporary per diem labor, food-for-work schemes, or short-term projects.

A sustainable employment paradigm must be put at the center of Gaza’s next phase. Many Gazans will explain, when asked, that many of the flanks of Hamas fighters are not driven by ideology but by predictable payrolls and access to goods for Hamas-affiliated families. Without a competing legal economy, Hamas will always have recruits.

Gaza needs macroeconomic and microeconomic development schemes that create market infrastructure capable of supporting the entire workforce. Education, vocational training, private-sector investment, and targeted upskilling can all generate meaningful employment. In Gaza, ignoring this is not simply poor economics. It is a direct security risk. This requires understanding the actual size of Gaza’s labor force, reasonable income targets, and priority sectors where workers can quickly enter employment with existing or modestly enhanced skills. Both public- and private-sector models will be required, with private-sector growth as the long-term engine of prosperity.

A full-employment-oriented mandate is not extreme government intervention, nor is it a call for the PA to dominate the labor market; rather, it should be defined as a strategy for long-term private-sector growth, carried out in partnership with and supported by public actors.

Impact on Palestinian sovereignty

Palestinian self-sovereignty requires economic independence and access to the world. One of the strongest inoculations against Hamas is broad access to markets and opportunities. Some of this will require long-term planning and sector-specific analysis, but many aspects are straightforward. For example, if private firms and the international community could employ Gazans to rebuild at even a slightly higher wage than Hamas salaries, stable employment could ultimately extend to swaths of the population, with Gazans able to support their families without using dollars tied to the militant group.

Sectors such as environmental rehabilitation, food production, education, medical care, infrastructure, and vocational services all require new labor. If a transitional authority seeks to meet the moment, it should invest heavily in private-sector job creation so that disarmament, deradicalization, and reintegration can begin.

Gaza’s next phase must recognize what weakens Hamas’s grip: economic independence and freedom of movement. Employment severs Hamas’s patronage networks by providing a reliable income not tied to armed actors. It rewires daily incentives, making militancy too costly for most people. The appeal of armed groups declines as economic opportunity expands.

Gaza’s future depends on far more than security forces or humanitarian aid. It depends on whether people see a path out of the rubble that is grounded in economic self-sovereignty, dignity, and the possibility of success. If security and political leaders ignore this reality, they will guarantee that the next war comes even while the debris of this one remains.

Melanie Robbins is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Realign For Palestine project.

The post Employment needs to take center stage in Gaza security plans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He recalls holding his wife as she recited the Tashahhud before the gas and the airstrikes that followed “erased all life,” and he later lost a second wife to another strike during the siege.

This September, sitting in his workshop that he rebuilt from the rubble, Khaled told one of the authors that he is working hard to restart the furniture business that once sustained his family. After years in Idlib and Turkey, he has returned to Eastern Ghouta—strictly driven by what he calls a “simple hope for peace and stability,” and a vow to “do whatever it takes to rebuild” his devastated town.

His suffering, he says, would be worth reliving “so long as it means I get to rebuild this country.”

One year since Assad’s fall and amid the steepest US development aid cuts in decades, Syria—a country that for over a decade was regarded as one of the worst humanitarian crises of the modern century—stands to have the most potential to showcase how local ownership, civil society, and a grassroots focus can accelerate reconstruction.

As is the case in many other parts of the region that have endured years of conflict, invasion, and destruction, Syria’s real infrastructure today is not physical, but human—the one thing that cannot be replaced, bypassed, or shortchanged by aid or the deficit of it. Syrian civil society must be a central architect to Syria’s rebuilding—not an afterthought to anyone’s investment. Today, the future of development rests not in big donor money or foreign aid but in a country’s most valuable asset: its people.

A 2017 State Department evaluation of Syrian civil society projects highlighted “local buy-in and ownership are key to project success in the short and long-term.” The evaluation recommended that there should be “consistent opportunities” for civil society organizations and grassroots communities to “provide input” to the project at hand from the get-go regarding community needs, training topics, and feedback throughout the project’s life cycle. For a country with a pre-war economy of roughly $60 billion, and whose physical reconstruction alone the World Bank now estimates at around $216 billion, Syria represents not just a humanitarian obligation, but a momentous opportunity to reimagine how investment, local ownership, and rebuilding can go hand in hand—setting an example for the rest of the Middle East and North Africa region, where tragically other conflicts linger in Gaza, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.

One year on from the start of life in a post-Assad Syria, the country faces a historic moment to set a regional example anchored in the most durable, valuable, and scalable asset of any nation, which remains its civil society.

Related reading

MENASource

Dec 7, 2025

One year after Assad’s fall, here’s what’s needed to advance justice for Syrians

By Elise Baker and Ahmad Helmi

The second year of a post-Assad Syria requires structural reform, victim-centered leadership, and international reinforcement.

Democratic Transitions International Norms

Rebuilding in Syria

In just the first few months since Syria’s emergence on the international stage, the country signed more than $14 billion worth of major investment agreements with regional and international companies—including investments from European donors, Gulf states (such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar), multilateral banks, and private companies that have moved into the country’s reconstruction sector. This includes the $5.8 billion in grants and loans pledged at the 2025 Brussels conference to the expansion of economic engagement with Turkey, the hundreds of millions of dollars in new Gulf-backed port and industrial-zone deals that are still a fraction of the roughly $216 billion the World Bank estimates full rebuilding will require.

Saudi Arabia, whose de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman is a key backer of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, signed forty-seven investment agreements and memorandums of understanding at the July 2025 Saudi-Syrian Investment Forum. Most of these investments are focused on rebuilding Syria’s infrastructure across various sectors, including transportation and construction—especially residential—as well as energy, maritime, and industry.

However, what’s indispensable to any form of sufficient, scalable, and sustainable development is that these public and private actors treat local Syrian councils, civic organizations, educators, and technicians as co-designers, facilitators, and contract partners.

Civil society as Syria’s greatest asset

These sectors provide a unique opportunity for engaging local actors in Syria. This includes the civil society organizations and community leaders that played a prominent role in maintaining basic services and key development projects amidst the horrors of the country’s civil war.

The White Helmets represent a key example. The humanitarian grassroots organization was formed in Aleppo and the surrounding countryside, saving civilian lives under perpetual airstrikes and shelling by the Assad regime and clearing the rubble and debris afterward, all at a time when no international aid could reach them. Their role grew into successfully repairing roads, reconnecting water networks in rebel-held districts, and providing key services to Syrians, including health and training to local community members.

It therefore came as no surprise that their founder, Raed Saleh, was appointed to Syria’s new cabinet as minister of emergencies and disaster management when the new government came to power. Today, he is bringing his decade-plus experience and community networks to the entire country.

In the northern Idlib province, previously ruled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—the Islamist militant group that ultimately broke with Assad’s rule—various civil society organizations such as Kesh Malek, the Mazaya Women’s Organization, and the Violet Organization for Relief and Development provided educational and literacy support, women’s empowerment initiatives, teacher trainings, vocational training, and civic-leadership programs designed to prepare the next generation of Syrians to rebuild their country.

In Duma, a suburb of Damascus that endured years of siege (including the deadly April 2018 chemical attacks claimed to be executed by the Assad regime), people such as Ameen Badran, an activist and local community council member, started arranging garbage pickups and today continue to engage in reconstruction efforts even after al-Sharaa’s government appointed a mayor.

Similarly, in Zabaadni, after the fall of Assad, English teacher Alaa Zain Al Den told one of the authors that “the trauma on us was so much that we don’t even know what to do with this newly found freedom and joy.”

“However,” he added, “what we do know is that we want to rebuild, we want to start our work—the work that was taken from us.”

Today, Syria’s education system lies in ruins, with over half of the five million school-age children currently out of school and around seven to eight thousand schools damaged or destroyed across the country. This educational breakdown underlines why rebuilding must rely on local knowledge and community-rooted institutions that only Syrians, with firsthand awareness of what their neighborhoods truly need, can design. This is one sector that incoming investments should focus on as it helps to develop a new generation of Syrians for a revived economy.

Alaa and many hundreds of educators alike remained in Syria through the war. Expelled from his government teaching post in 2017 after refusing conscription into Assad’s army, Alaa spent years in limbo, unable to find stable work as the economy collapsed. The cost of that decision was immense. For years, he lived in hiding, while his brother was arrested during the war. Alaa’s family found out recently that his brother was killed in prison. Despite the scars, he and other teachers now hope for a chance to return to their classrooms and rebuild a broken educational system.

“Reconstruction in Syria will be meaningless if it is not built on the lived experience of Syrians themselves. Our communities know exactly what was destroyed—and what it takes to rebuild in a way that lasts,” said Anas, another educator who works in the same school as Alaa in Zabadani.

Private sector-led workforce development

These are just a few examples of some of the individuals, grassroots organizations, and local initiatives that have the experience, local knowledge, and networks to work with the private sector—both Syrian and international—to effectively contribute to this essential rebuilding process.

Where there is a skills gap, especially in technology-heavy sectors, companies investing in Syria must commit to training and up-skilling Syrians, not just as future employees, but as future managers, executives, and leaders. This requires a workforce-development formula that moves beyond traditional international-aid models and instead places private enterprises at the center of project design, implementation, and assessment, allowing their sector-specific needs to shape training pipelines and employment pathways.

A successful example of this approach is Jordan’s Luminus Technical University College (LTUC)—a private-sector–funded institution that reimagined vocational and technical education by linking all its programs directly to labor-market demand and employer input. Today, LTUC offers fifty accredited programs across twelve specializations, including information technology, engineering, creative media, construction, and health and safety—all fields that mirror the urgent reconstruction needs identified for Syria in assessments by the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme that emphasize shortages in skilled engineers, technicians, digital-economy workers, and construction professionals.

Local ownership of reconstruction initiatives brings with it core elements that may sound frivolous for international heavy hitters but are proven to be key ingredients of long-lasting success. Chief among these foundational pillars are local integrity and purpose, in addition to deep knowledge of a complex and multidimensional sociocultural context.

Hisham Tinawi—a once successful shopkeeper in Zabadani whose home was destroyed under heavy artillery and airstrikes—explains how “local communities possess the precise knowledge of the destruction and how to build viable solutions.”

He added that “those who remained inside the country possess accumulated field experience that no external party can replace; excluding them from the reconstruction process means excluding the truth from the picture.” Syrians see themselves not as bystanders to a new future that they paid for with their blood and tears, but as core partners in rebuilding.

“Effective reconstruction cannot be conceived without linking it to the voice of Syrians on the ground; we are not just beneficiaries but key partners with a clear vision of the future we want,” Tinawi told the author.

Today, investors—regional and global—must heed Tinawi’s advice and invest in education and workforce development training, as a start. Syria’s civil society remains its biggest asset and has proven ready and effective at rebuilding a Syria they so deeply deserve.

Tara Kangarlou is an award-winning global affairs journalist, author, and humanitarian who has worked with news outlets such as NBC, CNN, CNN International, and Al Jazeera America. She is also the author of the bestselling book The Heartbeat of Iran, the founder of nonprofit Art of Hope, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, teaching on humanized storytelling and journalism.

Merissa Khurma is the founder and chief executive officer of AMENA Strategies, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute, and a nonresident fellow at the Baker Institute. She formerly headed the Middle East program at the Wilson Center. 

The post Syria’s civil society must take center stage in reconstruction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is the first chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

Ghana’s signature achievement since the mid-1990s is the consolidation of civic and political freedoms and a competitive political order in which citizens, journalists, and civic organizations routinely hold leaders to account. The durability of this achievement is not a result of elite benevolence or political will but the product of a dense, independent civil society and a remarkably resilient independent media ecosystem. When governments test the boundaries of civic space, the response is often swift and organized; this social infrastructure is the primary reason Ghana’s civic and political freedoms have remained consistently strong for more than two decades. This context is reflected in the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes’ political subindex for Ghana, which sits well above the economic and legal subindices. In recent years, it sits in the low-to-mid 70s out of a maximum score of 100, a pattern that aligns with lived realities. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2024, an overwhelming majority of Ghanaians (85 percent) reported that they did not fear political violence or intimidation during the last national elections, a strong testament to the electoral freedoms that Ghanaians enjoy. Moreover, a majority (52 percent) expressed trust in civil society organizations, ahead of religious leaders (who are trusted by 49 percent). Only the military (trusted by 65 percent) ranks ahead of civil society organizations in Ghana.¹

The historical roots of this civic vigilance matter. From the anti-colonial mobilization led by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first post-independence president, and mass professional and student associations to later generations of advocacy groups and think tanks, Ghanaians have long treated resistance to state overreach as a civic obligation.

As formal unions of lawyers, teachers, students, and medical professionals gave way to contemporary civil society and independent media organizations and research networks—among them, the Media Foundation for West Africa, the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition, the Ghana Integrity Initiative, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, and many others, including subnational advocacy groups—the core impulse has remained the same: to protect and defend civic space, demand procedural fairness, and insist that those in power remain answerable to the public. This explains why the social reaction to efforts to undermine political freedoms is often met with resistance and why Ghana’s political openings have not been easily reversed.

Electoral integrity is a useful illustration of how these social checks operate. While the courts can usually be swayed by partisan crosscurrents when individual political actors are charged with corruption or other acts of impropriety, the dynamic is often different with election disputes. The vigilance of civil society and independent media organizations in monitoring and independently collating election results at the polling-station level often helps to provide credible evidence when electoral disputes arise. The volume and quality of that evidence strengthen adjudication, making it harder for judicial bias to gain traction and increasing the credibility of outcomes, even in contentious contests.² This distinction is important: While the administration of justice in ordinary (nonpolitical) cases is broadly reliable, the politicization of corruption cases can distort judicial behavior; election cases, by contrast, have benefitted from robust, external scrutiny that fortifies the work of the courts.

This juxtaposition points to the core challenge in Ghana’s performance on legal freedom: The judiciary’s structural vulnerability to executive influence, particularly through appointments to the High Court and Supreme Court. Observers can—and do—sort judges into partisan “buckets,” a perception that inevitably erodes confidence in the system’s neutrality. Survey data clearly show a deterioration of citizens’ trust in the judicial system in the last fifteen years, falling by 20 percentage points since 2011.³ Yet outside of high-stakes political cases, the courts tend to function competently and deliver justice with regularity.

Recent movement in the legal subindex has been mildly positive, driven in part by improvements in informality and, to a lesser degree, by steadier security conditions after the turbulence of the early 2000s. On informality, the government’s digitalization initiatives, including the introduction of national (and tax) identification (the Ghana Card) and a digital address system, have helped to identify and increasingly formalize informal businesses. Other initiatives, such as the institution of fee-free secondary education, opened opportunities for young Ghanaians to further their education instead of entering the informal economy. The National Youth Employment Program, although relatively less successful, helped to draw young entrepreneurs into more formalized activities. Finally, a surge of capital investments into construction, alongside an expansion in mining activities, has created demand for artisans, contractors, and allied tradespeople who transact in more formal ways than the street-level microenterprise typical in developing economies. The result is a measurable reduction in the prevalence of informality, a trend visible within the relevant component of the legal subindex.

The gradual strengthening of security owes more to internal stability than to a benign regional environment. Ghana’s northern border with Burkina Faso and proximity to Nigeria’s insurgency-affected areas create constant risks, and yet Ghana has avoided the cascade of instability that has afflicted parts of the Sahel. That relative steadiness, together with the normal functioning of everyday justice for nonpolitical cases, helps explain why legal freedom is trending slightly upward despite persistent concerns about executive sway over judicial appointments and decisions.

Corruption control within the justice sector is another area to watch. Across administrations, chief justices have consistently placed anti-corruption at the center of their institutional reform agendas, and recent executive appeals to rebuild public trust in the courts suggest continued political salience. However, these public commitments have not always translated into tangible reforms or outcomes. Public perception of judicial corruption remains high: According to the 2024 Afrobarometer survey, more than 40 percent of Ghanaians believe that “most or all judges and magistrates” are corrupt.⁴ The growing trend of presidents appointing loyalists to the Supreme Court has only reinforced these perceptions, contributing to Ghana’s relatively weak performance on the legal subindex. The ongoing constitutional review presents an opportunity to reform judicial appointments and promotions, tighten avenues for corruption, and strengthen judicial independence.

Ghana’s strong performance on elections, civil liberties, and political rights within the political subindex is tempered by weaker scores on legislative constraints on the executive, highlighting concerns about the effectiveness of institutional checks in practice. However, civil society remains uncompromising in defending democratic norms, including contesting attempts to erode these checks. The resulting equilibrium is not perfect—nor is it immutable—but it has proven remarkably resilient over the past generation.

Economic freedoms have followed their own trajectory, with a notable increase from the mid-2000s into the first half of the 2010s, a period that coincided with the broader “Africa Rising” narrative. This period was characterized by strong improvements in governance and economic growth, rising incomes, and a growing middle class. Consolidation of Ghana’s return to constitutional democracy commenced in the year 2000 with the transfer of power from the ruling party to an opposition party, which further boosted optimism in the country’s political and economic outlook. The new political leadership signaled a clear focus on improving the economy, and market openness and property-rights enforcement seemed to find firmer footing. Former President John Kufuor is remembered in this context for emphasizing macroeconomic health and business-climate improvements that many citizens experienced in their daily lives. The results of committed political leadership and effective economic management are reflected in the economic subindex and the other components such as investment freedom and property rights, starting in the mid-2000s.

The subsequent downturn around 2015 is worth noting. Rising debt-service pressures, coupled with a large budget deficit and high inflation culminated in Ghana going in for an IMF program; a similar pattern occurred around 2023-24 as reflected in the downward trend of the economic subindex. These patterns signal the fragility of gains when fiscal anchors are not backed by disciplined fiscal decisions—such as politically motivated increases in public spending during election years and subsidies on utilities and petroleum products, among others—and when investment freedom and property-rights expectations face credibility questions. These observations underscore that Ghana’s enviable political freedoms do not automatically translate into disciplined fiscal management or sustained economic openness. The freedom metrics capture this: The political subindex remains high, while the economic and legal dimensions fluctuate with policy choices that either reinforce or erode market institutions and democratic norms.

Trade freedom tells a more erratic story. Ghana’s trade policy framework has generally been open by regional standards, but the component’s volatility reflects the broader health of the economy and investors’ read on the policy environment. In periods of economic stress, policy consistency suffers, and openness on paper does not translate into confidence in practice. The trends in the data thus track not only tariff schedules and non-tariff measures but also the credibility of macroeconomic management, which is often punctuated in election years.

The trajectory of women’s economic freedom stands out as a major structural improvement. Around 2004, there was a steep rise in the economic subindex driven in part by a cluster of women’s empowerment policies of the Kufuor administration: free maternal health services, including postnatal care services that reduced a key barrier to women’s labor-market participation, and explicit efforts to expand women’s access to finance and enterprise support. Those initiatives may have helped to boost women’s economic autonomy and anchor a higher plateau that persisted in the years that followed. The component’s level has stagnated since about 2008 and hence leaves some room for improvement—but the rapid change around 2004 is unmistakable. Recent Afrobarometer survey data for Ghana show strong popular support for women to have equal rights to work as men. However, more than a quarter of Ghanaians (26 percent) identify employers’ preference for hiring men as the top barrier to women’s advancement, ahead of childcare (17 percent) and skills gaps (16 percent).⁵

Where do remaining constraints lie? First, land ownership: In Ghana,  community and family lands are predominantly controlled by male heads; women’s ownership and collateralization of land remain very limited. Given the economic value of land, women remain at a significant disadvantage that dampens entrepreneurship, constrains access to credit, and restricts intergenerational wealth transfer for women. Second, intrahousehold decision-making: In many households, women’s ability to take paid work outside the home remains mediated by male authority. These social and legal frictions are the kinds of de facto constraints that keep the Women’s Economic Freedom component below its potential despite the formal policy gains that started in the mid-2000s.

Evolution of prosperity

Ghana’s prosperity trajectory since the mid-2000s mirrors, in broad outline, the “Africa Rising” era: a period of macroeconomic optimism, improved governance, favorable terms of trade, and political stability across much of the continent. Between 2005 and the mid-2010s, the Prosperity Index registered a strong and upward trend, reflecting the robust growth in incomes and steady improvements in social indicators, even as inequality widened in the classic early-development pattern. Ghana rode this wave and, for several years, significantly outpaced the sub-Saharan Africa average.

The story of the income component is familiar but still striking in its local particulars. A large discovery of offshore oil in the late 2000s added a new driver to a commodity basket already weighted toward gold and cocoa. In the mid-2000s, when global commodity prices were favorable, Ghana’s growth accelerated sharply; in 2011, Ghana recorded a double-digit real GDP growth rate (about 11 percent), up from about 8 percent the year prior. Oil windfalls amplified these gains, though they also heightened exposure to volatility and raised questions about how resource-linked revenues were managed.⁶ The income component of the Prosperity Index captures this rise and the subsequent plateau, which has persisted over the last decade. Reversals are visible too, mainly coinciding with the two IMF interventions mentioned earlier, driven in large part by fiscal indiscipline during election years.

The inequality component of the Prosperity Index shows a rapid deterioration, especially from the year 2000. But the composition of Ghana’s inequality is complex. It is not simply a rural-urban story; it is also generational. Large cohorts of better-educated youth, especially those under thirty-five, struggle to find formal employment at scale, while older cohorts, who are relatively less educated, hold on to existing jobs.⁷ The consequence is an age-skewed labor market that expands inequality even as education levels rise. On the rural side, extensive reliance on small-holder agriculture—more than 40 percent of the population is engaged in subsistence farming—keeps cash incomes low. Climate variability has compounded these pressures, with shifts in rainfall and temperature patterns outpacing the seed and crop research needed to adapt. The Index’s inequality line captures the macro pattern, and the underlying micro-mechanisms are the youth (un)employment crunch and the persistent productivity trap of smallholder agriculture.

Environment and health are relative bright spots. The national push to switch households from charcoal and wood to liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking—especially the 2013 rural LGP promotion program—may have helped to reduce indoor air pollution and, with it, the number of respiratory and related illnesses. Additionally, the government’s 2021 Green Ghana initiative to plant five million trees nationwide to combat desertification signaled a strong commitment to environmental issues in the country.⁸ The behavioral transition and practical action on desertification probably account for the Prosperity Index’s environment component alongside CO₂ and other measures. On the health side, Ghana’s COVID-19 response benefitted from institutional memory and capacity developed during earlier West African epidemics. Ebola never crossed into Ghana, thanks in part to the region’s experience dealing with health epidemics. When COVID-19 broke out, pandemic protocols were quickly activated and enforced, which resulted in comparatively low infection rates and deaths and a health system that proved more resilient than many expected.

Education presents a more mixed picture. Policy volatility in the secondary cycle—oscillating between three- and four-year models—created confusion and capacity mismatches just as youth cohorts ballooned. Free, compulsory basic education expanded access, but in many districts infrastructure and staffing could not keep pace, producing “shift systems” and, in some cases, causing students to drop out before completing upper-secondary education. Because the Prosperity Index’s education component bundles mean years of schooling with expected attainment, the friction from policy oscillation and demographic pressure is visible at a level that remains middling despite long-run improvements.

Finally, informality also intersects with prosperity through the labor market. The government’s digitalization programs—the introduction of the Ghana Card, which links to individual tax identification numbers, as well as the digital address system—have expanded formalization of the national economy. Moreover, governments’ special initiatives to increase youth employment and a boon in the construction and mining sectors have pulled workers into the formal sector. These interventions should, in principle, raise tax revenues and improve public service availability and access over time. The hard question is durability: Formalization built on cyclical or enclave sectors may not last if investment slows or governance costs mount. The Prosperity Index cannot answer that question by itself, but its pattern—modest gains in prosperity with uneven distributional effects and vulnerability to macro slippage—point to areas where reforms might matter most.

The path forward

The economic, social, and political outlook of Ghana’s next decade will depend largely on the steadiness with which it improves core institutions and transforms its civic strength into predictable, broad-based gains. Moreover, aligning reforms to citizens’ stated priorities—jobs, public services, and integrity—can increase traction.⁹ The political foundations are relatively strong; the next important step is ensuring that the transparency and accountability mechanisms that guard the conduct of elections also insulate the justice system from partisan distortion in high-stakes cases. Judicial appointments will remain politically salient, but the deeper imperative is to tighten the system’s incentives so that corruption cases are decided on evidence rather than allegiance. Civil society and media can help—by maintaining the evidentiary standard that has worked in election disputes—but ultimately the judiciary must build a reputation for political impartiality that is strong enough to withstand executive pressure. The ongoing constitutional review offers a chance to implement a judicial reform agenda that delivers on this objective.

Economic management is the second pillar. The political business cycles are familiar by now: A new government comes to power and starts out with prudent fiscal management that boosts confidence and attracts investment, often resulting in an increase in the economic subindex. Then comes election time and fiscal indiscipline—such as excessive borrowing and indiscriminate public spending with weak fiscal oversight—erode confidence and investment freedom, triggering adjustment and decline. Breaking this cycle requires more than fiscal rules on paper; it requires political commitment to enforce them consistently and minimize politically motivated borrowing and spending. The 2015 and 2024 IMF programs are markers of what happens when that discipline falters. In the coming years, the goal should be to make investment freedom boring—i.e., stable, predictable, and insulated from the electoral business cycle.

On economic freedom, two structural agendas stand out. The first is women’s economic freedom. The 2004 leap tied to women-centered policies shows how targeted policy can permanently raise the ceiling of economic progress. The unfinished business is in property rights, especially land ownership. In areas where family land remains the norm and titles are controlled by male heads, women’s ability to own, mortgage, and leverage land is curtailed. Reform here is politically delicate, embedded in social norms and local authority structures, but the economic payoff could be enormous: more women-owned firms, better access to credit, and fairer intergenerational asset accumulation. The women’s freedom component of the Index offers a clear benchmark; moving from the mid-seventies to the high eighties would require not just programs but enforceable property rights.

The second is youth (un)employment. Inequality in Ghana increasingly wears a generational face;a cohort of better-educated young people cannot find formal, stable jobs in sufficient numbers. Policy tools here must focus on easing business entry, expansion in labor-absorbing sectors, and modernizing agricultural value chains so that rural youth are not confined to subsistence farming. Climate-smart research and extension services, reliable input markets, and storage and transport infrastructure can help farmers move up the value ladder—and should be paired with vocational pathways aligned to construction, light manufacturing, and services. Such an agenda could help to address the twin problems of rural low productivity and urban underemployment.

Strengthened legal freedom and rule of law can support both agendas if reforms focus on clarity of the law and the quality of bureaucracy. Where statutes are clear, predictable, and enforced uniformly, the transaction costs that push firms into informality will fall; where frontline administration is competent and corruption risks are contained, formalization becomes a benefit rather than a burden. Ghana’s recent sector-led formalization has demonstrated that workers and firms will choose formal channels when the opportunity set changes. The task now is to make those choices systemic: digital one-stop services for business registration and tax collection; credible and quick adjudication for commercial disputes; and incentives for small firms to formalize without fear of retroactive penalties.

Regional (in)security will remain a concerning external variable. Instability in parts of the Sahel and the enduring threat of violent extremism in neighboring regions create risks that Ghana has to grapple with. The country’s success to date reflects internal discipline and professional security services, but the calculus can change quickly as alliances and external funding priorities shift. Ghana’s democratic resilience—anchored in a vigilant civil society and robust private media—makes it better placed than many to navigate these shocks without sacrificing core freedoms. The imperative is to ensure that security responses remain proportionate and bounded by law, so that security gains are not purchased at the cost of civil and political liberties that have been the bedrock of Ghana’s democratic success story.

Geoeconomic partnerships will also shape the opportunity set for Ghana. Specifically, infrastructure that lowers freight costs—an inland port located up north with rail connectivity, for instance—has immediate appeal, and Ghana would do well by investing in this area. Engagements with Chinese state and private investors are often judged domestically on whether they deliver such tangible benefits; they are not, by themselves, read as threats to democratic credentials. The test for the next decade is to structure these partnerships transparently, align them with national priorities, and avoid governance concessions that have complicated infrastructure deals elsewhere. If done well, they can help stabilize economic policy by supporting trade freedom in practice, not just on paper, and by attracting private investment that widens formal employment.

The prosperity side of the ledger will hinge on two slow-moving but decisive social investments. The first is education system reliability. When secondary school terms oscillate, cohort planning collapses; when seating capacity lags enrollment, “shift systems” lead to lost learning and early exits. The policy objective must prioritize stability: a curriculum and cycle length that survives political alternation, infrastructure that grows with cohorts, and targeted support to keep marginal students—especially rural girls—through upper secondary. If achieved, educational attainment will move steadily upward, with compounding effects on income and inequality.

The second is health and environment. Ghana’s clean cooking fuel and afforestation initiatives demonstrate how coordinated public messaging and practical access can drive large-scale shifts in household behavior—which often yield immediate and tangible benefits. Extending this logic—through cleaner fuels, safer urban air, adaptive health systems, and expanded green coverage—can enhance environmental quality, improve health outcomes, and free up resources otherwise consumed by preventable disease burdens.

Finally, the country’s political economy will continue to be shaped by how it manages its natural resource wealth. When mineral and oil revenues supplant tax collection, citizens have fewer reasons to monitor spending, governments face fewer incentives to be transparent, public resource leakages rise, and the discipline that keeps debt manageable erodes. A forward-looking reform would therefore tackle the credible fiscal rules that bind during booms, transparent revenue management that makes it costly to divert funds, and a tax system that is simple enough to comply with and fair enough to legitimize. The expanded government digitalization programs offer sound foundations to make this possible. If Ghana can lock in these basics while preserving the civic and media freedoms that have distinguished it for three decades, legal and economic institutions will catch up and converge with political freedom, and prosperity gains will follow.

Ghana’s comparative advantage is … the lived practice of accountability that precedes and outlasts any single administration.

Civil society and media have proven that they can guard the franchise; the task before us is to extend that guardianship to the legal system’s most politically sensitive corners and to the fiscal choices that unlock prosperity and avoid the familiar cycle of fiscal indiscipline, crisis, and repair. If managed well, the evidence should be visible where it matters most: a steadier investment freedom line, a women’s economic freedom score that rises again rather than plateaus, an inequality curve that bends as youth employment expands, and a legal freedom profile that reflects not just order in the streets but fairness in the courtroom. That is the trajectory Ghana can reasonably aim for in the decade ahead, and it is within reach.

about the author

Joseph Asunka is the CEO of Afrobarometer, a pan-African survey research organization that conducts public attitude surveys on governance and social issues across the continent. His research interests are in governance, democracy, and political economy of development. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of California at Los Angeles.

Explore the data

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

Explore the indexes

Ghana Scorecard

Stay Updated

Get the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s latest reports, research, and events.

Stay connected

Keep up with the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s work on social media

Read all editions

2026 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Against a global backdrop of uncertainty, fragmentation, and shifting priorities, we invited leading economists and scholars to dive deep into the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries around the world. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Read the Book

2025 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists, scholars, and diplomats analyze the state of freedom and prosperity in eighteen countries around the world, looking back not only on a consequential year but across twenty-nine years of data on markets, rights, and the rule of law.

Read the Book

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

Read the Book

Explore the program

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

1    Center for Democratic Development, Afrobarometer Round 10 Survey in Ghana, 2024, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Ghana-summary-of-results-Afrobarometer-R10-22april25.pdf (see pages 30, 32, and 33 of the summary of results tables).

2    For causal evidence that domestic observers in Ghana’s 2012 elections reduced fraud and violence at monitored stations and altered parties’ manipulation strategies, see Joseph Asunka et al.,  “Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies,” British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 1 (2019): 129–51.

3    See the Afrobarometer report on public trust in institutions here: https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/AD891-PAP20-Africans-trust-in-key-institutions-and-leaders-is-weakening-Afrobarometer-31oct24.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

4    Center for Democratic Development, “Ghanaians Decry Widespread Corruption, Afrobarometer Survey Shows,” news release, February 14, 2025, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/R10-News-release-Ghanaians-decry-widespread-corruption-Afrobarometer-14feb25.pdf.

5    Ghana Round 10 Summary of Results, April 22, 2025, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Ghana-summary-of-results-Afrobarometer-R10-22april25.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

6    According to an Afrobarometer survey in 2022, 85 percent of Ghanaians support tighter regulations of natural resource extraction. See Center for Democratic Development, “Ghanaians Call for Tighter Regulation of Natural Resource Extraction,” news release, November 8, 2022, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/R9-News-release-Ghanaians-call-for-tighter-regulation-of-natural-resource-extraction-Afrobarometer-bh-7november22.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

7    Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny, Shannon van Wyk-Khosa, and Joseph Asunka, “Africa’s Youth: More Educated, Less Employed, Still Unheard in Policy and Development,” Afrobarometer, November 15, 2023, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/AD734-PAP3-Africas-youth-More-educated-less-employed-still-unheard-Afrobarometer-13nov23.pdf.

8    Elorm Ntumy, “Green Ghana Day: A Chance to Turn the Tide on Deforestation,” UN Capital Development Fund, 2021, https://www.uncdf.org/article/6857/green-ghana-day.

9    See Joseph Asunka and E. Gyimah-Boadi, “People-Centered Development: Why the Policy Priorities and Lived Experiences of African Citizens Should Matter for National Development Policy,” Foresight Africa 2025–2030, May 13, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/people-centered-development-why-the-policy-priorities-and-lived-experiences-of-african-citizens-should-matter-for-national-development-policy/.

The post Delivering justice and jobs is the real test of Ghana’s storied democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-stronger-safer-and-more-prosperous-hemisphere-the-case-for-investing-in-democracy-in-the-americas/ Thu, 04 Dec 2025 14:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=891352 This issue brief is the fourth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center's "Future of democracy assistance" series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world—and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

The post A stronger, safer, and more prosperous hemisphere: The case for investing in democracy in the Americas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]>

Bottom lines up front

• Democratic backsliding, transnational organized crime, and authoritarian influence are driving insecurity and migration across Latin America and the Caribbean.
• At the same time, weak rule of law and entrenched kleptocratic networks are stifling economic growth and enabling criminal organizations.
• To push back, the US must shift to a broader investment-driven foreign policy that mobilizes public-private partnerships and supports democratic actors.

Download pdf

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction

After decades of democratic and economic progress, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is now losing ground. Between 1995 and 2016, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes recorded steady gains—a more than eight-point rise in prosperity and a more than three-point rise in freedom—that lifted millions out of poverty, deepened the region’s integration into the global economy, and strengthened democratic institutions. Over the past decade, however, this momentum has stalled, and in many countries reversed. Across the region, insecurity has surged, authoritarianism has deepened, and corruption has stifled development, with consequences that reach far beyond its borders.

This reversal is fueling two interconnected crises reshaping the Western Hemisphere: migration and insecurity. Over the past decade, migration—both within the region and toward the United States—has surged. Authoritarian rule in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, along with the collapse of Haiti, has driven mass exoduses, while gang violence spurs migration from Central America and hundreds of thousands more have left other countries in search of safety and economic opportunity. Transit states such as Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Panama face mounting strain on public services, while the United States confronts unprecedented pressure at its southern border.

Regional security is also deteriorating as gangs and transnational criminal networks expand their operations. Mexican cartels dominate the production and trafficking of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and other illicit drugs across Latin America and into the United States. The effects of their trade have been devastating, with tens of thousands of overdose deaths annually, particularly in the United States and Canada. Other groups, such as Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua, extend beyond narcotics, driving homicides, corruption, and violent competition over trafficking routes across the region.

Beneath these crises lies a deeper erosion of governance and democracy—one that the United States should support its allies in confronting. Weak rule of law and systemic corruption stifle economic growth and enable criminal networks to thrive. Authoritarian regimes in the region fuel migration, crime, and cross-border instability, while external powers—most notably China—exploit governance gaps through opaque infrastructure projects and debt diplomacy, deepening authoritarian influence. Together, these forces erode state capacity, destabilize the region, and pose a direct challenge to US security and economic prosperity.

Stable, transparent governance in LAC reduces migration pressures, disrupts criminal networks, and creates economic opportunities that benefit both US and Latin American citizens. As the United States reassesses its foreign assistance strategy, democracy assistance can be enacted as a strategic investment to make the hemisphere—including the United States—stronger, safer, and more prosperous. We identify three core issues that pose the greatest challenges but promise the greatest rewards if addressed, and provide recommendations to streamline assistance, expand its scope, and engage business and local actors as funders and partners.

Ultimately, democracy assistance in the region remains one of the most cost-effective investments to advance shared security and prosperity.

Regional challenges to democracy and governance

LAC is confronting a convergence of three interlinked challenges that erode governance, destabilize societies, and undermine US security and economic interests. Each reinforces the others and fuels the migration and crime that strain the region. The United States should therefore prioritize addressing these challenges through targeted foreign assistance and investment.

Transnational organized crime and insecurity

Transnational organized crime (TOC) has evolved into one of the most destabilizing forces in LAC. Once localized, criminal groups have grown into sophisticated, multinational networks that traffic drugs, weapons, and people across borders while infiltrating political systems. These networks now operate across nearly every corner of the region, both benefiting from and contributing to weak rule of law and institutional resilience.

Gangs and TOC actors are among the main drivers of insecurity in the region. Although the region comprises less than 10 percent of the world’s population, it accounts for roughly one-third of global homicides. Central America maintains high levels of insecurity, while countries such as Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru have experienced sharp increases in violent crime as cartels and gangs battle for control of trafficking routes, urban neighborhoods, and illicit economies. The costs are profound: Latin American Public Opinion Project data show that intentions to emigrate are significantly higher among individuals exposed to crime, while nearly one-third of private sector firms in Latin America cite crime as a major obstacle to doing business, with direct losses averaging 7 percent of sales. Insecurity is not only displacing communities but also undermining prosperity and eroding trust in governments.

The drug trade remains one of the most profitable and damaging arms of TOC. Mexican cartels—particularly the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel—are the hemisphere’s principal suppliers of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. Their operations extend beyond Mexico and the United States, reaching deep into Colombia, Ecuador, Central America, and increasingly Canada. In 2024, US Customs and Border Protection seized over 27,000 pounds of fentanyl at the southern border—up from 14,700 pounds in 2022. The human toll is staggering: Fentanyl overdoses now kill more than seventy thousand people annually in the United States.

TOC represents not only a law enforcement problem but also a profound institutional and governance challenge. These groups thrive in contexts marked by weak institutions, porous borders, and entrenched impunity. Venezuela’s institutional collapse, for example, directly enabled the rapid growth of the Tren de Aragua gang from one prison to over ten countries. Once established, criminal networks act as corrosive forces—penetrating police forces, judicial systems, militaries, local governments, and even segments of the private sector. Their influence extends into the electoral arena as well: In Mexico’s recent elections, criminal actors not only financed campaigns for local candidates but also threatened and assassinated others, further distorting political competition and undermining democratic accountability. Left unchecked, TOC erodes public trust, distorts markets, and makes effective governance nearly impossible, fueling a self-reinforcing cycle of violence, displacement, and state fragility.

Case study: Ecuador’s fight against insecurity

The once relatively stable country of Ecuador has become a battleground among Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in recent years, with authorities estimating that 70 percent of the world’s cocaine passes through its ports. As Ecuador has emerged as a vital transit country, Mexican DTOs have partnered with local crime syndicates to deepen their control in the country, buying the influence of politicians, judges, and security officials. The main actors vying for control of drug shipment routes include the Sinaloa Cartel, its rival the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, and their affiliated local crime syndicates. These structures tax and protect cocaine flows moving from border regions toward export terminals, targeting trucking firms, port and warehouse staff, and local authorities.

Ecuador’s security crisis, however, is not simply a matter of state versus gangs, but of deep institutional infiltration. The landmark Metástasis investigation (2023-25) exposed how judges, prosecutors, police officers, politicians, a former head of the prison authority, and other high-ranking officials systematically protected or advanced the interests of organized crime for years. In exchange for cash, gold, luxury cars, and other benefits, officials allegedly released gang leaders, altered prison conditions, and sabotaged investigations.

Despite these challenges, Ecuador’s government—reelected in 2025 with a mandate to confront organized crime—has pledged to continue the fight. Yet its experience highlights a critical lesson: Defeating gangs and cartels cannot be achieved solely through crackdowns or arrests; it also requires rebuilding institutions.

In many countries, governments have proven unable or unwilling to meaningfully confront TOC. Others have stepped up efforts to target these groups through mano dura policies or intensified security operations that, while capable of disrupting trafficking routes, cannot by themselves dismantle transnational criminal networks. Addressing the governance gaps that allow these organizations to thrive is therefore crucial. In this context, US leadership remains essential. Given the cross-border nature of these networks, lasting, viable solutions demand a coordinated regional response. By leveraging its diplomatic influence, security partnerships, military capabilities, and development tools—including technical assistance, institutional support, and investment incentives—the United States can help foster cross-border cooperation, strengthen judicial and prosecutorial capacity, and reinforce institutions to shield them from criminal infiltration. Paired with diplomatic and intelligence support, democracy assistance can play a critical role in disrupting organized crime, safeguarding US security interests, and creating the conditions for more prosperous and resilient communities across the hemisphere.

Rule of law and economic development

Declining rule of law has become an increasingly urgent concern in LAC, as regional indicators have steadily worsened in recent years and several countries have registered some of the steepest declines worldwide. This deterioration both enables transnational organized crime and authoritarianism and imposes enormous costs on national economies. Research by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center shows that the rule of law is the single most influential factor for long-term economic growth and societal well-being. Liberalizing markets is not enough: Legal clarity, judicial independence, and accountability are the foundations of effective governance and thriving economies. This is particularly relevant in Latin America, where corruption remains the region’s Achilles’ heel—undermining public spending, fueling fiscal deficits, and weakening financial oversight. Across the region, higher corruption levels are consistently associated with lower gross domestic product per capita and reduced foreign direct investment, costing countries and investors billions in lost growth and opportunity

A particularly distorting force in the region’s economy is the prevalence of kleptocratic networks. These are not isolated acts of graft, but coordinated, systematic efforts to capture state resources and extract rents for political and economic gain. Such networks often comprise coalitions of corrupt political elites, complicit business actors, and criminal organizations. They co-opt the judiciary and prosecutors, while silencing investigations and oversight bodies. Their actions stifle competition, discourage entrepreneurship, and produce unfair monopolies that sideline foreign investors, while draining public coffers of resources needed for development.

The scale of these operations can be staggering. In Venezuela, over the past two decades, ruling party figures and business allies have been suspected of siphoning off as much as $30 billion in public funds through transnational schemes involving front companies, illicit contracts, and offshore accounts. This systemic kleptocracy has not only enriched elites but also accelerated Venezuela’s economic collapse, fueling one of the worst migration crises in the region, including to the United States. In Peru, the Club de la Construcción scandal revealed how an informal cartel of major construction companies colluded to divide up public works contracts in exchange for bribes to officials in the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The scheme operated for more than a decade, was worth billions in inflated contracts, and sidelined honest competitors while draining infrastructure budgets.

Case study: The Dominican Republic’s success story

The Dominican Republic illustrates how strengthening the rule of law can improve governance and unlock economic opportunity. Since President Luis Abinader took office in 2020, the government has carried out anti-corruption reforms. The administration appointed an independent attorney general and empowered the public ministry to investigate and prosecute high-level corruption cases. The government has also advanced transparency and digitalization reforms to make interactions with public agencies—especially in procurement—more open, efficient, and resistant to abuse. In addition, the country has aligned with key recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force, including by passing a revamped Anti-money Laundering and Illicit Finance Law, which has constrained kleptocratic networks and organized crime.

These measures have begun to restore trust in public institutions. Procurement processes are now more transparent and competitive––with twenty thousand new suppliers registered—while new safeguards better protect against corruption. Since 2020, the Dominican Republic’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index has improved by eight points. Investor confidence has followed: Foreign direct investment reached record highs in 2024, while trade with the United States expanded sharply. US goods exports to the Dominican Republic grew to $13 billion that year, producing a $5.5 billion trade surplus for the United States.

Some of the region’s largest corruption scandals have been uncovered by investigative journalists and independent prosecutors. Yet in many cases, impunity prevails, and little progress is made toward prevention or sustained accountability. Strong judicial institutions, effective anti-corruption reforms, and governance are essential for stability and growth. Predictable, rules-based environments make countries far better partners for both domestic and US businesses—creating jobs, expanding markets, and strengthening local economies. Such efforts can also reduce migration pressures, as corruption has been shown to drive both legal and irregular migration. As with TOC, for the United States, supporting rule-of-law reforms is therefore a strategic investment in building a more prosperous, democratic, and secure hemisphere.

Countering authoritarian influence

LAC is home to several resilient democracies that remain close US allies and important trading partners. Yet the region also contains some of the world’s most entrenched dictatorships—Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—which pose direct threats to stability. Between these extremes lie eight nations that Freedom House classifies as “partly free,” many of which experienced additional democratic declines in 2025. Countering democratic backsliding and protecting the global order is not a values-based mission; it is essential to safeguarding US security, economic interests, and the long-term prosperity of the Western Hemisphere.

The region’s authoritarian regimes illustrate the stakes. Economic collapse and repression have forced 7.7 million Venezuelans, 500,000 Cubans, and tens of thousands of Nicaraguans to flee over the past decade. These governments also generate acute security risks. Nicaragua has positioned itself as a conduit for extra-regional migration, inviting travelers from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean to enter visa free and transit toward the US border. The Daniel Ortega regime has further been linked to targeted harassment and even assassinations of dissidents abroad, including the 2025 killing in Costa Rica of Roberto Samcam Ruiz, a retired Army major and government critic.

Similarly, the consolidation of Venezuela’s dictatorship has transformed the country into a hub for criminal organizations, including Colombian paramilitary groups and Tren de Aragua. The Nicolás Maduro regime has hosted the Wagner Group while continuing to rely on Russian military advisors, Iranian oil technicians, and Chinese surveillance systems to tighten internal control and repress dissent. Members of the regime have been linked to drug trafficking––most notably through the illicit military network Cartel de los Soles––and, in late 2024, Maduro threatened to invade neighboring Guyana.

At the same time, external authoritarian powers—especially China—are expanding their footprints, particularly in “partly free” states where institutional checks are weak. China exploits governance gaps through surveillance technology, opaque infrastructure deals, and strategic investments in critical sectors—often at the expense of US influence and market access. Over the past decade, China invested $73 billion in Latin America’s raw materials sector, including refineries and processing plants for coal, lithium, copper, natural gas, oil, and uranium. In Peru, Chinese firms paid $3 billion to acquire two major electricity suppliers, giving them what experts describe as near-monopoly control over the country’s power distribution and edging out competitors. Beijing also provides critical technology to regional authoritarian governments and at-risk democracies. In Bolivia, the government deployed Huawei’s “Safe Cities” surveillance systems, raising concerns about mass data collection, particularly during elections.

Case study: The cost of partnering with authoritarian regimes

Under President Rafael Correa, Ecuador—alongside Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez—pursued closer ties with foreign authoritarian powers, betting heavily on Chinese financing and infrastructure. A centerpiece of this strategy was the $2.7 billion Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric project, awarded under opaque terms to Chinese firms, primarily Sinohydro, as part of an $11 billion package of oil-backed loans and infrastructure deals.

The project soon became a symbol of the risks of such arrangements. The dam has been plagued by structural flaws, including more than seventeen thousand cracks, severe environmental damage, and corruption allegations implicating senior officials. State agencies attempted to downplay or conceal the problems, but by 2024 the facility had ceased functioning altogether. Experts estimated that repairing the damage could cost tens of millions of dollars, erasing much of the project’s intended economic benefit. Beyond its technical failures, Coca Codo Sinclair left Ecuador financially vulnerable. In 2022, the government was forced into arbitration and subsequently renegotiated more than $4 billion in debt with Beijing, further compromising its fiscal position and weakening investor confidence. The episode illustrates how opaque partnerships with authoritarian powers can undermine democratic accountability and damage economic stability.

These developments underscore the importance of countering authoritarianism in LAC as both a security and economic priority for the United States and the region. Betting on democratic renewal in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela is critical to restoring stability in the hemisphere. At the same time, it is equally important to strengthen “at-risk” democracies to prevent further backsliding. Targeted investments in political party development, anti-corruption reforms, and transparency measures can bolster resilience in these states and reduce the appeal of authoritarian alternatives. Pushing back against China’s growing economic and geopolitical influence in the hemisphere is also essential. By leveraging diplomatic and trade tools, the United States can position itself as a credible alternative to China—particularly by mobilizing investment, fostering public-private partnerships, and advancing governance reforms that strengthen transparency and accountability. Doing so is vital for freedom and security in the region and creates opportunities for business and investment.

Recommendations

Insecurity, weak rule of law, and authoritarianism represent growing threats to freedom and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. As outlined above, TOC, entrenched corruption, and authoritarian regimes impose heavy economic costs on LAC and undermine democratic governance. At the same time, these forces drive mass migration, placing immense strain on transit and destination countries. Tackling these challenges is a strategic win-win: It can enhance US security and economic interests while advancing stability and prosperity in the region.

As the United States reassesses its foreign policy and democracy assistance strategy in LAC, it should make use of its full range of diplomatic, security, trade, and investment mechanisms—including targeted democracy assistance—to address these challenges.

Move beyond grants to expand the toolkit

The proposed shift toward an investment- and trade-driven foreign policy can go hand-in-hand with democracy assistance and reform. The United States can mobilize financial and diplomatic tools to expand investment as an alternative to Chinese influence, while incentivizing governance, transparency, and accountability reforms that strengthen the region’s resilience against the challenges outlined above.

• Leverage the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to provide an alternative to Chinese financing and invest in projects that strengthen democratic resilience through economic modernization, digitalization, and high-quality infrastructure—particularly in areas vulnerable to authoritarian influence. As Congress prepares to revisit the DFC’s authorizing legislation, it should ensure the agency has long-term funding to deploy its range of tools—including debt financing, equity investments, and political risk insurance—across the region.
• Work with Congress to pass the Americas Act to establish regional trade, investment, and people-to-people partnerships with like-minded nations, fostering long-term private sector development. Use this framework to advance transparency and institutional autonomy reforms—particularly through the proposed Americas Institute for Digital Governance and Transnational Criminal Investigative Units—to ensure partner countries strengthen anti-corruption prevention, detection, and prosecution.
• Use regional forums—such as the Summit of the Americas—to advocate for governance, security, transparency, and accountability reforms to strengthen the resilience of democratic allies and counter authoritarian regimes. The United States should link political reform benchmarks to investment incentives, offering “carrots” for change through regional development commitments.

Ensure democracy assistance makes business sense

A safer and more democratic Western Hemisphere directly benefits economic development and business. The United States should position its domestic and the Latin American private sectors as active partners in strengthening democratic resilience, not just as passive beneficiaries of stability.

• Revive and operationalize America Creceto incentivize and promote reform-linked investments, infrastructure projects, and job creation across the region to counter Chinese influence and advance US interests while bolstering political will through the DFC. Participation should be tied to clear benchmarks on transparency, labor rights, and legal predictability.
• Forge public-private partnerships that co-finance civic education, anti-corruption initiatives, and local development projects, particularly in high-risk areas vulnerable to TOC recruitment and migration.
• Mobilize Latin America’s business elites—among the greatest beneficiaries of economic and democratic collaboration with the United States—to push for and co-fund democracy and governance programs in their home countries. Leading companies, philanthropic foundations, and chambers of commerce should be engaged as active partners in advancing reforms.
• Strengthen and engage with regional initiatives like the Alliance for Development in Democracy—championed by Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador—that integrate the private sector into democratic reform and good governance agendas.

Deploy whole-of-government tools

While the State Department plays a central role in US democracy assistance, the scale and interconnected nature of the region’s challenges—spanning security, rule of law, and authoritarian influence—demand a coordinated, whole-of-government approach.

• Leverage the Pentagon’s Defense Institution Building program to strengthen law enforcement reform, bolster rule-of-law resilience, and build institutional capacity to counter transnational crime and human trafficking.
• Provide technical assistance and legal expertise through the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to help countries develop national frameworks that protect transparency, law enforcement, and sovereignty in investment decisions.
• Double down on rule-of-law reforms and projects, particularly those targeting organized crime and corruption. Support vetted law enforcement units, independent anti-corruption actors, and judicial reform initiatives through US, private sector, and multilateral funding channels, including the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Open Government Partnership.
• Protect the key pillars of democratic institutions from co-optation by TOC, kleptocratic, or authoritarian actors. This must include courts, election management bodies, political parties, and critical government agencies such as those overseeing infrastructure, development, procurement, and public prosecution. Emphasis should be placed on institutional independence, combating and preventing corruption, and ensuring sustainable financing to strengthen resilience.
• Apply targeted sanctions, Global Magnitsky measures, and trade conditionality to dismantle kleptocratic networks, prosecute corrupt actors, and reward credible reformers.
• Advocate for and support the implementation of global security and anti-corruption standards—including recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force and its LAC branch, GAFILAT (Grupo de Acción Financiera de Latinoamérica), on money laundering, organized crime, and illicit finance—to disrupt TOC and kleptocratic funding networks while fostering safer and more competitive business environments.

Scale the power of local networks

Regional local actors—both within and outside of government—are often the most credible and resilient defenders of democratic governance. The United States should deepen its engagement with these networks while identifying and empowering new partners.

• Partner with trusted community institutions—including religious organizations, civic leaders, businesses, and grassroots groups—on programs that prevent gang recruitment, reduce crime, and promote integrity in high-risk areas.
• Strengthen governance mechanisms to build sustainable local capacity to counter corruption and transnational organized crime.
• Expand the partner ecosystem to include diaspora networks and local community groups, leveraging their resources, expertise, and transnational connections to reinforce democratic resilience.

Push back on regional and external authoritarian influence

Bipartisan US support for organized opposition in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela has been a cornerstone of regional democracy policy and should be sustained and expanded. At the same time, Washington should back democratic movements and reformers across the hemisphere where authoritarian influence is taking hold.

• Sustain support for dissidents and democratic movements in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to prepare the ground for eventual political transitions.
• Invest in independent media.
• Support the next generation of democratic leaders through fellowships, trainings, and political party development, prioritizing authoritarian and high-risk states.
• Collaborate with electoral commissions, legislatures, and political parties with an emphasis on internal democracy, campaign transparency, and long-term institutionalization.
• Assist governments in auditing and renegotiating opaque infrastructure or digital agreements—particularly those with authoritarian powers—that undermine sovereignty, transparency, and public accountability.

The recommendations offered here provide a roadmap to confront the region’s most pressing security and prosperity threats by pairing diplomacy, trade, and investment tools with targeted democracy support. By leveraging the United States’ entrepreneurial capacity and its ability to mobilize multinational and public-private partnerships, reforms can be made more attractive, sustainable, and impactful. This is not charity—it is a strategic investment that advances both US and LAC interests.

At relatively low cost, democracy assistance strengthens governance and open markets in ways that directly serve US security and economic priorities. It helps dismantle transnational criminal organizations, kleptocratic networks, and corruption, while countering the growing influence of authoritarian regimes inside and outside the region. These efforts reduce the flow of illicit drugs and irregular migration, create more reliable markets for businesses, and build stronger partnerships with governments that share democratic values. The outcome is clear: a stronger, safer, and more prosperous hemisphere.

about the authors

Antonio Garrastazu serves as the senior director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the International Republican Institute (IRI). Prior to this role, he led IRI’s Center for Global Impact and from 2011 to 2018 was resident country director for Central America, Haiti, and Mexico. Garrastazu has worked in academe, the private sector, and government, serving in the Florida Office of Tourism, Trade and Economic Development under Governor Jeb Bush. He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Florida, and a master’s and PhD in international studies from the University of Miami. 

Henrique Arevalo Poincot is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. A strategy and communications specialist with expertise spanning Europe and Latin America, Arevalo Poincot is pursuing his master’s degree in democracy and governance at Georgetown University.

Related content

The future of democracy assistance

This paper series provides an in-depth look at the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

explore the program

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post A stronger, safer, and more prosperous hemisphere: The case for investing in democracy in the Americas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-syrias-grassroots-civil-peace-committees-can-help-prevent-intercommunal-conflict/ Mon, 01 Dec 2025 15:58:29 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=890652 Syria’s local civil peace committees offer an important model for dealing with the country’s deeply rooted social divisions.

The post How Syria’s grassroots civil peace committees can help prevent intercommunal conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> In late September, violence erupted in the countryside around Suqaylabiyah, a large Christian town in Syria’s Hama governorate. The area had generally avoided the type of sectarian violence that has plagued other parts of the country since the December 8, 2024 collapse of the Assad regime. But an unsolved rape case in nearby Hawrat Amurin fueled new anger and tensions, eventually leading to the kidnapping and torture of a local soldier by Alawi insurgents. The next day, members of the soldier’s family entered the village near where he was kidnapped, demanding he be released. At the same time, Sunnis from other nearby communities stormed Hawrat Amurin, looting homes and killing an elderly man.

Security forces quickly intervened and the mob fled. In response to the rapidly deteriorating situation, the head priest of Suqaylabiyah held several dialogue sessions with Sunni and Alawi community leaders and local security officials. They agreed to form a committee to continue intercommunal dialogue and to address any future disputes before they turned violent.

This impromptu civil peace committee is not the first of its kind in post-Assad Syria. The first such committee was formed in Tartous’s Qadmus district in December 2024 by the town’s Ismaili population to address disputes with their Alawi neighbors and ease the arrival of the new government’s forces to the area. Since then, similar committees have been formed across parts of Damascus, Homs, Tartous, Latakia, and rural Hama. They are largely oriented toward resolving sectarian-related problems, whether between the Sunni security forces and Alawi locals, or between neighborhoods and villages of different sects.

The authors have traveled regularly to Syria over the past year, visiting with local security officials and activists across much of Homs, Hama, Tartous, and Latakia studying the challenges and successes of local peace-building in the wake of dictator Bashar al-Assad’s fall. Civil peace committees and similar systems have consistently stood out as an important aspect of trust-building and dispute resolution. While they have proven highly effective in some areas, they are only present in a few parts of the country. At times, they face opposition from government officials. Still, they offer one important model for dealing with the country’s decades of deeply rooted social divisions and the bouts of intercommunal violence that continue to leave Syrians dead.

The role of civil peace committees

Damascus formed a National Civil Peace Committee in the aftermath of the March 6 coastal massacres, theoretically tasked with preventing violence and easing intercommunal tensions through mediation. In June, this committee made headlines when news broke that one of the Assad regime’s most notorious criminals, Fadi Saqr, had effectively joined the committee. His inclusion reflected Damascus’s choice to try and maintain calm via close engagement with former regime-affiliated security and military officers, who some members of the new government argue will help prevent their former colleagues from engaging in renewed insurgent activity.

This controversial national body, however, has nothing to do with the civil peace committees organically forming at the local level in several municipalities across Syria. These committees vary in size, function, and form, but they all seek to prevent violence and improve communication at the hyper-local level. This often involves connecting locals to the new security apparatus via trusted community figures.

It is difficult to say with certainty how many civil peace committees are active in Syria, since many do not conform to the name even when they function in a similar capacity. Most of the more structured and explicitly named committees are concentrated in the southwestern Damascus suburbs, Homs, and Syria’s coast—reflecting both the concentration of strong activist networks and complex sectarian communal dynamics.

There are, however, core commonalities among the groups. Committees are usually formed around a council of local notables. Their success is largely dependent on two factors: 1) the attitudes and acceptance of local security officials and 2) the initiative and determination of local civil society. At their core, these committees facilitate communication between the security officials and locals who are too afraid to communicate with them directly. One Christian activist in Baniyas explained the importance of this role to the authors succinctly:

• “Fear is rooted in isolated violations and a rejection of government narratives . . . direct government outreach cannot fix this fear because locals don’t trust the government’s words or actions. Rather, they need civil society intermediaries.”

Due to their organic formation, each civil peace committee has its own culture and practices. In Jaramana, according to one member, the civil peace committee is very strong, includes representatives of all sects, and even has its own security force. In Alawi communities, the committees’ main roles are improving communication between locals and security officials and working with officials from Syria’s General Security Service, the country’s core internal security force, to address concerns and violations. Local officials use the committees to disseminate information, conduct peaceful disarmament campaigns, and gather complaints about misconduct of government personnel.

In other places, such as Homs and parts of Damascus, committees are equally focused on resolving intercommunal and housing, land, and property (HLP) disputes. For example, the committees in the suburbs of Daraya, Moadimiyah, and Sahnaya worked together to return civilians kidnapped and arrested during the violence there in May and to stop the attacks on the nearby Alawi suburb of al-Somoriyeh in September.

Expansion of informal intermediaries and religious bodies

More common than the formal civil peace committees are informal networks and individuals who do the same work as committees but under different names. Many of these networks are built around religious figures, as opposed to the aforementioned committees built around activists and administrative leaders of local towns. For example, in Homs, a small network of Christian priests, Sunni sheikhs, and Alawi leaders work together with the city’s mukhtars and security officials to resolve disputes and calm intercommunal tensions. While not a formal committee or council, these men are able to use their personal connections to each other and their respective communities to resolve many smaller issues.

In Homs’s Old City, the Syriac Orthodox Santa Maria Church is the main actor for settling disputes involving the neighborhood’s Christian population. The church’s leader, Father Yuhanna, has helped mediate disputes that occur between the residents and others in the city, but he also helps ease tensions when security officials conduct arrests or investigations of Christian men in the area. These religious and community leaders interact directly with the city’s security officials and the governorate’s political affairs director to discuss the implementation of laws and issues of government abuse.

In Salamiyah, the long-standing National Ismaili Council plays the same role through its various subcommittees. This council has been crucial for bridging the gap between the new government and the Ismaili population more generally, as well as the Alawi and Shia populations in Salamiyah specifically.

But in other places, the intermediary networks are much weaker and rely on only one or two individuals. This is particularly true in the coast, where Alawi communities face a double hurdle: a lack of historical civil society and extreme distrust and fear between themselves and the new government. Still, in some places, such as Tartous’s Sheikh Badr and Latakia’s Beit Yashout, there are individual men and women who do the same work as civil peace committees: improving communication between locals and security officials and resolving arrest- and security-related disputes.

For example, the mayor of Beit Yashout serves as a key communication node between the district security official and the local towns and villages. Whenever news of a large security convoy entering the area emerges, locals quickly message the mayor, who in turn calls the district security official to convey their concerns and learn what is happening. He then sends messages to a wide network of local leaders and media activists, sharing what the official told him and urging calm (the authors witnessed this first hand during a visit in September). He also regularly sits with security personnel at checkpoints to help encourage closer relations between them and the locals. In a region wracked with fear, these basic actions are critical for reducing tensions and preventing reckless actions by terrified locals and security forces.

Reconciliation committees

Both the formal civil peace committees and informal networks are new phenomena which have been met with mixed reactions by local officials. But there is a third type of dispute resolution mechanism, which has for decades been a staple of Syrian society: the reconciliation committee (majlis al-sulhi). However, these committees differ significantly from civil peace committees both in scope and the type of communities they serve.

Reconciliation committees focus almost exclusively on HLP issues for displaced people. The bulk of the dispute resolution conducted by the bodies are between those community members who were displaced and those who remained under the regime. They are most commonly found in Sunni communities in Idlib, Hama, and Homs, and they rely heavily on close family and communal ties for mediation. Nonetheless, these committees have long been embraced by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-backed Salvation Government in Idlib, setting a precedent for the new government’s acceptance of such civil peace-oriented systems. This acceptance should now be extended to the civil peace committee model.

Creating opportunities for peace

Creating lines of communication may be the most important function of these different systems. They often provide the only means of engagement with the authorities in places where many people are too afraid to approach officials on their own. These committees and networks also play a central role in resolving intercommunal and community-state disputes before they spiral into serious violence, as happened in Hamrat Amurin in September.

Much of the work of civil peace committees is initiated by motivated individuals who take it upon themselves to advance intercommunal trust-building. Many Ismaili and Christian activists who have been involved in these networks since December have stressed the same thing to the authors across multiple field trips—that local groups must assert themselves to the new government and force it to work with them. This approach has proven to work, but it is also a difficult concept for many activists, especially those from the Alawi community, to embrace when there is so much fear and distrust, and inconsistent government treatment of civil society more broadly.

Thus, most activists working in civil peace and dispute resolution issues emphasize the need for officials to genuinely engage with their work while giving them the space to operate freely. Members of multiple committees also discussed with us the need for logistical support to expand their networks, linking committees across districts to help share experiences and strategize communication and dispute resolution approaches. Such regional networks would give rural areas a more grounded view of the situation in other regions, undermining the chokehold that social media misinformation has on much of the country.

Inconsistent government limitations

Yet despite the benefits of this system, many civil peace activists across the country are still facing obstacles from the new government. While committees in places such as Qadmus, Damascus, and Salamiyah have seen many successes, the experiences of cities such as Baniyas, Masyaf, and Dreikish show how reliant this system is on a cooperative local government.

In Baniyas, a civil peace committee was formed after the extreme violence the city experienced on March 6, bringing together prominent Sunni and Alawi activists and religious leaders. Yet while it gave space for the Alawi community to voice complaints and work with local officials, their demands have been consistently ignored. The committee has been described by some former members as essentially being a mouthpiece for the local government, with no real agency of its own.

Masyaf’s short-lived committee faced a more direct challenge from its local government. In June, activists in the city gathered more than five hundred people to hold the country’s first-ever local elections for a civil council. Prior to the election, the organizers had received approval from the district director, Muhammad Taraa, to create the new body. Yet as soon as it was formed, Taraa began to oppose it. After sidelining and ignoring the new council for a month, Taraa called on the Hama Political Affairs Office to order its disbandment. Civil peace work in the district has now gone partially underground, with only a small civil peace committee now working exclusively on securing the release of ex-regime soldiers from the district’s rural villages who were captured by opposition forces during the final battles of the war.

Tartous’s Dreikish District has largely been another success story for the role of civil peace committees, but recent pressure from some local officials may undermine the positive steps that have been made. Like with the Ismailis in Qadmus, a small group of respected and educated Alawi leaders formed a committee in Dreikish the day after the regime fell. These men worked closely with Damascus’s newly appointed security official, fostering a deep bond of trust that endures today. However, the official was later transferred out of Dreikish, and his replacement was executed by local insurgents on March 6. The committee members were able to save the lives of the rest of the General Security officers that night, but the murder of the official has resulted in new pressure on the area since March. Now, two of the districts’ security officials still work closely with the committee, while a third views the body with distrust and refuses to engage with it. Committee members stress the importance of the close personal relationship they had built with their first official as well as the official killed on March 6, and the role these personal friendships and animosities play in the effectiveness of their work today.

Even when local government officials do embrace these committees and informal networks, their ability to address local grievances remains limited. These systems almost always engage with security officials—representatives of the Interior Ministry charged with overseeing the Internal Security Forces. Thus, issues such as the behavior of checkpoint personnel, detentions, and communication are more easily addressed, but these local officials have no say over the more pressing structural issues such as economic recovery, the settlement problem, political demands, and services. The inability of local security officials to address these topics limits the trust-building impacts of their engagement.

Empowering committees

Despite the potentially significant benefits of an expanded and empowered civil peace committee network in Syria, this system is largely isolated to addressing the symptoms of social discord. These committees should form one part of a broader approach to civil peace, bridging organizations and wider Syrian society with good governance practices to gradually break down the anger and loss felt between Syrian communities. One former civil defense member in Aleppo, who now works on humanitarian and civil peace issues, described the problem to the authors this way:

• “Civil peace itself is not a means but an end. . . it is not possible to make people accept this idea so quickly. . . but the government is burning this by trying to make everyone accept each other in a few days. They don’t understand civil peace. . . In all of Syria, there are civilian intermediary offices working between General Security and the people. . . But these offices solve the problems only after they occur. We have to focus on dealing with the source of conflict, not just one symptom.”

Some committees and civil peace activists fear that expansion could result in backlash from the government. Licensing issues and anxiety offer state monitoring stem from the government’s unclear and discouraging policies toward civil society. Instead, Damascus should understand the benefits these committees can provide as allies for civil peace.

The Syrian government should create and enforce a clear policy for how its security and political officials engage with civil society organizations that work on civil peace and sectarian issues. This policy should encourage the creation of independent civil peace committees across districts and sub-districts experiencing sectarian tensions, particularly in the coast, Homs, and rural Hama.

Damascus should ensure that officials engage with these committees in a genuine and honest manner to maintain their trust with their own communities, without which these committees are entirely ineffectual. Lastly, Damascus should expand the type of officials and government bodies that engage with these systems to begin addressing non-security-related local issues. This would increase peoples’ trust in both these intermediaries and the local government, while also providing more senior officials with granular insights into the needs of these area.

International organizations can support this work by funding trainings and dialogue sessions that bring together committees and activists from different parts of the country to share their experiences and best practices. Countries such as Turkey and Qatar that provide training to Syria’s Ministry of Interior personnel can also support these local peace efforts by including civil engagement and communication courses when training security officials.

Despite their mixed track record, these committees have laid forth a blueprint for preventing intercommunal violence and trust-building with the new government. Now they should be expanded across more areas and empowered by Damascus to operate freely rather than hindered. Taken together, this approach will help prevent further conflict while strengthening the new government’s ties to local communities across the country.

---

Gregory Waters is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Kayla Koontz is a PhD candidate at the Carter School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a researcher at the Syrian Archive.

The post How Syria’s grassroots civil peace committees can help prevent intercommunal conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/axis-of-authoritarians-poses-mounting-threat-on-the-global-information-front/ Thu, 20 Nov 2025 20:19:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=889674 The authoritarian axis that has taken shape since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is currently setting new standards in terms of coordinated information operations across media platforms, write William Dixon and Maksym Beznosiuk.

The post Axis of authoritarians poses mounting threat on the global information front appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, there has been growing alarm over the support that Moscow is receiving from fellow authoritarian regimes including Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and China. However, while Western officials have publicly raised concerns over material support for the Russian war effort, the issue of cooperation in the information sphere has received less attention.

This is short-sighted. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the critical importance of the information front in modern conflicts. The lessons of the war in Ukraine have not been lost on the Kremlin, which invests vast sums to finance information operations and has repeatedly used disinformation to destabilize its opponents. China is also well aware of the increasing role played by information capabilities and has established a range of powerful tools. This is creating potentially significant challenges for Western policymakers.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Many Western countries continue to view the issue of information warfare as primarily a matter of fact-checking and debunking fakes. In contrast, there are growing indications that Moscow and Beijing share a vision of the information space as a key element of their power projection and national security strategies.

A recent meeting between Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and his Chinese counterpart Li Qiang signaled deepening cooperation between Moscow and Beijing on the information front. The annual summit held in Hangzhou in early November featured commitments from both sides to partner on media initiatives, countering disinformation, and promoting traditional values.

Moscow already has extensive experience in information operations designed to disrupt and reshape Europe’s political landscape, and is widely regarded as a global pioneer in the use of multimedia information operations to advance foreign policy objectives. Beijing has also faced accusations of playing a role in these activities, which are aimed at exploiting social divisions and boosting polarizing narratives with a view to generating support for anti-establishment political forces throughout the Western world.

While measuring the success of information operations is not an exact science, there is certainly no shortage of evidence to suggest that these tactics are having an impact. Support for far-right political parties is now surging across Europe. While each party has its own individual agenda, these populist political forces tend to share a sympathetic stance toward Russia while enjoying extensive coverage on Kremlin-linked media platforms.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Perhaps the clearest indication of cooperation between Russia and China in the information arena is the growing Russian state media presence on TikTok. This is alleged to include coordinated campaigns and the use of AI technologies.

Disinformation watchdogs from Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council have accused the Kremlin of using the TikTok platform to conduct information campaigns designed to demoralize Ukrainian society and undermine resistance to Russia’s invasion. Ukrainian officials claim Moscow has employed AI to create videos featuring “ordinary Ukrainians” conveying pessimistic messages.

Russia is also reportedly using Chinese social media platforms to recruit Chinese citizens for the war in Ukraine. The large volume of recruitment adverts across China’s strictly controlled and monitored social media sphere has been interpreted by some as a sign of tacit approval from the authorities in Beijing.

Chinese and Russian information ecosystems appear to be engaging in significant cross-promotion. Kremlin outlets actively promote war-related content on platforms such as China’s Weibo. Meanwhile, Chinese state media and officials amplify key Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and framing sanctions policies as self-defeating. Both Beijing and Moscow employ similar language to describe the war in Ukraine, which they typically depict as a defensive reaction to the West’s provocative policies.

As information cooperation between Moscow, Beijing, and other authoritarian regimes expands, Western policymakers must recognize that information warfare is now a tier-one national security threat requiring a comprehensive response. This should include signaling that information offensives will be treated as comparable to other violations of sovereignty, with the European Union and NATO working to establish clear diplomatic, legal, and economic red lines in the information domain.

Efforts must be undertaken to defend the information space more effectively by combining the initiatives of individual governments along with civil society. This could draw on a wide range of specific examples, such as Ukraine’s wartime experience and recent elections in Romania and Moldova. Greater accountability for hostile information operations is also crucial. Western governments must be prepared to publicly expose attacks and impose tangible costs.

The authoritarian axis that has taken shape since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is currently setting new standards in terms of coordinated information operations across media platforms. The West’s response must be equally systematic. The tools and frameworks exist; Western governments must now demonstrate the necessary political will.

William Dixon is an associate fellow of the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy and security analyst with a focus on Ukraine, Russia, European security, and EU-Ukraine cooperation.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 18, 2025

Vladimir Putin fears entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Throughout his reign, Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin has become increasingly obsessed with the idea of erasing Ukrainian independence, but his decision to invade has backfired disastrously, eroding centuries of Russian influence and accelerating Ukraine’s European integration, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Nov 17, 2025

Zelenskyy faces the biggest corruption scandal of his presidency

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine in now facing the largest corruption scandal of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidency over alleged kickbacks in the graft-prone energy sector, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Oct 23, 2025

Russia’s ‘human safari’ in southern Ukraine is a warning to the world

By Oleksandr Tolokonnikov

Russia’s escalating campaign of drone attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine’s Kherson region highlights the destructive power of modern drone technologies, writes Oleksandr Tolokonnikov.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

Follow us on social media
and support our work

support our work

The post Axis of authoritarians poses mounting threat on the global information front appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dispatch-from-cop30-in-the-brazilian-jungle-the-private-sector-takes-center-stage/ Thu, 20 Nov 2025 19:52:05 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=889565 Throughout COP30, there has been a recognition that the public and private sectors cannot act alone when it comes to climate finance.

The post Dispatch from COP30: In the Brazilian jungle, the private sector takes center stage appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> BELÉM, Brazil—As the 2025 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) comes to a close, the weather here has been mixed, with intermittent storm clouds followed by periods of sun. Fittingly, the varying weather matches the mood among many COP30 participants in the Blue Zone, where the negotiations happen and where our Center’s Resilience Hub is located.

On the one hand, voices of doubt are rising from some negotiating groups on the ability of the Brazilian presidency and the multilateral process to deliver an ambitious package of decisions that deliver real impact, particularly on finance for adaptation for the least developed countries and small island states. But on the other hand, it is heartening that the heat and humidity of the Amazon have not slowed momentum on elevating the importance of adaptation, resilience, and the role of private finance. Holding this COP in the Amazon rainforest has sharpened the focus for many stakeholders, serving as a powerful reminder that strengthening climate adaptation will require forward-looking climate finance that includes private sector investment.

The private sector—particularly insurers, banks, asset managers, and other financial institutions—has the analytics, risk expertise, and growing appetite to engage in adaptation and resilience finance. And they are ready to work on devising the right investment vehicles to channel that much-needed finance. What they need now are strong policy signals, stable regulatory environments, and practical mechanisms from governments that can connect capital to projects.

Throughout COP30, there has been a recognition that the public and private sectors cannot act alone when it comes to climate finance.

One of the most notable developments at this year’s COP was the announcement of the National Adaptation Plans (NAP) Implementation Alliance. Led by the governments of Germany, Italy, and Brazil, as well as the United Nations Development Programme, with the support of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center, this initiative aims to improve coherence in the complex ecosystem of financing for NAPs. Streamlining NAP financing will be critical to enable the flow of more public and private resources for climate adaptation and resilience. Over the next year, this initiative will bring together representatives from the private financial sector, multilateral development banks, civil society organizations, the public sector, and other stakeholders to find ways to improve collective action to support the implementation of NAPs.

For the private sector, this means greater visibility into future projects and greater confidence in the investment environment. For governments, it means being better equipped to design projects that meet investor expectations while delivering local resilience benefits.

The Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center, along with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), will play a vital role in the alliance through Fostering Investable National Planning and Implementation for Adaptation & Resilience (FINI). Announced at a high-level session during the first week of COP30 with representatives of the governments of Australia and Switzerland, FINI is mobilizing more than one hundred actors from civil society, multilateral entities, philanthropy, and the private sector that are already advancing adaptation investments around the world.

Another remarkable development at COP30 was the announcement that fifty-three countries have committed a combined $5.5 billion to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). The TFFF incentivizes the conservation and expansion of tropical forests by making annual payments to tropical forest countries that maintain their standing forest. The initiative is especially notable within the climate community because of its proposed hybrid financing model. The TFFF will mix sovereign and philanthropic funding to de-risk investments on forest conservation, regenerative agriculture, and agroforestry that sustain standing forests. This, in turn, will help attract commercial capital toward these activities.

Throughout COP30, there has been a recognition that the public and private sectors cannot act alone when it comes to climate finance. The announcements and initiatives that have been launched so far at this year’s summit reflected a broad shift: the conversation is no longer about whether private finance should engage in adaptation and resilience, but how quickly financial ecosystems and policy frameworks can be aligned to deliver project pipelines to respond at the scale and speed that climate change requires.

---

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He formerly served as chief advisor and negotiator to the government of Peru, playing a critical role during the adoption of the Paris Agreement in the government’s dual role as president of COP20 and co-chair of the Green Climate Fund’s board.

The post Dispatch from COP30: In the Brazilian jungle, the private sector takes center stage appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/zelenskyy-faces-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-of-his-presidency/ Mon, 17 Nov 2025 15:58:20 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=888467 Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine in now facing the largest corruption scandal of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidency over alleged kickbacks in the graft-prone energy sector, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

The post Zelenskyy faces the biggest corruption scandal of his presidency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]>

Editor’s note: This article was updated on November 17 to include Herman Halushchenko’s response to the corruption investigation.

Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine is now facing the largest corruption scandal of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidency. It is a scandal with the potential to reshape the country’s politics. The intrigue, which involves alleged kickbacks in the graft-prone energy sector laundered through Russian-linked channels by close associates of President Zelenskyy, may prove as big a test of his leadership as the war itself.

On November 10, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) exposed an alleged $110 million corruption scheme at state-owned nuclear company Energoatom. The charges are supported by a fifteen-month wiretap and over seventy searches carried out as part of a major investigation called Operation Midas.

According to NABU officials, the investigation uncovered a criminal enterprise run by Timur Mindich, a film producer and a former business partner of Zelenskyy. Additional suspects include former Minister of Energy and recently appointed Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko; former Naftogaz CEO and Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Chernyshov; former Minister of Defense and current National Security and Defense Council member Rustem Umerov; and Ihor Myroniuk, former deputy head of the State Property Fund and former advisor to Halushchenko.

Mindich fled Ukraine the day before his premises were raided and is reportedly now in Israel. Both Chernyshov and Mindich have long had ties with Zelenskyy, who co-founded the latter’s production company in 2003. Thus far, formal charges have been filed against eight of those implicated. Halushchenko has said he would defend himself against the accusations.

The alleged theft took the form of 10-15 percent inflated prices for infrastructure project contracts, which contractors were forced to pay in order to avoid losing their supplier status. The kickback scheme reportedly included security measures for the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant. The Ministry of Energy is suspected of facilitating the scam.

The stolen funds were allegedly laundered through an office linked to fugitive ex-Ukrainian MP and now Russian Senator Andrii Derkach before being extracted from Ukraine. Derkach has been sanctioned since 2021 and was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship in 2023.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

While the investigation is still underway, the scandal is already proving extremely damaging to Zelenskyy and his entire administration. The alleged involvement of a former Ukrainian MP turned Russian fugitive in the middle of the Kremlin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine may be the most scandalous aspect of the accusations.

Meanwhile, Zelenskyy’s long contact with many of the accused and their high-level appointments has raised the political stakes for the President. This has led to speculation over whether the scandal could topple Zelenskyy and cost Ukraine the war.

The investigation comes in the wake of a recent standoff between Zelenskyy and his administration with Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. In July 2025, a law proposed by Zelenskyy’s political party was passed by the Ukrainian parliament stripping NABU and other anti-corruption institutions of their independence.

This led to vocal condemnation from Ukraine’s civil society and the international community, including the largest street protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Days later, Zelenskyy reconsidered and signed a law that restored and guaranteed the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

That guarantee has now been tested and proven credible. While the sheer number of criminal investigations and indictments targeting prominent Ukrainian officials has raised concerns about possible political prosecutions by NABU, the apparent success of Operation Midas and its exposure of alleged corruption on the part of some of the most powerful people in Ukraine would seem to confirm the agency’s independence and its efficacy.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Zelenskyy appears to recognize the dangers of the situation and has begun responding to the crisis. The Cabinet of Ministers is looking at sanctions against Mindich and businessman Oleksandr Tsukerman, who was also implicated in the scandal. The Ukrainian leader has already forced the resignations of Halushchenko and newly appointed Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko has announced a comprehensive audit of all state-owned companies, especially in the energy and defense sectors. Anastasia Radina, head of the parliament’s anti-corruption committee, has called for a parliamentary inquiry into the transfer of funds to Russia.

These steps are significant but are unlikely to prove adequate. The stakes are extremely high, not just for Zelenskyy’s political future, but for Ukraine’s conduct of the war. European leaders answer to their citizens, many of whom might now be wondering why they are sending massive aid to Ukraine if large sums are being siphoned off by privileged insiders. In the US, while Trump is slowly moving in the right direction with recent sanctions on Russia, there are still influential figures in his orbit who are looking for ways to end all American support for Ukraine’s defense against Kremlin aggression.

This means that Zelenskyy must turn his attention to the crisis energetically. A good next step would be for him to speak up on the issue publicly and strongly, much as he did in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Zelenskyy might start by acknowledging, as former US President Harry Truman did when he said the buck stops with him, that as President of Ukraine, he is ultimately responsible for failures in his government. He should recognize the magnitude of the scandal and the underlying problem of corruption, while explaining how he intends to take the lead in fixing it. This means bringing to justice, in accordance with the law, all those responsible, no matter who they are and where they are. He can do this by vowing to empower NABU and other relevant state institutions fully.

Zelenskyy could frame the scandal as proof that despite clear progress made by Ukraine in dealing with corruption, much more remains to be done. He could demonstrate his openness by inviting advice from Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners. This current crisis has clearly demonstrated the dangers of relying on just a small circle at Bankova to get things done.

Such a speech should not be a one off. It should be the start of a dialogue with the Ukrainian public, much like Zelenskyy’s masterful wartime communications. This dialogue should include regular updates on efforts to bring those responsible for this theft to justice, and news about steps to strengthen state institutions against the scourge of corruption. Zelenskyy has the skills to take this on. Now is the time to do it.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 23, 2025

Russia’s ‘human safari’ in southern Ukraine is a warning to the world

By Oleksandr Tolokonnikov

Russia’s escalating campaign of drone attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine’s Kherson region highlights the destructive power of modern drone technologies, writes Oleksandr Tolokonnikov.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Nov 4, 2025

EU praises Ukraine’s progress but warns Zelenskyy over corruption

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s bid to join the EU received a boost this week with the release of a report praising the country’s progress toward future membership, but EU officials also warned President Zelenskyy about the dangers of backsliding on anti-corruption reforms, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Corruption

UkraineAlert Nov 6, 2025

Vladimir Putin’s endless nuclear threats are a sign of Russian weakness

By Stephen Blank

Since 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly used nuclear threats to deter Western support for Ukraine, but this scare tactic risks exposing Russia’s inability to project strength via more conventional means, writes Stephen Blank.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

Follow us on social media
and support our work

support our work

The post Zelenskyy faces the biggest corruption scandal of his presidency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-how-will-iraqs-parliamentary-election-shape-the-countrys-politics/ Fri, 14 Nov 2025 16:12:42 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=888109 Our experts examine what the results of Tuesday’s elections mean for the future of Iraqi politics and Baghdad’s regional role.

The post Experts react: How will Iraq’s parliamentary election shape the country’s politics? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> The voting is over, but the maneuvering could go on for a while. In Iraq’s parliamentary elections on Tuesday, the bloc led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani won the most seats, but it will need the backing of other parties to form a government. Tuesday’s vote came amid pressure from the Trump administration to crack down on Iran-backed militias operating in the country and questions over whether Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s call to boycott the elections would depress turnout. Below, our experts examine what the elections mean for the future of Iraqi politics and Baghdad’s role in the region.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Victoria J. Taylor: His coalition may have won, but Sudani faces stiff opposition to a second term

Omar Al-Nidawi: A higher turnout than expected, especially in predominantly Sunni and Kurdish provinces

Safwan Al-Amin: What to watch from the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission

Yerevan Saeed: The KDP remains the dominant party in the Kurdistan region

Rend Al-Rahim: The elections consolidated the grip of Iraq’s traditional parties

---

His coalition may have won, but Sudani faces stiff opposition to a second term

While Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc did very well throughout southern Iraq, translating his high approval into votes, he still appears to have fallen short of the overwhelming victory he likely needed to guarantee a second term as prime minister. In the weeks ahead of the election, Sudani launched a public relations offensive in the Western press. He published an op-ed in the New York Post and gave interviews to Bloomberg and Newsweek aimed at securing US and international support for a second term, making a pitch for his “Iraq first” agenda. 

However, the days of decisive US engagement in the government formation process are likely over. For Sudani to secure a second term, he will have to do so the old-fashioned way by building a coalition. Although popular among the public, Sudani does not have ready alliances among the other major Shia parties and coalitions. The two largest Shia blocs after Sudani’s are former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and the Al-Sadiqoun Bloc (which is affiliated with the US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) both of which oppose giving Sudani a second term.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

---

A higher turnout than expected, especially in predominantly Sunni and Kurdish provinces

Contrary to what many Iraq watchers expected, myself included, the initial results—if accurate—suggest that more Iraqis were motivated to vote this time. Turnout reached almost 56 percent of registered voters, according to Iraq’s electoral commission, a notable jump from 43 percent in 2021. However, part of this increase is tempered by the fact that there were 700,000 fewer registered voters than in 2021, even though nearly four million Iraqis have reached voting age since then. In other words, while the voter pool shrank, the absolute number of ballots cast actually grew.

Another striking development is the geographic variation in turnout. Whereas participation in 2021 was uniformly low across all provinces, Tuesday’s vote revealed new patterns: Turnout was significantly higher in predominantly Kurdish and Sunni provinces than in Shia-majority areas. This divide was also evident within Baghdad, between the mostly Sunni western and Shia eastern banks of the Tigris. In 2021, the gap between the provinces with the highest and lowest turnout—Duhok and Baghdad—was more than 20 percent; this time, it widened to a 36 percent gap between the highest turnout in Duhok and the lowest in Sudani’s home province of Maysan.

With party platforms largely devoid of real policy proposals, were the shifts driven mainly by more effective mobilization through tribal and patronage networks? Or were they primarily driven by a more genuine sense of stability and renewed hope among voters? A deeper analysis will be needed to explain these shifts.

—Omar Al-Nidawi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Al-Nidawi is also the director of programs at the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, where he co-develops and leads research and field initiatives focused on governance, peacebuilding, and climate action in Iraq.

---

What to watch from the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission

At this point, the only official information released by the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission (IHEC) relates to voter turnout. IHEC put voter participation at around 56 percent. What is noteworthy is that IHEC only counted those who obtained or renewed voter registration cards as eligible voters, and did not count those who failed to so or intentionally boycotted as eligible voters.

This participation level is still higher than most had expected given that there was a strong boycott campaign led by al-Sadr as well as other smaller political movements. Initial leaked results show that the established parties maintained most of their seats, with Sudani’s coalition being the new big entrant. The smaller liberal parties appear to have lost momentum. Most of this is by design and a result of the electoral system the main parties reverted to when they amended the election law in 2023. We should also keep an eye on the potential post-results exclusion of candidates by IHEC, which could potentially change the results.

—Safwan Al-Amin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

---

The KDP remains the dominant party in the Kurdistan region

Preliminary election results reaffirm the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP’s) political dominance in the Kurdistan region. It garnered more than one million votes and secured twenty-seven seats while its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) received roughly half as many votes but still increased its share of seats from seventeen to eighteen. When compared to last year’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) election, the PUK’s votes declined in areas under KRG jurisdiction, while the KDP’s increased. Outside KRG-controlled territory, the PUK won four seats in Kirkuk while the KDP emerged as the leading party in votes and seats in Nineveh province. This will further challenge the PUK’s influence in areas beyond the KRG’s authority. In addition, five minority-quota candidates backed by the KDP across Iraq also won seats, further strengthening the party’s leverage at the federal level.

New actors also made gains. Halwest won five seats, while New Generation, which previously held nine seats, dropped to four. The two main Islamist parties maintained their previous share seats of four and one seats respectively. Despite these shifts, the broader electoral map in the Kurdistan Region remains largely intact. Most changes in seat distribution occurred among smaller, antiestablishment parties within the PUK’s traditional areas of influence. The PUK had aimed to win back voters and reclaim seats in these strongholds, many of which it has gradually lost over the past fifteen years to emerging parties. Instead, a familiar pattern persisted: Voters in PUK-dominated areas continue to be more inclined than others to experiment with and switch to new political forces.

These results are likely to embolden the KDP to hold firm on its terms for forming the new KRG cabinet. This, in turn, could affect government formation in Baghdad, given that the KDP is now among the top three blocs in terms of seats at the federal level and can wield significant influence over the Iraqi presidency, a post traditionally held by the PUK since 2003. At the same time, negotiations over the new federal government in Baghdad could make the pie larger for the KDP and PUK, enabling them to reach compromises on key issues and ministerial portfolios that might facilitate the formation of a government in the KRG. The central question is whether the PUK will accept a government in Erbil that reflects its actual votes and seats or continue to insist on a fifty-fifty power-sharing arrangement based on territorial control.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

---

The elections consolidated the grip of Iraq’s traditional parties

No clear winner emerged from the November 11 parliamentary elections. The forty-five seats gained by Sudani’s bloc did not represent the landslide his supporters had hoped for. Nevertheless, this was a significant improvement on the two seats his party occupies in the outgoing parliament. The KDP and Mohamed al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum coalition also made gains. Sadiqoun, the political arm of the Asaib Ahl Al-Haqq militia expanded its presence in Parliament, as well. The big losers were smaller parties, independents, and liberal/secular candidates, who didn’t stand a chance under the 2023 changes to the election law and the massive sums spent by the big parties and candidates. Another loser is Muqtada al-Sadr, whose call for a boycott clearly went unheeded, and who has been marginalized by the elections and needs to find new relevance. Despite popular calls for change, the elections brought no new blood but consolidated the grip of the traditional parties.

The next phase is the process of forming a government. Sudani’s postelection address sounded like an acceptance speech, but it is far from certain that he will serve a second term as prime minister. Negotiations to create the largest parliamentary bloc will be contentious. A grand alliance of Sudani’s bloc with the KDP and Taqaddum, such as was attempted by al-Sadr in 2021, is now even more far-fetched. Instead, the Shia Coordination Framework coalition is likely to declare itself the largest parliamentary bloc and claim the right to nominate the new prime minister, and many members of this bloc are adamantly opposed to Sudani. While the Shia Coordination Framework can nominate, the high number of seats won by the KDP and Taqaddum will give the latter two blocs a powerful countervailing voice over the nomination. Iranian and US influence will also be elements in the nomination process. In previous Iraqi government formation cycles, there was tacit agreement between Washington and Tehran. But the Trump administration, with its confrontational posture toward Iran, will likely make such an agreement difficult to reach, thus prolonging the government formation process.

—Rend Al-Rahim is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

---

The post Experts react: How will Iraq’s parliamentary election shape the country’s politics? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/a-little-discussed-point-in-trumps-gaza-plan-could-be-an-opportunity-to-build-interfaith-understanding/ Mon, 10 Nov 2025 20:32:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=887160 Peace efforts don’t need more gleaming Abrahamic baubles, they need a genuine commitment to supporting grassroots religious peacebuilding.

The post A little-discussed point in Trump’s Gaza plan could be an opportunity to build interfaith understanding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Inside US President Donald Trump’s twenty-point peace plan for Gaza is a call, largely unnoticed and buried towards the end of the text, for a new interfaith dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians.

More specifically, point eighteen reads:

“An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.”

Most have glossed over the point, likely dismissing it as rhetorical padding or meaningless fluff. They are wrong to do so. In fact, engagement with religious actors will be a crucial aspect of long-term peacebuilding in Israel and Palestine. If implemented wisely, Trump’s point eighteen could make a real contribution to peace. Implemented poorly, however, it risks becoming another exercise in empty symbolism.

Point eighteen can’t be about returning to the interfaith status quo. During a memorable conversation last year in Bethlehem, Palestinian pastor Mitri Raheb told me that when it comes to interfaith dialogue in Palestine and Israel, “the current paradigm is broken.”

The juncture the region faces today thus provides an opportunity to take up the challenge of bridging religious divides and to explore what a new model for effective local religious peacebuilding might look like—by questioning many underlying assumptions and learning from what has and hasn’t worked in the past.

At its heart, of course, the Israel-Palestine conflict is not a religious dispute. It’s a conflict over territory. Yet that land—Jerusalem, Hebron, Bethlehem—carries immense religious significance for Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike. Sacred geography makes the conflict not only political but also existential, rooted in identities, rituals, and sacred narratives. Sites like the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif are not just bargaining chips in negotiations. They are living spaces of prayer and devotion.

One thing Palestinian and Israeli religious leaders all agree on—as I’ve learned from many conversations with them—is that official negotiators have consistently marginalized their respective voices in efforts to achieve peace over the years. The assumption by political leaders—Israeli, Palestinian, and international alike—has been that religion is about absolute truths unamenable to the kind of transactional logic needed to negotiate peace. While this perspective is understandable, it couldn’t be further off the mark. Religious leaders possess unique forms of moral authority and social capital that no politician or diplomat can replicate.  

For example, in the summer of 2017, Jerusalem teetered on the brink of spiraling into violence after Israel installed new metal detectors at the entrances to the Temple Mount or Ḥaram al-Sharif, leading to rapidly escalating protests and clashes. What ultimately helped defuse the crisis was not the local security forces or another round of shuttle diplomacy from foreign envoys but quiet intervention by local rabbis and Muslim scholars. Sustainable peace will ultimately require communities on both sides to embrace narratives that allow for coexistence—narratives that must be articulated in religious as well as political terms if they are to take root.

The inclusion of point eighteen in Trump’s plan is, therefore, a welcome development. But there is a significant risk of it being implemented in a manner that would be feckless at best and possibly even damaging.

The Abraham Accords—a geopolitical framework painted in religious overtones—supercharged an already burgeoning cottage industry of religious diplomacy largely centered on the Gulf Cooperation Council region. With the encouragement and endorsement of the United States, countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have organized a continuous parade of interfaith summits focused on peace, tolerance, and coexistence—many of them generating lofty-sounding declarations and charters affirming shared values and universal fraternity across faith divides.

These interfaith summits suffer from two shortfalls. First, the inspiring and, to be sure, very welcome words they produce are rarely followed by concrete plans to transform them into actions or deeds. This is not surprising because genuine social transformation of the kind that would be needed to realize their aspirations is deeply threatening to the governments whose patronage makes these convenings possible. For example, in some cases, it would require regional leaders to shift away from deeply entrenched policies of discrimination against their own religious minorities. Declarations of tolerance and coexistence make for excellent public relations, but they demand nothing of the signatories and change nothing on the ground.

Second, the religious leaders who attend these conferences, many of whom dwell at the top of their respective denominational hierarchies, are without doubt among the most eminent clergy in the world. Because of this, however, very few of them possess organic connections to or trust within communities on the ground. Many of them are also closely tied to one or another government, constraining their credibility and sometimes tainting them by association with official policies that often promote something very different from tolerance and coexistence. When a government-appointed mufti or state-approved bishop speaks about peace, communities struggling under occupation or siege have every reason to question whether these figures truly represent their interests or merely provide religious cover for political agendas.

The danger, then, is that point eighteen becomes the pretext for yet another round of comfortable interfaith conferences that produce ethereally beautiful statements wholly divorced from the local conflict settings in which communities struggle daily for peace with and through religion. This risks creating “peace theater”—performances of reconciliation designed more for international consumption than for any genuine transformation of relationships. Already, there are worrying signs that things once again may be heading in that direction.

Instead, point eighteen should lead back to the always-difficult work of ground-level interfaith peacebuilding in Palestine and Israel. This work has been going on for decades, often quietly and at great risk to those involved. It has involved rabbis, imams, priests, and lay religious leaders meeting in living rooms, walking the streets of contested neighborhoods together, and standing guard at each other’s holy sites during times of heightened tension. It has meant religious educators developing curricula that teach the history and theology of the other, and religious leaders jointly confronting extremism within their own communities. And it has often seen women of different confessional backgrounds risking everything to reach across lines that no one else is willing to cross.

This grounded religious peacebuilding has both done good and caused harm. On the one hand, it has prevented violence at flashpoint sacred sites, but on the other, it has masked and reinforced sharp inequities and power asymmetries. When interfaith dialogue occurs between parties in profoundly unequal positions—with Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and Israelis enjoying full sovereignty—there is always a risk that such engagement normalizes injustice rather than confronting it. These are not reasons to abandon interfaith peacebuilding, but they underscore why such work must be undertaken with careful attention to context, power dynamics, and the complex ways religion can both challenge and legitimize oppression. Once-celebrated initiatives such as the Seeds for Peace camps that brought young Israelis and Palestinians together have come under criticism for ignoring power imbalances between the participants.

If, against all odds, the current cease-fire does somehow produce the contours of a new political and security framework acceptable to all parties, religious leaders will have a crucial role to play in providing legitimacy for those arrangements. Political agreements, no matter how carefully negotiated, remain fragile abstractions until they are embraced and internalized by communities. Religious leaders can help translate the language of diplomatic protocols into the idiom of lived faith—explaining why a particular compromise is not a betrayal but rather an expression of religious values, or how a specific security arrangement honors rather than violates sacred obligations.

Most importantly, in the long run, sustainable coexistence will require a religious grammar that can only come into existence through the collective work of rabbis, imams, and clergy living and working on the front lines of broken and traumatized communities. This theology will not emerge from conference halls in Abu Dhabi or Riyadh. It will be forged in the much more difficult and dangerous spaces where people live with the daily consequences of this conflict—in Jerusalem and Hebron, in Gaza and the West Bank, and in villages and cities where the work of building peace means risking accusations of collaboration and betrayal from one’s own community.

The region doesn’t need more gleaming Abrahamic baubles; it needs a fraught, hopeful, and seemingly impossible new theology born from the rubble of Gaza. Point eighteen could facilitate that work—but only if it is implemented with genuine commitment to supporting grassroots religious peacebuilding rather than staging another round of well-catered interfaith spectacles. The choice between these two paths will determine whether this provision becomes a meaningful contribution to peace or simply another missed opportunity.

Peter Mandaville is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. He is also a professor of international affairs in the Schar School of Policy and Government and director of the Abu Sulayman Center for Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University. From 2024 to 2025, he served as the director of the Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships and senior advisor for faith engagement at the United States Agency for International Development.

The post A little-discussed point in Trump’s Gaza plan could be an opportunity to build interfaith understanding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/peru-at-a-breaking-point-how-ten-years-of-political-chaos-opened-the-door-to-organized-crime/ Mon, 27 Oct 2025 20:26:27 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=883536 Unless the next government restores both security and institutional credibility, Peru’s democracy risks becoming not merely ungovernable, but unrecognizable.

The post Peru at a breaking point: How ten years of political chaos opened the door to organized crime appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Peru has erupted once again. The assassination attempt against a cumbia band in Lima on October 8 triggered a tumultuous month for the country. On October 10, President Dina Boluarte was removed from office, and Congressman José Jerí was inaugurated as Peru’s eighth president in ten years. In the days that followed, Peruvians took to the streets in what have become the country’s largest protests in the past five years. Clashes with police have left at least one dead and dozens injured.

The demonstrators are not only protesting the new president, who has been accused of corruption and sexual assault. The protests are the political manifestation of something deeper: the steady advance of organized crime into everyday life and the collapse of public confidence in the Peruvian state’s ability to protect its citizens. As Peru approaches its April 2026 elections, the moment holds both promise for democratic renewal and risk of democratic collapse.

As Peruvians prepare to head to the polls, the insecurity crisis will be top of mind. Over the past three years, Peru has experienced an unprecedented rise in organized criminal activity. Between 2019 and 2024, reported extortions increased sixfold, and this year every third Peruvian reported knowing a victim of extortion, many of whom are small business owners. Homicides, too, have doubled since 2019. And in January of this year alone, there were 203 percent more homicides than in January 2017. What was once seen as a problem of border towns or drug corridors has become the daily reality of small and medium-sized businesses—the country’s true economic engine.

Peru’s crisis is no longer just about corruption or governance. It is about the basic survival of the rule of law.

In cities such as Trujillo and Chiclayo, bus operators and construction firms now pay weekly “quotas” to criminal groups. In Lima’s districts, even market vendors receive extortion calls demanding transfers through digital wallets. Many of these workers belong to Peru’s vast informal sector, which employs nearly seven out of ten Peruvians and forms the social base that has now turned against the political establishment and is demanding solutions. When extortion payments and successive killings became commonplace, strikes and street protests followed against a government perceived as absent or complicit.

This explosion of criminality is the predictable outcome of a decade in which Peru’s institutions have been eaten away by self-interested politicians, resulting in political instability. Beginning in 2016, a Congress dominated by the fujimorismo movement began to abuse its oversight powers, engaging in what legal scholars term “constitutional hardball”—exploiting procedural rules to turn impeachment into a tool for political leverage rather than accountability, as seen during the impeachments of Boluarte and former President Martín Vizcarra.

The country was also undergoing the aftermath of Operation Car Wash, a far-reaching set of investigations originating in Brazil, during which Peruvian prosecutors launched aggressive corruption probes against Peru’s pre-2016 political class. The probes ended with four former Peruvian presidents convicted of corruption. Former President Alan García, who was accused of bribery, committed suicide as police entered his house to apprehend him. Former ministers, presidential contenders, business leaders, and mayors across Peru were swept up in corruption probes, effectively purging the political elite that had once promised to renew the country after the fall of Alberto Fujimori’s regime in 2000.

Unfortunately for the country, what emerged after the Operation Car Wash probes was not a cleaner class of leaders but a more fragmented, parochial, and self-interested one—far easier for organized crime to penetrate. Peru’s Congress, now one of the least trusted institutions in the hemisphere, has often acted as a shield for illicit interests. In recent years, lawmakers have quietly advanced legislation that has reduced penalties for certain crimes, weakened controls on political financing, and obstructed efforts to vet local authorities for corruption. Behind these moves lies a new generation of politicians, many of whom are under criminal investigation for corruption and other offenses. With institutions hollowed out, prosecutors underfunded, and police leadership constantly reshuffled, criminal economies have flourished.

Peru is now less than six months away from national elections, and the outlook is uncertain. After a decade of political chaos, citizens are exhausted and cynical, and the party system is in ruins. The danger is clear: When democracy cannot guarantee security or stability, it loses its moral and practical legitimacy.

The moment could go either way. On one hand, the democratic reflex remains: Peruvians still take to the streets, still reject corruption, and still demand that a competent state guarantee basic services. If leveraged the right way, these demands could be channeled by a democratic and reformist leader willing to rebuild Peru’s institutional arrangements and salvage its democracy.

On the other hand, the ground for populism has never been more fertile. Candidates who promise “order at any cost” will likely find a receptive audience among voters who feel abandoned by their government and terrorized by crime. Promising results in the fight against crime, an opportunistic leader may yet destroy what’s left of Peruvian democracy.

Peru’s crisis is no longer just about corruption or governance. It is about the basic survival of the rule of law. The October protests should not be seen as another episode in the country’s cyclical instability but as a warning that the old model—political chaos insulated from economic collapse—has possibly reached its breaking point. Unless the next government restores both security and institutional credibility, Peru’s democracy risks becoming not merely ungovernable, but unrecognizable.

---

Martin Cassinelli, who was born in Peru, is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Peru at a breaking point: How ten years of political chaos opened the door to organized crime appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/bread-and-circuses-no-more-moroccos-gen-z-rejects-spectacle-politics/ Tue, 07 Oct 2025 17:52:20 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=879886 The youth-led demonstrations make clear that Morocco stands at a crossroads between spectacle and substance.

The post ‘Bread and circuses’ no more: Morocco’s Gen Z rejects spectacle politics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> The term “bread and circuses,” first used by Roman poet Juvenal to criticize the emperors’ appeasement of the masses through basic needs and grandiose gladiator shows, echoes today in many of Morocco’s disjointed development plans. This perception by the country’s youth that Rabat actively governs its citizens with “bread and circuses” is at the center of a wave of demonstrations that have shaken Morocco since September 27.

The younger “Gen Z” generation is leading the latest protest movement, demanding greater government accountability and structural reforms in the fields of employment, health, and education. The movement represents the largest mass protest the country has seen since the February 20, 2011, Arab Spring uprisings. These demonstrations place Morocco at a crossroads between spectacle and substance, as its youth are no longer content with “bread and circuses” alone. The most anticipated reaction, however, is due this week—with a consequential address from King Mohamed VI to the parliament set for October 10.

A healthy sign in a two-speed country

On September 11, Morocco celebrated the inauguration of its state-of-the-art Prince Moulay Abdellah soccer stadium in Rabat, which has a capacity of 68,500 and a construction cost of over $75 million. This architectural jewel was completed in under two years, just months before hosting the 2025 African Cup of Nations. Three days later, protests erupted in the coastal city of Agadir over medical negligence, leading to the alleged death of several female patients. The incident, along with the stark contrast between the country’s sports ambitions and public health policies, fueled public outrage among Morocco’s youth online, leading to the launch of the #GenZ212 hashtag and calls for protests.

The kingdom lives in a disjointed reality, where the government prioritizes large-scale infrastructure and entertainment projects over the country’s external branding and tourism industry at the expense of investing in servicing its citizens. This reality was best described with the words of the kingdom’s own monarch: “a two-speed country.”

Morocco, for example, is eleventh in the world on the FIFA soccer ranking, yet ranks 120th out of 193 countries in the United Nations’ 2025 Human Development Index (HDI). It is building the largest stadium in the world in anticipation of hosting the 2030 World Cup, yet it still sits in the bottom half globally of the Healthcare Index score. It rose to second place as the fastest bullet train in the world and dropped to ninety-eighth place in the Global Knowledge Index.

Protests in a stable and dynamic country like Morocco, with a historical empire muscle and a proven survival record over the past twelve centuries, should be seen as a positive form of political participation. That’s especially true given the outsized participation of a younger, statistically more apathetic generation—and serves as a sign of a healthy society holding accountable its elected officials amid the apparent failure of performative, spectacle politics. Nonetheless, danger persists if the demonstrations spiral further. The protests have already seen moments of confrontation and vandalism, resulting in casualties, signaling how volatile the situation could become.

A generation searching for the ‘One Piece’

To understand the ongoing demonstrations, it’s essential to understand the generation that drives them. There are nearly eleven million Moroccans between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four, a quarter of whom are NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training), according to a recent study by the Moroccan Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE). The rates are far worse among women and in rural populations. Morocco’s unemployment rate soared to 13.3 percent in 2024, as the economy continues to recover from the COVID-19 crisis, despite achieving significant strides in niche industrial sectors like automotive, aeronautics, and pharmaceuticals. The current Akhannouch government coalition, led by a mishmash of oligarchs and technocrats, vowed to reduce unemployment to under 9 percent and create 350,000 new jobs by 2026, but failed to convince Moroccan youth who grew disenchanted with most political elites.

The numbers place Gen Z as the lowest age group in terms of political participation, with only 33.5 percent of the eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds registered to vote, and 55 percent of the eighteen to twenty-nine age group wanting to emigrate. Still, the massive numbers of youths who took to the streets, paired with their active online engagement, offer a different point of insight on youth political investment. Mobilization content produced on social media platforms like Discord and Instagram demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of political dynamics and a high sense of social justice.

The symbolism used in some social content borrows metaphors from popular culture, such as the Korean series Squid Game or the Spanish drama The Platform—both startling allegories about social injustice and proletarian struggle—confirms the values and aspirations guiding the protests. Similar to Gen Z movements in Nepal, Indonesia, and Europe, there is one Japanese anime that became the main symbol of these protests: One Piece. Moroccan youth seem to identify most with the manga, which tells the story of a brave subaltern youth seeking to defeat the establishment and find a mysterious treasure called the One Piece.

The ‘Zlayji’ versus the ‘Hargaoui’

Gen Z in Morocco, however, is not a homogeneous group, as it comprises several distinct archetypes within the same generation. The Z word, for example, can also apply to the “Zlayji” group of youth. The pejorative term entered the Urban Dictionary in recent years amid the raging cultural war between Morocco and Algeria over heritage symbols, such as the Kaftan, couscous, and Zellij tiles—hence the appellation of Zlayji (tile artisan). A typical Zlayji Gen Z is a fervent defender of Moroccan exceptionalism. He or she unquestioningly supports a supremacist narrative calling for the revival of the glory of the Moorish Empire in North Africa under Moroccan leadership.

The trend, which began as a spontaneous reaction to the ongoing Moroccan-Algerian rivalry, quickly evolved into an ideological tool to further expand the government’s “bread and circuses” posture and disseminate a form of banal nationalism. During the recent events, this group went completely silent, especially the army of online influencers who benefited financially from promoting Morocco’s World Cup ambitions. Others tried to recalibrate and join the new wave, siding with the more peaceful form of demonstrations.

SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER

In opposition to this class of neo-chauvinists, another archetype appeared in the kingdom’s public sphere: the “Hargaoui.” The term historically refers to a class of “uncivilized” people who behave against the social norms of politeness and respect for public property and order. The appellation Hargaoui, however, is not exclusive to a particular socio-economic class in Moroccan society, but rather a behavioral profile inherited from the era of “Blad Siba”, which was widespread in non-state-governed areas prior to the colonial encounter with the French and Spanish in 1912. 

The Hargaoui Gen Z never felt ownership of the infrastructure erected in preparation for the African and World Cups, and even actively engaged in vandalizing stadiums, signaling that they do not adhere to the government’s entertainment-focused development model. This group soon took center stage in what started as peaceful demonstrations, dragging the movement into violent confrontations, leading to the destruction and looting of private and public property.

Where we go from here

Initial government reactions show positive signs of containment and readiness to engage in constructive dialogue and reforms. Some even publicly confessed their failure in governing and responding to the aspirations of the new generations. After the demonstrations turned sour, many opposition leaders, such as Abdelilah Benkirane (the former prime minister from 2011 to 2017), who had initially fueled the discord, started calling for restraint and condemning violence. One year before the next electoral cycle, which is due in September 2026, partisan elites have come to understand the significance of youth in their political future and are attempting to appeal to them. Nevertheless, Gen Z has lost hope in the political class and is demanding accountability and the resignation of the current government.  

King Mohamed VI’s address this week will send an important signal on the steps forward. The monarch is largely considered the guarantor of the social contract between elected officials and the citizens and the symbolic “Commander of the Faithful”, according to the Moroccan Constitution. Back in 2011, in the height of the February 20 movement, the king stepped in with bold constitutional reforms and offered a pathway out of the crisis for the country’s Millennial generation. The movement has recently published its petition calling for the King to impeach the government, dissolve certain political parties, and hold public courts to punish fraudulent politicians. These demands pose a real existential conundrum for the very nature of a constitutional monarchy. Such ends will constitute a regression from the gains of the 2011 constitution, limiting the powers of the King in favor of stronger legislative and executive branches, which other generations sacrificed to attain.

An equally crucial response is expected from Crown Prince Moulay El-Hassan, who is actively being groomed for throne succession and is a Gen Z himself. Moulay El-Hassan has been increasingly active in representing his father at important development initiatives, greeting world leaders, and slowly forging a separate, more youthful, and firm public persona for himself. Several protesters have addressed him directly in some of their social media posts and solicited his mediation. 

Beneath the spectacle of gleaming stadiums and bullet trains lies a deeper hunger for dignity, accountability, and equity. Just like the pirates of “One Piece”, Gen Z Moroccans are charting their own course toward justice and belonging. Their quest is not against the crown or the system, but against the illusion that performance equals progress. Whether the Makhzen (the establishment) chooses to listen—or continues dazzling itself with its own reflection—will define the trajectory of an entire nation.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, where she also serves as the center’s deputy director for communications.

The post ‘Bread and circuses’ no more: Morocco’s Gen Z rejects spectacle politics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-questions-and-expert-answers-about-the-antigovernment-protests-in-morocco/ Fri, 03 Oct 2025 00:46:18 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=878975 Mass protests over economic conditions led by members of Morocco’s Gen Z continued to escalate in multiple cities on Thursday.

The post Four questions (and expert answers) about the antigovernment protests in Morocco  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Youth-led protests continue to escalate in multiple cities across Morocco, with three people killed in an altercation with security forces, Moroccan authorities announced Thursday. Below, Sarah Zaaimi, a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, answers four pressing questions about the ongoing demonstrations.  

1. Who is protesting?

Moroccan youth took to the streets starting September 27, after calling for general protests across the kingdom on social media using the #GenZ212 hashtag to mobilize and demand more accountability and improved public services. (The number 212 refers to Morocco’s telephone country code.) Those leading the demonstrations were initially mostly Gen Z individuals, who were apparently inspired by the momentum created by this generation in other parts of the world such as Nepal, Indonesia, and Madagascar. These demonstrations are the largest in the country since the Arab Spring and the February 20 movement, which led in 2011 to constitutional reforms limiting the power of the monarchy and providing more authority to the executive and legislative branches.  

This new type of protest is unique because it is largely organized by a digital generation using the tools and ideals of Gen Z—coordinating and arranging an entire social movement on platforms such as Discord, Twitch, and TikTok. Unlike in other demonstrations in Morocco, where civil society, opinion leaders, and political parties take the lead—as seen over the past two years in the pro-Palestine protests—this wave extends beyond the country’s traditional political and business elites, civil society leaders, and media. 

For the past three days, the demonstrations have taken a more violent turn in some of the most impoverished towns and suburbs, where socioeconomic disparities are more pronounced and the populations are increasingly frustrated with the political class. This includes cities such as Sale, Inezgane, and Oujda. Some demonstrations that had been peaceful have been hijacked by new groups, mainly minors from Gen Alpha, who have vandalized and looted public and private property, according to the Interior Ministry’s spokesperson, Rachid El Khalfi.

Last night, the authorities responded with live ammunition when a group of minors stormed a gendarmerie barricade in Lqliaa, Southern Morocco, resulting in the death of three people. The Moroccan Ministry of Interior also announced the injury of 354 people, mostly from law enforcement, and damage to private cars, shops, banks, and public buildings across twenty-three regions.  

2. Why are they protesting?

The demonstrations started after Morocco unveiled its new Moulay Abdellah soccer stadium in Rabat in mid-September. The stadium reportedly costs $75 million and it is scheduled to host the African Cup this December. Simultaneously, reports of several patients dying of medical negligence in Agadir brought back to the surface questions about the country’s development priorities. Frustration over degraded health and education services, while the government is actively gearing up to erect state-of-the-art sports infrastructure to meet its 2030 World Cup hosting targets, is compounding the crisis.  

In a recent speech, King Mohamed VI described Morocco as a two-speed economy, where opposites coexist in the same dysfunctional context. On one hand, ambitious infrastructure and industrial projects are underway, while on the other, basic vital public services are performing poorly. 

Youth, who make up nearly a third of the population, say they feel disenfranchised by the country’s policies and international ambitions, which mainly target external audiences and tourists. Entire neighborhoods are being reduced to rubble to make space for new hotels, highways, and stadiums. At the same time, progress in the vital fields of education, youth employment, and medical services remains unsatisfactory. Adding to the problem, Morocco has not yet fully recovered from the economic crisis and inflation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and it has still not fully compensated victims of the 2023 Al Haouz earthquake. 

Demonstrators have also leveld accusations of corruption against the current coalition government, which has been in power since October 2021 and is led by Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch. Akhannouch, one of Morocco’s wealthiest businessmen and the head of Akwa Group, with a reported net worth of $1.6 billion, has been under scrutiny for potential conflicts of interest between his personal business dealings and state projects. Some voices within the new protest movement are also calling for the government to step down and be held accountable for any mismanagement of public funds.  

3. How has the Moroccan government responded? 

In the first few days of the demonstrations, the authorities apprehended around one thousand protesters, according to the Moroccan Association of Human Rights, for holding unauthorized protests. Many of these protesters have since been released. But as frustration grew over the government’s lack of communication and limited response, more violent confrontations between the authorities and a mixture of mobsters and demonstrators started dominating parts of the movement, especially in the suburbs and more underdeveloped towns, resulting in casualties and chaos.  

Akhannouch addressed the protests in public remarks on Thursday, six days after the start of the protests. He expressed his sadness amid the unfortunate escalation of violence. He vowed the readiness of his cabinet to respond to the demands voiced by Morocco’s youth and to engage in dialogue within institutions and public spaces. 

Given the complex nature of the constitutional monarchy in Morocco, dividing powers between the monarch, “the commander of the faithful,” and the elected executive and legislative branches, many demonstrators also look up to King Mohamed VI to take firm decisions and enact drastic systemic reforms to adress the failure of the political class and degrading services. The king had previously responded positively to the Arab Spring’s demonstrations in 2011, allowing Moroccan society to experience what commentators have referred to as “an evolution rather than a revolution,” unlike other Arab countries in the region. However, the 2011 constitutional reforms would make it difficult for the king to simply dissolve the government, and it would require a broader consensus and action from the parliament’s side. Moroccan youth are also looking for signals from Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, a member of Gen Z himself, who has been playing a greater role in the political and development sphere as part of the long-term succession process.  

4. What should we expect next? 

With general elections scheduled to take place in September 2026, the current Gen Z uprising will undoubtedly reshape the political conversation in Morocco and help recenter the government’s priorities beyond the spectacle- and infrastructure-focused policies ahead of the 2030 World Cup. Given the country’s track record in managing crises, Morocco will likely absorb the current events and gradually return to normalcy. While it is unlikely that this new social movement will evolve into a more transformative revolution, as was the case in Nepal, it is still a pivotal moment for the country and a wake-up call. It is clear that there is a deep rift between a digitally connected and politically critical generation and the current governing elites, and whose priorities focus on stones rather than humans.  

It is also essential to watch for any ripple effect of these demonstrations in the larger Middle East and North Africa region, like what happened during the Arab Spring, when the wave of protests started in Tunisia and then spread across other Arab countries. Neighboring Algeria is already bracing for similar protests under the label of #GenZ213 (using Algeria’s telephone code of +213) on Friday.  

---

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, focusing on identity and minorities in the region. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

The post Four questions (and expert answers) about the antigovernment protests in Morocco  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/plight-of-belarusian-political-prisoners-must-not-be-forgotten/ Wed, 01 Oct 2025 19:58:50 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=878544 Belarusian human rights defender Andrei Chapiuk spent almost five years in prison and says the world must not forget about the more than one thousand Belarusian political prisoners who remain behind bars.

The post Plight of Belarusian political prisoners must not be forgotten appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On October 2, 2020, Belarusian human rights defender Andrei Chapiuk was arrested as part of a sweeping crackdown on the country’s civil society following mass protests in the wake of a presidential election that was widely considered fraudulent. Chapiuk is a volunteer for the Belarusian NGO Viasna, one of many civil society organizations specifically targeted by the Belarusian authorities and falsely accused of orchestrating mass demonstrations against Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Like many Viasna staff and volunteers, Chapiuk faced trumped up charges and was tried in a closed session of the Minsk Municipal Court. He received a fine and a six-year sentence. In April 2025, Chapiuk was released.

More than 1000 political prisoners remain behind bars in Belarus, including other Viasna staff and volunteers such as Ales Bialiatski, Uladzimir Labkovich, Valiantsin Stefanovic, and Nasta Loika. Viasna volunteer service coordinator Marfa Rabkova was arrested two weeks before Chapiuk and is also still in prison. The UN Special Rapporteur monitoring human rights in Belarus has consistently called on the Belarusian authorities to cease the persecution of human rights defenders and others in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of civil and political rights.

This month marks five years since Chapiuk was imprisoned. From exile, Chapiuk spoke to Human Rights House Foundation to discuss life after prison in a new country and reflect on the realities facing his colleagues still behind bars. When asked about life following his release, Chapiuk says the impact of prison is only truly understood once a person is free. “Everything surfaces, the whole experience of imprisonment. It’s like the body finally feels it can release everything that’s been piling up.”

Freedom, Chapiuk argues, brings a painful clarity to what has been taken away. “Six months, one year, then three; those numbers felt oddly insignificant because you were always surrounded by people who had served longer. Once you’re free, you realize how long that time really is.”

Chapiuk remains deeply concerned for his friends and colleagues who are still unjustly imprisoned, such as Marfa Rabkova. “Masha has missed so much over this period, left so much behind. There are health problems, too. I think it will feel even heavier when she’s released.”

The longer you’ve been inside, says Chapiuk, the harder it is to adjust to the new realities of freedom. “You step out into a world you last saw during COVID. People in masks. Now there’s a war. Belarus feels emptier. Technology has leapt ahead and you’re supposed to just jump right back in.” The arrival of artificial intelligence especially struck him. “In prison, we heard rumors. Once free, I was amazed at how cohesive and powerful these tools are.”

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Chapiuk says that political prisoners in Belarus now face restricted access to books and education. “When I arrived in 2023, inmates could still apply for secondary education. Months later, the authorities cut it off entirely, especially for those of us on the extremism list. Then they started confiscating foreign language books, even personal ones.”

The confiscation of books is used as a form of punishment. “People tried hiding their own books but staff still found and confiscated them. The mindset in the system is that prisoners must suffer constantly. And since political prisoners tend to value books and education, the system decided to eliminate those.”

While discussing what life might have been like if he had not been arrested in 2020, Chapiuk is adamant that there really was no alternative. “Historically in Belarus, after civic activity, repression follows. I expected something to happen after the 2020 protests, but not the scale. Given the situation in Belarus, I’d likely have ended up either imprisoned or forced into exile anyway.”

On the subject of exile, we discuss Chapiuk’s decision to leave Belarus after his release. Faced with constant harassment and the likelihood of rearrest, he felt that fleeing Belarus was the only option. “The police presence in Belarus is constant. Former prisoners are subjected to mandatory check-ins twice a month, weekly lectures, and home visits, often late at night with flashlights in your face.”

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

In early 2022, news of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine reached Belarusian inmates via state media. “Only later did I learn the truth about occupied cities and mass casualties. There was constant fear that Belarus would be dragged in and that we prisoners would be used as cannon fodder,” Chapiuk recalls. He says that even the prison guards seemed unsettled, secretly following independent news sources and perhaps worrying about what role they might be forced to play should Belarus enter the war.

International attention has become a complex issue for Belarusian political prisoners in recent years. Relatives of prisoners often ask human rights organizations not to make posts marking detention anniversaries or birthdays, as such attention can lead to reprisals inside prison. At the same time, Chapiuk argues that media coverage can make a difference. “After reports of abuse, inspectors arrive at colonies or jails. Prisons often hide people in punishment cells, but overall, high-profile prisoners are sometimes mistreated less to avoid trouble.”

Chapiuk emphasizes the importance of keeping the health of political prisoners high on the agenda. “The more medical units are checked, the more violations are documented, the better for inmates in the long run. Prison healthcare is terrible everywhere.”

Letters were once a lifeline for political prisoners in Belarus but are now heavily censored, says Chapiuk. Nevertheless, he urges people not to give up and to continue writing. “Even if letters don’t reach us, the authorities see the activity. It shows we’re not forgotten.”

The families of political prisoners also face pressure and can be targeted by the Belarusian authorities. Chapiuk recalls the case of one co-defendant’s mother who was given a prison sentence for simply sharing information about her son. “The state has built a second ring of repression to cut off information flows.”

Chapiuk is deeply troubled by the idea that the suffering of Belarusians will be forgotten and that no one will be held accountable for the years of abuse, despite the extensive documentation of human rights violations by Belarusian civil society. Recent prisoner releases have given him hope, despite the fact that these releases have often been followed by forced exile. “It would be better if people were freed earlier, not just at the end of their terms. But still, each release matters. It means someone can finally live freely again and feel what freedom really is.”

Craig Jackson is senior communications officer at the Human Rights House Foundation.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 30, 2025

Putin’s dream of demilitarizing Ukraine has turned into his worst nightmare

By Peter Dickinson

Putin had hoped to demilitarize and decapitate the Ukrainian state, but his self-defeating invasion has inadvertently created the militarily powerful and fiercely independent Ukraine he feared most of all, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Sep 16, 2025

Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet

By David Kirichenko

NATO must urgently learn from Ukraine’s unique experience of Russian drone warfare as the alliance seeks to address the growing threats posed by Putin’s drone swarms, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Sep 9, 2025

What is the Coalition of the Willing actually willing to do in Ukraine?

By Mykola Bielieskov

European troops in Ukraine could serve as a meaningful element within a broader deterrence package, but Coalition of the Willing leaders should focus on making the Ukrainian military strong enough to deter the Kremlin, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

Follow us on social media
and support our work

support our work

The post Plight of Belarusian political prisoners must not be forgotten appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/a-geography-of-protest-inside-the-rise-of-irans-minority-factor/ Tue, 23 Sep 2025 15:39:23 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=876510 From the death of Mahsa Jina Amini to the Twelve Day War, the ethnic question has emerged as a significant dimension of Iran’s politics.

The post A geography of protest: Inside the rise of Iran’s minority factor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> In the wake of June’s Twelve Day War between Israel, Iran and the United States, the role of ethnicity in shaping political mobilization and activism in Iran remains a particularly important issue.

In recent years, the ethnic question has emerged as a saliently significant—though often under-examined—dimension of Iran’s domestic politics. While ethnicity has long played a role in Iran’s political landscape, in recent years— from the 2017 demonstrations against rising food prices, the 2019 fuel price protests, the 2021 “uprising of the thirsty” and the 2022 demonstrations sparked by the death of Mahsa Jina Amini —the main axis of anti-regime activism has increasingly shifted from Persian-majority or ethnically mixed metro areas of central Iran to the country’s ethnic periphery.

The term “ethnic periphery” here refers to both the geographic concentration of non-Persian ethnic groups along Iran’s borders—from the northwest to the southeast and up north—and the structural inequality in power and resource distribution between these regions and the central parts of the country. This shift has placed ethnic identity and long-standing ethnic grievances at the heart of domestic political contention, reshaping significantly both the geography and logic of protest.

Related reading

MENASource

Sep 23, 2025

Iran’s minorities and policy complexity: A look at two communities

By David Sklar

Iran plays a significant role in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Policymakers should develop a sober, accurate mapping of its population.

Civil Society Iran

The growing prominence of the ethnic factor in Iranian politics demands recognition from analysts and policymakers. Much prevailing discourse and debate about Iran remains Tehran-centric, overlooking the voices and grievances of marginalized ethnic communities in the periphery. Yet any future political transformation, whether through protest, reform, or conflict, must reckon with the centrality of ethnic demands. Rooted in decades of structural exclusion and cultural repression these demands have now coalesced into a potent political force.

This has effectively created a bifurcation of political activism in recent years into two distinct geographies: the Persian-majority center and the ethnic periphery. Unlike earlier protest movements—such as the 1999 student protests or the 2009 Green Movement, which were primarily centered in Tehran and other Persian-majority cities—protests since 2017 have either originated from, or derived their strength and longevity in, the non-Persian periphery, typically provoking harsher government violence in these regions.

Therefore, for policymakers inside and outside Iran, analysts, and activists alike, a Tehran-centric view of Iran is no longer sufficient. The ethnic factor is not a fringe issue but a defining element of Iran’s contemporary political landscape. Activists in these regions are not only challenging the government or the regime—they are also challenging the meaning of citizenship and national identity in Iran, with implications that extend beyond the current political system.

SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER

Ethnic mobilization and the new geography of protest

There is no precise breakdown of ethnic groups in Iran, as the state does not include ethnicity in its population censuses. Estimates vary considerably: for example, the US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook editions of 2010 and 2016 placed Persians at 51 percent and 61 percent respectively, Azeris at 16–24 percent, Kurds at 7–10 percent, Arabs at 2–3 percent, and Baloch at around 2 percent.

Decades of systemic discrimination has given rise to a deepening sense of ethnic political consciousness among Kurdish, Baluch, Arab, and Azeri Turkish communities in Iran. While in many cases this has led to the emergence of numerous (and technically outlawed) ethnic-nationalist political parties, the Kurdish case illustrates the prevailing demand among ethnic communities is generally for some form of recognized status and local governance within the borders of present-day Iran.

Apart from socio-economic factors discussed below, the distinct ethnic-nationalist consciousness unfolds against a state-promoted national identity constructed around two primary poles: Persian language and culture, and Shia Islam. The manifestations of this systematic exclusion are multifaceted. For instance, while Article Fifteen of Iran’s Constitution permits non-Persian languages in schools, the state suppresses this right even in private settings—as seen in the sentencing of Kurdish activist Zahra Mohammadi to five years in prison for teaching Kurdish in a non-official capacity, (though she was released one year later).

Additionally, ethnic groups have historically suffered from disproportionate state violence. According to the Oslo-based Iran Human Rights organization, From 2010 to 2024, 97 percent of those executed on political charges (participation in political and armed groups) were Kurds, Baluch, or Arabs. The Baluch, only 2–6 percent of the population, accounted for 17 percent of execution on narcotics charges in 2024 and nearly half in 2022 and 2021. Human rights organizations say these trials lacked due process and often coincided with the aftermath of major political unrest. Economic disparities mirror this repression. In the Iranian calender year 1402 (March 2023–March 2024), ethnic-majority provinces like Sistan-Baluchistan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ardebil, and Khuzestan ranked among the highest in poverty and unemployment in Iran.

The marginalization outlined above has been met with growing political awareness, particularly since the late 1990s. Satellite television, the internet, and social media have enabled ethnic political activists—mostly based outside Iran due to state repression—to connect with their communities, and raise awareness about structural discrimination. At times, using these communication technologies, political activists and groups from outside have successfully mobilized collective action inside the country, such as strikes.

This expanded media ecosystem has fostered a deeper understanding in the non-Persian periphery of how ethnic identity intersects with broader forms of religious, economic, and gender-based exclusion, shaping the relationship between these regions and the central state. As a result, demands emerging from Iran’s ethnic periphery are increasingly framed through a discourse of identity-driven rights and justice—often infused with ethno-nationalist undertones, especially among diaspora-based groups and individuals—in response to long-standing perceptions of ethnically driven exclusion and marginalization. These demands, directed at the central state, often include cultural and linguistic recognition, fair distribution of economic resources, religious freedom—since many in these communities are non-Shi’a (the official religion of the state) or non-Muslim—and freedom for political activity and representation.

Ultimately, due to the confluence of persistent multifaceted discrimination and rising political awareness, the center of gravity of anti-government activism in Iran has increasingly shifted to the country’s ethnic periphery. This trend is evident in several waves of large-scale protests in recent years. For example, the Arab-majority province of Khuzestan, with a sizeable ethnic Lur population, became a focal point of unrest and state violence during the 2019 protests over rising fuel prices and again in 2021 due to water scarcity. Iranian security forces reportedly killed around 1,500 protestors in Khuzestan in 2019.

While the death of Amini, a young Kurdish woman, in Tehran was not the first case of state violence against women, it was the large funeral and subsequent gatherings in her Kurdish hometown of Saqqez that provided the sparks for what became the most enduring protests and serious threat to the Islamic Republic in recent memory. This early reaction in Kurdish areas gave Amini’s death a powerful resonance across Iran, fueling growing protests elsewhere in the country and prompting widespread international outrage and condemnation.

Data from various sources indicated that during the ensuing 2022–2023 Women, Life, Freedom protests, the bulk of those killed came from the ethnic periphery—particularly the Baluch and Kurdish regions. Human rights organizations focused on Iran estimated that fatalities in these areas accounted for between 40 and over 50 percent of the roughly five-hundred civilians killed during the protests. A study presented at an Iranian scientific conference in 2022, and cited in both domestic and foreign-based media, listed Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchestan—alongside the capital Tehran—among the three provinces that witnessed the “most extensive and severe” protests of the movement. Overall, the various waves of protests from 2017 through 2022 point to an evolving geography of dissent, signaling a shift in the dynamics of political resistance in Iran: ethnic peripheries—historically sites of securitization and neglect—have emerged as the primary arenas of anti-regime mobilization.

A spectrum of political mobilization

However, not all non-Persian ethnic communities in Iran exhibit the same degree of political mobilization or motivation to challenge state policies, as they are not all subjected to the same levels of exclusion or persecution. Kurds—estimated to comprise 10 percent of the population—stand out as the most politically active and organized, due in part to their longstanding tradition of ethno-national activism going back to the turn of the twentieth century. Stronger trends of activism have begun to emerge among the Baluch and Arab communities. In contrast, various Turkic groups like the Azeris tend to engage less in overt political activism. This can largely be attributed to their Shia identity and long-standing integration into Iran’s ruling structures—most notably through the legacy of Turkic dynasties such as the Safavids, who institutionalized Shiism, and later the Qajars. Today, both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian are of Azeri Turkish background, reflecting that legacy of incorporation into the state.

Shared experiences of systemic marginalization and state repression have fostered inter-ethnic solidarity, notably during the 2022–2023 protests where Kurdish and Baluchi demonstrators expressed mutual support. Outside Iran, this sentiment is reflected in the Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran—an alliance of ethnic-oriented political groups formed in 2005. Yet, internal tensions complicate sustained cooperation, as seen in disputes between Azeri Turks and Kurds in West Azerbaijan over territory, and between Arabs and Lurs in Khuzestan over local power and resources. Neighboring states, particularly Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan, add further complexity by promoting Azeri nationalism within Iran. Tehran exploits these ethnic tensions to cement its control over ethnic regions.

Policy implications and future outlook

The shift in Iranian protest movements from the Persian center to the ethnic periphery carries a number of major implications. First, there is a growing divide between how people in the center and those in the periphery imagine political action and change. Second, the success of any future protests movement will hinge on bridging the gap between the center and the periphery and bolstering intra-communal solidarity. Third, the ethnic periphery has moved from being a passive recipient of state policy to an assertive and influential actor in shaping Iran’s political future.

As a relic of numerous empires, the geography of the modern state of Iran is a rich tapestry of various ethnic and religious groups and cultures. The emergence of a unitary and centralized state in early twentieth-century Iran—and the imposition of a singular national identity, with power and resources distributed based on conformity to that identity—is a departure in the broader historical trajectory of this pluralistic political geography.

While ethnic activists, whether peaceful or armed, are often accused of separatism, the reality is that most ethnic political movements and communities in Iran are calling for a more equitable distribution of authority—increasingly through decentralized arrangements—and a fairer allocation of resources, irrespective of ethnicity or religion. Framing these demands as separatist not only distorts their intent but also enables the state’s violent suppression of ethnic activism, as accusations of “separatism” and “partition” remain the primary legal grounds for imprisoning—and in many cases executing—ethnic activists.

Against this backdrop, there appears to be growing recognition of ethnic agency at the political level inside Iran, as reflected particularly in the 2024 presidential elections. The victory of Pezeshkian, an Azeri Turk, and his strong reliance on Azeri Turkish votes underscored how ethnic solidarity can significantly influence national outcomes. While the state has typically framed ethnic activism as a threat to national security and stability, Pezeshkian—and reformists more broadly—appear to recognize the political value of engaging non-Persian constituencies. Under Pezeshkian, for the first time in the Islamic Republic’s history, the government has appointed Sunni Kurdish and Baluch governors and a Sunni Kurdish vice president, in an attempt to win over hearts and minds within these communities. However, despite promises in past election cycles, reformists have failed to deliver on core ethnic demands such as recognizing linguistic rights in the education system, redistributing economic resources, and ending securitization. This failure has cast doubt on reformists’ willingness or ability to address broader injustices against ethnic communities and has underscored the structural limits of the political system. Yet, as protest remains a dangerous and heavily repressed avenue for ethnic expression, the electoral arena may increasingly become a key venue for ethnic mobilization and leverage—but the question remains whether this will yield meaningful representation or merely co-opt elite figures.

Mohammed A. Salih is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program. He has two decades of experiences writing on Middle Eastern regional affairs, including Kurdish affairs and ethnic and sectarian relations, in various capacities as a journalist, analyst, and scholar. He is available on X @MohammedASalih

The post A geography of protest: Inside the rise of Iran’s minority factor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/irans-minorities-and-policy-complexity-a-look-at-two-communities/ Tue, 23 Sep 2025 15:38:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=876503 Iran plays a significant role in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Policymakers should develop a sober, accurate mapping of its population.

The post Iran’s minorities and policy complexity: A look at two communities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> This summer, a US-backed campaign aimed at Iranian regime change seemed possible. While that is now unlikely, further covert operations by Israel remain probable, and future US involvement is not out of the question. Iran plays a significant role in Middle Eastern geopolitics, so even barring dramatic near-term action, policymakers should develop and maintain a sober, accurate mapping of the population.

To that end, some initial points ought to be registered: Iran is far from a monolithic country, a new Shah may not be a realistic or suitable solution, and efforts to reform or topple the current regime are as complex and diverse as Iran’s citizens and diaspora communities. What follows is a brief illustration of two key regions.

Related reading

MENASource

Sep 23, 2025

A geography of protest: Inside the rise of Iran’s minority factor

By Mohammed A. Salih

From the death of Mahsa Jina Amini to the Twelve Day War, the ethnic question has emerged as a significant dimension of Iran’s politics.

Civil Society Iran

Rojhelat

Rojhelat, which translates to ‘east’ in Kurdish, is commonly used to refer to Kurdish-inhabited areas in present-day Iran. While figures are inevitably estimates, Kurds assess the population as about twelve-million, and Kurdish discontent has been consistent for decades across Iranian government systems. Over the summer I spoke to several community activists and analysts living abroad; some wished to remain anonymous due to Iran’s history of transnational attacks.

Zhila Mostajer, spokesperson and co-founder of the Oslo-based Hengaw organization, told me, “American audiences and international institutions must understand discrimination and repression against nationalities and religious or cultural minorities in Iran. Human rights violations are not temporary trends but part of a structural and organized state policy.”

SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER

The Jin, Jiyan, Azadi (Kurdish for women, life, freedom) movement began in Kurdish-majority areas in 2022 after Jina Amini was killed in Tehran by the morality police, sparking massive outcry. For Kurds, Jina’s ethnicity was paramount, and many bristle when she is called Mahsa (her Persian name). A European-based activist explained to me:

“During the Jina protests, when we highlighted the harsh violence in Kurdish areas, Persian anti-regime activists told us to stop causing disunity. We were criticized for saying that Jina was killed because she was Kurdish. But in Iran, it is Kurds being shot or handed death sentences, far more than those from Tehran. We are not granted space to own our narrative, so violence is made invisible. We have been against this regime from the start. But Kurds must be allowed to represent themselves. It is a monologue, not a dialogue.”

Kurdish activists and civil society representatives expressed, first and foremost, heightened frustration with Iran’s diaspora anti-regime voices. Samira Ghaderi, a Kurdish-American attorney, said that “many Iranian monarchists demand commitment to a ‘unified Iran’ as a prerequisite for cooperation, but Kurds see this as a continuation of the centralized, nationalist model that has historically repressed them.”

“Without recognizing the Kurdish people’s right to meaningful autonomy, federalism or even confederalism, calls for territorial integrity will be seen as a tool of domination rather than unity,” she added.

All of the activists and analysts I spoke with want anti-regime activists to validate their complaints regarding the regime’s targeting of Kurds rather than stress Iranian unity.

Some referred to the current Pahlavi restoration movement as the ultranationalist, threatening vestiges of a former dictatorship, and a European activist was alarmed that Pahlavi claims the support of prospective Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) defectors. Minority diaspora communities appear frustrated and surprised by the friendly reception the Shah’s son has received from Western media and the international community, given the family’s history of corruption and dictatorial tendencies.

One activist noted that during and immediately after the Iran-Israel conflict, Kurds were holding their breath. Hengaw’s documentation illustrates that regime pressure against minorities sharply intensified after the war, for example through increases in Kurdish arrests and violent raids of Baha’i homes. Three Kurds were executed on June 25, and five Kurds were handed death sentences on vague charges on July 10 amid fear of widespread crackdowns. Schilan Kurdpoor, a German-based activist, pointed out that during and shortly after the Iran-Israel conflict, the IRGC flooded into Kurdish regions to prevent an uprising and imprison Jin, Jiyan, Azadi protesters.

It is not clear whether policy-makers in Israel or the United States weighed the consequences of this conflict in terms of heightened human rights abuses on marginalized populations in Iran. A British-based analyst told me that “Kurds, whether in Iraq, Iran, or Syria, see themselves as US and Western allies … I think leaving this regime in power is a catastrophic mistake.”

“While it has been badly crippled, it will recover over the next five to ten years thanks mostly to its oil revenue, and the West and Israel will have to deal with another major escalation, most likely with someone who comes after Ayatollah Khamenei,” he said.

Balochistan

While the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi movement began in Rojhelat, it quickly spread throughout Iran. In Balochistan, this roughly coincided with a local issue. A week before Amini’s murder, a fifteen-year old Balochi girl was taken to an interview with Ebrahim Khouchakzai, IRGC Police Commander in Chahabar. There had been a murder in her neighborhood, and she was summoned as a potential witness. After the interview, she told her parents that she was raped by Khouchakzai, and the family then sought community support. At Friday prayers in Rask, Imam Naghshbandi referred publicly to the alleged violation. He later stated that it was his duty to break the silence. This incident, together with the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi movement, spurred protests throughout Balochistan. The IRGC responded by firing live rounds at protesters—Balochis refer to this as bloody Friday. A Balochi Human Rights Group (BHRG) spokesperson noted that the IRGC barred doctors and nurses from providing treatment to protesters, and many died due to lack of medical care.

Prominent Balochi activist, Rahim Bandoui, told me: “The American public needs to know that Iran is not one nation. We do not have one language, one culture, or even one history.”

Bandoui recounts the historical privilege of Persian elite and twelver Shia adherents over all others in Iran, particularly following the 1921 coup and furthered through the Pahlavi dynasty. He explains, “all Iranian citizens became insiders or outsiders—and in particular Balochi, Kurds, and Arabs became outsiders. Balochis do not trust Persian government rule, and Persian governments have never trusted Balochi people.”

Balochistan first fell under Tehran’s control in the early 1800s, and successive Iranian administrations have refrained from meaningful investment in Balochi regions.

Bandoui is skeptical of a new [Pahlavi] Shah as a solution. “The problem is that he is not accepting Iran as a multi-ethnic, multinational country. We seek a federation or a confederation, nothing short of that. We want decentralization, and we doubt any oppressed minority nationalities in Iran will support him.”

While some estimates put the Balochi population as low as 2 percent of Iran’s population, others put the figure as high as 4.8 million. A BHRG spokesperson told me that hundreds of thousands of Balochis in Iran are denied government identification, complicating population estimates and preventing many from getting jobs, opening bank accounts, or traveling. The undocumented are especially vulnerable to abuse by government authorities, who allegedly confiscate their property with impunity.

On July 1, Iranian security forces reportedly stormed the small village of Gunich, ostensibly to round up Israeli agents. Several villagers were shot, at least two women were killed, a pregnant mother lost her baby, and protesters were arrested. But according to Bandoui, the Israel-Iran conflict is not the Balochi’s fight.

“The regime is always after excuses to attack or kill. But the fight between Israel and the Iranian regime has nothing to do with Kurds or Balochis. The regime spent all Iran’s wealth on its military weapons and on proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas, and always said ‘death to Israel’. They wanted this fight, they wanted the Shia crescent, and October 7 was done with their support. For Balochis, we care about the people inside Iran. This is not between Iranian people and Israeli people or between Islam and Judaism. This is between Khamenei and Israel.”

According to the BHRG spokesperson, the Iran-Israel conflict has only intensified what was already happening: arrests, executions, extrajudicial killings of Balochi fuel carriers, and imprisonment of undocumented Balochis and Afghan refugees.

Bandoui added that “Washington should better understand what is happening throughout Iran, not only in the Farsi-speaking areas. Women in Tehran may be fighting against the mandatory hijab, but in minority areas, it is a daily fight for survival.”

She also said that the regime has been so humiliated in the Iran-Israel war that in the aftermath it is trying to create havoc, pain, and fear to maintain control. Bandoui says that “this regime is now like an injured snake. And the ones who will suffer from this will be Kurds, Arabs, and most certainly, Balochis.”

Considerations for US policy

While the future of US-Iran relations is difficult to chart, given the unpredictable nature of decision-making in both countries, simplified and rosy assessments can lead to unintended and disastrous consequences.

When the United States toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, policy visions–conjectures–proved poor substitutes for what was required: nuanced understanding of the political priorities of various and often competing ethnic and sectarian communities and tribes. Washington will benefit from exposure to voices representing different communities in Iran, with their distinctive goals and orientations. The Iranian nuclear program may currently be top of mind for many external observers, but it is far from the only or even the leading concern for many of Iran’s citizens and diaspora community members.

David Sklar is a consultant specializing in the rights of minority communities in the Middle East and North Africa. He advises the Free Yezidi Foundation and worked at the National Democratic Institute.

The post Iran’s minorities and policy complexity: A look at two communities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/in-landmark-syria-elections-women-still-face-electoral-hurdles/ Wed, 17 Sep 2025 19:29:26 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=875120 As the indirect electoral process begins, Syrian officials could take several steps to increase women’s chances in this process.

The post In landmark Syria elections, women still face electoral hurdles appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Syrians are about to complete a new and important step of the country’s transition after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime last year: the formation of a transitional legislative assembly. The indirect electoral process is expected to be completed by the end of September.

The stakes are high because during their two-and-a-half-year renewable mandate set by the Constitutional Declaration adopted in March, the new parliament members will be tasked with passing laws that will shape the reconstruction and the new direction of the country. Therefore, it is crucial that all the components of the Syrian society are represented. According to the electoral framework, there will be “at least 20 percent of women” in the total of all the electoral committees. This provision has revived the discussion about the need for increased women’s inclusion in decision-making in Syria.

Under Assad, women made up only 10 to 12 percent of the members of parliament between 2007 and 2022, according to a report by the Syrian non-governmental organization (NGO), Musawa. Women’s participation was even lower at the local level, where they accounted for 2 percent of the members of local and municipal councils in 2011, reaching 11 to 12 percent in 2022, the organization found.

Since the fall of Assad, progress regarding women’s political participation has been limited. The interim government includes only one woman Minister. The Preparation Committee for the National Dialogue and the Constitutional Drafting Committee—transitional bodies tasked with completing milestones of the transition—both included two women out of seven members (30 percent). However, women accounted for approximately 20 percent to 25 percent of the participants in the National Dialogue Conference held in Damascus in February 2025, according to my conversations with organizers and participants.

Traditions and conservative social norms have hindered Syrian women’s political participation, despite their involvement in the 2011 revolution and during the war. Based on my conversations with women activists throughout Syria last spring, the requirement of joining the former governing Ba’ath Party and the fear of being associated with the corruption of the regime also deterred women from participating in politics under Assad. Therefore, the current transition offers an opportunity for women, despite the resistance of conservative parts of Syrian society and the authorities themselves.

SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER

Yet, the complicated mechanism designed for these indirect elections does not favor women’s inclusion. The Supreme Committee for the People’s Assembly Elections, which oversees the process, appointed Election Sub-Committees in each of the sixty-two electoral districts. Only 11 percent of the appointed members of the Election Sub-Committees are women (twenty out of 179). Election sub-committees are in charge of appointing a fifty-member Electoral Body for each seat allocated to the electoral district. On election day, approximately six thousand members of the Electoral Body will elect 120 members of parliament from their ranks. There are 140 seats open for the election, but the government has decided to postpone voting in Suweida, in parts of Raqqa and Hasakeh provinces, officially because of security concerns. In reality, the government does not control these parts of the country. In addition, the President will directly appoint a third of the assembly by selecting an additional seventy members.

Research shows that women are less likely to be elected in majoritarian systems, whereas they do better in proportional representation elections. Majoritarian systems, such as the Syrian People’s Assembly indirect election system, favor the dominant groups, including notables and community leaders, who are usually men.

For this indirect election, the first challenge for women is to be selected for the Electoral Body, which will be made up of one-third of notables (overwhelmingly men) and two-thirds of professionals and academics. Then, women need to put themselves forward as candidates among their peers of the Electoral Body. Last but not least, women have to win the majority of the votes of the members of the Electoral Body.

Therefore, it is very challenging for women to become members of the new assembly, even more so for women from minority groups. While the announcement of a 20 percent quota is a positive, albeit modest, step, the electoral decree specifies that it applies to “the total of all the electoral committees” and not to each Sub-committee and to each Electoral body. In order to enhance women’s participation in decision-making, Syrian civil society organizations have launched a campaign calling for a 30 percent quota for women in each committee involved in the electoral process, as well as in the People’s Assembly.

Syrian officials have privately said, according to a trusted secondary source who spoke to me on background, that President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s appointment of one-third of the members of the assembly will present an opportunity to fill gaps once the vote is completed. But this opaque and discretionary procedure cannot be a reliable solution to counter the barriers to women’s participation.

Across the wider Arab region, women represent an average of 17.7 percent of parliament membership. Several countries, including Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, have adopted electoral quotas or reserved seats for women, ranging from 14 percent to 50 percent. For instance, in 2019, the United Arab Emirates issued a decree providing for a 50 percent electoral quota for women, and it has since reached parity in its Parliament, whereas no women were sitting in the assembly in 2006.

As the indirect electoral process has started, the Syrian authorities and civil society could take several steps to increase women’s chances in this process. First, it is crucial to inform women about the election mechanism and encourage them to ask to join the Electoral bodies. Civil society organizations are leading the awareness effort, but it is challenging for them to reach all the districts, and they should be supported. Second, when the preliminary lists of members of the Electoral bodies are published, civil society activists should advocate to increase the number of women in the final list. Third, civil activists and women’s organizations should raise awareness among members of the Electoral bodies of the need for fair representation of women in the assembly.

The task is daunting in such a short time frame, but the stakes are high. Building a political system that guarantees the representation of all, including women from all communities, and equal rights, will significantly determine the success of the transition, as inclusion is the main way to ensure a durable peace.

Marie Forestier is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She is also currently a consultant for the European Institute of Peace and the co-director of the Syria Strategy Project.

The post In landmark Syria elections, women still face electoral hurdles appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inside-the-talibans-gender-apartheid/education-as-resistance-how-women-in-afghanistan-fight-gender-apartheid-through-solidarity/ Mon, 15 Sep 2025 13:36:12 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=872814 Even under the Taliban’s gender apartheid, the women and girls of Afghanistan continue to learn, build, and gain leadership skills with the help of community mentors and small stipends.

The post Education as resistance: How women in Afghanistan fight gender apartheid through solidarity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> In today’s Afghanistan, education is no longer just a human right denied; it has become an act of resistance. Since the return of the Taliban in 2021 and their imposition of a gender apartheid system, more than one million girls in Afghanistan have been pushed out of school. Yet, across villages and cities, they continue to learn, build, and lead—often in silence, and often starting from next to nothing.

What does it take to support a girl in such extreme conditions? The answer, it turns out, is solidarity. It’s trust. It’s mentorship. And sometimes, it’s fifty dollars and a community.

During the first Taliban regime in the late 1990s, I worked with women in Afghanistan to establish what we called the community fora. These were quiet gatherings—sometimes around a stove, other times in the back rooms of homes—where women shared knowledge, developed skills, generated resources, and sustained each other. Today, that legacy continues.

It is out of those spaces that the foundations of the model now used by my charity, the Rahela Trust, are built: deeply communal, quietly strategic, and anchored in dignity.

In provinces across Afghanistan, young women are receiving small, one-time stipends of fifty US dollars each and building micro-initiatives, a process facilitated by a young female scholar who identifies five young women with different skills or interests. The program’s model works within the restraints of Taliban restrictions, with mentors and instructors holding underground courses in private homes or rotating locations.  

From these efforts, women are raising chickens, crafting art, tailoring clothing, and creating jobs for one another. But the money is only part of the story. What transforms these efforts is mentorship: older students, diaspora professionals, and other mentor figures offering not just guidance but partnership. It’s about solidarity and unlocking their talents within their community groups—building moral strength, confidence, and practical skills in managing local resources. Their skills grow organically through this hands-on, learning-by-doing approach. And Rahela Trust is not alone; similar initiatives, such as ACDEO, which is improving both education and economic access across Afghanistan, and Empowerment for Her, a women-led charity in Denmark, are contributing to the same vision of women’s empowerment.

Zahra, a twenty-three-year old student in Baghlan, used her funds from Rahela Trust to start a poultry initiative with five friends. (The names of Zahra and other participants from the Rahela Trust who spoke for this article were changed to protect their identities.) “Each member of the team has a specific role,” she said. “We’ve learned to delegate, manage resources, and plan for the future.” While their chickens have yet to produce a profit, significant growth in other areas has already begun. “We’re learning teamwork, responsibility, and how to build something with our own hands, even from a small amount of money,” Zahra explained. The vision is that, despite living under a gender apartheid regime, the success of their small businesses can help transform their villages, cities, and ultimately, the future economy of their nation.

In another region, a group of girls founded a pyrography business after seeing this style of wood-burning art at an exhibition in Kabul. With simple tools and a cooperative model, they produced their first five orders within a month. “For me, this is more than just a business,” Fatima, a participant said. “It is a bridge between art and empowerment.”

Perhaps most inspiring is Homa’s story. A student of Islamic studies, Homa used her stipend to launch a small textile venture that now employs five women—each with a role in production, marketing, or logistics. Their modest operation has already begun generating profits that allow the women to support themselves. “All members are pleased with their work and are happy that they can now meet their daily needs,” she shared.

This model of mentorship and micro-enterprise was not adopted from elsewhere—it was developed by the women of Afghanistan out of resistance to the first Taliban regime’s imposition of a system of gender apartheid. In those years, underground learning spaces and quiet community fora became lifelines for women denied access to public life. Organized under the guise of health trainings, tailoring courses, or other permissible activities, community fora created safe spaces for women to exchange knowledge, share resources, and support one another. Both the fora and underground schools survived through careful planning, constant relocation and, above all, the courage of those committed to education and freedom.

Drawing from those roots, the model the Rahela Trust combines education and peer mentorship with small-scale business initiatives designed to foster independence and leadership. It is a framework that sees education and economic empowerment not as separate paths, but as deeply intertwined. It emphasizes leadership, resourcefulness, and the power of collective learning. With only a small amount of money, young women are supported not just in starting businesses, but in taking control of their own futures.

Today, more than a dozen online mentoring classes are running, with courses on subjects including leadership, small business management, mental health counseling, job hunting, and résumé writing. The courses offered depend on the needs assessment conducted each quarter. Perhaps what is most powerful about this model is that it grows from within: many of the girls and young women who receive mentorship go on to mentor others in their households or wider communities. The impact goes far beyond income and creates a ripple effect—it rebuilds confidence, nurtures agency, strengthens community solidarity, and quietly pushes back against a system determined to suppress them.

Amid gender apartheid, these stories are not just inspiring, they are political. They are a powerful reminder that transformation doesn’t always begin with loud declarations or sweeping policies. Sometimes it begins with a conversation around a kitchen table, a lesson in how to bake bread in a tandoor oven, or a student teaching her sister what she learned online that morning.

Even under the weight of repression, girls in Afghanistan are rewriting the narrative of their country—patiently, creatively, and together. We must listen closely.

---

Rahela Sidiqi is a social community development expert and founding director of Rahela Trust and Omid International.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

The post Education as resistance: How women in Afghanistan fight gender apartheid through solidarity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fighting-corruption-strengthens-ukraine-in-the-war-against-russia/ Thu, 11 Sep 2025 20:17:19 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=874053 Ukraine's efforts to combat corruption on the domestic front play a vital role in the country's broader fight for national survival against Vladimir Putin's resurgent Russian imperialism, writes Matthew H. Murray.

The post Fighting corruption strengthens Ukraine in the war against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> In recent months, Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to US-led peace efforts by escalating attacks on Ukrainian civilians and seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. The Russian ruler refuses to even meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for talks, attempting instead to portray him as the illegitimate leader of an irredeemably corrupt government. Moscow’s goal is to delay meaningful negotiations and weaken Western resolve to support Ukraine in the hope that this will cause the Zelenskyy government to fall and derail the entire Ukrainian war effort.

Putin’s uncompromising stance reflects his commitment to extinguishing the threat posed by a free and democratic Ukraine. The Russian leader was driven to invade primarily because he saw an independent Ukraine slowly but steadily building the institutions of a functioning democracy right on Russia’s border. This represented an existential challenge to Putin’s own regime, an autocracy fueled by systemic corruption and dependent on repression.

Faced with Russia’s determination to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation, Ukrainians could be tempted to delay the fight against corruption at home in order to first defeat Russia. In reality, however, this is a false choice. Ukraine has been locked in a struggle against both Russian imperial aggression and domestic corruption for more than a decade. From the 2014 Revolution of Dignity to the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022, Ukrainians have been battling not only to defend their land, but to build a country that belongs to its citizens rather than oligarchs and autocrats. The fight against Russia and the fight against corruption are two fronts of the same war.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Recent events in Ukraine underscore just how wrong Putin is to question the nation’s fundamental commitment to democracy. Over several days in July, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in cities across the country, braving the threat of Russian missiles and drones to demonstrate against their leaders. They were not protesting wartime hardships or economic woes, though both are deeply felt. These protests were driven by a more fundamental desire to safeguard the country’s anti-corruption institutions against efforts to turn back the clock and undo the progress achieved since the Revolution of Dignity.

These recent protests were sparked by a government move to strip Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies of their independence. The Ukrainian authorities may have been attempting to use wartime exigencies to bring anti-corruption bodies under their control and prevent the possible prosecution of high-level officials. If so, this was a major miscalculation. Within hours of a parliamentary vote placing key anti-corruption institutions under the authority of the prosecutor general, Ukraine’s first major protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion were underway.

International stakeholders including the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and Ukraine’s G7 partners also reacted swiftly. The EU publicly demanded the full reversal of the legislative changes, stressing that independent anti-corruption institutions are a prerequisite for Ukraine’s EU accession. To exert concrete pressure, Brussels suspended €1.5 billion in macro-financial assistance that was already in the pipeline for Ukraine.

The IMF echoed these concerns, indicating that Ukraine’s compliance with anti-corruption commitments was essential for ongoing financial support. Similarly, G7 officials issued a statement urging the Ukrainian authorities to protect the autonomy of anti-corruption bodies, warning that continued support from international partners depended on upholding the rule of law.

Bolstered by this international support, Ukraine’s civil society won the day. Zelenskyy moved quickly to reverse course, proposing new legislation that reinstated the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies. The lesson was clear: There can be no trade-offs for Ukraine when it comes to combating corruption, just as there is no room for half measures in the fight against Russia.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Ukraine’s July 2025 protests reaffirmed a commitment to grassroots democracy that has defined the country’s post-Soviet experience. During the Revolution of Dignity, millions of Ukrainians rallied not merely to remove an unpopular president who was viewed as a surrogate of Russia, but to demand a system of government where institutions work for the public good rather than the benefit of the few. This has served as a vision for the country’s future ever since. Even now, amid the largest European invasion since World War II, Ukrainians continue to demand accountability while working to create a truly democratic society rooted in the rule of law.

Ukraine’s courage, ingenuity, and resolve in the war against Russia draw heavily from the sense of empowerment that sprang from landmark events like the Revolution of Dignity and subsequent democratic reforms such as the decentralization of power. This has helped give Ukrainians more confidence in their ability to shape their communities and their country, fostering solidarity and promoting engagement in public life.

Greater Ukrainian agency has translated into remarkable resilience on the battlefield and beyond. Local initiatives, volunteer networks, and territorial defense units have all thrived because the Ukrainian authorities ceded space for society to organize itself. When power flows from the ground up, a nation becomes so much more than the territory it defends. This has helped make Ukraine capable of fighting back against a far larger adversary.

Ukrainian society’s lack of tolerance for corruption is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the defense sector, where the stakes could not be higher. As Ukraine fights for its very existence, citizens and soldiers alike have demonstrated zero patience for anyone accused of exploiting the war for private gain. Wartime corruption scandals related to military procurement have provoked widespread outrage across the country. The public response has often been swift and unrelenting with investigations launched, resignations demanded, and reforms accelerated.

Despite the success of this summer’s protest movement, the battle to protect Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture is far from over. As Ukraine moves forward, its commitment to safeguarding the autonomy and integrity of anti-corruption organs will be tested by adversaries who are as persistent as they are resourceful. In parallel to the ongoing Russian invasion, Moscow will continue to push the message that Zelenskyy’s government is illegitimate, while also promoting perceptions of Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt.

Putin’s fear of Ukraine’s emerging democracy is the root cause of the war. Unlike Russia’s traditionally authoritarian and highly centralized system of government, Ukrainian democracy pulses with the will of the people. It is a highly dynamic and decentralized political culture that derives its strength from the grassroots level. Time and again, Ukrainians have reminded Zelenskyy and his predecessors that true power lies not at the highest levels of government in Kyiv, but with the Ukrainian people. The anti-corruption reforms of the past decade manifest this reality. They have set an example that resonates far beyond Ukraine’s borders and helps generate strong international backing for the country.

As peace negotiations continue to unfold and Ukraine’s partners seek a security formula to prevent further Russian aggression, the fight against corruption will fortify Ukrainian sovereignty. Each advance in transparency and the rule of law strengthens Ukraine’s standing, both at home and abroad, while exposing the malign intent of Russia’s disinformation. In the end, Ukraine’s freedom will not be secured solely by military victories, but also by a new social contract under which every Ukrainian knows that no one is above the law.

Matthew Murray is an Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. He is the former Chair of the Selection Commission for the Head of the US National Agency for Corruption Prevention, and former Deputy Assistant US Secretary of Commerce for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 9, 2025

What is the Coalition of the Willing actually willing to do in Ukraine?

By Mykola Bielieskov

European troops in Ukraine could serve as a meaningful element within a broader deterrence package, but Coalition of the Willing leaders should focus on making the Ukrainian military strong enough to deter the Kremlin, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Sep 4, 2025

Ukrainian bombing campaign turns Russia’s sheer size into a weakness

By David Kirichenko 

For centuries, Russia’s sheer size has been its greatest asset. Ukraine now intends to transform this vastness into a weakness with a long-range bombing campaign targeting Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable energy industry, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Sep 2, 2025

Putin’s failed summer offensive shatters the myth of inevitable Russian victory

By Peter Dickinson

The failure of Putin’s summer offensive should help to debunk the persistent myth of inevitable Russian victory and persuade Western leaders to increase their support for the Ukrainian war effort, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

Follow us on social media
and support our work

support our work

The post Fighting corruption strengthens Ukraine in the war against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/dispatch-from-syrias-christian-strongholds-a-new-government-a-full-political-spectrum/ Mon, 25 Aug 2025 18:58:37 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=869562 The conditions of Christian communities across the country remain varied, with the opinions of religious and community leaders deeply mixed.

The post Dispatch from Syria’s Christian strongholds: A new government, a full political spectrum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On the morning of July 6, Christian parishioners in Syria’s small coastal city of Safita awoke to find death threats outside their churches. They were signed “Saraya Ansar Sunnah,” the same terrorist group that just two weeks earlier had claimed responsibility for the brutal suicide bombing of the Mar Elias Church in Damascus that killed 25 worshippers. The bombing brought the contentious state of Syria’s Christian community after the fall of Bashar al-Assad and ascendency of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former Islamist militant, to the foreground.

On the day the leaflets were found, I was in western Hama in the Christian town of Suqaylabiyah, meeting with government officials and priests. When asked about the leaflets, the head of the town’s Eastern Orthodox community, Father Dimitri, laughed, discounting them as a weak attempt by pro-Assad Alawite insurgents from the villages around Safita to capitalize on the fresh fears after the attack in Damascus.

Father Dimitri then pulled out his phone and called one of the priests in Safita whose church had been targeted.

“How is the situation, Father? What happened?” he asked.

Like Dimitri, the Safita priest quickly dismissed the leaflets as a pro-Assad trick, insisting everything remained stable within the city.

Despite this bravado, the conditions of Christian communities across the country remain varied, and the opinions of religious and community leaders deeply mixed. In May and July, I visited Christian towns across western Syria, where I heard about their concerns for the future and their relationships with neighboring Sunni and Alawite communities. Responses spanned the entire spectrum, from complete rejection to passionate support for the new government.

The Sunni Angle

Suqaylabiyah was once known for its powerful Russian-backed pro-Assad militias. But the militia leaders are now widely believed to live in Moscow, having fled the country days before Assad himself.

With the militias gone, the new religious and civilian leaders in Suqalyabiyah cooperate closely with new Damascus-appointed officials. Here, a young Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) officer, Fayez Latouf, serves as the head of the broader administrative district. Within the town itself, a long-time Christian Free Syrian Army commander, Amjad Haddad, serves as the mayor. The town’s main commercial street remains open well after midnight with young people sitting at cafes, drinking tea and alcohol.

When asked about the cultural freedoms of the town’s Christian population, one young woman explained to me that when Latouf first arrived, he considered limiting the town’s bars, but that the community simply went to him and stood their ground, demanding that he respect their culture and rights. According to both the woman and Father Dimitri, Fayez has since been extremely cooperative with the Christian social and religious leadership, fostering a safe environment in the city.

Father Dimitri believes Haddad is a significant reason for the speed with which his town accepted the new government and engaged in close cooperation with the new local authorities.

“We are lucky to have Amjad among us to explain how the Sunnis are and ease our initial fears,” he explains, citing Haddad’s more than ten years fighting alongside Sunni revolutionaries. When Haddad returned to Suqaylabiyah, he played a key trust-building role between the community and the new authorities.

Familiarity with Sunnis, or the lack thereof, appears to be an important factor in how Christians perceive the new government. In the city of Latakia, Christians and Sunnis have lived together for centuries. This historic proximity has resulted in close relationships between the two religious groups, even among otherwise deeply conservative Sunni fighters.

SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER

Ali Hamada, for example, returned to his home in Latakia on December 8 of last year, twelve years after being exiled. He has been a long-time supporter of HTS, but upon his return, he quickly established an armed neighborhood watch group consisting of Christians and Sunnis protecting each other’s holy places during their respective holidays. In my conversation with him, Hamada is very open in his sectarian disdain of Alawites and Shia, but talks at length about the important social and religious ties between Sunnis and Christians.

One Christian activist in the city, Tony Daniel, echoes these sentiments. A political activist and ex-Assad detainee, Tony works with multi-sect civil society groups in the city and its countryside that aim to connect locals to the government and vice versa.

“Christian Syrians were a tool by the Assads,” he explains. “Most of us left Syria under the Assads, but many Christians are now afraid of this government because Assad told everyone that if Muslims take over, they will oppress you.”

This fear was a major obstacle that Tony and other activists worked on in those first weeks after December 8. He cites the new government’s quick engagement with Christian leaders across the country and their ability to ensure safe Easter celebrations as important milestones.

“The government protects us and we pray and dress how we want,” Tony says.

But, he adds, “Christians are afraid of the constitution now.”

While Tony does not believe the new government will persecute Christians, he cites the lack of democratic safeguards in the March constitutional declaration as a significant problem. “When I see and hear [al-Sharaa] talk, it is beautiful words, I trust [al-Sharaa] and most of the government, but when I see this constitution and the way some militias act it is not the same.”

Based on my visit to these areas, this lack of trust in the new government is much more pronounced in the Christian communities that are more isolated from Sunnis. The towns of Mashta Hilou and Wadi Ayoun, located just east of Safita and surrounded by Alawite villages themselves, are prime examples of this dynamic. Here, Christian priests and civil society activists are much more cautious about the new government and fear that Sunni religious figures are taking too much power.

“We get our news from social media,” explains a doctor and influential community leader in Mashta Hilou in May. “This has caused a lot of frustration within our community and the spread of false news.”

He cites a lack of clarity on new laws and an increase in petty crime, all resulting in a deepening distrust of local security officials. This animosity has only grown as the officials responsible for Mashta Hilou continue to sideline Christian civil society organizations, hardening the barriers between the government and locals.

This dynamic stands in stark contrast to Suqaylabiyah and Latakia, where local officials have engaged extensively with Christians and, as a result, have assuaged many of their fears. Without this, those in Mashta Hilou are left to draw their own conclusions.

“I see what ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham] did to Christians in Iraq,” says the doctor, “and so I make an assumption given Sharaa’s background, and the lack of implementation of his promises.” Misinformation and false claims on Facebook about new government policies rooted in Islamic law have all fueled a belief that Damascus will soon impose Sharia law upon the country.

As one priest in Mashta Hilou puts it, “if Sharia Law is implemented, then Christians will be immediately discriminated against.” Like the doctor, the priest also cites al-Sharaa’s “history in ISIS” as a cause for concern. Al-Sharaa was originally a member of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of ISIS, but he explicitly rejected merging his Syrian group with ISIS in 2013.  

“We are more comfortable around Alawites,” the priest admits, “because even though they were raised on shabiha [Syrian term for pro-Assad thugs] behavior, they are not religious.”

The behavior of some religious extremists among the government’s rank and file fuels these concerns. Several Christians on the coast cited instances of harassment by soldiers for wearing a cross, or wounded fighters who refused to be treated by female nurses.

The head priest of Wadi Ayoun says much the same—otherwise quelled fears “renewed” after March 6.

However, the decrease in violence in the region since March and the reopening of roads to other parts of Tartous and Homs have helped reduce local fears once again.

“The government must ensure our genuine safety,” the priest says, “protect everyone’s rights and create a civil state.”

Unclear security threats

Until the June 22 attack in Damascus, these security fears were largely rooted in distrust over the new government’s militant Islamist background and the violations being committed against Alawites. These fears were generally more common in communities with poorly performing local officials or those that were isolated from other Sunnis. Even amid their hesitations and criticisms of the new government, everyone interviewed in Mashta Hilou and Wadi Ayoun in May admitted that the security situation was very good at present.

Yet, minor incidents have occurred occasionally across the country, underlying the threat posed by armed extremist Sunnis operating outside of the government. On December 18, armed men shot at a church in Hama. Five days later, a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah was burned by a foreign fighter. On February 17, a group of youth destroyed crosses in a cemetery in rural Homs. On April 6, assailants attempted to burn down a church in Damascus. On May 17, the car of a Christian family in Hama city was burned, and threatening leaflets were left in the area. On June 8, a church in Homs city was shot at.

But it was the June 22 terror attack in Damascus that truly shook Syria’s Christians. Even a month later, Suqaylabiyah’s Father Dimitri admitted that his congregation is only now beginning to return to Sunday services. “We have reached a very good place in this area and deal with the government and security forces easily, thanks to their engagement with our religious and civilian leaders.” Nonetheless, the Father says that the bombing caused widespread anger and fear in the town that he and other leaders are still struggling to address.

For some Christians, the Damascus bombing played no role in their opinions—they had already given up on the new government. When asked about local governance, a couple who live in a small village just outside Tartous city engaged in a multi-hour tirade against the new authorities, blaming them for everything from the lack of functioning water lines to what they perceived as an “Islamification of coastal Sunnis, citing some Sunni friends’ adoption of the hijab.

While they deny that any Christians have been harassed in their area, they are terrified that this calm will change at any moment. At the same time, their village has rejected any General Security deployment within it, and they claim that even if there were Christian security members, “they would still be instructed to harass us.”

Complex dynamics in Idlib

Perhaps the most complex Christian dynamics exist in Idlib, where the small number of Christian families remaining in six villages along the governorate’s western edge have had a complicated, evolving relationship with the new authorities. These villages were first freed from the regime in late 2012 by neighboring Free Syrian Army factions, whose leaders quickly engaged in dialogues with the local priests. Yet the situation deteriorated over the ensuing years, with criminal FSA-affiliated and Islamist gangs robbing and kidnapping locals amid regime airstrikes. In 2014, ISIS briefly captured the region from the Syrian opposition. According to one local priest, the terror group quickly put an end to the random crimes through their excessively violent punishment of thieves, but also heavily limited their religious freedoms. Crosses were not allowed to be displayed, church bells could not be rung, and women were required to wear headscarves.

None of this changed when ISIS was evicted in 2015 and Jabhat al-Nusra—the predecessor to HTS—took charge. It would not be until 2018 when the HTS-affiliated Syrian Salvation Government was formed that HTS leaders began to address these years of violations. By now, most of the people in the six villages had fled to Europe or regime-held areas, and a variety of foreign and Syrian fighters had seized most houses and lands. Al-Sharaa’s chief religious official, Sheikh Abdul Rahman Atoun, who now serves as the head of Syria’s Supreme Fatwa Council, began to personally engage with Father Hanna Jalouf, who was later named Bishop and vicar of Aleppo by the Vatican.

Years of dialogue saw the gradual return of homes and property first to those Christians who still resided in Idlib, and then to caretakers within the community for the property of those who had fled. In late 2022, Atoun finally issued a fatwa legalizing public religious practices for Christians. By this point, HTS had greatly improved security in the area, eliminating violent threats against Christians. As Jalouf told me in a meeting in Idlib that year, significant progress had been made in their inter-faith relations, with some property disputes being the only remaining issues.

By July 2025, these property disputes were still not fully resolved. Almost all homes in five of the villages have been returned, but in one village, Yacoubiyah, many homes are still occupied. Meanwhile, in the three Christian villages on the edge of the Hama plains, most of the farmland remains under the control of the Uyghur foreign fighter group Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

As with the Christian communities elsewhere, priests and locals in these villages paint a complicated picture of their current situation.

“There is a huge difference in the amount of freedom here and other parts of Syria,” says one elderly woman in Judayda as she described their more socially oppressive environment.

“Only two foreign families remain in our village—without permission, or paying rent. They have not caused issues, but no Christian will go close to them out of fear. Last week, a woman and her husband were walking on the street without a headscarf, and someone from the [foreign] family spat in their face. It was just a family member, not a fighter.”

In Qunaya, the village’s priest emphasizes the danger these foreign fighters pose to the community.

“We don’t speak with these families occupying our houses,” he said in July. “We just work through the government, as we did before December.”

He says all the farmland in this area has been returned to the Christian families, and believes the authorities will soon return the last stolen homes. He adds that although the community has a good relationship with the officials in Idlib and Damascus, “it just takes time because they are trying to remove these people without using force.”

Despite this, both the priest and the woman from Judayda insist that the security situation in their areas is good, differentiating between the harassment from locals and the treatment of the authorities. “Here in Idlib we are very safe and don’t have these kinds of attacks targeting our churches,” they say, highlight the trust that has grown over the years between their community and HTS’s security services.

“After the attack in Damascus, we were mentally exhausted,” the woman says. “We were afraid of going to the churches, but we still went because the General Security is guarding them.”

Stuck in the middle

For some Christians, the violence that has persisted in the shadow of Assad destroyed any opportunity for their trust in the government. The March 6 insurgent uprising on the coast and the subsequent massacre of Alawite civilians by armed Sunnis and government forces shattered the cautious optimism in the brief period of relative peace following the fall of Assad.

One activist in the city of Baniyas had been optimistic for his country’s future, despite the sectarian challenges, before March 6. “No matter what, Syria is my country, I will send my children away for a better life, but I will never leave,” he said defiantly in February.

But the brutality of the March 6 massacres broke any confidence he had that Damascus could contain the sectarian violence left in Assad’s wake. “I don’t care anymore,” he said in May, “I am doing everything I can to leave this country.”

In other places, Christian leaders have taken on a mediation role, doing their best to lower tensions. In Suqaylabiyah and Latakia, for example, Christian priests and activists have begun serving as mediators for Alawites from the countryside, utilizing their close connections to local officials. In return, they try to show their Alawite neighbors that minorities can work with the new government, slowly building trust between the two sides.

One fact is clear: there is no one Syrian Christian experience. Like every Syrian community, some Christians are fearful, others optimistic, and some have lost all hope. While it is clear there is no systematic targeting of Christians by the new government at large, Damascus still has a long path towards earning the whole community’s trust.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive and an independent analyst whose research focuses on the development and reform of security institutions, local governance initiatives, and sectarian relations.

The post Dispatch from Syria’s Christian strongholds: A new government, a full political spectrum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/uncategorized/gray-quoted-in-the-hill-on-president-trumps-foreign-policy/ Fri, 22 Aug 2025 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=885481 On August 22, Alexander B. Gray, nonresident senior fellow of the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center, was quoted in The Hill arguing in favor of President Trump’s decision to have Secretary Marco Rubio run the National Security Council.

The post Gray quoted in The Hill on President Trump’s foreign policy  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]>

On August 22, Alexander B. Gray, nonresident senior fellow of the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center, was quoted in The Hill arguing in favor of President Trump’s decision to have Secretary Marco Rubio run the National Security Council.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Gray quoted in The Hill on President Trump’s foreign policy  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the tragedy of leadership loss and the strain on frontline medical staff may seem unrelated, they are threads in the same fabric of fiscal and structural fragility that many developing nations face—a fragility tied, in part, to the opaque and discriminatory power of global credit rating agencies.

A system priced on perception

Zambia is one of more than fifty low- and lower-middle-income countries now spending more on servicing external debt than on public health or education, according to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As of July 2024, twenty-two African nations were either already in or at high risk of debt distress, according to the African Development Bank. For many, that distress is not simply the result of bad choices or poor governance—it’s also driven by credit downgrades steeped in Western-oriented bias, with devastating human consequences.

For years, African leaders have called for reforms to the global credit rating system. But today, only four countries on the continent—Botswana, Mauritius, Morocco, and South Africa—hold investment-grade ratings from the Big Three credit rating agencies Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch.

The rest remain classified as “junk,” regardless of their economic trajectories or structural reforms. These ratings carry high costs. A 2023 study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that African countries pay, on average, 1.5 percentage points more in interest than other nations with similar economic features. That disparity has cost the continent over $75 billion in excessive borrowing costs—resources that could have funded hospitals, classrooms, or climate adaptation projects.

When ratings fall, lives change

Zambia’s experience serves as a dire warning to many African nations. In November 2020, amid the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the country defaulted on a $42.5 million Eurobond repayment, becoming the first African nation to do so in the pandemic era. Almost immediately, Fitch and S&P Global downgraded Zambia to “Restricted Default” and “Selective Default” respectively.

The downgrades triggered a series of economic consequences: inflation soared to nearly 16 percent by the end of 2020; the kwacha, Zambia’s currency, lost over half its value; unemployment rose to nearly 13 percent; and public debt ballooned to 103.5 percent of GDP—up from 62 percent just a year earlier.

While the crisis was framed internationally as a failure of fiscal discipline, it stemmed primarily from structural vulnerabilities long ignored by lenders and significantly worsened by COVID-19-related shocks—for example, Zambia’s overdependence on raw copper exports, lack of economic diversification, and exposure to global price swings.

To regain access to capital markets, Zambia turned to the IMF. In August 2022, the IMF approved a $1.3 billion Extended Credit Facility, but with strings attached. Subsidies on fuel, fertilizer, and seeds were slashed. Tax exemptions were eliminated. While these measures were intended to stabilize the economy, they exacerbated hardship for ordinary Zambians.

Despite a national health strategy aimed at achieving universal health coverage by 2026, government health spending stood at just 8 percent of the national budget in 2022—well below the 15 percent target African nations committed to under the Abuja Declaration of 2001. Across the country, public hospitals remain overcrowded, understaffed, and underfunded, while medical workers barely earn sufficient incomes.

Medical migration worsens health crisis

The effects ripple far beyond the wards. As health infrastructure deteriorates, skilled professionals are seeking opportunities abroad. According to data from the Global Press Journal, by mid-2023, more than seven hundred Zambians were working in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service—half as nurses, the others as support staff for doctors and midwives.

This migration has not only drained Zambia of vital expertise but reflects a deeper erosion of public trust.

Zambia is far from alone. As of 2024, thirty-six low-income countries were ranked by the World Bank and the IMF as either in or nearing debt distress. The highest number on record came in 2021, when forty countries fell into this category—largely due to pandemic-era disruptions and rigid creditor responses.

Yet debt relief remains elusive, especially when private creditors—often protected by Western legal jurisdictions—refuse to participate in restructuring. Bailouts, often financed with public funds, prioritize financial markets over human needs.

Reforming the ratings regime

That’s why calls to rethink sovereign credit ratings are gaining traction. African policymakers are urging the adoption of homegrown solutions—most notably the African Credit Ratings Initiative supported by the UNDP and AfriCatalyst—to support African countries navigate credit assessments and access affordable capital. Others are pushing for greater transparency in rating methodologies and the inclusion of developmental indicators and climate vulnerability metrics, which better reflect the realities on the continent.

Alongside these reforms, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) could fundamentally shift Africa’s risk profile and reduce its overreliance on external creditors. By connecting 1.4 billion people across 54 countries into a single market, AfCFTA offers African nations a pathway to scale up intra-African trade, diversify export bases, and build economic resilience against global commodity shocks. Greater regional trade integration can lead to stronger fiscal buffers, more predictable revenue streams, and a reduced perception of sovereign risk—all of which could, in time, help countries negotiate better borrowing terms and demand more equitable treatment from global credit markets.

In this context, aligning AfCFTA’s trade reforms with a reimagined financial architecture—including AfCRA and climate-linked development finance—could be transformative. Not only would it allow African nations to retain more value within the continent, but it would also reposition Africa as a cohesive economic bloc, capable of challenging outdated, externally imposed narratives about risk and creditworthiness.

More than metrics

Ultimately, this is not just a technical issue about creditworthiness or bond yields—it’s about justice. When a rating falls, it doesn’t just shake investor confidence in New York or London. It empties pharmacy shelves in the capital Lusaka, delays school construction in Ndola, and sends doctors to London instead of keeping them in Kitwe. Behind every downgrade is a family struggling to afford food, a patient turned away from a clinic, a child missing class because of budget cuts.

If the global financial system is to serve development rather than distort it, reforming the sovereign ratings regime is no longer optional—it is a moral imperative. Because ratings may be abstract, but their consequences are all too human.

Looking ahead, change is possible—and necessary. Governments can begin by investing in stronger data systems and institutional capacity to ensure that credit ratings accurately reflect real risk and resilience, not outdated assumptions. Credit rating agencies must also recognize the profound human consequences of their assessments and adopt more inclusive, context-sensitive approaches. This means going beyond narrow fiscal metrics to account for structural vulnerabilities—such as health system fragility, climate exposure, or commodity dependence—and giving greater weight to a country’s reform efforts and resilience strategies.

Agencies should also engage in transparent, two-way dialogue with African finance ministries, regional bodies, and development institutions to ensure their methodologies reflect local realities rather than global templates. A collaborative approach would mean treating African nations not simply as borrowers to be scored, but as partners in shaping more just and development-oriented financial systems.

The development community, in turn, should treat credit ratings as a development emergency—mobilizing support and reform with the same urgency as a health or climate crisis. Finally, deeper investment in domestic capital markets and financial institutions will empower countries to forge a more independent and stable fiscal future.

Because at the heart of every rating is a story not just of numbers—but of people and their right to health, dignity, and opportunity.

Maggie Mutesi is an analyst at the Africa Credit Ratings Initiative, a platform dedicated to reducing the cost of capital across Africa.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Biased credit ratings are costing Africa billions—and worsening its health crises appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Summary

Cultural diplomacy is among the most powerful tools of soft power. Since the Cold War, the United States has invested billions in spreading its cultural influence—using icons from Louis Armstrong to Duke Ellington, often broadcast via Voice of America across Europe, Asia, and beyond. More recently, South Korea developed a comprehensive global cultural strategy—known as Hallyu, or the Korean Wave—which has integrated music, television, and film into a cohesive brand, elevating Korea’s international goodwill, visibility, and recognition.
Taiwan, a vibrant democracy and global technology leader with a rich cultural heritage, has struggled to achieve similar resonance, particularly among younger demographics in the United States. As Taiwan faces a shrinking pool of formal diplomatic partners and a generational decline in awareness abroad, its leaders could draw valuable lessons from South Korea’s success. Expanded cultural diplomacy is not merely possible—it is essential for Taiwan’s long-term engagement with the world.

Introduction

Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, is a dynamic democracy in East Asia with a cultural history shaped by Chinese, Japanese, and Indigenous influences. Despite its achievements in technology and its vibrant society, global understanding of Taiwan—especially beyond policymakers in the United States and its dozen official diplomatic allies—remains limited.
The good news is that public support for Taiwan in the United States is strong. A 2025 survey showed that 68 percent of Americans view Taiwan favorably, while 77 percent hold unfavorable views of China. However, only 34 percent of Americans could correctly identify Taiwan on a map, and just 15 percent reported being “very familiar” with cross-strait issues. Notably, awareness skews older: In a 2024 survey, 77 percent of Americans aged sixty-five and up considered Taiwan-China tensions personally important, compared to only 40 percent of those aged eighteen to twenty-nine—a thirty-seven-point generational gap.
This growing divide raises serious implications. If US support were ever required in a cross-strait crisis, younger Americans’ lack of familiarity could undermine public backing. This risk is highlighted by declining US support for Ukraine: Those viewing Russia as an enemy peaked at 70 percent in March 2022—and fell to 50 percent by March 2025.
To build sustained global support, Taiwan might lean into cultural diplomacy, a tool successfully employed by the United States in the battle for hearts and minds during the Cold War. American cultural diplomacy, led by institutions like the United States Information Agency, aimed to counter Soviet influence by promoting democratic ideals, freedom of expression, and American cultural values. Through jazz tours featuring artists like Louis Armstrong and Duke Ellington, as well as the international circulation of American films, books, and exhibitions, the United States sought to present a compelling image of its open society.¹Radio broadcasts like Voice of America disseminated news, music, and pro-democracy content to millions behind the Iron Curtain, shaping a narrative of American cultural leadership and liberal modernity.²
More recently, the Republic of South Korea has made cultural diplomacy a national priority, turning K-pop, K-dramas, cinema, beauty, and cuisine into vehicles for strategic influence. These efforts have made South Korea instantly recognizable and admired by younger generations worldwide.
By adopting a similar model, Taiwan can reinvigorate its cultural diplomacy, increase awareness among younger global audiences, and bolster its sovereign identity on the world stage.

South Korea’s Hallyu model

Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, South Korea identified cultural exports as a new engine for economic and soft power growth. President Kim Dae-jung’s administration launched the “Hallyu Industry Support Development Plan,” boosting the cultural budget from $14 million in 1998 to $84 million in 2001, and promoting public-private partnerships in entertainment. Over the decades, the South Korean government allocated robust budgets for culture, consistently spending between 1.4 percent and 1.6 percent of its federal budget on cultural issues, which, in South Korea include sports and tourism. In recent year, this budget has grown in nominal terms: On a per capita basis, South Korea’s culture spending increased from $145 in 2021 to $166 by 2024.
In 1999, South Korea passed a Basic Law for the Promotion of Cultural Industries and established the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) to fund and support Korean content. In 2001, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism was created, expanding investments in talent development, infrastructure, and international promotion.
KOCCA subsidized record companies, festivals, overseas tours, and international music expos—laying the groundwork for the global rise of K-pop. Similar investments supported cinema and TV. The Korean Film Council funded coproductions and production support, ultimately helping Korean films like Parasite win global accolades, including the 2020 Academy Award for Best Picture.
South Korea also launched forty-two cultural centers in over thirty countries, offering exhibitions, performances, language classes, and film screenings. More recently, Korean beauty expos have joined the export lineup, supported by embassies and cultural agencies.
Importantly, South Korea’s top political leadership championed these efforts. In 2013, President Park Geun-hye’s “creative economy” policy identified culture as a national growth engine. In 2021, President Moon Jae-in appointed BTS members as presidential envoys for public diplomacy.
By 2023, Hallyu-related exports reached $14 billion—including $7.5 billion in cultural content, $4.1 billion in consumer goods, and $2.4 billion from tourism. Perhaps more importantly, awareness and favorability soared: The share of Americans unfamiliar with Korea dropped from 13 percent in 2001 to just 2 percent by 2018. That year, Gallup recorded a 77 percent US favorability rating for South Korea.

Current state of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy

While China views Taiwan as a breakaway province, Taiwan operates as a sovereign state with its own government, military, and constitution. This unresolved tension limits Taiwan’s international space and recognition—but not its cultural potential.
Taiwan boasts an impressive cultural portfolio. Directors such as Ang Lee and Hou Hsiao-hsien have garnered international acclaim. Its culinary scene includes Michelin-starred restaurants like Din Tai Fung and popular street foods like bubble tea and xiaochi (“small eats”) from its night markets. Mandopop enjoys regional popularity, though it has yet to achieve global reach.
Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy strategy includes efforts like the Taiwan Academy, founded in 2011, with cultural centers in Los Angeles, New York, Houston, and Paris. In 2012, the Ministry of Culture was created to coordinate cultural policy. Taiwan’s Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO) also sponsor events abroad. In 2021, Taiwan Plus, an English-language streaming and media platform, was launched with government backing, modeled after South Korea’s Arirang TV.
Taiwan’s cultural budget has only marginally increased to 1.09 percent of the total central government budget in 2024 from 1.01 percent in 2020. In terms of official exchange rates, Taiwan’s per capita culture ministry spending rose modestly to NT$1,088 (about US$37) in 2024 from NT$976 in 2020.
Other efforts include participation in book fairs, translation subsidies, and support for Taiwanese literature and cinema. Yet despite this progress, Taiwan’s global cultural footprint remains modest—especially among youth audiences.

Strategies to elevate Taiwanese culture globally

Taiwan can enhance its cultural diplomacy by adopting strategies modeled on South Korea’s experience, with a focus on younger demographics and unified branding.

1. Unified branding: The “Formosa flow”

Taiwan should create a cohesive cultural brand akin to Hallyu. A campaign titled “Formosa flow” could unify arts, food, technology, music, and democratic values under a single narrative. Themes could include digital innovation, Indigenous culture, LGBTQ+ rights, and environmental sustainability—distinguishing Taiwan in the global imagination.

2. Youth engagement: TikTok Taiwan

Taiwan must adopt a digital-first approach. Taiwan Academies should partner with YouTubers, TikTok creators, podcasters, and influencers to cocreate content. Virtual concerts, e-sports collaborations, and interactive media festivals could help Taiwan connect with younger audiences—particularly in the United States and Latin America, home to most of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners.

3. Youth engagement: “Bubbles on campus”

While popular all-over Southeast Asia, night markets represent a unique opportunity for Taiwan to connect with young audiences in the United States. TECO and Taiwan Academies could identify youth engagement nodes in college towns and neighborhoods with large young populations and set up monthly night markets to promote Taiwanese culture to US college towns through monthly pop-ups featuring street food, art, and music. Bubble tea, invented in Taiwan in 1986, could serve as the flagship attraction—offering cultural engagement in a handheld, tasty format.

4. Expand the Taiwan Academy network

Taiwan Academies currently offer language instruction, scholarships, and film screenings. Expanding their scope to include cuisine, fashion, and digital media—modeled after South Korea’s cultural centers—could increase cultural reach and relevance among younger global audiences. Initiatives such as the Taiwan Cultural Center in Tokyo, participation in international art fairs, and collaborations with foreign cultural institutions have yielded positive results.

5. Launch and fund a “global Taiwan” campaign

Taiwan should increase its investments in subtitling, translation, and international distribution of its films and TV shows—placing content on platforms like Netflix and YouTube. A strong digital marketing effort across Instagram, TikTok, and other platforms would amplify reach. Additionally, Taiwan should cultivate and promote cultural ambassadors in music, fashion, and cinema. Allocating more money for cultural diplomacy is critical—perhaps a redesignation of cultural diplomacy as a national security tool could help alleviate some of the current interparty budgetary disagreements around funding for cultural diplomacy.

6. Engage local leadership

Local leaders, including mayors and governors of states, are multipliers of soft power and can make the Taiwan-US partnership more tangible and relatable by embedding it in daily civic, cultural, and economic life. Mayors can open night markets, issue city proclamations recognizing Taiwan’s contributions during relevant holidays (e.g., Double Ten Day), host Taiwan-themed festivals, film series, and exhibitions in city-sponsored cultural venues like libraries, parks, or museums. Governors can highlight Taiwan’s role in local economies, especially in sectors where Taiwan is a key trade partner—like semiconductors, electronics, green tech, and medical equipment, and use their social media platforms to elevate Taiwan’s culture in tandem with the deep trade linkages.

Conclusion

Taiwan has a compelling story to tell—one that includes Indigenous culture, technological leadership, digital activism, diverse food culture, and democratic values. By integrating these narratives into globally resonant media and arts, Taiwan can build its own Hallyu with Taiwanese characteristics.
With sustained investment and strategic branding, Taiwan can increase global awareness, deepen international partnerships, and fortify its national identity through cultural diplomacy.

Fellow

Nik Foster

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub

China Energy & Environment

Report Mar 24, 2025

How Beijing uses inducements as a tool of economic statecraft

By William Piekos

As strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, Washington and Beijing seek every possible advantage to gain an edge. In this environment, both countries are increasingly turning to economic statecraft—the use of economic coercion or inducement to pursue strategic goals—to advance their interests.

China Economy & Business

Issue Brief Dec 20, 2022

Taiwan’s engagement with the world: Evaluating past hurdles, present complications, and future prospects

By Jessica Drun

Since Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) took office in May 2016, relations across the Taiwan Strait have grown increasingly tense—and even more so following the visit of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in August 2022.

China International Organizations

New Atlanticist Dec 5, 2024

How could US-Taiwan security ties change under Trump 2.0?

By Kitsch Liao

The incoming administration will have significant decision-making power over how the United States would respond to a Taiwan crisis.

China Conflict

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Surfing the Hallyu: What Taiwan can learn from South Korea’s cultural diplomacy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainians have a long record of rising up against non-democratic moves in times of need. This latest example mirrored much larger and equally successful protest movements in recent decades such as the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. The Ukrainian public are well aware that their hard-won democratic freedoms cannot be taken for granted.

The Ukrainian authorities would be wise to treat the recent protests as a serious indication of mounting public dissatisfaction with the current government. While Ukrainians have rallied behind Zelenskyy as the country’s wartime leader, this should not be confused with blanket approval for all his policies. Indeed, more protests cannot be ruled out. Next time, public anger might not be as easily appeased.

In any healthy democracy, elections are always the best pressure valve for public discontent. However, due to wartime security concerns, logistical obstacles, and martial law restrictions, elections are not currently possible in Ukraine. In 2024, the country postponed scheduled presidential and parliamentary ballots. More recently, Ukraine’s Central Election Commission confirmed that local elections would not go ahead later this year.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The reasons for the lack of elections are clear and mandated by Ukraine’s Constitution. In fact, a consensus has crystallized that any public calls for wartime elections in Ukraine could help legitimize Russian efforts to portray the country as a dictatorship. However, there is no escaping the fact that the absence of elections hurts Ukraine’s credibility as an emerging democracy. This risks undermining international support for Ukraine and could potentially lead to a reduction in military aid.

While it has often been pointed out that Britain postponed all elections throughout World War II, many Americans have noted that the United States was able to hold both congressional and presidential elections during the nineteenth century American Civil War. Indeed, Abraham Lincoln’s main opponent was one of his own generals.

Ukrainian safety concerns amid the largest European invasion since World War II are obviously valid. At the same time, holding local votes in parts of Ukraine situated far from the front lines such as Uzhgorod, Lviv, and Chernivtsi could theoretically be possible with the necessary security measures in place.

With millions of voters currently living as refugees outside Ukraine and others displaced or serving in the military, voter turnout would almost certainly be significantly below the average for Ukrainian elections. This is regrettable but should not be decisive. After all, any free and fair election would help revive domestic and international confidence in Ukraine’s democratic credentials.

Of course, even local elections could not be safely staged in cities closer to the front lines like Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. The solution to this problem may lie in Ukraine’s sophisticated tech sector and the widespread adoption of digital tools throughout Ukrainian society.

Since 2022, Ukraine has earned an international reputation for battlefield innovation and now is recognized as a world leader in drone warfare. If this same spirit is applied to the country’s democracy, it could be possible to hold local or national elections while avoiding the risks associated with large groups of people gathering for campaign rallies and at polling stations.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Following his election as Ukraine’s sixth president in 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyy established the Ministry of Digital Transformation and identified digitalization as one of his strategic priorities for Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian government then launched the Diia app as a key e-governance tool that makes it possible for Ukrainians to hold a wide range of official documents in digital format. By late 2024, the Diia app had over 21 million users, representing a majority of the Ukrainian electorate.

It is worth exploring whether the Diia app could serve as the basis for secure digital voting. If Diia is not suitable, other digital options should be identified and developed. This approach could address election security concerns while also preventing the disenfranchisement of the millions of Ukrainians currently living abroad or defending the country against Russia’s invasion.

Skeptics may argue that the Diia system or any other digital voting platform would be vulnerable to hacking. This would undoubtedly be the key issue to address before proceeding with digital elections. At the same time, it is important not to overstate the challenges this represents. Fraud is always possible in any election, but the transparency of digital tools may actually reduce the risk when compared to paper ballots. Indeed, Ukraine’s digitalization experience suggests that the introduction of digital platforms actually reduces the scope for abuses.

Ukrainians are not yet demanding elections, but there are signs that public distrust of the authorities is mounting and may soon reach alarming levels. At a time when national unity is so crucial for the country’s survival, this mood of frustration must be taken seriously.

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, Ukraine cannot afford to postpone all elections indefinitely. It is therefore time to start the process of digitalizing Ukraine’s democracy and employing the same kind of innovative thinking that has proved so effective on the battlefield. The technologies to do so already exist. The Ukrainian government must now demonstrate that they also have the political will to find the right solutions.

Brian Mefford is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has lived and worked in Ukraine since 1999.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 24, 2025

Ukraine is now an indispensable security partner for the US and Europe

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

Ukraine’s million-strong army and unique experience of the twenty-first-century battlefield makes it an indispensable security partner for the United States and Europe, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 29, 2025

Trump offered Putin victory in Ukraine. Why did Putin refuse?

By Peter Dickinson

Trump thought he could get a peace deal in Ukraine by offering Putin generous terms that amounted to a Russian victory. But Putin rejected Trump’s offer because he cannot accept anything less that Ukraine’s complete capitulation, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jul 14, 2025

A Western-funded drone surge could end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

By Mark Boris Andrijanič

Ukraine has the technology, talent, and industrial potential to prevail in the war with Russia, but currently lacks the funding to scale drone production to the necessary levels, writes Mark Boris Andrijanič.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Digital democracy is the key to staging wartime elections in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The scandal surrounding efforts to subordinate Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies to the politically-appointed Prosecutor General was part of a broader trend that has sparked concerns over potential backsliding in the country’s reform agenda. Additional factors include the failure to appoint a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, investigations targeting prominent anti-corruption activists, and alleged attempts to undermine the work of other key institutions like the High Qualification Commission of Judges.

The recent wave of nationwide protests in defense of the country’s anti-corruption reforms served as a timely reminder that Ukraine’s democratic instincts remain strong, even amid the horrors of Russia’s invasion and the escalating bombardment of Ukrainian cities. The message to the government was clear: Ukrainian society is determined to defend the democratic progress secured over the past eleven years since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This includes safeguarding the independence and integrity of the watchdog institutions established in the wake of the revolution.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The readiness of Ukrainians to rally in support of the country’s anti-corruption reforms undermines efforts by detractors to portray today’s Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt and unworthy of international support. In reality, Ukrainians are more committed than ever to the democratic values that have shaped Ukraine’s national journey throughout the turbulent past few decades.

Meanwhile, the anti-corruption bodies established since the 2014 revolution are evidently effective enough to target senior figures close to Ukraine’s political leadership. They have also won the respect of the country’s vibrant civil society and are regarded as an important element of Ukraine’s reform agenda by much of the population.

It should come as no surprise that so many ordinary Ukrainians view the fight against corruption as crucial for the country’s future. After all, efforts to improve the rule of law are widely recognized as central to Ukraine’s European ambitions.

Over the past decade, anti-corruption reforms have helped the country achieve a series of key breakthroughs along the path toward EU integration such as visa-free travel, candidate country status, and the start of official membership negotiations. Ukrainians are well aware of the need to maintain this momentum, and remain ready to pressure the government on anti-corruption issues if necessary.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Since the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine’s reform progress has been closely monitored and fiercely guarded by Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian public combines a strong sense of justice with a readiness to act in order to preserve fundamental rights. They are backed by a seasoned and self-confident civil society sector, along with an independent media ecosystem that refuses to be silenced.

Over the past decade, Ukraine’s ability to adopt and implement reforms has often depended on a combination of this grassroots domestic pressure together with conditions set by Ukraine’s international partners. These two factors remain vital in order to keep the country on a pathway toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration.

Some skeptics have suggested that the fight against corruption is a luxury that Ukraine cannot afford while the country defends itself against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Such thinking is shortsighted. Faced with a far larger and wealthier enemy like Russia, Ukraine must make every single penny count.

In peacetime, corruption can undermine the business climate and hinder the country’s development. The stakes are far higher in wartime, with corruption posing a threat to Ukraine’s national security. It is therefore crucial to increase scrutiny and reduce any graft to an absolute minimum. Meanwhile, the long-overdue reform of specific sectors such as the state customs service and tax administration can generate important new revenues that will provide a timely boost to the Ukrainian war effort.

The success of Ukraine’s recent protest movement is encouraging and underlines the country’s status as a resilient young democracy. At the same time, it is too early to declare victory.

In the coming weeks, Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners will expect to see a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine appointed, along with the appointment of four Constitutional Court judges who have passed the international screening process. Efforts to pressure civic activists and the country’s independent media must also stop.

Speaking on August 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a point of attacking Ukraine’s anti-graft agencies. He obviously recognizes that strong anti-corruption institutions serve as important pillars of Ukraine’s long-term resilience and represent an obstacle to Russia’s plans for the conquest and subjugation of country. The Kremlin dictator’s comments should be seen as further confirmation that Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever in the current wartime conditions.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 24, 2025

Ukraine is now an indispensable security partner for the US and Europe

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

Ukraine’s million-strong army and unique experience of the twenty-first-century battlefield makes it an indispensable security partner for the United States and Europe, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 29, 2025

Trump offered Putin victory in Ukraine. Why did Putin refuse?

By Peter Dickinson

Trump thought he could get a peace deal in Ukraine by offering Putin generous terms that amounted to a Russian victory. But Putin rejected Trump’s offer because he cannot accept anything less that Ukraine’s complete capitulation, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jul 14, 2025

A Western-funded drone surge could end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

By Mark Boris Andrijanič

Ukraine has the technology, talent, and industrial potential to prevail in the war with Russia, but currently lacks the funding to scale drone production to the necessary levels, writes Mark Boris Andrijanič.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever during wartime appeared first on Atlantic Council.

According to a draft directive published recently by the Russian Education Ministry, the study of Ukrainian is to be removed from the school curriculum throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine beginning in September 2025. The directive cites “changes in the geopolitical situation in the world” as justification for the decision.

In reality, the official ban on Ukrainian language studies is a formality confirming processes that have been well underway ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, and for far longer in areas of Ukraine occupied by Moscow following the initial onset of Russian aggression in 2014. The removal of the Ukrainian language from Ukrainian classrooms has been accompanied by the introduction of a new Kremlin-friendly curriculum that glorifies the ongoing Russian invasion while denying Ukraine’s right to exist and demonizing Ukrainians as Nazis. Parents who resist risk losing custody of their children.

This campaign of classroom indoctrination is only one aspect of the Kremlin’s comprehensive Russification policies in occupied Ukraine. Since February 2022, the Russian authorities have conducted mass arrests of anyone deemed a potential threat to the occupation, with thousands of Ukrainian officials, activists, community leaders, veterans, and patriots disappearing into a vast network of prisons. A recent UN probe has classified these large-scale detentions as a crime against humanity.

Ukrainian civilians still living in occupied Ukraine are being forced to accept Russian citizenship or lose access to essential services such as pensions and healthcare, along with the ability to run a business or hold a bank account. Beginning in September, new legislation will make it possible for the authorities to expel anyone without Russian citizenship from their own homes and deport them.

Meanwhile, public symbols of Ukrainian statehood, heritage, and culture are being methodically removed and replaced by the trappings of an imported Russian imperial identity. Likewise, the demographic makeup of the occupied Ukrainian regions is being systematically transformed by Kremlin programs that aim to attract migrants from across the Russian Federation.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The hard line Russification policies currently being implemented in the 20 percent of Ukraine under Russian occupation offer a chilling blueprint for the rest of the country if the invasion succeeds. Indeed, it is now be abundantly clear that Putin’s ultimate objective is a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

This should come as no surprise. For years, Putin has insisted Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has accused Ukraine of being an illegitimate state occupying historically Russian lands. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he began referring ominously to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia,” while describing the country as an “inalienable” part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space. More recently, he underlined his contempt for Ukrainian independence by declaring: “All of Ukraine is ours.”

Putin’s Ukraine obsession has been one of the dominant themes of his entire reign. This reflects the Kremlin dictator’s desire to reverse the 1991 Soviet collapse and his fear that the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood could spark the next stage in a Russian imperial retreat that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

For Putin and millions of his fellow Russians, the emergence of an independent Ukraine is a bitterly resented reminder of their own country’s post-Soviet humiliation, while Ukrainian society’s efforts to embrace a democratic European identity offer alarming echoes of the pro-democracy movements that led to the fall of the USSR. For the past two decades, Putin’s top priority has been making sure Ukraine’s turn away from authoritarianism does not serve as a catalyst for similar democratization demands inside Russia itself.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

During the early years of his reign, Putin attempted to return Ukraine to Moscow’s orbit via a combination of political interference, economic leverage, and soft power tools including the Kremlin-controlled Russian media and the Russian Orthodox Church. When this strategy failed, he opted to launch the limited military intervention of 2014, which began with the seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.

Once it became apparent that even the partial occupation of Ukraine would not derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Putin appears to have concluded that he could no longer take the risk of allowing an independent Ukraine to exist at all. This set the stage for the full-scale invasion of 2022 and laid the ideological foundations for the Kremlin’s current efforts to extinguish Ukrainian national identity entirely.

Unless Putin is stopped, there can be no serious doubt that millions more Ukrainians will be robbed of their identity and subjected to Putin’s ruthless brand of Russian imperial indoctrination. During recent bilateral peace talks in Istanbul, Kremlin officials underlined their determination to secure Kyiv’s complete capitulation. Moscow’s terms include the revival of Russian dominance over every aspect of Ukrainian public life and the dramatic reduction of the Ukrainian military. It does not take much imagination to anticipate exactly what kind of treatment Russia has in mind for the civilian population if Ukraine compiles with these demands and is left defenseless.

Putin’s calculated campaign to erase the identity of the largest country situated wholly in Europe makes a complete mockery of efforts to portray the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a conventional armed conflict with limited goals. This is no mere border dispute or rational response to legitimate Russian security concerns; it is a classic war of colonial conquest with the explicit intention of destroying Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

If it is allowed to continue, the magnitude of this crime will dwarf anything seen in Europe since World War II. This will fuel Putin’s sense of impunity and whet his imperial appetite, creating the conditions for further previously unthinkable acts of international aggression. It will then only be a matter of time before other “historically Russian” nations are subjected to the horrors currently being inflicted on Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 24, 2025

Ukraine is now an indispensable security partner for the US and Europe

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

Ukraine’s million-strong army and unique experience of the twenty-first-century battlefield makes it an indispensable security partner for the United States and Europe, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 29, 2025

Trump offered Putin victory in Ukraine. Why did Putin refuse?

By Peter Dickinson

Trump thought he could get a peace deal in Ukraine by offering Putin generous terms that amounted to a Russian victory. But Putin rejected Trump’s offer because he cannot accept anything less that Ukraine’s complete capitulation, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jul 14, 2025

A Western-funded drone surge could end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

By Mark Boris Andrijanič

Ukraine has the technology, talent, and industrial potential to prevail in the war with Russia, but currently lacks the funding to scale drone production to the necessary levels, writes Mark Boris Andrijanič.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post A Ukraine without Ukrainians: Putin is erasing Europe’s largest nation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since Ukraine’s integration into NATO has been politically stalled, the EU accession process has become the primary track helping Ukrainians to ensure their country’s democratic interoperability. This is especially true given that the European Union has traditionally been the main driving force for the transformation of the wider region.

Ukraine has experienced this firsthand. The most important reforms carried out in Kyiv over the past decade have almost all been tied to Ukraine’s EU integration. This has included the launch and development of the country’s independent anti-corruption infrastructure.

Attempting to advance toward European Union membership in the present conditions is exceptionally challenging. Ukraine is the first country ever to approach the democratic transformation necessary for EU accession while fighting a full-scale war. No other European nation has ever joined in such circumstances.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

While Ukraine currently faces a range of unique challenges, this cannot justify neglecting democratic principles. On the contrary, defending the democratic gains of recent decades is vital if further progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration is to be achieved.

Ukraine is home to one of the most dynamic and demanding civil societies in the world today. The country has staged two revolutions since regaining independence. Both were in support of Ukraine’s European and democratic path. Meanwhile, there have been no protest movements or grassroots campaigns in favor of authoritarian rule or alignment with Russia, even at times when public attitudes toward Moscow were very different.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s swift response to last week’s protests in defense of the country’s independent anti-corruption institutions shows that Ukraine’s democratic instincts are as strong as ever. The next big test for Ukrainian democracy will be Thursday’s parliamentary vote on a presidential bill that aims not only to ensure the independence of anti-corruption bodies, but also to make them more effective.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Ukraine may not yet be an ideal democracy, but Ukrainians have clearly identified the democratic direction they want their country to move in. This is not because the EU demands it, but because it is the future the Ukrainian people wish for themselves and for their children.

Ukrainians understand that only a democratic Ukraine, fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, can be truly safe from further Russian imperial aggression. By embracing democratic values, Ukraine moves decisively away from the Kremlin’s authoritarian alternative and can no longer be treated as a “mini-Russia.”

There is also growing awareness that while Ukraine currently deserves the support of its partners as the victim as unprecedented international aggression, continued assistance will depend on the extent to which the rule of law prevails and the principles of transparency and accountability are upheld.

The heroism and sacrifices of recent years have unquestionably consolidated Ukraine’s commitment to democratic values. The deaths of so many Ukrainians in the fight for a democratic European future weigh heavily on every single question related to the country’s adherence to democratic norms and practices. Understandably, families and friends who have lost loved ones will not allow their sacrifices to be in vain.

After defending their homeland against authoritarian Russia’s full-scale invasion for more than three and a half years, Ukrainians now firmly believe they have earned the right to be seen as the front line of the democratic world. They know that Putin’s imperial ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine, and see how other autocratic regimes like China, Iran, and North Korea are aiding the Russian war effort. Ukrainians feel they are fighting on behalf of all freedom-loving nations, which makes it even more important for them to preserve and strengthen their country’s democracy.

Alyona Getmanchuk is Head of the Mission of Ukraine to NATO-designate.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 24, 2025

Ukraine is now an indispensable security partner for the US and Europe

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

Ukraine’s million-strong army and unique experience of the twenty-first-century battlefield makes it an indispensable security partner for the United States and Europe, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 29, 2025

Trump offered Putin victory in Ukraine. Why did Putin refuse?

By Peter Dickinson

Trump thought he could get a peace deal in Ukraine by offering Putin generous terms that amounted to a Russian victory. But Putin rejected Trump’s offer because he cannot accept anything less that Ukraine’s complete capitulation, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jul 14, 2025

A Western-funded drone surge could end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

By Mark Boris Andrijanič

Ukraine has the technology, talent, and industrial potential to prevail in the war with Russia, but currently lacks the funding to scale drone production to the necessary levels, writes Mark Boris Andrijanič.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s democracy is the key to the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

International backing for Ukraine is more fragile than many people may appreciate, and is particularly vulnerable to shifts in the domestic politics of partner countries. This support is also at risk of being eroded by the tendency to publicly criticize Ukraine whenever a controversial or unpopular decision is made in Kyiv.

Scrutiny is an important aspect of international support for Ukraine. After all, a healthy democracy depends on accountability. But there is a big difference between constructive engagement and unqualified condemnation. Every time Ukrainian diaspora groups or international allies choose to attack the Ukrainian authorities on the world stage, this provides ammunition for those pushing to cut aid or abandon Ukraine altogether.

It is no secret that Ukraine’s detractors are always watching for any excuse to argue that Ukraine is hopelessly corrupt, terminally divided, or otherwise undeserving of further support. Their arguments are all the more persuasive when they are able to quote pro-Ukrainian voices. Why give them such gifts?

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The recent debate over controversial legislation limiting the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies illustrates the challenges of addressing Ukrainian domestic politics in a responsible manner during wartime. While concerns over the need for transparency and democratic integrity are entirely legitimate, not everyone has rushed to judgment. This more cautious approach should not be confused with passive acceptance. On the contrary, sometimes being a true partner means seeking clarity and offering solutions rather than shouting from the sidelines.

Too often, diaspora voices and international observers fall into the trap of reacting to sensational headlines without digging deeper. This kind of armchair criticism rarely helps Ukraine. Instead, the country needs allies who understand that mistakes will happen in wartime, while also acknowledging that even troubling developments do not justify withdrawing support entirely. I’ve lost count of the number of times I’ve heard members of the Ukrainian diaspora use corruption as an excuse to justify their lack of support for Ukraine.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

It also helps to maintain a sense of proportion. With the largest European invasion since World War II now in its fourth year, the real scandal that should be occupying the attention of Ukraine’s supporters is the sluggish pace of international aid. According to the Kiel Institute, European countries need only allocate 0.21 percent of GDP to the Ukrainian war effort in order to replace military support from the United States. While countries like Estonia, Denmark, and Lithuania are easily surpassing this target, wealthier European nations like Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, and Belgium continue to fall short.

Ukraine cannot hope to prevail against a military superpower like Russia without sufficient backing from the country’s allies. Wherever they are located, Kyiv’s supporters and members of the Ukrainian diaspora should be laser-focused on convincing their respective governments to meet or exceed the 0.21 percent threshold. This could prove decisive in determining whether Ukraine survives as an independent state.

The vast majority of Ukraine’s friends and allies are committed to a shared vision of the country’s future as a European democracy. They recognize that this means upholding basic human rights and core democratic principles, including the need to rigorously combat corruption and hold power to account. At the same time, it should be abundantly clear to anyone who cares about Ukraine that the country’s fight for survival is the current priority.

Ukraine needs unity. Even when the country’s supporters bitterly disagree, it is important to remember exactly what is at stake. We will hopefully have decades to continue the debate over building a better Ukraine. However, if Russia is not stopped, there may be no Ukraine at all.

Pavlo Grod is President of the Ukrainian World Congress.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 21, 2025

NATO is unprepared for the growing threat posed by Putin’s Russia

By Elena Davlikanova, Yevhenii Malik

NATO officials believe Russia could attack the alliance within five years but NATO members are still not ready to face the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s expansionist regime, write Elena Davlikanova and Yevhenii Malik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Jul 14, 2025

Russia’s bombing campaign is killing record numbers of Ukrainian civilians

By Peter Dickinson

As Russia’s bombing campaign continues to escalate, June 2025 saw the highest monthly casualties among the Ukrainian civilian population in more than three years, according to new data from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 8, 2025

Putin is winning the drone war as Russia overwhelms Ukraine’s defenses

By Maksym Beznosiuk

Russia is now winning the drone war against Ukraine thanks to a massive increase in domestic drone production and a series of technological upgrades, writes Maksym Beznosiuk. This is enabling Putin to dramatically escalate the bombardment of Ukrainian cities.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s supporters should prioritize unity and focus on defeating Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Thousands took to the streets in cities across Ukraine on Tuesday after parliament passed legislation limiting the independence of anti-graft agencies established following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. The protests, which were the first to take place in the country since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, gained momentum on Wednesday.

In an apparent reversal of his initial position, Zelenskyy has now announced that he has approved a new draft bill restoring all powers to the country’s anti-corruption organizations and largely safeguarding their freedom to conduct investigations without government oversight. The new legislation has been submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament, with anti-corruption officials backing the government U-turn and urging swift passage of the bill next week.

There may yet be many more twists and turns in the scandal surrounding Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies, but at this stage it certainly seems that the protesters have achieved a significant victory. Crucially, they have also highlighted the enduring strength of Ukraine’s democratic instincts and underlined the country’s continued commitment to basic freedoms at a time when the realities of war make elections impossible.

The Ukrainian authorities were unable to stage scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024 due to martial law restrictions and a wide range of security and logistical obstacles related to Russia’s ongoing invasion. With more than six million Ukrainians living as refugees in the EU and millions more currently under Russian occupation, a large percentage of the electorate would be unable to participate in any vote. Russia’s record of targeting Ukrainian civilians means that those who remain inside the country could not attend election campaign events or gather at polling stations in safety.

Despite widespread consensus among Ukraine’s opposition, civil society, and the country’s international partners over the practical barriers to organizing elections in wartime Ukraine, the Kremlin has sought to exploit the issue in order to question Zelenskyy’s legitimacy and brand him a dictator. Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin even floated the idea of placing Ukraine under temporary United Nations administration.

In reality, however, Putin is well aware of independent Ukraine’s strong democratic credentials. Indeed, it was the consolidation of the country’s fledgling democracy that helped persuade the Kremlin dictator to begin his military intervention in 2014, before convincing him of the need to launch his full-scale invasion eight years later.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Like millions of his fellow Russians, Putin has never come to terms with the loss of Ukraine and continues to view the country as part of Russia’s historical heartlands. He is therefore deeply hostile to independent Ukraine’s embrace of a democratic European identity, which he regards as an existential threat to his own increasingly authoritarian regime. The emergence of a democratic Ukraine is seen by Putin and other Kremlin leaders as a potential catalyst for the next phase in a Russian imperial retreat that began in the late twentieth century with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Putin has been obsessed with the idea of extinguishing Ukrainian democracy ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which he personally helped spark by attempting to rig the country’s presidential election. In the immediate aftermath of the flawed vote, millions of Ukrainians flooded into Kyiv and succeeded in forcing a rerun, leading to the victory of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko.

This was to prove the breakthrough moment for Ukrainian democracy. Between the Orange Revolution and the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost eighteen years later, Ukraine held a total of eight presidential and parliamentary elections, all of which were rated free and fair by independent international observers. Meanwhile, Putin’s Russia continued to move steadily in the opposite direction.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

The Ukrainian population’s staunch defense of their democratic freedoms has consistently been a source of confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv. When pro-Kremlin Ukrainian politician Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010 and attempted to reverse the country’s democratic gains, Ukrainians rose up once more and staged a second pro-democracy revolution. Within days of this successful uprising, Putin began the invasion of Ukraine with the seizure of Crimea.

For millions of Ukrainians, the country’s democratic choice remains one of the core values at stake in the current war. This sentiment has featured prominently during the present wave of protests, with many participants noting that Ukrainian soldiers are currently risking their lives for the freedoms that Zelenskyy himself appeared to be threatening with his undemocratic attack on the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

Former Ukrainian First Lady Kateryna Yushchenko, whose husband Viktor led the Orange Revolution, underlined the continuity between this week’s wartime protests and the country’s two pro-democracy revolutions of the post-Soviet era. “Ukrainians went to the streets today for the same reason they did in the 2004 Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. They want a European future, not a Russian one,” she commented.

Amid the horror and trauma of the largest European war since World War II, the readiness of so many ordinary Ukrainians to protest against threats to their hard-won freedoms speaks volumes about their determination to safeguard a democratic future. They understand that this is what so many of their compatriots are fighting for, and they are determined that these sacrifices will not be in vain. Indeed, it was striking to see many men and women in military uniform among the protesters. This is surely a sign of things to come in Ukrainian politics.

Putin has spent much of the past two decades attempting to corrupt Ukraine’s politicians and discredit the country’s democratic institutions, but he cannot convince the Ukrainian people to abandon the freedoms they have already tasted. This is why he is now so determined to erase Ukrainian statehood altogether. It is also a key reason why his invasion will likely end in failure.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 21, 2025

NATO is unprepared for the growing threat posed by Putin’s Russia

By Elena Davlikanova, Yevhenii Malik

NATO officials believe Russia could attack the alliance within five years but NATO members are still not ready to face the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s expansionist regime, write Elena Davlikanova and Yevhenii Malik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Jul 14, 2025

Russia’s bombing campaign is killing record numbers of Ukrainian civilians

By Peter Dickinson

As Russia’s bombing campaign continues to escalate, June 2025 saw the highest monthly casualties among the Ukrainian civilian population in more than three years, according to new data from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 8, 2025

Putin is winning the drone war as Russia overwhelms Ukraine’s defenses

By Maksym Beznosiuk

Russia is now winning the drone war against Ukraine thanks to a massive increase in domestic drone production and a series of technological upgrades, writes Maksym Beznosiuk. This is enabling Putin to dramatically escalate the bombardment of Ukrainian cities.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Wartime protests prove Ukraine’s democratic instincts are still strong appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 21, law enforcement agencies raided the offices of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and declared investigations into fifteen NABU employees, allegedly as part of an ongoing effort to prosecute traffic violations. This sort of harassment on obscure charges has plagued other investigative agencies and individuals, but rarely was it used against institutions like NABU, which was created in 2014 as an independent body to tackle high-level government corruption. While NABU has had its problems, Ukrainian and Western experts widely acknowledge it as one of the country’s most important post-Maidan reform projects.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Unfortunately, this was no petty shake down. Law enforcement—led by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Prosecutor General’s Office—announced that the centerpiece of its investigation was charges of treason against a pro-Russian member of parliament who allegedly worked with NABU detectives to influence investigations at the behest of Russian intelligence services. The SBU, whose leadership is chosen by the president of Ukraine, named two of NABU’s top detectives as having connections to Fedor Khyrstenko, the lawmaker charged with acting in Kremlin interests against Ukraine. They also alleged the detectives helped Ukrainian oligarchs flee the country to avoid criminal charges.

Western partners in Kyiv swiftly urged the Zelenskyy administration to end its harassment of NABU. Undeterred by such warnings, reports surfaced that Zelenskyy’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) was planning “amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code” in an effort to ensure “the purity of the work of law enforcement … and remove opportunities for corruption.” Observers feared this portended further obstruction of NABU’s work.

Those fears were confirmed on July 22, when the NSDC asked the Ukrainian parliament to introduce a draft law that would put NABU and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)—the independent prosecutorial counterpart to NABU—under the control of the Prosecutor General’s Office. In effect, this would make them subordinate to the Office of the President and likely end their ability to investigate state corruption independent of influence from the government.

The parliament quickly passed the law thanks to support from Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party and with key votes from the remaining pro-Russian parties. Zelenskyy hastily signed the bill into law, despite widespread domestic and international calls not to do so.

But the fiasco has already succeeded in mobilizing Ukraine’s famously civic-minded public. Protests, while still relatively small in number, broke out in Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Dnipro just hours after parliamentarians passed the bill.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Ukraine’s government and law enforcement agencies insist these moves are an effort to root out Russian influence in NABU and SAPO to prevent the agencies from being co-opted against the Ukrainian state. But civil society experts and journalists are not convinced. Many suggest the attempted purges are payback for NABU pursuing charges of illicit enrichment and abuse of office against former deputy prime minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, a key ally for the Office of the President. Ironically, it was Zelenskyy himself who brought back criminal liability for illicit enrichment back in 2019 during his original anti-corruption drive.

Others see the moves as part of a broader effort to crack down on corruption investigations. On July 11, armed police raided the home of Vitaliy Shabunin, co-founder of the nonprofit Anti-Corruption Action Center, and detained him on suspicion of evading military service. Critics say the charges are politically motivated.

The harassment of independent anti-corruption agencies throws Ukraine’s European Union (EU) membership bid into doubt. EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos declared that the independence of NABU and SAPO was “essential” for Ukraine’s EU path. “Rule of Law remains in the very center of EU accession negotiations,” she commented. Already forced to fight for a war its existence, Ukraine has “no room for error” in securing its democracy and European future, others noted.

Ukraine also risks alienating its most important partners in defending itself from Russian aggression. The Ukrainian government, civil society, and the country’s Western partners have had to vigorously fight Russian-amplified narratives portraying Ukraine as a hopelessly corrupt country unworthy of military aid. Willfully tearing down the anti-corruption institutions created after Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity risks giving credence to voices that wish Ukraine harm.

Just two short weeks ago, Kyiv officials were courting Western investment for post-war reconstruction at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome. Already uncertain about entering a potentially unstable security and political environment, many international businesses will balk at entering a market governed by fiat.

The best outcome for Ukraine would be for Zelenskyy to decline to sign the bill into law and refocus on pushing invading Russian forces out of the country. NABU, SAPO, and other watchdog organizations have helped make Ukraine more resilient amid the existential danger of the Russian war. Zelenskyy has proven to be a superb leader of a nation made stronger by its institutions that hold power to account—leadership qualities urgently needed now to halt this series of counterproductive moves.

Andrew D’Anieri is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on X at @andrew_danieri.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 29, 2025

Judicial reform must be at the heart of Ukraine’s postwar recovery

By Oleksandr Vasiuk

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance, writes Ukrainian MP Oleksandr Vasiuk.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Mar 19, 2024

Ukraine’s partners should link wartime aid to continued reform progress

By Mykhailo Zhernakov, Nestor Barchuk

It is crucial for Ukraine’s international allies to link continued wartime financial assistance with the implementation of reforms, write Mykhailo Zhernakov and Nestor Barchuk.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Aug 22, 2024

Ukraine’s EU accession hinges on stronger defense and consolidated reforms

By Zachary Popovich

To achieve EU accession, Ukraine must strengthen its defense capabilities, execute administrative reforms within its judiciary, and implement a multi-sector approach to corruption, writes Zachary Popovich.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine rocked by first wartime protests amid attacks on anti-corruption agencies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Reports poured in: friends and family killed in their homes, doctors shot en route to hospitals, neighborhoods shelled and looted. The attacking forces ravaged a house I considered my second home. The pain was unbearable, shattering my belief in a future Syria where citizens are safe and institutions know their limits. Fourteen years of agony, thought to have finally achieved a reprieve after the December ousting of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, surged back. I found myself asking again: Is Syria’s tragedy rooted in state violence or sectarian civil war? And how did this happen again after Assad’s fall?

US officials described the events as “a rivalry” between Druze and Bedouins. That simplification mirrored Damascus’s version: a state stepping in to contain intercommunal strife. But this framing strips the crisis of its historical and political context. The truth is, Swaida’s suffering stems from its peripheral status and long-standing marginalization.

A distinct and marginalized region

As a Druze-majority, marginal province, Swaida was chronically underdeveloped. Its autonomy grew after 2014, when locals refused to be conscripted to fight their own people. In 2018, Swaida suffered a devastating Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) attack, which resulted in the community’s need for protection and armament, leading to the formation of many armed groups. In 2023, Swaida further distanced itself from Damascus, when Druze leader Sheikh al-Hajari endorsed a civic uprising calling for regime change from Assad, leading to his rise as a political figure addressed by US officials, overshadowing the other two Druze religious leaders, Sheikhs Jarbouh and Hennawi.

These dynamics fostered a distinct socio-political status for Swaida—outside of full Damascus control—with local armed groups, mainly directed at deterring extremists, and a political structure strongly influenced by al-Hajari in the absence of an alternative political process. But when Assad fell abruptly in late 2024 and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), once labeled extremist over its ties to al-Qaeda, took control, the opposition and transitional authorities failed to offer a path to re-merge these two political structures. A rushed attempt at state-building led instead to exclusion, mistrust, and instability—especially for minorities like the Druze, who bore arms mainly to deter extreme Islamist groups like HTS. 

Ironically, Damascus under Assad had framed al-Hajari a traitor for alleged Israeli ties—a charge that persisted after the regime’s fall.

These allegations tap into the Druze community’s complex role in Israel. Tribal and familial ties among Druze across Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan remain strong, and these bonds were often activated by humanitarian or security threats during the fourteen years of war.

In 2023, Israeli deterrence helped shield Swaida from regime attacks. Now, under new leadership, Syria’s transitional government has echoed the same rhetoric used by the Assad regime to delegitimize Swaida’s resistance. Yet, no Israeli weapons or forces were found in Swaida—only leftover Syrian army arms.

Syria in transition, Swaida lagging behind

Rather than addressing grievances, the transitional government took a unilateral approach, sidelining all local elites, including Swaida’s leadership, and failing to include diverse voices. Al-Hajari’s calls for decentralization, secularism, and democratic representation clashed with the new authorities’ centralized, Islamist-tinged vision. These demands, however, were criticized by government supporters as they came from a religious leader who enjoys power in his community.

The popular slogan among government supporters—“those who liberated decide”—alienated communities like Swaida, validating al-Hajari’s position. Fearing aggression, al-Hajari used international protection as a deterrent against Assad’s aggression in 2023. Those inside Swaida who favored engagement with Damascus had a marginal political weight, which made them shy away from confrontation, fearing community fragmentation, a survival instinct for minorities. Tensions deepened between Druze factions.

Coast massacres and sectarian tensions

The early transition saw massacres of Alawites on the coast, reportedly incited by members of the Transitional Government. These atrocities confirmed minority fears and validated al-Hajari’s warnings. While some factions were criticized for agreeing to join state institutions, al-Hajari’s resistance to disarmament gained traction.

In April 2025, a fabricated audio clip of a Druze Sheikh insulting Prophet Muhammad triggered protests and chants appearing to endorse ethnic cleansing, if not genocide.. Attacks followed against Druze in Jaramana and other areas. Later, an Israeli airstrike halted a regime offensive near Sehnaya, where extremist groups had targeted Druze civilians.

A Bedouin ambush against a Druze convoy of fighters to rescue the Druze in Sehnaya, with massive mobilization of Bedouins from different fronts, escalated the violence. Given the overwhelming numbers, al-Hajari called for international protection, which some saw as a plea for Israeli intervention. Meanwhile, negotiations with Damascus yielded an agreement on joint security; however, this agreement rapidly collapsed when state media framed the talks as a government win, prompting al-Hajari’s withdrawal.

The Bedouin-Druze flashpoint

Bedouins and Druze have coexisted in Swaida since the 1800s—at times in peace, at times in conflict. Most clashes stem from pastoralist-agrarian tensions. But in Swaida, these often evolved into sectarian strife, easily weaponized for mobilization.

Frequently, if armed clashes between Druze and Bedouins erupted inside Swaida, the Bedouins would retaliate outside Swaida, targeting Druze vehicles and blocking roads to Damascus—a critical lifeline for Swaida. These tactics were used by the Ottomans, the Assad regime, and now they are occurring again under the new government. Similarly, when Druze are attacked in clashes outside Swaida, the Druze often retaliate against Bedouins inside Swaida.

On July 13th, a Bedouin group kidnapped a man and took his car. In retaliation, an armed group linked to the owner detained Bedouins in Swaida’s suburbs. The situation escalated: retaliatory kidnappings, property seizures, then shelling from Bedouin groups, which killed eight people, including a child. Druze fighters mobilized. Mediation led to the release of the hostages by July 14.

Despite that resolution, on July 15, the ministries of interior and defense announced plans to forcibly enter Swaida to “restore peace.” Many interpreted this as a signal of Israeli approval, believing the Syrian government would not risk a direct retaliatory strike by Israel otherwise. The government’s offensive began from Daraa, targeting western Swaida. Resistance followed—not only from al-Hajari’s groups but also from Rejal El Karama, who supported integration with the state but were not consulted and opposed the incursion.

A video showing Druze fighters humiliating government forces—including handcuffing and verbally abusing them—prompted further army mobilization. Later videos appeared to show the government forces being executed. The incident intensified the government fighters’ resolve, and the Druze’s basic defenses were quickly overrun. Government forces entered al-Mazra’a, a key village, without resistance. Still, reports of looting and burning houses emerged.

As the offensive pushed forward, shelling hit residential areas, with reports of significant casualties and destruction of properties. To minimize casualties, identical statements from al-Hajari and Jarbouh welcomed state forces; however, violence continued. Videos surfaced showing fighters without uniforms, foreign accents, homes ablaze, and the public humiliation of elderly civilians. Al-Hajari said the government coerced him into the statement to prevent further bloodshed, but after continued attacks, he called for mass mobilization.

Numerous Facebook videos showed killings, looting, and shelling. Druze ambushes intensified, and al-Hajari again called for international protection. Israeli airstrikes soon followed, targeting heavy weaponry and demanding a full army withdrawal. The violence triggered a broader popular uprising beyond organized armed groups, forcing many regime forces to retreat.

On July 16, Damascus launched a massive counteroffensive with drones, shelling, and heavy troop deployments. Reports poured in of families slaughtered, homes looted, and neighborhoods devastated. Israeli strikes then hit Swaida and Damascus, including the defense ministry and presidential palace.

Damascus sought an exit and secured a deal with Jarbouh, recognizing the state while preserving local forces. However, al-Hajari refused the terms. That night, President Ahmed al-Sharaa gave a speech characterizing the events as a domestic issue, blaming Israel, and announced a withdrawal of government forces from the region, delegating security to local actors.

The possibility of unleashing civil war

After the withdrawal of government forces last week, Druze Facebook feeds poured with videos and pictures of mass atrocities, including field executions, mass slaughter of families, live decapitations, forcing people to jump from balconies, torturing, looting, and destruction of properties. Social media became a wildfire of videos showing sectarian killings that were used to construct an extremely distorted media narrative, reducing the events to Druze killing and kidnapping Bedouins. A social media campaign dehumanizing the Druze provided a pretext for genocide. The magnitude of savagery sent shocks in the community, instigating limited but serious calls for revenge.

One discussion I had with a key source in Shahba indicated that, driven by these horrors, retaliatory atrocities against a Bedouin community in Shahba included mass killing and looting. Local Shahba armed groups responded by protecting about one thousand women and children in their homes from the threat of break-ins, looting, and violence. The women and children were then moved to a local mosque that was making arrangements for their safe release from the territory.

Mass mobilization of tribal communities across Syria yielded tens of thousands in subsequent waves. Hundreds of civilians died in each wave. Video, filmed by the attackers in the past days, showed more brutal decapitations. Syrian towns along the way supported the attackers to kill Druze using an Islamic doctrine “that whoever equipped an attacker, as if he attacked, himself.”

Hundreds of college students in Aleppo received life threats. Demonstrations by Syrian students to expel Druze students emerged from universities. Druze boycott campaigns erupted, resulting in a cut in food supplies. A universal power outage and interrupted fuel paralyzed the town. Electricity-dependent water was stopped. Despite the US-backed cease-fire, Bedouin attacks continued, burning villages, with field reports indicating the destruction of infrastructure. Field reports from key sources indicate that more than twenty villages were burned, with no information made available by Syrian authorities on the status of their residents. A mediator of ongoing negotiations indicated that ninety-seven Druze women are missing, which delayed the release of the Bedouin community in Shahba. The fighting and killing continue.

The future is dark

The Swaida debacle is a political struggle to force an exclusive regime on a community that doesn’t trust it. Instead of trust building, hate speech was a policy, and ethnic cleansing is the outcome. The Druze-Bedouin conflict was not the cause, but a tool, and the outcome is a Sunni-Druze civil war.

When speaking to many locals of Swaida, Druze, and Christians in the diaspora, a common narrative persists: “How did we trust these people before?” There is complete mistrust in, and grievances against, the facade of state forces. The obstructed roads to Swaida and severed relationship to the hostile surrounding leave no choice but to have a humanitarian cross-border relationship with Jordan. The vision of a centralized, unified state is now considered delusional by many.

As someone who has been working on local governance models, I struggle to imagine any viable long-term solution. For now, an isolated, aid-dependent canton seems to be the only interim path, waiting for violence to stop and the new realities to shape the final outcomes.

Majd AlGhatrif is an Associate Professor and Director of the Syria Peace Project at Johns Hopkins University. He serves as a governance and health systems consultant to the Swiss government and the European Union, advising on the restructuring of the health sector in Syria. He is also a board member and the Founding President of the Swaida American Society.

The post Why the violence in my hometown, Swaida, goes beyond ‘rivalry.’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

When that time comes, the United States and its partners and allies should continue to speak out, fund counter-disinformation efforts, and stand unequivocally behind the Dalai Lama’s succession plan. In doing so, the West will continue to defend not just one people’s faith, but also the principle that spiritual authority cannot be dictated by political power. It’s also in the United States’ geopolitical interest to defend the Dalai Lama’s succession from Chinese manipulation, as this can help prevent the spread of Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) influence throughout the region’s large Buddhist populations.

For human dignity and democratic values

Supporting Tibetan religious freedom is a defense of human rights as outlined in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is also a matter of Tibetans’ long-term development and well-being. Western support for religious freedom reinforces the global norms of human dignity and democratic values that are proven to be remarkable drivers for prosperity and stability. The historical lack of sufficient support for Tibet from the international community is an alarming example of what happens when religious and political repression goes unchecked—it erodes cultural identity, undermines community resilience, and enables authoritarian consolidation.

The Dalai Lama’s renewed focus on succession is playing out against the backdrop of the CCP’s continued cultural genocide of the Tibetan people. For the fifth year in a row, Freedom House has listed Tibet as scoring zero out of one hundred in its index, tied for the least free place on Earth. In the past several years, the CCP has gone to new lengths to Sinicize Tibetan culture, even officially renaming Tibet as “Xizang.” Nowhere is this suppression more acute than in the sphere of religious freedom.

As former supervising attorney for the Office of Tibet in Washington, DC, I’ve witnessed the extraordinary lengths Tibetans go to preserve their faith—from risking deadly crossings over the Himalayas to reach religious freedom in India, to building Tibetan charter schools in the United States—to ensure that their beliefs are passed on to the next generation. However, the crux of China’s strategy to curtail resistance to its religious persecution is its long-standing attempt to isolate Tibetans from the Dalai Lama.

As the living embodiment of Avalokiteśvara, the patron deity of Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama holds unparalleled religious and cultural significance for his followers. Yet many Tibetans are forbidden by the CCP from owning his image, uttering his name in public, or following his teachings. These acts can result in beatings, imprisonment, or worse. The CCP’s aggressive campaign is designed to repress and reshape Tibetan Buddhism under state control. Central to this effort is Beijing’s insistence on installing its own successor to the Dalai Lama.

A long history

Historically, Dalai Lamas were selected by a search committee composed of high-ranking monks and officials, including the Panchen Lama, a figure spiritually intertwined with the Dalai Lama who has historically played an important role in identifying and legitimizing the next Dalai Lama. This search committee would use traditional spiritual methods to identify the next reincarnation. Yet for more than two centuries, rulers of China have unsuccessfully sought to assert control over Tibetan reincarnations to exercise political control over Tibet and Tibetan Buddhist followers across the region. It wasn’t until well after the 1949 invasion of Tibet, however, that the CCP began institutionalizing control through regulatory mechanisms requiring state approval for recognizing reincarnate lamas.

In 1995, the Dalai Lama recognized Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, who was six years old at the time, as the eleventh Panchen Lama. Three days later, the boy was abducted by Chinese authorities and has not been seen since. In his place, Beijing appointed Gyaincain Norbu, a figure widely viewed by Tibetan Buddhists as illegitimate. However, this maneuver has allowed China to exert control over the lineage of the Panchen Lama.

A divided future

As a result of the CCP’s actions, it is all but certain there will be two competing fifteenth Dalai Lamas: one recognized by the Tibetan Buddhist community in exile, and another installed by Beijing. This duality is not just a theological matter but a geopolitical flashpoint. The CCP will likely use its appointed figure to exert spiritual influence over Tibetan Buddhists and reinforce its political claims to Tibet. While the current Dalai Lama has been an incredibly potent unifier for his people both inside and outside Tibet, struggling peacefully against the CCP’s Sinicization policies, the introduction of two competing Dalai Lamas will likely fracture Tibetan unity and risk a cultural identity crisis.

Inside Tibet, for example, the presence of a CCP-backed Dalai Lama may coerce some to accept Chinese authority, especially if that figure endorses Beijing’s claims. Outside Tibet, the global Tibetan Buddhist community is likely to reject such manipulation, deepening internal divisions. It also threatens broader global discord, as Tibetan Buddhists, Chinese Buddhists, and religious practitioners worldwide are drawn into this contested succession.

Anticipating this crisis, the United States has taken proactive steps. The Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 and the Resolve Tibet Act of 2024 both establish that the United States will not recognize any Dalai Lama selected by Chinese authorities. These laws reaffirm that succession is a religious matter to be decided solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community, and they allocate funding to counter Chinese disinformation and support the Tibetan government-in-exile. They even contain provisions for the sanctioning of Chinese officials interfering in the succession of the Dalai Lama. But as Beijing ramps up its efforts to install its own Dalai Lama, the United States must continue its support for Tibetan Buddhists’ religious freedom.

Cohesive support

In the face of the CCP’s attempts to control the Dalai Lama’s succession, robust Western engagement will be vital. Religious freedom is not only a pillar of human dignity but a deterrent against authoritarian overreach. By supporting the Dalai Lama’s succession, the West will support a peaceful people who have resisted violent retaliation, even under profound oppression. Such support also undermines China’s religious and political overreach, discouraging other authoritarian regimes from co-opting religious figures for political purposes.

Backing the Dalai Lama’s chosen successor will also reinforce strategic partnerships, especially in Asia. India, which hosts the Tibetan exile community and is in a soft power competition with China over the claim to Buddhism, affirmed earlier this month that the Dalai Lama alone holds the authority to determine his successor. Similarly, countries with substantial Tibetan Buddhist communities, such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Mongolia, will be wary of a CCP-appointed religious figure holding significant sway over large portions of their populations. While these countries have so far remained largely silent after the Dalai Lama’s succession announcement, perhaps for diplomatic reasons, the time will likely come when they will look for partnerships and countermeasures.

Despite the extraordinary resilience of the Tibetan people, China’s decades-long campaign of propaganda and suppression continues to erode religious authenticity and community cohesion. Without strong, sustained international support, Beijing may succeed in redefining Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism under state authority. The United States has already taken important steps to come to the defense of Tibetan Buddhists’ religious freedom and to counter the CCP’s attempts to gain regional influence through religious repression. Washington and its allies and partners must not waver in these efforts; they must redouble their commitments.

Peter Arvo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center and the former supervising attorney with the Office of Tibet in Washington, DC.

The post To stand up for religious freedom, the US should support the Dalai Lama’s succession plan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Recent European electoral results underscore the gravity of this shift. In a tight presidential race in July, Poland swung back to the conservative right, with the Law and Justice (PiS)–backed candidate Karol Nawrocki winning the presidency. Romania avoided a far-right presidency only narrowly in May. And in Czechia, populists are tightening their grip ahead of October’s parliamentary elections. Moreover, this pattern extends beyond Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as recent elections in Germany and Portugal demonstrate.

As Europe’s political center frays and once-marginal parties reshape national agendas, the continent’s ability to govern effectively is at risk at a moment when external pressures demand strategic coherence. At home, populist victories threaten the European Union’s (EU’s) social cohesion and democratic values, including the rule of law. Internationally, far-right gains threaten Europe’s solidarity with Ukraine as it fights for its survival. Populist advances also risk hindering the military buildup necessary to deter mounting security threats to the continent should the United States disengage more from European affairs.

Election outcomes

Following elections earlier this year in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the mixed results reveal that the contest between liberal democracy and populism remains far from settled.

Some of the populist right’s successes can be ascribed to anti-incumbent sentiment. In Romania, for example, centrist opposition candidate Nicușor Dan defeated George Simion, a right-wing opposition candidate and Euroskeptic who opposes military aid to Ukraine. But the narrow presidential contest between these two “outsiders” exposes a deeper vulnerability. Simion’s party has emerged as Romania’s second-largest political force, commanding significant influence in a parliament in which far-right legislators occupy a third of the seats. Even more worryingly, the electoral process itself proved chaotic. Simion reached the runoff only after the original first round was annulled amid allegations of Russian interference. Though he conceded defeat, Simion simultaneously contested the results, claiming improper French and Moldovan meddling—charges Romania’s Constitutional Court unanimously dismissed. Dan’s triumph preserves Romania’s westward orientation and is an important reaffirmation of the rule of law and its Euro-Atlantic alignment. Even so, the thin margin of his victory and the turmoil surrounding the election demonstrate that Romania’s democratic institutions remain vulnerable to outside threats.

In Poland, right-wing presidential candidate Karol Nawrocki’s narrow win over centrist Rafał Trzaskowski shows right-wing populism’s staying power and may prove consequential for European stability. Trzaskowski, who was backed by the centrist Civic Coalition, led the first round with 31.4 percent but ultimately fell short, dealing a severe blow to Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-EU government and to Warsaw’s unified voice on European and transatlantic affairs. While Polish presidents have a mostly ceremonial function, they can veto legislation. This power could affect the governing coalition’s hopes to reverse years of what it and its supporters see as institutional capture, court politicization, and the damage from PiS’s systematic assault on democratic norms—efforts that triggered multiple EU rule-of-law proceedings. Many Poles are now concerned that Nawrocki’s presidency could derail that restoration project, with implications that might extend far beyond Poland’s borders to the heart of European governance itself.

Turning westward, recent political developments provide little solace. Portugal’s early general election in May delivered another minority government, as well as unprecedented support for the populist party Chega (Enough) that added to both the preexisting political instability and Europe’s far-right drift. Chega ran on a populist platform of antiestablishment rhetoric and anxieties over immigration, garnering 22.6 percent of the vote and placing it alongside the historically dominant center-left Socialist Party.

Earlier this year in Germany, the right-wing, ultra-nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party came in second in federal elections, doubling its vote share from four years prior. It was the strongest showing for a far-right German party since World War II. Despite being battered by scandals and intelligence scrutiny, the AfD has continued to poll strongly on the back of anti-immigrant, Euroskeptic messaging, particularly in the former East Germany, where the party has found a foothold among young, disillusioned voters.

The strategic stakes

This pattern of populist advances may soon extend to Prague. Czechia, which has anchored Central Europe’s pro-Western and pro-Ukraine coalition in recent years, appears headed for a populist shift in October’s general elections. Former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’s ANO party leads polling, alongside the right-wing Freedom and Direct Democracy, which has built its platform on Euroskepticism, anti-immigration sentiment, and explicit opposition to military aid for Ukraine.

The rightward drift in Poland and Czechia carries outsized significance because Warsaw and Prague have punched above their weight in EU politics, bridging Western capitals with the more politically fluid EU eastern flank. Both countries have been vocal, generous supporters of Ukraine and have advocated closer European defense cooperation. A populist turn in Prague—alongside familiar foot-dragging on sanctions and dialed-down commitments from Bratislava and Budapest—could unravel that posture. It could feed broader regional and continental ambivalence toward Kyiv at a vulnerable moment, when the burden of sustaining Ukraine’s defense is falling more squarely on Brussels.

Also at stake are the EU’s nascent ambitions for a credible defense capability, since proposals for common rearmament programs and joint procurement depend on the very cohesion that Europe’s populists seek to undermine. The foreign policy challenge is nuanced: Polish and Romanian nationalists support robust defense spending at home but remain skeptical about pooled sovereignty within the EU. Yet without alignment on planning, procurement, and command structures, rising national defense budgets do little to strengthen Europe’s collective readiness. Meanwhile, Germany’s AfD opposes both domestic and EU military buildups. If every major defense initiative must first survive such centrifugal forces of domestic politics among the bloc’s twenty-seven members—some actively sympathetic to Moscow—the promises of united European defense look increasingly hollow. As with Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, populists sometimes govern more pragmatically than they campaign. But whether these leaders would uphold Europe’s commitments to Ukraine and collective defense remains to be seen.

Institutional defenses: More than just elections

There are many factors that account for the recent success of populist parties, but these trends run deeper than electoral outcomes. They reflect domestic narratives that exploit grievance and mistrust, as much as a failure to counter foreign efforts to manipulate European electorates. Europe’s centrists must work to take back the language of sovereignty and security from those who wield it to divide voters, and they should do so before these messages harden into conventional wisdom under the combined weight of internal discontent and external interference.

In practice, this means connecting European cooperation to kitchen-table concerns and leaning into language an ordinary citizen can understand and appreciate. This entails stressing how coordinated defense procurement delivers better equipment at lower cost to national armies and how energy partnerships reduce household bills. It also requires emphasizing how European frameworks amplify—rather than diminish—national power by enabling small EU countries to negotiate with large ones as equals, allows states to secure better trade and investment deals that create jobs, and help deter Russian aggression through collective strength that no single nation could muster alone.

To better defend against foreign information interference, the EU should double down on auditing social media platforms and how their algorithms prioritize and distribute political content under the Digital Services Act. The EU should also enforce penalties and suspend service when platforms are shown to facilitate hostile influence operations.

Even then, the information landscape in an open Europe remains porous, and the institutional responses will lag multiple steps behind malicious campaigns. But such measures could meaningfully reduce their scale and effectiveness while signaling the EU’s resolve to tackle them as a continent-wide security imperative requiring a sustained response that could eventually tip the balance decisively in favor of democratic discourse. Given the stakes, both for the state of the EU’s democracies and the need for Europe to unite on rearmament to deter Russia, Brussels must act now to defend its institutions.

Soňa Muzikárová is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Populist gains are threatening Europe’s strategic coherence. Here’s how the EU can fight back. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 25, 2025, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and Strategic Litigation Project, together with the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School (IHRC), hosted a hybrid panel discussion on new findings and policy implications surrounding Russian aerial attacks against Ukraine over the last three years. The event was moderated by Strategic Litigation Project Staff Lawyer Celeste Kmiotek.

In his introductory remarks, IPHR Project Director for Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus Simon Papuashvili discussed the situation on the ground in Ukraine, stating that “Putin is not interested in peace; he is committed to a long brutal war. The only way to stop him and to safeguard Ukraine and Western allied security is by sustaining and strengthening military, financial, and political support for Ukraine.” 

Russian aerial attacks as crimes against humanity and war crimes

In the first portion of the event, IPHR and IHRC panelists discussed the findings of their newly published report, “Airstrikes and Atrocities: A Legal Assessment of Russia’s Aerial Campaign in Ukraine,” in which they demonstrate that these aerial attacks amount to several crimes against humanity, including those of murder, extermination, persecution, and other inhumane acts as well as war crimes, including those of intentionally directing attacks against civilians, civilian objects, and other specially protected objects, and of disproportionate attacks and starvation. To introduce this portion of the event, Team Lead of Ukraine Legal Team for IPHR, Anastasiya Donets discussed her team’s work in Ukraine and the specific need to work on investigating aerial attacks. “Russian attacks have escalated dramatically since early 2025, which coincided with the beginnings of the peace talks with Russia, and we do not think it’s a coincidence,” said Donets. 

The report aimed to advance justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine, to complement Donets’ fact-finding work at IPHR with IHRC’s legal analysis, and to “develop the jurisprudence around war crimes and crimes against humanity,” as IHRC Director and Clinical Professor of Law at Harvard Law School Susan Farbstein explained. In doing so, the report showcases that international law still matters and that it is possible to prosecute these kinds of cases. Oceania Eshraghi, a member of the clinical team that authored the report, discussed the primary findings of the report as well as the process of using IPHR’s evidence to build legal arguments, saying that the team wanted to focus on “highlighting the crimes against humanity of extermination and persecution.” 

During the harsh winter months, Russia’s actions have led to prolonged power outages lasting for weeks, creating life-threatening conditions for civilians. These blackouts not only hinder access to essential information but also disable air raid sirens, leaving Ukrainians unaware of imminent attacks and without guidance on evacuation routes. These conditions “represent a deliberate effort by Russia to create unlivable conditions for Ukraine’s civilian population, consistent with the crime [against humanity of] extermination” Eshraghi said. She continued: the report establishes the crime against humanity of persecution by demonstrating how “Russia’s actions have resulted in the clear deprivation of Ukrainians fundamental rights, most notably the right to life, the right to education, and the right to cultural participation.” This deprivation “has been carried out with the requisite discriminatory intent, specifically targeting individuals because of their Ukrainian identity.” 

Sign up for the latest updates from the Strategic Litigation Project

Eshraghi continued by outlining two overarching patterns in the Russian attacks: “first, attacks on critical energy infrastructure including electric grids and power grids. And second, attacks on civilians and civilian objects with the use of precision guided weapons.” She concluded the objective of the attacks was to “disrupt and destabilize the entire energy system in Ukraine on such a scale that it inflicts significant harm on the civilian population.” Furthermore, Russia has destroyed or damaged over “seven hundred medical facilities and over 1,500 schools or colleges, often in areas where there’s not [an] identifiable military target nearby.” This illustrates the Russian military’s intention to “terrorize and demoralize the Ukrainian population to ultimately encourage their surrender or their [decision to] flee.”

Donets implored the US government to implement a strong sanctions bill against Russia that is currently under consideration in Congress and has bipartisan support. She emphasized that “a bill that mandates, rather than leaves room for, sweeping sanctions for Russia, will demonstrate that atrocities described in today’s report come at a high cost and so does Russia’s mockery of US-led peace talks.”

The policy implications of Russia’s total war

The second half of the event consisted of a panel discussion on the policy implications of Russia’s total war, featuring Eurasia Center Distinguished Fellow Ambassador William B. Taylor and Security and Defense Researcher at RAND Corporation Michael Cecire. When asked about the path forward, Ambassador Taylor emphasized the real-world implications for Putin of international accountability: “He is an indicted war criminal by the International Criminal Court . . . he has not been able to travel to some places. He’s turned down, had to skip meetings because of it.”  Additionally, he stated that “[Ukraine’s] defense industrial base which gives them agency has been dramatically expanded, not just drones, but [also] on the artillery [and] vehicles. This is a really important point that Ukrainians [can] say no. The Ukrainians have agency. Someone mentioned the minerals deal… that resulted in actually a pretty good agreement. The Ukrainians can say no; they now have the ability to prosecute.” 

Next, Cecire offered questions to consider in policymaking: “How does our policy allow or at least not appreciably respond to these destructive measures? What are the downstream effects on our credibility? What are the downstream effects on the United States’ national security interests? And frankly, our moral credibility and standing?”  

Donets added: “It’s really important to not only focus on the horrific things that Russia’s invasion brought into Ukraine and into the world . . .  [but to also] focus on Ukrainian resilience. Focus on the future and the opportunities that this horrible war created. One of these opportunities is making international law more effective for who it was created for: civilians.”  

The event concluded with a moderated question and answer session in which audience members posed questions about political messaging, the criteria for selecting case studies, and accountability measures within different jurisdictions, both domestically in Ukraine and through the International Criminal Court. Farbstein highlighted that the immediate focus is on demonstrating that accountability is attainable, which can in turn motivate broader action and engagement from the international community. This approach aims to show that justice is possible, encouraging others to meaningfully advocate for accountability on behalf of victims of crimes against humanity and war crimes. 

Fatima Khan is a summer intern with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. 

Winnie Zheng is a summer intern with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. 

The post New findings: Russian aerial attacks amount to extermination and persecution appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Charai in National Interest: Canada Can Learn from Trump’s Native American Policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This time, however, the Taliban’s approach is more calculated. Its goal is not merely to rule but to sustain its rule. Unlike in the 1990s, when the curtailment of women’s rights and suppression of civil liberties were driven primarily by rigid ideological interpretations rooted in the teachings of madrassas in Pakistan, the current restrictions are a fusion of ideology and political strategy. The Taliban now understands that restricting education, civic participation, and the political awakening of youth and women is essential to neutralizing long-term threats to its grip on power.

Informed by the trajectories of other ideological regimes—particularly that of the Islamic Republic of Iran—the Taliban appears to have some absorbed important lessons. After the 1979 revolution, Iran imposed strict religious codes and social restrictions yet allowed continued access to education for women. Over time, this decision inadvertently enabled the rise of an educated and politically conscious population—one that today represents a significant challenge to the Iranian regime. The Taliban, however, has chosen the opposite path: to deny women access to education and employment altogether, effectively cutting the roots of future opposition before it can grow.

From the outset, policies restricting girls’ education, women’s employment, and youth expression have not been temporary or incidental. Rather, they are integral to a broader strategy of ideological entrenchment and political consolidation. The excuses provided by some in the regime—the notion that Afghan society is not prepared to accept women in public and in leadership roles, logistical limitations, or undefined “Islamic frameworks”—are tactical deflections meant to obscure the Taliban’s true intent: to silence the country’s most capable agents of transformation. 

Yet, despite the regime’s efforts, the people of Afghanistan, particularly its women and youth, continue to organize, advocate, and strategize, both within the country and across the diaspora. They are risking their lives protesting, documenting human rights violations, educating girls in underground schools, and building solidarity across communities and borders. These individuals and communities are not merely resisting; they are actively reimagining a future Afghanistan.

What needs to be done

Legal, diplomatic, and political pressure on the Taliban must be sustained, particularly around issues of human rights, gender equality, and inclusive governance. At the same time, the path forward must also include constructive, meaningful, and targeted engagement that centers the Afghan people themselves. Recognizing and supporting the agency of Afghans, especially women, youth, and civil society actors, must become a strategic pillar of international policy toward Afghanistan.

Afghans inside the country, as well as those in exile, are actively envisioning and building models for a peaceful, inclusive future. Their efforts represent the most credible and locally grounded alternatives to the Taliban’s extremism and authoritarianism. Ultimately, it is about building on the resilience and leadership that persist within Afghan communities despite repression and exclusion.

One example of this is the Strategizing a Seat at the Table (SSTI) initiative, facilitated by Women for Peace and Participation, an organization which I founded in 2012 and where I currently serve as director. This initiative brings together hundreds of Afghan women, including young women from both within and outside the country, in a series of strategic dialogues aimed at shaping policy, proposing solutions, and advocating for inclusion. It is rooted in an ecosystem model that emphasizes complementarity, where different positions, experiences, and capacities across the population of Afghan women are leveraged to advance a collective agenda. This agenda is not limited to women’s inclusion, encompassing other historically excluded groups in Afghan society. Building on this foundation, SSTI trains women in negotiation, mediation, and advocacy; connects them to international platforms; and supports grassroots projects in healthcare, education, and community resilience. By engaging with key forums like the exclusionary Doha Process, United Nations bodies, and local mechanisms, it offers a flexible framework that enables Afghan women not only to participate—but to lead.

Initiatives like this one are part of a growing movement connecting Afghans inside and outside the country to reimagine leadership, redefine governance and assert a new vision for Afghanistan. Media outlets such as Rukhshana and Zan Times amplify voices across generations to advocate for women’s rights and social justice. Organizations like Rawadari document atrocities and pursue justice through international legal accountability mechanisms. Meanwhile, the Women Advocacy Committee of the Women and Children Research and Advocacy Network has established a platform in Canada to represent women leaders and organizations in exile. Women’s Rights First, a women-led organization, promotes gender justice, expands women’s access to justice, and strengthens accountability for human rights violations in Afghanistan.

On the ground in Afghanistan, despite severe repression, women-led resistance continues. These protest movements take many forms: some publish anonymous videos, others run underground schools, and many engage in decentralized, grassroots organizing to resist the systematic erasure of women’s presence, rights, and agency.  

Investing in Afghanistan’s future

The Taliban’s model of control today is not simply a product of ideological conviction—it is a deliberate political strategy aimed at long-term dominance. Educated youth and empowered women pose a threat not just because they oppose the Taliban, but because they embody an alternative vision for the nation: one rooted in rights, human dignity, participation, and accountability.

If Afghanistan is to reclaim its aspirations for freedom, equality, and an end to gender apartheid, it will do so through the leadership of those the Taliban seeks to silence. Ensuring these voices are protected, amplified, and resourced is not just a moral imperative, it is the only viable path forward.

Quhramaana Kakar is a peace strategist, mediator, and leadership expert with over two decades of experience advancing women’s inclusion in peacebuilding and women’s socioeconomic empowerment expert across conflict and post-conflict contexts, particularly in Afghanistan. She is the founding director of Women for Peace and Participation and a senior strategic advisor to the Women Mediators across the Commonwealth network, and a fellow at the Centre for Women, Peace and Security at the London School of Economics.

The post How centering Afghan women and youth now can help challenge oppressive regimes in the future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 27, Muhammad Tahir, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former RFE/RL Central and South Asia liaison in Washington, DC, was published in MSNBC on funding for the US Agency for Global Media and the role of US soft power in Iran.

Fellow

Muhammad Tahir

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Eurasia Center

Central Asia Media

The post Tahir in MSNBC on the Voice of America and Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The quick succession of events offers the United States an opportunity to shape a sustainable sports legacy. It can do so by building on France’s planning philosophy that it used for the 2024 Paris Olympics.

But that legacy should expand beyond the host countries and the competitions that will unfold in North America over the next few years. The world’s major economies—which usually swap the honor of hosting the world’s biggest sports events—should also support Africa’s sports sector and its sustainability.

Starting with its initial bid to host the 2024 Summer Olympics, Paris promised to host the “greenest-ever Games,” with the main goal of reducing carbon emissions by 50 percent compared to previous editions. To accomplish that, Paris heavily relied on existing sites and minimized new construction. Ninety-five percent of Olympic venues were preexisting or temporary facilities. Moreover, new construction (such as the Olympic Village) was planned with post-Games conversion in mind.

The City of Light set the bar high. But, according to the Paris Summer Olympic Games Organizing Committee’s Sustainability and Legacy Post-Games Report, Paris achieved its goal. In doing so, the city showed that it is possible to think long-term about sustainability amid the short-term fever that accompanies the Olympic Games.

In the end, the Games brought hope in uncertain times, set a precedent for sustainable sports, and offered a strong model of what green global sports events can look like. Future editions must aim for ambitious environmental goals, particularly by conceiving sustainable sites or reusing preexisting venues.

Despite being co-hosted by three nations, with potentially high environmental costs, the organizers of the 2026 World Cup appear to be attempting to follow Paris’ model. All sixteen host cities will use existing venues (one of the sites, the Azteca Stadium, was previously used in the 1970 and 1986 World Cups in Mexico), making renovations to these sites to accommodate the influx of fans. FIFA has also announced key environmental initiatives, emphasizing the need for sustainable global sports events.

As for the 2028 Summer Olympic Games, Los Angeles has already announced it will rely on existing sites—one of which was also used during the 1932 and 1984 Olympics. Under its “Radical Reuse” plan, Los Angeles aims to host the Olympics without building a single new permanent venue, building on Paris’ legacy and marking a giant leap for sports sustainability. The United States could go further, pushing the International Olympic Committee to turn the “Radical Reuse” concept into a required commitment for future Olympic bids. Such pressure could help ensure that global sports sustainability is not just a short-term trend started by Paris but a torch passed by Los Angeles to future host cities.

From the World Cup to the Olympics, the biggest sports events offer an opportunity to solidify the Paris 2024 model as a major shift in the sustainability legacy of global sports. But as the West pushes forward on setting these standards and in shaping the sustainability conversation, Africa is searching for its spot.

Indeed, Africa is the “missing ring of the Olympics,” the only continent to never host the Games. The continent faces numerous challenges, such as governance issues, a lack of government support or appropriate infrastructure, and the loss of African talent to better-funded countries. The financial costs associated with hosting Olympic Games on the continent are believed to be high. As a result, few African nations see their bids to host advance. In addition, many countries face difficulties in participating in the Olympics when hosted elsewhere.

As for the FIFA World Cup, Africa has only hosted the event once, in South Africa in 2010. The issues weighing down on Africa’s Olympics prospects also help explain the continent’s track record in world soccer. The 2022 World Cup sparked an insightful conversation when Morocco became the first African country to reach the semifinals. The Atlas Lions’ soccer performance became a diplomatic win for the continent, but also raised once again the paradox of Africa’s sports legacy: Africa is brimming with talented athletes, but it is held back by its systemic issues. Without change, the continent is fated to remain excluded from the global sports discourse (mirroring its experience in international organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council).

Among several forms of support, Africa’s partners—several of them being the countries that often host the Olympics—should invest in Africa’s sports infrastructure. With the continent lacking the infrastructure needed to host major sports events and leagues, African countries and their partners should use this funding to set a sustainable foundation, constructing new infrastructure with sustainability in mind from the start. Doing so would be a game changer, not just for countries’ bids to host global sports events, but also for education, gender equality, and social cohesion: In a sense, it would be a game changer for the continent’s future.

Of course, African countries have already gotten the momentum started: Some, not waiting for investors or partners, have built sports infrastructure, noting how powerful the impact on their societies may be. For example, Senegal’s Dakar Arena and Abdoulaye Wade stadium embody this African vision of global sports. In addition, both infrastructures strengthen the continent’s stature for hosting future global sports events.

That is why Africa’s sports sector needs more funding than ever. The momentum is building and must be sustained. Senegal will host next year’s Summer Youth Olympics, and Morocco will co-host—with Portugal and Spain—the 2030 FIFA World Cup. As the spotlight slowly shifts to Africa, the continent’s sports movement is taking off. As it does so, Africa’s global partners can support the continent in carrying a legacy of sustainable global sports.

Malcolm Biiga is a senior consultant at Havas Paris.

Note: Havas ran marketing for the 2024 Paris Olympics, but the author had no involvement in the effort.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Don’t leave Africa behind in sports sustainability—put it first appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee, and Joseph Lemoine

• The dangerous authoritarian narrative
• What do the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes measure?
• The state of Freedom and Prosperity around the world
• Is political freedom needed for growth and prosperity?
• Is political freedom disconnected from economic growth?
• Factors masking the democracy-growth nexus
• A refined analysis of political freedom and economic growth
• Democracy favors economic growth
• Political freedom as a linchpin of prosperity

Get the latest program developments, reports & research, and events.

The dangerous authoritarian narrative

A dangerous belief has taken root globally: that political freedom is not essential to prosperity and may even be an obstacle to economic growth.¹ This report demonstrates that this narrative is not supported by rigorous empirical evidence. On the contrary, the Indexes show that political freedom does lead to stronger long-term growth. In fact, the process of democratization alone provides an average 8.8 percent boost to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita after twenty years compared to its autocratic peers.

The deterioration of political freedom that began in 2012 remains an ongoing trend affecting countries across all regions and income levels. The continuing erosion of core political rights, such as freedom of expression and association, as well as the weakening of institutional checks on executive power, including judicial and legislative oversight, are alarming developments highlighted in this 2025 update of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes.

The benefits of political liberalization take time to materialize. Policymakers must be persistent and patient before reaping the rewards of liberalization. And the same logic likely applies in reverse: Declines in political freedom may not have immediate economic consequences, but they carry long-term risks. Complacency in the face of democratic backsliding may ultimately jeopardize the prosperity of the next generation.

Although the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes currently capture this decline of freedom most clearly in the political dimension, the outlook for the rule of law and economic freedom is not much better. The erosion of democratic institutions and oversight mechanisms will likely contribute to declines in the rule of law and economic governance. Executives unchecked by legislatures or civil society are less likely to be held accountable for bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption, and more likely to pursue harmful economic policies.

The authoritarian narrative must be challenged with rigorous research and evidence-based analysis. History shows that it was free institutions—political, legal, and economic—that enabled today’s most developed countries to escape poverty and achieve remarkable prosperity over the past two hundred years. The Freedom and Prosperity Center remains committed to this mission, working alongside thousands of freedom advocates around the world to safeguard and advance the institutions that foster long-term prosperity.

What do the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes measure?

The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center was created with the mission to increase the well-being of people everywhere—and especially of the poor and marginalized in developing countries—through unbiased, data-based research on the relationship between freedom and prosperity. The cornerstone of this project is the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: a rigorous effort to assess the evolution of freedom and prosperity around the world, going back three decades.

The two indexes are based on well-established theoretical definitions of the concepts of freedom and prosperity, matched with respected empirical measures produced by international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the V-Dem project, or Fraser Institute.²

The Freedom Index

We think of freedom comprehensively, as a combination of a political dimension (democracy and individual rights), a legal dimension (the rule of law), and an economic dimension (free-market economy). Therefore, the Freedom Index aggregates three subindexes (political, legal, and economic), each covering several components.

The Freedom Index is composed of three equally weighted subindexes: political, legal, and economic 

The political subindex measures the extent to which governments and lawmakers are responsive to the demands of citizens and respect their individual rights and liberties. The more democratic the political system, and the more it allows for citizens to oppose and contest those in power, the more public policies are expected to reflect the preferences of a majority of the population. The political subindex has four components: (1) elections; (2) political rights; (3) civil liberties; and (4) legislative constraints on the executive.

The legal subindex measures the degree to which a country abides by the rule of law—that is, whether citizens and government officials are bound by and abide by the regulations and laws of the land. It thus reflects certainty, stability, and predictability. The legal subindex includes five components: : (1) clarity of the law; (2) judicial independence and effectiveness; (3) bureaucracy quality and corruption; (4) security; and (5) informality.

The economic subindex is designed to measure whether most economic activity in a country is guided by the principles of free and competitive markets. An economically free society enhances the incentives to work and invest. Businesses and individuals can also capture the gains of an efficient allocation of resources guided by the price mechanism, and fully exploit the economic potential of its population. The economic subindex comprises four components: (1) property rights; (2) trade freedom; (3) investment freedom; and (4) women’s economic freedom.

We scale each component so that all have the same range (0–100), and compute each subindex as the unweighted average of its components. Finally, we arrive at a Freedom Index score for each country for each year, again using the unweighted average of the three subindexes.

In order to offer an intuitive and simple representation of the differences in freedom across countries, we assign one of four freedom categories (High Freedom, Moderate Freedom, Low Freedom, and Lowest Freedom) to each country-year observation. To do so, we use the Freedom Index rank for each year, labeling the level of freedom of the first quartile of countries as “High Freedom” (those that rank 1–41), “Moderate Freedom” for those in the second quartile (ranking 42–82), “Low Freedom” the third quartile (ranking 83–123), and “Lowest Freedom” those in the bottom quartile (ranking 124–164).

The Prosperity Index

The Prosperity Index also takes a broad view, going beyond the measurement of pure material well-being and including additional social aspects that we see as necessary for the discussion of a “prosperous society.” The Prosperity Index has six components: (1) income; (2) health; (3) education; (4) inequality; (5) minorities; and (6) environment. The first three components capture individual flourishing, while the last three assess whether prosperity is shared and sustainable.

Income per capita is the most widely used indicator of prosperity in economic and social science research. A prosperous society is necessarily one that has escaped generalized poverty and misery, and that generates sustained economic growth. The expectation of a long and healthy life and the opportunity to acquire knowledge are also widely considered to be standard dimensions of a holistic view of human flourishing.

A prosperous society requires that material well-being is shared among citizens and not concentrated in a small group. The components of inequality and minorities are intended to capture the degree of inclusiveness in a country. We measure inequality in terms of income, which is also highly correlated with education and health inequality. The minorities component captures the absence of discrimination regarding access to public services and opportunities, based on ethnic, social class, language, gender, political affiliation, and other considerations.

Finally, prosperity needs to be sustainable in the long run, and thus we include in the Prosperity Index a measure of environmental quality. This component is an equally weighted average of three sub-components, which deal with the wide variation in countries’ stage of development. First, we assess the cleanliness of a country’s production processes using the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to GDP per capita (both in logs). Second, we capture the consequences of environmental quality for human life, using the rate of deaths from air pollution. Third, we consider the fact that in the least developed countries citizens can be exposed to unclean environments on a daily basis, so we use access to clean cooking technologies at a household level as a proxy.

As we do for the Freedom Index, we assign one of four prosperity categories (High Prosperity, Moderate Prosperity, Low Prosperity, and Lowest Prosperity) to each country-year observation. To do so, we use the Prosperity Index rank for each year, labeling as “High Prosperity” the first quartile of countries (those that rank 1–41), “Moderate Prosperity” those in the second quartile (ranking 42–82), “Low Prosperity” the third quartile (ranking 83–123), and “Lowest Prosperity” those in the bottom quartile (ranking 124–164).

The state of Freedom and Prosperity around the world

Global freedom continues to decline

The Freedom Map (linked below) illustrates the global landscape of freedom in 2024, as measured by our three subindexes (political, legal, and economic). Freedom remains unevenly distributed across the world, with scores ranging from a high of 93.8 in Denmark to a low of 16.9 in Afghanistan. The persistent low scores for some countries over several years (sometimes decades) highlight persistent gaps in institutional capacities and economic freedom, particularly in fragile and authoritarian states.

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

Explore the indexes

Detailed Freedom Index scores and rankings for each country are available in Table 1. which also highlights changes in rank over the past year.

Because institutional reform is typically a slow and gradual process, the overall global distribution of freedom has remained quite stable over the past three decades. Western European countries continue to dominate the top of the Freedom Index, alongside Australia and New Zealand. Differences in scores among these countries are small, which helps explain seemingly large changes in rank, such as Finland dropping three positions or Germany falling five, even in the absence of major changes.

That said, it is noteworthy that both Canada (ranked 20th) and the United States (22nd) have lost ground relative to their European peers, falling four and three positions, respectively. Significant movements within the top quartile include Poland’s reversal of its recent democratic backsliding: It has gained eight positions in the 2025 Index and reentered the “High Freedom” category after eight years. In contrast, Slovakia’s performance is cause for concern, dropping eight positions following a nearly four-point decline in its Freedom score.

Among the middle two quartiles, categorized as “Moderate Freedom” and “Low Freedom,” we observe more dynamic shifts. On the positive side, the largest improvements were seen in Guatemala (up 26 positions), Vietnam (up 21), South Africa (up 13), and Jordan (up 12). The sharpest declines were recorded in Georgia (down 22 positions), Burkina Faso (down 17), and Mozambique (down 13).

Unfortunately, mobility within the “Lowest freedom” category remains limited. This group continues to include many countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. China (ranked 143rd) and Russia (145th), despite being two of the world’s most populous and geopolitically significant nations, remain firmly entrenched in the lowest tier, showing little progress toward greater freedom.

Table 1. Freedom Index scores and ranking for 2024

Looking beyond the most recent scores, the Freedom Index’s thirty-year coverage allows us to uncover some interesting dynamics. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the Freedom Index and its three subindexes since 1995 at a global level. The most striking—and worrying—trend is the negative evolution of the political subindex over the past twelve years. Democratic regression started in 2013, well before the COVID-19 crisis, accelerated during the pandemic, and continues today. The global average score of the political subindex in 2024 is similar to that of 1999, erasing 25 years of progress.

Figure 3. Political subindex is now at the same level as in 1999—a twenty-five-year low

The erosion of political freedom in the past decade is a generalized trend that affects countries at all levels of development, and across all regions of the world. Most notably, both the political subindex and the legal subindex have declined by more than two points globally.

Figure 4 shows that the OECD countries (those with the highest levels of income in the world, most of them well-established democracies) have experienced a decline in all three subindexes since 2014. For this group, the sharpest declines in the political subindex have occurred in Turkey, Mexico, Greece, and Hungary, each losing more than ten points over the past decade. In the legal subindex, which assesses the rule of law, Canada and the United States rank as the fourth- and sixth-largest decliners, respectively. Their scores dropped significantly due to a marked deterioration in the “clarity of the law” component, which evaluates whether legal norms are clear, transparent, stable, and consistently enforced.

Figure 4. OECD scores have declined across all three freedom subindexes in the past decade 

Declines in the political subindex are significant across all regions, as shown in Figure 5. with South and Central Asia experiencing the largest fall (-6.12 points on average), followed by Middle East and North Africa (-5.27) and Sub-Saharan Africa (-5.16). Similarly, legal freedom has fallen in all regions except for South and Central Asia, but it is important to keep in mind that this region still shows the worst average score in this subindex.

Figure 5. The democratic decline has continued to worsen across all regions 

The erosion of political freedom has been the most salient and generalized trend in recent times. We can examine what has been driving this by looking at the evolution of the political subindex components. Figure 6 presents the percentage change of each component since the political subindex peak in 2012. All three have decreased in the last twelve years, although with slightly different timing and strength. Changes in the components measuring elections, civil liberties, and legislative constraints on the executive are relatively minor until 2019, but worsen significantly during the pandemic (2019–2021) and continue to decline well after the world came back to relative normality.

The deterioration of the political rights component has been sustained and very strong since 2012, accumulating a loss of more than 10 percent. It seems clear that the restrictions imposed during the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis were only an accelerator of a process already incubated, as political regression started well before 2019, and continues up to this day.

Figure 6. All components of political freedom have declined since 2012 

Until now, our analysis has focused on global and regional simple averages, where each country carries equal weight in the aggregate trends, regardless of its population size, geographic area, or GDP. Figure 7 examines how political freedom has evolved for the average individual worldwide. It compares the global development of the political subindex using a simple country average (blue) versus a population-weighted average (orange).

Figure 7. Population-weighted averages show lower political freedom scores and a sharper decline

Two related facts stand out. First, the level of political freedom experienced by the average citizen of the world is significantly lower than the country average would indicate. Second, its erosion over the past decade has been much steeper when we examine it through population-weighted averages. This is because countries with larger populations carry more weight in population-based averages, meaning their declines in political freedom impact the global trend far more than those in less-populous countries.

China is a big factor explaining the former, as it comprises more than 17 percent of the world population and has ranked among the bottom ten countries on the political subindex, and all its components, since 1995. India, the most populous country in the world, is the main driving factor of the latter, with a plummeting trend in political freedom since 2014 (-14 points). Significant declines in several other populous countries have also contributed to the steep downward trend, such as Russia (-14.5), Indonesia (-11.8), and Bangladesh (-9.8).

While the political and legal subindexes have declined since 2014, the economic subindex shows positive progress over the same period. In fact, two of its components, property rights protection and, most notably, women’s economic freedom, are the only areas of the entire Freedom Index to have improved globally since 2014 (see Figure 8). Women’s economic freedom, in particular, has risen by nearly seven points globally since 2014, and by almost twenty-three points since 1995.

Figure 8. Only women’s economic freedom presents significant improvement in the last decade

Virtually every country in the Index has experienced improvements in women’s participation in economic affairs in the past decade. It is encouraging to observe that some of the largest increases in this component have taken place in countries that had the lowest scores just ten years ago. The Gulf monarchies (especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain), together with some African countries such as Gabon and Democratic Republic of the Congo, present significant expansions in women’s rights. However, it is important to acknowledge that this measure is limited to economic rights only, and that further progress is needed if these countries are to catch up with the most advanced countries of Western Europe.

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

Explore the indexes

Rising global prosperity, but worsening treatment of minorities

The Prosperity Map (linked below) shows the situation of prosperity around the= world according to the six prosperity components (income, health, inequality, environment, minorities, education) in 2024. Detailed scores and rankings for each country can be found in Table 2. The general distribution of prosperity is similar to that of freedom, with the Western world topping the top quartile (“High Prosperity”), and Africa being the least prosperous region.

Table 2. Prosperity Index scores and ranking for 2024

Large movements in the ranking position of specific countries in a single year are almost impossible as the components of prosperity vary only gradually and in the long term. Nonetheless, we do observe clear trends when looking at the evolution of prosperity and its components since 1995 (Figure 9). Most striking is the dramatic improvement of education globally, increasing by more than twenty points. The apparent stagnation in the last two years is the product of a lack of data from our preferred source (the UN’s Human Development Index). The disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are only lightly visible, but these do not seem to have obstructed the generalized positive trend toward increasing years of education across the globe, and especially in developing regions.

Other noticeable trends in the components of the Prosperity Index (Figure 9) include: A U-shape evolution of income inequality, which worsened from 1995 to 2005 but has improved since. Steady gains in health outcomes until 2019, followed by a sharp decline due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a partial recovery. Consistent improvement in environmental quality. And a visible decline in the treatment of minorities since 2019.

Overall, the big picture is clear: The world is becoming more prosperous. However, the specific driving forces of this process vary significantly between regions and levels of development.

Figure 9. Prosperity has improved across all components since 1995, but the treatment of minorities has worsened in the past decade

Figure 10 shows the 2024 score in the Prosperity Index for all seven regions of the world (the tip of each arrow), as well as the size and direction of change in each region’s score since 2014 (beginning of the arrow). The substantial differences in levels of prosperity between regions is by no means a novel finding, but it is always necessary to keep in mind these disparities when discussing how the different regions have evolved in recent years.

Figure 10. The Global South has been catching up in overall prosperity since 2014, but a significant gap remains (ten-year change on the Prosperity Index)

Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia are the most improved regions since 2014, with much of that performance attributable to substantial increases in the health, environment, and education scores. Nonetheless, it is also worth noticing that although decreases in the minorities component are generalized across the globe, the fall in South and Central Asia is the largest in the Global South. This trend may be attributable to the deterioration of political freedom in the region (see above).

Figure 11. The treatment of minorities has worsened across all regions in the past decade

North America is the only region in which overall prosperity has declined over the past decade, a trend that warrants several important caveats. First, as previously noted, North America still maintains a significant lead in overall prosperity compared to other regions, with the exception of Europe. This advantage holds across most components of the Prosperity Index. Second, the primary driver of the region’s decline is a drop in the minorities component of the Index. In both the United States and Canada (the region’s only two countries in our grouping, which places Mexico with Latin America and the Caribbean) this indicator has experienced a notable downturn in recent years. This decline is likely linked to more restrictive immigration policies, which may have reduced access to public services and economic opportunities for non-nationals and minority groups.

Is political freedom needed for growth and prosperity?

We now turn to a deeper question at the heart of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s mission:

What is the relationship between freedom and prosperity?

In other words:

Is freedom the surest path to long-term development and well-being?

Prosperity and overall freedom are closely associated

In the 2024 Freedom and Prosperity Report, we presented substantial evidence of a strong and consistent association between freedom and prosperity. Figure 12 provides an updated visual summary of this link, showing a clear positive correlation (0.71) between the two Indexes across all countries in 2024: Nations with greater freedom tend to enjoy higher levels of prosperity.

Last year’s report further supported this finding by examining changes over time rather than one-off snapshots—an approach that helps control for potential econometric concerns. Even then, the positive relationship held: Countries that improved most in their freedom scores since 1995 also experienced the largest gains in prosperity. In addition, we explored the long-term impact of a significant increase in freedom (a freedom “shock”) and again found substantial positive effects on prosperity.

Figure 12. There is a strong positive correlation (0.71) between the Freedom Index and Prosperity Index

Is political freedom disconnected from economic growth?

Having established a strong positive relationship between overall freedom and prosperity, we now take a closer look at the connection between each of the three freedom subindexes—political, legal, and economic—and the various components of the Prosperity Index (Table 3). While each of the freedom subindexes is positively correlated with all prosperity components, the strength of these relationships varies.

One clear pattern emerges: The legal subindex, which reflects the quality of the rule of law, shows the strongest correlation with nearly all prosperity components (with the exception of inequality). By contrast, the political subindex is the one least strongly correlated with nearly all prosperity components (with the exception of minorities).

Table 3. The legal subindex (rule of law) correlates most strongly with prosperity (2024)

Some might argue that this strong relationship is driven mainly by the wealthiest countries, such as those in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which tend to score high in both freedom and prosperity. To test this, we re-ran the analysis, excluding these high-income OECD countries and focusing only on the remaining 126 non-OECD countries. The strength of the correlations decreased, but the relationships remained positive in nearly all cases. The one exception was for the inequality component, where the correlation was essentially zero. This can likely be explained by the Kuznets curve, a well-known economic theory that suggests inequality tends to rise in the early stages of development before falling as countries grow richer. Since non-OECD countries span a wide range of development stages, it is unsurprising that inequality patterns are inconsistent among them, weakening the overall correlation.

One of the standout findings from the global data—that the legal subindex relates much more strongly than the political subindex to prosperity—is also repeated in this non-OECD-country analysis. For example, the correlation between political freedom and GDP per capita is just 0.17—three times lower than the correlation for the legal subindex.

Figure 13 illustrates this divergence by plotting 2024 scores in the legal and political subindexes against income per capita for non-OECD countries. On the left graph (political subindex), several countries—including Gulf monarchies, Belarus, Russia, and China—score low on political freedom but still enjoy relatively high income levels. Conversely, we also see a number of countries with strong political freedom scores (above 75) that perform poorly in terms of income, clustered in the bottom right of the graph.

Figure 13. At first glance, political freedom alone is not strongly related to growth

These findings raise challenging questions: Should we conclude that political freedom is not important for economic growth, and only marginally related to broader prosperity? Should the international community focus solely on strengthening the rule of law in developing countries as the most effective way to boost income? And if political rights don’t appear to drive growth, should we be less concerned about the global democratic backsliding seen in recent years?

These may appear to be logical observations based on the data—but a deeper dive into the Indexes, and the explanatory factors behind them, reveals that they are also simplistic, and misleading.

Factors masking the democracy-growth nexus

The simple correlations do not account for several important factors that may obscure the true relationship between political freedom and economic growth. First, democratization is often a disruptive process, generating fundamental changes to a country’s institutional framework through the expansion of key political rights and civil liberties. In the short term, such political transformations can generate uncertainty and require significant adjustment from economic actors as they adapt to new rules, norms, and power dynamics.

Moreover, democratization is frequently triggered by economic crises. While such crises may help mobilize civil society and create momentum for reform, they also place a heavy burden on newly democratic governments. Political scientists have described this as the “tumultuous youth” of democracy, that is, a phase marked by instability and delayed returns. As a result, the time horizon used to assess the impact of democratization is crucial: The economic effects of increased political freedom may only become visible in the medium to long term.

Take the case of Gambia, one of the countries that has made the largest gains in political freedom over the past decade, following a major democratization process beginning in 2017. It is too early to fully assess the economic benefits of these reforms, especially considering the significant external shock of the COVID-19 pandemic between 2019 and 2021.

Another limitation of simple cross-sectional correlations is that they overlook the starting conditions under which countries undertake political reform. Some countries begin democratization with strong legal and economic institutions already in place, while others do not. The Freedom Index is particularly useful here, as it disentangles—and independently measures—the political, legal, and economic dimensions of freedom. For example, a country can achieve high performance on rule of law without being democratic, just as it is possible to have a vibrant democracy with weak rule of law. This raises an important question: To what extent do the rule of law and economic freedom shape the relationship between political liberalization and economic growth? Focusing on the relationship between political freedom and the rule of law, we can imagine two possible scenarios, depending on whether they function as substitutes or complements:

• If substitutes: Political freedom could be especially beneficial in countries with weak rule of law, meaning improvements in either dimension could spark economic growth independently.
• If complements: The benefits of democratization may depend on having a strong legal foundation already in place. In this case, only countries that democratize after establishing robust legal institutions would see significant economic gains, while those lacking such foundations may not.

Finally, when evaluating the effects of political freedom, it is critical to define the right comparison groups. The “treatment group” should consist of countries that have undergone substantial and lasting increases in political freedom—not those with marginal or temporary changes. At the same time, the “control group” must be carefully chosen to serve as a credible benchmark—countries that have remained politically unchanged but are similar to the “treatment” country in other relevant characteristics.

The next subsection outlines a more rigorous analysis of the political freedom-economic performance relationship, taking these methodological challenges into account.

A refined analysis of political freedom and economic growth

To better understand the relationship between political freedom and economic growth, we revert to our analysis of 126 non-OECD countries, now over the period 1995–2019. We intentionally end the period before the COVID-19 pandemic to avoid distortions caused by its unprecedented economic disruptions.

Since the political subindex is a continuous measure, we set a threshold score of fifty. Every country-year observation of fifty or above is classified as “democratic”, and any score below is “autocratic.” Acknowledging that this threshold is somewhat arbitrary, we also tested alternative cutoffs—forty-five, sixty, and the sample median (65.9)—to assess the robustness of our results. Varying the cutoff does not significantly affect the results. Based on the 50-point threshold, we are able to categorize countries into four distinct groups, based on their political trajectories over time:

1. Always Autocracies: Countries that remained below the fifty-point threshold throughout the entire period. This group includes twenty-five countries, such as China (Figure 14).
2. Democratizers: Countries that started below the threshold in 1995 but crossed above it by 2019, indicating a sustained shift toward democracy. This group includes twenty-one countries, such as Nigeria.
3. Autocratizers: Countries that started above the threshold in 1995 but fell below it by 2019, indicating democratic backsliding. There are nine countries in this group, such as Venezuela.
4. Always Democracies: Countries that remained above the threshold throughout the entire period. This is the largest group, with seventy-one countries, such as Botswana.

Figure 14. An “Always Autocracy”, a “Democratizer”, an “Autocratizer”, and an “Always Democracy.” Political subindex scores (1995–2019) for one exemplar country from each of the four types, grouped by political freedom trends

We then compare the group of Democratizers against the group of “Always Autocracies,” as this creates the clearest counterfactual: What happens when a country democratizes versus when it remains authoritarian? This comparison involves a total of forty-six countries: twenty-one “Democratizers” and twenty-five “Always Autocracies.”

To examine the long-term impact of democratization on economic performance, we use local linear projections as our main analytical tool. This method is well suited to address the concerns discussed in the previous subsection, especially regarding timing and variation across countries. In simple terms, the technique involves running a series of regressions that estimate how a democratization “shock” (i.e., a significant increase in political freedom) affects real GDP per capita over time. We project these effects for up to twenty years into the future, plotting the estimated impact for each year.

For each “Democratizer” country, we identify the year of democratization as the one with the largest single-year increase in the political subindex, for example, 1999 in the case of Nigeria. Local linear projections also allow for the inclusion of important control variables. Specifically, we include: (1) country fixed effects to account for time-invariant characteristics (such as geography or historical institutions) that might influence growth regardless of political regime; and (2) year fixed effects to control for global shocks or trends that could affect all countries in a given year (such as financial crises or commodity price shifts).

These controls help isolate the true effect of democratization from broader national or global events that could otherwise bias the analysis.

Democracy favors economic growth

Figure 15 shows the cumulative effect of democratization on GDP per capita over a twenty-year period, comparing countries that experienced a democratization shock or episode with those that remained autocratic. The results are clear: Democratization has a positive and substantial long-term impact on economic growth. On average, countries that democratize achieve GDP per capita levels 8.8 percent higher than their autocratic counterparts after two decades.

Figure 15 also supports our earlier insight about timing: The economic benefits of political liberalization do not appear immediately. On average, it takes around six to eight years for the growth dividends of democracy to become visible—and around ten to twelve years for those benefits to be fully realized.

Figure 15. Democratization generates a boost in GDP per capita of 8.8 percent (compared with countries that remained autocratic)

To explore the interaction between political freedom and the rule of law, we divided the democratization episodes into two categories:

• High legal subindex score at time of democratization (above the median score)
• Low legal subindex score at time of democratization (below the median)

We find that democratization leads to long-term economic gains in both groups, but the effect is more pronounced in countries with weaker legal institutions at the time of democratization. In those cases, GDP per capita had grown 12.3 percent after twenty years, measured against their autocratic counterparts. In contrast, for countries that democratized under relatively strong rule of law conditions, the gain was more modest, at 5.3 percent over the same period.

These findings suggest a degree of substitutability between political and legal freedom: Where the rule of law is weak, political liberalization plays a more critical role in unlocking growth potential.

Political freedom as a linchpin of prosperity

This thirtieth year of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes presents a complex picture. Encouragingly, our Prosperity Index shows broad growth, though significant regional disparities and challenges persist. Conversely, political freedom and the rule of law are in decline across the board. Whether in OECD or non-OECD countries, or across regions, all are experiencing a downturn. Our political subindex, which measures the extent to which a nation upholds civil liberties, democratic legislature, and the political rights of its constituents, reveals the increasingly dire state of global democracy—sinking to its lowest point in twenty-five years.

While prosperity encompasses far more than just income, sustained economic growth remains a critical pillar of long-term well-being. Our analysis provides compelling evidence that democratization contributes meaningfully to long-term economic growth, even if its effects take time to materialize. Over twenty years, countries that democratize achieve per capita GDP that is 8.8 percent higher than their autocratic peers. While the rule of law emerges as a consistently strong predictor of prosperity, our analysis also shows that political freedom plays a vital and independent role, particularly in contexts where legal institutions are weak.

Political liberalization can act as a powerful catalyst for progress, especially when it helps correct institutional deficits. At the same time, the impact of democracy on growth is not automatic or immediate; it depends on timing, national conditions, and the broader institutional environment. This underscores a central insight of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: that freedom, when exercised in its full political, legal, and economic dimensions—is not just a moral imperative, but a pragmatic path to shared prosperity.

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

Explore the indexes

Expert bio

Ignacio Campomanes

Senior Advisor

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Economy & Business English

Staff

Nina Dannaoui-Johnson

Deputy Director

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Africa Human Rights

Staff

Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee

Assistant Director

Freedom and Prosperity Center

East Asia Rule of Law

Former staff

Joseph Lemoine

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Africa Economy & Business

We would like to thank Will Mortenson and Christine Hutchinson for their valuable contributions, and the team at Soapbox for their support with data visualization.

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes are a creation of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. The center’s mission is to increase the well-being of people everywhere—and especially of the poor and marginalized in developing countries—through unbiased, data-based research on the relationship between freedom and prosperity.

Report Jun 25, 2024

The path to prosperity: The 2024 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

By Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea

In this “year of election,” freedom continues to decline globally. Political rights, judicial independence, and checks and balances are eroding. Prosperity growth has slowed, particularly in developing countries. The data underscores a strong link between freedom and prosperity, highlighting the need for data-driven policy reforms.

Democratic Transitions Freedom and Prosperity

Oct 30, 2024

Freedom and prosperity indexes

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes analyze twenty-nine years of data taken from 164 countries to better understand how a strong rule of law, political freedom, and market economy provide the surest path to durable prosperity.

Dec 11, 2024

2025 Atlas: Freedom and prosperity around the world

2024 has seen escalating global crises, shifting alliances, and over half of the world’s population voting in national elections. In this Atlas, twenty leading economists, scholars, and diplomats analyze the state of freedom and prosperity in sixteen countries around the world, looking back not only on a consequential year but across twenty-nine years of data on markets, rights, and the rule of law.

Public Event Mon, June 23, 2025 • 7:00 pm ET

2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes launch

Experts examine the latest trends in global freedom and prosperity and highlight the work of changemakers fighting to promote democracy in launching the 2025 Indexes.

Eastern Europe Freedom and Prosperity Human Rights Inclusive Growth

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post 2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: How political freedom drives growth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The two countries have come close to a full-fledged war since October 7^th, 2023, but tit-for-tat strikes and proxy warfare have so far paled in comparison to the almost week-long apocalyptic scenes of raining missiles from one side and the other. The gloves are off this time, and the world is in disbelief. The stakes are higher as two opposing rhetorics about the region’s future are at play: Pan-Abrahamism and Revolutionary Islamism.

The bomb shelter diaries

It’s three am on Friday in Jerusalem, and deafening sirens wail, disturbing the peaceful sleep of our American delegation, which was just reassured a few hours earlier at a dinner with a US official that “nothing will happen.”

Then, Israel hit Iran. Strategic military and nuclear facilities in Iran crumpled under Israeli fire, and a dozen Iranian military leaders and scientists lost their lives in the shadow of the night.

While rushing to find cover in a bomb shelter three floors down the hotel, barefoot in my pajamas, my eyes caught the sight of Tal, a five-year-old Orthodox Israeli boy with his family. This young person appeared to be going through the security motions unbothered by the enormity of the situation, and the imminence of an Iranian retaliation strike. Since the 1991 Scud missile attacks by Iraq’s former dictator, Saddam Hussein, the Israeli society has developed a cutting-edge early detection and sheltering system, which includes fortified safe rooms in every habitat, larger shelters around each neighborhood, and a series of mobile applications and procedures developed by the central home command.

Tal and other Israelis with whom our group became acquainted over our four long sleepless nights, dictated by the tempo of the hundreds of Tehran’s clumsy missiles, are the embodiment of the Israeli spirit and resilience. While trans-national Arab and Persian media try to portray the citizens of Israel as scared and fearful, the reality we witnessed first-hand is far from that. Locals who shared our confinement were all disciplined, united, and had a shared understanding of how vital this conflict is for their nation. The long nights at the bunker teach you a lot about a nation. In spite of the fatigue and psychological warfare imposed by Iran, we only saw a mix of singing, praying, and passing along ice cream to combat the summer heat in the Judean Desert.

The unholy alliance of the Iranian octopus

One recurrent theme kept coming up in all the discussions with Israeli officials and journalists, who generously visted our hotel to brief us on the events, as we were ordered to remain confined near our anti-bomb shelter: The necessity to cut the head of the Iranian octopus after removing many of its tentacles in the region, like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the now-ousted regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Tehran has been posing an existential threat to the safety and continuity of the state of Israel through its proxies in the region. Iran’s development of a proxy network also has been aimed at reshuffling the Sunni-Shia balance of power in the Middle East, establishing Iranian dominance, and exporting its Islamic Revolutionary Model.

One high commander we spoke with at the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), argued that what the Americans might be too naïve to grasp is that Tehran never stopped implementing Qassem Sulaimani’s vision for the Middle East, and that the nuclear negotiations are but an attempt to buy more time to achieve not only the bomb—but their ideological ambitions. However, many inconsistencies persist in the supreme leader’s discourse, especially the moral dilemma caused by the anomalous coalition with Muslim Brotherhood offshoots like Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, which are the same frictions that were killing Shia populations in Syria and Iraq during the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) conflict.

The Islamic Republic’s octopus constructed its complex web of proxies based on doctrinal affinities with Shia minority groups across the Middle East.  At its heart, Iran might be a purely pragmatic international actor more concerned with regional hegemony and power balance, but it still needed to keep a religious Twelver façade to justify its theocratic nature. Iran already adopted a larger definition of Shiism when it allowed controversial Shia sects like the Syrian regime’s Alawite creed and the Houthis’ Zaydi movement to join its zone of influence. With Hamas joining the party, it became a “stinky unholy alliance,” as Israeli Channel Twelve’s Ohad Hamou described it in my chat with him on the morning after the first series of retaliatory ballistic missiles hit Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Ultimately, supporting Hamas in the October 7^th terrorist attacks was the demise of Iran’s strongest proxy, Hezbollah, and is a direct casualty of the Israel-Iran war we are seeing today.

A war of symbols and rhetoric

On this delegation trip to Jerusalem, one of the leading Israeli Abraham Accords architects told us that “this is a war of imaginations, where each side wants to imagine a Middle East in its own image.” This troubled region is no stranger to civilizational clashes. Israel’s Arab and Muslim-majority neighbors have been unable to move beyond the 1948 Arab Nakba, and many have built their entire national identity in opposition to the state of Israel. Minutes before rushing again underground to the bunker, another Israeli who works at a media watchdog warned us not to be fooled, “This is not about the bomb. It’s about ideological dominance.”

Using Aristotle’s rhetorical appeals, Israel and the global West embody the values of the Greek ethos and logos (credibility and logic) that favor discipline, hard work, and a human-centric disenchanted world vision, which is proper to the Judeo-Christian civilization that underwent a drastic metamorphosis after the Renaissance.

In contrast, the Shia axis draws its legitimacy from politicizing the past and the power of the mythos and pathos in Twelver Shia mythology and sentimentalism. This is a dogma that believes it has a historical duty since the great discord between Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Muawiya Ibn Abu Sufiyan to stand with the subaltern underdogs against global hegemons, as displayed by Khomeini’s famous portrayal of the United States as the “Great Satan.” The side that will win this ongoing war will get to reshape the region—a view not necessarily shared by all of the Iranian society.

Equally crucial as US President Donald Trump’s sixty-day ultimatum to the regime in Tehran to reach a nuclear deal with Washington is the symbolism of attacking Iran on the celebration of Eid Al Ghadeer. The day commemorates Imam Ali’s appointment as the successor of Prophet Mohammed—a historical event intimately intertwined with the Iranian doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, or “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist,” which ideologically legitimizes the Iranian theocracy itself since the Islamic Revolution.

Similarly, Israel chose an emblematic appellation for its latest operation, “Rising Lion,” as a nod to Iran’s pre-1979 flag, calling upon the people to rise against the clergy. On the other side, Iran has consistently named its military arsenal after its religious symbols and presumed martyrs, like the Haj Qassem missile, which was launched over Tel Aviv starting June 13^th, to signal that the former leader of Al Quds Brigade lives on. The clerical establishment also hanged a red flag on top of the Jam Karan mosque on the outskirts of Qom, which is a pilgrimage site dedicated to the Shia’s occulted savior, the Mahdi.

Pan-Abrahamism instead of Revolutionary Islamism

The Assad regime in Syria was the last battalion of the Pan-Arab revolutionary regimes that rose in the fifties and sixties as an antithesis to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Sykes-Picot borders. The collapse in December, 2024 of the Syrian regime and the current Israeli war against Iranian revolutionary Islamism represents a unique opportunity to reimagine the region based on a Pan-Abrahamism, “a vision that offers a story where Muslims, Jews, and Christians all belong to the holy land instead of fighting over who does it belong to,” as one interlocutor told me minutes before Iran launched its first daytime missile attacks on June 15—one of which landed four-hundred meters from our location in a civilian neighberhood.

As we attempted to evacuate from Jerusalem on Monday morning on a bus through the challenging Allenby border crossing with Jordan, driving through the West Bank’s arid, barren lands, I remembered what Israeli Historian Yuval Noah Harari said in one of his interviews. He explained that this land that Middle Easterners and foreigners alike are obsessed with and fight for is not the richest, most beautiful, or fertile. It’s all about the stories they construct and recount, and the sanctity they confer to place. I can’t help but wonder what stories Tal and his five-year-old Iranian counterparts will tell at the end of this once-in-a-lifetime civilizational war.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, focusing on identity and minorities in the region. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

The post Dispatch from Jerusalem: Inside Israel’s bunkers as Iran war erupts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Located in the geographical center of Kyiv, Independence Square is known to locals and foreign guests alike by its Ukrainian-language name, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or simply Maidan. Over the past three decades, Maidan has undergone a dramatic transformation that has seen it emerge from Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity crisis via two popular uprisings to become the sacred ground zero of a nation forged in the crucible of revolution and war.

Today, Maidan is an obligatory point of pilgrimage on the itinerary of all visitors to the Ukrainian capital. People come to Maidan in order to honor those who have died in the fight against Russia’s invasion, or just to soak up the atmosphere of an iconic location that has witnessed some of the most consequential political events of the twenty-first century.

It was not always this way. When the modern square first began to take shape in the nineteenth century, it was a relative backwater in an elegant and aged city where the center of gravity remained firmly fixed elsewhere. Tellingly, when Ukrainian officials gathered in Kyiv on January 22, 1919, to publicly sign the unification act between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, they chose to stage this historic event on Sophia Square rather than Maidan.

As Kyiv rose from the ashes following World War II, the square became more architecturally impressive and gained in logistical importance, but it continued to lack the aura attached to the city’s true heirlooms. Instead, Maidan remained a fairly identikit Soviet public space noted for its large fountains and even larger Lenin monument.

Maidan first became associated with political activism during the dying days of the Soviet Empire in 1990 when it hosted a two-week student protest dubbed the Revolution on Granite that played a significant part in Ukraine’s independence struggle. At the time, it was known as October Revolution Square. Maidan would receive its current name on August 26, 1991, two days after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, but it would be many years before the square began to earn its current reputation as a genuine symbol of Ukrainian statehood.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

During the first decade or so of Ukrainian independence, Maidan was anything but inspiring. The square remained largely empty, with no monuments or memorials to celebrate the newly independent state. Instead, the cult of communism was replaced by crass commercialism. On the spot once occupied by Lenin, a giant TV screen was installed broadcasting an eclectic mix of adverts, pop videos, cage fights, and catwalk shows. Taxi drivers would line up nearby and watch absentmindedly while waiting for new fares.

High above Maidan, the skyline was dominated by the Hotel Moscow. In 2001, the Ukrainian authorities finally decided that this branding was probably inappropriate for a country looking to shake off the shackles of empire, and the hotel name was duly changed from Moscow to Ukraine. Likewise, a colossal Soviet hammer and sickle was allowed to loom large over Maidan until 2003, when it was belatedly removed from the facade of the Trade Union building. The continued prominence of the Soviet crest made a mockery of Independence Square and spoke volumes about the often ambiguous attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood that characterized the early post-Soviet period.

The first big turning point in Maidan’s transformation came following Ukraine’s November 2004 presidential election. Amid massive public anger over a crude Kremlin-backed bid to steal the vote, huge crowds flooded into Kyiv from across the country and congregated on Maidan, establishing a tent city and a round-the-clock presence. This protest movement lasted for over two months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Millions of Ukrainians participated. They eventually succeeded in overturning the rigged election and forcing a rerun which was won by the opposition candidate, representing a watershed moment in modern Ukrainian history.

Maidan itself was synonymous with the Orange Revolution and occupied a central position in the mythology that grew up around it. From that moment on, Maidan became not just a place but also an event. To stage a Maidan meant to organize a grassroots protest and hold power to account. This was a particularly terrifying concept for the neighboring Russian authorities. Dread of a Moscow Maidan soon began to haunt the Kremlin, feeding Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and laying the foundations for the horrors that were to follow. The Russian propaganda machine promptly adopted Maidan as a buzzword signifying wicked foreign plots, and continues to use it two decades later without any need for further explanation.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 5, 2025

Trump’s Russia policy must be rooted in realism

By Agnia Grigas

The Trump administration favors a realist approach to international relations, but a pragmatic assessment of Russia’s capabilities and objectives is needed to achieve the stated goal of bringing the war in Ukraine to an end, writes Agnia Grigas.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 29, 2025

UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity

By Peter Dickinson

UN investigators have concluded that a coordinated Russian campaign of deadly drone strikes targeting civilians in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is a crime against humanity, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jun 3, 2025

After Ukraine’s innovative airbase attacks, nowhere in Russia is safe

By David Kirichenko

Ukraine carried out one of the most audacious operations in modern military history on June 1, using swarms of smuggled drones to strike four Russian airbases simultaneously and destroy a significant portion of Putin’s bomber fleet, writes David Kirichenko.

Artificial Intelligence Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Modern Ukraine’s national journey can be traced on Kyiv’s central square appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For more than a decade, Syria’s crisis has caused unimaginable suffering inside the country and a constant stream of strategically significant spillover effects across the Middle East and globally. However, this dynamic changed in late 2024, when armed opposition groups in Syria’s northwest launched a sudden and unprecedentedly sophisticated and disciplined offensive, capturing the city of Aleppo and triggering an implosion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the space of ten days, Assad’s rule collapsed like a house of cards, dealing a crippling blow to Iran’s role in Syria and significantly weakening Russia’s influence. 

Now, for the first time in many years, Syria has a chance to recover and reintegrate into the international system. If the United States, Europe, Middle Eastern nations, and other stakeholders embrace the right approach, support the right policies, and encourage Syria’s transition to move in the appropriate direction, the world will benefit—and Syrians will find peace. The work of the Syria Strategy Project (SSP) and the policy recommendations in the report “Reimagining Syria: A roadmap for peace and prosperity beyond Assad” present a realistic and holistic vision for realizing that goal. 

This report is the result of intensive joint efforts by the Atlantic Council, the Middle East Institute (MEI), and the European Institute of Peace (EIP), which have been collaborating since March 2024 on the SSP. At its core, the project has involved a sustained process of engagement with subject-matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and across the Middle East to develop a realistic and holistic strategic vision for sustainably resolving Syria’s crisis. This process, held almost entirely behind closed doors, incorporated Syrian experts, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders at every step.

Mar 15, 2024

Syria Strategy Project

The Atlantic Council, Middle East Institute, and European Institute of Peace collaborate with subject matter experts and policymakers in the US, Europe, and the Middle East to develop a holistic strategy to sustainably forge a pathway to resolving Syria’s crisis.

Sep 5, 2019

Syria Project

Our work on Syria sheds light on the ongoing struggle of Syrians to fulfill their desire for democratic self-governance as the United States and the international community grapple with the aftermath of a devastating civil war, millions of refugees across the Middle East and Europe, and ongoing security and political challenges spilling over Syria’s borders.

Event Recap Mar 29, 2024

Launching the Syria Strategy Project

By JP Reppeto and Charles Johnson

On March 18, 2024, the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project, the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, the European Institute of Peace, and Madaniya Civil Society Network launched the Syria Strategy, an intensive process of engagement with subject matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East to develop a holistic strategy to […]

Civil Society Conflict

New Atlanticist May 13, 2025

Experts react: Trump just announced the removal of all US sanctions on Syria. What’s next? 

By Atlantic Council experts

Our experts provide their insights on how the removal of US sanctions on Syria would affect the country and the wider region.

Civil Society Financial Sanctions and Economic Coercion

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2024

Experts react: Rebels have toppled the Assad regime. What’s next for Syria, the Middle East, and the world?

By Atlantic Council experts

Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has been ousted as opposition forces quickly took the Syrian capital. Atlantic Council experts share their insights on the developments.

Conflict Corruption

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

Learn more

The post The fall of Assad has opened a door. But can Syria seize the moment? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Currently, remittances are not taxed separately, as senders already pay income tax on the earnings they transfer to family and friends abroad. “The One, Big, Beautiful Bill” would upend that system—effectively taxing those transfers twice. But that’s not all. A tax on remittances—valued at $905 billion globally—would not only hit US households and low-income countries, where they can account for more than 30 percent of gross domestic product; it could also undermine key US national security and foreign policy priorities.

If the Senate passes the Republican budget bill, remittance senders and recipients—who already contend with high fees—will undoubtedly be hit the hardest. In 2024, the global average cost of sending two hundred dollars across borders was 6.4 percent. That’s more than double the United Nations’ sustainable development goal of 3 percent and exceeds the Group of Twenty (G20) target of 5 percent.

If overall remittance volumes were to fall, US remittance providers—the companies that enable the sending and receiving of these payments—would be adversely affected. The proposed legislation imposes new responsibilities for these remittance service companies—such as verifying the sender’s citizenship and enforcing new fee structures and reporting mechanisms—all of which impose new costs, compliance burdens, and risks for remittance providers. These additional requirements threaten to reduce operational efficiency and drive up consumer prices, especially as US companies currently dominate the remittance services sector, setting standards for transfer speed, cost, and security. A tax-driven shift in the market would hurt these companies’ profitability and competitiveness, undermining broader US economic interests. 

The risk of driving transactions underground

When it comes to national security, the United States already has a robust framework to monitor and regulate money and payment flows, including laws and infrastructure designed to combat financial crime. Remittance service companies are a central component of this framework, enabling state and federal law enforcement to track and pursue suspicious transfers and bad actors. 

Moreover, research shows that taxing remittances leads to increased use of underground or informal channels for sending money. That is, senders seek out alternatives—less regulated, less transparent, and less safe ways of transferring their money abroad. In fact, countries that have enacted punitive measures on cross-border payments and currency exchange have often undermined their own ability to combat financial crime, thereby weakening their economies and diminishing their foreign influence. 

Argentina serves as a revealing case study. Under previous leadership, the Argentine government imposed foreign exchange and capital controls that drove transactions into underground banking networks, making it far harder to trace illicit activity. These restrictions also weakened the already vulnerable economy, contributing to stagnation and inflation. President Javier Milei is now actively reversing these policies in favor of open and transparent capital flows and foreign currency exchange—reforms that significantly benefit both law enforcement and economic stability.

In the United States, the revenue generated by a federal tax on remittances would likely be less than 0.1 percent of the national budget. At the same time, it would reduce remittance volumes or push them underground, contradicting broader US national security goals and making US companies less competitive by increasing their cost of doing business. Accordingly, policymakers should reconsider the trade-offs and recognize that transparent, reliable remittance services serve the national interest of the United States.

A foreign policy tool hiding in plain sight

With respect to foreign policy and the ability to influence global development, remittances play a vital role—especially in an era of shrinking public-sector aid. Private remittance flows often reach communities and individuals more directly and efficiently than government-to-government assistance. US senders are often family members and friends of recipients, as well as faith-based and other humanitarian organizations. These flows ultimately contribute to stabilizing fragile economies, reducing the financial distress that often drives illegal migration. Additionally, remittances often support democratic activity and institutions in recipient countries, while also helping undermine autocratic governments by empowering citizens with resources independent of state control.

Because they account for one-sixth of all cross-border payments, remittances also reinforce the global dominance of the US dollar. A large portion of remittances is sent in—or exchanged into—US dollars, bolstering the currency’s central position in the international financial system and providing visibility into foreign transactions. This visibility, in turn, allows for the effective enforcement of anti–money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) policies, as well as sanctions enforcement in cases of illicit activity.

Given these strategic benefits, the United States should take concrete steps to better leverage remittances as a national security and foreign policy asset. This begins with adopting smart, forward-looking policies that strengthen remittance channels and maximize their impact.

First, US policymakers should not just protect, but also actively promote legal remittance channels to ensure that these funds can flow safely and efficiently. Rather than imposing restrictive measures such as new taxes, the United States should foster deeper collaboration between law enforcement and well-regulated remittance providers. Such cooperation would support the adoption of rapidly evolving compliance technologies that more effectively detect illicit financial flows.

Second, the United States should reduce the costs and friction associated with remittance transactions. This includes granting well-regulated US remittance providers direct access to national payments systems and modernizing AML and Bank Secrecy Act regulations to reflect the realities of digital transactions. Emerging technologies can improve financial crime detection—provided that regulators offer clear guidance and foster their adoption.

Third, the United States should leverage its presidency of the G20 in 2026 to establish a global working group that captures the complexity of remittances as a tool of foreign policy and national security. The G20 has traditionally provided targets for remittance payments. Additionally, a US-led working group could address the need for better global coordination to curb illicit flows, reduce frictions, and explore how remittances can complement official aid flows, especially in constrained fiscal environments. 

By recognizing and elevating the role of remittances, US policymakers can incorporate a powerful, underused asset into their broader foreign policy strategy—one that supports both domestic prosperity and global stability.

Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The author thanks Daniel Gorfine for his contributions to this article.

The post A tax on remittances could hurt US households—and national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine is currently fighting for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Once this battle is won, the most important challenge facing the country will be judicial reform. If Ukraine is to emerge in the postwar years as a stable and prosperous European democracy, the process of recovery and renewal must be based on the firm foundations of a strong justice system. This is not a mere slogan; it is an absolute necessity.

Judicial reform is the key to the country’s entire future economic development. Investors will not come to Ukraine if contracts cannot be enforced or if property rights can be bought and sold through corruption. That is the message Ukraine’s international partners have been repeating consistently for many years. With the massive task of postwar rebuilding looming on the horizon, this message is now arguably truer than ever.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Once the war ends, Ukraine can expect to receive unprecedented international support as foreign governments seek to participate in what promises to be Europe’s largest reconstruction initiative since the years following World War II. While donor funding from partner countries is likely to be very significant, this will not be nearly enough to cover the estimated rebuilding price tag of around half a trillion US dollars. Instead, much of this money must come from the private sector. However, unless Ukraine has a transparent, reliable, and efficient justice system, private capital will stay away.

If Ukraine hopes to become a success story, it needs courts that can settle disputes fairly, whatever the issue. If legal cases are tainted by bias or drag on for years, this will serve as a major red flag to all potential investors. For this reason, Ukraine’s courts should be recognized as a key element of the country’s infrastructure that is every bit as vital to national recovery as roads or power lines. After all, the justice system serves as the legal framework that makes it possible to build everything else.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine has made real progress in recent years toward meaningful judicial reform. This has included the reform of key institutions like the High Court of Justice, along with the launch of new processes to improve the selection of Constitutional Court judges. It is now crucial to build on this momentum.

Judicial reform must be deep, deliberate, and closely tied to Ukraine’s European future. With this in mind, it is important to maintain the current dialogue with the Venice Commission and use its recommendations to shape genuine change. One of the most effective tools to help achieve this change is the participation of international experts. Their role is not to control the process, but rather to help ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability.

As Ukraine looks to create the conditions for national reconstruction, one judicial reform initiative currently being backed by the Ukrainian parliament is the creation of specialized courts to handle issues like land rights and construction disputes. These courts could help speed up vital cases and take pressure off the existing judicial system.

Work is also continuing toward greater digitalization within the justice system, from electronic courts to online case tracking. Much more can be done in this direction. Other tech savvy countries such as Estonia and Singapore are currently leading the way in digital justice. Ukraine can build something just as bold using tools like blockchain and AI. The expanded use of technology can improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s courts, while also boosting trust levels and leading to greater transparency.

Creating a fully functioning and internationally credible justice system is the necessary starting point for everything else Ukrainians want to achieve, from economic strength and prosperity to the rule of law and a greater sense of national security. It can encourage investors to bet on Ukraine, and can help persuade Ukrainians currently living abroad to return home. Ultimately, judicial reform can serve as a national anchor confirming Ukraine’s place in the heart of Europe.

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance.

Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian parliament for the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukraine-USA Strategic Partnership cross-party association.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 8, 2025

Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

By Mykola Bielieskov

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert May 21, 2025

Putin aims to destroy Ukraine and has zero interest in a compromise peace

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s ongoing campaign to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation is taking place in front of the watching world and makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker some kind of compromise peace, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 13, 2025

Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

By David Kirichenko

Today’s Ukraine is now a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Judicial reform must be at the heart of Ukraine’s postwar recovery appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since Assad’s December ousting, Syrians have struggled to sift the truth from fake claims about security incidents across the country and to find accurate information about local and central government decisions.

Under the Assad regime, all official media were state-run, overtly political, and heavily censored. Most Syrians instead relied on Facebook to obtain local news and avoid censorship. But since the regime’s collapse, many Syrians have struggled to keep up with current events, official decrees, and local news. Absent any clear official new channels, most Syrians turned to social media to fill the information void. This reliance on social media has predictably resulted in rampant misinformation and disinformation across the country. The flood of unverified news has been exploited by foreign actors as well, further exacerbating sectarian conflict and fears.

Nowhere is this more impactful than in Syria’s Alawite-majority coast—the minority group to which the Assad family belongs. These communities have, since December 8, relied on social media to both raise awareness of and look for sectarian crimes committed by civilians and security forces affiliated with the new government. But this ecosystem was immediately flooded with false and misleading claims of massacres and international intervention, bolstered by real events and confusing statements by the transitional authorities. All of this fueled panic and confusion even before the March 6 insurgent uprising and Alawite massacres that killed more than 1600 security forces and Sunni and Alawite civilians. Without access to a consistent stream of reliable news, Syrians of all sects have adopted divergent narratives of major security events and struggle to understand the diplomatic positions of foreign countries or assess their own security status in their regions. This uncertainty also extends to all details of the transitional, and now interim, government’s policies and security forces.

Utilizing two weeks of fieldwork across the coast and consistent monitoring and analysis of Syrian social media before and after the fall of the regime, this report provides anecdotal evidence of the issues and effects of the information ecosystem in Syria. This research followed a more loosely structured two weeks of fieldwork in the same areas in mid-February. Through this, three common themes of information sharing have emerged:

1. Social media dominates the information ecosystem, from rumor mills to international misinformation campaigns.
2. Locals and officials have utilized WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages to fill the communication void, but they have still failed to create clear lines of official communication.
3. The media void has fueled fear, hatred, and sparked instability over security uncertainty. Parallel narratives of the current security situation have created further sectarian divisions.

“The biggest problem is Facebook”

In the nearly two decades since Facebook’s creation, the social media platform has evolved into thousands of community, group, and celebrity pages that often compete for followers and daily traffic. Facebook’s algorithms often promote these high-traffic, generic ‘news’ pages over more accurate, smaller-traffic local news pages, flooding Syrians with unverified clickbait-style news.

Facebook has for years been Syria’s dominant social media and news platform, a crucial medium for sharing information about and calling attention to crimes occurring in their communities. Misinformation was widespread from the revolution’s earliest days in 2011, and similar trends were quickly apparent in the chaos of the regime’s collapse.

For example, local Salamiyah community pages quoted a General Security official on May 8, saying, “We urge our fellow citizens to exercise caution and refrain from engaging with any fake accounts or pages and to rely only on the official channels issued by the Ministry of Interior to disseminate security news and information.”

When asked how locals along Syria’s Alawite-majority coast accessed news about their region, the response was a resounding accordance of: “social media.”

Each governorate, village, and even neighborhood has experienced the fall of the regime and developments differently. Local news, perhaps even more so than national news, carries important implications for local safety, access to services, and impacts on daily life. For instance, information about the violence perpetrated by both the insurgents and the pro-government factions on March 6 became vital for survival, but fake claims muddied real events as everyone turned to social media for answers.

For many Alawites, all of these claims were taken together to prove the extent of a “genocide” against them in the aftermath of Assad’s fall. But as the fake claims were disproven, they became evidence for many Sunnis that the real deaths of Alawite civilians and crimes by pro-government forces must have also been faked. As a result, the two communities today have completely separate narratives of that week, and many attempts at interfaith dialogues since have devolved into debates over the basic facts.

One woman in Latakia put it simply: “The biggest problem is Facebook,” she told us.

The media environment in March was a microcosm of how fake news had been used since Assad’s downfall to push divergent realities between the pro and anti-new government communities. But this misinformation goes beyond local initiatives and rumors.

Recent investigations by the BBC, Arabi Post, Verify-Sy, and the German Marshall Fund have also underscored the role of foreign media campaigns backed by Iran, Israel, and Hezbollah to push sectarian narratives and fake news onlinee, including the rumors that Maher al-Assad was returning to the coast with the Russian army at his back, ready to reclaim Syria.

And as real violence against Alawites escalated in Homs in January and February, this disinformation ensured that Alawites in other areas like Latakia and Tartous, which had not seen any considerable violations, remained confused and terrified about their future safety. Promises from pro-Assad Alawite networks of an imminent international intervention by the United States, France, Israel, or the United Nations to either reassert Assad in Damascus or carve out an “Alawite Coastal State” were used to widen support for the growing anti-Damascus insurgent movement, culminating in widespread support or neutrality for the insurgent attacks in March.

A Christian businessman from Safita recalled the Maher rumor, pointing to the Alawite villages surrounding the city: “That night you could hear gunfire from every village here, they all believed he was returning and celebrated.” Other locals told the authors at the time how their Facebook feed had suddenly become full of Alawites threatening revenge on coastal Sunnis for opposing Assad. As a local from a village outside Tartous recalled, when the rumors began, gunshots were heard throughout the Khirbet al-Mazzah region, convincing the local General Security forces that they would soon come under attack. As the confusion threatened to escalate into armed conflict, Alawites in the village sheltered the security forces in their homes until the morning, ensuring the area remained calm.

Struggling official channels of communication

These social media rumors and foreign media campaigns spread fear and confusion across Syria’s minority regions by exploiting both the real sectarian violations and the government’s lack of official news channels. For its part, the new government has made some initial attempts to spread information about municipal news, but still struggles greatly at relaying clear security-related statements or establishing effective two-way communication channels so locals can clarify rumors.

The  Tartous and Latakia Governorate Facebook pages, which were formed in mid-December 2024 and appear to be run by government employees, regularly post updates of meetings and activities conducted across the governorate. Yet these pages have relatively few followers, are overshadowed by much higher traffic privately-run pages, and do not resolve the fears of those who already distrust the government. The majority of people, when asked where they get official government news from, made no mention of such pages, instead relying on word of mouth and their own online networks.

It all leads to one question. As a Christian in Safita asked, “Who represents the government?”

Official communication for security issues is even more opaque.

While there is one official Ministry of Interior page, for example, there are dozens of Facebook pages that claim to represent the General Security Services, with no way to discern any of their affiliations.

Regardless, a single Ministry of Interior page does not address the vast majority of Syrians’ needs: detailed and up-to-date information on security issues. This is not just a problem of clear government communication, but also a lack of two-way communication, allowing locals to check rumors or events witnessed in their towns.

To address this, local officials in the cities of Latakia and Tartous created multiple WhatsApp groups to directly connect their communities to security and administrative officials on security developments.

A business owner in Latakia city who was among the first invited to the group claimed the system “was very useful in the early days of the new administration because of the rise in crime.” Residents will text in reports about robberies or suspicious activity, and security forces will respond in a timelier manner than when using phone lines, which he claimed were always busy. These groups have also become a central means for regional officials to disseminate news.

However, in Tartous, a female activist stated that the WhatsApp groups were almost entirely composed of men and were capped at four hundred people. As she wasn’t included in that limit, she would have to reach out to others to get information from or to the channel. The business owner from Latakia also voiced concerns about the size of the group, saying that some people were clogging the chat with non-security-related comments and would then have to be removed from the group by moderators.

While this approach improves some communication, many criticize this improvised system: “Why is an official decree distributed in a WhatsApp channel?” asks a Sunni activist in Tartous.

Confusion about official policies of the government, such as the settlement process for ex-regime soldiers, rules around civil society, curfews, and checkpoints, has forced many to lie low and wait anxiously for clarity. As a priest in Suqlabiyah stated, locals come to him with questions about what makes a war criminal: “There is confusion about who is going to be detained or killed.”

The rift between realities

In Latakia, some Sunnis who spoke with the authors were unsure what to think about the news of the massacres on the coast. They don’t know or perhaps don’t want to know if civilians were killed. Meanwhile, in Baniyas, many survivors argue that there were no insurgents in the city, but rather it began with a government-sanctioned slaughter. These conflicting realities continue to be fought online, but the Facebook quarrels have real-life consequences.

During the long years of Syria’s civil war, many regions became isolated and rooted in their local realities of struggle. As al-Sharaa’s forces seized the country, many were optimistic, though they knew little of his government in Idlib. However, as the new government settled in and in light of the violence on the coast and elsewhere, the initial hope has faded into distrust and confusion. Those interviewed had more questions than answers about the various security forces and their origins, the factions from the north, life in Idlib under al-Sharaa’s militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the ideology of the current government, and the conditions in nearby governorates.

Officials are deeply aware of this—one security officer in Qadmus told us that “combatting fear is a major issue.”

This uncertainty about the future has heightened sectarianism based on the regime’s careful weaponization of Syria’s demographic makeup. Fear of military checkpoints has further isolated many Alawites, while Facebook rumors about roving foreign fighters and factions committing daily crimes against Alawites have prevented most from engaging with local security officials. Distrust in the government, in hand with their resounding silence on the specifics of the events of March 6, has left Syrians to piece together their own narratives, further separating the country into distinct realities.

Reconstructing the Syrian information ecosystem

Breaking Syria from Facebook’s grasp will not be easy or quick. However, the Syrian authorities and international organizations can take several steps to help begin the process.

First, ensuring that the March 6 Investigation Committee releases an accurate and uncensored report on the events of that week will go a long way towards bridging a trust gap between the Sunni and Alawite narratives, as most Sunnis who denied the deaths of Alawite civilians also told the authors that they would accept whatever conclusion the committee came to.

Second, expanding civil communication networks will help foster more accurate and effective local news systems. This can include both word-of-mouth via civil councils that engage with local officials, as well as local journalists on Facebook. Expanding these systems requires funding support from the international community and clear authorization from Damascus to ensure local civil networks do not face any risk of legal troubles.

Third, expanding official government media channels to include local security announcements, such as curfews, deployments, and patrols, and, importantly, addressing any violations or crimes rumored to have been committed by security forces.

Lastly, international organizations should increase funding for local media outlets, especially those engaged in fact-checking and who demonstrate professional standards in what they share. Helping existing journalists organize into new institutions with websites outside of Facebook will further bolster their credibility and reach.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive and an independent analyst whose research focuses on the development and reform of security institutions, local governance initiatives, and sectarian relations.

Kayla Koontz is a PhD candidate at the Carter School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a researcher at the Syrian Archive.

The post Sectarianism, social media, and Syria’s information blackhole appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Current Russian troop movements and battlefield dynamics indicate that the coming summer offensive may be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war. If successful, this campaign could allow Russian troops to push the front line tens of kilometers forward into Ukrainian-held territory and overrun parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk provinces.

The cities of Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Kramatorsk are high on the list of likely targets. They have all experienced significant damage and large-scale displacement as a result of Russian bombardment. If these cities and others in the surrounding area fall to the Russians in the coming months, the wider region could become depopulated as large numbers of people flee the fighting.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Based on current trends and previous displacement waves, at least two hundred thousand Ukrainian civilians living close to the current front lines of the war could be forced to leave their homes by fall 2025. This is not speculation; it is informed by experience gained during Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Since the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian organizations have been on the front lines of the humanitarian response. They have provided essential aid, temporary housing, psychological support, and ongoing reintegration counselling to help Ukrainians displaced by Russia’s invasion rebuild dignity and restart their lives.

Ukraine’s civil society has worked wonders over the past three years but cannot realistically hope to absorb another 200,000 diplaced people without international support. The situation is even more alarming due to the recent closure of USAID, which was a major player in the humanitarian response to Russia’s invasion. With Putin’s troops already advancing, Ukraine’s Western partners must not ignore the looming danger.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 3.6 million people remained internally displaced within Ukraine as of early 2025. Most are women, children, and elderly individuals. Many have already been forced to flee multiple times. This population of displaced people may soon become considerably larger.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Compounding the crisis, European governments are beginning to phase out temporary support programs for Ukrainians. While the EU recently agreed to extend temporary protection through 2026, enforcement is sometimes patchy. Meanwhile, there are indications across Europe that resettlement fatigue is growing.

In the UK and US, political rhetoric on the topic of Ukrainian refugees has shifted ominously. Most recently, reports emerged that the Trump administration is exploring options to repatriate Ukrainians who entered the United States following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

If these trends continue, millions of Ukrainians could find themselves trapped between advancing Russian forces and a closing window of international asylum. While Ukrainians in the east of the country flee Putin’s invading army, many Ukrainian refugees may be forced to return home with uncertain prospects.

If the overstretched Ukrainian military is unable to contain Russia’s summer offensive, the fallout will reverberate far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The displacement of at least 200,000 more civilians would severely strain humanitarian corridors, destabilize border regions, and sow chaos in Ukrainian cities already struggling to absorb previous waves of refugees.

Ukraine’s Western partners still have time to prevent this, but they must act with a sense of urgency. While the Trump administration has been clear that it does not plan to provide Ukraine with further military aid, it should continue sharing intelligence with the Ukrainians while confirming its readiness to sell arms to Kyiv. Europe must speed up the delivery of promised weapons and should expand supplies significantly to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield.

In parallel, European countries should take steps to provide reassurance and protect the legal status of Ukrainian refugees. Donor organizations can help by strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian civil society groups that have demonstrated agility, transparency, and high levels of local trust.

The next phase of Russia’s invasion is not just being fought on the front lines of the war. It is taking place across the country in bomb shelters, train stations, and temporary accommodations. Russia is trying to break Ukrainian resistance by making large parts of Ukraine unlivable and destabilizing the country. Ukraine’s partners can do much to counter these efforts, but they must act now before the military and humanitarian situation deteriorates further.

Viktor Liakh is president of the East Europe Foundation. Melinda Haring is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior advisor at Razom for Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 8, 2025

Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

By Mykola Bielieskov

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert May 21, 2025

Putin aims to destroy Ukraine and has zero interest in a compromise peace

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s ongoing campaign to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation is taking place in front of the watching world and makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker some kind of compromise peace, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 13, 2025

Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

By David Kirichenko

Today’s Ukraine is now a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Russia’s summer offensive could spark a new humanitarian crisis in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Many Ukrainian civil society representatives stress that peace must be more than a mere pause in fighting. Temporary ceasefires may lead to periods of relative calm, but unless the root causes of the war are addressed and justice is delivered, the conflict will merely be frozen and not resolved. Similarly frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia offer cautionary tales of how such outcomes can serve Russian interests. These unresolved disputes have allowed Moscow to destabilize its neighbors for decades while maintaining strategic leverage and control.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In order to avoid the geopolitical uncertainties and internal instability of a frozen conflict, Ukrainian sovereignty must remain non-negotiable. This means rejecting any potential peace deal built on territorial concessions, restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military, or limitations on the country’s ability to form international alliances.

Instead, Ukraine needs concrete and comprehensive security guarantees from the country’s partners. With this in mind, many civil society representatives warn against repeating the mistakes of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear arsenal in exchange for toothless security assurances that failed to prevent Russia’s invasion.

Ukraine’s future security also depends on a strong military. Many women within the country’s civil society have sought to communicate this to their colleagues in the international feminist movement, which has often traditionally championed disarmament and non-violent conflict resolution. They stress that a durable peace cannot come at the expense of security or Ukraine’s fundamental right to exist.

Speaking during a recent visit to the United States, Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Oleksandra Matviichuk emphasized that safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty is about much more than protecting the country’s physical borders and also involves millions of human lives. Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are currently enduring the kidnapping of children, forced deportations, prison camps, sexual violence, widespread human rights abuses, and the methodical erosion of civil liberties. These are not isolated crimes. Instead, Russia is accused of seeking to systematically erase Ukrainian national identity in a campaign that many believe amounts to genocide.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Ukrainian civil society leaders have stressed the need for broad inclusion in peace negotiations and post-war recovery processes. Their calls are backed by the experience of peace initiatives elsewhere. Research indicates that peace efforts are up to 64 percent less likely to fail in instances when civil society representatives are invited to participate in talks. This has been the case in places like Northern Ireland and South Africa, where a combination of official diplomacy and civil society dialogue helped forge lasting peace.

Excluding Ukrainian civil society from peace efforts could undermine the human dimension of the process and remove accountability from the equation. While defining what justice should look like at the local, national, and international levels will be an ongoing discussion requiring the involvement of diverse stakeholders, Ukrainian civil society activists emphasize that justice must remain at the heart of any peace agreement.

Demands for accountability are widespread throughout Ukrainian society. More than 70,000 war crimes have been documented since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, including a large number of cases involving conflict-related sexual violence. Civil society activists have been at the forefront of efforts to secure justice for war crimes while also working for the protection of displaced people and the return of abducted Ukrainian children. Their demands include ensuring that the perpetrators of war crimes do not enjoy immunity, and that frozen Russian assets be directed toward rebuilding Ukraine and supporting victims.

Many Ukrainian civil society leaders believe the pursuit of justice in response to the crimes committed during Russia’s invasion is not only a national priority. Instead, they say Russia’s actions elsewhere from Syria to Africa reflect a wider pattern of impunity and argue that addressing this problem is a global imperative. As Oleksandra Matviichuk bluntly puts it, “Unpunished evil grows.”

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern history that has directly undermined the foundations of the existing international order. Ukrainian activists recognize the scale of the challenge this represents, but argue that international law must be revitalized rather than being abandoned entirely. They see this moment as a critical test for the global community. How the world responds to Russia’s alleged war crimes will set precedents that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Failure to act decisively now will not only undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Ana Lejava is a Policy Officer at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security at Georgetown University.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 13, 2025

Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

By David Kirichenko

Today’s Ukraine is now a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert May 13, 2025

How much longer will Putin be allowed to continue stalling for time?

By Peter Dickinson

President Trump has made a legitimate effort to broker a generous peace, but the time has now come to acknowledge that Putin is not negotiating in good faith and will only respond to the language of strength, writes Peter Dickinson.

France Germany

UkraineAlert May 6, 2025

The shadow of 1930s appeasement hangs over US-led peace talks

By Oleksandr Merezhko

As the world prepares to mark the eightieth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, the shadow of events leading up to World War II hangs over efforts to end Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine, writes Oleksandr Merezhko.

Conflict European Union