On December 19th, 2025, Global China Hub Assistant Director Caroline Costello appeared on the China in Africa Podcast to discuss China’s outsized role in West Africa’s illegal resource trade.

The post Caroline Costello in the China in Africa Podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 9th, 2025, Global China Hub Assistant Director Caroline Costello published an op-ed in Foreign Policy about China’s role in fueling illegal logging in Africa.

The post Caroline Costello in Foreign Policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

All of this unfolded against the backdrop of a new administration in Washington that has been unafraid to shake up decades of US diplomatic conventions.

As 2025 comes to a close, our senior analysts at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs unpack the most prominent trends and topics they are tracking for the new year.

Khalid Azim: Three trends shaping the economic landscape

Gissou Nia: Demands for justice—and protests driven by the thirsty

Karim Mezran: North Africa is a rising priority for US policy

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Key questions remain for Palestinians

Victoria J. Taylor: Iraq must maintain unprecedented stability

Daniel B. Shapiro: A political transition in Iran approaches

Nathanael Swanson: Will the Israel-Iran cease-fire hold?

Jonathan Panikoff: A duality of possible trajectories

Three trends shaping the economic landscape

Three major macro trends will shape the Middle East and North Africa in 2026, each carrying profound implications for the region’s economic trajectory.

1. The pressure of lower energy prices
As energy revenues soften, governments across the region will be forced to make more disciplined, risk-adjusted investment decisions. The era of abundant fiscal cushions is shifting toward one that requires sharper prioritization, operational efficiency, and a clearer sense of expected returns. This will test policymakers’ ability to allocate capital effectively and to reduce long-standing subsidies and support for entrenched constituencies. These choices become even more consequential as a growing cohort of young people demand economic opportunity, purpose, and social mobility.

2. Rising debt and the cost of ambition
Fiscal tightening will coincide with an accelerating need for investment. Across the Gulf, governments are committing billions to data centers, artificial intelligence ecosystems, new power generation, and other foundational infrastructure. These projects will increasingly be financed through borrowing, especially as the current account deficit grows. The result will be higher debt levels and rising debt-servicing costs. Countries that clearly articulate their economic value proposition and demonstrate credible reform will have a competitive advantage in the capital markets. Those that do not may face steeper financing costs and slower momentum in their diversification strategies.

3. Vision 2030 ten year anniversary: A regional bellwether
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 has already reshaped the kingdom’s economic and social landscape through diversification, investment in future industries, and the creation of a more open and optimistic society. The plan’s tenth anniversary in 2026 marks a critical milestone, not only for the kingdom but for the region. The next decade will be defined not by the wealth beneath the ground, but by the wealth of human talent above it. How effectively the kingdom transitions from resource-driven growth to human capital-driven growth will influence the MENA region’s competitiveness for a generation.

Khalid Azim is the director of the MENA Futures Lab at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

Related reading

MENASource

Nov 20, 2025

Saudi Arabia’s next horizon: Building human capital beyond Vision 2030

By Khalid Azim

Riyadh still needs to take fully support small and medium-sized enterprises—the true engines of job creation.

Economy & Business Middle East

Demands for justice—and protests driven by the thirsty

In 2026, expect to see more widespread protest movements for change across the Middle East and North Africa fueled by climate change and authoritarian mismanagement. Analysis of global protest movements in 2025 focused heavily on the young age of the protesters. While youth demographics have gained relevance as new communication tools have emerged over the last decades (in 2011, it was Twitter organizing the youth in the “Arab Spring”; in 2025, it’s the gaming app Discord organizing Morocco’s “Gen Z” protests), the evergreen undercurrent is frustration with corruption and elites. Resources have become scarcer due to global warming and authoritarian mismanagement, and the globe has become increasingly and overtly transactional as it shuns diplomacy in favor of kinetic means and “might is right” politics. The Middle East and North Africa are profoundly impacted by both these negative trends. With water running out in Tehran and water instability around the Nile Basin and the Tigris and Euphrates River, expect the next wave of regional protests to be driven not just by the youth, but by the thirsty.

Regional victim and survivor-centric demands for justice will also continue to grow in 2026 in countries that are emerging from conflict, experiencing government transitions, or where restive populations wish to usher in a change of rule. There is no clearer example than in Syria, where Assad’s exit one year ago opened the space for a new Syria and where a previously exiled network of Syrian lawyers, researchers, and advocates now work on transitional justice processes from inside their own country. In Iran, where the population is publicly demanding regime change, victims of protest violence, executions, and custodial deaths have organized powerful advocacy groups to demand that international processes deliver justice where domestic courts are unable and unwilling to do the job. And across the region, while many governments have been complicit in the violence in Gaza, the Arab street stands at odds with those governments and instead has demanded—alongside much of the world—that the perpetrators of the violence in Gaza be held to account.

Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Related reading

MENASource

Dec 8, 2025

States shouldn’t waste the chance to establish a Syria Victims Fund

By Kate Springs, Celeste Kmiotek

A centralized fund would better support victims of international law violations in Syria, who face unique challenges.

Democratic Transitions International Norms

North Africa is a rising priority for US policy

North Africa is poised to move closer to the center of US regional policy for 2026. The past year of quiet US engagement, including the work of US President Donald Trump’s Senior Advisor Massad Boulos, is beginning to reduce tensions and open political space. Algeria and Morocco are edging towards some degree of a detente, creating space for practical steps on the Western Sahara file.

Additionally, Libya may see modest but meaningful progress. Headway on an agreement between the divided governments on a unified development funding mechanism may reduce parallel spending and put less pressure on the dinar, as well as release the funds for long-awaited reconstruction and modernization projects. The decision to include Libyan units from both east and west in AFRICOM’s Flintlock 2026 special operations forces exercise suggests an incremental movement on military unification in Libya, an area where US diplomacy with key partners has grown more active.

Egypt will remain an integral partner as Washington tries to deal with situations in Gaza, states located on the Red Sea, and Sudan. At the same time, renewed attention to commercial diplomacy signals a shift toward advancing US business interests across North Africa.

Taken together, these dynamics make the region harder to overlook and suggest that 2026 may be the year North Africa becomes a sustained policy priority in Washington.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Related reading

MENASource

Oct 3, 2025

US, Italy, and Turkey alignment could push the needle in Libya

By Frank Talbot and Karim Mezran

The US, Italy and Turkey can—through balanced diplomacy—reinforce the economic opportunities presented by institutional unification in Libya.

Italy Libya

Key questions remain for Palestinians

This was a tectonic year of realignments for the Palestinian people, as well as their heavily divided and largely powerless leadership. Next year is likely to be equally important and trend-setting—and four major threads have emerged that could shape its trajectory.

For Palestinians and what’s next for Gaza, the top four trends to look for in 2026 are the following:

1. The Trump administration’s commitment to the Palestinian issue and its willingness to engage the Palestinian Authority, which remains subject to US sanctions and restrictions. Will elements of a comprehensive peace deal between Palestinians and Israelis, like the one that Trump proposed during his first term, return?
2. What becomes of the Gaza cease-fire that the United States and international players are hoping to cement into a lasting peace deal that transforms the coastal enclave? The year 2026 is either going to be one in which Hamas is disarmed and fundamentally changed—or it will be one in which the Palestinian terror group continues to dominate Gaza’s affairs and prevent substantive change to revitalize the decimated Strip after two years of devastating warfare.
3. The prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization—which could unlock immense potential for the kingdom, the Palestinians, Israel’s regional integration, and a regional anti-Iran coalition—is enormous. The year 2026 will set the tone for whether Saudi Arabia proceeds with integration based on its often-stated requirement for Palestinian statehood, or if this ends up in further stalemate and stagnation.
4. The fourth critically significant trend to watch is the impact the Gaza war and Israel will have on influencing voters in the upcoming midterm elections. As with the Trump election, this issue increasingly played a role in rallying US voters to the ballot box, including the high-profile race to elect New York City Mayor-Elect Zohran Mamdani. The year 2026 will reveal whether this trend persists or if it is a fad that passes once the Gaza war comes to a more permanent end.

Ultimately, 2026 will either mark the end of the Gaza war and the initiation of reconstruction and hope in the Strip—or it will perpetuate a state of stagnation and stalemate, risking a return to fighting, devastation, and more tragic deaths.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is the director of Realign For Palestine at the Atlantic Council.

Related reading

MENASource

Nov 10, 2025

A little-discussed point in Trump’s Gaza plan could be an opportunity to build interfaith understanding

By Peter Mandaville

Peace efforts don’t need more gleaming Abrahamic baubles, they need a genuine commitment to supporting grassroots religious peacebuilding.

Civil Society Freedom and Prosperity

Iraq must maintain unprecedented stability

Amid continued regional turmoil, Iraq ended 2025 in a period of relative stability and security, avoiding being drawn into the Twelve Day War between Israel, Iran, and the United States—and holding successful parliamentary elections. The challenge for Iraqi political leaders in 2026 will not only be to maintain this unprecedented stability, but also to navigate Trump administration pressure to rein in Iran-aligned militias and avoid being pulled into the broader US maximum pressure campaign against Iran. Iraq is also likely to continue its efforts to appeal to the Trump administration through investment, pitching new energy deals to US companies, but it is not yet clear whether these efforts will be successful.

With Iranian influence in the region at an all-time low, Iraqi leaders have an opportunity to forge a more independent foreign policy that prioritizes continued partnership with the United States and differentiates Iraqi from Iranian interests. Core to this effort will be progress toward Iraq’s regional integration and strengthened political and economic ties to the Gulf and other regional partners such as Jordan and Egypt. In the face of Iraqi efforts to challenge the militias and strengthen partnerships with the United States and the Gulf, 2026 may bring attempts by Iran and Iran-aligned militias to act as spoilers who obstruct Iraq’s progress and imperil Iraq’s stability. Iraq’s next prime minister has an opportunity to transform the country.

The next year will be critical in determining whether the Iraqi government can seize the opportunity and whether the United States and other regional partners will support it in doing so.

Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East program.

Related reading

Dispatches

Dec 10, 2025

Dispatch from Iraq: The biggest challenge awaiting the country’s next prime minister

By Victoria J. Taylor 

A recent visit to Iraq following parliamentary elections reveals a growing divide between the political elite and the people.

Elections Iraq

A political transition in Iran approaches

Political transitions are hard to predict, but there is no doubt Iran is approaching one. With a frail, unpopular, eighty-six-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei nearing his actuarial and conceivably political limits, 2026 could be the year.

Any transition has the potential to unleash dramatic changes in Iran, across the region, and in relations with the United States. The potential positive implications of new Iranian leadership and a change of approach are massive: relief from brutal suppression for the Iranian people, new possibilities in nuclear diplomacy and toward normalization with the United States, broadened detente with Iran’s Arab neighbors, and an end to the arming of violent terrorist proxies across the region that have squandered hundreds of billions of dollars of Iranian resources—driven by an ideological crusade to destroy Israel—while the Iranian people endure manmade water and electricity shortages. The beneficial effects would be felt from Iran to Lebanon to Gaza to Yemen and beyond.

None of this is preordained or automatic. A transition could cement a new generation of the Islamic Republic’s clerical leadership, bring to power an even more hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or devolve into chaos and civil war with massively destabilizing effects. What Washington should engage in through 2026 is transition planning—not in order to cause a regime change, which must be left to the Iranian people, but to be prepared to provide support for the Iranian people, resources and expertise, potential sanctions relief, and coordination with international partners to assist in steering a transition when it comes toward one of the better possible outcomes. The United States has moved smartly in 2025 to support a stable Syrian transition, and while the jury is still out on long-term stability there, there has been significant progress. An even more consequential transition awaits in Iran. Washington must not be caught flat-footed.

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Will the Israel-Iran cease-fire hold?

Following the Twelve Day War in June, Iran retains large quantities of highly enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges, without oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time, while Iran’s missile program and support for nonstate proxies were diminished, Iran is rebuilding its capabilities and still threatens US, Israeli, and regional security.

After initially declaring Iran’s nuclear program obliterated, Trump has also repeatedly called for resumed negotiations and a new nuclear deal with Tehran. Although still nominally implementing the US “maximum pressure” campaign, Trump also made a high-profile gesture by inviting Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to the Gaza Peace Summit in October.

For its part, Iran appears to remain in a largely reactionary posture. It is attempting to rebuild its missile and defense capabilities but is not currently enriching uranium or advancing its nuclear program (that we know of). Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Iran is open to talks at the United Nations, but also foolishly rejected the Cairo invitation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has responded by reminding the world of the Iranian missile threat and increasingly targeting Iranian proxies. There is no written cease-fire in place, and continued peace is partially reliant on Trump holding Netanyahu back. As Israeli elections approach, will Trump’s “complete and total ceasefire” hold? Will Iran do something that gives the Israeli’s an excuse or opportunity to re-engage Iran militarily? Or will Iran give negotiations another chance? Either way, 2026 should make for a pivotal year for Iran.

Nathanael Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Related reading

New Atlanticist

Nov 17, 2025

As elections loom, can Netanyahu balance Trump, Mohammed bin Salman, and his political future?

By Daniel B. Shapiro

The Israeli prime minister’s preferred path to survive a treacherous election will be to show Israeli voters that he is advancing their country’s regional integration and staying within the US president’s embrace.

Israel Middle East

A duality of possible trajectories

2026 is a year of potential opportunity—and potential peril—for the Middle East.

Gulf states are determined to advance their political, economic, and security autonomy. Syria and Lebanon could either emerge as models of forward movement from instability or revert to sectarian strife and conflict. Pockets of normalcy could continue to advance in Iraq as exists today in parts of Baghdad and other cities, or it could descend back into political stasis and conflict. Israel could find itself more secure in the region by continuing to undertake kinetic strikes, or it could choose the path of less violence by completing meaningful security and cease-fire agreements with its neighbors. Choose the wrong option, however, and Israel could find itself more vulnerable to threats on its borders, not less. Palestinians could find space to grieve and begin to rebuild after two years of devastation—or face continued violence from West Bank settlers and a renewed war in Gaza, as well as some intra-Palestinian conflict. Jordan and Egypt will continue to muddle through their economic challenges and associated domestic social and political pressures, or this will be the year that they face collapse, and the world will look back and say the warning signs were there, we just missed them. 

Most of the region has an opportunity at this moment in which it can seize and advance its desire for greater autonomy, global influence, and further integration. The Middle East can envision a calmer, more prosperous region driven by technological opportunity across sectors, including by leveraging artificial intelligence and US-exported advanced chips, while taking advantage of the economic integration pathways that are being developed, such as IMEC.

But the duality of possible trajectories laid out above reflects that in the Middle East, more often than not, positive opportunities are interrupted by internal or exogenous factors that regional capitals have to manage in a manner they did not expect. How the region grapples with the enduring and emerging risks of 2026 will determine whether it can prosper as a whole or whether only some will thrive while many continue to struggle. But if those regional countries that are advancing economically, politically, socially, and in their security only look inwards and do not seek to stabilize their neighbors facing social and physical insecurity, they will risk the latter impeding their development, as well. And then 2026 will once again be a year of missed regional opportunities instead of progress.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

The post What will 2026 bring for the Middle East and North Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 2, Imran Bayoumi, associate director of the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article for “Just Security” titled “As Solar Geoengineering Enters its Startup Phase, Governments Must Address Emerging Security Risks” cowritten with Scott M. Moore. The article breaks down potential security risks associated with solar geoengineering and argues governments must act now to regulate the nascent industry.

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post Bayoumi in Just Security on solar geoengineering appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the one hand, voices of doubt are rising from some negotiating groups on the ability of the Brazilian presidency and the multilateral process to deliver an ambitious package of decisions that deliver real impact, particularly on finance for adaptation for the least developed countries and small island states. But on the other hand, it is heartening that the heat and humidity of the Amazon have not slowed momentum on elevating the importance of adaptation, resilience, and the role of private finance. Holding this COP in the Amazon rainforest has sharpened the focus for many stakeholders, serving as a powerful reminder that strengthening climate adaptation will require forward-looking climate finance that includes private sector investment.

The private sector—particularly insurers, banks, asset managers, and other financial institutions—has the analytics, risk expertise, and growing appetite to engage in adaptation and resilience finance. And they are ready to work on devising the right investment vehicles to channel that much-needed finance. What they need now are strong policy signals, stable regulatory environments, and practical mechanisms from governments that can connect capital to projects.

One of the most notable developments at this year’s COP was the announcement of the National Adaptation Plans (NAP) Implementation Alliance. Led by the governments of Germany, Italy, and Brazil, as well as the United Nations Development Programme, with the support of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center, this initiative aims to improve coherence in the complex ecosystem of financing for NAPs. Streamlining NAP financing will be critical to enable the flow of more public and private resources for climate adaptation and resilience. Over the next year, this initiative will bring together representatives from the private financial sector, multilateral development banks, civil society organizations, the public sector, and other stakeholders to find ways to improve collective action to support the implementation of NAPs.

For the private sector, this means greater visibility into future projects and greater confidence in the investment environment. For governments, it means being better equipped to design projects that meet investor expectations while delivering local resilience benefits.

The Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center, along with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), will play a vital role in the alliance through Fostering Investable National Planning and Implementation for Adaptation & Resilience (FINI). Announced at a high-level session during the first week of COP30 with representatives of the governments of Australia and Switzerland, FINI is mobilizing more than one hundred actors from civil society, multilateral entities, philanthropy, and the private sector that are already advancing adaptation investments around the world.

Another remarkable development at COP30 was the announcement that fifty-three countries have committed a combined $5.5 billion to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). The TFFF incentivizes the conservation and expansion of tropical forests by making annual payments to tropical forest countries that maintain their standing forest. The initiative is especially notable within the climate community because of its proposed hybrid financing model. The TFFF will mix sovereign and philanthropic funding to de-risk investments on forest conservation, regenerative agriculture, and agroforestry that sustain standing forests. This, in turn, will help attract commercial capital toward these activities.

Throughout COP30, there has been a recognition that the public and private sectors cannot act alone when it comes to climate finance. The announcements and initiatives that have been launched so far at this year’s summit reflected a broad shift: the conversation is no longer about whether private finance should engage in adaptation and resilience, but how quickly financial ecosystems and policy frameworks can be aligned to deliver project pipelines to respond at the scale and speed that climate change requires.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He formerly served as chief advisor and negotiator to the government of Peru, playing a critical role during the adoption of the Paris Agreement in the government’s dual role as president of COP20 and co-chair of the Green Climate Fund’s board.

The post Dispatch from COP30: In the Brazilian jungle, the private sector takes center stage appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Food, society, and politics
• Food security in the Americas
• Drivers of change in the Americas and beyond
• Toward a food-secure future
• Conclusion
• About the authors

Introduction

Food security is at the core of national, regional, and global security. When societies are food secure, they stand a much greater chance of social and political stability; when they are food insecure, the opposite is true. Fortunately, the Western Hemisphere—the Americas—is a food-secure region. Although access to food is an ongoing challenge deserving greater attention in every country (as there are hungry people across the hemisphere), food abundance generally characterizes the Americas. Historically, the hemisphere has owed its unique position to several factors: a favorable natural resource base; equally benign geopolitical conditions; and extensive public and private cooperation to improve production methods and support innovation.

However, the future is not guaranteed to look like the past. Several key drivers of change are afoot that could alter the trajectory of hemispheric food security. These drivers bring with them uncertain outcomes, alternatively threatening the stability and productivity of current agrifood systems or offering hope that they could become even stronger and more resilient in the years to come.

This report assesses the future of food in the Western Hemisphere. It focuses on the major uncertainties that are driving change in the agrifood systems within the hemisphere and the world. These drivers represent risks or opportunities, and sometimes both. They include the decline of healthy and stable ecosystems, rapidly changing geopolitics, the erosion of multilateral institutions, increasingly inflationary and volatile food prices, the promise of innovation and emerging technologies, and generational shifts in farming and agricultural production.

These forces are not siloed. Rather, they intersect. There might be an awareness that these individual drivers of change represent obstacles to (or opportunities for) achieving durable food-security solutions in the future, yet many leaders see them as isolated challenges rather than as intersecting ones, obscuring the bigger picture.

The drivers discussed in this report therefore are not just accumulating layers of risks and opportunities. Rather, their interaction multiplies the system’s dynamism. This emerging dynamism will require policymakers, business leaders, investors, and farmers to find innovative solutions in the face of a rapidly changing, and not entirely predictable, agrifood landscape. Yet such outlooks may not arise. Complacency is a big risk, if leaders believe that the status quo will continue to improve, requiring changes only at the margins. In such a situation, the hemisphere would become far more vulnerable to unexpected shocks because there would not be enough appreciation for how ecological, technological, geopolitical, and institutional changes are reshaping the future.

This concern is not hyperbolic. A very recent external shock—the COVID-19 pandemic—erased major progress that the hemisphere had made on reducing hunger, which should remind us that the foundations of food security remain shaky. Looking ahead, there is little margin for error, as even moderate shocks can have profound consequences.

Food, society, and politics

Food security is at the core of national, regional, hemispheric, and global security. When societies are food secure, they stand a much greater chance of social and political stability; when they are food insecure, the opposite is true.

This axiom, although a simple one, has been demonstrated time and again throughout history. High food prices occasioned by war, poor harvests, or high taxation of the peasantry (or all three) preceded the onset of the French Revolution in 1789 and the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, to name just a couple of famous examples from history.

Today, despite far greater agricultural production at national and global levels, such disturbances still recur with alarming frequency: The 2007–2008 food riots across Africa followed commodity price spikes for agricultural inputs (oil, principally) that inflated the price of food; the 2010–2011 Arab Spring was preceded by food-price spikes owing to multiple breadbasket harvest failures across several world regions; and Russia’s war in Ukraine, which disrupted wheat, fertilizer, and natural gas exports, blocked the flow of agricultural inputs and outputs and dramatically raised food prices globally. Millions of additional people became food insecure around the world.

No other good has such an impact on society and politics as food because people need to eat every day. “Food riots are as old as civilization itself,” as one food security analyst summarized the impact of food on social and political stability. Often, it will only take a single big food-price shock to change social and political dynamics within a country or even an entire region. Although high food prices have a disproportionately negative impact on vulnerable, poor, and fragile countries, they also can have an outsized impact on otherwise wealthy and stable ones. Japan offers a recent example. In July 2025, soaring rice prices in Japan directly contributed to the defeat of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party in parliamentary elections.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) adopted a definition of food security at the 1996 World Food Summit (see box 1 for the history of the concept), which has persisted with only slight revision:

• Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.

This definition contains four main dimensions, or pillars:

1. The physical, supply-side availability of food, typically assessed at the national level and consisting of domestic agricultural production plus food imports.
2. Household access to food, which is dependent on household incomes and food prices (set by a combination of market and nonmarket forces).
3. Nutritional intake by individuals, which is not the same thing as caloric intake; nutrition depends in part on dietary diversity.
4. Stability of the first three pillars over time.

A couple important pieces of the food security puzzle are missing from this formulation. One is ecological stability. Food security depends on the sustainability of the underlying Earth systems that are essential to food production. Maintaining the integrity of these Earth systems, including the integrity of the world’s soils, water, biodiversity, nutrients, and atmospheric conditions (precipitation and temperature, primarily), is critical. A second missing piece is the stability of the international systems, specifically stability of a rules-based trading order that ensures that food moves easily from food-surplus to food-deficit countries. Such a trading order improves food security through enhancing agriculture productivity and (under emergency conditions) enables swift distribution of humanitarian aid in the form of food. Such a system helps to avoid trade conflicts and establishes international norms for the notion that food security is in the collective interest and responsibility of all parties.

The capacity of the current international system to encourage global production and trade in food has increased over time, dramatically so over the past several decades: The FAO reported that in 2021, the world traded some 5,000 trillion kilocalories of food, more than double the amount that it did in 2000. A central piece of this equation has been the existence of key multilateral institutions that have had the credibility and authority to provide a forum for states to negotiate trade agreements, resolve trade disputes, and monitor and enforce commitments.

None of these conditions should be treated as a given. Looking ahead, the odds are high that the world will become more dynamic rather than less so, with no guarantee that dynamism will have more upside than downside. To adapt and thrive within changing conditions (with both positive and negative impacts), the world’s agrifood systems will need to become more resilient and adaptable. The good news is that humankind has the tools—or can develop the necessary tools—to ensure such outcomes.

Food security in the Americas

The Western Hemisphere is in a fortunate position regarding agriculture and food. Its natural endowment is significant, consisting of arable soils and plentiful rainfall distributed across numerous regions suitable for agriculture (temperate, subtropical, and tropical). The hemisphere’s highly productive agriculture benefits from relatively stable political and economic environments, medium-to-high income levels, and reasonably well-functioning domestic and international markets, all stimulated by public, private, and academic sector investments in agricultural research and development (R&D).

As a result, the hemisphere’s aggregate production capacity in both staple and specialized crops gives it an indispensable role in providing domestic food security but also meeting the world’s food needs.

There are several caveats to this picture, which this report endeavors to make clear. First, several driving forces are changing baseline conditions that will alter the hemisphere’s future, for better or worse. Second, the Americas might be fortunate in many respects, but it is not a single bloc of countries acting in unison. Trade disputes, unfortunately, are becoming a sharper and more common part of the hemisphere’s diplomatic landscape, for example. Finally, as this report also makes clear, food security is not just about supply-side agricultural production. Food insecurity remains a problem in the Americas as it does everywhere in the world.

Supply side: Agricultural production
in the Americas

The five largest primary crop producing countries (by tonnage) in the world are all in the Americas: Brazil, the United States, Argentina, Mexico, and Canada. As shown in table 1 and figure 1, the hemisphere also contains top exporters of all four primary crops: soybeans, corn, wheat, and rice. The largest producers of food in the Americas are, therefore, critical for ensuring global food security. What happens in the region matters greatly, because developments in the Americas have an outsized effect on global trade in food.

In addition to the largest primary crop producers, the Americas also lead in the production of a wide range of specialty crops, including coffee, avocados, lemons, limes, oranges, blueberries, cranberries, quinoa, almonds, and more. Numerous countries in the hemisphere are leading producers of these crops. For example, Peru is in the top three global producers of avocados, blueberries, and quinoa, while Colombia is a leading global producer of coffee, sugar cane, avocados, and agave fibers.

For many countries in the Americas, agriculture continues to be a critical piece of their national economies. As shown in figure 2, agriculture’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) is above five percent in most countries and is above ten percent in a handful of countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. Over the 2023–2024 period, agriculture’s share of Brazil’s GDP was 6.24 percent while its agricultural exports represented nearly half (49 percent, at $164 billion) of Brazil’s total exports by value. Both figures demonstrate the spectacular growth in Brazil’s intensive farming, especially of soybeans (see also box 2).

Demand side: calories and nutrition

The FAO’s definition of food security, which is broadly accepted among experts, emphasizes that food security is as much about access and affordability, especially by vulnerable populations, as it is about the aggregate production of food. If people cannot access a nutritious diet at affordable and stable prices, they will not be food secure.

In recent decades, the Western Hemisphere has gradually decreased its level of food insecurity. In comparative terms, it has done well. Between 1990 and 2015, for example, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was the only region in the world to reduce hunger by half.

As shown in table 2, the FAO’s latest data indicates that the Western Hemisphere continues to be relatively food secure. Over 2022–2024, the two major subregions in the Americas, North America on the one hand and LAC on the other, performed better than the world average. This is reflected in several key metrics related to the reduction of caloric intake of food, in particular undernourishment (calorie deprivation over time), severe food insecurity (a measurement of households going without food for periods of time), and the prevalence of wasting in small children (an indicator of undernourishment). On metrics related to poor diets such as overweight and obesity (both of which are indicators of too many calories rather than too few), the Americas performed less well.

These outcomes are consistent with levels of wealth. Although an oversimplification, as national wealth increases, per capita consumption of food rises. Most countries in the Americas are classified by the World Bank as either high- or upper middle-income countries. (Note, however, that lower-income populations, including those within both lower- and higher income economies, are at increasing risk of obesity, in part due to easy availability of inexpensive processed foods with low nutritional value.)

There are several countries in the Americas that underperform. According to the FAO, over half (54.2 percent) of Haitians are undernourished, while just 10.7 percent of adults are obese (compared with over 40 percent of US citizens); Haiti is the most fragile state in the Americas. Although undernourishment is much lower across the hemisphere now than in previous decades, it nonetheless remains high in several countries including Bolivia (21.8 percent), Honduras (14.8 percent), Ecuador (12.1 percent), and Guatemala (11.8 percent).

There is a gendered dimension to deprivation, with women being more likely to be food insecure than men. This difference worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing to a 3.3 percent gap between the genders in Latin America in 2021, before reducing again by 2024. In North America, the gap has worsened every year since 2020, from 0.1 percent in 2020 to 0.5 percent in 2024.

Drivers of change in the Americas and beyond

Strategic foresight asserts that the future likely will not conform to our expectations. It is risky to assume that the future will consist of a simple linear extrapolation of one or two current trends. Hence, the discipline focuses as much on the intersections of the drivers that together will drive multiple possible futures. Food security in the Americas is no different, as there are several significant intersecting drivers of change that will
shape the hemisphere’s future.

Changing ecology

Ecological risks are among the greatest threats to food security in the Americas. A rapidly changing climate creates the primary set of risks, from rising heat and worsening drought and flooding. Other ecological risks exist as well in specific subregions, for example deforestation, biodiversity loss, and soil erosion and degradation.

Of these changing ecological conditions, perhaps the worst for agricultural production is the combination of drought and heat, or “dry-hot” conditions. Trend data show that such conditions are becoming more frequent and intense. An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study of drought patterns, released in July 2025, found that the share of land globally exposed to drought has doubled since 1900.

Dry-hot conditions threaten to become more frequent across the Americas. In North America, for example, scientists estimate that the now decades-long megadrought that has impacted northern Mexico and the southwestern United States might be the worst in 1,200 years. In South America, the frequency of dry, hot, and flammable weather has increased across much of the continent since the early 1970s. Such changes are highly consequential for agriculture. A 2021 study, for instance, showed that increases in Brazil’s dry-hot conditions, combined with the impacts of deforestation on temperature and rainfall, have already pushed 28 percent of the country’s agricultural land beyond its optimum productive range, with further projections of 51 percent by 2030 and 74 percent by 2060.

One of the more discouraging climate-driven outcomes is the possibility, even probability, of future multiple breadbasket failures (i.e., “simultaneous harvest failures across major crop-producing regions” around the world). Climate change likely will make such failures more common in the future. A 2021 study projected that the probability of multiple harvest failures globally was “as much as 4.5 times higher by 2030 and up to 25 times higher by 2050.”21 Another, focusing on the impacts that oscillations such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) might have under future warming, concluded that shifting ENSO and NAO patterns might “expose an additional 5.1–12% of global croplands” to such oscillations, with strong ENSO/NAO negative phases “likely to cause simultaneous yield losses across multiple key food-producing regions.”

The Americas, home to several of the world’s major producers of staple crops including soybeans, corn, and wheat, faces the possibility of multiple breadbasket failures. It is entirely possible that in the years to come, severe dry-hot conditions could strike simultaneously in the United States, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. The consequences for agricultural production and global food security would be enormous.

A changing climate also will negatively impact most—perhaps all—of the other crops grown across the Americas. Coffee and banana production, to name just two examples, likely will be severely affected by increased heat and altered precipitation patterns. A recent scientific study conducted by the University of Exeter forecasts that 60 percent of the regions currently producing bananas—including regions in Central America—will be unable to do so before the end of this century, owing principally to increased temperature. The world will not have to wait nearly that long to see such effects because climate-driven impacts are already occurring. In 2024, the FAO reported a 38.8 percent annual increase in global coffee prices “primarily driven by supply-side disruptions, stemming from adverse weather conditions” including drought, heat, and flooding in major coffee-producing countries including Brazil, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

Because farmers are on the receiving end of changing ecological conditions, it is critical to understand how they are impacted by such change and how they process those changes.

Doing so will assist in defining the policy and investment options with the greatest likelihood of mass adoption on farms and in farming communities. Farmers will be impacted differently depending on where in the hemisphere they farm, their farm sizes and resources (financial and otherwise), whether they are subsistence farmers or integrated into national, regional, and global markets, and the types of crops they grow. Taken together, farmers do not experience changing ecological conditions in the same way at the same time. Smallholder farmers in poorer settings, for example, will be at greatest risk from climate-driven impacts given the small size of their landholdings and a lack of access to insurance and other sources of resilience. It follows that farmers’ perceptions of ecological impacts on their farming operations will not follow a straight line. Farmers will parse the impacts of environmental hazards such as drought, heat, or flooding differently.

In sum, ecological change dramatically increases the risk of declining crop yields while shifting the locations where crops can be grown. Potentially, ecological change with impacts at scale could generate significant shortfalls in global food supply, causing market panics, high prices, hoarding, and a breakdown of trade. Food insecurity would spike.

Geopolitical and geoeconomic turbulence

A second set of risks stems from rising geopolitical and geoeconomic competition and uncertainty. An open, rules-based trading system has been essential to improving hemispheric and global food security. Trade in that system has precipitated more economic integration of the region—more bilateral trade and investment agreements, greater investment flows, and exchange of technical know-how—which benefits food security via higher economic growth, greater employment opportunities and rising incomes, poverty reduction, and general economic dynamism. It also has allowed governments to see that a set of policies, including more focus on innovation and competitiveness and less on trade distortions and protectionism, is the best path forward.

Yet this trajectory is now subject to geopolitical risk. Over the past two decades, the global food trading system has been disrupted by several significant events including wars and related phenomena (e.g., civil strife, terrorism). Such events generate (largely) unanticipated shocks to agricultural inputs, supply chains, and agrifood exports, resulting in higher production prices and, therefore, consumer prices. The most well-known and significant of these events is the full-scale war in Ukraine, which upon its onset in 2022 immediately resulted in higher global prices for key commodities including natural gas and nitrogen fertilizers (because Russia is the world’s third ranking natural gas exporter and natural gas is a critical input for nitrogen fertilizers); potash fertilizers (primarily from Russia and Belarus) and wheat (before the war, Ukraine was the world’s seventh-largest wheat exporter).

Although global input markets, for example for fertilizers, are broadly resilient, at the same time they also clearly are affected by geopolitical turbulence arising from trade policies, sanctions, shocks such as wars, and other phenomena. While the war in Ukraine is an important case, it hardly exhausts the list of current examples. In July 2025, the World Bank said that sanctions and restrictive trade policies “are playing an increasingly significant role in reshaping global fertilizer markets,” citing China’s discretionary export restrictions on nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers to protect its domestic agriculture, and the European Union’s (EU) June 2025 tariffs against Belarusian and Russian fertilizers to reduce EU dependence on these countries.

An even more difficult problem is the risk that the hemispheric and global agrifood trading system is returning to a protectionist order, which risks the benefits that have accrued since the emergence of a rules-based trading model in the 1990s for agriculture established under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 1994 Agreement on Agriculture. Under that model, countries tended to place high tariffs only on a few politically sensitive crops (such as sugar or cotton). Yet today’s rising protectionism is much broader, affecting a larger number of crops, including staple crops, and implemented by an ever-longer list of countries. The result is likely to undermine food security by increasing food prices—with impacts falling most harshly on poor households—and reducing profitability by raising both producers’ and exporters’ costs, lowering investment and decreasing productivity.

Over the past several decades, the largest agricultural producers in the Americas, including the United States and Brazil, have become the world’s largest agrifood exporting nations. Southern Cone states have pushed agricultural exports as key pieces of their export-led growth strategies, especially to China given its rapidly growing demand for commodities. With such a high dependence on global agricultural exports, the biggest agricultural producers in the Western Hemisphere ought to be the most heavily invested in a global agrifood free-trading regime. Tariff and nontariff barrier uncertainty negatively impacts agrifood producers, processors, distributors, and consumers.

These disruptions have other distorting effects. Trade patterns within the Americas, and between the Americas and the rest of the world, are shifting because of trade tensions. China’s behavior in international agricultural markets is a significant example, with direct relevance to the Western Hemisphere. A decade ago, China imported more agricultural goods from the United States than from Brazil; today, China imports almost twice as much from Brazil as from the United States, including in soybeans and corn. China’s shift toward non-US sources (including but not limited to Brazil) began even before the 2018 trade dispute with the United States. In addition to supply diversification, China also has dramatically increased its stockpiling of food (grains, soybeans, and frozen meat), which it defines as a strategic good.

Further, China’s decoupling from the US agricultural market has had major consequences for trade patterns in that it has helped Brazil become the world’s largest exporter of soybeans. Since the 2018 Sino-American trade dispute, Brazil’s global soybean exports have increased by 40 percent, while those from the US have remained flat.

Geopolitical and geoeconomic turbulence has distorting effects on global trade in food. The biggest concern for global food security is the impact on food prices, both in terms of inflation but also price variability. Such turbulence also can generate trade disputes and, therefore, contribute to fractured relations among states. After the United States levied tariffs in August 2025 of up to 50 percent against certain Brazilian agricultural goods including coffee, beef, and sugar, Brazil immediately asked the WTO for consultation, arguing that the tariffs violate international trade rules. A likely immediate effect of the tariffs is to hasten Brazil’s interest in developing alternative markets for its agricultural products, including with China. A second and (often) underappreciated concern is that unstable trade rules and fluctuating market access make it more difficult for farmers to plan and make production and investment decisions, increasing their economic uncertainty.

Geopolitical tensions and rising trade protectionism are also likely to lead to slower economic growth. This is important because in the Americas, as everywhere, economic growth coupled with rising incomes are keys to increased food security. If slower economic growth combines with higher food prices owing to increasing trade friction, then there is a greater risk of more food insecurity in the future. International food trade is being shaped increasingly by geopolitical considerations rather than market signals, thereby realigning trade patterns in unpredictable ways.

Institutional uncertainty

Multilateral institutions are a hallmark of the current international order. Most of the world’s biggest and most important institutions that exist today were created after 1945. Although not without criticism, much of it deserved, these institutions have been central to building a global order which has delivered unprecedented—if also uneven—prosperity. When it comes to trade, the data say as much: Today’s global trade is 45 times by volume and 382 times by value greater than it was in 1950. Moreover, since the mid-1990s, global trade growth has accelerated, averaging 4 percent growth by volume annually and 5 percent by value.

However, the multilateral institutions that have facilitated this growth in trade now are under enormous pressure from all sides. One reason is that the world’s largest trading powers as well as many smaller ones have been willing to bend or even break established norms and international trade law. China, for example, has taken advantage of its status as a developing country under the WTO to engage in unfair practices, including massive subsidies, heavy use of state-owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and protection of its domestic market (for example, limiting foreign companies’ and investors’ access to its technology and financial markets).36 Further, the United States is preventing the WTO’s Appellate Body from functioning as designed, preventing the organization from enforcing its own rules.

Such developments are important because they create uncertainty surrounding trading rules and thereby increase friction among countries when it comes to trade. Even worse, these developments create space wherein the breaking of rules by some countries prompts others to believe they can as well. Both India and Indonesia, for example, recently have taken advantage of the lack of a functioning Appellate Body to
implement policies that likely are in violation; Indonesia instituted a ban on nickel exports (to induce nickel processors to relocate to Indonesia) while India heavily subsidized steel and pharmaceuticals. By some estimates, two-thirds of initial WTO rulings made about trade disputes have been appealed, but the Appellate Body cannot convene itself.

The decline of multilateral institutions is significant because the Americas benefit more than other regions from an open global trading system in agricultural goods, per table 1 above. Agriculture always has been a controversial topic in trade negotiations, extending back to the origins of the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 1940s. Despite this fact, functional multilateral institutions are valuable because
they create a stable, rules-based global marketplace that in turn enables trade in food at scale.

In sum, a breakdown of multilateral institutions and rising protectionism portend headwinds for agriculture in the years to come, increasing risks and possibly disincentivizing investments by farmers. Such developments erode the open agrifood trading system that globalization made possible. The Americas have utilized open trade to expand agriculture production and exports and, therefore, is most at risk from the unraveling of that system

Price inflation and variability

The price of food is a core metric for food security: For the world’s consumers, the most desirable food prices are both low and stable over time. Food insecurity is made worse when the opposite applies: rapid price inflation combined with high price variability. Unfortunately, as shown in figure 3, the latter situation has characterized global food prices for much of the past quarter century.

Since the 2000s, shocks have occurred with such frequency that prices settle on a new higher baseline rather than returning to previous levels. The FAO noted this trend as early as 2009: Prior to the 2006–2008 global food-price shock, “real prices [in food had] shown a steady long-run downward trend punctuated by typically short-lived price spikes.” But by the mid-2000s, the FAO observed, this trend no longer held. As of 2008, its own food-price index “still averaged 24 percent above 2007 and 57 percent above 2006.” Indeed, as shown in figure 3, since the mid-2000s, global food prices have risen to a new and higher level after each exogenous shock. The most recent global shocks—the COVID-19 pandemic followed by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine—has had the greatest impact on sustained high food prices.

The upward trend in the price of food has important implications for food security around the world. Food is less affordable; households have more difficulty consuming a healthy diet, and they are forced to switch to less nutritious foods and/or reduce their total consumption of food. This cost-of-living crisis erodes food security gains and threatens to make societies less stable.

Food-price inflation and volatility is as problematic in the Americas as elsewhere in the world, increasing food insecurity and becoming a key social and political issue. In Latin America, rising food prices have been a major driver of inflation across the region. In some cases, such as Argentina, food prices have contributed to extreme inflation rates. In North America, food prices also continue to rise and are a major cause of the cost-of-living crisis experienced by many households.

Investment: Innovation, technology, and infrastructure

Public- and private-sector investments in on- and off-farm innovation and productivity have been critical enablers of modern agrifood systems. A question to be answered in the years to come is whether such investments will increase agricultural productivity and sustainability enough to match or exceed demand-side pressures for more food (from population and income growth), even as baseline conditions from other drivers—ecological, institutional, geopolitical—become more challenging.

Historically, on- and off-farm innovation and productivity increases, which stem from process and technological developments plus infrastructural improvements, have been fundamental to increasing the supply of food to meet rising demand. Since the 1990s, global efficiency gains have been the largest contributors to global growth in agricultural output. Efficiency gains have far outstripped the other contributors, including the use of more inputs per hectare of land, greater extension of irrigation to cropland, and expansion of new agricultural land (e.g., expansion of agriculture into previously forested lands).

In agriculture, efficiency is gauged using total factor productivity (TFP), a metric of inputs relative to outputs. If total on-farm output (e.g., volume of crops produced) is growing faster than inputs (defined as labor, capital, and material resources), then TFP is increasing.

That is the good news. The bad news is that global TFP growth is now slowing. After steadily increasing from a 0.55 percent annual growth rate during the 1970s to a peak of 1.97 percent annual growth rate in the 2000s, TFP has since fallen back to 1.1 percent annually (figure 4). Within the Americas, the picture is even more dire. Between 2011 and 2020, TFP increased by only 0.9 percent annually in Latin America and the Caribbean. In North America, typically at the global forefront in productivity and efficiency gains, TFP grew over the same period by just 0.2 percent annually. The Americas significantly lagged the global average (figure 5).

The decline in TFP over the past fifteen years is a worrisome development, as it threatens to undermine progress toward an elusive goal, which is to produce enough food to meet growing global demand while simultaneously retaining on-farm profitability and reducing environmental impact. Analysts at the US Department of Agriculture recently made this argument. “At the global level,” they wrote, “improvements in agricultural productivity have not been rapid or universal enough to make a significant dent in the effect of agriculture on the environment.” If TFP were to continue to slow down in the future, the impact “could [negatively] affect food prices, [lead to] the expansion of agriculture into more natural lands, and [threaten] global food security.”

Nor is underinvestment in innovation the only form of investment risk. Despite the hemisphere’s reliance on trade in agriculture and food, infrastructure across much of the Americas remains underdeveloped. The so-called infrastructure gap in the Americas refers to how the hemisphere’s ports, railways, bridges and roads, telecommunications, and other forms of infrastructure are insufficiently robust in kind, quality, and/or maintenance. In 2021, for example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimated that countries in Latin America and the Caribbean alone would need to invest $2.2 trillion in “water and sanitation, energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure” to meet the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. The IDB’s estimate included not just funds for new infrastructural investment but for maintenance and replacement as well (at some 41 percent of the total).

North America is not exempt from this problem, as both Canada and the United States face large infrastructure deficits. As is well-known, for decades the United States has largely underinvested in infrastructure. Despite passage of the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which directed the federal government to spend some $1.2 trillion over five years on infrastructure, investment levels in the United States will remain insufficient absent systematic changes in how funds are raised by local, state, and federal governments.

Likewise, in Canada, the infrastructure deficit, which is estimated at $196 billion, is of particular importance to that country’s globally important agricultural exports, which include foodstuffs such as grains (wheat, principally) and key agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, largely produced in the country’s vast interior. Getting bulky grains and inputs to external markets more cheaply and efficiently will require Canada to upgrade its transport infrastructure, including railway lines, bridges, and ports, which are key in all circumstances but especially so during periods when unexpected disruptive factors, such as recent port labor strikes or extreme weather events, create choke points that necessitate rerouting. The recent announcements by the government of Canada to expand the Port of Montreal is a step in the right direction. However, significantly greater ambition will be required to push Canada’s infrastructure investments to levels comparable to other leading OECD countries.

Policymakers, the private sector, farmers, investors, and the scientific and technological communities will need to find solutions to these challenges. Doing so will require some combination of enhanced public and private investment in on- and off-farm infrastructure, R&D, improved piloting and scaling of new technologies, and implementation of policies to encourage farmers to become more innovative, productive, and efficient.

Demographic shifts

Agricultural employment as a share of global GDP has been trending downward for decades, owing to the ongoing mechanization of farmwork, increasing urbanization and industrialization, and other factors. According to the World Bank, in 1991, 43 percent of the world’s population was employed in agriculture. By 2023, that figure had fallen by almost half, to 26 percent.

The Western Hemisphere has followed this trendline. In Latin America and the Caribbean, agricultural employment fell over the same 1991–2023 period from 21 percent to 13 percent and in North America from 2.8 percent to 1.6 percent. As can be expected, given differences in income levels, structure of national economies, and crop specialization, there are widespread differences in agricultural employment across the hemisphere. In 2023, several countries still had employment levels in agriculture above 20 percent: Haiti (by far the most, at 45 percent), Ecuador, Guatemala, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru, and Honduras. In contrast, the hemisphere’s biggest producers of staple crops—the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina—are all well below the global average of 26 percent, in most cases in low single digits.

This demographic transition underscores how agriculture is becoming more capital-intensive and productive: more food is being produced per person employed in the sector. The largest food producers also typically have the lowest share of farmers and agricultural workers employed in the national economy, as the United States, Canada, and Argentina all show (each is at less than 2 percent of their populations employed
in agriculture).

However, there is a generational downside to this demographic trend: farmers worldwide are aging in part because on-farm employment opportunities are declining. The trend appears to be worse in the wealthiest regions having the smallest share of employment in agriculture. In the EU, for example, only 11.9 percent of farmers were under forty years old in 2020.52 In the United States, only 9 percent were under thirty-five years of age in 2022.

Toward a food-secure future

The world needs a bold new way of thinking about food security, one that incorporates a comprehensive understanding of how divergent forces, including those identified in this report, are creating a dynamic and unsettled agrifood landscape that will shape the future in unpredictable ways. To avoid negative future scenarios and increase the odds of positive ones, what is needed is a shift in the prevailing debate about food security that incorporates all these driving forces. That debate should stress that these forces combine in important and not entirely predictable ways to disrupt agrifood systems.

Such an outlook recognizes, for example, that geopolitical tensions add risk to other phenomena such as climate change to make an already perilous situation more difficult.

Policymakers and other leaders across the Americas should recognize that these drivers intersect and combine, in turn reshaping the hemisphere’s agrifood outlook. The challenge is clear: They will need to develop strategies and design policies that will lead to resilient and sustainable food systems that minimize the impact of shocks—both natural and human-made—on the production, distribution, and access to food.

Ecology

As stated above in the introduction, a central challenge will be to ensure that food production can remain profitable and resilient in the face of disruptive change. Ecological changes and the environmental resources that the world relies upon for productive and healthy agriculture systems are critical pieces of this equation.

A key task concerns how best to frame this problem for policymakers, business leaders, and farmers, to relay that ecological changes threaten to undermine progress toward a food-secure future. How these stakeholders act through policies, investments, and practices to mitigate and adapt to ecological changes will go a long way to determining whether the hemisphere’s future is food secure or insecure.

Farming is inherently uncertain because of the vagaries of weather and disease, so efforts to minimize the instability caused by ecological changes, including climate change, extreme weather, disasters, and other phenomena, will help farmers to manage this complex set of risks. Integration across risks is an important way to frame the problem, not only because the problem itself is multifaceted but so too are the solutions. Synergies among healthy ecosystem services, robust agricultural production, and profitability can be found with the right application of imagination, creativity, policymaking, investment, and on-the-ground application by utilizing input and knowledge from farmers and farming communities.

Agriculture is a major driver of ecological change, including land-use patterns and carbon emissions. Yet at the same time, agriculture also holds enormous potential, under the right domestic and international conditions, to provide robust and lasting solutions. Doing so would require that policymakers, investors, farmers, scientists, and technologists and society writ large coordinate efforts toward effecting scalable change.

Synergistic approaches include a range of alternative farming techniques and practices as well as novel technologies that collectively hold great potential not only to perform at a high level of output but at the same time go some way toward repairing the natural world. These strategies, which overlap in practice, include regenerative agriculture, no-till farming, agroforestry, climate-smart agriculture, and 4R nutrient stewardship practices (referring to nutrient-management practices focusing on the right sources, right rates, right times, and right places for nutrients). Such approaches aim to improve resource efficiency, reduce waste, protect ecosystems and ecosystem services including freshwater sources, soils, and biodiversity, while retaining profitability. Through the more efficient use of resources, carbon sequestration in soils, land and forest conservation, and improved management (for example, of water and waste processes), these strategies also can mitigate the agricultural sector’s significant greenhouse gas emissions.

Although many of these approaches once were considered experimental, novel, and unproven, that is far less the case today. Regenerative farming, for example, now has more adherents (including farmers) who believe that the diverse methods falling under it deliver tangible environmental benefits without sacrificing on-farm yields—a claim that is also drawing greater financial-sector interest and investment. A global survey of farmers, conducted in 2024 by McKinsey and Company found that over three-quarters of farmers in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and the United States were adopting no-till or reduced tillage practices. Farmers’ willingness to adopt these and other regenerative practices were “underpinned by economics,” according to McKinsey, with respondents in the Americas ranking increased yields as their primary motive for adoption, followed by lower production costs and additional revenue streams.

There is an enormous amount of land worldwide and in the Americas that could be revitalized through such approaches. Land degradation, which by extension means the degradation of the world’s soils, is a massive problem. The world is losing at least one hundred million hectares of productive land each year, with some forecasts suggesting up to 95 percent of the world’s arable land could be in some kind of degraded state
by 2050.

In the Americas, degradation is a serious problem but also a big opportunity for soil and land regeneration. Brazil alone has enormous swathes of degraded pastureland. Embrapa, Brazil’s agricultural research agency, estimated in 2024 that the country has approximately twenty-eight million hectares of degraded pastureland (classified as intermediately or severely degraded). Bringing this land back into production using regenerative methods would help alleviate forest conversion pressures in Brazil’s Cerrado and Amazon regions.

One important consideration for policymakers is that if trade in agriculture and food becomes more costly, there is a risk that the fiscal capacity to invest in policies to make agrifood systems more productive and resilient in the face of ecological change will be reduced. Hence, this report focuses on understanding how these issues are linked and addressing them through greater international cooperation to promote more sustainable and resilient agrifood systems.

Trade, geopolitics, and institutions

Rising protectionism and geopolitical competition undermine the incentives for states to cooperate. Trade tensions risk spilling over into diplomatic tension, eroding international trust. In such conditions, states will be less likely to collaborate, which can sour international relations. If the world’s biggest economies are becoming more protectionist and eschewing a rules-based trading system, a zero-sum world returns, with many states, concerned by protectionist measures placed on them from elsewhere, believing they must adopt such policies. More dialogue among states, not less, is an antidote.

An increasing number of governments around the world appear to no longer see the equation in these terms. China, for example, is seeking greater self-reliance in food through stockpiling and other measures. It also has weaponized tariffs for its own purposes, imposing large tariffs on grain imports from Australia and more recently on Canada. These are not isolated incidents but part of how China exercises its power, given its outsized impact on world markets.

As articulated in this report, global trade in food depends on the strength of multilateral institutions and international agreements. These institutions are often underappreciated contributors to global food security. Today these institutions are being eroded by rising geopolitical and diplomatic conflict and other forces. The rapid rate of their erosion is worrisome.

Despite the WTO’s flaws—of which there are many—it remains valuable because it has the reach and standing to create and enforce global trading rules. Yet the organization is failing at doing so, in large part because of its own rules (decisions are made by consensus) and even more so because the largest trading countries no longer want to abide by a rules-based system. The risk is a collapse of the entire multilateral trading system. “The reversal of global economic integration [if the multilateral trading system were to fail] would bring with it growing lawlessness, conflict, and disorder in the global economy,” one scholar writes, and with it “the international system at large.”

One aim should be to build alternative institutions within the hemisphere consisting of states having the critical mass to achieve desired outcomes. One such solution would be to mimic the Group of Seven and Group of Twenty, two examples of institutions that bring leaders from the world’s largest economies together to attempt to coordinate solutions to various global challenges. One possibility would be to start with just the largest agricultural producers in the hemisphere—an “A5” consisting of the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina—to bring agriculture ministers together for systematized dialogue about hemispheric trade. Dialogue outcomes might include regional food-security compacts that generate commitments to invest in agricultural research leading to breakthrough technologies (“agtech”), to avoid the most trade distorting policies (export bans, for example), and more.

A related idea is to construct a standing (as opposed to episodic) hemispheric food security council to bring willing governments together for discussing responses to future shocks, identifying pathways for greater scientific and technological cooperation, and buttressing the norm regarding the hemisphere’s responsibility to the rest of the world as a major food supplier. Hemispheric institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and Inter-American Development Bank can be leveraged to convene this council, given their credibility in addressing hemispheric affairs, including in trade. Using the inter-American system to convene a hemispheric food security council consisting of foreign, environment, and agriculture ministers—alongside representatives from industry and producer groups—should appeal to a wide set of stakeholders.

Investment in innovation, technology, and infrastructure

The constant improvement of on- and off-farm activities, including innovative use of new technologies and processes, and capital investment in the phenomena that enable them (including infrastructure), are central to ensuring that the hemisphere and the world are food secure. Innovation and investment also are critical components of agrifood systems that not only are productive but also sustainable and resilient, given
the need to prepare for climate-driven shocks in the future. Innovative technologies and processes, and the infrastructure that undergirds them, can build redundancy and efficiency into the agrifood system in anticipation of such shocks.

Regenerative agriculture and other agrifood systems focused on sustainability can be enhanced through the application of advanced technologies. Examples include:

• Alternative energy sources can enhance on- and offfarm systems while reducing carbon footprints.
• Geospatial remote sensing tools for precision farming can identify and help safeguard ecological assets.
• Robotics and mobile digital technologies (including deeper integration of handheld devices into farming practices) can improve agricultural efficiencies while reducing environmental impact.
• AI-driven analytics can integrate and utilize data streams from numerous applications.

Such technologies will become more critical in the future, as ecological changes make farming more difficult. Rising heat, for example, will create harsher working conditions for farm labor, in turn requiring machines and other technologies to alleviate workers’ outdoor exposure during periods of extreme heat.

Biotechnologies should be added to this list, given their promise to improve on-farm productivity and nutrient use efficiency while protecting ecological assets such as soils and water. Biofertilizers, for example, aim to improve soil fertility and nutrient use efficiency through application of living organisms including bacteria, fungi, and algae, with crop yields increasing by an estimated 10 percent to 40 percent. They also help
plants withstand abiotic stressors, some brought on by climate change, including drought, salinity, and extreme temperatures.

How can governments, the private sector, and other actors together ensure that the right mix and scale of investments are being made that will lead to innovative technologies and processes across the hemisphere’s agrifood systems? Additionally, how can they ensure that innovative technologies and processes are transformative at all scales, including for the hemisphere’s millions of smallholder farmers in addition to its largest producers? Some technologies and processes are more suitable for large-scale applications because of high cost or other considerations, for example. Improving access to the benefits of such technologies will require improved pathways for dissemination of knowledge, practical know-how, access to capital, and other services (e.g., training).

Every year, researchers at Virginia Tech produce the Global Agricultural Productivity Report, which tracks and analyzes TFP trends. The 2025 version asserts that reversing the decline in TFP growth—including low growth in the Americas—will require five “policy, investment and research priorities,” which are:

• Invest more in strengthening and expanding multistakeholder dialogues, agriculture extension services, and incentive structures for technology transfer to smallholder farmers.
• Expand access to markets for all participants in the agrifood value chain, including smallholder farmers.
• Strengthen trade as it “enhances competitive prices” which incentivizes investment in improved inputs and technologies” while facilitating “the exchange of knowledge, innovations, and best practices across borders, driving productivity gains.”
• Reduce food loss and waste.
• Invest in public-private partnerships, joint ventures, knowledge sharing agreements and platforms, and interdisciplinary research.

These types of innovative practices have real impact on agrifood systems at every level, down to the farm itself. Innovation delivers new seeds and crop varieties, creates more efficient production methods, solves practical problems faced by farmers (pests and disease), and creates new markets for goods and services provided by farmers (such as using sugarcane to produce ethanol to reduce carbon emissions of transport
fuels).

Farmers are both users and creators of innovative technologies and processes, so their knowledge and experience should be included in robust feedback loops. Moreover, farmers must be able to adopt and utilize innovative technologies and processes to realize their full positive contributions. This is not an automatic process, as on-farm adoption is not the same thing as laboratory invention. When making investment decisions, farmers are businesspersons, concerned about the upfront costs and return on investment (ROI). Global surveys of farmers indicate they are hesitant to adopt new technologies and processes if the technologies and processes are unfamiliar or they face high initial investment costs or uncertain ROI.

Publicly funded agricultural extension programs, which connect researchers at universities and other institutions to farmers—in the process, enabling mutual learning and successful technology transfer—are critical to improving agtech adoption. Maintaining and strengthening extension services (including public funding) should be central to any country’s aspiration to build world-class agrifood systems based on widespread technology and process adoption by farmers.

Improving infrastructure to strengthen agrifood supply chains is also critical, especially as higher temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, more frequent and powerful disasters, and other problems will put more infrastructure—e.g., ports, bridges, roads, railroads, canals— at risk. Ports are especially at risk, with most food trade moving by cargo ships. The Panama Canal, which in recent years has had low water levels due to Central American drought, is a good example. (Chinese ownership of port facilities also has proven controversial in the United States.) Beyond adaptation measures designed to improve individual pieces of infrastructure, there is much need for strategies that will frame the challenge in terms of societal and even transboundary (international) resilience. Canada, for example, in 2023 released a whole-of-society National Adaptation Strategy that emphasizes the need to make physical infrastructure (and communities) more resilient to climate-driven impacts.

Farmers for the future

Ensuring a food-secure future in the Americas must place human beings at its center. This formula long has been the focus on the demand side of the food-security equation: The goal always is to ensure that all humans always have access to affordable and nutritious food.

Yet the same logic also holds on the supply side of the equation. To avoid the demographic decline of farming amid the chronic aging of the world’s farmers, it is imperative that farming be made financially, socially, and culturally attractive to younger generations. Unfortunately, such conditions are not prevalent in many countries (perhaps most) around the world. The reasons for this are many. To young people, particularly those without a family heritage in agriculture, farming can be perceived as backward, unprofitable, difficult, alien, or uncool—or all the above.

There is no single set of recognized solutions to assist in turning the demographic trendlines around. However, evidence from around the world suggests that a combination of interventions, some obvious and others not so much, might suffice. The obvious ones are to make it easier to gain access to farming in the first place by reducing barriers to entry (access to affordable financing or access to farmland through ownership or long-term contract), and closing knowledge and skills gaps through on-farm training programs, scholarships, and apprenticeships. There are less obvious interventions, too. One such intervention is to incentivize nontraditional candidates to enter farming, for example, young women, in addition to traditional candidates (typically men). Another is to stress the increasingly important role played by digital technologies, robotics, big data and remote sensing, artificial intelligence, and other technical applications that appeal to tech-savvy and ambitious young people.

Although none of these solutions will guarantee a demographic rebound in farming, there are examples of where the curve has been bent toward youth. Brazil’s farmers are getting younger rather than older. They appear to be attracted by the prospect of getting rich in Brazil’s booming, forward-facing, and tech-savvy industry.

Conclusion

The issues outlined in this report should be seen as a starting point for discussion. The challenges and the opportunities facing agrifood systems in the Americas in the coming decades will be profound. A central question is whether the hemisphere’s key actors—governments, farmers, the private sector, researchers, foundations, civil society groups, and the public—will be willing to invest in the transformative processes and approaches that will reduce risk while increasing prosperity, sustainability, and resilience.

This report has put great emphasis upon generating productive dialogues among key stakeholders. Promoting the diffusion of critical innovations for food security will be an important piece of this process. It is imperative that governments and multilateral institutions in the hemisphere find financing and pool technological know-how to support programs tailored to meet the needs of the region.

Beyond that, however, it is critical that nongovernmental stakeholders, including investors, the private sector, researchers, scientists, analysts, farmers, and farming communities, act in concert with one another. They must themselves build the transnational dialogues to assist in envisioning, creating, and strengthening the tools that will be needed to ensure a food-secure future.

This report was produced by the Atlantic Council with support from The Mosaic Company as part of the Food security: Strategic alignment in the Americas project.

Peter Engelke is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a senior fellow with its Global Energy Center. His diverse work portfolio spans strategic foresight; geopolitics, diplomacy, and international relations; climate change and Earth systems; food, water, and energy security; emerging and disruptive technologies and tech-based innovation ecosystems; and demographics and urbanization, among other subjects, and he is the creator of the Council’s most widely read long-form publication series, Global Foresight. Engelke’s previous affiliations have included the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Robert Bosch Foundation, the World Economic Forum, and the Stimson Center.

Matias Margulis is associate professor of the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs and a faculty member of Land and Food Systems at the University of British Columbia. His research and teaching interests are in global governance, development, human rights, international law, and food policy. In addition to his academic research, Margulis has extensive professional experience in the field of international policymaking and is a former Canadian representative to the World Trade Organization, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

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The post The future of food in the Americas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introducción

La seguridad alimentaria está en el núcleo de la seguridad nacional, regional y global. Cuando las sociedades tienen garantizado el acceso a los alimentos, poseen una probabilidad mucho mayor de mantener la estabilidad social y política; cuando carecen de ella, sucede lo contrario. Afortunadamente, el hemisferio occidental—las Américas—es una región con seguridad alimentaria. Aunque el acceso a los alimentos sigue siendo un desafío constante, la abundancia alimentaria caracteriza en general a las Américas, gracias a una base favorable de recursos naturales, condiciones geopolíticas benignas y una amplia cooperación pública y privada orientada a mejorar los métodos de producción y fomentar la innovación. 

Sin embargo, el futuro podría no parecerse al pasado. Varios factores clave de cambio podrían alterar la trayectoria de la seguridad alimentaria hemisférica, amenazando la estabilidad y productividad de los actuales sistemas agroalimentarios o, por el contrario, ofreciendo esperanza de que estos se vuelvan aún más sólidos y resilientes. Estos factores incluyen el deterioro de ecosistemas sanos y estables, la rápida transformación de la geopolítica, la erosión de las instituciones multilaterales, la creciente inflación y volatilidad de los precios de los alimentos, la promesa de la innovación y las tecnologías emergentes, y los cambios generacionales en la agricultura y la producción agropecuaria. 

Aunque estas fuerzas se cruzan, muchos líderes las perciben como desafíos aislados. Su interacción multiplica el dinamismo del sistema, lo que exigirá que los responsables de políticas públicas, líderes empresariales, inversionistas y agricultores encuentren soluciones innovadoras frente a un panorama agroalimentario que cambia rápidamente y cuyo futuro no es del todo predecible. 

Alimentación, sociedad y política 

Ningún otro bien tiene un impacto tan profundo en la sociedad y la política como los alimentos, porque las personas necesitan comer todos los días. A menudo, basta con un solo gran aumento en los precios de los alimentos para alterar las dinámicas sociales y políticas dentro de un país o incluso de toda una región. Aunque los precios altos de los alimentos afectan de manera desproporcionada a los países vulnerables, pobres y frágiles, también pueden tener un gran impacto en naciones que, en principio, son ricas y estables. 

La definición estándar de seguridad alimentaria, adoptada en 1996 por la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (FAO) y solo ligeramente revisada desde entonces, establece que: 

La seguridad alimentaria existe cuando todas las personas, en todo momento, tienen acceso físico, social y económico a alimentos suficientes, inocuos y nutritivos que satisfacen sus necesidades dietéticas y preferencias alimentarias para llevar una vida activa y sana. 

Sin embargo, faltan algunos elementos importantes en esta formulación de la seguridad alimentaria. Uno de ellos es la estabilidad ecológica. La seguridad alimentaria depende de la sostenibilidad de los sistemas naturales de la Tierra que son esenciales para la producción de alimentos. Un segundo elemento es la estabilidad del sistema internacional, específicamente la estabilidad de un orden comercial basado en normas que garantice que los alimentos puedan desplazarse fácilmente desde los países con excedentes hacia aquellos con déficits alimentarios. 

Estas condiciones no deben darse por sentadas. Mirando hacia el futuro, es probable que el mundo se vuelva más dinámico y menos estable, con aspectos tanto positivos como negativos. Para prosperar, los sistemas agroalimentarios mundiales deberán volverse más resilientes y adaptables. 

Seguridad alimentaria en las Américas 

El hemisferio occidental desempeña un papel indispensable en la seguridad alimentaria global. 

Lado de la oferta: Producción agrícola en las Américas 

Los cinco países con mayor producción primaria de cultivos (por tonelaje) en el mundo se encuentran todos en las Américas: Brasil, Estados Unidos, Argentina, México y Canadá. El hemisferio también cuenta con los principales exportadores de los cuatro cultivos básicos: soya, maíz, trigo y arroz. Además, las Américas producen una amplia variedad de cultivos especializados, entre ellos café, aguacates, limones, limas, naranjas, arándanos, cranberries, quinua, almendras y muchos más. 

La agricultura continúa siendo un componente esencial de las economías nacionales en las Américas. La participación de la agricultura en el PIB supera el 5% en la mayoría de los países y llega a más del 10% en algunos de ellos. 

Lado de la demanda: Calorías y nutrición 

La definición de seguridad alimentaria de la FAO subraya que, si las personas no pueden acceder a una dieta nutritiva a precios estables y asequibles, no se puede hablar de seguridad alimentaria. 

En las últimas décadas, el hemisferio occidental ha reducido gradualmente su nivel de inseguridad alimentaria. En términos comparativos, ha tenido un buen desempeño. Entre 1990 y 2015, América Latina y el Caribe fue la única región del mundo que logró reducir el hambre a la mitad. Actualmente, el hemisferio presenta mejores resultados que el promedio mundial en cuanto a subalimentación, inseguridad alimentaria severa y prevalencia de emaciación infantil (niños pequeños con bajo peso). 
(Aunque varios países tienen un rendimiento inferior, como Haití, Bolivia, Honduras, Ecuador y Guatemala.) 

En los indicadores relacionados con dietas poco saludables, como el sobrepeso y la obesidad, las Américas muestran un desempeño menos favorable. 

Finalmente, las mujeres en las Américas son ligeramente más propensas que los hombres a sufrir inseguridad alimentaria. 

Factores de cambio en las Américas y más allá

La seguridad alimentaria en las Américas enfrenta varios factores de cambio significativos que se cruzan e interactúan entre sí. 

Cambio ecológico 

Los riesgos ecológicos se encuentran entre las mayores amenazas para la seguridad alimentaria. Los principales riesgos incluyen el cambio climático, la deforestación, la pérdida de biodiversidad y la erosión y degradación del suelo. Quizás la amenaza más grave para la producción agrícola sea la combinación de sequía y calor extremo, condiciones “secas-calientes” que se volverán más frecuentes tanto en el mundo como en las Américas. 

Una posibilidad desalentadora para el futuro es la aparición de fallas simultáneas en múltiples regiones productoras de granos básicos (“fallas en las canastas de pan” del mundo). Las Américas, hogar de varios de los principales productores mundiales de cultivos básicos, enfrentan esta posibilidad. El cambio climático también afectará negativamente a la mayoría de los cultivos especializados, incluidos el café y los plátanos. 

Los agricultores se verán afectados de manera diferente dependiendo de dónde trabajen dentro del hemisferio, el tamaño y los recursos de sus fincas (financieros y de otro tipo), si son agricultores de subsistencia o están integrados en los mercados nacionales, regionales y globales, y los tipos de cultivos que producen. Los pequeños agricultores en contextos más pobres estarán en mayor riesgo debido al tamaño reducido de sus parcelas y a la falta de acceso a seguros y otros recursos. 

Potencialmente, los cambios ecológicos con impactos a gran escala podrían generar importantes déficits en el suministro mundial de alimentos, provocando pánicos en los mercados, precios altos, acaparamiento y una ruptura del comercio internacional. La inseguridad alimentaria se dispararía. 

Turbulencia geopolítica y geoeconómica 

Un segundo conjunto de riesgos proviene de la incertidumbre geopolítica y geoeconómica creciente. Un sistema comercial abierto y basado en normas ha sido esencial para mejorar la seguridad alimentaria, al fomentar una mayor integración económica que, a su vez, contribuye a la seguridad alimentaria mediante mayor crecimiento económico, más empleo, aumento de ingresos, reducción de la pobreza y dinamismo económico. 

Sin embargo, el sistema mundial de comercio de alimentos ha sido perturbado por varios acontecimientos geopolíticos importantes, incluyendo guerras (como la de Ucrania), políticas comerciales y sanciones que generan choques imprevistos en los insumos agrícolas, las cadenas de suministro y las exportaciones agroalimentarias, lo que resulta en mayores costos de producción y precios de los alimentos. 

El sistema agroalimentario mundial podría estar regresando a un orden proteccionista previo a los años 1990, cuando los países solían aplicar aranceles elevados solo a unos pocos cultivos políticamente sensibles (como el azúcar o el algodón). Hoy, el proteccionismo emergente es mucho más amplio, afecta a un número mayor de cultivos y lo implementa una lista cada vez más larga de países. 

Los patrones comerciales también están cambiando debido a la geopolítica. El comportamiento de China es un ejemplo significativo. Hace una década, China importaba más productos agrícolas de Estados Unidos que de Brasil; hoy, importa casi el doble de Brasil que de EE. UU. La desvinculación de China del mercado agrícola estadounidense ha ayudado a que Brasil se convierta en el mayor exportador mundial de soya. 

Además, después de que Estados Unidos impusiera aranceles en agosto de 2025 a ciertos productos agrícolas brasileños, Brasil probablemente intensificará su interés en desarrollar mercados de exportación alternativos, incluidos los acuerdos con China. 

Incertidumbre institucional 

Las instituciones multilaterales han contribuido a generar una prosperidad sin precedentes—aunque desigual—al fomentar el comercio global y hemisférico. Sin embargo, hoy estas instituciones están bajo una enorme presión. Las principales potencias comerciales del mundo, junto con muchas naciones más pequeñas, han estado dispuestas a romper normas establecidas y leyes internacionales de comercio, creando una gran incertidumbre en torno a las reglas comerciales. 

Las Américas se benefician más que otras regiones de un sistema global de comercio agrícola abierto. La agricultura siempre ha sido un tema controvertido en las negociaciones comerciales, desde los orígenes del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio (GATT) en la década de 1940. A pesar de ello, las instituciones multilaterales funcionales son de gran valor porque crean un mercado global estable y basado en normas, lo cual posibilita el comercio de alimentos a gran escala. 

Inflación y variabilidad de precios 

La inseguridad alimentaria se agrava con una inflación rápida de precios y una alta variabilidad de precios. Desde los años 2000, los sucesivos choques han generado nuevos niveles base de precios más altos. Los alimentos son menos asequibles, y los hogares enfrentan más dificultades para mantener una dieta saludable. 

La inflación y la volatilidad de los precios de los alimentos son tan problemáticas en las Américas como en otras partes del mundo, y se han convertido en un tema clave social y político. En América Latina, el aumento de los precios de los alimentos ha sido un principal impulsor de la inflación regional, mientras que en América del Norte, el alza de precios ha sido una de las principales causas de la crisis del costo de vida que afecta a muchos hogares. 

Inversión: Innovación, tecnología e infraestructura 

Las innovaciones y aumentos de productividad dentro y fuera del ámbito agrícola —derivadas de los avances tecnológicos, las mejoras en los procesos y las inversiones en infraestructura— han sido fundamentales para aumentar la oferta de alimentos y satisfacer la creciente demanda mundial. 

Desde la década de 1990, las ganancias globales en eficiencia han superado ampliamente otros factores, como el uso de más insumos por hectárea, la expansión del riego en tierras de cultivo o la apertura de nuevas áreas agrícolas (por ejemplo, la conversión de tierras forestales en agrícolas). 

Sin embargo, el crecimiento mundial de la Productividad Total de los Factores (PTF) —una medida de eficiencia que evalúa los insumos agrícolas en relación con los resultados— se está desacelerando. Después de aumentar de forma constante durante décadas, la PTF ha comenzado a caer, especialmente en las Américas. 

Las inversiones en infraestructura en gran parte del hemisferio también siguen siendo insuficientes, con trillones de dólares necesarios para mejorar las redes de transporte, energía y logística. 

Por ejemplo, en Canadá, el déficit de infraestructura, estimado en casi 200 mil millones de dólares, es particularmente relevante para las exportaciones agrícolas de ese país, que incluyen tanto productos alimenticios (como granos) como insumos agrícolas clave (como fertilizantes) producidos en su vasto interior. Reducir los costos y aumentar la eficiencia del transporte de estos bienes hacia los mercados internacionales exigirá modernizar la infraestructura de transporte. 

Cambios demográficos 

El empleo agrícola como proporción del PIB mundial lleva décadas en descenso. El hemisferio occidental ha seguido esta tendencia, lo que demuestra que la agricultura se está volviendo más intensiva en capital y más productiva. 
Hoy se produce más alimento por persona empleada en el sector. 

Sin embargo, existe un efecto generacional negativo asociado a esta tendencia. En todo el mundo, los agricultores están envejeciendo, en parte porque las oportunidades laborales en las fincas están disminuyendo. 
Esta tendencia es más pronunciada en las regiones más ricas, donde la proporción de empleo agrícola es menor, como en la Unión Europea y los Estados Unidos. 

Hacia un futuro con seguridad alimentaria 

El mundo necesita una nueva y audaz forma de pensar sobre la seguridad alimentaria, una que incorpore una comprensión integral de cómo fuerzas divergentes están creando un panorama agroalimentario dinámico e inestable, que moldeará el futuro de maneras impredecibles. 

Ecología 

Un desafío central será garantizar que la producción de alimentos siga siendo rentable y resiliente frente a los cambios ecológicos disruptivos. 
Las sinergias entre los servicios ecosistémicos saludables, una producción agrícola robusta y la rentabilidad pueden encontrarse mediante la aplicación adecuada de imaginación, creatividad, formulación de políticas, inversión y acción práctica, utilizando el conocimiento y la participación de los agricultores y sus comunidades. 

La agricultura es un importante impulsor del cambio ecológico, incluido el uso del suelo y las emisiones de carbono. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, la agricultura posee un enorme potencial —bajo las condiciones nacionales e internacionales adecuadas— para ofrecer soluciones sólidas y duraderas. 

Los enfoques sinérgicos incluyen una amplia gama de técnicas y prácticas agrícolas alternativas, así como tecnologías novedosas, entre ellas: 

• La agricultura regenerativa 
• La siembra directa (no-till farming)
• La agroforestería 
• La agricultura climáticamente inteligente 
• El Manejo 4R de Nutrientes (Right sources, Right rates, Right times, Right places: fuentes, dosis, momentos y lugares correctos para aplicar nutrientes). 

Aunque muchos de estos enfoques se consideraban antes experimentales o no comprobados, hoy eso es mucho menos cierto. Por ejemplo, la agricultura regenerativa cuenta con un número creciente de adeptos —incluidos agricultores— que creen que puede generar beneficios ambientales tangibles sin sacrificar los rendimientos en las fincas. Existe una enorme cantidad de tierras y suelos degradados que podrían revitalizarse mediante estas prácticas.

 
En las Américas, la degradación representa un problema serio, pero también una gran oportunidad. Brasil, por ejemplo, posee vastas extensiones de pastizales degradados que podrían volver a ser productivas utilizando métodos regenerativos, lo que ayudaría a reducir la presión sobre la conversión de bosques en las regiones del Cerrado y la Amazonía. 

Comercio, geopolítica e instituciones 

El aumento del proteccionismo y la competencia geopolítica socavan la cooperación entre Estados y erosionan la confianza internacional. El comercio mundial de alimentos depende de la fortaleza de las instituciones multilaterales y de los acuerdos internacionales, que suelen ser contribuyentes subestimados a la seguridad alimentaria global. Hoy, estas instituciones están siendo erosionadas, y el riesgo es la posible caída de todo el sistema multilateral de comercio. 

Una mayor cantidad de diálogo entre los Estados es un antídoto necesario. 
Un objetivo podría ser la creación de nuevas instituciones regionales, empezando, por ejemplo, con los principales productores agrícolas del hemisferio —un posible grupo “A5” compuesto por Estados Unidos, Brasil, México, Canadá y Argentina— para reunir a los ministros de agricultura en torno al diálogo comercial. 

Los resultados de dicho esfuerzo podrían incluir: 

• Pactos regionales de seguridad alimentaria 
• Compromisos de inversión en investigación agrícola
• Acuerdos para evitar políticas comerciales que distorsionen los mercados 

Una idea relacionada es la creación de un Consejo Hemisférico Permanente de Seguridad Alimentaria, que reúna a los gobiernos para coordinar respuestas a crisis y choques, identificar vías para una mayor cooperación científica y tecnológica, y reforzar la norma que reconoce la responsabilidad del hemisferio como principal proveedor de alimentos para el resto del mundo. Instituciones hemisféricas existentes, como la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), podrían desempeñar un papel clave en la convocatoria y apoyo de este consejo. 

Inversión en innovación, tecnología e infraestructura

La mejora constante de las actividades dentro y fuera de las fincas —incluyendo el uso innovador de nuevas tecnologías y procesos, así como la inversión de capital en los factores que las posibilitan (como la infraestructura)— es fundamental para garantizar que el hemisferio y el mundo sean seguros en materia alimentaria. 

La agricultura regenerativa y otros sistemas agroalimentarios sostenibles pueden potenciarse mediante la aplicación de tecnologías avanzadas. Algunos ejemplos incluyen: 

• Fuentes de energía alternativas que mejoran las operaciones dentro y fuera de la finca, reduciendo al mismo tiempo la huella de carbono. 
• Herramientas de teledetección geoespacial aplicadas a la agricultura de precisión, que permiten identificar y proteger los activos ecológicos. 
• Robótica y tecnologías digitales móviles (incluyendo una mayor integración de dispositivos portátiles en las prácticas agrícolas) que pueden mejorar la eficiencia y reducir el impacto ambiental. 
• Analítica impulsada por inteligencia artificial (IA), que puede integrar y utilizar flujos de datos provenientes de múltiples aplicaciones. 
• Biotecnologías que mejoran la productividad agrícola y la eficiencia en el uso de nutrientes, al tiempo que protegen activos ecológicos como el suelo y el agua. 

Los agricultores son tanto usuarios como creadores de tecnologías y procesos innovadores, y deben tener la capacidad de adoptar y aprovechar estos avances. Sin embargo, la adopción en el campo no es lo mismo que la invención en laboratorio. 

Las encuestas globales de agricultores muestran que muchos son reacios a adoptar nuevas tecnologías o procesos cuando enfrentan altos costos iniciales de inversión y rendimientos inciertos. 

Por ello, los programas públicos de extensión agrícola, que conectan a investigadores y agricultores para fomentar el aprendizaje mutuo y la transferencia tecnológica, son críticos. Fortalecer los servicios de extensión debe ser una prioridad central para lograr una adopción amplia de innovaciones agrícolas. 

Asimismo, mejorar la infraestructura para fortalecer las cadenas de suministro agroalimentarias es esencial. Se necesitan estrategias que aborden este desafío desde la perspectiva de la resiliencia social e incluso transfronteriza (internacional). 

Los agricultores del futuro 

Para evitar el declive demográfico del sector agrícola, es fundamental que la agricultura se vuelva financieramente, socialmente y culturalmente atractiva para las nuevas generaciones. 

Para muchos jóvenes —especialmente aquellos sin una herencia familiar agrícola—, dedicarse al campo puede parecer anticuado, poco rentable, difícil, ajeno o poco atractivo… o todo lo anterior. 

No existe un conjunto único de soluciones reconocidas para revertir esta tendencia demográfica. Sin embargo, la evidencia global sugiere que una combinación de intervenciones podría ser suficiente: 

• Facilitar el acceso a la agricultura, reduciendo las barreras de entrada, como el acceso limitado al financiamiento asequible y a la tierra cultivable. 
• Cerrar las brechas de conocimiento y habilidades mediante programas de capacitación en campo, becas y programas de aprendizaje. 
• Incentivar la participación de candidatos no tradicionales, como mujeres jóvenes, en la agricultura. 
• Resaltar el papel creciente de la tecnología digital, la robótica, los macrodatos (Big Data), la teledetección, la inteligencia artificial y otras aplicaciones técnicas que resultan atractivas para los jóvenes ambiciosos y con afinidad tecnológica. 

En resumen, el futuro de la agricultura dependerá de su capacidad para integrar la innovación con el atractivo social y económico, de modo que las nuevas generaciones vean en el campo una oportunidad de progreso y liderazgo, no una ocupación del pasado. 

Conclusión breve 

Una cuestión central es si los actores clave del hemisferio —gobiernos, agricultores, sector privado, investigadores, fundaciones, grupos de la sociedad civil y el público— estarán dispuestos a invertir en procesos y enfoques transformadores que reduzcan riesgos a la vez que incrementen la prosperidad, la sostenibilidad y la resiliencia. 

Promover la difusión de innovaciones críticas para la seguridad alimentaria será una parte importante de esta ecuación. Es imperativo que los países y las instituciones multilaterales del hemisferio encuentren financiamiento y compartan el conocimiento tecnológico necesario para apoyar programas adaptados a las necesidades de la región. 

Otros actores no gubernamentales, incluyendo inversores, sector privado, investigadores, científicos, analistas y comunidades agrícolas, también deben actuar de manera concertada para visualizar, crear y fortalecer las herramientas necesarias que aseguren un futuro con seguridad alimentaria. 

Este reporte fue elaborado por el Atlantic Council con el apoyo de The Mosaic Company como parte del proyecto Seguridad alimentaria: alineación estratégica en las Américas

Peter Engelke es experto sénior del Centro Scowcroft para Estrategia y Seguridad del Atlantic Council, y experto sénior del Centro Global de Energía. Su diverso portafolio de trabajo abarca previsión estratégica; geopolítica, diplomacia y relaciones internacionales; cambio climático y sistemas terrestres; seguridad alimentaria, hídrica y energética; tecnologías emergentes y disruptivas y ecosistemas de innovación basados en tecnología; y demografía y urbanización, entre otros temas. Es el creador de la serie de publicaciones extensas más leída del Consejo, Global Foresight. Las afiliaciones previas de Engelke han incluido el Centro de Política de Seguridad de Ginebra, la Fundación Robert Bosch, el Foro Económico Mundial y el Centro Stimson.

Matias Margulis es profesor asociado de la Escuela de Políticas Públicas y Asuntos Globales y miembro de la facultad de Tierras y Sistemas Alimentarios de la Universidad de Columbia Británica. Sus intereses de investigación y docencia se centran en la gobernanza global, el desarrollo, los derechos humanos, el derecho internacional y la política alimentaria. Además de su investigación académica, Margulis tiene una amplia experiencia profesional en el ámbito de la formulación de políticas internacionales y fue representante canadiense ante la Organización Mundial del Comercio, la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos y la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura.

La Iniciativa GeoStrategy, alojada dentro del Centro Scowcroft para Estrategia y Seguridad, utiliza el desarrollo estratégico y la previsión a largo plazo para servir como el principal referente y convocante de análisis y soluciones relevantes para las políticas públicas, con el fin de comprender un mundo complejo e impredecible. A través de su trabajo, la iniciativa se esfuerza por revitalizar, adaptar y defender un sistema internacional basado en normas para fomentar la paz, la prosperidad y la libertad durante las próximas décadas.

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The post El futuro de la alimentación en las Américas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introdução

A segurança alimentar está no núcleo da segurança nacional, regional e global. Quando as sociedades possuem segurança alimentar, elas têm muito mais chances de alcançar estabilidade social e política; quando não a possuem, ocorre o contrário. Felizmente, o hemisfério ocidental — as Américas — é uma região com segurança alimentar. Embora o acesso aos alimentos continue sendo um desafio constante, a abundância de alimentos geralmente caracteriza as Américas, graças a uma base favorável de recursos naturais, condições geopolíticas estáveis e ampla cooperação entre os setores público e privado para aprimorar os métodos de produção e promover a inovação.

Entretanto, o futuro pode não se parecer com o passado. Diversos fatores determinantes de mudança podem alterar a trajetória da segurança alimentar no hemisfério, ameaçando a estabilidade e a produtividade dos atuais sistemas agroalimentares ou, alternativamente, oferecendo a esperança de que esses sistemas se tornem ainda mais fortes e resilientes. Esses fatores incluem o declínio de ecossistemas saudáveis e estáveis, as rápidas transformações na geopolítica, a erosão das instituições multilaterais, o aumento da inflação e da volatilidade dos preços dos alimentos, o potencial da inovação e das tecnologias emergentes, bem como as mudanças geracionais na agricultura e na produção agropecuária.

Embora essas forças se interconectem, muitos líderes as veem como desafios isolados. A interação entre elas multiplica o dinamismo do sistema, o que exigirá que formuladores de políticas públicas, líderes empresariais, investidores e produtores rurais encontrem soluções inovadoras diante de um cenário agroalimentar em rápida transformação — e não totalmente previsível.

Alimentação, sociedade e política           

Nenhum outro bem exerce impacto tão significativo sobre a sociedade e a política quanto os alimentos, pois as pessoas precisam se alimentar todos os dias. Muitas vezes, basta um único grande choque nos preços dos alimentos para alterar as dinâmicas sociais e políticas dentro de um país ou até mesmo em toda uma região. Embora preços elevados de alimentos tenham um impacto desproporcionalmente negativo sobre países vulneráveis, pobres e frágeis, eles também podem afetar de maneira significativa países que, de outra forma, seriam ricos e estáveis.

A definição padrão de segurança alimentar, adotada em 1996 pela Organização das Nações Unidas para a Alimentação e a Agricultura (FAO/Food and Agriculture Organization) e apenas ligeiramente revisada desde então, é:

A segurança alimentar existe quando todas as pessoas, em todos os momentos, têm acesso físico, social e econômico a alimentos seguros, nutritivos e em quantidade suficiente para atender às suas necessidades dietéticas e preferências alimentares, permitindo uma vida ativa e saudável.  

Algumas peças importantes do quebra-cabeça da segurança alimentar estão ausentes nesta formulação. Uma delas é a estabilidade ecológica. A segurança alimentar depende da sustentabilidade dos sistemas terrestres subjacentes, essenciais à produção de alimentos. A segunda é a estabilidade do sistema internacional, especificamente a estabilidade de uma ordem comercial baseada em regras, que garante que os alimentos possam se mover com facilidade de países com excedentes para países com déficits alimentares.

Essas condições não devem ser tratadas como garantidas. Olhando para o futuro, é provável que o mundo se torne mais dinâmico — e não o contrário — com ganhos e perdas. Para prosperar, os sistemas agroalimentares globais precisarão se tornar mais resilientes e adaptáveis.

Segurança alimentar nas américas

O hemisfério ocidental desempenha um papel indispensável na segurança alimentar global.

Lado da oferta: Produção agrícola nas Américas

Os cinco maiores países produtores de culturas agrícolas primárias do mundo (em volume) estão todos nas Américas: Brasil, Estados Unidos, Argentina, México e Canadá. O hemisfério também abriga os principais exportadores das quatro principais culturas globais: soja, milho, trigo e arroz. Além disso, as Américas produzem uma ampla variedade de culturas especiais, incluindo café, abacate, limões, limas, laranjas, mirtilos, cerejas, quinoa, amêndoas e outras.

A agricultura continua sendo uma peça fundamental das economias nacionais nas Américas. Em grande parte dos países, sua participação no PIB é superior a 5%, e em alguns casos ultrapassa 10%.

Lado da demanda: Calorias e nutrição

A definição de segurança alimentar da FAO enfatiza que, se as pessoas não tiverem acesso a uma dieta nutritiva a preços acessíveis e estáveis, elas não estarão em situação de segurança alimentar.

Nas últimas décadas, o hemisfério ocidental reduziu gradualmente seu nível de insegurança alimentar. Comparativamente, teve um bom desempenho. Entre 1990 e 2015, a América Latina e o Caribe foram as únicas regiões do mundo a reduzir a fome pela metade. Atualmente, o hemisfério apresenta desempenho superior à média mundial em indicadores de desnutrição, insegurança alimentar grave e prevalência de emagrecimento em crianças pequenas, (embora vários países apresentem desempenho inferior, incluindo Haiti, Bolívia, Honduras, Equador e Guatemala). Em métricas relacionadas a dietas inadequadas, como sobrepeso e obesidade, as Américas tiveram desempenho menos favorável.

Por fim, as mulheres nas Américas têm uma probabilidade ligeiramente maior do que os homens de enfrentar insegurança alimentar.

Fatores de transformação nas américas, e além

A segurança alimentar nas Américas enfrenta diversos fatores significativos e interconectados de transformação.

Transformações ecológicas

Os riscos ecológicos estão entre as maiores ameaças à segurança alimentar. Os principais riscos incluem mudanças climáticas, desmatamento, perda de biodiversidade e erosão e degradação do solo. Talvez o mais preocupante para a produção agrícola seja a combinação de seca e calor — as chamadas condições “quentes e secas” — que ameaçam se tornar mais frequentes em todo o mundo e nas Américas. Um cenário desanimador para o futuro é a ocorrência de múltiplas falhas nas “breadbaskets” (quebras simultâneas de safra em regiões produtoras de grãos-chave). As Américas, que abrigam vários dos principais produtores mundiais de culturas alimentares básicas, enfrentam essa possibilidade. As mudanças climáticas também terão impacto negativo sobre a maioria das culturas especiais, incluindo café e bananas.

Os agricultores serão impactados de maneiras diferentes, dependendo de onde se localizam no hemisfério, do tamanho e dos recursos de suas propriedades (financeiros e de outra natureza), de serem agricultores de subsistência ou estarem integrados aos mercados nacionais, regionais e globais, e dos tipos de culturas que cultivam. Os pequenos produtores em contextos menos favorecidos estarão sob maior risco, devido ao tamanho reduzido de suas propriedades e à falta de acesso a seguros e a outros recursos.

Potencialmente, transformações ecológicas com impactos em larga escala podem gerar déficits significativos na oferta global de alimentos, provocando pânico nos mercados, elevação de preços, acúmulo de estoques e colapso do comércio. A insegurança alimentar aumentaria drasticamente

Turbulência geopolítica e geoeconômica

Um segundo conjunto de riscos decorre da crescente incerteza geopolítica e geoeconômica. Um sistema comercial aberto e baseado em regras tem sido essencial para o avanço da segurança alimentar, promovendo maior integração econômica — o que beneficia a segurança alimentar por meio de crescimento econômico mais elevado, maior geração de empregos, aumento de renda, redução da pobreza e dinamismo econômico.

Ainda assim, o sistema global de comércio de alimentos tem sido impactado por diversos eventos geopolíticos significativos, incluindo guerras (como a guerra na Ucrânia), políticas comerciais e sanções que geram choques inesperados sobre insumos agrícolas, cadeias de suprimentos e exportações agroalimentares — resultando em aumento dos custos de produção e dos preços dos alimentos.

O sistema de comércio agroalimentar pode estar retornando a uma ordem protecionista anterior aos anos 1990, quando os países costumavam aplicar tarifas elevadas apenas sobre algumas culturas politicamente sensíveis (como açúcar ou algodão). O protecionismo atual, no entanto, é significativamente mais amplo, afetando um número maior de culturas e sendo implementado por uma lista cada vez mais extensa de países.

Os padrões de comércio estão se transformando em função da geopolítica. O comportamento da China é um exemplo significativo. Há uma década, a China importava mais produtos agrícolas dos Estados Unidos do que do Brasil; atualmente, importa quase o dobro do Brasil em relação aos EUA. Esse processo de desacoplamento da China em relação ao mercado agrícola norte-americano contribuiu para que o Brasil se tornasse o maior exportador mundial de soja. Além disso, após a imposição de tarifas pelos Estados Unidos, em agosto de 2025, sobre determinados produtos agrícolas brasileiros, é provável que o Brasil intensifique seu interesse em desenvolver mercados de exportação alternativos para produtos agrícolas, incluindo a China.

Incerteza institucional

As instituições multilaterais têm contribuído para proporcionar uma prosperidade sem precedentes — embora desigual — ao impulsionar o comércio global e hemisférico. No entanto, essas instituições estão agora sob enorme pressão. As maiores potências comerciais do mundo, assim como muitos países menores, têm demonstrado disposição para romper normas estabelecidas e leis internacionais de comércio, gerando incertezas em torno das regras que regem o sistema comercial.

As Américas se beneficiam mais do que outras regiões de um sistema global de comércio aberto de produtos agrícolas. A agricultura sempre foi um tema controverso nas negociações comerciais, desde a origem, na década de 1940, do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio (GATT/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Apesar disso, instituições multilaterais funcionais são valiosas, pois criam um mercado global estável e baseado em regras, que, por sua vez, possibilita o comércio de alimentos em larga escala.

Inflação e volatilidade dos preços

A insegurança alimentar se agrava com a rápida inflação de preços e a elevada volatilidade dos preços. Desde os anos 2000, choques geraram novos patamares mais altos de preços. Os alimentos se tornaram menos acessíveis, e as famílias enfrentam maior dificuldade para consumir uma dieta saudável.

A inflação e a volatilidade dos preços dos alimentos são tão problemáticas nas Américas quanto em outras regiões do mundo, tornando-se uma questão social e política fundamental. Na América Latina, o aumento dos preços dos alimentos tem sido um dos principais impulsionadores da inflação em toda a região, enquanto na América do Norte, o aumento dos preços dos alimentos é uma das principais causas da crise do custo de vida enfrentada por muitas famílias.

Investimento: Inovação, tecnologia e infraestrutura

A inovação dentro e fora das propriedades rurais, aliada ao aumento da produtividade, decorrentes de avanços processuais e tecnológicos, além de melhorias na infraestrutura, têm sido fundamentais para aumentar a oferta de alimentos e atender à crescente demanda. Desde a década de 1990, os ganhos globais de eficiência superaram amplamente os demais fatores, incluindo o uso de mais insumos por hectare de terra, a extensão da irrigação em áreas cultivadas e a expansão de novas terras agrícolas (por exemplo, a expansão da agricultura em áreas anteriormente florestadas).

Infelizmente, o crescimento global da Produtividade Total dos Fatores (PTF — métrica de eficiência que relaciona os insumos agrícolas aos resultados obtidos) está desacelerando. Após décadas de crescimento contínuo, a PTF passou a registrar queda, especialmente nas Américas.

Os investimentos em infraestrutura em grande parte das Américas também permanecem subdesenvolvidos, sendo necessários trilhões de dólares para impulsionar a infraestrutura do hemisfério. No caso do Canadá, por exemplo, o déficit de infraestrutura — estimado em cerca de US$ 200 bilhões — é particularmente relevante para as exportações agrícolas do país, que têm importância global. Essas exportações incluem produtos alimentares como grãos e insumos agrícolas essenciais, como fertilizantes produzidos no vasto interior canadense. Para viabilizar o transporte desses produtos volumosos aos mercados externos de forma mais barata e eficiente, será necessário modernizar a infraestrutura logística do país.

Mudanças demográficas

A participação do emprego agrícola no PIB global vem diminuindo há décadas. O hemisfério ocidental tem seguido essa tendência, evidenciando que a agricultura está se tornando mais intensiva em capital e mais produtiva. Cada vez mais alimentos são produzidos por pessoa contratada no setor.

No entanto, há um efeito geracional negativo associado a essa tendência demográfica. Os agricultores em todo o mundo estão envelhecendo, em parte devido à redução das oportunidades de emprego no campo. Essa dinâmica é mais acentuada nas regiões mais ricas, que apresentam a menor participação relativa de empregos no setor agrícola, como a União Europeia e os Estados Unidos.

Construindo a segurança alimentar do futuro

O mundo precisa de uma nova e ousada forma de pensar sobre a segurança alimentar — uma abordagem que incorpore uma compreensão abrangente de como forças divergentes estão criando um cenário agroalimentar dinâmico e instável, que moldará o futuro de maneiras imprevisíveis.

Ecologia

Um dos principais desafios será garantir que a produção de alimentos continue sendo lucrativa e resiliente diante das mudanças ecológicas disruptivas. É possível encontrar sinergias entre serviços ecossistêmicos saudáveis, uma produção agrícola robusta e lucratividade, por meio da aplicação adequada de imaginação, criatividade, formulação de políticas públicas, investimentos e ações práticas, baseadas na contribuição e no conhecimento de agricultores e comunidades rurais.

A agricultura é um dos principais vetores das mudanças ecológicas, incluindo as relacionadas aos padrões de uso da terra e emissões de carbono. No entanto, ao mesmo tempo, a agricultura também possui um enorme potencial — sob as condições domésticas e internacionais adequadas — para oferecer soluções sólidas e duradouras.

Abordagens sinérgicas incluem uma variedade de técnicas e práticas agrícolas alternativas, bem como tecnologias emergentes, como agricultura regenerativa, cultivo sem revolvimento do solo (no-till farming), sistemas agroflorestais, agricultura inteligente para o clima (climate-smart agriculture) e o Manejo 4R de Nutrientes (4R Nutrient Stewardship) — um conjunto de práticas de gestão de nutrientes que prioriza o uso das fontes corretas, nas doses certas, nos momentos adequados e nos locais apropriados.

Embora muitas dessas abordagens tenham sido consideradas, no passado, experimentais, inovadoras e não comprovadas, hoje essa percepção mudou significativamente. A agricultura regenerativa, por exemplo, conta hoje com um número crescente de adeptos — incluindo produtores rurais — que acreditam em seu potencial para gerar benefícios ambientais concretos sem comprometer a produtividade das lavouras. Há uma quantidade expressiva de terras, incluindo solos, que poderiam ser revitalizadas por meio dessas práticas. Nas Américas, a degradação representa um problema grave, mas também uma grande oportunidade. O Brasil, por si só, possui extensas áreas de pastagens degradadas que poderiam ser reincorporadas à produção agrícola por meio de métodos regenerativos, contribuindo para reduzir a pressão por conversão de florestas nas regiões do Cerrado e da Amazônia. 

Comércio, geopolítica e instituições

O aumento do protecionismo e da competição geopolítica enfraquece a cooperação entre os Estados, desgastando a confiança internacional. O comércio global de alimentos depende da força das instituições multilaterais e dos acordos internacionais — instituições que, muitas vezes, não recebem o devido reconhecimento por sua contribuição à segurança alimentar mundial. Atualmente, essas instituições vêm sendo enfraquecidas, e o risco é o colapso de todo o sistema multilateral de comércio.

Mais diálogo entre os Estados é um antídoto para esse cenário. Um dos objetivos deve ser a construção de instituições alternativas — por exemplo, começando com os maiores produtores agrícolas do hemisfério, um grupo “A5” formado por Estados Unidos, Brasil, México, Canadá e Argentina — para reunir ministros da agricultura em torno de um diálogo sobre comércio. Os resultados potenciais incluem convenções regionais de segurança alimentar, compromissos de investimento em pesquisa agrícola e acordos para evitar as políticas que mais distorcem o comércio.

Uma ideia relacionada é a criação de um conselho hemisférico permanente de segurança alimentar, destinado a reunir governos para discutir respostas a choques, identificar caminhos para uma cooperação científica e tecnológica mais ampla e reforçar a norma que reconhece a responsabilidade do hemisfério perante o restante do mundo como um dos principais fornecedores de alimentos. Instituições hemisféricas, como a Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA) e o Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID), podem ser mobilizadas para convocar esse conselho.

Investimento em inovação, tecnologia e infraestrutura

A melhoria contínua das atividades dentro e fora das propriedades rurais — incluindo o uso inovador de novas tecnologias e processos, além do investimento de capital nos elementos que os viabilizam (como a infraestrutura) — é fundamental para garantir a segurança alimentar no hemisfério e no mundo.

A agricultura regenerativa e outros sistemas agroalimentares voltados à sustentabilidade podem ser aprimorados por meio da aplicação de tecnologias avançadas. Exemplos incluem:

• Fontes alternativas de energia podem aprimorar os sistemas dentro e fora das propriedades rurais, ao mesmo tempo em que reduzem as marcas das emissões de carbono.
• Ferramentas de sensoriamento remoto geoespacial aplicadas à agricultura de precisão podem identificar e contribuir para a preservação dos recursos ecológicos.
• Tecnologias robóticas e digitais móveis (incluindo a integração mais ampla de dispositivos portáteis às práticas agrícolas) podem aumentar a eficiência da produção agrícola, ao mesmo tempo em que reduzem o impacto ambiental.
• As análises orientadas por inteligência artificial podem integrar e utilizar fluxos de dados provenientes de diversas aplicações.
• As biotecnologias podem melhorar a produtividade no campo e a eficiência no uso de nutrientes, ao mesmo tempo em que protegem recursos ecológicos, como o solo e a água.

Os agricultores são tanto utilizadores quanto criadores de tecnologias e processos inovadores, e precisam ter condições de adotar e aplicar essas inovações. A adoção no campo não é o mesmo que a invenção em laboratório. Pesquisas globais indicam que os produtores rurais tendem a hesitar em adotar novas tecnologias e práticas quando os custos iniciais de investimento são elevados e os retornos financeiros são incertos.

Programas de extensão agrícola financiados com recursos públicos — que conectam pesquisadores a produtores, promovendo aprendizado mútuo e transferência de tecnologia — são fundamentais. O fortalecimento dos serviços de extensão deve estar no centro das estratégias para ampliar a adoção de inovações pelos agricultores.

Aprimorar a infraestrutura para fortalecer as cadeias de suprimento do sistema agroalimentar também é fundamental. Há uma necessidade premente de desenvolver estratégias que enquadrem esse desafio em termos de resiliência social e até mesmo transfronteiriça (internacional).

Agricultores para o futuro

Para evitar o declínio demográfico da agricultura, é fundamental tornar a atividade agrícola financeiramente, social e culturalmente atrativa para as novas gerações. Para os jovens — especialmente aqueles sem vínculo familiar com o setor —, a agricultura pode ser percebida como uma atividade ultrapassada, pouco lucrativa, difícil, distante da realidade ou “sem apelo” — ou todas essas coisas ao mesmo tempo.

Não existe um único conjunto de soluções reconhecidas para reverter as tendências demográficas no setor agrícola. No entanto, evidências de diversas partes do mundo indicam que uma combinação de intervenções pode ser eficaz: facilitar o acesso à atividade agrícola, por meio da redução de barreiras de entrada (como o acesso a financiamento acessível e a terras cultiváveis); reduzir lacunas de conhecimento e habilidades por meio de programas de capacitação prática nas propriedades rurais, bolsas de estudo e estágios supervisionados; incentivar a entrada de perfis não tradicionais na agricultura — como jovens mulheres — e destacar o papel cada vez mais relevante desempenhado pelas tecnologias digitais, pela robótica, pelo Big Data, pelo sensoriamento remoto, pela inteligência artificial e por outras aplicações técnicas que despertam o interesse de jovens ambiciosos e familiarizados com tecnologia.

Breve conclusão

Uma questão crucial é saber se os principais atores do hemisfério — governos, produtores rurais, setor privado, pesquisadores, fundações, organizações da sociedade civil e o público em geral — estarão dispostos a investir em processos e abordagens transformadoras capazes de reduzir riscos e, ao mesmo tempo, aumentar a prosperidade, a sustentabilidade e a resiliência.

Promover a difusão de inovações essenciais para a segurança alimentar será um elemento crucial dessa equação. É indispensável que os países e as instituições multilaterais do hemisfério encontrem fontes de financiamento e reúnam o conhecimento tecnológico necessário para apoiar programas adaptados às necessidades específicas da região.

Outras partes interessadas, não governamentais — incluindo investidores, o setor privado, pesquisadores, cientistas, analistas, além de agricultores e comunidades agrícolas — também deve agir em conjunto para conceber, criar e fortalecer as ferramentas que serão necessárias à garantia de um futuro com segurança alimentar.

Este relatório foi produzido pelo Atlantic Council com o apoio da The Mosaic Company como parte do projeto Segurança alimentar: Alinhamento estratégico nas Américas.

Peter Engelke é pesquisador sênior do Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security do Atlantic Council, bem como pesquisador sênior do seu Global Energy Center. Seu portfólio diversificado abrange prospecção estratégica; geopolítica, diplomacia e relações internacionais; mudanças climáticas e sistemas terrestres; segurança alimentar, hídrica e energética; tecnologias emergentes e disruptivas e ecossistemas de inovação baseados em tecnologia; e demografia e urbanização, entre outros temas, sendo o criador da série de publicações de formato longo mais lida do Atlantic Council, Global Foresight. As afiliações anteriores de Engelke incluem o Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Robert Bosch Foundation, o World Economic Forum e o Stimson Center.

Matias Margulis é professor associado da School of Public Policy and Global Affairs e membro do corpo docente de Sistemas Agrícolas e Alimentares da University of British Columbia. Seus interesses de pesquisa e ensino abrangem governança global, desenvolvimento, direitos humanos, direito internacional e política alimentar. Além de sua pesquisa acadêmica, Margulis possui vasta experiência profissional na área de formulação de políticas internacionais e foi representante canadense na Organização Mundial do Comércio, na Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico e na Organização das Nações Unidas para a Alimentação e a Agricultura.

A GeoStrategy Initiative, sediada no Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, utiliza o desenvolvimento de estratégias e a prospecção de longo prazo para servir como principal referência e articuladora de análises e soluções relevantes para políticas públicas, visando a compreensão de um mundo complexo e imprevisível. Por meio de seu trabalho, a iniciativa busca revitalizar, adaptar e defender um sistema internacional baseado em regras, a fim de promover a paz, a prosperidade e a liberdade nas próximas décadas.

Saiba mais

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Those defining lines of tension were this month underscored at a pivotal moment for the region. Intense rainfall over the Ethiopian Highlands this month triggered severe flooding in several northern Egyptian governorates, including Beheira, Kafr el-Sheikh, and Menoufia.

The floods triggered renewed hostility over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia presents the GERD as a developmental milestone aimed at poverty reduction and energy self-sufficiency. For Egypt and Sudan, however, the project’s unilateral management represents an existential risk.

Egypt’s Ministry of Irrigation blamed Ethiopia for “reckless dam management,” claiming that abrupt water discharges from the GERD exacerbated the recent surge in floodwaters. Addis Ababa—having formally inaugurated the dam only weeks earlier, on September 9—countered that operations followed technical protocols and mitigated what would otherwise have been worse flooding in Sudan. This episode underscores how data opacity fuels political mistrust.

The latest escalation coincides with a renewed diplomatic shift. In a recent interview with Al Arabiya Arabic, Massad Boulos—senior adviser to US President Donald Trump on African, Arab, and Middle Eastern Affairs—stated that Washington now supports a “technical, not political” approach to the GERD dispute. According to Boulos, “the GERD issue must be resolved through technical means, not political pressure,” a position that signals a recalibration of US engagement and places the emphasis on data transparency, operational coordination, and joint risk mitigation rather than on coercive diplomacy.

Cairo warned more than once that rapid filling or uncoordinated water releases could sharply reduce downstream flows, disrupt irrigation, and even increase flood risk during heavy rains—challenges that pose real risks for a deeply water-stressed country.

The GERD and Egypt’s water stress

Costing roughly five billion dollars, located fourteen kilometers from the Sudanese border, and designed to hold 74 billion cubic meters of water, the GERD represents Africa’s largest hydroelectric plant. Following the fourth and final filling in September 2023, Addis Ababa declared the dam fully operational, doubling national power capacity and consolidating its ambition to become a regional energy hub.

The hydrological risks of the project for Egypt’s Delta are both immediate and structural. In the short term, large or poorly coordinated releases from upstream reservoirs can overwhelm outdated drainage systems, provoking floods and disrupting irrigation cycles. In the medium to long term, a new operational regime at GERD will alter seasonal flow patterns, affecting groundwater recharge and salinity levels, and challenging agriculture and infrastructure alike. Without transparent data-sharing and coordinated management, Cairo will struggle to anticipate these shifts.

With over 118 million people and relying on the Nile River for nearly 97 percent of its freshwater, the Nile represents not merely a resource but Egypt’s national bloodstream. Average water availability per person has declined from almost 1,900 cubic meters in 1959 to fewer than six hundred today—well below the United Nations’ water-poverty threshold—and is expected to fall below five hundred by 2050, signaling an absolute water scarcity level. Climate change, sea-level rise, and irrigation inefficiencies compound these pressures, placing food production and social stability at risk.

Cairo, therefore, faces a dual challenge: modernizing its irrigation and drainage infrastructure while preventing upstream states from restricting flows. Meanwhile, Ethiopia—despite contributing 86 percent of the Nile’s waters—remains among the world’s lowest in water-use capacity, struggling with recurrent droughts and power shortages.

Historical legacies and legal asymmetries

The current diplomatic crisis cannot be understood without recalling colonial-era water agreements between Egypt and Sudan. The 1929 British-brokered Nile Waters Agreement granted Egypt 48 billion cubic meters per year and Sudan 4 billion, along with Cairo’s veto over upstream projects—an agreement negotiated solely between Egypt, Sudan, and their former colonial power, the United Kingdom. Ethiopia was never a party to this treaty and has consistently rejected its legitimacy, arguing that no upstream state can be bound by colonial-era arrangements in which it had neither representation nor consent. The 1959 Egypt–Sudan accord reinforced this asymmetry, allocating about 84 percent of the river’s flow (55.5 billion for Egypt and 18.5 for Sudan) and creating a joint commission to oversee water management between these two countries—again without Ethiopian participation. Addis Ababa regards both treaties as legally irrelevant and historically obsolete.

For decades, these treaties anchored Egypt’s claim to “historic rights,” while upstream countries rejected them as colonial relics. The result is a structural mismatch between legal legitimacy and hydrological reality: Upstream states see their development prospects as constrained, while Egypt perceives any alteration in river flow as an existential threat.

But structural tensions escalated with Ethiopia in 2011 when Addis Ababa launched construction of the GERD. Years of negotiations mediated by the African Union, the United States, and the World Bank have yet to yield a binding trilateral agreement, leaving both hydrological and political uncertainty unresolved and tensions high among these states. In this context, water management has become inseparable from national security, energy policy, and regional diplomacy.

Ethiopia insists that dam operations follow seasonal hydrology and turbine requirements, while Egypt argues that opaque management violates the 2015 Declaration of Principles on equitable use of Nile waters. From a geopolitical and security perspective, the return of tensions among these states confirms the reemergence of hardened positions and the risk of a prolonged hydropolitical confrontation. Addis Ababa continues to argue that the GERD symbolizes a new order based on equitable development and regional interdependence, rather than dominance. Yet, this new order still lacks a legal and technical framework acceptable to all. No binding agreement exists on how the dam will be filled and operated during droughts or flood years, leaving each side vulnerable to the other’s decisions.

Sociopolitical tensions further magnify these physical risks. Recurrent floods and perceived external threats to national water security could exacerbate domestic grievances, fuel nationalist rhetoric, and push policymakers toward confrontational postures—including legal or, in extreme cases, military options. Indeed, Egypt has repeatedly framed control over Nile waters as an existential issue and has at times indicated that it would consider armed intervention if upstream dam operations were to threaten downstream flows.

Recommendations

Today, three overlapping deficits continue to undermine Nile Basin governance: a technical deficit (lack of real-time data on releases and inflows), an operational deficit (absence of agreed rules for drought or flood management), and a political deficit (mutual distrust and competing national narratives). The recent floods starkly reveal the cost of these gaps. Egypt’s repeated assertion that the Nile constitutes a “red line” underscores how water security remains inseparable from national sovereignty, making compromise politically difficult.

Cairo should consider a strategic path forward from this dilemma, based on a dual approach.

On the one hand, it must intensify external engagement—pursuing legal and diplomatic efforts through mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice, which reframes the dispute in legal rather than existential terms, while sustaining negotiations under the African Union (regional legitimacy) and the United States (one of the few external actors able to exert leverage on all three capitals).

Representatives of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia will establish an independent trilateral technical commission under African Union oversight to analyze hydrological data and develop predictive flood models. At the same time, an integrated early-warning system that interconnects the existing hydrological, meteorological, and dam-operation monitoring platforms in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt—allowing real-time data sharing and coordinated response to droughts, floods, and irregular water releases—would help avert humanitarian crises and improve coordination during extreme weather events. Equally important is the negotiation of legally binding operational guarantees—however minimal—that can anchor political trust in measurable hydrological parameters. International partners, including the United States, have promoted technical confidence-building measures designed to calm tensions, such as installing automated flow gauges and satellite-based monitoring to increase transparency. Yet such measures will build trust only if embedded within a political framework for data sharing and collaborative drought management.

On the other hand, Cairo should prioritize domestic adaptation by investing in water efficiency, desalination, and drainage upgrades to enhance resilience regardless of upstream actions. Egypt must accelerate its adaptation efforts by upgrading drainage infrastructure, modernizing pumping stations, and expanding agricultural insurance schemes to protect vulnerable communities. Ultimately, international diplomacy should be reframed toward the goal of shared resilience, encouraging Ethiopia to view coordination as an expression of responsible sovereignty, rather than an externally imposed constraint.

The recent floods serve as a warning: Technical cooperation cannot remain hostage to political rivalry. Whether the GERD becomes a driver of regional integration or a lasting fault line will depend on how quickly riparian states shift from mutual accusations to shared management. The alternative—a future of recurrent floods, escalating mistrust, and securitized water politics—would threaten not only livelihoods in the Nile Delta but also the broader stability of the Horn of Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Alessia Melcangi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. She is also an associate professor of contemporary history of North Africa and the Middle East at the Sapienza University of Rome, an associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies in Milan, and a member of the scientific committee of the Fondazione Med-Or Leonardo SpA in Rome.

The post The Nile at a crossroads: Navigating the GERD dispute as Egypt’s floodwaters rise appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Then came Hurricane Melissa, the strongest Atlantic hurricane on record ever to make landfall in Jamaica. Starting late last month and into this week, it tore through the island’s central and western parishes, destroying towns, roads, hospitals, and critical infrastructure.

After days of watching the slow, relentless approach of Hurricane Melissa, one of the authors, Patricia, sheltered in her home in Kingston. She could hear the wind howling at over 100 miles per hour (mph) and rain lashing sideways against the windows—yet even that was nothing compared to the 185 mph winds and torrential rain battering the west of the country, where her friends and family live. While Patricia dealt with small leaks, her friends and family were left with nothing.

In the days after, her family visited some of the hardest-hit communities to distribute care packages, and what they saw was heartbreaking. Entire neighborhoods flattened, the landscape looking as if an atomic blast had torn through it.

At least 40 percent of the buildings and roads on the western part of the island, including Montego Bay, suffered damage. Many small communities, such as the port town Black River, were almost completely wiped out. Such damage is remarkable mostly for its sudden severity, not for its novelty. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries lose an estimated 2 percent of their infrastructure capital stock annually to climate-related damage. Infrastructure upgrades must therefore be a priority, given the region’s exposure to natural disasters and climate change.

This is where US leadership can step in, not as charity, but as shared investment in resilience and regional stability. Jamaica has kept its promises: it has delivered disciplined fiscal reform, climate-smart policies, and innovation in risk financing. It has done what the international system asks of developing nations. Now, it needs that system, and its closest ally, the United States, to respond.

Reality over foresight

The Caribbean remains highly vulnerable to hurricanes and other climate-related events, which can disrupt or extend projects critical to rebuilding, driving up costs. Natural disasters often destroy essential infrastructure, forcing projects to pause or cancel. The question now is how long it will take Jamaica to recover from this cumulative destruction. The immediate response is urgent, but so too is planning for the months ahead. With projections indicating that dangerous climate events will become more frequent and severe, insurability declines and the cost of future investment rises.

The damage caused by Hurricane Melissa already amounts to almost eight billion US dollars, which is equivalent to nearly half of Jamaica’s annual GDP. That figure dwarfs the country’s much-heralded $150 million parametric catastrophe bond that it arranged with the World Bank. This bond, purchased as a form of insurance from capital markets, is designed to trigger after major disasters like this one. Given the strength of Hurricane Melissa and the scale of Jamaica’s losses, it is expected that the 2024 catastrophe bond to pay out its full $150 million value. Even so, Jamaica will need much more to rebuild.

Two sustainable paths forward

The destruction caused by Hurricane Melissa is so extensive that once the search-and-rescue efforts end and basic services such as water and electricity are restored, the damage to homes and infrastructure will exceed the capacity of any single government. Jamaica’s recovery will likely therefore depend on two important factors: innovative financing models that reduce investment risk and strong public-private partnerships that accelerate sustainable recovery.

The Caribbean’s unique and small markets call for creative financing, but there are tools readily available to help US companies invest in infrastructure and the recovery process. Two options are especially relevant.

First, US companies partnering with multilateral development banks and insurance companies can help de-risk investments. To reach the average of advanced economies by 2030, Jamaica would need significant investment, including $5.8 billion for new infrastructure and asset replacement in road infrastructure. It would also need more than $1.4 billion toward telecommunications infrastructure for fixed broadband and 4G networks to reach equivalent levels in developed economies. This significant need offers opportunities large enough to attract major investment. Limited human and institutional capacity make collaboration with third-party institutions even more important. Projects such as the Inter-American Development Bank’s One Caribbean program can help prepare projects, strengthen public-private partnerships, and manage political risk. Equally important is building trust with local partners. Many Caribbean firms are family-owned and community-rooted, which makes relationship-building essential for lasting investment. Joining local business organizations such as American Chamber of Commerce chapters and participating in trade missions can help US investors understand regulations, identify talent, and ensure that projects succeed over time.

Second, public-private partnerships can help the Jamaican government and their partners meet urgent recovery needs while driving long-term, sustainable efforts. Launching public-private partnerships is one of the most effective ways to mobilize capital from local, regional, and private investors. Under these partnerships, governments provide needed guarantees and subsidies to reduce risk, while the private sector generates the capital needed to determine a project’s commercial viability.

It is important that this model is used, as opposed to wholesale private ownership of foreign operators, to avoid eroding projects’ national economic value. Therefore, local equity participation should be prioritized in public-private partnership structures to maximize national benefits and ensure long-term sustainability. The private sector can work with governments and local civil society to strengthen resilience through environmental and social impact assessments. It can also support by improving infrastructure standards, including for underground piping and the usage of hurricane-proof glass, as well as updating building codes where necessary. Insurance can also help keep infrastructure projects afloat during delays and stoppages resulting from natural disasters. At the same time, new investments will need to focus on renewable energy, resilient infrastructure, digital connectivity, and community housing, all sectors where US expertise and capital can make an immediate impact.

Hurricane Melissa tested Jamaica’s strength and found it unbreakable but not inexhaustible. The island has proven that fiscal responsibility is possible. Now it’s time for the United States to prove that climate solidarity is, too.

Patricia R. Francis, who currently resides in Jamaica, is a nonresident senior fellow for the Caribbean Initiative at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council.

Maite Gonzalez Latorre is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council.

The post Hurricane Melissa left $8 billion in damage. Jamaica needs US support to get back on its feet. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May 2025, the China Global South Initiative (CGSi), a collaboration between the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, convened a group of twenty-two African environmental experts at the Peduase Valley Resort in Ghana for a three-day workshop on China’s environmental impact in West Africa. This policy workshop, hosted with the support of the Ford Foundation, included representatives from eleven West African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and South Africa. Amid three days of comradery and collaboration, these experts worked together to draft policy memorandums on China’s environmental impact across the region. In the months following the workshop, we worked closely with the authors to curate three briefs—on mining and resource extraction, timber and wildlife, and fisheries and water resources—that identify the challenges and offer actionable policy solutions. We would like to recognize the excellent work of the co-authors who contributed their time and expertise to creating these briefs. In particular we would like to thank the group leaders Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, and Ebimboere Seiyafa and Awa Niang Fall, respectively, for their diligent work.

First and foremost, we would like to thank Caroline Costello, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, for her essential contributions to the workshop in Ghana and this collection of issue briefs. Her tireless efforts were truly essential to the success of the project. Ashley Bennett, events strategy program director of the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, provided critical logistical support across a dozen countries. Alexandra Towns at the Keough School and Cate Hansberry, Beverly Larson, and Jeff Fleischerat the Atlantic Council provided expert editorial support. Guidance from Notre Dame’s Pamoja Africa Initiative helped us identify contributors, and the Kellogg Institute helped support their participation. We would also like to thank the excellent staff of the Peduase Valley Resort for their hospitality during the May 2025 workshop. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our partner, the Ford Foundation, whose support made the workshop and these policy briefs possible. Ford is not responsible for the content of these policy briefs.

Executive summary

West Africa’s forests are vital for climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and economic growth. They store carbon, protect watersheds, and sustain millions of rural livelihoods. However, accelerating deforestation, habitat loss, illegal wildlife trade, and unsustainable resource extraction—often linked to Chinese actors—threaten these critical functions. Chinese timber companies, agribusinesses, infrastructure developers, and wildlife traders have increasingly contributed to forest degradation across the region. Illegal logging— particularly of rosewood and other valuable timber in Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia— has fueled widespread forest loss, including in protected areas. Driven almost entirely by Chinese demand, rosewood is now the world’s most trafficked illegal wildlife product in terms of both value and volume, surpassing ivory and rhinoceros horn combined. Though Chinese investments in the region’s timber industry have brought some economic benefits, the environmental costs far outweigh the local gains. Largescale land acquisitions and infrastructure projects frequently lead to forest conversion, erode community land rights, and put endangered species at risk of extinction. This policy brief examines the environmental and social impacts of Chinese exploitation of forests and wildlife in West Africa and offers recommendations to strengthen enforcement, promote accountability, and engage Beijing to address these challenges.

Background

West Africa contains some of the continent’s most intact tropical forests, which support more than nine hundred bird species and nearly four hundred species of terrestrial mammals.¹ The region is recognized as a global biodiversity hotspot and hosts 113 key biodiversity areas across countries such as Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, and Cameroon.² However, these ecologically important regions are under increasing threat, with more than 265,000 hectares of forest lost in the past decade.³

A significant driver of this forest loss is the growing footprint of Chinese economic activity in the region. China’s involvement in timber extraction, agribusiness, infrastructure development, and wildlife trade has been linked to deforestation, biodiversity loss, and the breakdown of essential ecosystem services such as climate regulation, water provision, and carbon storage.⁴ The demand for valuable hardwoods, especially rosewood—driven almost entirely by the Chinese market—has led to widespread illegal and unsustainable logging, often in protected areas and forest reserves.⁵

Over the past two decades, Chinese investments in West Africa—estimated at more than $200 billion as of 2021—have expanded rapidly across various sectors.⁶ While these investments have spurred infrastructure development and trade, they have also caused serious environmental damage. In countries such as Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, Chinese firms are frequently associated with both legal and illicit timber operations. In addition, Chinese-backed agribusiness ventures, particularly in rubber and palm oil, have led to extensive land acquisitions and deforestation, undermining traditional land tenure systems and disrupting local livelihoods.⁷

Chinese infrastructure and mining projects have opened previously undisturbed forest and conservation areas, fragmented habitats and weakened the ecological integrity of critical landscapes. These developments often erode community-based forest management practices and contribute to the marginalization of local populations.⁸

Despite existing legal and voluntary frameworks—including forest codes, environmental impact assessment laws, and international commitments such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+, developed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) and the African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative—many West African countries struggle with enforcement due to weak institutional capacity, underfunded regulatory agencies, corruption, limited monitoring, and political interference.⁹ In many cases, Chinese firms bribe local officials to push forward opaque timber and land deals.¹⁰ The co-optation of local elites further shields environmental offenders from accountability.¹¹

There is an urgent need for coordinated national and regional responses to address these challenges. Key policy priorities should include strengthening environmental governance, enhancing transparency in investment and land deals, securing community land rights, and holding Chinese firms accountable for environmental damage. Without these measures, the region’s forests—and the critical ecological and social benefits they provide—will remain at risk from unchecked Chinese firms’ exploitation.¹²

Evidence

The evidence of China’s role in accelerating deforestation and biodiversity loss in West Africa is substantial and alarming. Driven by surging demand for valuable timber and wildlife products Chinese firms have emerged as the dominant foreign actors in the trade. Even when there are existing protections for threatened tree species (e.g., the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), these logging activities, which are often conducted illegally or through weak regulatory channels, have far-reaching consequences for ecosystems and rural livelihoods.¹³

At the heart of the crisis lies demand for rosewood, a valuable tropical hardwood used in traditional Chinese furniture. According to the Environmental Investigation Agency, rosewood is now the most trafficked illegal wildlife product globally—by both value and volume—surpassing ivory, rhinoceros horn, and big cats combined.¹⁴ The value of rosewood exports from West Africa to China was estimated to have surpassed $2 billion between 2017 and 2022, with logs fetching on average more than $20,000 per metric ton in 2021.¹⁵ China’s domestic market demand drives rampant logging in West Africa, with an estimated 70 percent of logging in Ghana, 65 percent in Cameroon, and 56 percent in Nigeria classified as illegal.¹⁶ Despite an export ban, Ghana sent 540,000 metric tons of rosewood to China between 2012 and 2019—equal to six million trees or about 2,000 acres of forest loss.¹⁷

The financial losses attributed to illegal timber harvesting are staggering. The World Bank estimates that illegal logging deprives source governments worldwide of between $7 billion and $12 billion annually.¹⁸ In 2018, illegal deforestation cost countries approximately $4,000 per hectare in lost tax revenue, ecosystem degradation, and social conflict.¹⁹ Each year Nigeria loses $191 million to $383 million in tax revenues; Cameroon loses $51 million to $103 million; Côte d’Ivoire loses $38 million to $76 million; and The Gambia loses $4 million to $9 million.²⁰ The illegal rosewood trade—driven by corruption, the misuse of licenses to recover trees downed by storms or construction, and weak oversight – has been particularly profitable.

Criminal and extremist networks use profits from this illicit trade to fund their operations. As of 2020, more than 1 million trees were illegally harvested and sent to China from Senegal’s Casamance region, helping to fund separatist groups such as the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance.²¹ In Mozambique, the rosewood trade fuels al-Shabab militants linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).²² Chinese smugglers source rosewood from Nigerian regions controlled by Boko Haram, allowing the group to profit.²³ In Mali, despite a 2020 national export ban, nearly 150,000 tons of rosewood—equivalent to 220,000 trees—were exported to China.²⁴ In Mali, al-Qaeda-linked Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin militants profit by controlling access to rosewood forests.²⁵

Corruption plays a central role in sustaining the illegal timber trade. Chinese companies often operate through shell firms or local agents to obscure accountability.²⁶ Regulatory enforcement remains underfunded and inconsistent, while laws requiring environmental impact assessments for logging are frequently bypassed or ignored. Forestry agencies and customs offices are often compromised by corruption.²⁷ One of the most egregious cases happened in Nigeria in 2017, when Chinese customs authorities intercepted 1.4 million illegal rosewood logs valued at $300 million, facilitated by nearly $1 million in bribes to Nigerian officials.²⁸ Chinese-funded infrastructure also contributes to deforestation.

Chinese-funded infrastructure also contributes to desforestation. Chinese-financed roads, ports, and dams often cut through protected areas, offering loggers access to previously unreachable forests. Operating through local intermediaries, Chinese timber companies extract high-value hardwoods such as rosewood, teak, and ebony either illegally or through legal loopholes. Based on geospatial analysis, approximately 10 percent of Ghana’s critical forest reserves and 11 percent of Côte d’Ivoire’s over-lap with Chinese-sponsored infrastructure.²⁹ One of the most contested cases is Ghana’s Atewa Forest Reserve, a biodiversity hot spot threatened by Chinese bauxite mining.³⁰ Despite strong civil-society opposition, the government proceeded with road construction in anticipation of mining operations, causing significant environmental degradation including forest fragmentation, incursions into conservation zones, and habitat destruction. Deforestation disrupts rainfall patterns, accelerates erosion, and increases the frequency of droughts and floods, undermining agricultural productivity in a region where 70–80 percent of rural livelihoods depend on farming.

Large-scale agricultural ventures compound these impacts. In Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Cameroon, Chinese agribusinesses have cleared vast tracts of forest for rubber, palm oil, and rice cultivation. Free, prior, and informed consent policies are on the books in all of these nations, requiring consultations with indigenous peoples and local communities.³¹ But agribusinesses routinely ignore such requirements. In
Cameroon, Sudcam (a subsidiary of China Hainan Rubber Group) cleared more than 10,000 hectares between 2011 and 2018 and contributed to 45,000 hectares of deforestation.³² These enterprises displace communities without proper compensation.

In addition to timber, China’s demand for exotic wildlife has turned West Africa into a hub for global wildlife trafficking. Since 2015, Nigeria has been China’s primary source for ivory and pangolin scales. Between 2018 and 2023, seizures in Nigeria included more than 30 metric tons of ivory and 167 metric tons of pangolin scales, equivalent to at least 4,400 elephants and hundreds of thousands of pangolins, respectively.³³ While West African countries are signatories to relevant international frameworks like CITES, which monitors the trade in endangered wild animals and plants, in many West African countries sales continue due to weak enforcement, corruption, poor monitoring, and lack of effective local regulatory mechanisms.³⁴

China has responded to criticism of its global development and infrastructure initiatives by releasing voluntary environmental sustainability guidelines, including the 2017 Guidance on Promoting a Green Belt and Road and the 2021 Green Development Guidelines for Overseas Investment.³⁵These guidelines encourage Chinese firms to abide by host country laws, but they lack enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, China’s 2019 Forest Law discourages illegal timber imports but lacks provisions for supply chain oversight. Firms can evade prosecution by claiming ignorance of illegality.³⁶ A 2022 draft regulation aims to apply aspects of China’s domestic Forest Law to its international practices, but it lacks the enforcement mechanisms necessary to make the international supply chain traceable.³⁷

In short, China’s timber harvesting, infrastructure construction, agriculture investments, and wildlife trade have contributed significantly to deforestation and biodiversity loss in West Africa. The convergence of high domestic Chinese market demand, weak governance across West Africa, lapse enforcement within China, and corruption has created a perfect storm of environmental degradation. Addressing this behavior requires a strong political commitment to combat criminal activity and shift the incentives that drive the market for illegally traded wildlife products. To address the problem, African countries must coordinate policy responses across the local, regional, and international levels. For its part, China should adopt and strictly enforce mechanisms that ensure responsible practices toward West African forests and wildlife.

Policy recommendations

Improve oversight and compliance

• Disclose environmental and social impact assessments. To enhance transparency and facilitate oversight. West African governments should require all foreign investments in logging, agribusiness, and infrastructure to conduct and publicly disclose their environmental impact assessments. These results must be made available to relevant local authorities prior to project approval.
• Improve legal transparency. Publish a national land and concession registry that includes all foreign allocations and permits. Ensure contracts are clearly defined, legally binding, and aligned with national conservation laws. Update land tenure legislation to protect customary rights and require public registration of all foreign land concessions. Strengthen customs enforcement in African countries, shared border points, and Chinese ports to prevent the export and import of unverified timber and endangered species.
• Establish escrow accounts to ensure reforestation. Require licensed logging and agribusiness firms to deposit funds into escrow accounts dedicated to ecological restoration. Funds should only be released upon verification of reforestation or land rehabilitation by either a certified private institution or the relevant state agency, depending on relevant laws and regulations. If companies fail to restore the land, the funds should be redirected to local communities for remediation and compensation.
• Create national whistleblower systems. Develop national level secure, multilingual tools—such as short message service (SMS) platforms, mobile apps, and anonymous hotlines—for communities, nongovernmental organizations, and forestry workers to report illegal logging, land grabs, and wildlife crimes. Rather than rely entirely on global reporting platforms that may be inaccessible, national and local level platforms would enable faster and real time detection of illegal logging for prompt action by relevant subnational institutions. Enforce strong legal protections for whistleblowers and environmental defenders. Partner with international bodies such as Interpol, TRAFFIC (a network of two hundred experts on the trade of wild species), and CITES to verify and investigate reported violations.

Raise public awareness

• Support regional civil-society coalitions. Fund and strengthen regional and national coalitions of civil-society organizations that monitor Chinese forestry investments and expose violations of national laws and regulations. Recognize land governed and managed according to traditional community-based systems and build local capacity to negotiate fairer contracts. Equip community actors with tools including drones, Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, and mobile reporting apps to document and report illegal activities in real time.
• Train and protect environmental journalists. Work closely with local and transnational civil society organizations to provide training for local journalists to investigate the illegal timber trade, land seizures, and biodiversity threats linked to foreign investments. Training should focus on developing investigative methods, digital security, environmental law, and data-gathering. National and regional safety support programs should be made available to journalists, including emergency legal support, and encrypted communication platforms for those facing threats or harassment.

Regional cooperation

• Adopt a regional forestry code of conduct. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should establish a binding regional code of conduct that sets minimum environmental and social standards for all foreign investments in terms of forests and biodiversity. This framework could be modeled on the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) polices of the European Union or United Kingdom, and include voluntary partnership agreements.³⁸ Collective regional action can encourage individual reform-minded leaders to act as a counterweight against corrupt local officials.
• Create a regional public forestry investment database. Establish and maintain an online database that tracks foreign licenses, timber exports, and environmental violations. Under ECOWAS auspices, this platform should become a regional information hub that documents licensing status, compliance records, and audit outcomes. The intention is to enable public oversight of Chinese and other foreign firms operating in forest and critical biodiversity areas.
• Enhance international coordination. Set up an ECOWAS task force to regularly exchange information on West African forest and wildlife resource exploitation. The task force would facilitate intelligence sharing on illegal timber trade routes and identify specific violations and bad actors. It could facilitate joint investigations into cross-border violations in shared forests such as the Upper Guinea region, which traverses Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea. The group would publish an annual report for ECOWAS members states and make specific recommendations to member countries. The task force could form a collective negotiation platform in collaboration with national forestry commissions to engage Chinese state-owned enterprises and private investors.
• Work with China. Create formal and informal dialogue channels among African environment ministries, ECOWAS, and Chinese embassies and companies to address logging violations and environmental disputes. To enhance contract transparency, the equitable sharing of benefits, and improve oversight, urge Beijing to make its Green Development Guidelines for Overseas Investment mandatory. West African governments should push China publicly and privately to implement timber supply chain tracing and to regularly publish customs data on timber imports into China.

Roland Azibo Balgah is professor of development studies at the University of Bamenda, Cameroon, and visiting professor at Sol Plaatje University, South Africa and University of Cologne, Germany. As a social economist, he researches on the human-nature sustainability nexus, with thrust on hazards, poverty and livelihoods, and sustainable development in Africa.

Caroline Costello is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Costello worked on the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program. In previous roles, she has taught English in Xiting, China; interned with the Peace Corps, the Department of State, and Save the Children; and served as the head of Learning Enterprises, an international volunteer program which sends students to teach English in underserved communities abroad.

Moses Fayiah is a forestry lecturer at the Department of Forestry and Wood Science, School of Natural Resources Management, Njala Campus, Njala University, Sierra Leone and has over 10 years of professional experience. He is also the executive director of Universal Consulting Services and the Forum for Environment, Biodiversity and Climate Change in Sierra Leone. His research interests include forest regeneration, sustainable forest management, climate change, forest policy and ecosystem restoration and conservation.

Jean-Luc Kouassi is an assistant professor of forestry and environmental management at the Felix Houphouet-Boigny National Polytechnic Institute (INP-HB) of Cote d’Ivoire with a decade of experience in cacao agroforestry, fire ecology, and GIS. His research explores the intersection of agriculture and sustainability, focusing on climate change mitigation, community empowerment, and sustainable landscape management.

Christine Ajokè I. N. Ouinsavi is a professor at University of Parakou (Benin), where she coordinates doctoral training in natural resources management, chairs the Scientific Committee of Natural Sciences and Agronomy, and leads the Forestry Studies and Research Laboratory. Her research focuses on ecology, agroforestry, climate change, biodiversity conservation, forest management and restoration in tropical regions. As former cabinet minister she led national policies in trade and education, chaired critical commissions, and participated in international negotiations.

Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh is an Associate Professor in in ecology and sustainable management of land at Nangui Abrogoua Universiy, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. He has an extensive experience in stakeholder engagement, feasibility studies, and strategic planning. He is currently involved in projects for the sustainable management of tree-based cash crops agroforestry and other climate smart cropping practices. He is also in dialogue with various ministries responsible for forest, agriculture, and the environment in Côte d’Ivoire to provide science-based insights into their activities and develop integrated management plans for the sustainable management of agroecological landscapes.

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebimboere Seiyafa, Awa Niang Fall, Ellis Adjei Adams, Kadidia Kane, Isa Elegbebe Olalekan, Kodjo N’Souvi, and Salamatu Joana Tannor

Chinese companies have rapidly expanded into West Africa’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese mining in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Richard Asante, Joseph Asunka, Joshua Eisenman, Fancies Egu Lansana, Sanusha Naidu, Igwe Ogbonnaya, Youmanli Ouoba, and Boukary Sangare

Chinese entities are expanding legal and illegal mining for minerals in West Africa.

Africa China

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Chinese demand for timber and wildlife in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May 2025, the China Global South Initiative (CGSi), a collaboration between the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, convened a group of twenty-two African environmental experts at the Peduase Valley Resort in Ghana for a three-day workshop on China’s environmental impact in West Africa. This policy workshop, hosted with the support of the Ford Foundation, included representatives from eleven West African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and South Africa. Amid three days of comradery and collaboration, these experts worked together to draft policy memorandums on China’s environmental impact across the region. In the months following the workshop, we worked closely with the authors to curate three briefs—on mining and resource extraction, timber and wildlife, and fisheries and water resources—that identify the challenges and offer actionable policy solutions. We would like to recognize the excellent work of the co-authors who contributed their time and expertise to creating these briefs. In particular we would like to thank the group leaders Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, and Ebimboere Seiyafa and Awa Niang Fall, respectively, for their diligent work.

First and foremost, we would like to thank Caroline Costello, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, for her essential contributions to the workshop in Ghana and this collection of issue briefs. Her tireless efforts were truly essential to the success of the project. Ashley Bennett, events strategy program director of the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, provided critical logistical support across a dozen countries. Alexandra Towns at the Keough School and Cate Hansberry, Beverly Larson, and Jeff Fleischer at the Atlantic Council provided expert editorial support. Guidance from Notre Dame’s Pamoja Africa Initiative helped us identify contributors, and the Kellogg Institute helped support their participation. We would also like to thank the excellent staff of the Peduase Valley Resort for their hospitality during the May 2025 workshop. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our partner, the Ford Foundation, whose support made the workshop and these policy briefs possible. Ford is not responsible for the content of these policy briefs.

Executive summary

Overfishing by Chinese trawlers poses a serious threat to West Africa’s rich fisheries and water resources, endangering regional food security, national economies, and local livelihoods. Chinese companies— including state-backed firms and private actors—have rapidly expanded into the region’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters. Hundreds of Chinese vessels now fish off the West African coast, primarily between Senegal and Mauritania. These vessels are much larger than the artisanal canoes used by local fishermen and easily outcompete them. The expansion of Chinese companies’ fishery operations and overfishing in the region strains marine and freshwater ecosystems and undermines longstanding livelihoods of traditional fishing communities. Chinese vessels employ bottom trawling and other destructive methods, which—combined with limited oversight and poor enforcement of national and transboundary laws—have caused severe environmental degradation and declining fish stocks, weakened local economies, and deteriorated coastal water quality. At the same time, inland fish populations—especially in transboundary rivers such as the Falémé, Niger, and Volta—continue to decline due to runoff pollution from Chinese companies’ illegal mining operations. This policy brief examines the ecological and social risks posed by Chinese trawlers’ fishing in West Africa, and offers policy recommendations to strengthen legal protection and enhance regional cooperation to safeguard the region’s fisheries and water systems.

Background

Fisheries and aquaculture are vital to West Africa’s food security and economy—contributing more than 15 percent of regional gross domestic product (GDP), with Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana accounting for 70 percent of total production.¹ Fish are the main source of animal protein for more than 60 percent of households in the region, which produces 32 percent of Africa’s annual fish catch and 21 percent of its aquaculture in Africa.²

In recent decades, growing concerns have emerged among environmental experts, national policymakers, and coastal communities in West Africa about the environmental and socioeconomic effects of China’s expanding role in the region’s fisheries and water resources. Chinese firms’ involvement— driven by the depletion of domestic fish stocks—now extends throughout West African countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), major rivers, and shared transboundary watersheds.

Small-scale, artisanal local fishermen are no match for the larger, more powerful Chinese trawlers, which engage in both legal and illegal fishery activities, often exploiting weak local regulations, limited enforcement capacity, and the complicity of corrupt local actors.³ The lack of coordinated monitoring
and limited presence of enforcement agencies, such as coast guards or marine patrols, have enabled these fleets to operate with minimal oversight.⁴ China’s sizeable investments in industrial fishing—backed by state subsidies, low-interest loans, and tax exemptions—has resulted in growing instances of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in West Africa, ultimately undermining the long-term sustainability of the region’s fishery stocks.⁵

Besides fishing, Chinese companies’ activities in mining, dredging, and infrastructure development compound pressures on water quality and aquatic ecosystems, with direct implications for fishery sustainability. Gold mining operations, particularly those involving mercury and cyanide, have contaminated rivers and their fish with harmful chemicals.⁶ Bucket excavators used in mining operations deposit oils, fuels, and alluvium into riverbeds, which causes erosion, changes the shape of river channels, and damages ecosystems. Dredging also stirs up sediments, turning clear water murky. This increased cloudiness, known as high turbidity, makes water hazardous for drinking and affects aquatic ecosystems.⁷ The consequences of mine-related pollution extend to upstream catchments and transboundary river basins with socioeconomic and ecological importance, including the Tano-Bia Basin (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire), the Falémé River (Senegal and Mali), and the Bagoé River (Côte d’Ivoire and Mali).⁸

West African governments face structural obstacles in addressing Chinese vessels’ impact on fisheries and water resources, including under-resourced enforcement agencies and outdated legal frameworks that hinder effective regulation and governance. Corruption—particularly at the local level, where Chinese fishers sometimes pay communities not to report illegal fishing and mining—weakens oversight.⁹ Political and business elites with vested interests in fishery ventures involving Chinese companies often obstruct reform or weaken enforcement. Moreover, the presence of non-state armed groups in key maritime zones, such as the Gulf of Guinea, hampers monitoring and leaves fisheries and waterways increasingly vulnerable to exploitation by Chinese trawlers.¹⁰

These governance challenges are further compounded by West African states’ dependence on loans from China’s state-owned banks and infrastructure projects, which have reduced their bargaining power and undermined their ability to hold Chinese companies accountable. Despite the existence of regional initiatives such as the Economic Community of West African States Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) and the African Common Fisheries Policy, implementation has remained weak.¹¹ Taken together, these impediments to enforcement leave marine and freshwater sectors neglected, allowing the associated environmental and social devastations to persist.

Evidence

China’s fishing fleet is currently considered the largest in West Africa, with nearly 17,000 vessels and annual catch amounting to roughly $3.8 billion.¹² Chinese vessels benefit from state subsidies and advanced fishing technologies, enabling them to overwhelm local fisheries, leaving artisanal fishers unable to compete. In Ghana, local fishermen in wooden canoes have drowned after their small boats capsized in the wakes of large Chinese vessels.¹³

Many Chinese fishing companies exploit poorly regulated licensing systems to conceal vessel ownership, engaging in joint partnerships with local actors, operating through local intermediaries, or registering as subsidiaries of local operators.¹⁴ Using local companies as legal fronts allows Chinese firms to circumvent fishing license laws that prevent foreign vessels from operating within national EEZs.¹⁵ Meanwhile, local corruption and collusion between China’s fishing operations and local political elites further stifles law enforcement.

Chinese industrial vessels operating in West African waters often fish in prohibited zones and use illicit practices such as dynamite, illegal nets, and chemicals that harm marine life and pollute waters.¹⁶ The impacts of these destructive techniques on local coastal communities in West Africa are profound. In Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana, which account for 70 percent of the region’s fish production, foreign vessels dominate the industry, undercutting local economies and ecosystems.¹⁷

Due to illegal fishing, small-scale fishers, many of them women working in fish processing and sales, face declining catches and rising unemployment.¹⁸ Illegal fishing has led to over 300,000 losses in artisanal and traditional fish related jobs in West Africa. In 2018, illegal fishing cost Nigeria an estimated $70 million.¹⁹ In Ghana, Chinese firms’ fleets engage in saiko, a form of illegal fishing in which industrial trawlers deliberately catch and resell small, juvenile fish at sea.²⁰ By catching undersized fish, they undermine the sustainability of fish populations in the region’s marine ecosystems. This illegal fishing practice threatens the livelihoods of coastal communities that rely on sustainable fishing for survival.²¹

The abuse and neglect of local workers is common on Chinese fishing vessels. Interviews by the Environmental Justice Foundation found that 94 percent of Ghanaian crew members received inadequate medicine or witnessed verbal abuse.²² One fisherman claims that he was treated like a “slave”: beaten, spit on, starved, forced to drink dirty water, and witnessed the deaths of three other African fishermen due to neglect and abuse.²³ In Ghana and Senegal, local communities have reported labor violations and bribery involving local officials—practices that undermine local governance and strain relations between China and West African countries.²⁴

Industrial pollution is another major concern. Chinese vessels and processing plants routinely discharge harmful waste into both marine and inland waters. Pollution from Chinese-owned fishmeal factories has been reported in The Gambia, where the process contaminates inland waters, killing fish and precipitating the collapse of some local lagoons.²⁵ Gold mining operations, particularly those involving mercury and cyanide, are a public health menace, contaminating rivers and groundwater and threatening both fish and crops. Chinese companies dredging and mining operations have polluted and deformed the Falémé River in Senegal and Mali and the Bagoé River in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, reducing the productivity of local fisheries and farmlands.²⁶ China’s infrastructure development has further complicated water governance. The construction of the Lekki Deep Seaport in Lagos, for example, has severely disrupted local water and fishery ecosystems.²⁷

Efforts by individual countries—such as Ghana’s Fisheries Commission and Nigeria’s new Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy—have been undermined by weak institutional capacity and limited financial investment.²⁸ In Togo, understaffing and poor coordination among fisheries and water institutions undermine enforcement despite the country’s accession to the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) to combat illicit and unregulated fishing.²⁹ The presence of armed groups in the Gulf of Guinea inhibits enforcement officers’ ability to conduct the surveillance and monitoring necessary to curb illegal activity and protect marine sovereignty.³⁰ These multilayered security challenges underscore the urgent need for national and regional policy interventions to improve oversight and safeguard the sustainability of fisheries and water resources by regulating Chinese fishers exploitation in the EEZs of West African countries.

Policy recommendations

Strengthen governance and legal frameworks

• Implement stricter penalties. Penalize local fishing companies that collaborate with Chinese trawlers to circumvent fishing license laws and other environmental policies. Fines, vessel confiscation, and blacklisting mechanisms should be introduced for companies and individuals acting as intermediaries to enable illegal fishing or the dumping of waste and pollutants into marine and freshwater systems.
• Revise outdated fisheries and water resource policies. Update policies and laws to reflect current realities including the rapid expansion of industrial-scale overfishing, invasive ballast discharge by foreign vessels, and plastic waste pollution. Policymakers should engage all relevant stakeholders—including small-scale fishers, processors, local nongovernmental organizations and local communities—to revise existing laws and policies. New laws should clearly outline regulatory loopholes and specify new monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to address them.
• Invest in the navy and the coast guard. To better monitor China’s illegal fishing activities along their coasts and EEZs, West African countries should invest in increasing the capacity—through better equipment and training—of their navy, coast guard, and other maritime security and enforcement agencies. Port authorities, coast guards, and inland water management units must be trained and incentivized to enforce existing environmental standards effectively and consistently.
• Work with the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC). The SRFC, based in Dakar, Senegal, should grow its policy influence in West Africa by coordinating closely with member states to develop regional policies and guidelines for dealing with overexploitation. The SRFC can become the regional hub for the harmonization of fishery laws, joint patrols, and shared resource management.

Improve regional monitoring and surveillance

• Develop a regional real-time monitoring system to track water resources, illegal activities, and waste dumping. The system should integrate satellite data, citizen reporting platforms, and automatic identification systems (AIS) to create a comprehensive monitoring web across the Gulf of Guinea and key river basins. AIS are positional awareness systems used to identify ships and provide additional information such as location, speed, intended port of call, prior identities, and activity history. They give authorities a full view of ships’ likely involvement in illegal fishing activity.³¹ Ghana has already employed AIS tools as part of its Vessel Viewer pilot program, and has seen success in strengthening its monitoring, control, and surveillance operations.³² AIS should be made mandatory for all industrial vessels operating in West African EEZs, with remote data made accessible to national and regional authorities.
• Develop public reporting systems. Growing public anger and grassroots activism have the potential to force governments to respond to these challenges, even if elites prefer the status quo. Highly publicized labor abuses, coupled with increasing resentment toward corrupt officials, exact a reputational toll. Civil society campaigns should seek to channel this anger into action, standing up platforms that allow citizens to anonymously report bad actors, including vessels, companies, complicit government officials, and intermediaries involved in illegal fishing or toxic waste disposal. This system should offer multiple online reporting options. This system should begin on the national level with an eye toward expanding to the regional level. By democratizing the response to this problem, civil society leaders can diversify oversight away from a small group of corrupt actors and elite gatekeepers. By demonstrating to officials that the desire for public monitoring is widespread, a successful reporting system will also be a mechanism for generating greater political will for change.

Promote sustainable fisheries agreements and mechanisms

• Empower the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote transboundary cooperation on shared waterways. Joint watershed management programs should be established to address shared pollution risks, dam regulation, and hydrological data sharing. This should begin with transboundary river systems such as the Volta Basin, the Falémé, and the Tano-Bia. ECOWAS could promote multilateral agreements and provide a multinational venue for promoting data sharing and enabling enforcement transboundary agreements. Working multilaterally can help override local elite resistance, as reform-minded officials can justify enforcement by citing binding regional commitments and reputational risks within ECOWAS.
• Negotiate regional fisheries agreements with China that prioritize the interests of coastal communities. Enforced under ECOWAS, these regional agreements should emphasize environmental sustainability, verifiable catch quotas, mandatory gear and equipment specifications, and designated no-fishing zones.

Ellis Adjei Adams is an associate professor of geography and environmental policy at the Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame. With background in both social and natural sciences, his research examines the social, political, institutional, and governance dimensions of environmental and natural resources, particularly water. He currently conducts research in Ghana, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, and the United States.

Awa Niang Fall is full professor of physical geography at Cheikh Anta Diop University, in Dakar, Senegal. Since 2010 she has been involved in the African Networks of Centres of Excellence on Water Sciences Project, and leads the Master/UNESCO Chair on Integrated Management and Sustainable Development of West African coastal zone (Master GIDEL). Since June 2022 she has been coordinating the European Union-funded GoNEXUS project on behalf of UCAD, covering 6 river basins in Europe and Africa.

Kadidia Kane is a Malian civil servant working at the Mopti Regional Hydraulics Directorate. She holds a degree in hydrogeology engineering and a master’s degree in integrated water resources management. She currently serves as Head of the Water Resources Inventory and Management Division within this directorate, where she is involved in all activities related to water and related resource management.

Kodjo N’Souvi holds a master’s degree in economic analysis and policy and a doctorate in agricultural economics, majoring in fisheries economics and management. He is currently working as post-doctoral research associate at the College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Ocean University, China. His major area of research includes economics of aquaculture, namely shrimp, the socioeconomics of small-scale fisheries, sustainable fisheries, aquaculture development, and climate change.

Isa Olalekan Elegbede is a distinguished environmental assessment, planning, and sustainability expert focusing on marine sustainability and the blue economy. He is the Deputy Chair of IUCN/CEESP/TGER, Switzerland, and a Future Earth Coast (FEC) Fellow. Dr. Elegbede plays a key role in shaping policies for sustainable fisheries management and marine governance through his contributions to the Central and South Atlantic Regional Scientific Research Working Group and as a co-chair of the GEO BON Blue Planet Fisheries Working Group.

Ebimboere Seiyefa is a lecturer at Baze University in the department of international relations and diplomacy, with a background in politics, governance and security in West Africa. She has worked with Conflict Research Network West Africa, ACLED, NATO Southern Hub and USIP, amongst other institutions, to advance human security initiatives towards a peaceful West Africa.

Salamatu J. Tannor is a certified Mining HSE Professional with an interdisciplinary background in natural sciences. She is currently working as postdoctoral research associate at the Faculty of Life Sciences, Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences Kleve, Germany. Her research interests include the interactions of global economic systems such as mining and agribusinesses with other socio-ecological systems (people & water) within rural landscapes.

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese demand for timber and wildlife in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, Roland Balgah, Caroline Costello, Moses Fayiah, Jean-Luc Kouassi, and Christine A. I. Nougbodé Ouinsavi

West Africa’s forests are vital for climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and economic growth.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese mining in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Richard Asante, Joseph Asunka, Joshua Eisenman, Fancies Egu Lansana, Sanusha Naidu, Igwe Ogbonnaya, Youmanli Ouoba, and Boukary Sangare

Chinese entities are expanding legal and illegal mining for minerals in West Africa.

Africa China

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May 2025, the China Global South Initiative (CGSi), a collaboration between the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, convened a group of twenty-two African environmental experts at the Peduase Valley Resort in Ghana for a three-day workshop on China’s environmental impact in West Africa. This policy workshop, hosted with the support of the Ford Foundation, included representatives from eleven West African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and South Africa. Amid three days of comradery and collaboration, these experts worked together to draft policy memorandums on China’s environmental impact across the region. In the months following the workshop, we worked closely with the authors to curate three briefs—on mining and resource extraction, timber and wildlife, and fisheries and water resources—that identify the challenges and offer actionable policy solutions. We would like to recognize the excellent work of the co-authors who contributed their time and expertise to creating these briefs. In particular we would like to thank the group leaders Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, and Ebimboere Seiyafa and Awa Niang Fall, respectively, for their diligent work.

First and foremost, we would like to thank Caroline Costello, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, for her essential contributions to the workshop in Ghana and this collection of issue briefs. Her tireless efforts were truly essential to the success of the project. Ashley Bennett, events strategy program director of the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, provided critical logistical support across a dozen countries. Alexandra Towns at the Keough School and Cate Hansberry, Beverly Larson, and Jeff Fleischer at the Atlantic Council provided expert editorial support. Guidance from Notre Dame’s Pamoja Africa Initiative helped us identify contributors, and the Kellogg Institute helped support their participation. We would also like to thank the excellent staff of the Peduase Valley Resort for their hospitality during the May 2025 workshop. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our partner, the Ford Foundation, whose support made the workshop and these policy briefs possible. Ford is not responsible for the content of these policy briefs.

Executive summary

Driven by growing global demand for minerals, West Africa has become a major hub for mining. Chinese entities—including individuals and private actors and corporations, some of them backed by state financing—are expanding legal and illegal mining for gold, diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, lead, zinc, stones, and critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and copper. These activities, which range from large-scale commercial ventures to small-scale artisanal mining, often cause serious environmental degradation. In many West African countries, Chinese nationals involved in illegal artisanal mining collaborate with local and transnational criminal actors. While some Chinese operations have created jobs and infrastructure in mining communities, their negative impacts on water resources, forests and biodiversity, livelihoods, health, and food security across West Africa have been profound. National or regional policies and enforcement mechanisms have failed to adequately address the social and environmental impacts of mining in the region. This brief proposes policy recommendations responding to the detrimental social and environmental impacts of Chinese mining in West Africa.

Background

There is growing concern about the detrimental environmental effects of Chinese mining operations in West Africa. Chinese companies exploit policy gaps, weak institutions, and the lack of regulatory enforcement
across mineral-rich West African countries. Their involvement in legal and illegal large-scale corporate mining, as well as the small-scale artisanal mining intended for locals, demands policy responses that strengthen governance and enforcement across the region.

The environmental impacts of Chinese mining activities in the region are complex, evolving, and difficult to fully identify due to the blurred lines between formal and informal mining operations. While industrial-scale mining tends to be confined to specific areas and is somewhat better regulated, illegal small-scale mining operations are poorly monitored despite their environmental and social harms. Chinese actors’ deployment of heavy-duty machinery in small-scale mining has significantly damaged ecosystems, especially forests and watersheds. Ultimately, both large- and small-scale mining have become major sources of environmental degradation, enabled by noncompliance with mining regulations, weak regulatory enforcement, and a lack of accountability and prosecutions for legal violations in the mining sector.

The impacts of these activities are not only ecological but also social. The scale of Chinese mining operations with heavy machinery drive land dispossessions and displacement across the region.¹ Chinese operators in illegal mining often convert farmland, forest, and rivers into mining sites—sometimes forcibly or through collusion with government, traditional leaders, and private landowners—eroding long-standing livelihoods rooted in agriculture and fishing.² The loss of land for farming bananas, rice, potatoes, and other traditional crops undermines food security, fuels social tension, and stokes conflicts between local communities and Chinese miners.³

Weak regulatory enforcement in the mining sector stems from both systemic and political failures. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are underdeveloped, and existing legal frameworks fail to address the complex challenges posed by the involvement of Chinese nationals throughout the formal and informal mining sectors. Critically, there is a lack of political will to enforce existing laws—due in large part to the complicity of state and local authorities. High-level government officials, security personnel, and local leaders often benefit from illegal mining operations through bribery schemes, unlawful permits and licensing, and even ownership of mining equipment and operations.⁴ These activities undermine law enforcement, shielding both local and Chinese violators from prosecution. Compounding the problem is the widespread failure of Chinese mining companies to honor their corporate social responsibility (CSR) agreements. Although mining laws in many West African countries require community engagement and CSR implementation, Chinese company compliance is often absent or minimal, leading to public resentment and straining diplomatic relations between China and countries such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Nigeria.⁵ These problems, detailed in the following section, underscore the urgent need for national and regional policy responses that address regulatory gaps, strengthen enforcement mechanisms, and promote transparency and accountability in the mining sector.

Evidence

The environmental impacts of Chinese mining activities are broad and far reaching, encompassing land degradation, ecosystem destruction, landslides, pollution deforestation, biodiversity loss, desertification, and exacerbating climate change. Chinese miners’ consistent flouting of environmental standards and safety measures has severely damaged forest reserves, farmlands, and water resources. Chinese mining in West Africa is commonly tied to illegal small-scale artisanal operations carried out in collusion with local and transnational actors, including criminal gangs.⁶ These activities have profound consequences across the region.

Deforestation and soil erosion are commonplace across West African mining sites, and pollution of marine and freshwater bodies occurs at multiple stages of mining exploration. Small-scale gold mining causes extensive land degradation and harms water quality.⁷ In Nigeria, Liberia, Mali, and Ghana, Chinese financing has enabled local miners to excavate deeper with bulldozers and use harmful chemicals more extensively.⁸ Local mining workers and artisanal miners are exposed to hazardous mercury, cyanide, arsenic, and fluoride, often due to the lack of proper protective gear.⁹ Wastewater from mining containing these and other toxic heavy metals pollutes soil, groundwater, and rivers in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Mali, where landslides at abandoned Chinese-owned artisanal mines have resulted in fatalities.¹⁰ In Nigeria, lead poisoning in mining sites in Zamfara State in 2010 resulted in about four hundred children falling ill or dying.¹¹ Wastewater discharge onto farmlands from mining reduces crop yields and introduces toxins into the food chain, affecting human and animal health.¹² Many mining communities have reported disproportionate cases of cancer, respiratory infections, waterborne diseases, reproductive disorders, skin disorders, asthma, spontaneous abortions, and birth defects.¹³

In coastal communities where mining is widespread, dredging boats discharge oil, fuel, and chemicals, obstruct riverbeds, cause erosion, and deform watercourses. Chinese mining operations have also released ballast water containing invasive species and toxic waste into marine ecosystems.¹⁴ Harmful runoff in mining sites poisons fish and reduces the size and quality of local stocks. Meanwhile, loss of farmland worsens poverty and undermines food security. In Ghana, the majority of small-scale “galamsey” gold mining sites are run by Chinese nationals, with more than fifty thousand Chinese nationals entering the country between 2008 and 2013 to engage in illegal gold mining. According to the Mankurom Cocoa Cooperative Farmers Association, small-scale gold mining has destroyed more than 100,000 acres of cocoa farmland.¹⁵ In Nigeria, mining-related disruptions have intensified farmer-herder conflicts due to declining access to water and grazing land.¹⁶

Chinese artisanal and illegal mining has also accelerated deforestation.¹⁷ In Ghana, bauxite mining in the Atewa Forest has devastated 5,000 hectares.¹⁸ In Nigeria, mining in forest zones has resulted in significant habitat loss. From 1975 to 2005, Bukuru, Plateau state, lost 63 percent of its forested area due to mining.¹⁹ These forests filter pollution and ensure a steady supply of water to important inland rivers such as the Falémé River (Senegal and Mali), Bagoé River (Côte d’Ivoire and Mali), Tano-Bia Basin (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire), and the Volta Basin (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Togo).²⁰

Chinese involvement in mining across West Africa is linked to organized crime and the proliferation of weapons.²¹ Transnational criminal networks linked to Chinese mining have destabilized mining regions and eroded trust in both local and national governance.²² Illegal mining has also become a funding source for armed groups and terrorists, such as Boko Haram and bandits in the Nigerian state of Zamfara.²³ Illicit gold mining in the Central Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—has been linked to transnational organized crime and instability. The illicit trade in Sierra Leonean diamonds and Malian gold has been tied to criminal syndicates and terrorism.²⁴

While Chinese involvement in mining has supported some job creation, infrastructure development, and technology transfer in mining communities, these benefits are typically accompanied by poor working conditions, low wages, environmental hazards, and labor-rights violations.²⁵ Even when communities negotiate infrastructure projects, the benefits rarely offset the environmental and social damage.²⁶ Numerous cases of inadequate compensation, unpaid royalties, and poor infrastructure have fueled community tensions and intracommunity disputes.²⁷ In Niger, for example, top Chinese oil executives were expelled for failing to adhere to the mining code requiring them to use local subcontractors and laborers
for extraction.

Governance weaknesses exacerbate these challenges. Environmental and natural resource agencies across West Africa are underfunded, lack the independence needed to enforce regulations, and are plagued with corruption.²⁸ Overlapping mandates and poor interagency communication hinder enforcement, while lax licensing systems allow illegal Chinese operations to flourish. Weak coordination between federal, provincial, and local authorities further enables illegal mining to thrive.²⁹ Many countries also lack clear procedures governing the entire process from mineral exploration to mine decommissioning.³⁰ In Nigeria, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia, small-scale mining licenses are often misused for large-scale operations and many Chinese firms operate without proper registration or licenses.³¹ In Ghana, where artisanal mining is restricted to nationals, Chinese actors are heavily involved through local intermediaries.³² Governments frequently issue licenses without consulting or compensating local landowners.³³ In Nigeria and Ghana, vague and controversial land laws allow governments to appropriate land regardless of prior ownership, often keeping marginalized communities from receiving the economic benefits of mineral extraction.³⁴

Even in countries that have environmental impact assessment (EIA) laws—such as Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire—implementation is politicized and inconsistent and rarely results in severe penalties for violators. Officials often exploit the EIA process for personal gain, circumventing pollution-mitigation and land-restoration requirements. In Ghana, EIAs are mandatory for small-scale mining, but enforcement is weak.³⁵ In Nigeria, the process remains opaque, and officials have misled local communities, particularly in areas with high illiteracy.³⁶

This evidence underscores the urgent need for national and regional policies to close regulatory gaps and strengthen enforcement to curb the socioenvironmental consequences of Chinese mining in West Africa.

Policy recommendations

Improve oversight and compliance

• Establish a digital reporting system. To empower reform-minded actors as a counterweight to corrupt elites, civil society organizations should develop a secure, accessible, and digitalized reporting system that includes strong whistleblower protections. Under the banner “See something, say something,” the system should allow for various channels—such as phone calls, WhatsApp, Telegram platforms, encrypted messaging, and dedicated call lines—to report violations and upload images. It should include a robust mechanism for data protection to ensure the safety of whistleblowers and the integrity of reports. Simplicity, reliability, and accessibility should guide its design, and the system should be created in partnership with credible civil-society organizations and community groups that could help provide capacity to investigate the veracity of each report and guard against manipulation by corrupt actors. To demonstrate its effectiveness and have immediate impact, the system should be piloted in select mining regions in which civil society groups and community organizations have existing local relationships. The system could be expanded gradually, region-by-region, with the ultimate aim being the creation of an integrated reporting network throughout West Africa.
• Update and enforce visa regulations for Chinese nationals and strengthen immigration and border controls. To address the poorly regulated licensing regimes and the involvement of Chinese entities in illegal mining, visa requirements and regulations should be reviewed, strengthened, and strictly enforced for Chinese visitors entering the region. Extradition treaties must be updated and enforced to hold foreign violators, including Chinese citizens and entities, accountable for environmental crimes. Locals who help foreign mining firms violate visa laws should be strictly prosecuted under the law.
• Clarify and improve mining license regimes and land tenure laws. Clear, equitable land policies are essential to protect communities from dispossession and ensure fair access to the profits of mining. Governments should review their existing licensing structures to close loopholes and clearly distinguish between different categories of mining operations—both formal and informal. Land tenure laws should be updated and reformed to eliminate ambiguities—particularly around the ownership and use of mineral-rich lands. This will ensure transparency, streamline oversight, and reduce regulatory loopholes for illegal mining.
• Create a regional mining compliance database to monitor implementation of EIA and CSR and identify bad actors. West African countries should establish an online monitoring and evaluation mechanism for all international mining companies operating in the region. The system would be overseen by a multinational committee comprising state and local stakeholders and civil-society organizations, which would conduct random biannual checks to verify compliance and enforcement. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) could develop the database in collaboration with member states.
• Establish mining escrow accounts. This mechanism would ensure that mining companies have set aside sufficient funds for land reclamation and environmental remediation. Firms would pay into an escrow account before they begin mining. If they clean up the environmental destruction associated with their activities, the funds would be returned to them with interest. But if mining companies fail to carry out proper land remediation, then the money in the escrow account would be used to support the cleanup and/or as compensation.

Raising public awareness

• Strengthen public education. Governments and civil society should establish national and sub-national level educational programs to inform the public—especially grassroots actors and traditional leaders—about the health risks and environmental impacts of illegal and artisanal mining. These efforts should include targeted publicity campaigns using radio broadcasts pamphlet distribution, and social media platforms with language-accessible slogans. Mining communities should also be educated about the environmental, social, and health consequences of mining through community meetings and gatherings designed to raise public awareness. These educational initiatives can leverage regular community gatherings and forums, and should be conducted in local languages to reach a broader audience. They could be led by nonprofit and civil-society organizations in close partnership with local health authorities and relevant stakeholders. This collaborative approach would help to effectively communicate medical and environmental risks while fostering greater community awareness and engagement.
• Train and protect journalists. Journalists should receive specialized training by professionals from local and international media and other international community organizations to build capacity for professional and investigative reporting on mining issues involving Chinese actors.

Empower communities

• Form community monitoring committees. Local community groups should be formed and should work in collaboration with security agencies, government bodies, local and international nonprofit organizations, civil-society groups, and the press to distinguish between legitimate (i.e., properly registered and escrow backed) and illegal mining activities. These groups would expose collusion between Chinese entities, local actors, and transnational criminal networks. To prevent corrupt actors from co-opting them, these committees should prioritize transparency and undergo regular reviews and oversight checks by a committee of experts from neighboring countries.
• Register local miners and support cooperatives. Begin a campaign to register local small-scale miners to enhance transparency. Registration could come with access to credit facilities to disincentivize them from relying on Chinese financing. Establish mining cooperatives, or support existing ones, that encourage small-scale artisanal miners to move from illegal to formal mining by helping them apply for appropriate licenses and explaining the harm caused by heavy metals.

International engagement

• Engage the Chinese government. West African governments should establish regular channels for both formal and informal discussions between state institutions (e.g., environmental protection agencies, ministries of environment and natural resources, ministries of mines and energy, minerals commissions, and other such institutions with oversight over minerals and mining), the local Chinese embassy, and their counterparts in Beijing. West African leaders and officials should raise the issue of environmental degradation in discussions with senior Chinese leaders, and it should be placed on the agenda and prioritized at the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and other multilateral meetings with Chinese counterparts.
• Engagement among West African governments. West African governments should establish regular channels for information sharing among their relevant ministries. These mechanisms can be formal or informal, bilateral or multilateral, but their objective should be to exchange timely information—for example, about cross-border bad actors and mining-induced environmental pollution—as well as to coordinate collective action among likeminded officials.

Richard Asante is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics, Development and African Studies at the University of Ghana, Legon. His research focuses on the intersection between politics and development, with particular focus on Africa-China relations, Ghana-U.S security cooperation, natural resource governance, environmental security and communal conflicts, and impact of peacekeeping on domestic and regional security. Asante has been a visiting professor at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Pomona College, Claremont, California, USA, where he taught comparative politics of Africa and peace and security in Africa (2016/2017). He also served as a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow, at the Program of African Studies (PAS), Northwestern University; he taught comparative politics and development in Africa (2012/2013). Asante holds a B.A and M. Phil degrees in Political Science from the University of Ghana, and a PhD degree in Political Science under the Harvard University (Boston, USA)-University of Ghana split-PhD program. He was a special student in the Department of Government at Harvard University, Boston, USA (2008/2009). He is the Regional Manager, West Africa for the Varieties of Democracy.

Joseph Asunka is the CEO at Afrobarometer, a pan- African survey research organization that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy, and social issues across Africa. Joseph’s research interests are broadly in governance and democracy in Africa, with specific interests in elections and electoral processes and public service delivery. Joseph holds first and second degrees in Statistics & Computer Science and Economics from the University of Ghana and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at Los Angeles.

Abosede Omowumi Babatunde is a professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. Prof. Babatunde has been awarded several distinguished academic fellowships including the 2024 Afox Visiting Research Fellow (Africa-Oxford Initiative) in the Merton College and African Studies Centre, University of Oxford, United Kingdom. Her work has been supported by research grants from CODESRIA; APN/SSRC, APSA Centennial Foundation and IPRA Foundation. Her research interests include conflict resolution, natural resources governance, human rights and security, peacebuilding and gender studies. She recently co-authored the book “Managing Violent Religious Extremism in Fragile States: Building Institutional Capacity in Nigeria and Kenya,” Routledge African Governance Series” (recommended by CHOICE and selected for the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Ethiopia Tana High Level Forum Book Launch, 2023).

Joshua Eisenman is a professor of politics at the Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame. His research focuses on the political economy of China’s development and foreign relations with the United States and the Global South — particularly Africa. His latest book, China’s Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement (Columbia University Press, 2023), explains the tactics and methods that China uses to build relations with African countries and contextualizes and interprets them within Beijing’s larger geostrategy.

Francis Egu Lansana is a forward-thinking development enthusiast with technical knowledge in natural resource governance, gender inclusion and leadership. He is an experienced public and private sector manager. He has a strong foundation in current methodologies paired with an understanding of trends and a desire to innovate. His research examines open governance and citizens’ participation in mining concession decision-making. He holds a master’s degree in development studies from Erasmus University, The Netherlands.

Sanusha Naidu is a senior research associate with the Institute for Global Dialogue. Her areas of analysis include democracy, development and the political economy of Africa’s international relations and South Africa’s Foreign Policy. She has also focused her interests on South-South Cooperation and the footprint of emerging powers in Africa. She previously worked at the Centre for Conflict Resolution based in Cape Town and managed the South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI) at the Open Society Foundation for South Africa.

Ogbonnaya Igwe is the chairperson of the Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Research Group, and the Lead of Engineering Geology/Geotechnical Engineering Unit, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is an environmental expat specializing in sustainable environmental protection and disaster prevention/management. He is the coordinator of the ICL-UNESCO Centre of Excellence and Tuning Africa Project in Applied Geology University of Nigeria, Nsukka
and consults for the oil and gas industry in environmental and social impact assessment and environmental evaluation studies projects.

Youmanli Ouoba is a professor of economics at the University of Thomas SANKARA. His research interests are in natural resources management, agricultural development and environmental economics. He is the current director of the Center for Economic and Social Studies, Documentation and Research (CEDRES) of Thomas SANKARA University, Burkina Faso.

Boukary Sangaré is a Malian anthropologist and independent consultant and has conducted several studies for international NGOs working in Mali and the Sahel. He joined the Institute for Security Studies in 2019 as a research consultant. Before joining ISS, he was a program officer for the Peaceful Coexistence, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Program at the Danish Embassy in Bamako. Boukary has worked in the Sahel for the past decade on conflict, violent extremism, radicalization, governance, social mobility and social media.

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebimboere Seiyafa, Awa Niang Fall, Ellis Adjei Adams, Kadidia Kane, Isa Elegbebe Olalekan, Kodjo N’Souvi, and Salamatu Joana Tannor

Chinese companies have rapidly expanded into West Africa’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese demand for timber and wildlife in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, Roland Balgah, Caroline Costello, Moses Fayiah, Jean-Luc Kouassi, and Christine A. I. Nougbodé Ouinsavi

West Africa’s forests are vital for climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and economic growth.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Chinese mining in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Sun, September 28, 2025 • 4:00 pm ET

Former Senegalese President Macky Sall on Africa’s rising global role

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Former President of Senegal and Chairperson of the African Union Macky Sall discusses Africa’s economic and security outlook.

Africa Economy & Business General Africa North & West Africa

Giving the African continent permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is “the right thing to do,” argued former Senegalese President Macky Sall. “The continent has to be involved in the management of crises.”

Sall, who is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s International Advisory Board, gave his take on the UNSC debate during a Front Page event hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center on Monday, as the UN General Assembly continued in New York. The former African Union chairperson, speaking in French throughout the event, argued that for the Security Council to serve everyone, it will need to have permanent members representing Africa.

He pointed to the Ezulwini Consensus, a proposal backed by the African Union that calls for at least two permanent seats (with veto power) and five total nonpermanent seats for African nations. But Sall, a previous chairperson of the African Union, said that before this consensus becomes reality, African nations will need to determine how they will allocate seats.

“Africa must organize itself so that . . . when the time will come, we’ll be ready so that Africa can find its right place,” he said.

Below are more highlights from Sall’s conversation with Julian Pecquet, US correspondent with Jeune Afrique/The Africa Report, in which Sall outlined the challenges facing the African continent, from climate and energy uncertainties to debt crises.

A just transition

• Sall said it is “completely unjust” to argue that developing countries in Africa shouldn’t tap their fossil-fuel resources, considering the continent has produced less than 4 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.
• “We can’t condemn Africa,” Sall said. “Africa has to continue to exploit its natural resources to be able to develop itself, to be able to industrialize.”
• Sall said that while African governments are considering non-fossil-fuel-based sources of energy, such as nuclear, such sources require “basic infrastructure” that the continent sorely lacks. “We need railways, we need bridges, we need the nuclear power plants,” he explained.

Debt dilemma

• Yet, the loans currently available for building such infrastructure “are short-term, and the interest rate is very high,” Sall said, raising fears among African leaders of landing in a debt crisis. “It’s not how we rebuilt Europe” after World War II, he said, pointing to the US-funded Marshall Plan.
• With Africa’s infrastructure financing gap estimated at up to $108 billion, Sall said that more private investment and public-private partnerships could make financing needed infrastructure easier. But, in the end, “it’s necessary to change the financial architecture of the world,” he said.

Keeping the peace

• Sall said that Africa will continue to grapple with security challenges, including the “terrorism that is plaguing the whole continent today.” He added that Sahel countries in particular “have to spend a lot of their resources to fight,” meaning they have less money for development-related initiatives such as education and health.
• As several Sahelian states experienced coups d’état over the past few years, Sall said that the Economic Community of West African States—which once included these Sahelian countries—struggled to respond to the crisis and impose sanctions.
• And now, since Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have left and formed the Alliance of Sahel States, Sall said that it is important to “maintain dialogue” between the two regional bodies to avoid “consequences” that would result in citizens losing important benefits, such as freedom of movement.

The youth wave

• Sall pointed to one final challenge: Harnessing Africa’s talented youth. He pointed out that the continent’s population is set to surge, yet trained young people often leave the continent seeking opportunities elsewhere.
• “One in four in the future is going to be an African youth,” Sall said, “so we should not waste our time just consuming things that are already being produced and put on the market. We have to invest ourselves into training.”

Katherine Golden is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post Former Senegalese President Macky Sall on designing an international architecture with Africa in mind appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction

This October, the mandate for one of the US government’s most effective tools in its global competition with China is set to expire. The International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) was created under the first Trump administration with the goal of mobilizing private capital to promote economic development in low-income countries (LICs) and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) while advancing US foreign policy interests.

In the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, the bill that first established DFC, China is never mentioned by name. But China’s shadow looms large over references to “debt sustainability” and providing countries with an “alternative to state-directed investments.” When the BUILD Act was written seven years ago, US policymakers were just starting to take note of China’s growing presence in LICs and LMICs. Since then, China has become the top trading partner of 145 countries, making up roughly 70 percent of the world’s population. Between 146 and 150 countries have joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Xi Jinping’s $1 trillion flagship lending program. China is the world’s largest official creditor, and its lending initiatives have won Beijing significant geopolitical influence.

However, in the last seven years, DFC has turned the United States from a passive observer of China’s meteoric rise as a development lender into a serious contender in an intensifying front of competition with Beijing. DFC is making good on its mandates: advancing development objectives in LICs and LMICs, furthering US foreign policy goals, and winning deals that China wanted. Its lending has exceeded $50 billion to 114 countries, impacting more than 200 million people and businesses worldwide. This includes multiple cases in which DFC stepped in to provide financing that outcompeted Beijing, from the Elefsina Shipyard in Greece to the acquisition of a telecommunications company in the Pacific Islands and the Lobito Corridor railway in Zambia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

DFC is one of the United States’ few remaining tools of positive economic statecraft to compete with China in global development—and it must be protected. Congress has an opportunity to fine-tune DFC’s operations and set it up for even greater success before the reauthorization deadline on October 6. In that spirit, this brief explores three case studies in Chinese development lending, what they teach us about why China’s lending programs succeed—and fail—and how Congress can make DFC an even sharper tool.

Case study 1: Jakarta-Bandung railway

China’s approach: Flexible mandates, high risk tolerance

When Beijing is asked to participate in multilateral debt relief initiatives, there is an insistence that one of its two state-owned policy banks, the China Development Bank (CDB), is a commercial lender, and not an official creditor. As a state-owned bank acting purely in its own commercial interests, Beijing argues, CDB is not furthering the PRC’s foreign policy goals, and it should not be subject to the same transparency requirements as other official lenders.

As revealed in an AidData analysis of CDB lending practices, the bank often behaves like a commercial institution adhering to standard commercial lending practices such as lending at floating market interest rates. However, when Beijing deems a project strategically important, CDB will suddenly change its practices, offering unusually concessional lending terms.

CDB came across one such strategically important project in 2014, when the Indonesian government announced a bid to finance a high-speed rail line connecting two of its largest cities, Jakarta and Bandung. Just a few months earlier, during a trip to Indonesia, Xi had announced his intention to build a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” to enhance connectivity throughout Southeast Asia. This proposed maritime silk road became the “road” in “One Belt, One Road,” the lending program now known as the Belt and Road Initiative. The Indonesian government’s newly announced rail project presented an opportunity to develop a strong early example to showcase Xi’s new initiative in action.
From January 2014 to May 2017, CDB and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) submitted competing bids to bankroll the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail project. JICA offered to finance 75 percent of the project at a 0.1 percent interest rate, contingent on the Indonesian government providing a sovereign repayment guarantee. CDB’s counteroffer was to finance 100 percent of the project at a 2 percent interest rate, with a lower overall cost and shorter construction timeline, provided the Indonesian government guaranteed repayment.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo surprised observers by rejecting both offers, citing a desire to avoid taking on substantial sovereign debt. JICA responded with a 50 percent reduction in the debt that the government would need to back with a sovereign guarantee. But CDB offered the winning bid: an arrangement that would require Indonesia to take on no debt whatsoever. Instead, the bank would create an off-government balance sheet by lending to a special purpose vehicle, a separate legal entity jointly owned by Chinese and Indonesian state-owned enterprises, created solely for the purpose of financing and building the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Railway. This would allow CDB and Widodo to work around the Indonesian government’s debt ceiling. The final loan was far more concessional than CDB’s typical offers, and far more concessional than the minimum standards the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development uses to define concessionality.

CDB blurs the lines between its commercial, developmental, and geostrategic purposes and, as a result, Beijing gets to have it both ways. CDB protects its balance sheet, evades its responsibility to participate in multilateral debt relief initiatives, and lends at far below-market rates when an opportunity arises to advance the government’s policy objectives.

Lessons for the United States

Flexibility can be a strength. DFC has a dual mandate: support sustainable development in LICs and LMICs and advance US foreign policy interests. This has implications for where DFC operates, and there is currently widespread disagreement among experts on this front.

The conversation around DFC’s reauthorization is bifurcated between two camps. In one corner, development practitioners voice frustration with DFC’s gradual shift toward lending to richer countries. These observers rightly argue that US foreign policy interests have led DFC to stray from its original mandate to prioritize LICs and LMICs. In the other corner, national security analysts advocate harnessing DFC’s demonstrated effectiveness to respond to the short-term foreign policy challenges of the day.

Dealing with China means swimming in murky waters. Beijing blurs the lines between the commercial, the developmental, and the geostrategic, and a heavily siloed US system will not meet the multifaceted and overlapping challenges that the United States must address. While DFC should not neglect its development mandate, it should also have the flexibility to respond to challenges where they occur.

High risk tolerance is critical. Risk tolerance is an oft-cited advantage for Chinese lenders, and an oft-cited disadvantage for DFC. DFC’s cautiousness limits its ability to move quickly and lean into opportunities where the returns are nonmarket geostrategic wins.

Case study 2: DRC Sicomines copper-cobalt deal

China’s approach: Extreme high-volume financing

In 2007, the Export-Import Bank of China and two Chinese state-owned construction firms signed an agreement with the government of the DRC for the nation’s largest resources-for-infrastructure (RFI) deal. RFI deals, in which loans for infrastructure development are repaid with natural resources, are commonplace for China.

Under this deal, the Chinese parties would provide a staggering $9 billion of loans—more than three times the DRC’s annual government budget of $2.7 billion. The deal included $3 billion earmarked for developing and operating the Sicomines copper-cobalt mine, with the Chinese consortium owning 68 percent, and $6 billion earmarked for postwar rebuilding projects following the Second Congo War.

Ultimately, the deal was renegotiated several times. In 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) called for a renegotiation due to concern over the DRC’s capacity to repay the loan. In 2021, the deal faced renewed public scrutiny, and DRC President Félix Tshisekedi launched an audit that found that the agreement presented “an unprecedented harm in the history of the DRC.” China had only spent a fraction of the amount promised for postwar reconstruction projects—reaping $10 billion in profits and giving the DRC only $822 million in return. Last year, this gave the country leverage to renegotiate the deal once more and secure an agreement that increased the infrastructure budget by $4 billion and gave the DRC a greater share of mining revenues.

In this case, Beijing was willing to commit an astounding volume of capital to a highly risky endeavor, but China has lent far greater amounts to critical minerals over the last two decades, nearly $57 billion from 2000 to 2021.

It is difficult to overstate the geopolitical gains that have resulted from high-volume financing deals like this one, which have enabled Beijing to capture over 70 percent of the world’s rare earths extraction and almost 90 percent of processing capacity. Beijing has unparalleled dominance over the essential inputs underpinning the construction of the modern world. To build everything from fighter jets to consumer electronics, MRI machines, and electric vehicles, the rest of the world is now, to some extent, dependent on Beijing’s good graces.

Lessons for the United States

The United States cannot compete with China on a dollar-for-dollar basis, but current resources are insufficient. The United States does not have to close the gap between what it and China can offer globally. US lenders can be strategic, focus on key sectors and countries, and double down on areas in which the United States has a competitive advantage. Narrow the gap it must, though. Small, strategic investments could not have won China supply chain dominance in critical minerals. The current level of resources dedicated to this challenge are not proportionate to the severity of the threat

Invest with foresight. China’s dominance in critical minerals was built over decades of placing strategic bets on resource rich countries with assets that have national security implications. Beijing pledged $9 billion for the Sicomines copper-cobalt deal in 2007, many years before terms like “critical minerals,” “electric vehicles” or “5G” entered the public lexicon. DFC should similarly aim to make strategic investments in the supply chains of the future.

Case study 3: 2025 Sino Metals Zambia dam disaster

China’s approach: Move fast, break things

This February, a dam built by Sino-Metals Leach Zambia, a Chinese state-owned mining firm, burst, spilling toxic mining waste into the Kafue River in Zambia. The damage was catastrophic and unprecedented. The river, now an acid-leached wasteland, had supplied drinking water for roughly 5 million people and supported the livelihood of roughly 20 million farmers, fishermen, and industrial workers.

The dam held waste from nearby mines that were slated to serve a critical role in meeting an ambitious development goal: triple Zambia’s copper output by 2033. As the Zambian government raced forward in pursuit of this objective, the country became increasingly reliant on the only international partner who could meet the speed and scale they required: China.

Over the last several months, Zambian civil society has demanded greater transparency and accountability in the government’s mining deals. Thanks to public pressure to disclose further information, we now have a detailed record of the negligence behind this disaster.

It’s clear now that prioritizing speed led the parties involved to overlook negligence in terms of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards. Sino Metals operated within the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, Africa’s first special economic zone designed to attract international investment through incentives like tax breaks and streamlined approvals, including environmental approvals. In 2014, a Zambian auditor warned that tailings dams, large embankments used to store mining waste, were being systemically mismanaged in Zambia’s Copperbelt. Nevertheless, Sino Metals decided to rely on a tailings dam to store copper mining waste from its Chambishi Leach Plant. Rather than building a new dam, it was faster for the company to raise the wall of an existing dam built many years earlier.

Once built, the company repeatedly failed to conduct routine inspections, and there is no evidence to suggest that the dam was managed by licensed engineers. Sino Metals’ sister company, NFCA Africa Mining, admitted to disregarding safety and environmental standards in an internal report. Zambian regulators and the Chinese project managers had many chances to prevent the disaster from happening. A 2017 study found that the groundwater near the Sino Mines facility was already contaminated. In 2022, Sino Mines expanded the dam once again.

Lessons for the United States

ESG standards and transparency are important competitive advantages for US-backed deals. The Sino Metals dam disaster was not a one-time occurrence. Beijing routinely scores own goals in the form of flagrant disregard for host countries’ environmental, labor, and anti-corruption standards. The Jakarta-Bandung high speed railway project managers sped through an environmental impact assessment that should have taken twelve to eighteen months in only seven days. The consequence: a fatal accident, flooded roads, ruined homes and farms, improper waste dumping, mass protests, and $1.49 billion in cost overruns.

Particularly in democracies sensitive to public opinion and countries facing civil society backlash against opaque Chinese deals, the United States should lean into this strategic edge.

Moving fast makes a difference. Paradoxically, speed is a commonly cited factor contributing to host countries’ preference for Chinese loans. While the United States should not save time by cutting regulatory corners, US-backed deals cannot afford to be burdened by needlessly lengthy bureaucratic timelines.

Policy recommendations

To promote thoughtful versatility:

• Rethink the guidelines on where DFC operates. The BUILD Act mandates that DFC prioritize the provision of support to countries that meet the World Bank classifications for LICs and LMICs. The resulting arrangement excludes many countries with significant development needs that are classified as upper-middle-income countries (UMICs), often because of socioeconomic disparities or remittances. Examples include Mexico, Brazil, Tuvalu, Thailand, and Malaysia. Rather than relying on the World Bank’s rigid income classifications, DFC should revisit its lending criteria, borrowing from other official lenders’ practices.
• Clarify the key terms of DFC’s dual mandate. The BUILD Act instructs DFC to “pursue highly developmental projects” and assess their “strategic value,” but does not put forward standard criteria to determine what is developmental or strategic. A Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis, which collected insights directly from US government development practitioners, found that different agencies apply varying standards for what qualifies as “highly developmental.” Setting standard definitions for these key terms will begin to bridge the divide between the two camps of development practitioners and national security analysts who have different visions for where DFC should operate.

To strengthen risk tolerance:

• Establish an internal advisory council to provide guidance on projects that have the potential to generate nonmarket returns. The advisory council can weigh the project’s commercial viability against its implications for US strategic interests and judge whether the risk is acceptable to DFC’s balance sheet.
• Transfer the responsibility to approve exceptions to the LIC and LMIC preference from the president of the United States to the DFC’s Board of Directors. Under current law, exceptions to this rule—41.6 percent of investments made in DFC’s first five years—must go up a lengthy approval chain to the highest authority in the United States, who is then expected to parse through highly technical financial terms to evaluate the project’s risk-return profile and repayment terms. Instead, LIC and LMIC preference exceptions should be approved by DFC’s board, a group of development finance and foreign policy experts from across federal agencies. Particularly amid heightened political scrutiny of US government spending, professional oversight may empower DFC to take calculated risks with greater assurance.
• Evaluate investments at the portfolio level, not the individual project level. This creates space for DFC to take on, for example, a high-risk, high-reward mining project, provided the aggregate critical minerals portfolio is generating returns.
• Authorize DFC—permanently. The life cycles of many current DFC projects extend well beyond another seven-year reauthorization period. In contrast, BRI loans have been steady, providing highly concessional, long-term financing that complements LIC and LMIC governments’ long-term economic development plans. Repeated reauthorization cycles disincentivize DFC from pursuing partnerships that require a long-term steady commitment. DFC has built credibility that warrants a longer leash. Despite weathering a global pandemic, significant leadership turnover, and two highly tumultuous presidential transitions, DFC is delivering on its mandates: investing in LICs and LMICs, generating returns, and outcompeting China for key deals.

To boost finance volume:

• Triple DFC’s portfolio cap, from $60 billion to $180 billion. While this may sound like a hefty increase, $180 billion will only make up 12 percent of the $1.5 trillion infrastructure finance gap in LICs and LMICs. A larger portfolio cap will increase the total value of outstanding commitments that DFC can have at any given time and enable DFC to back bigger deals.
• Fix the budget rule accounting for DFC’s equity investments. The BUILD Act granted DFC the authority to make direct equity investments, an arrangement that grants the United States unique influence by giving DFC partial ownership in individual companies and projects. Oftentimes, this means DFC earns a voice in management decisions, enabling DFC to ensure projects align with development and US policy goals. Unfortunately, this authority has been underutilized due to an administrative rule with an outsized impact. Under current federal budget rules, DFC’s equity investments are treated as grants, assuming a total loss on 100 percent of DFC’s equity investments. Instead, DFC’s equity investments should be reflected using net present value scoring, which accounts for the likelihood of financial return over time to determine the true cost to taxpayers.
• Emphasize the importance of collaboration. The United States should pool funding with allies and partners’ development finance institutions to meet the scale and speed needed to match Chinese state-backed capital. DFC already has partnerships with Australia, Japan, and the Inter-American Development Bank; these partnerships should cut the burden of dealmaking in half, not double it. DFC should work with US partners to create standard due diligence requirements, term sheets, and agreements. This will create opportunities for more effective collaboration across institutions and help joint projects move forward faster.

To streamline operations:

• Increase the threshold of investments subject to congressional notification. While the notification process allows for additional oversight and gives Congress the opportunity to raise concerns, this bar is currently set at $10 million, an extremely low threshold that imposes a significant administrative burden for roughly 60 percent of DFC transactions.
• Improve staffing. DFC was built to be a lean and dynamic entity akin to a private corporation, but in practice, it has not been given the personnel and resources it needs to work efficiently. The Office of the Inspector General’s most recent report on DFC found that staffing was insufficient to perform robust site visits. DFC has been steadily growing its workforce and had a total of 675 employees in 2024, but the corporation has not released updated staffing figures since the US government terminated all probationary employees earlier this year. The World Bank has more than thirteen times as many employees managing a portfolio less than twice the size of DFC’s. Furthermore, the salaries of DFC’s investment professionals with prior deal experience are roughly a quarter of their private-sector peers’. Having more staff on board—and compensating them fairly—will help to move transactions through DFC’s project preparation workflows more efficiently.

Conclusion

The most common refrain in commentary on US-China competition in LICs and LMICs is that “don’t take China’s money” is not a policy. It is not tenable to beg host governments not to make deals with China, especially when China is the only option for meeting urgent development needs. For many years, experts have repeated the same recommendation to the US government: show up. Offer a US-led alternative to Chinese capital. DFC represents a major step in the right direction. The last seven years have been proof of concept. Now, Congress must scale it and commit resources that will allow DFC to live up to its full potential.

Staff

Caroline Costello

Assistant Director

Global China Hub

China Chinese

Issue Brief Jun 9, 2025

Why Congress must reauthorize the US Development Finance Corporation

By Enrique Millán-Mejía, Martin Cassinelli

Congress has an opportunity to give the United States tools to create jobs at home and strengthen ties overseas. Updating the Development Finance Corporation and reauthorizing it before the October deadline are the first steps.

Americas Economy & Business

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2024

China pairs actions with messaging in Latin America. The United States should do the same.

By David O. Shullman

China has coordinated trade, financing, and investment with diplomatic engagement, public diplomacy, and information operations to deepen its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington should, in turn, pair diplomatic engagement and messaging with greater attention to regional countries’ needs.

China Economy & Business

Report Mar 24, 2025

How Beijing uses inducements as a tool of economic statecraft

By William Piekos

As strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, Washington and Beijing seek every possible advantage to gain an edge. In this environment, both countries are increasingly turning to economic statecraft—the use of economic coercion or inducement to pursue strategic goals—to advance their interests.

China Economy & Business

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Leveraging Beijing’s playbook to fortify DFC for global competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

As temperatures soar above 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit) in Iraq and desertification claims 400,000 acres annually, traditional farming systems are contributing to the severe climate impacts. Iraq stands at a critical environmental crossroads, where climate change, land degradation, and water scarcity threaten not just its agricultural heritage but its national security. However, there is an emerging farming method with historical roots—called regenerative farming—that is being innovatively adapted to modern conditions and can be seen as viable solution for Iraq. 

Regenerative farming is gaining global recognition as a transformative agricultural strategy that does more than just mitigate climate change impacts—it actively reverses environmental degradation while delivering substantial economic benefits. Research shows this approach can increase farm productivity by more than 70 percent while reducing energy costs by 45 percent. For the Iraqi government, which currently subsidizes 50 percent of pesticide and chemical input costs, this method offers significant fiscal relief. The shift would be particularly beneficial for smallholder farmers who depend on government agricultural programs for survival, providing a path to self-sufficiency while reducing state expenditure on chemical subsidies within two years.

Iraqi farmers face an existential crisis as their arable land diminishes yearly, caught between severe climate change impacts and the government’s lack of environmentally sustainable agricultural policies. The decline in traditional agriculture has triggered a mass exodus from rural areas to cities, fundamentally reshaping Iraq’s socioeconomic landscape. This rural-urban migration has overwhelmed urban infrastructure and services while creating widespread employment instability. However, within this crisis lies an opportunity: Adopting modern, sustainable farming methods could both rejuvenate rural communities and ease urban pressures, offering a path toward agricultural renewal and social stability. 

This policy brief explores how regenerative farming offers a viable solution to Iraq’s agricultural challenges by restoring the environment, enhancing productivity, and improving public health. This approach is a reimagining of agriculture in Iraq and offers more than a set of farming practices: It presents a paradigm shift for the state and the farmers. 

Drawing from successful international case studies and local expertise, this brief presents actionable recommendations for scaling these practices nationwide. this policy brief  shows that Iraq’s environmental challenges can be addressed through strategic interventions that rebuild soil health, increase biodiversity, and mitigate climate impacts.

Implementation requires a three-pronged approach: 

• Targeted agricultural practices that prioritize ecological restoration and sustainable production. 
• Policy reforms that incentivize sustainable farming and support farmers transitioning to regenerative methods. 
• International cooperation to leverage global expertise, technology, and funding for widespread adoption.

Key findings and recommendations

My research reveals several critical findings regarding environmental restoration efforts in Iraq including:

• The lack of systematic data collection and monitoring mechanisms hinders accurate assessment of the impact of Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects in southern Iraq and the potential for replication elsewhere.
• Current coordination between national and local authorities remains fragmented, leading to implementation delays and reduced efficiency.
• Existing environmental projects often operate in isolation without integration into broader national agricultural and water management strategies.
• Farmers currently spend $200 on pesticide per hectare, half of which is often covered by state subsidy programs.
• Government subsidy policies create a disincentive for sustainable farming practices by failing to differentiate between chemical and organic inputs. The subsidy rate for each one is the same despite the higher base cost of organic fertilizers. Higher out-of-pocket costs effectively discourage farmers from adopting organic methods, despite their long-term environmental and health benefits.

Practical recommendations

• Short-term actions (one to two years):
• Establish a centralized digital database within the Ministry of Environment to track project outcomes, soil-quality improvements, and water-usage patterns.
• Create a joint task force between the Environment, Water Resources, and Agriculture ministries to streamline project approvals and resource allocations.
• Develop practical training modules for farmers, focusing on water-efficient irrigation techniques and soil-restoration methods.
• Launch pilot programs offering financial incentives to farmers who adopt sustainable farming practices.
• Medium-term actions (two to five years):
• Expand successful pilot projects to new regions, prioritizing areas most affected by desertification.
• Create policy reform and a certification program for regenerative farming practices, linking implementation of these practices to preferential access to government agricultural support.
• Establish regional knowledge-sharing centers where successful farmers can mentor others in sustainable techniques.
• Long-term strategic initiatives (five-plus years):
• Integrate environmental restoration projects into Iraq’s national food-security strategy.
• Create a sustainable agriculture fund supported by both government allocations and international donors.
• Develop climate-resilient farming zones with specialized support and infrastructure.
• Establish research partnerships between Iraqi universities and international institutions to improve farming techniques suitable for Iraq’s climate.

Introduction

A. Objectives of the policy brief

This policy brief aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of farming practices and agricultural policies in Iraq, focusing on the potential of regenerative farming as a solution to the pressing challenges faced by the country’s agricultural sector and its role in mitigating climate change impacts.

The specific objectives of this policy brief are:

1. Current farming practices: Examine the prevailing farming methods in Iraq, including the reliance on industrial agriculture, monocultures, and chemical inputs and their impact on soil health, water resources, and overall agricultural sustainability.
2. Agricultural policies: Analyze the existing agricultural policies in Iraq and their effectiveness in supporting farmers, promoting sustainable practices, and addressing the challenges posed by climate change and desertification.
3. Regenerative farming successes: Highlight successful examples of regenerative farming practices in Iraq, showcasing their potential to restore degraded lands, improve soil fertility, increase biodiversity, and enhance food security.
4. Challenges and barriers: Identify the main challenges and barriers to the adoption and scaling up of regenerative farming in Iraq, including knowledge gaps, financial constraints, institutional capacity, and policy hurdles.
5. Policy recommendations: Provide clear and actionable recommendations to support the transition toward regenerative agriculture in Iraq. 

B. Background on regenerative farming and its global significance

Regenerative farming represents a transformative approach to agriculture that has demonstrated remarkable success in combating environmental degradation worldwide. In Ethiopia’s Tigray region, these practices restored one million hectares of degraded land into productive farmland by 2012, dramatically improving food security. China’s Loess Plateau project, implementing similar principles, transformed 35,000 square kilometers of drought-prone land into thriving agricultural areas, lifting 2.5 million people out of poverty. Such practices, including cover cropping, rotational grazing, and minimal tillage, work by rebuilding soil health, enhancing biodiversity, and improving water retention. These successes offer promising solutions for Iraq’s environmental challenges. The principles that revitalized degraded lands in arid regions like Australia’s outback—where regenerative farming increased soil carbon by 40 percent and water retention by 30 percent—demonstrate the potential for transforming Iraq’s threatened agricultural lands into resilient, productive ecosystems.

II. State of regenerative farming and its feasibility in the Iraqi context

A. The importance of regenerative farming in Iraq

Iraq, historically celebrated as the “cradle of civilization,” faces an unprecedented environmental crisis that threatens its agricultural foundation and national stability. The convergence of accelerated climate change—with temperatures regularly exceeding 50°C—and severe water scarcity has devastated the country’s farming sector. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Iraq loses approximately400,000 acres of arable land annually to degradation, while its Ministry of Agriculture reports that 70 percent of agricultural land risks desertification. The flow of both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has diminished by 60 percent in recent decades, exacerbating soil salinity and water scarcity. This environmental degradation, coupled with decades of conflict and neglect, has transformed Iraq from an agricultural powerhouse—where farming contributed 20 percent of gross domestic product before 2003—to a nation dependent on food imports, with agriculture accounting for merely 3.3 percent of GDP in 2019. The resulting rural-to-urban migration and increasing food insecurity underscore the urgent need for sustainable solutions, positioning regenerative agriculture as not merely an environmental initiative but a crucial strategy for national security and economic stability.

For Iraq, the potential benefits of regenerative farming are profound and multifaceted:

• Climate resilience: Farms using regenerative practices were 78 percent more resilient to drought conditions compared to conventional farms.
• Profitability: Farms with regenerative practices were 78 percent more profitable than conventional plots. Farmers that implement regenerative principles match or surpass conventional yields, especially in drought years.
• Water conservation: Regenerative and organic systems use 45 percent less energy and 40 percent less water than conventional systems.

B. Regenerative farming initiatives and projects—and their challenges

While acknowledging the limited knowledge and support for regenerative farming practices in Iraq and the paucity of individually funded projects, it is useful to look at a few notable pilot projects that international organizations have implemented in Iraq, which were inspired by the benefits of regenerative farming elsewhere. 

Enduring Harvest, a project located in southern Iraq, focuses on introducing regenerative agriculture practices to local farmers and communities. The project is self-funded by a group of Iraqi Americans and located in the Badiya Desert in Samawa province. The initiative employs a range of regenerative farming techniques, including composting, cover cropping, crop rotation, and agroforestry, to improve soil health, increase crop yields, and enhance the resilience of local food systems.

The project faces multiple interconnected challenges. Knowledge gaps exist between farmer and policymaker levels, necessitating extensive education and training programs. The labor-intensive nature of regenerative farming poses a significant economic hurdle, particularly for farmers dependent on daily wages. While the project hasn’t yet achieved profitability, it continues to make progress toward its goals, according to the co-founder and director of the project.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF), a US-based organization that calls itself the family of funds for the environment, has been at the forefront of addressing environmental challenges in Iraq since 2010. GEF’s work focuses on reversing climate change impacts, addressing biodiversity loss, and combating land degradation. GEF’s current projects in southern Iraq, implemented under the supervision of the Ministry of Environment and funded by UNDP, demonstrate a comprehensive approach to environmental restoration.

While not explicitly labeled as regenerative farming, GEF’s projects incorporate fundamental regenerative principles in their land restoration efforts. These initiatives encompass soil restoration, water-management optimization, and capacity building among farmers and local officials. The programs also address broader challenges, including biodiversity conservation, farmer migration to urban areas, and Iraq’s food security concerns.

Several small-scale projects incorporating regenerative farming principles have been implemented in Nineveh province by international organizations, though they remain relatively unknown. However, these initiatives operate largely outside the purview of both the federal Ministry of Agriculture in Baghdad and the Ministry of Environment, and there is limited public data available to assess their long-term impact and success rates. This lack of coordination between international organizations and government ministries represents a missed opportunity for knowledge sharing and potential scaling of successful approaches. The absence of systematic documentation and evaluation of these projects also makes it difficult to replicate successful models or learn from their experiences in other parts of Iraq.

III. Policy landscape

A. Analysis of current agricultural policies in Iraq

Iraq’s agricultural policies, led by the Ministry of Agriculture under Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani’s administration, reflect a conventional approach that prioritizes immediate production and job creation over sustainability. While the government’s four-year vision demonstrates commitment to agricultural development, it primarily focuses on traditional support mechanisms: seed distribution, essential crop subsidies, and protective tariffs for domestic production.

Current policy instruments include:

• Purchase guarantees for strategic crops (wheat and barley).
• Equipment subsidies and infrastructure support.
• Seasonal import restrictions to protect local farmers.
• Basic irrigation-system maintenance.

Notably, al-Sudani’s administration has introduced a separate climate change initiative through the Ministry of Environment and special envoy for climate change, but these environmental policies remain disconnected from agricultural programs.

Key policy gaps:

• Minimal research funding for sustainable farming practices.
• No integration of environmental policies with agricultural subsidies.
• Limited coordination between climate and farming programs.
• No systematic framework for promoting regenerative agriculture.
• A lack of data on agricultural projects’ contribution to climate impacts in Iraq.

This fragmented approach, while addressing both agricultural and climate needs separately, fails to create synergies necessary for long-term environmental sustainability.

B. Policy challenges and structural limitations in Iraqi agriculture

Iraq’s agricultural policy framework faces significant structural challenges that hinder the adoption of sustainable farming practices. The current system primarily emphasizes conventional farming through immediate support mechanisms—including wheat and barley purchase guarantees, equipment subsidies, and seasonal tariffs—while neglecting long-term sustainability concerns.

Key institutional and policy gaps:

• Competing ministerial priorities create policy conflicts: The Agriculture Ministry’s farmer support programs often clash with the Water Resources Ministry’s conservation initiatives and the Environment Ministry’s climate action plans.
• Limited coordination between federal and regional authorities fragments policy implementation.
• Research funding and technical support for sustainable farming practices are insufficient.
• Financial incentives remain focused on conventional rather than regenerative methods.

The political sensitivity of agricultural reform further complicates policy changes, as farmers, particularly in southern Iraq, represent a significant voting bloc. This political dynamic often leads to maintaining status quo policies despite their environmental drawbacks. Current support systems, while providing necessary immediate assistance to farmers, inadvertently discourage the adoption of sustainable practices like drip irrigation and regulated chemical usage due to perceived additional costs and lack of financial support for sustainable farming. 

These challenges are exacerbated by inadequate institutional frameworks for promoting regenerative agriculture. A fragmented approach between various ministries and agencies creates implementation gaps and reduces policy effectiveness. Addressing these limitations requires a coordinated strategy that balances immediate farmer needs with long-term environmental sustainability goals.

C. Opportunities for policy intervention and support

Despite the challenges and limitations in the current agricultural policies in Iraq, there are significant opportunities for policy intervention to promote regenerative agriculture there. The following steps are necessary and required to address policy issues.

1. Aligning regenerative agriculture with government priorities: Policymakers in Iraq, particularly in southern Iraq and Nineveh, are keen on supporting local farmers and rural communities, as they rely on their support during elections.
2. Addressing climate change and environmental challenges: The Iraqi government is increasingly aware of the severe impacts of climate change on agriculture, such as water shortages and desertification. Regenerative agriculture is a viable solution to mitigate these challenges, as it focuses on building soil health, improving water retention, and enhancing the resilience of agroecosystems. 
3. Engaging agricultural engineers and experts: Iraq has a significant number of agricultural engineers and graduates from agricultural colleges, many of whom currently need to be working in the sector. 
4. Building on local preferences for domestic products: Iraqi consumers generally favor locally produced agricultural products, even though they may be more expensive or less readily available than imported goods.

IV. Conclusion: Call to action for policymakers and stakeholders

Iraq stands at a pivotal moment in its agricultural history. The land that gave birth to farming 12,000 years ago now faces an existential crisis that threatens not only its agricultural heritage but it’s very survival as a nation. The convergence of climate change, water scarcity, and land degradation presents not just a challenge but an urgent mandate for transformation. This is not merely about preserving agriculture—it’s about reimagining it.

Regenerative agriculture offers more than a set of farming practices: It presents a paradigm shift in how we think about food production, environmental stewardship, and national resilience. 

Bold, transformative policies are needed that:

• Redirect a portion of agricultural subsidies from conventional to regenerative practices.
• Create dedicated funding streams for regenerative farming research and implementation.
• Establish a national regenerative agriculture training program.
• Develop market incentives for sustainable farming practices.
• Reform water policies to prioritize efficient, sustainable usage.

IV. Appendix: List of interviewees and experts consulted for this policy brief

Minister Nazar Amedi, Minister of Environment

Dr. Najla Muhsen al-Waeli, General Director, Ministry of Environment

Dr. Sajad Zalzal, Co-Founder and Director, Enduring Harvest Project

Kadhim al-Huassani, Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq

Begard Talabani, Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources for the Kurdistan Region

Hassan al-Kaabi, Former Deputy Speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives

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The post Regenerative farming in Iraq: Challenges, opportunities, and policy recommendations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Geopolitics
• Climate change
• Emerging technology
• Conclusion
• Recommendations

Introduction

Canada’s threat landscape is rapidly evolving. To address this new reality, Canada is reframing its strategies and shifting its defense policy priorities and security footing to be nimble and adept within these regional and global contexts. As a reflection of this reality, in April 2024, Canada’s Department of National Defense (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) released Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence, emphasizing three main global trends of significance for Canada: geopolitics, climate change, and emerging technology. Though Canada faces challenges beyond the scale of its geographic size, population, economy, and military footprint, it must maximize its opportunities to assert its comparative advantage in an increasingly competitive world.

Over 2024 and 2025, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, in partnership with the DND Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program, hosted three virtual workshops with government officials, academic experts, and participants from the public and private sectors of Canada, the United States, and Europe. The insights gathered from these conversations helped inform this report, which assesses how these three critical arenas—geopolitics, climate change, and technological development—create challenges and opportunities for Canada’s national security.

Geopolitics

Geopolitics is a significant driver of change in Canada’s threat landscape, especially for the DND and CAF. Geopolitics is a central element across the varied challenges facing Canada, whether those posed by authoritarian regimes, through increased tensions in the Arctic, and within Canada’s evolving role in the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. Authoritarian powers such as Russia and China promote values that directly undermine Canada’s commitment to upholding a stable and peaceful international order, the rule of law, and democracy worldwide, making it critical for the DND and CAF to be equipped to address these emerging geopolitical threats.

One of Canada’s biggest geopolitical challenges arises from strategic vulnerabilities in the Arctic, given that 40 percent of Canada’s territory and more than 70 percent of its coastline is in that region. The Arctic also holds significant strategic value due to its vast reserves of critical minerals and resources, including “13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of the world’s untapped natural gas.” As climate change accelerates ice-cap melting, Arctic shipping routes are becoming increasingly accessible and navigable, particularly the Northwest Passage that hugs the North American Arctic coastline.

A changing Arctic creates new pathways for geopolitical competition, as authoritarian adversaries such as Russia and China have demonstrated an increased interest in extending their presence and influence in the region. Russia, the world’s largest Arctic state with key strategic military capabilities located in the Kola Peninsula, is threatened by the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden—two countries that historically maintained strategic nonalignment with military alliances during the Cold War. In turn, Russia has sought to strengthen its Arctic presence by allying with other “potential Arctic stakeholders” including other BRICS countries. Critically, Russia has deepened its collaboration with China on a series of joint projects in the region. This collaboration includes a joint military exercise in the fall of 2024, during which Russian and Chinese forces carried out coordinated patrols in the Arctic region, as well as joint coast guard patrols extending into the Bering Sea. Additionally, military aircraft from both countries were detected by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) after entering Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone.

Although China is not an Arctic state, its 2018 Arctic white paper identifies China as a “near-Arctic state,” clarifying its long-term ambition to become a polar great power by 2030. China is developing a “Polar Silk Road” that enables it to both access Arctic resources, including critical minerals, oil, and gas, and support dual-use research conducted in its two permanent research stations and elsewhere in the Arctic region. In December 2024, China introduced a “polar-ready” cargo ship that is “capable of transporting a wide range of cargo, including offshore oil shield, wind and nuclear power equipment, as well as large vessel steel structures of sections.” Weighing 58,000 tons, the ship has been likened by Chinese bloggers to the size of an aircraft carrier.

Russia’s and China’s growing ambitions in the Arctic present escalating challenges to Canada’s interests in the region, including the possibility of eventual territorial disputes that could threaten Canadian sovereignty and national security. Though DND/CAF have indicated that there are no “immediate threats to the Arctic,” it nonetheless is crucial for them to allocate adequate resources to ensure the sustainability of their defense operations while enhancing Arctic domain awareness in response to emerging challenges in the region.

In addition to the Arctic, Russia and China also pose significant threats to Canada’s interests in the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. As a founding member of NATO that has long benefited from the alliance’s security guarantees, Canada’s defense priorities have historically been closely aligned with those of the Alliance. While Canada continues to uphold its NATO commitments—including through military, humanitarian, and financial support to Ukraine—workshop participants emphasized the need for the CAF to adjust resources from the transatlantic to the Indo-Pacific theater (in addition to the aforementioned Arctic region), where China’s growing influence poses an increasing geopolitical threat. Canada considers itself a “Pacific nation,” with the Indo-Pacific region representing its second-largest export market and encompassing six of its thirteen top trading partners. China’s emergence as a strategic threat is further strengthened by its increased collaboration with Russia. Just prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow committed to extensive cooperation with Beijing in the form of a “no limits” partnership consisting of advanced military technology transfer and substantial economic support.

This evolving geostrategic situation requires the DND/CAF to carefully balance its resources across the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters, given the growing collaboration between Russia and China, in targeting Canada’s defense priorities. The CAF has committed additional resources to the region, including maintaining a continuous submarine presence. Currently, HMCS Ville de Québec is set to join the United Kingdom’s Carrier Strike Group deployment in the Indo-Pacific, and the Royal Canadian Navy has been participating in freedom of navigation movements alongside allied countries in the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, Indo-Pacific nations have expressed increased interest in developing defense partnerships with Canada, agreements that have the potential to boost the DND and CAF’s regional presence. In May 2025, South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean and Hyundai Heavy Industries visited Ottawa and pitched a plan valued at C$20 billion (US$14.57 billion) for submarines and armored vehicles. In the same visit, Hanwha Aerospace proposed a C$1 billion deal to supply DND/CAF with mobile howitzers and rocket-propelled artilleries. This highlights significant opportunities for the DND/CAF to collaborate with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners to enhance Canada’s posture and capacity to deter security threats in the region. Workshop participants specifically identified joining the AUKUS partnership as a significant security benefit to Canada by enhancing the DND/CAF’s Indo-Pacific posture.

In the Atlantic Council workshop focused on geopolitics, experts emphasized how China presents a complex and multifaceted challenge that extends beyond traditional defense concerns. China’s economic and trade power, its technological capabilities, and the large Chinese diaspora in Canada all contribute to China’s multifaceted presence. Given this issue, a major challenge for Canada that stood out among workshop participants is the shortage of China experts within the DND and CAF. Although fostering the next generation of China experts requires significant time and investment, doing so is essential to ensure that world-class China assessments are included in broader strategic considerations that include alignment of domestic and foreign policy approaches toward China. While much of the current focus on China surrounds trending topics such as artificial intelligence and critical minerals, it is crucial for the DND/CAF to also deepen its understanding of China’s internal politics and how these dynamics shape its defense posture. These insights could inform DND/CAF’s strategic response to security threats.

In addition to the DND/CAF’s engagements in other regions, it is important to consider the US position in Canada’s security context. The United States and Canada have numerous shared strategic interests, including in addressing authoritarian adversaries, and have collaborated across many bilateral defense initiatives such as NORAD, which plays a critical role in protecting the countries’ respective airspaces. Canada has played an important role in modernizing outdated NORAD tracking systems and there is talk amongst experts on potentially increasing Canada’s contributions to North America’s missile-interceptor defense capabilities. Workshop participants emphasized the need to reaffirm Canada’s commitments to NORAD by investing more money in upgrading NORAD equipment.

However, the bilateral relationship has been tested by recent disagreements centered on tariffs and trade, given the importance of the trading relationship between the two countries (totaling around $1 trillion annually). During a March 2025 trip to Washington, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced his intention to reduce Canada’s reliance on US military equipment, including a reconsideration of a previous commitment to purchase F-35 fighter jets. A Canadian exit from the F-35 agreement would signify considerable change in the current US-Canadian defense procurement process, which is established by the Defense Production Sharing Agreement—a unique and long-standing bilateral agreement that seeks to integrate US and Canadian military collaboration to align both countries’ defense industrial bases for shared defense needs.

An ongoing concern regarding Canada’s relationship with the United States and other transatlantic NATO partners is its continued shortfall in meeting NATO’s 2 percent spending guideline (i.e., the expectation for each NATO member state to allocate at least 2 percent of gross domestic product to defense spending). Currently, Canada allocates approximately 1.4 percent of its GDP on defense. Initially, Carney pledged that Ottawa would reach the 2 percent threshold by 2030 through increased investments in rearmament, Arctic infrastructure resilience, submarine procurement for enhanced underwater capabilities, and increased shipbuilding initiatives. Most recently, NATO member states agreed to increase their defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. Canada also signed a deal with the European Union for Canadian companies to participate in ReArm Europe.

However, workshop participants underscored the importance of establishing a more credible and consistent defense-spending track record to demonstrate Canada’s renewed strategic commitment to its transatlantic allies. While Carney’s new pledge to reach the 2 percent defense-spending target within the year is an improvement, it is not sufficient in today’s threat environment—particularly as other NATO allies like Belgium and Denmark have already met the 2 percent GDP benchmark more quickly¹ and Canada has previously shown a lack of commitment to reaching the target. Canada must promptly meet this 2 percent target (and ultimately the new 5 percent pledge) to dispel previous assumptions about Canada’s commitment to the Alliance. If Canada fails to meet the target numbers quickly and robustly, this will undermine the CAF’s capacity to effectively collaborate with Canada’s traditional allies on critical security issues including the war in Ukraine.

Climate change

Canada is the world’s second-largest country by land mass, with a coastline of 151,019 miles and nearly 40 percent of its geography considered Arctic. Climate change is increasingly impacting Canadian national security, with melting ice and rising sea levels, as well as extreme climate disruptions threatening the country’s population, infrastructure, and natural resources. Canada’s defense, economic, and technology ecosystems face vulnerabilities from climatic disruptions that the DND and CAF must address for the changing security landscape of the future.

The Arctic is experiencing a major transformation, becoming one of Canada’s most strategically challenging threats to manage. To surveil and exercise the defense and security of the Arctic region, CAF stations around 500 full-time military personnel alongside 1,800 Canadian Rangers year-round through operations like NANOOK. Their presence is tasked not only for military safety and security threats, like understanding operational challenges of the environment, developing unique skill sets, and evaluating equipment for extreme weather conditions, but to respond effectively to climate emergencies through Operation LENTUS. With no national emergency or disaster management authority in Canada, the CAF is frequently deployed for relief missions to protect populations around the country alongside local, provincial emergency-management responders. With climate change worsening, the frequency, duration, and intensity of CAF deployments throughout the region are increasing.

The Arctic’s higher than average global temperatures are melting ice and raising sea levels faster than in other regions around the world. This difference, known as Arctic amplification, is creating glacier retreat, ice thinning, coastal erosion, and permafrost thawing, which damage the Indigenous communities, roads, houses, water supplies, industry pipelines, and waste disposal structures in northern Canada. These effects have serious implications for the CAF, placing competing demands and priorities on its resources and training. The CAF’s bandwidth is limited and requires decisions about which capabilities it will use for various missions. Waterways that flood local communities pose regional disruption, and the increasing Russian and Chinese maritime and aerial presence threatens how the CAF operates in the Arctic. With forces dividing their time and equipment between disaster response and critical defense training to defend Canada of threats in the deteriorating global security environment, CAF readiness is at risk of being overburdened and underfunded. Deploying CAF is expensive, and these funds are decreasing the amount available in the operational DND budget, creating concerns over maintenance and readiness. Additionally, the CAF equipment utilized for national disaster response is not what is appropriate for helicopter evacuation operations, for example, because it is designed for warfighting.

The effects of climate change and demand for CAF assistance are not limited to the Arctic and melting ice. Extreme climate disruptions including drought and heat have severely affected provinces across the country, as a surge in wildfires affects Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario. Rising fire risk has demanded that CAF provide evacuation support across the provinces, particularly in sparsely populated rural regions home to Indigenous communities. Rising frequency and expanding areas of impact have strained CAF’s ability to provide timely emergency response.

Emerging technology

Emerging technologies are important pieces within Canada’s national security landscape. Canada possesses operational niche strengths across several key technological areas, including nuclear energy, space, and artificial intelligence. Although Russia and China currently dominate the global uranium supply chain, Canada possesses the world’s largest high-grade uranium supply deposits and has significant potential to leverage its uranium production to advance its civilian nuclear industry in emerging innovations. This potential is reinforced by current innovative initiatives, such as the construction of small modular reactors in Ontario. In the space sector, Canadian companies like Telesat have developed satellite constellations that rival major players such as SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Kuiper, offering competitive services with a smaller environmental impact. Furthermore, with 3 percent of the world’s top-tier AI researchers and the G7 leader in AI-related scholarly outputs per capita, Canada is well-positioned to emerge as a global leader in AI. Ultimately, investment and procurement in these and other emerging technologies are crucial to Canadian national security.

However, Canada faces numerous challenges in this space, particularly within the defense procurement system, that hinder the DND and CAF abilities to effectively develop, acquire, and use advanced technologies. Workshop participants highlighted the fragmented aspects of Canada’s defense procurement process, which has no centralized authority to coordinate efforts and lacks transparency. Participants also highlighted the scale issue within the defense procurement process. While Defense Research and Development Canada and other departments are investing in Canadian start-ups to boost the country’s defense industrial base, these efforts are insufficient to sustain the companies’ operational costs throughout long procurement processes. As there is also limited domestic investment from the civilian sector, many tech start-ups simply do not have enough capital to remain operational. Instead, they prioritize commercial ventures, which are typically more profitable and accessible, over the highly competitive defense industry.

Alternatively, Canadian defense start-ups often pursue opportunities in foreign defense markets, which are often more lucrative and viable for sustaining operations. Some emerging technology companies initially founded to advance Canadian defense priorities had to shift toward commercialization and secured contracts in other regions, such as the Nordic region, for an extended period before having an opportunity for domestic Canadian defense contracts. This reflects a common trend among Canadian tech start-ups, where they are forced to procure investment abroad to remain operational, despite their potential value to national defense. Experts in the workshop emphasized the need for the DND and CAF to support investment in these domestic defense start-ups and prioritize dual-use companies, which can develop critical defense operational capabilities, while also generating commercial returns that can support the company’s long-term viability.

Technology start-ups also can be supported through shortening defense procurement cycles and reducing the burden on companies to fully develop their technology before seeking investment. In the workshop, US defense experts noted the success of the US Department of Defense’s program providing grants to start-ups in the ideation phrase, allowing these companies to test their technologies and foster innovation without the immediate pressure of securing capital. This model is particularly relevant for Canadian start-ups that often face funding constraints and thus are discouraged from pursuing defense innovation in an uncertain domestic market where capital is not guaranteed. Moreover, by providing early-stage grants, start-ups are more likely to agree to licensing their technology exclusively for the DND and CAF, bolstering Canada’s defense capabilities. Current programs such as NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) help accelerate the defense procurement process. However, workshop participants believe that these programs do not have enough investment capital to fully service Canada’s vast technological talent and, moreover, are not adequately advertised to start-ups.

The Canadian government has begun to address reforms needed to bridge the well documented “valley of death” for defense procurement. Representatives in the workshop noted the whole-of-government effort outlined in the Defence Procurement Reform of 2025 as progress toward addressing these issues, but other experts argued that there needs to be further collaboration among government agencies, the defense industry, and civilian companies. Strengthening these relationships could involve the DND and CAF partnering with civilian firms and academia to provide a secure environment for testing experimental technologies using real data and providing shared secure facilities for civilian firms. Within the defense industry, the Canadian government can encourage bigger defense contractors to engage and work with innovative Canadian start-ups, elevating smaller emerging technological firms. Enhancing collaboration across all sectors of Canada’s defense apparatus would allow the DND and CAF to more effectively identify up-and-coming technologies that best suit Canada’s defense needs and ensure they fully capitalize on the most advanced innovations available.

Workshop participants also highlighted the importance of personnel and talent. While Canada has skilled tech experts, it experiences a brain drain as many are drawn to higher paying commercial opportunities in the United States or elsewhere. The DND and CAF could capitalize on dual-hatted uniformed members who work in commercial industries, provided there is no conflict of interest, to drive defense technological innovations, as they are well suited to understanding commercial and defense needs. Furthermore, the DND and CAF could recruit and retrain veterans who can also provide the operational expertise and specialized technological knowledge needed to innovate emerging defense technologies. Ultimately, a culture shift is needed to rekindle innovation in the Canadian talent pool to include a stronger commitment to advancing domestic defense capabilities. Encouraging Canadian technological experts to apply their expertise toward national defense and motivating domestic investors to support domestic defense companies would better enable the DND and CAF to attract, develop, and retain Canada’s skilled workforce.

In addition to looking inward to strengthen Canada’s emerging defense ecosystem, Canada should also work closely with its allies to mutually reinforce each other’s operational strengths. Workshop participants stressed that Canada has a small population and GDP in proportion to its large landmass, making it difficult to fully capitalize on its defense potential. The recent agreement at the Canada-EU summit, allowing Canadian companies to take part in the EU’s $1.25 trillion ReArm Europe program, highlights the strong interest from foreign governments in partnering with Canada’s defense sector. Canada should build on this momentum by pursuing similar partnerships with like-minded allies and encouraging investment in domestic defense companies to boost homegrown innovation and continue to build up the domestic emerging dual-use technology ecosystem.

Conclusion

Canada’s role as a middle power is actively evolving due to geopolitical and climate changes. The DND and CAF need to adopt new strategies to address the changing threat landscape to better achieve their respective missions. There is a clear strategic need to leverage and invest in Canada’s comparative advantage in emerging technologies and deepen partnerships with allies to address these issues and further its defense leadership in important regions such as the Arctic, which is pivotal to Canada’s security. Here are some recommendations drawn from the three workshops and desk research to support the DND and CAF’s mission.

Recommendations for the DND/CAF

1. Canada should develop an annual whole-of-government national security strategy to clearly communicate its security priorities to allies and the international community, and to provide a unified framework for governmental departments and private industries to align their efforts.

The Canadian administration’s grand strategy is currently driven by fragmented reports and mission statements that, together, inform its broader defense posture. The Department of National Defence is primarily guided by its latest strategy, Our North, Strong, and Free, but Canada currently lacks a unified, whole-of-government strategy which communicates national defense priorities to both allies and adversaries. While the DND acknowledges the importance of maintaining a regular strategy, the latest Canadian strategy provides for an update every four years—which is inadequate given how much can shift in the geopolitical, environmental, and technological landscapes within a single year. By publicly articulating a yearly coherent national security strategy, the Canadian government can transparently signal its defense intentions to the international community and be more responsive to the ever-evolving threat landscape. This step would enable allies and partners to align more effectively with Canada on shared objectives and deter adversaries by clearly defining boundaries Canada is committed to upholding.

2. Due to the High North’s vital role in defending Canadian national security, the Arctic should be the priority for both the DND and the CAF, with defense efforts in other regions supporting this overarching focus.

Given the growing geopolitical and climate considerations of the region, a Canadian national security strategy should clearly articulate the Arctic region as Canada’s top defense priority, particularly since securing the High North has become essential to Canadian domestic security. A cohesive, whole-of-government national security strategy centered on the Arctic would not only safeguard Canada’s High North interests but also bolster its position in other key regions, particularly the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres. As both Russia and China have shown strategic interest in the Arctic that poses challenges to Canadian security, prioritizing this region and formulating a strong defense strategy would enable Canada to enhance its independent influence and engagement globally.

3. The Canadian military establishment must maintain its relationship with the Pentagon while also working to diversify its partnerships for defense needs such as military-equipment procurement.

The United States will always be Canada’s closest ally due to its shared border, common values, mutual threats, and long-standing defense cooperation. This close working relationship must be maintained. Canada can achieve this by prioritizing NORAD modernization and enhancing its defense capabilities, including the development of interceptors to support US efforts in safeguarding the North American continent and the shared border. However, the DND and CAF should also actively support Canada’s efforts to diversify its defense partnerships by engaging with like-minded allies, particularly those with comparable defense and industrial capabilities, such as Japan, South Korea, and Sweden. These countries align well with Canada’s role as a middle power focused on strategic stability. Strengthening ties with Nordic and Arctic NATO members is essential, as they share similar Arctic interests and are likely to pursue comparable defense technologies tailored to the High North. Canada can advance this goal by investing in initiatives like NATO’s DIANA in collaboration with other like-minded partners, such as AUKUS, to more effectively promote joint defense innovation and interoperability. Moreover, Canada can draw valuable lessons from the experiences of smaller states in rapidly and efficiently increasing their defense spending, particularly from how Denmark and Belgium were able to meet NATO’s defense budget targets within a short time frame. Likewise, Canada can emulate Finland’s experience in expanding naval and shipbuilding capacity in a cost-effective manner.

4. The Canadian government should create a national disaster management and response body similar to the original purpose and structure of the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to limit the extent to which CAF forces are deployed to manage Canada’s increasing climate disruptions.

Damaging effects of climate change will only increase in the future. The Canadian government must recognize the country’s increasing vulnerability to climate change and its fragmented system of disaster response that relies on provincial leadership. The government needs to proactively build a national force with adequate equipment designed for disaster response and resilience dedicated to managing climate emergencies without relying on CAF personnel and resources. This FEMA-like force should be managed by Public Safety Canada—and reinforced with coordination efforts for information sharing and joint training exercises with the DND and CAF.

5. The DND and CAF should prioritize investment in scalable, climate-resilient infrastructure in the Arctic and North, ensuring that funds associated with Our North, Strong and Free are directed to designing airstrips, logistics facilities, and equipment prepared for flooding and increased adversary activity.

Climate change is the most pressing and proximate threat both to Canadian security in the Arctic and to the communities there. Expanding the amount of CAF architecture/presence requires consideration of the region’s evolving threats of higher sea levels and new opportunities for foreign adversaries to covertly or overtly operate in the Canadian Arctic.

6. The DND and CAF must continue to maintain their partnerships with Indigenous communities to improve Arctic navigation and operational skills in line with the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework.

Cooperation with Indigenous groups supports understanding of the evolving northern environment and infrastructure affected by climate change. The CAF should establish new operations (like NANOOK) focused not only on defense to assert its presence and sovereignty in the North, but strategizing for increasing climate disruption. The CAF should also integrate Indigenous expertise into the new Northern Operational Support Hub locations to improve surveillance, resilience, and responsiveness across the Arctic.

7. The DND and CAF should work with the Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) to prioritize domestic investment and commit to reaching the 5 percent defense spending goal by collaborating closely with Canadian industry and academia. This approach would strengthen Canada’s defense capabilities and contribute more meaningfully to Canada’s alliances by offering capabilities that are valuable to its partners.

The DND and CAF should accelerate progress toward meeting the new NATO defense spending target of 5 percent. A key part of this effort involves strengthening collaboration with Canadian industry and academia to drive innovation in emerging technologies critical to national defense. To that end, the DND and CAF should work closely with DRDC to further invest in initiatives, such as NATO’s DIANA, which help to accelerate the development of emerging dual-use technologies and develop secure dual-use shared facilities to foster innovation in high-level, dual-use applications. Such efforts can help shorten procurement cycles, reduce reliance on foreign funding for companies to remain operational, and stimulate dual-use innovation. Leveraging and recruiting the right talent is also essential for the DND and CAF, such as engaging military reservists with commercial-sector experience, recruiting veterans with operational expertise into transitioning back into defense-related industries, and working closely with Indigenous rightsholders on climate and environmental technologies. By prioritizing domestic innovation and talent recruitment in emerging defense technology, Canada can move more quickly toward the original 2 percent NATO defense spending target and the new 5 percent target while also sending a credible signal to allies of its commitment to shared defense goals.

8. The DND and CAF need to work with other government agencies to target investments in niche operational capabilities that play to Canada’s advantage.

The DND and CAF also should collaborate with other government agencies to strategically direct investments toward operational capabilities that align with Canada’s unique strengths. Given Canada’s small population and dispersed infrastructure in comparison with its vast geography (unlike larger nations such as the United States or China), it cannot pursue defense capacity building across all areas equally. Instead, Canada should focus on its existing operational advantages in specialized sectors such as space, nuclear technology, and artificial intelligence. By prioritizing and enhancing these niche strategic defense capabilities, the DND and CAF can position Canada as a global leader in these fields. This approach would allow Canada to contribute high-value capabilities to allied partnerships, such as AUKUS, and encourage deeper collaboration by offering Canada’s specialized logistical assets and comparative advantages.

Peter Engelke is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a nonresident senior fellow with its Global Energy Center.

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Samantha Wong is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

The Atlantic Council would like to thank its partner, The Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program, for supporting the Council’s work on this publication.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post Defining Canada’s threat landscape: Resetting for a new reality appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Notably, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have extremely limited natural freshwater resources, leading to a heavy reliance on energy-intensive seawater desalination to meet their municipal and industrial water needs. At the same time, these hydrocarbon-exporting economies are pursuing strategies to reduce dependence on oil and gas revenues by developing high-tech industries, in line with national visions such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030.

In the realm of feasible innovative solutions, integrating data centers with desalination facilities to create “regenerative data centers” stands out as a powerful approach to address both water security and economic diversification goals. Dual-purpose infrastructure like regenerative data centers that use waste heat or dedicated power to desalinate water offers a doubly advantageous solution for GCC countries aiming to address water security concerns while diversifying their economies.

Water security and economic diversification

Water security is a critical issue in the Gulf. GCC countries now depend heavily on desalination for their drinking water, effectively bridging the gap between limited freshwater and increasing demand. Nearly half of the world’s desalinated water is produced in the Arabian Gulf region. For instance, Saudi Arabia alone produces more desalinated water than any other country—its capacity is expected to reach 8.5 million cubic meters per day by 2025 after investing $80 billion in new projects. Besides infrastructure costs, the Kingdom consumes about 300,000 barrels of oil daily to power its desalination plants.

Regarding the economic diversification axis, the volatility of oil markets and the global shift toward clean energy have prompted Gulf states to reinvest oil revenues into building knowledge-based, sustainable economies. A key element of diversification is the growth of information and communications technology (ICT) industries, including cloud services, artificial intelligence (AI), and data center infrastructure. PwC recently forecasted that the Middle East’s data center capacity will triple from about one gigawatt (GW) in 2025 to around 3.3 GW by 2030, marking one of the fastest growth rates worldwide. These projects also require advanced engineering, creating a need for skilled workers in mechanical, electrical, environmental, and information technology (IT) fields. Saudization and Emiratisation of the labor force are strong drivers that align particularly well with the need for a skilled labor force.

Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 exemplifies this shift: it explicitly aims for a technologically advanced, diversified economy with a vibrant digital sector. Technology plays a central role in Saudi Arabia’s diversification efforts, supported by over $300 billion in public investment in new industries, including advanced manufacturing, AI, biotechnology, space, and cloud computing.

What is a regenerative data center?

The idea of a “regenerative data center” was introduced by a Schneider Electric engineer in 2022 to describe a data center that is entirely self-sufficient in critical resources. In this model, a data center would produce its own renewable energy on-site (e.g., via solar farms or wind), recycle or reuse all waste materials, and replace all the water it uses through internal recycling or by producing new water through desalination.

By closing resource loops, such a facility would not drain external water supplies, despite heavy cooling demands, and could even become a net-positive infrastructure for the surrounding community by providing excess freshwater or energy. Incorporating a desalination unit into a data center’s design is a key innovation in this concept, particularly relevant for regions such as the Gulf.

Indeed, desalination-integrated data centers exemplify the high-tech, knowledge-intensive industries that Gulf states aim to develop. If even a small portion of the region’s data center capacity were to adopt heat-to-desalination technology, the total water output could reach hundreds of thousands of cubic meters per day, produced essentially for free using waste heat. This volume is roughly comparable to the output of a mid-sized desalination plant.

However, realizing this vision does not come without challenges. One major hurdle is technical integration. Marrying two complex systems—a data center and a desalination plant—requires careful and cutting-edge engineering.

Another challenge is economic viability and risk. Advanced projects, such as these, require a significant capital investment upfront. While it likely pays off over the long term through savings on fuel, water, and other expenses, the initial costs may be daunting. It will be important to demonstrate strong proof of concept, which is why the current pilot projects and first-generation implementations (like those in NEOM or Masdar) are so vital. If they can show good results, it will boost confidence for more projects.

The high energy requirement of such a facility can also pose a challenge, with the Gulf currently relying on hydrocarbons to power its desalination systems. Innovative clean energy solutions beyond solar and wind, such as small modular reactors (SMRs), have been gaining traction in the United States, with Amazon planning to use those to power its data centers in Washington State.

And from an environmental standpoint, even if these projects solve many problems, they won’t solve everything. Brine, the highly concentrated wastewater left over after freshwater is extracted, remains a significant challenge in desalination. For every liter of fresh water produced, a typical desalination plant may produce 1.5 liters of brine loaded with salt and chemicals that still need to be treated. The hope is to reach zero liquid discharge by extracting salts and minerals, as NEOM aims to do with a brine processing plant. To tackle this issue, the UAE also launched a “Rethink Brine” innovation challenge to find creative uses for brine and mitigate ecological harm.

Multi-effect distillation: A practical approach

One practical way for a data center to generate freshwater is by using its waste heat to power a thermal desalination process. Data centers convert nearly all their electrical energy into heat; large server farms consistently release heat that often reaches water temperatures of 40 to 60 degrees Celsius in liquid cooling loops or condenser circuits. Instead of releasing this heat into the air, it can be captured for useful purposes. In hot climates—such as the Gulf—where heating needs are low, desalination becomes an attractive option for utilizing waste heat.

Multi-effect distillation (MED) is particularly suitable for this purpose. MED is a thermal desalination technique where seawater is heated to produce vapor across several stages (effects) at progressively lower pressures, enabling efficient operation with relatively low-grade heat (often less than seventy degrees Celsius). Researchers highlight that MED “fits perfectly with data centers,” especially in hot regions, as it can serve as a cooling mechanism—removing heat from the data center’s coolant—while simultaneously producing fresh water. One study estimates that a one-megawatt (MW) IT-load data center can generate up to 80 liters of freshwater per minute (approximately 115 m³ per day) by integrating its waste heat into a multi-effect distillation system. This amount of water could hydrate thousands of people from a single medium-sized data center, demonstrating the concept’s significant potential.

This waste-heat driven desalination essentially adopts a circular economy approach to data center cooling: instead of using water (via evaporative cooling) or electricity (for chillers) and releasing heat, the data center becomes a co-generator of water. In engineering terms, the system’s overall energy efficiency improves because a larger portion of the input electrical energy is converted into useful outputs such as IT computation and freshwater, rather than just dissipating as low-grade heat. From a climate perspective, this can lower net emissions: each cubic meter of water produced using free waste heat replaces a cubic meter that would have been generated by burning fuel in a standalone desalination plant.

The idea is gaining momentum in the research. Recent studies have proposed integrating data center cooling with low-temperature desalination units, demonstrating feasibility through models and laboratory experiments.

In conclusion, the challenges of limited water resources and the post-oil economic shift, often viewed as separate issues, can be effectively addressed through integrated technological innovation. Desalination-enhanced regenerative data centers exemplify this integration by ensuring that digital transformation also provides vital resources for human well-being. The case for such combined projects is supported by the Gulf’s unique conditions—abundant solar energy, significant water scarcity, strong government investment capacity, and a clear policy goal to develop sustainable high-tech solutions. Early data and pilot projects are encouraging: a single megawatt of data center load can produce around 100 m³ of water daily through waste-heat MED. As the Gulf region invests in a future beyond oil, these dual-purpose solutions will be crucial in ensuring economic growth.

Hany Ghanem is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs. He is a financial services professional based in Washington, D.C., serving as Associate Director in the Client Intelligence Group at UBS.

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Global Energy Forum

The tenth Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum will be held June 9-10, 2026 in Washington, DC. Please check back regularly for updates on our programming.

“Our greatest rival is China, I would argue, and they now in many cases dominate the refining of critical minerals, in addition to the extraction,” said US Senator John Hickenlooper (D-CO) at the 2025 Global Energy Forum on Wednesday. 

“We definitely in this country need to be able to demonstrate a certain capacity to deliver and refine critical minerals, but we cannot do it by ourselves,” said Hickenlooper, emphasizing the importance of partnering with US allies on energy security. “We have an alignment of countries that share certain values and have historically worked very well together despite differences.”

The discussion came amid debate in the US Senate on the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which would phase out many clean energy tax credits and investment incentives.

Below are more highlights from this discussion, which was moderated by David L. Goldwyn, chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group. 

Big bill, big debate

• “As the one scientist in the Senate,” said Hickenlooper, a geologist by training, “I hold myself to account that we’ve got to do a better job of explaining” to his Republican colleagues “why there needs to be a sense of urgency around climate change.”
• Hickenlooper said he supports an “all-of-the-above” approach to US energy policy, including producing and exporting liquefied natural gas. “But at the same time, climate change is real,” he said, adding that “we’ve also got to be willing to push every source of energy we can that is cleaner.”
• “It’s not just wind and solar, it’s geothermal” and hydrogen power that would be negatively impacted by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act’s revocation of tax cuts and incentives, Hickenlooper said. “All these different sources of energy are going to get sliced to pieces,” he said, warning that this would cost jobs and fuel inflation.
• However negotiations in Congress end up, Hickenlooper said that the bill “looks almost certain to abandon many billions of dollars that are invested in wind, solar, [and] batteries.” He added that he hoped “we’ll be able to balance that out with innovations like what we’re seeing with geothermal.”

An “alignment of self-interest” on mining

• When it comes to permitting mining operations in the United States, said Hickenlooper, “there should be an alignment of self-interest that we’ve got to go faster.”
• “We don’t have the luxury to litigate and slow down these types of investments,” he said, citing efforts by environmental groups to slow the development of mines. “If we’re going to be able to address climate change successfully, we need to develop mines faster, and we’ve got to make sure that we provide a level of environmental certainty.”
• The United States hasn’t passed “a real mining law” in over one hundred years, said Hickenlooper, who called this situation “pathetic, because that means that we don’t have a framework that the rest of the world can use. Usually, we take the environmental progress we make in this country, and the rest of the world follows us.”

The future of US scientific leadership

• Domestic decisions on investments in science have an impact on US partnerships, Hickenlooper noted. Cutting back on investments in scientific research “corrodes the trust that many in the scientific community have in how America has always led the way in research and development.”
• “What we need is more of our young people to get involved in technology and science,” Hickenlooper said, noting that China produces significantly more mining engineers than the United States. China is “creating the workforce that’s going to help them lead in critical minerals,” he said, adding that the United States needs to invest in creating more “entry points” for young Americans to become interested in pursuing scientific careers.

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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The frontier has become the front line.

Canada’s choice is binary: secure its portion of the Arctic or suffer the consequences of foreign powers acting with impunity in and around Canada’s Arctic. Ottawa’s central challenge, therefore, is to harden its Arctic presence with dual-use infrastructure and supply chain resilience while hostile powers increase their influence around the pole.

This task gets more difficult the longer Ottawa dithers because change manifests across many vectors concurrently. The infrastructure and supply chains critical to the region are underdeveloped and ill-suited for the future—and they do not improve with age. Climate change continues to alter the contours of the region, often to Canada’s strategic disadvantage. An ascendant generation of US strategists proclaim that the Canadian Arctic is the “new soft underbelly” of North America. And it is no longer fantasy to suggest that the Arctic is ground zero for the new ‘Great Game’ between the United States, Russia, and China.

The region has been one of strategic contest since 1921, when Joseph Stalin claimed the North Pole for the Soviet Union, a claim re-animated by Moscow in 2015. It may lack the trenches and dragon’s teeth in Europe, or the clashes between fishing vessels and coast guard ships in southeast Asia. But the Arctic is no longer a low-threat, low-force posture environment that can be defended by a couple Coast Guard icebreakers and some Canadian Rangers on snowmobiles.

It is a region of strategic consequence and likely to be more so in the coming decades, which begs the question—why does Canada lag allies and adversaries alike in both the defense and development of its Arctic territory?

The simplistic answer is that Ottawa is torn among competing interests and an inability, or an unwillingness, to marshal the domestic resources necessary to protect its Arctic from a growing cast of players keen to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in pursuit of their interests.

The Atlantic Council delved deeper into Canada’s challenge to bolster infrastructure and supply chain resilience in the region. Research included literature reviews, interviews, and off-the-record conversations with a broad range of government and private-sector stakeholders. Interviews yielded constructive, if passionate, views from respondents who expressed repeatedly how much they want Canada to secure its part of the Arctic and enable its full development.

Analysis revealed that Ottawa knows the region well; the Canadian government has few peers in understanding the Arctic and what is required to right supply chains there. Geological surveys and development plans are completed to a gold standard. Stakeholders know the problem and solution space—and have for decades. But domestic policy, not climate change or geopolitical calculus, is the primary factor influencing strategic decisions for Canada’s north.

Key players (and honorable mentions)

Climate change has made the Arctic accessible. Glacier melting has created new sea routes, extended shipping seasons, and unveiled vast natural resources. But it has also created an opening in the region for strategic contest. Three threat vectors shape the region’s security dynamics for Canada.

Russia

More than half of the Arctic Circle’s population and half its economy are Russian. Russia sits at the end of one of the Arctic’s most accessible regions. Russia is opening old bases and building new infrastructure throughout the region. It holds more than 50 percent of Arctic investment (made between 2017 and 2022), and its military doctrine treats the north as central to economic and national defense. Since 2014, the Kremlin has launched Cold War-style investments in Arctic airfields, radar systems, submarine networks, and year-round basing. Russian military planners are considering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) domes extending over the Northern Sea Route.

Moscow likely observes that Canadian defense planning remains rooted in an outdated peace dividend mindset—one that grossly underestimates the threat of state-on-state conflict in the Arctic. Canada’s lack of comprehensive undersea surveillance renders its Arctic maritime approaches effectively blind, and its military presence in the region—symbolized by a modest footprint of Canadian Rangers—leaves much to be desired in terms of deterrence or rapid response. Equipment remains outdated, modernization plans languish in bureaucratic limbo, and logistics chains are stretched perilously thin. These gaps create space for Russian forces to maneuver below the threshold of war, exploiting ambiguity and Canada’s limited detection capabilities to assert influence or project force unchallenged.

The Kremlin likes to see how Canada’s strategic dependence on the United States substitutes alliance commitments for genuine sovereign deterrence. Ottawa’s whole-of-government approach—while inclusive in theory—has fragmented decision-making in practice, rendering Canada slow and reactive at a time when speed and coherence are strategic advantages. Indigenous consultation, while legally and morally necessary, remains procedurally rigid and politicized, often becoming a brake on critical national security decisions rather than a channel for partnership and empowerment.

While Russia invests heavily in its Arctic capabilities, Canada’s Arctic capability is stuck in the twentieth century. Surveillance assets are aging, space-based platforms are insufficient, and investment in modern ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) technology remains anemic. Communications remain unreliable across vast regions, exposing both civilian and military systems to disruption. Cyber defenses—especially around critical infrastructure—are poorly funded and unevenly deployed, inviting adversaries to strike via code rather than missile.

China

China considers itself a “near-Arctic power” and its Polar Silk Road links Arctic shipping to its global Belt and Road ambitions. China’s white papers frame the region as a commons to be commercially and scientifically accessed. Icebreaker construction in Chinese shipyards matches the tempo of a nation preparing for permanent presence.

Beijing understands that Canada’s economic infrastructure in the Arctic is brittle. Melting permafrost, seasonal reliance on ice roads, and a near-total absence of deepwater ports make northern logistics vulnerable to both climate and conflict. These choke points offer asymmetric opportunities to disrupt supply chains or sabotage dual-use facilities. China could exploit these vulnerabilities by embedding itself through ostensibly civilian investments in Arctic mining, telecommunications, or transportation infrastructure—investments that are strategic positioning by other means. In such a fragile environment, any hybrid attack or technological failure could sever vital arteries with catastrophic effects.

From China’s vantage point, Canada’s Arctic declarations are noble but hollow—bold in language but weak in execution. For Beijing, which has increased defense spending every year for three decades, Canada’s plan to reach two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense spending by 2030 is symbolic. Procurement remains tangled in inefficiency and overregulation, hampering modernization and undermining operational readiness. Economic pressures, shifting political winds, and lukewarm support for military spending are likely to derail Canada’s commitments before they mature. Moreover, China likely sees Canada’s overreliance on its NATO allies as a strategic liability. The Arctic can be probed or pressured just below NATO’s collective defense thresholds—ensuring ambiguity, diffusing Western resolve, and highlighting Canada’s limited unilateral options.

Manpower shortages, insufficient Arctic basing, and the long-delayed Nanisivik port all point to structural underinvestment in hard infrastructure. These gaps offer Beijing a rich menu of asymmetric opportunities to: subvert Arctic economies through proxy investments; cultivate cultural ties through scholarships, research partnerships, and diplomatic outreach; sabotage digital and physical infrastructure through cyberattacks or dependency entrapments; and sow political dissent by financing Indigenous, environmental, or anti-militarization movements within Canada’s own democratic fabric.

The United States (and others)

For Washington, Canada’s failure to defend its Arctic territory is not merely a function of limited resources, but of deliberate strategic neglect. The refusal to acquire nuclear-powered submarines—essential for year-round under-ice patrols and true sovereignty enforcement—reveals a deeper aversion to the burdens of great power responsibility. While adversaries invest in undersea dominance and dual-use Arctic infrastructure, Ottawa opts for half-measures: diesel patrol submarines that can’t operate under the polar ice, minimal surveillance capabilities, and no permanent military basing north of 60.

The US view is shifting from a posture of “monitor and respond” to one of “prepare and deter.” Pentagon reports no longer downplay the Arctic as a region of strategic importance. Even smaller powers have taken notice. India published its Arctic strategy in 2021, emphasizing scientific diplomacy. Turkey signed the Svalbard Treaty to gain access rights to the Arctic in 2023. France and Germany are also exploring greater footprints in the region.

While the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact with Canada and Finland represents a trilateral effort to rebuild icebreaker capacity and harden the Arctic industrial base, it is not enough. Canada remains trapped in a peacetime posture and mentality—symbolic patrols and seasonal exercises—while the region becomes increasingly contested by powers that are, at best, are neutral to Canada’s concerns and, at worst, openly hostile to them.

This inertia is rooted in a political culture that prioritizes accommodation over assertiveness. Successive governments have deferred to progressive special interest groups whose influence blunts hard security policies. Environmentalist and Indigenous consultations, while important, are often weaponized procedurally to paralyze decisive action. The result is a government debilitated by process, one that speaks of sovereignty but shrinks from the instruments necessary to enforce it. Even modest defense initiatives face resistance if they challenge entrenched activist orthodoxies or require confronting Canada’s internal contradictions. This includes the legal quagmire of provincial and territorial jurisdiction in the North, which Ottawa remains unwilling to override or reform.

Perhaps most damning for Washington is Canada’s lack of strategic coherence. Ottawa provides a strategic framework for the Arctic but fails to dedicate the resources to achieve the objectives contained therein. Policy and strategy without resource commitments are unseriousness ideas. Moreover, Canada’s policies do not form a doctrine of Arctic deterrence, convey no idea on how to mobilize federal will, and fail to weave a unifying narrative that connects Arctic defense to the survival of Canada as a sovereign nation in an increasingly anarchic world.

America cannot—and will not—permit a soft underbelly to fester in a domain as critical as the Arctic. It is not inconceivable for US forces unilaterally securing parts of the Canadian Arctic in the event of a crisis. Such actions, while diplomatically uncomfortable, would be strategically necessary if Canadian gaps remain unaddressed. To be blunt: if pressed and in a fight with Russia or China in the Arctic, the US will almost certainly be “Elbows Up” in defense of North America, even if it offends Canadian sensitivities.

Five “cold kills”

Our research unearthed five factors that contribute to Canada’s Arctic inertia. Each of these “cold kills” continues to impede progress on increasing supply chain and defense resilience.

1. Lacking multipartisan consensus on the region as “ground zero” for a new “Great Game.”

Canada cannot do much in the Arctic if it lacks enduring political will to support and fund dual-use infrastructure over decades. The growing importance of the Arctic for great-power competition underscores the need for politicians, defense planners, local communities, industry partners, and other relevant stakeholders to walk in the same general direction, if not in lockstep. Despite the urgency of this task, no sustained, cross-partisan strategy for Arctic defense exists. Without it, investments, infrastructure development, and operational planning will almost certainly come up short. In 2025, Natural Resources Canada is projected to invest $12.1 million toward climate adaptation projects in the North—which is necessary, but insufficient when compared to similar efforts by other Arctic powers.

Yet, allies offer a contrast. Norway’s Arktis 2030 fund and its defense pledge of 3 percent of GDP underscore a whole-of-society approach. Finland’s NATO entry boosted its participation in Arctic exercises. Sweden utilizes Arctic data to create a stronger and better informed national defense policy. Denmark leverages Greenland’s geostrategic importance in its Arctic defense. While Canada’s Arctic is inaccessible by comparison, it can look at what NATO allies do right in the region and their whole-of-society approaches.

2. Placing too much of the strategic burden on local communities.

The Canadian government continues to place disproportionate responsibility for Arctic security on local communities, revealing a dangerous strategic asymmetry between rhetoric and capability. The Canadian Rangers, though a symbol of national resolve and cultural integration, are not a substitute for a modern, standing military presence. They are lightly armed, part-time volunteers—valuable in their knowledge of the land but structurally unfit to deter or respond to the increasing threats posed by adversarial state actors operating just beyond the line of sight. This over-reliance has created a strategic mirage: Ottawa appears engaged in Arctic defence, but the burden is unfairly borne by those with the fewest resources and the highest exposure.

In effect, Canada’s Arctic is not treated as an equal part of Confederation, but as a frontier outpost whose primary function is surveillance and symbolic sovereignty. The political imagination to raise Arctic communities to the standard of living of rural southern Canada is absent. There is no serious nation-building project underway—no long-term vision to tie infrastructure, broadband, energy, healthcare, and education in the North to the national grid of opportunity.

The region is home to significant deposits of iron ore, gold, diamonds, and rare earth elements. The Mary River Mine on Baffin Island is one of the world’s richest reserves of high-grade iron ore, producing millions of tons annually. Similarly, the Hope Bay and Meliadine gold mines contribute substantially to Canada’s mineral output. These resources are critical for economic development and for national security, given their importance in defense manufacturing and technology. Yet, the extraction and transportation of these resources are hampered by limited infrastructure that eludes further development due to lack of coordination and investment at all levels of government. While the Yukon Security Advisory Council can be a model for shared governance federal, territorial, and Indigenous jurisdictions overlap without coherent authority. The result is a bureaucratic bottleneck that limits response agility and accountability, especially in scenarios involving mass casualty events or foreign incursions below the threshold of war.

3. Misunderstanding the Arctic as a land- or maritime-centric domain, instead of a multidomain one.

Canada’s Arctic strategy remains anchored in a legacy mindset—fixated on land and maritime domains—while the battlespace has already expanded far beyond the ice and tundra. The Canadian Arctic is a multi-domain operating environment in the most rigorous sense: a crucible where air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace domains converge. Focusing primarily on ground mobility or maritime choke points is antiquated.

In an era defined by precision-guided conflict, gray zone incursions, and orbital competition, the North requires integrated deterrence across all domains. The space domain is already decisive; Russia and China have launched dual-use satellites optimized for polar reconnaissance, while Canada’s surveillance constellation remains limited and aging. Cyberspace, too, is an active front. Persistent foreign probing of Canada’s critical Arctic infrastructure—from power grids to fiber lines—underscores the need for zero-trust architectures and sovereign cyber capacity hardened against both disinformation and sabotage. The air domain, often overshadowed, remains underutilized despite offering cost-effective ISR opportunities via high-altitude, long-endurance drones and balloon-based sensors that can supplement space assets in degraded environments.

Canada must approach the Arctic as a multi-domain region. Infrastructure nodes at Iqaluit, Yellowknife, and Inuvik must be conceived not as mere logistics hubs, but as permanent and staffed bases in a broader multi-domain lattice of deterrence. Airfields should be hardened, satellites shielded, networks encrypted, and data fused in real time. The resilience and infrastructure footprint must be multi-domain: ISR in orbit, radar on ice, seaborne logistics hubs, and hardened cyber networks. It might even be cheaper to establish and easier to maintain air-based sensors to augment space-based sensors, such as high-altitude, long-endurance drones and high-altitude balloons.

4. Missing the point that infrastructure spending enables both military and local resilience.

Canada’s policy frameworks fail to grasp a foundational truth: infrastructure is not ancillary to defence; it is defence. Roads, railways, hospitals, and power stations in the Arctic are bulwarks of resilience and lifelines to national unity. The harsh environment demands more than token outposts; it demands permanence that begins with infrastructure designed for both civilian and military pursuits.

Canada’s persistent underinvestment in Arctic infrastructure can be attributed largely to sticker shock. Building in the north is expensive at the outset, but those initial costs conceal long-term value. Roads, railways, and ports that facilitate the movement of Canadian forces and provide necessary infrastructure for local communities also enhance NATO mobility and resilience.

The Grays Bay Road and Port Project is unlikely to open before 2035. Until then, the Port of Churchill remains Canada’s only Arctic deepwater port for more than 106,000 miles of coastline—and even it is more than 800 kilometres south of the Arctic Circle. The overland situation is equally stark. The long-considered Mackenzie Valley Highway remains unbuilt. Meant to replace unreliable winter roads and connect remote Arctic communities, the highway should be considered as a defense artery.

Moreover, the North needs cyber towers as much as radar domes; fibre optic cables as much as sonar arrays. Schools and post-secondary institutions—anchored by Arctic research centres—should be erected alongside hardened military installations to attract families, not just forces. In Alaska, the dual-use success of the University of Alaska Fairbanks and the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport provides a model: educational and aerospace ecosystems aligned with the broader security posture of the United States.

Still, there are signs of acceleration. The Department of National Defence has committed $230 million to extend the main runway at Inuvik Airport. The upgrades include modern lighting and arrestor systems—investments tailored for sustained military operations and a rare example of a concrete commitment in a domain often shaped by abstraction. Canada should build Arctic spaceports and drone launch facilities for persistent surveillance and communications dominance—assets that would likely qualify as defence expenditures under a broadened NATO definition. And that definition is evolving. With calls to raise the alliance-wide benchmark to five percent of GDP, the line between civil and military investment will blur. Forward-thinking allies are already redefining defence to include national resilience, critical infrastructure, and technological redundancy.

5. Failing to call out the need to achieve A2/AD capability.

Canada’s current Arctic strategy is more performative than purposeful. It remains anchored in rituals of presence rather than a doctrine of deterrence. The reasons are structural and cultural: A2/AD sounds too aggressive for a nation wedded to peacekeeping identity and constrained by intergovernmental jurisdictional frictions. But if Canada is to hold the Arctic, it must defend it—not merely inhabit it. That demands something Canada has never attempted: a comprehensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy adapted for the circumpolar battlespace.

A2/AD refers to the deployment of integrated capabilities that prevent an adversary from operating freely within a region. This includes long-range fires, persistent surveillance, advanced radar, cyber denial tools, hardened command-and-control infrastructure, and air and maritime denial platforms. Canada does not mention A2/AD in its Arctic lexicon because it fears what it implies: that the North is no longer a sanctuary but a frontier. Building an Arctic A2/AD network would require political will, sustained investment, and a strategic mindset that accepts confrontation as a precondition for sovereignty. It would also provoke diplomatic risk—Russia would label such a move provocative, and China would test the perimeter with gray-zone maneuvers masked as scientific exploration or commercial navigation. Yet the absence of such a posture risks far greater cost: a hollow sovereignty, subject to erosion by increments.

Investments in some areas do not amount to A2/AD. True, Canada’s $38.6-billion commitment over twenty years to modernize NORAD is substantial. If fully implemented, this would be the largest reinvestment in continental defense since the early Cold War. Arctic over-the-horizon radar systems will track threats from the US-Canada border to the Arctic Circle. A more powerful polar variant will extend coverage into the Arctic archipelago and beyond. Crossbow—a classified network of advanced sensors—will supplement these systems with real-time precision. And the Defence Enhanced Surveillance for Space (DESSP) project will allow space-based tracking of adversary launch and maneuver capabilities. Canada has partnered with Australia on a next-generation Arctic early-warning detection system. But even these investments are insufficient; they do not achieve A2/AD in the Arctic. Canada has ISR blind spots, insufficient logistical depth, and infrastructure degraded by thawing permafrost. RADARSAT’s capabilities are aging; the Northwest Passage is functionally unmonitored. There is no cruise missile defense layer.

A Canadian A2/AD architecture would extend ISR reach from geostationary orbit to the ocean floor. At its core: Over-the-Horizon Radar (AOTHR), high-altitude drones, and advanced satellite constellations fused via a hardened C4ISR backbone. Any credible A2/AD structure must project deterrence not only northward but outward via NORAD, integrating seamlessly with allied efforts across the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and the European High North.

Challenge and opportunity

We recommend the following six steps to shape decision-making vis-à-vis Canada’s Arctic. Addressing each of them is necessary for more resilient supply chains and robust infrastructure for defense of the Canadian Arctic.

1. Achieve enduring domestic political consensus.

Without sustained, bipartisan consensus on the strategic value of the Arctic, Canada’s northern policy will remain fragmented, underfunded, and vulnerable to reversal.

Canada should establish a nonpartisan Arctic Strategy Council, drawing on members from federal, provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments, as well as the private sector. This council could be modeled loosely on the United Kingdom’s National Security Council, with a standing mandate to oversee and report on Arctic development milestones.

To correct course, Parliament should adopt a minimum percentage of GDP for Arctic infrastructure and defense investments—similar to how NATO’s 2-percent defense spending benchmark frames national priorities. A 0.5-percent GDP floor specifically earmarked for Arctic readiness would send a powerful signal to allies, adversaries, and Canadians alike.

2. Build permanent bases and infrastructure.

Sovereignty requires presence. Canada cannot assert command over its northern territory while maintaining a transient, seasonal military posture.

Canada must develop at least two permanent Arctic bases by 2035 and reinforce the air infrastructures in Yellowknife. These installations should support multi-domain enablers: ground forces, drone squadrons, ISR satellites, and cyber defense detachments. One proposed location is Resolute Bay in Nunavut—a strategic logistics point halfway through the Northwest Passage. Another is Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories, where the Inuvik-Tuktoyaktuk Highway provides ground access to the Beaufort Sea.

Canada need not sacrifice environmental stewardship to bolster its dual-use infrastructure in the region. On the contrary, the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) offers a way to meet energy needs in a sustainable and flexible manner. These compact, deployable energy systems would enable off-grid installations to power radar stations, bases, and airstrips—allowing the Canadian Armed Forces to operate autonomously across a vast and power-starved frontier.

Canada can and should discover best practices in other nations and adopt to the fullest extent possible. The Arctic Remote Energy Networks Academy is training a new generation in clean energy implementation, building the intellectual and technical foundation for sustainable Arctic energy systems. It is one example of innovation that can help make strides in the Arctic.

3. Reorient superclusters toward strategic innovation.

Canada’s innovation ecosystem is misaligned with its strategic realities.

To adapt, Canada must integrate Arctic operational challenges into supercluster mandates. The focus of these superclusters has strayed too far from core security imperatives, and redirecting their mandate toward the defense and security sector could allow Canada to reanimate its atrophied defense industrial base, stimulate Indigenous research and development, and provide a platform for strategic innovation drawn from academic and private-sector talent.

The Global Innovation Cluster for Advanced Manufacturing could sponsor development of modular Arctic housing for deployed forces. The Digital Technology Cluster could support remote communications networks hardened against magnetic interference. And the Protein Industries Cluster could help devise shelf-stable, high-calorie rations adapted to extreme environments.

Canada should establish a national challenge prize—modeled on the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge—to spur innovation in climate-resilient infrastructure, Arctic mobility, and remote power generation. Such efforts should be coordinated by a Defence Innovation Agency akin to the United Kingdom’s Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), ensuring alignment between technological output and operational need.

4. Integrate civil-military infrastructure.

Canada must adopt a whole-of-society approach to Arctic logistics—one that erases the line between civilian and military use.

Every kilometer of highway, every meter of runway, and every watt of power grid must serve dual purposes. Similarly, the Grays Bay Road and Port Project, which aims to connect the rich mineral fields of western Nunavut with the Northwest Passage, must be prioritized for its economic benefits and geopolitical value. Its completion would give Canada a second deepwater Arctic port—an essential node for resupply, power projection, and emergency response.

Meanwhile, the feasibility of Arctic spaceports must be considered thoughtfully. With global competition accelerating in polar orbit surveillance, Canada’s geography is a latent advantage. Nunavut and the Northwest Territories are prime candidates for launching satellites into sun-synchronous and polar orbits, a domain critical for ISR.

5. Accelerate NORAD modernization and ISR integration.

Canada must modernize its Arctic surveillance and early-warning capabilities through the renewal of NORAD and deep integration of orbital, aerial, and terrestrial ISR platforms.

Canada must move decisively to modernize its contributions to NORAD and integrate a layered, multi-domain ISR architecture that meets the threats of the 21st century. The existing North Warning System (NWS)—a relic of the Cold War—is functionally obsolete. It is increasingly vulnerable to kinetic destruction, electronic warfare, and deception by adversaries leveraging hypersonic, low-flying, and space-enabled strike platforms. While Canada has acknowledged this through its stated commitment to over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) and new space-based capabilities, progress has been halting, piecemeal, and under-resourced.

Canada should fast-track its involvement in key pillars of NORAD modernization alongside the United States by:

1. Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR): Advance procurement and installation of Arctic-facing OTHR systems based in Labrador and Nunavut to create a persistent early-warning envelope stretching across the polar approaches. These systems must be hardened against electromagnetic disruption and integrated into NORAD’s command-and-control nodes in real time.
2. Ballistic Missile Defence and the Golden Dome: Canada must shed outdated policy inhibitions and join the continental Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) architecture. A Canadian contribution to a “Golden Dome” over North America—built on Aegis Ashore components, ship-based interceptors, and ground-based midcourse defence systems—would reinforce deterrence and mitigate the strategic vacuum currently inviting adversary escalation. Participation in the US Missile Defense Review and integration into layered BMD command structures should begin immediately.
3. Space and High-Altitude ISR: The integration of RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM) assets with Gray Jay microsatellites must be complemented by investment in high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs, stratospheric balloons, and commercial space partnerships. Persistent polar orbit surveillance is not a luxury—it is the sinew of a sovereign Canadian deterrent.

A modern NORAD without a full Canadian partner is a NORAD weakened in scope, credibility, and political cohesion. In an age of hypersonics, space militarization, and AI-driven surveillance, Canada’s northern shield must be not just symbolic but steel-wrought—an active, intelligent barrier underpinned by the best minds and machines the alliance can field. The window to shape this future is closing fast. Canada must step forward now, not as a follower, but as a co-architect of North America’s defence.

6. Integrate the Arctic with broader national and allied defense postures.

Canada’s Arctic strategy must not be treated in isolation.

Canada must integrate its Arctic strategy into a broader, assertive national defence posture—one that acknowledges the indivisibility of Canadian sovereignty and its responsibilities as a G7 power. The Arctic is not a separate theatre, but the forward glacis of the North American fortress. What begins as radar coverage over Baffin Bay ends in deterrence posture from Vilnius to the Taiwan Strait. Canadian defence policy must therefore harmonize Arctic readiness with strategic power projection abroad, ensuring the nation can respond decisively to threats—whether they emerge from the Beaufort Sea, the Black Sea, or the South China Sea.

The Arctic remains critical—but it is not Canada’s only defence priority. A myopic focus on the North risks undermining broader global responsibilities. Canada must project credible force across multiple domains and theatres. That means integrating Arctic surveillance—through over-the-horizon radar, low Earth orbit satellite constellations, and AI-driven ISR—directly into NORAD’s early warning lattice. These capabilities must be interoperable with US Northern Command, NATO’s Arctic flank, and allied sensors in the Indo-Pacific. Surveillance is not enough; it must be paired with striking power and forward basing.

Strategic mobility and offensive reach are essential. Arctic airbases must be upgraded to sustain F-35 squadrons year-round, with rapid deployment capabilities for long-range precision fires and mobile expeditionary forces. Arctic-class naval platforms should anchor presence and power projection into contested waters, with the logistical depth to pivot between the Arctic archipelago and Pacific choke points. Canadian-built UAVs and high-altitude drones should patrol both the Northwest Passage and Western Pacific, forming a twin-hemisphere presence. Above all, Canada must act as a sovereign Arctic nation capable of defending its territory, while remaining a credible contributor to the rules-based international order. The Arctic is the crucible, but Canada’s responsibilities—and its enemies—do not stop at the pole.

Canada’s Arctic infrastructure and supply chain resilience are foundational components to its basic expression of sovereignty. But the future of the Arctic belongs to those who show up first and endure longest. The question is not whether Canada can afford Arctic sovereignty, but whether it can afford its absence.

Jeff Reynolds is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This research was made possible by the generous support of the Canada Mobilizing Insights in Defense and Security (MINDS) program.

New Atlanticist Mar 10, 2025

Experts react: What Mark Carney means for the US-Canada relationship

By Atlantic Council experts

As the next prime minister of Canada prepares to take office, Atlantic Council experts look at what’s ahead for Ottawa and its relationship with Washington.

Elections Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist May 1, 2025

Foreign policy was a hot topic in Canada’s election. Now it’s on Carney to make it last.

By Imran Bayoumi, Maite Gonzalez Latorre

The campaign is over. Now, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney faces several important choices, from how to increase defense spending to what a new relationship with the United States should look like.

Elections Politics & Diplomacy

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

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The post The frontier is the front line: On climate resilience for infrastructure and supplies in Canada’s Arctic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Earlier this week, US President Donald Trump made headlines by stating what many Iranians have known for years: a corrupt “water mafia” has looted the nation’s resources while its leaders have “managed to turn fertile farmland into dry deserts.” He underscored the regime’s role in fueling the crisis, declaring that “their corrupt water mafia—it’s called the water mafia—causes droughts and empty riverbeds. They get rich, but don’t let the people have any of it.”

For millions of Iranians displaced by environmental degradation and water scarcity, it was the first time a sitting US president openly echoed what whistleblowers and environmental advocates have been shouting for decades.

The term “water mafia” has been used by Iranian journalists, scientists, and activists for more than a decade to describe a powerful and politically connected network responsible for pushing ecologically catastrophic megaprojects. These actors thrive on opacity, benefiting from unchecked dam-building, wasteful water transfers, and the relentless overextraction of groundwater, often under the guise of development and national security. Trump’s remarks may have been blunt, but they captured the essence of the crisis: Iran is not just running out of water, it is being robbed of it.

The aftermath of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal offered a clear warning. Billions of dollars flowed back into Iran, yet no serious reforms followed. Instead, environmental destruction accelerated. Expensive dam-building and ill-conceived water transfer projects continued unchecked, groundwater depletion worsened, and land subsidence spread across critical plains. Agricultural practices remained wasteful, and environmental priorities were ignored.

In the Islamic Republic, the reflexive belief that crises can be drowned in money has repeatedly backfired. Over the past four decades—particularly since the Iran-Iraq War—financial windfalls without transparency, accountability, or public participation have fueled corruption, exacerbated environmental damage, and triggered deeper social unrest. Funds intended for resilience and renewal have instead bankrolled inefficient megaprojects, enriching politically connected contractors while pushing the country’s ecosystems closer to collapse.

Parliament and oversight bodies have long been reduced to hollow institutions, offering little more than a façade of accountability. Public dissent—especially from provinces ravaged by water scarcity—has been met with suppression, not solutions. Now, with the prospect of ongoing US negotiations delivering some sanctions relief, the economic arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, stands ready to tighten its grip. Under the banners of “development” and “poverty alleviation,” it will likely expand its empire of megaprojects—ventures that, without environmental safeguards or transparency, have consistently deepened corruption, entrenched inefficiency, and accelerated environmental collapse.

Widespread corruption and lack of oversight

Water governance in Iran is tightly controlled by the Supreme Water Council—a body that exists more as a rubber stamp for elite interests than a forum for sustainable planning. Dominated by the Ministry of Energy, with the president or vice president merely present in name, the council has consistently prioritized unsustainable development over ecological integrity. In practice, it has functioned as a front for the water mafia—an entrenched network of bureaucrats, contractors, and cronies whose goal is profit, not preservation.

The Ministry of Agriculture, as the largest water consumer, is a major influencer within this council. Civil society and non-governmental organizations are almost entirely excluded from decision-making, and local stakeholders lack the ability to prevent resource destruction. The Department of Environment, while occasionally voicing concerns, has been reduced to a ceremonial role.

Most large-scale water projects in recent decades have either bypassed environmental permits or obtained them under pressure, often through compromised processes involving firms with direct ties to the water mafia. In cases where local courts attempted to intervene, rulings were ignored or overruled by higher judicial officials loyal to political interests. Environmental defenders and whistleblowers who challenge these projects face intense security pressures, harassment, and, in many cases, exile.

Powerful consulting firms, many of which have long benefited from insider connections, have greenlit projects that have devastated entire ecosystems, displacing upstream communities, triggering deforestation, damaging cultural heritage sites, salinizing rivers, depleting aquifers, and contributing to widespread land subsidence in urban and agricultural zones alike. From Tehran to Isfahan, cities are literally sinking under the weight of institutional negligence. These aren’t development projects—they’re environmental crimes disguised as infrastructure. And if sanctions are lifted and new capital flows into the system without strict oversight, the water mafia will seize the opportunity to expand its empire, accelerating Iran’s ecological collapse.

IRGC involvement

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), through its Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, has become Iran’s largest and most politically untouchable contractor, positioned squarely at the center of what many now call the “water mafia.” This deeply entrenched network includes senior officials within the Ministry of Energy, politically favored consultants, and powerful construction and engineering firms. Shielded by military influence and judicial complicity, they operate with near-total impunity. Whenever a major dam or inter-basin water transfer project is launched, Khatam is either directly involved or quietly profiting through layers of subcontractors. Although sanctions have constrained some of its operations in recent years, the IRGC has routinely sidestepped these limits by deploying a spiderweb of front companies to keep cash and construction flowing behind the scenes.

Any future sanctions relief would give Khatam and the broader IRGC-industrial complex even greater control over state development budgets, further emboldening the water mafia. Since its post-1989 transformation, engineered by former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and sanctioned by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Khatam has overseen disastrous megaprojects.

Those include the Karkheh and  Gotvand dams, which have inflicted irreversible ecological damage across Khuzestan. Its inter-basin water transfer schemes, including the Garm-Siri project, not only jeopardize domestic water security but risk igniting future disputes with Iraq over shared river systems. Far from alleviating Iran’s water crisis, the JCPOA-era influx of capital largely served to reinforce the very machinery driving the collapse.

Lack of environmental impact assessment

Today, major multinational projects funded by international loans typically require rigorous Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) to ensure that long-term benefits outweigh ecological and social costs. In Iran, however, EIAs have become a hollow formality. They are often conducted by firms with vested interests in project execution, many of them closely tied to the water mafia. There is little to no independent review, and virtually no public scrutiny.

In many cases, projects begin without any assessment at all. Only after public outrage or activist pressure do authorities scramble to produce retroactive EIAs—by then, the damage is often done. The Gotvand Dam remains one of the most damning examples: its post-construction mismanagement of saline layers in the reservoir has created a chronic, man-made disaster.

Then there’s Lake Urmia—once the largest lake in the Middle East, now a stark reminder of systemic mismanagement. Over forty dams and multiple diversion tunnels throttled its inflows, all while upstream expansion of water-intensive crops like sugar beets continued unchecked. Climate variability may have accelerated the decline, but the collapse was largely engineered. Today, it’s exposed salt flats that feed dust storms that damage farmland, corrode infrastructure, and pose serious public health risks across the region.

Despite the efforts of environmental activists and a handful of parliamentary investigations, Iran’s annual budget continues to greenlight hundreds of new projects without proper assessments, many pushed through by consulting firms and contractors aligned with the water mafia. Without strict environmental conditionalities and oversight, sanctions relief will only accelerate this destructive trajectory, handing more capital to those who profit from ecological collapse.

More recently, the water mafia has set its sights on large-scale seawater desalination projects—particularly along the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman—without seriously accounting for the massive carbon footprint or the ecological harm to already stressed marine ecosystems. These projects are not only energy-intensive and environmentally hazardous, but the plan to pump desalinated water to central Iran comes with astronomical upfront and long-term maintenance costs. For the water mafia, however, it’s a goldmine: billions in unaccountable contracts, minimal oversight, and endless opportunities for profit—another expensive illusion sold as a solution.

The absence of a comprehensive plan

Countries facing severe water scarcity have developed innovative governance models that Iran could learn from—not by copying policies wholesale, but by embracing their core principles.

After enduring the Millennium Drought, Australia implemented the Murray–Darling Basin Plan, establishing basin-level governance and water trading systems to balance ecological sustainability with agricultural needs. Singapore, lacking natural freshwater sources, has become a global leader in integrated water management through its “Four National Taps” strategy, which includes water catchment, desalination, imported water, and wastewater recycling (NEWater). Spain utilizes river basin councils (Confederaciones Hidrográficas) that involve stakeholders from various sectors in decentralized water decision-making. Israel, situated in one of the world’s most arid regions, has achieved a high level of water security through a mix of technological innovation and strict efficiency standards, including the reuse of over 85 percent of its wastewater for agriculture.  

These models share a commitment to transparency, adaptability, and inclusive governance—qualities that are currently lacking in Iran’s centralized and opaque water management system. For Iran to address its escalating water crisis, it must shift from supply-centric megaprojects to participatory and sustainable resource management.

The billion-dollar question: What should be done?

With sanctions relief, poor water governance, inefficient management, and structural corruption will not disappear. Scientists like Kaveh Madani, head of the United Nations University’s Institute for Water, Environment and Health, believe that Iran has become a water-bankrupt nation due to misguided policies, weak governance, and decades of poor management. Even if billions of dollars are released, absent a genuine will for reform, these resources will merely accelerate the execution of costly, unnecessary, and environmentally damaging projects.

A system resistant to methodical review and structural rebuilding will only collapse faster when flooded with money. The core problem lies in decision-making behind closed doors, the exclusion of public participation, and neglect of environmental imperatives.

To change course, Iran needs immediate, transparent, and measurable actions:

• Halt all projects lacking legitimate environmental assessments.
• Mandate the public release of water resource data and project budgeting details.
• Reform budget allocation laws to prevent the approval of scientifically unjustified projects.
• Establish an independent national body composed of experts, academics, farmers, and civil society actors to oversee and redefine macro water policies.
• Pilot participatory governance models in critical watersheds to lay the groundwork for institutional learning and environmental democracy.

Ultimately, drafting a comprehensive, sustainable national water plan—regularly reviewed and adapted—is crucial for restoring balance to Iran’s fragile environment. As long as policymaking focuses on “increasing water supply at any cost” rather than preserving and optimizing resources, every newly injected dollar will only deepen the crisis, not resolve it.

Nik Kowsar is an Iranian-American journalist and water issues analyst based in Washington, DC. He produces and hosts a weekly TV program on Iran’s water crisis. He is also known for his past work as a political cartoonist.

The post Feeding the ‘water mafia’: Sanctions relief and Iran’s water crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Building on the Atlantic Council’s previous report on the nuclear innovation ecosystem, this new report by Kemal Pasamehmetoglu explores the role of the United States in establishing a full domestic nuclear fuel cycle.  

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Kemal Pasamehmetoglu

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

Global Energy Center

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

Report Feb 24, 2025

Atoms for Appalachia: The role of nuclear energy in economic development

By Lauren Hughes

Advanced nuclear technologies can drive economic security and energy security within Appalachian states.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

EnergySource Mar 7, 2025

The US can reduce Russia’s nuclear energy—and geopolitical—influence

By Marina Lorenzini

As the Trump administration outlines its energy priorities, strengthening the US nuclear industry remains a point of bipartisan agreement. Revitalizing this sector will lead not only to domestic economic growth, but also a reduction in Russia’s dominance in global nuclear markets and its geopolitical leverage.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

Issue Brief Apr 4, 2025

Building a path toward global deployment of fusion: Nonproliferation and export considerations

By Sachin Desai, Michael Hua, Amy Roma, Jessica Bufford, Jacqueline Siebens, Andrew Proffitt

With commercial fusion on the horizon, questions around the process for regulating fusion power plants have arisen.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

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The post The United States’ role in managing the nuclear fuel cycle appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 27, 2025, Africa Center nonresident senior fellow Oluwayemisi Ajumobi published an article in Globalization and Health, “Safeguarding global health security amidst a scramble for Africa’s minerals for the clean energy transition.”

“The global transition to renewable energy is increasing the demand for critical minerals mining in Africa. Without appropriate safeguards, expansion of mining operations on the continent increases the risk of mining-associated infectious disease outbreaks with epidemic and pandemic potential,” Ajumobi writes.

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Oluwayemisi Ajumobi

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Africa Center

Technology & Innovation Non-Traditional Threats

The post Ajumobi in Globalization and Health: “Safeguarding global health security amidst a scramble for Africa’s minerals for the clean energy transition” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Localized climate awareness through interactive mapping: A policy tool

Public opinion is pivotal for shaping climate policy. Awareness of climate risks can help accelerate the development and implementation of effective climate policy. A recent nationally representative survey reveals some surprising insights: Despite 82 percent of Indians believing in global warming (once it’s explained), only 10 percent feel informed about it and over half have little to no understanding of the concept. What is particularly worrying is that Indians’ awareness levels about climate change have barely changed since 2011, when the survey was first conducted as part of our studies.

National surveys only provide a single number, however, to characterize the opinions of an entire country. Recent advances in statistical modeling now allow us to pool survey data from local areas and pair it with relevant geographic, census, and environmental data to construct accurate estimates of climate change opinions for subnational administrative areas. Using this approach, we mapped climate opinions across the country, and found that the knowledge gap about climate change varies widely by region (see figure 1). For example, the western state of Gujarat shows greater climate awareness compared to its southern neighbor Maharashtra, with the understanding ranging between 52 percent and 33 percent, respectively. Likewise, about half the residents in the southern state of Tamil Nadu say they “know something” or “a lot” about global warming, while only 31 percent feel knowledgeable in neighboring Andhra Pradesh. These differences present opportunities to increase local support for climate initiatives, especially in states where awareness lags.

Figure 1: Knowledge about global warming

Public opinion maps are powerful tools for bridging these knowledge gaps. The interactive version of the India climate opinion maps show variations in public beliefs and attitudes across thirty-four of India’s thirty-six states and union territories and in 604 districts. These maps aren’t just diagnostic: By exactly identifying where knowledge is low, these maps enable policymakers and technologists to align awareness campaigns with regional needs, fostering a stronger foundation for climate action.

Imagine Maharashtra, where awareness is lower, having more support for climate action at the grassroots level. This could make local adaptation efforts—like water conservation or heat wave preparedness—more successful because the public better understands the urgency. Extreme heat is one of the most direct and widespread threats to human health from climate change, and these risks cascade to economic sectors through reduced labor productivity, decreased crop yields, and increased energy demands for cooling, straining infrastructure and resources, and exacerbating income inequality. Recent heat waves, intensified by global warming, have killed many thousands of people around the world, and yet most heat-related deaths are preventable with appropriate preparation. Many members of the public do not adequately understand the risks associated with extreme heat, however, and many are unprepared, underscoring the characterization of heat waves as “silent killers.”

Turning data into action: Targeting interventions with technology

Interactive maps based on scientific public opinion surveys do more than illustrate what people know—they guide real, on-the-ground actions to address specific regional risks. Take Bihar, a state in eastern India, for instance, where 74 percent of residents expect more severe heat waves in the coming years. This awareness has driven the state to create an early warning system and use mass texts to send heat advisories to millions. However, in regions with limited technological access, low-tech community-based solutions remain critical. Localized data about awareness levels can help identify these more vulnerable populations and inform tailored interventions. For example, Bihar’s Heat Action Plan (HAP) includes drum-based village announcements, ensuring even the most remote populations are better prepared.

Figure 2: Perceptions of severe heat waves

But there’s still room to grow. Also in Bihar, a state with high solar insolation levels, the installed solar capacity reached approximately 193 MW in 2023, reflecting steady growth in this area. But while 59 percent here believe India should rely more on renewable energy, many don’t yet connect extreme heat with fossil fuel use (figures 2 and 3). And solar adoption here is slower compared to neighboring states like Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand, which have both set ambitious solar installation targets and have slightly higher public support for renewables (62 percent and 63 percent, respectively). Closing these gaps with targeted information could shift behaviors and foster broader support for sustainable practices. This is where region-specific insights can make a huge difference—not just in preparing for immediate risks but also in encouraging lasting climate resilience.

Bridging knowledge gaps for real climate action

India’s linguistic and cultural diversity adds complexity to its climate strategies. At least twenty-two major languages are spoken across the country, and thousands of regional publications inform the public. Yet many media outlets, both English and regional, miss the chance to connect climate events like heat waves directly to climate change. Only about 10 percent of media articles covering the 2022 record-breaking heat waves also mentioned climate change. By understanding what different communities believe and know, journalists, educators, and activists can tailor messages that resonate locally, bringing climate awareness directly into people’s lives.

This is where data equity comes into play. Making climate data accessible and relevant to communities is essential to ensure that everyone—from rural villages to crowded cities—can understand and act on it. Empowering people with accurate, actionable information is key to building a resilient society that is prepared to handle the challenges ahead.

India’s twenty-eight states and eight union territories each have distinct identities and approaches to climate action. Backed by a clear National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) and with tailored State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCCs) in place, regional governments play a major role in addressing their specific challenges. Public opinion data offer a unique opportunity for each state to adapt its strategies to local concerns, making climate policies more effective and sustainable. For example, states with higher awareness, like Gujarat, can attract investments and public-private partnerships in clean energy technology, while states with lower awareness might prioritize educational programs alongside infrastructure projects. Companies like ReNew Power and Tata Power, for example, are helping to drive renewable energy adoption and smart grid integration across India. Pursuing these kinds of collaborations with a greater awareness of how district-level opinions vary can help accelerate local climate action and ensure that each region’s unique needs and perspectives shape its climate approach.

Figure 3: Perceptions of fossil fuels and renewable energy

Localized climate insights can power the changes that India needs, accelerating the shift to clean energy and building resilience against climate impacts. However, current policies—like fossil fuel subsidies and price caps —present significant challenges. These measures, while aimed at shielding low-income households from rising energy costs, often lock in dependence on fossil fuels and divert resources away from renewable investments. For example, fossil fuel subsidies in India still outweigh subsidies for renewables, undermining the economic incentives for a clean energy transition.

Public opinion surveys provide a valuable opportunity to address these misalignments by demonstrating that support for renewable energy is strong, even in states with significant fossil fuel reliance (figure 3). By leveraging localized public opinion data, India can reframe subsidy reforms as not only economically prudent but also widely supported by the public. By better aligning policies with both national and regional data, India can ensure that efforts to reduce emissions and prepare for climate impacts reflect the voices of its people.

The future of climate resilience in India depends on both bridging the gap between data and action through enabling renewable energy technologies and gaining greater awareness of public understanding about climate change causes and solutions. When interactive maps and survey data are accessible and used to guide local strategies, they become invaluable tools. Scaling models using insights from localized data can transform regional adaptation strategies, including the deployment of clean technologies and renewable energy solutions; this can be done by aligning public knowledge with practical policy initiatives such as job training for the renewable energy industry, which also has widespread support (figure 4). Emphasizing technology-driven, equitable access ensures interventions resonate with India’s diverse population.

Figure 4: Perceptions on national training programs

By building awareness of public opinion among diverse stakeholders and reflecting the insights from the data back to the public, policymakers build trust and alignment in decision-making. This approach allows everyone—from local communities to state governments to national policymakers—to have confidence in collective efforts that aim to tackle climate change head-on. By building a common sense of purpose, India can catalyze the testing and scaling of technology-based interventions to achieve its long-term strategic goal of becoming a vishwa guru, a global leader in climate action.

Jennifer Marlon is a senior research scientist at the Yale School of the Environment and the executive director of the Yale Center for Geospatial Solutions.

Jagadish Thaker (JT) is a senior lecturer at the University of Queensland and research associate at the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication.

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While the fund was officially established at the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Egypt, known as COP27, it was operationalized this past year at COP29 in Azerbaijan. An executive director of the fund was appointed and initial financing agreements with the World Bank were finalized. The decision to operationalize the fund moved the conversation on loss and damage from a fringe issue to a prime example of what global collaboration on climate must look like.

Now, however, just fifteen weeks after COP29 ended, the Trump administration has decided to withdraw the United States from the management of the fund. The withdrawal was marked “effective immediately,” and the consequences will be, too.

In its withdrawal from the fund’s management, the United States has given up its seat at the international table. It has limited its long-term ability and credibility to shape debate and take leadership on climate finance. As one of the future managing members of the board for the government of Peru, I am deeply aware that this withdrawal marks a striking missed opportunity.

But even more immediate, the United States has damaged its own economic resilience.

The underlying reasons for the fund have not changed. Climate change is disproportionately affecting countries on the frontlines. Between 2000 and 2019, climate change cost an estimated $2.8 trillion in loss and damage. Notably, loss and damage is the last threshold of climate costs. When countries prepare for the impacts, most look first to mitigate the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. However, the planet now faces locked-in costs, so leaders then have to turn to adaptation to prepare people for impacts such as hotter average temperatures.

Still, these adaptation actions are also limited. At some point, humanity’s ability to adapt to climate change moves beyond what is feasible—becoming losses (permanent) and damages (reversible in principle). This accounts for property loss and damage for individuals, or severe damage to infrastructure. It can also capture lost earnings or irreparable harm to entire sectors. While these costs are staggering, they are also borne unequally. Often, those countries that have contributed the least to global emissions are the same ones dealing with the worst impacts of climate change. The African continent, for example, faces devastating and disproportionate climate costs but has contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions.

If the United States continues to reduce its investments in and focus on climate, it comes with an economic cost for its own economy. In an interconnected world, inaction on climate means lower growth worldwide. Not only will climate inaction negatively impact global trading routes (for example, the noted and increasing traffic jams at the Panama Canal, which handles 5 percent of sea-based trade), but it will also cost the United States in terms of its own imports.

The less countries invest—especially high-emitting countries, including the United States—on addressing the causes of climate-related losses and damages, the more it will cost countries on the climate frontlines to produce essential goods and resources. Whether it’s an immediate realization or revealed in the years to come, these policies and inaction will hurt the United States and its ability to source agricultural products, manufacturing goods, or raw resources.

Climate change transcends borders. It’s impossible to build invisible walls around its impacts. The Trump administration has an opportunity and obligation to reconsider its climate policies and to fully recognize the economic costs associated for the country if it continues down an isolationist climate path.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He previously served as chief advisor and negotiator to the government of Peru, and he will serve as board member of the UN Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, representing the government of Peru.

The post The US pullout from the climate loss and damage fund will prove costlier in the long run appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Welcome to the fourth edition of Global Foresight from the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, home for the last decade to one of the world’s premier strategic foresight shops.

In this year’s installment, which is part of the Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series, our experts present exclusive findings from our survey of leading strategists and experts around the world on how human affairs could unfold over the next ten years across geopolitics, the global economy, climate change, technological disruption, and more. Our next-generation foresight team spots six “snow leopards”—under-the-radar phenomena that could have major unexpected impacts, for better or worse, in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three scenarios for how the world could transform over the next decade as a result of China’s ascendance, worsening climate change, and an evolving international order.

Welcome to 2035

What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

To survey the future, we polled global strategists and foresight gurus on our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next decade. Check out their forecasts on everything from the likelihood of another world war to the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

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Six snow leopards to watch in 2025

The underappreciated phenomena that could have outsize global impact

Because it receives relatively little attention in the press, the “snow leopard” does not appear significant enough to warrant much scrutiny as a driver of change and shaper of the future. Yet just like the real cat in the wild, the figurative snow leopard is something that could sneak up and vividly remind us of its power.

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Three worlds in 2035

Imagining scenarios for how global affairs could be transformed over the next decade

The Atlantic Council’s foresight team brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of envisioning three potential future paths for humanity.

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Meet your expert guides to the future

Full survey results

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Matthew Kroenig

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James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

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Consider the snow leopard. Panthera uncia sports some of the most effective camouflage in the animal kingdom, its white coat with gray and black spots blending in perfectly with the rocky, snowy Himalayan landscape it inhabits. It’s known as “the ghost of the mountains,” seeming to appear out of thin air on the rare occasions it is seen in the wild. 

There’s an equivalent phenomenon in global affairs: under-the-radar trends and events that elude even the most seasoned observer. When their effect on world affairs eventually becomes apparent, they may seem to have come out of nowhere. But these “snow leopards” were there all along. Trends slowly gathering momentum while the crisis du jour dominates headlines, technological developments whose real-world application is still theoretical, known but underrated risks—all of these phenomena have the power to reshape the future. Some already are. 

Any forecast of the future needs to account for these snow leopards. As we brought together experts across the Atlantic Council for our annual look into the future, our next-generation staff took on the challenge of spotting the hard to spot. They surveyed the world around them for overlooked risks, trawled scientific journals and the websites of obscure government departments, and came up with a list of potentially world-changing trends and developments. 

In the year to come and beyond, keep an eye on these six snow leopards. 

When you send a message on WhatsApp to a friend in Colombia or share a video call with family in India, the data—images, text, and video—gets broken down into packets and travels along undersea cables that connect continents in fractions of a second. Nearly 99 percent of international data passes through these cables, including terabytes of sensitive data sent by the US military to command posts overseas as well as an estimated ten trillion dollars transferred every day through the global financial system. In an increasingly interconnected world, nonstate actors pose a serious threat to this critical digital infrastructure, which often lies in shallow waters where it is vulnerable to everything from cyber threats to explosive devices to dragging anchors. 

It doesn’t take advanced equipment like submarines to damage these undersea cables. In 2013, for instance, Egyptian authorities arrested three divers who had used underwater explosives to slice through the South East Asia-Middle East-West Europe 4 internet cable, which runs for 12,500 miles and connects three continents. This incident came five years after a similar attack on the same cables and three years after terrorists in the Philippines successfully cut cable lines near the Filipino city of Cagayan de Oro. While the possible involvement of China and Russia in recent cord-cutting incidents has drawn international scrutiny, these prior incidents indicate that nonstate actors also perceive these cables as an opportune target.  

In late 2023, a Telegram channel affiliated with Yemen’s Houthi rebels threatened this vital underwater infrastructure by posting a map showing the subsea communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. An ominous message accompanied the map: “There are maps of international cables connecting all regions of the world through the sea. It seems that Yemen is in a strategic location, as internet lines that connect entire continents—not only countries—pass near it.” Of note, the Houthis possess an arsenal of underwater mines, and Houthi militants have reportedly undergone combat diver training in the Red Sea.  

The Houthis’ bold assertion could inspire other nonstate actors to put undersea cables in their crosshairs, expanding the threat to this vital infrastructure beyond the region. The same day the Telegram post appeared, a Hezbollah-affiliated Telegram channel shared a similar message and questioned whether the Houthi statement was a “veiled message to the Western coalition.” 

Since these cables facilitate financial transactions and are the only hardware capable of accommodating the huge volumes of military sensor data that inform ongoing operations, terrorist groups may see them as high-value targets that can be attacked at a relatively low cost. Furthermore, non-state actors with growing cyber capabilities could exploit vulnerabilities in these networks, potentially disrupting services or stealing sensitive data. This confluence of high-tech and low-tech threats should sound alarms about the future security of global communication networks. 

Emily Milliken is an analyst focusing on Gulf security issues, and the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. 

In 2023, the United States produced more oil in a single year than any other country in history—largely due to fracking, which injects fluid under high pressure into rocks, cracking them open to access oil stored within them. The same technique can be used to draw cleaner sources of energy—such as the heat trapped in the earth’s crust—to the surface and send it out to homes across the United States. Geothermal energy harnesses that heat and constitutes a low-carbon energy source. With new technology on the horizon that could make it easier to utilize geothermal energy in more parts of the country, the United States is poised to unlock a major source of energy.  

Geothermal-power extraction is currently confined to traditional hydrothermal regions, mostly in the western continental United States plus Hawaii and Alaska. In these regions, conventional geothermal systems tap into the naturally occurring hot water or steam from the earth to drive turbines that generate electricity.  

Through enhanced geothermal systems (EGS), geothermal-energy production could be expanded far beyond traditional hydrothermal regions. According to the US Department of Energy, by replicating the physical dynamics present in these regions, EGS has the potential to power more than 65 million homes—a little under half of all American homes. EGS is similar to fracking in that it involves injecting fluid into the ground to create new fractures or reopen old ones, resulting in increased permeability. The hot fluid is then pumped to the surface, where it is used to generate electricity. This method works in areas where the ground is hot enough but there may not be enough naturally occurring fluid or permeability to make geothermal power viable without the addition of EGS. 

Currently, the United States has utilized less than 0.7 percent of its geothermal-electricity resources, with the remaining potential expected to become available via EGS. The Department of Energy has started to recognize the potential of EGS, funding projects in Nevada, California, and Utah. The department’s Enhanced Geothermal Shot initiative seeks to reduce the cost of EGS by 90 percent by 2035 to $45 per megawatt hour. It’s an ambitious goal, but one that, if successful, would dramatically increase access to this low- or no-carbon energy source across the United States.  

That could help address an urgent need. One analysis estimates that power demand in the United States will grow 4.7 percent over the next five years, outpacing the 0.5 percent growth in annual demand over the last decade. Though not a silver bullet, expanding access to geothermal power could help meet this demand in a clean, predictable, and relatively cheap way. 

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Given the political and technical difficulties of getting countries to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases they pump into the air, the quest for technologies that can remove these gases has grown ever more important. One such technology, direct air capture (DAC), involves pulling carbon dioxide (CO2) out of the air and permanently storing it somewhere else, usually deep underground in rock formations. Because current methods of direct air capture are costly and energy-intensive, they have made only a marginal contribution to meeting global climate goals.  

Yet carbon capture might be poised for a transformation thanks to a yellow powder. DAC technologies are expensive to scale because they use substantial amounts of water and energy and are designed to capture concentrated sources of carbon such as the exhaust from a power plant. A new CO2-absorbing material called COF-999, created by a University of California at Berkeley-led team of scientists, could collect CO2 far more cheaply, using substantially less water and energy, than current DAC processes. Utilizing a covalent organic framework—involving the strongest chemical bonds in nature—the material promises to be dependable and sustainable. The powder is less likely to be damaged by humidity, reaches half its capacity in only eighteen minutes, is reusable (it can be used through one hundred cycles of the carbon-removal process, with minimal capacity loss), and might effectively pull CO2 out of the air around us, which has far lower concentrations of carbon than, for example, power-plant exhaust. 

Current carbon-capture technology, according to some estimates, could account for 14 percent of the global-emissions reductions needed to meet climate targets by 2050. The market is already expected to rapidly expand, with a projected compound annual growth rate of 6.2 percent over the next five years and estimated value of four trillion dollars by 2050. The invention of COF-999 could supercharge these numbers. It could be easily implemented in existing carbon-capture systems, or scientists could experiment with ways to take advantage of its ability to clean ambient air. “We took a powder of this material, put it in a tube, and we passed Berkeley air—just outdoor air—into the material to see how it would perform … It cleaned the air entirely of CO2,” said Omar Yaghi, a Berkeley chemistry professor who worked on the study. As atmospheric CO2 levels hit record highs, and extreme heat waves, wildfires, floods, and hurricanes increase in frequency, the yellow-powder breakthrough is one example of the creative science needed to counter inaction on rising global emissions.

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

If you have fifteen million dollars to spare, an unused ancestral estate, or even a small plot of land in need of transformation, you too can get in on the hot new trend of rewilding—or the process of rebuilding natural ecosystems on landscapes disrupted by humans. The concept represents a fundamental shift in the way governments, ecologists, and ordinary people view conservation. It focuses on restoring to health native environments—including their balance of plants and animals—rather than on trying to protect scarce undisturbed areas such as wilderness (only 3 percent of the Earth’s land surface is ecologically intact). The idea first took off in North America and has spread like kudzu, including to the estates of the ultra-wealthy. Although rewilding remains a niche solution to various conservation problems, it may be on the verge of an explosion, with major consequences for the global climate. 

Some estimates already put the global total of land available for rewilding at a billion acres, which is roughly half the area of the Australian landmass—and even more is set to become available over the course of this century as a combination of factors reduce pressure for the intensive use of land. Some two-thirds of humanity is projected to live in cities by 2050, and the world’s total population (urban and rural) is expected to peak by the mid-2080s. At the same time, agricultural productivity is increasing, technology and innovation are decoupling food output from land input, and alternative proteins, which are far less land- and carbon-intensive than animal-based proteins, are becoming increasingly popular. 

A 2024 study found that a quarter of land in Europe is suitable for rewilding, with Scandinavian countries, Scotland, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal at the top of the list. A lot of land is viable for rewilding beyond Europe, too, including in Japan and North America. In the United States alone, around thirty million acres of cropland has been abandoned since the 1980s.  

Rewilding may help the environment by absorbing carbon and reversing biodiversity loss. Recent declines in biodiversity around the world, including a 73 percent decrease in wildlife populations over the last fifty years and one million species on the verge of extinction, are linked to accelerated climate change and the spread of infectious diseases. There could be economic benefits as well. Nature tourism is responsible for $600 billion in revenue globally and twenty-two million jobs; revitalized natural spaces and the reintroduction of large animals into them can help raise those numbers. Restoration and rewilding can also increase farming yields, the availability of water, and global fish populations, while also reducing the degradation of agricultural land. Mangroves, coastal wetlands, and coral reefs can lessen flood risk. Putting large herbivores back into their native areas can lower wildfire risk. 

Just as the potential benefits of rewilding are becoming clearer, so too are its possible costs. Some experts fear that rewilding efforts may, like some net-zero carbon pledges, allow governments and industry to sidestep decarbonization efforts in favor of carbon offsets, which are unregulated and can be reversed. The reintroduction of animals and plants, particularly large predators, can also induce a public backlash, which may harm rewilding and restoration. Restoration of ecosystems might increase the risks of tick- and other vector-borne diseases as well. As the world grows hotter, it could prove difficult to reintroduce some desired species. 

Nevertheless, if the land resources and financial incentives for ecological restoration combine with messaging and public sentiment in favor of individual and community action, rewilding may become a movement capable of restoring wide swathes of land to their original states. In so doing, it might open a new route to address the effects of a changing climate.

John Cookson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist.  

Sydney Sherry is an assistant director with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

In 2019, scientists Akira Yoshino, M. Stanley Whittingham, and John B. Goodenough won the Nobel Prize in chemistry for their development of the rechargeable, renewable lithium-ion battery. The committee commended the trio for having “laid the foundation of a wireless, fossil fuel-free society.” Since their debut in the 1990s, batteries have become ubiquitous in all kinds of electronics. But there’s something even better on the horizon, and not a moment too soon: quantum batteries. 

These novel batteries store energy by drawing on quantum mechanics (the study of physics on a microscopic scale) and particularly quantum chemistry, which is crucial to battery research and allows scientists to understand the chemical structure and reaction of atoms at significantly quicker speeds than current models. It’s a promising emerging technology to watch amid a broader exploration of alternative battery chemistries that could offer the energy density and stability to perform better than lithium-ion batteries for certain functions. 

One application is medical devices. About 26 percent of the US adult population has some type of disability that requires a medical device—such as cochlear implants or a pacemaker—and these devices rely on lithium-ion, lithium, or lithium-iodine batteries for energy. Supply of such batteries isn’t guaranteed; beginning in 2022, for instance, a lithium-ion battery shortage upended electric-vehicle and medical-device supply chains in the United States. These batteries also often require recharging or a replacement, which can necessitate additional surgeries if the medical device that uses them is implanted.

Since quantum batteries could have higher energy density, quantum devices could provide more efficient and long-lasting performance than lithium-based options, reducing the number of battery exchanges that put patients at risk. The energy stored in quantum batteries also could power medical facilities and electric vehicles, improving emergency services in vulnerable and remote areas—a crucial concern worldwide, as climate change brings stronger storms along with longer and more intense heat waves, which not only raise health risks but also strain power grids. During power outages, most hospitals today rely on fossil-fuel and battery-system generators, which often experience complications. In the future, quantum batteries could power these facilities instead. Additionally, since quantum batteries could accelerate charging times for electric vehicles from the current thirty minutes to seconds at high-speed stations (and from about ten hours to a few minutes at home), electrically powered ambulances and medical devices could be charged and ready to go in seconds—a unit of time that can make all the difference for first responders.  

Tatevik Khachatryan is an assistant director for events at the Atlantic Council.

Picture someone falling for an online hoax. If an elderly internet user came to mind, think again. A recent study from Cambridge University revealed that the generation that grew up with the internet—and that reported in the study spending the most time online—had a hard time telling real headlines from fake ones. 

Though they tend to be tech savvy and certainly are not the only generation vulnerable to inaccurate information, members of Generation Z (those born in the late 1990s and early 2000s) are more susceptible to mis- and disinformation than widely assumed. Often relying on social media as a primary news source, digital natives are vulnerable to manipulation. In the Cambridge study, as well as in research conducted by the Center for Countering Digital Hate, they demonstrated a propensity to believe in conspiracy theories. Gen Z might be conscious of the threat posed by biased feeds and manipulated media, but its members continue to scroll and share—and their amplification of mis- and disinformation will be a serious challenge in the future.

Social media is a central fact of life for the vast majority of Gen Zers in the developed world, and it has become an indispensable informational tool for those in developing countries as well. In 2024, a report surveying nearly 4,500 individuals across the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Australia found that 91 percent of Gen Z social media users are on Instagram and 86 percent are on TikTok. Gen Z is forming judgments based on the content appearing on their social media feeds—often curated by algorithms that privilege content with higher engagement levels regardless of whether it is true or false—and circulating it to their digital communities. Their decisions about who to follow on social media are not necessarily rooted in the authenticity or credibility of those figures. Instead their social media consumption is often parasocial: They tend to follow media streams and engage with the causes of individuals who they don’t know personally, be they influencers or politicians. 

A generation growing up with seemingly unlimited access to information and extensive knowledge about what digital technologies like algorithms do, but with limited ability to verify that information, represents a significant sociological change. As members of Gen Z proceed in their careers and assume more powerful positions, there is a real risk that they have been left ill-prepared to navigate the overwhelming scale of online information ecosystems. The mis- and disinformation surrounding global challenges ranging from war to migration to climate change may also make Gen Zers more mistrustful of both institutions and other individuals, rendering them less capable of addressing these challenges. Collaborative efforts between Gen Z and older generations—engaging private companies, governments, and individuals—are needed to manage a transformed information landscape and prevent subsequent generations from growing up in an era of misinformation or falling for online hoaxes. 

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

Srujan Palkar is a Global India fellow and assistant director with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

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The post Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By Mary Kate Aylward, Peter Engelke, Uri Friedman, and Paul Kielstra

Not all the projections were pessimistic. Fifty-eight percent of those who participated in our Global Foresight 2025 survey, for example, felt that artificial intelligence would, on balance, have a positive impact on global affairs over the next ten years—an increase of 7 percentage points from our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Roughly half of respondents foresaw an expansion of global cooperation on climate change.  

But the grimmer forecasts were in keeping with a dark global outlook overall, with 62 percent of respondents expecting the world a decade from now to be worse off than it is today, and only 38 percent predicting that it will be better off.  

The 357 survey respondents were mostly citizens of the United States (just under 55 percent of those polled), with the others spread across sixty countries and every continent but Antarctica. Respondents skewed male and older, and were dispersed across a range of fields including the private sector, nonprofits, academic or educational organizations, and government and multilateral institutions.  

So what do these forecasters of the global future anticipate over the coming decade? Below are the survey’s ten biggest findings. 

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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1. Forty percent of respondents expect a world war in the next decade—one that could go nuclear and extend to space 

For the first time in our annual survey, we asked respondents whether they expected there to be another world war by 2035. We defined such a war as involving a multifront conflict among great powers. And the results were alarming, with 40 percent saying yes.  

While this was a new question, our Global Foresight 2024 survey surfaced a similar concern, with nearly a quarter of respondents pointing to war between major powers as the greatest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years.

The finding tracks with worries expressed by other experts amid major wars in Europe and the Middle East, growing tensions between the United States and China, and increasing cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Surveying this treacherous global landscape this past summer, for example, the historian and former US diplomat Philip Zelikow assigned a 20 to 30 percent probability to the prospect of “worldwide warfare” and warned of a “period of maximum danger” within the next one to three years. 

Judging by our respondents’ answers, another world war might feature nuclear weapons. Forty-eight percent of respondents overall (and 63 percent of those predicting World War III) expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade by at least one actor.  

Such a conflict also may play out in outer space. Forty-five percent of respondents overall (and 60 percent of those predicting World War III) expected the next decade to include a direct military conflict fought, at least in part, in space.  

And it could be devastating to the global economy. Twenty-eight percent of respondents identified war among major powers as the single biggest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years. 

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2. Tensions with China and Russia are potential vectors for major conflict 

By definition, a world war would involve more than two belligerent nations. But across multiple questions in the survey, respondents forecast a future in which today’s strategic competition and geopolitical tensions between the United States and China in particular could sharpen into something more dangerous.  

Survey respondents, for instance, were significantly more inclined than a year earlier to foresee a military conflict over Taiwan, which could draw in the United States in support of the island and against China. Sixty-five percent of all respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that China will try to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, and only 24 percent somewhat or strongly disagreed. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, that split was 50 percent to 30 percent. Among those predicting the breakout of another world war, the proportion was even higher: Seventy-nine percent believed China will attempt to forcibly retake Taiwan over the next ten years. 

Expand to read expert insight by Markus Garlauskas

Though this year’s survey findings may seem worrisome at first because respondents see increasing risks of war, I find them reassuring. The change from last year shows a greater awareness of the nature of the threats we face in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the risk of confronting simultaneous conflicts with multiple adversaries and nuclear attacks.

That a clear majority of respondents now expect Beijing to try to take Taiwan by force in the coming decade is actually a hopeful signal to me. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been clearly building up military forces suited for offensive operations and has repeatedly stated that he will not renounce the use of force to bring Taiwan under control. Meanwhile, polls suggest that the vast majority of the people of Taiwan are disinclined to be ruled by Beijing, favoring either the status quo or outright independence.

This would seem to set Beijing and Taipei on an inevitable collision course. Yet there is also good reason to believe that China overwhelming Taiwan is not inevitable, in part because invasion would be a far more difficult operation than is commonly recognized. It will take the increasing sense of threat of force identified by the survey to prompt Taiwan and the United States to make the investments necessary to increase their preparedness for deterring and defeating such use of force.

This growing awakening on the part of the United States and its allies can become the basis for a call to action for the populations, governments, and militaries of these countries. The United States has typically waited until war was thrust upon it before preparing comprehensively. Now is the time to act, to prepare, ideally to deter such aggression, and to be ready to hold firm if deterrence fails and we face either a short, sharp war or a protracted one. 

—Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

A US-China confrontation is not the only potential pathway to a multifront conflict among great powers. Forty-five percent of respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that Russia and NATO will engage in a direct military conflict within the next ten years—a significant increase from the 29 percent who felt this way in our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Among respondents expecting another world war within the next decade, 69 percent anticipated a direct clash between Russia and NATO.

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3. Just under half of respondents expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to be formal allies within a decade, potentially in a world featuring China- and US-aligned blocs 

Other geopolitical dynamics forecast by survey respondents could serve as the kindling for whatever spark ignites a wider war or, alternatively, emerge as byproducts of such a conflict.  

Forty-seven percent of respondents predicted that, by 2035, the world will largely be divided into China-aligned and US-aligned blocs; among that group, nearly 60 percent expected the China-aligned bloc to include Russia, Iran, and North Korea as formal allies, presumably with China leading the alliance.  

Overall, just under half of our survey respondents (46 percent) agreed that the emerging axis of Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea will be formal allies in 2035. While this was the first time we asked this question regarding all four countries, in our Global Foresight 2024 survey 33 percent of respondents thought Russia and China would be formal allies in ten years’ time. 

Many respondents appeared to associate these potential developments with the prospect of a world war. Among respondents who foresaw both the world being divided into China- and US-aligned blocs and China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea becoming formal allies, 62 percent also anticipated another world war over the next decade; among other survey respondents, that figure was far lower at 33 percent. 

Expand to read expert insight by Melanie Hart

Economically, there is movement underway toward a US-and-allies versus China-aligned bloc structure, but this movement is still nascent. How far it goes will largely depend on whether the United States can overcome its domestic political reticence to actively shaping the global economic order and once again begin negotiating market-access trade deals.

Beijing seeks a global system in which other nations must abide by its wishes and there are no constraints—legal, normative, or otherwise—limiting Beijing’s own actions. Beijing is using global commerce to enforce this approach. For nations that depend on trade or investment with China, Beijing is increasingly willing to shut off the flow of goods and capital to enforce its demands in other issue areas. Beijing is also using those partners as consumption dumping grounds, exporting excess capacity across a wide array of goods (such as steel and electric vehicles) at rock-bottom prices, which addresses over-supply in the China market but drives local producers out of business. This is leading many nations to reduce their exposure and vulnerabilities to Beijing’s market interference. Many of those nations increasingly view Western, US-centric supply chains as a more attractive option.

As this shift unfolds, it could lead to new economic blocs—for example, a new multilateral trading structure in which the United States and its allies are at the center of a global trading bloc that China is not allowed to join. However, that will depend on Washington shaking off its trade malaise and figuring out how to negotiate new trade deals that create new, formal structures centered on US and allied rules of the road. China is busy creating its own options—such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Asia—but the United States is hanging back. Without more assertive US-led action on the trade front, the biggest risk is that China will form a new, massive global economic bloc and write the rules to benefit itself at our expense, while the United States and its allies watch from the sidelines.

As for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, these four nations are partners with a clear shared interest—namely, their desire to undermine the United States and the liberal international order—but they are not true allies. China’s need for integration with the global economy is likely to limit the degree to which today’s partnership evolves in the future into a more formal alliance similar to the alliance the United States enjoys with its NATO partners.

The Chinese Communist Party has staked its regime legitimacy—its pitch for the Chinese people’s continued support—largely on its ability to deliver economically. Unfortunately, the party has also decided that the reforms required to deliver next-level economic growth are too risky, as they would require the party to cede more internal political control over the nation’s economy, legal system, and society. As long as Chinese leaders are unwilling to do that, they will lag behind the West in technology innovation, and they will depend on access to Western companies, universities, and markets to help fill that gap. That dependence limits China’s willingness to sign up for a comprehensive alliance with Russia, Iran, or North Korea, because Beijing does not want to join those nations in an economic wilderness that cuts Chinese companies off from the world’s leading technology powers.

—Melanie Hart, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub 

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4. The proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is a growing risk, with nearly half of respondents expecting a nuclear weapon to be used by 2035

Since the dawn of the Atomic Age and particularly since the latter part of the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation efforts have sought to prevent additional countries from acquiring the world’s most destructive weapons, with varying success. And after the United States did so in 1945, no country has used nuclear weapons in war. But according to our survey respondents, the coming decade could bring very concerning developments on both these fronts. 

Iran is the most likely—but not the only potential—new nuclear-weapons power on the horizon 

In our latest survey, 88 percent of respondents expected at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons in the coming decade, a slight uptick from 84 percent in the Global Foresight 2024 edition. As in our previous survey, just under three quarters of respondents predicted that Iran will go beyond its current threshold status and join the nuclear-weapons club within the next ten years, making it the survey’s most-cited candidate to become a nuclear-weapons state in the future.  

The coming years could bring a range of policy responses to this anticipated development, from strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities to a new round of nuclear negotiations with Tehran. Perhaps in recognition of these scenarios, more than a third of respondents expected Israel to have engaged in a direct war with Iran by 2035.

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

Is Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon inevitable or at least highly likely in the next decade? Far from it. Whether Iran acquires a nuclear weapon will depend on policy choices made by Iran, Israel, and the United States regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.

Currently, Iran still officially disavows an intent to produce a nuclear weapon, but there has been much more talk among Iranian officials during the past year of the need for one as pressure on Iran has increased due to Israeli military actions against Tehran’s “resistance axis” and Iran itself.

Iran’s military and economic weaknesses have intensified an ongoing debate between moderates and hardliners in Iran over the direction of the country’s foreign and nuclear policy. Moderates want to negotiate a freeze on Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions and an opening of trade and investment with the West and Arab Gulf states. Hardliners argue Iran must double down on its expansionist regional policies, its threshold status as a military nuclear power, its growing ties to Russia and China, and its hardline stance toward the United States and the West to rebuild deterrence and resilience.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will have to make the call on which policy to pursue, and uppermost in his mind will be which approach—or mixture of the two—best ensures the survival of the Islamic Republic, his overarching priority.

Israeli officials continue to monitor Iran’s nuclear program closely and have reiterated warnings that Israel will resort to military force if Iran seeks to acquire a nuclear weapon. Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been emboldened by its military successes over the past year, including the destruction of Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s military capabilities and Iran’s air defenses, as well as the weakening of Iran’s missile-production capabilities. Senior Israeli officials probably believe conditions are ripe to destroy or set back Iran’s nuclear program without major threat of retaliation, given the Islamic Republic’s current vulnerability, but also seem to recognize that Israel would need US military support to do lasting damage.

The Trump administration is committed to restoring its previous maximum-pressure campaign of sanctions against Iran to compel it to agree to a new nuclear deal and curbs on its malign regional behavior. Trump’s transition team reportedly discussed the possibility of a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities given that Iran now has enough highly enriched uranium for several bombs and that sanctions could take a long time to work. They may have leaked this option to frighten Iran into agreeing to negotiations, but clearly the Trump administration is signaling a willingness to go beyond sanctions and diplomacy to achieve its objectives.

With Iran’s axis of resistance shredded, and Iran itself weakened militarily and economically, the United States has an extraordinary opportunity—working with Israel, Arab allies, and European countries—to use economic and diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force to secure an agreement that walks Iran back from the nuclear brink and curbs its destabilizing regional policies.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East 

What is new is the jump in the percentage of respondents expecting other countries to get these weapons. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, for example, a quarter of respondents thought South Korea would acquire nuclear weapons. In our most recent survey, that figure was 40 percent. The percentage of respondents expecting Japan—the only country ever subject to a nuclear-weapons attack, where the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are a prominent national presence—to acquire nuclear weapons also increased ten percentage points over 2024, from 19 percent to 29 percent. (Notably, while the percentage of respondents anticipating a nuclear Iran in ten years’ time remained steady year over year, so did the roughly 40 percent of respondents expecting nearby rival Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons as well.) 

North Korea and Russia are considered the most likely to launch a nuclear-weapons attack

Forty-eight percent of respondents expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade, up from 37 percent in our previous survey.  

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

This finding demonstrates that nuclear weapons have returned to the center of geopolitics. For years after the end of the Cold War, many assumed that nuclear weapons were obsolete relics from the past. The Obama administration made eliminating nuclear weapons a top priority. At the time, Washington assessed that there was virtually zero chance of a nuclear war among states and the greatest nuclear threats came from terrorism or accident.

Now, nearly half of our respondents assess that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade. This shows that nuclear weapons are not twentieth-century curiosities but the ultimate instrument of force and essential tools of great-power competition. China is engaging in the most rapid nuclear buildup since the 1960s, Russia is issuing regular nuclear threats, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, and Iran’s dash time to the bomb is now measured in weeks.

This means that the United States will need to once again strengthen its strategic forces to deter adversaries and assure allies. By doing so, I hope the United States can prove our respondents wrong and ensure that the world’s most powerful weapons are never used again.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 

Roughly one-quarter of respondents predicted that Russia will use a nuclear weapon by 2035, with around the same percentage saying the same regarding North Korea, amid reports of near-Russian nuclear use early in its war against Ukraine and concerns about crumbling deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Both cases represent significant increases relative to our previous survey, when only 14 percent expected Russia to employ a nuke and 15 percent believed North Korea would do so. 

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5. The United States is still likely to be dominant militarily in 2035—but with relatively less economic, diplomatic, and soft power as it navigates a multipolar world

Three-quarters of respondents in our latest survey agreed that the world in 2035 will be multipolar, with multiple centers of power, in line with the findings in our previous survey. 

A slightly smaller percentage of respondents—71 percent—expected the United States to remain the world’s dominant military power by that time. A majority (58 percent) envisioned the United States being the world’s dominant technology innovator a decade from now.  

On other measures of power—economic, cultural, and diplomatic—respondents predicting US dominance in 2035 were in the minority, if only ever so slightly in the case of economic power, in which 49 percent of respondents expected the United States to be dominant. 

Between our latest survey and the previous year’s, confidence in US dominance over the next decade dropped across several measures of power, particularly diplomatic and military clout. Those forecasting US dominance in ten years’ time declined from 81 percent to 71 percent for military power, 63 percent to 58 percent for technological innovation, 52 percent to 49 percent for economic power, and 32 percent to 24 percent for diplomatic power. (The Global Foresight 2024 survey did not ask about future US dominance in cultural or soft power, which 35 percent of respondents expected in our most recent survey.) Slightly more respondents (12 percent) relative to our prior survey (7 percent) forecast that the United States will be dominant in none of these areas by 2035. 

A bright but more uncertain future for US alliances 

While a majority of respondents (61 percent) expected the United States to maintain its security alliances and partnerships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in 2035, this figure was markedly down from our previous survey (79 percent), with much of the shift seeming to stem from those answering that they “don’t know” (26 percent in the Global Foresight 2025 edition relative to 12 percent in the 2024 edition).  

Responses on the future of US military dominance and alliances appear correlated. Among those who expected the United States to retain such dominance by 2035, 67 percent believed that it would maintain its network of alliances. Among those who did not think the United States would be the world’s dominant military power in a decade, only 46 percent believed that the country would preserve its alliance network. 

In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, just under a third of respondents expected Europe to have achieved “strategic autonomy” within the next decade by taking more responsibility for its own security and thus relying less on the United States. In our latest survey, however, almost half of respondents (48 percent) expected Europe to achieve “strategic autonomy” over the next ten years—a notable increase as President Donald Trump presses European countries to substantially increase their defense spending.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of alliances and partnerships in 2035:

The dangers of a diminished United States 

Those who anticipate a diminished United States over the next decade may link such a scenario to worse outcomes for the world. Among respondents who said that by 2035 the United States will be the dominant power in none of the domains listed in the survey, for instance, only 24 percent believed that the world will be better off in a decade’s time. Among other respondents, 40 percent expected the world to be better off ten years from now. Similarly, among those who didn’t expect US dominance in any domain of power in a decade, 62 percent envisioned a world war occurring over that timeframe. For the rest of the survey pool, 38 percent anticipated another world war.  

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

In the United States, declinism is a national pastime with a poor track record. In the 1970s, many thought the Soviet Union was on a trajectory to overtake the United States as the world’s leading superpower. In the 1980s, economists projected that Japan would unseat the United States as the world’s leading economy. In the 2010s, many thought it was inevitable that China would become the world’s largest economic power.

All of those predictions turned out to be incorrect.

The United States is now a rising power, claiming 26 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), its largest share in two decades. Meanwhile, China is declining; Xi Jinping’s desire to assert Chinese Communist Party control over all aspects of Chinese society is stifling Chinese growth, and his aggressive foreign policy is undercutting the global economic engagement strategy that fueled China’s rise. Europe’s share of global GDP has fallen from a quarter in the 1980s to roughly 15 percent today. Russia’s GDP is smaller than Italy’s and Spain’s. To whom then is the United States supposedly ceding all of this power?

Is the United States in decline? I wouldn’t bet on it.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 

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6. Many respondents are pessimistic about the war in Ukraine ending on terms favorable to Ukraine

Amid a push by the incoming Trump administration to bring the war in Ukraine to an end three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country, and as Ukraine and Russia each seek to secure the best possible terms in any future negotiated peace deal, respondents were split on the likely outcome of the conflict. Forty-seven percent predicted that Russia’s war against Ukraine will end on terms largely favorable to Russia and 43 percent forecast that it will result in a “frozen conflict.” Only 4 percent expected the war to end on terms largely favorable to Ukraine.  

Our previous survey a year earlier, which asked a different and more detailed question about Ukraine in ten years’ time, reflected more optimism, with 48 percent of respondents predicting that Ukraine would emerge from the war as an independent, sovereign state in control of the territory it held before Russia’s escalated assault on the country in 2022. 

Expand to read expert insight by John Herbst

Expectations about the future change in the wake of historic developments and perceptions of those developments. Perhaps the single most important factor in determining the outcome of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is US policy.

Simply put, a strong US policy providing Ukraine the weapons to drive Russian forces largely out of Ukraine and rallying the political West to supply Ukraine’s economic needs would lead to a clear defeat for Russian President Vladimir Putin that would return much of occupied Ukraine to Kyiv’s control, and with a US-led effort would vouchsafe Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity via NATO membership. Alternatively, a US decision to cut off aid to Ukraine would likely lead to a disaster that would ensure Kremlin political control of the country, produce a direct threat to NATO, and encourage aggression by US adversaries in the Far and Middle East.

US President Joe Biden gave substantial support to Ukraine, but he stopped well short of giving Ukraine the arms and permission to take back most of the country. Trump has stated that he wants Ukraine to survive and would not abandon the country, but he is seeking a durable peace that requires compromise from Ukraine as well as Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has indicated a readiness to compromise; Putin has not. Recognizing this, Trump and his team have identified Putin as the recalcitrant party and have spoken of major economic measures—tougher sanctions, transferring the $300 billion in frozen Russian state assets to Ukraine—to persuade Russia to negotiate. Respondents to the survey pay attention to the major factors affecting this war, including the Trump angle. But respondents to surveys are not seers, and survey questions are not written to explore the insights that seers might provide.

What therefore might we expect to happen with the war this coming year? First, Trump will roll out a peace initiative that likely includes four elements already public. Two are hard for Zelenskyy: territorial concessions (at least de facto) and no NATO membership for Ukraine for twenty years minimum. And two are hard for Putin: the demilitarized zone enforced by European troops and arming Ukraine to the hilt to prevent future Russian aggression. We can expect Putin to try hard to get Trump to drop those last two points before and then during the talks. But if Putin is persuaded that Trump will arm Ukraine with far more advanced weapons if Russia is unyielding, he might agree to terms that he intends to violate. Trump’s hopes for a Nobel Peace Prize depend on him insisting that Russia compromise to the point of ensuring a viable and stable future for Ukraine, and being ready to confront the ever-treacherous Russian dictator if Putin violates an agreement whose terms would yield that outcome.

—John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center 

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7. Respondents are much more optimistic about a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi relations than in Israeli-Palestinian peace  

Ever since Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks against Israel and Israel’s ensuing war in Gaza set off transformative changes in the broader Middle East, US officials have linked reviving work on normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia with renewing the push for a pathway to a Palestinian state as part of an eventual Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, with the Saudis insisting on the latter as a condition for the former.  

But our survey respondents—who, notably, shared their views before Israel and Hamas reached their January cease-fire and hostage deal—were much more bullish about the prospects for Israeli-Saudi normalization in the coming decade than about the chances of an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution. Fifty-six percent envisioned Israel having normalized diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia by 2035—roughly similar to the percentage who said the same in our post-October 7, 2023, Global Foresight 2024 survey—relative to 17 percent who expected Israel to be coexisting next to a sovereign, independent Palestinian state within that timeframe. More than 60 percent of respondents predicted that when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, today’s status quo, with occupied Palestinian territories, will persist. 

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

In 2035, will Israel have the status quo that exists today, with occupied Palestinian territories?

Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 has taught us the dangers of thinking a status quo will continue indefinitely. Israeli leaders’ belief that Hamas had reconciled itself to the status quo in Gaza—in which Gazans received economic benefits in return for Hamas not attacking Israel—left them unprepared for the most devastating attack on the Jewish state since its war of independence in 1948.

And the war in Gaza that resulted from Hamas’s attack has brought further surprises: Israel’s almost complete destruction of Hamas as a military and political organization; the killing of most of Hezbollah’s military leaders and elimination of a majority of its vaunted rocket and missile arsenal; direct Iranian and Israeli attacks on each other’s territory, with Israel wiping out all of Iran’s most advanced air-defense systems; and the almost overnight collapse of the Syrian military and the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the face of a renewed rebel offensive.

The Middle East’s geopolitical landscape has been dramatically transformed, and Iran’s image as a regional hegemon and defender of the Palestinians badly tarnished. Israeli leaders have been emboldened by Israel’s military successes and seem to believe that maintaining military dominance alone will deter the country’s enemies.

But some observers, looking ahead, ask whether the cycle of violence since October 7 is likely to repeat itself at some point if Israel doesn’t address the issue of Palestinian aspirations for independence. The Biden administration and others have called for a return to the idea of a two-state solution as necessary to forestall future cycles of Israeli-Palestinian violence.

Admittedly, the current environment is not propitious for discussion of a Palestinian state. A large majority of Israelis, still traumatized by Hamas’s horrific attack on October 7, reject the idea as posing a grave risk to Israel’s security. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly refused calls from the United States to incorporate the concept of an eventual Palestinian state into Israel’s post-war strategy, and right-wingers in the current Israeli government want to annex a large part of the West Bank, keep long-term control of the Gaza Strip, and return Israeli settlements to Gaza.

But the Palestinian issue is not likely to go away. Anti-Israel militancy and violence by Palestinians is growing in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, and Israel hasn’t totally suppressed attacks by Hamas in Gaza after more than a year of fighting. Arab publics are seething with anger over the large number of Palestinians killed and displaced by Israeli military operations in Gaza. And world opinion has increasingly turned against Israel as Palestinian casualties have mounted.

The Palestinian issue remains a roadblock to Israel becoming fully integrated into the region, a key goal of Netanyahu’s that he hopes will put a capstone on his legacy as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. Responding to popular sentiment, Saudi leaders have indicated that Riyadh won’t normalize relations with Israel—an essential step to create a political and security bulwark against renewed threats from Iran—unless Jerusalem endorses a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood.

New elections will probably need to take place in Israel, bringing new leadership open to the idea of a political horizon for the Palestinians, if the current status quo is to change. The United States has an important role to play here by encouraging Israeli leaders to think about how to translate their military success into a regional strategy that includes a vision for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The odds of such a development seem long right now, but October 7 is a reminder that clinging to an unstable status quo can be riskier than seeking to change it.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East 

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8. As global organizations become less capable of solving the world’s problems, regional groupings and the BRICS may rise in importance   

Respondents foresaw many global institutions growing less effective over the coming decade. Seventy-five percent expected the United Nations (UN) to be less capable of solving challenges core to its mission by 2035 relative to today, compared with 9 percent who anticipated it becoming more capable of doing so. The figures for the United Nations Security Council are only slightly better, with 67 percent of respondents predicting less capability and 9 percent more capability. Sixty percent of respondents envisioned the World Trade Organization being less capable in a decade than it is today.  

Respondents also may be skeptical about the UN’s capacity to tackle global-governance challenges such as climate change. Just under 40 percent of respondents predicted that greenhouse-gas emissions will have peaked and begun to decline by 2035, despite signs that this tipping point is already near. Only about half of respondents believed that renewable energy technologies will be the dominant form of electricity production globally by then, despite significant growth in demand for renewable energy. 

The forecast was less dire for the World Bank, with 46 percent predicting less capability and 19 percent more capability, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), with 41 percent predicting less capability and 20 percent more capability. A similar if slightly more sanguine picture emerged regarding organizations consisting of the world’s leading powers. Forty-nine percent of respondents predicted less capability and 21 percent more capability for the Group of Seven (G7), while 38 percent expected less capability and 29 percent more capability for the Group of Twenty (G20). 

But respondents seemed to hold out even more hope for regional blocs and the BRICS, which is now expanding its membership beyond Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Forty percent of respondents predicted that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be more capable of fulfilling its mission by 2035, while 20 percent said the opposite. For the European Union, those figures were 40 percent and 33 percent. (Respondents from EU countries were even more optimistic, with 50 percent expecting greater capability and 22 percent less capability.) For the BRICS, the numbers were 43 percent and 31 percent. 

Expand to read expert insight by Josh Lipsky

The findings show in hard data what many analysts believe—that the international financial institutions, in particular the Bretton Woods institutions, remain the most functional parts of the multilateral system. That’s because they deliver real money every day to countries around the world. 

But the responses also show a growing recognition that these institutions are not self-perpetuating. The tenuous consensus that allows them to go about day-to-day business is predicated on an understanding that functioning IMF and World Bank institutions serve every country (including the United States) better than dysfunctional ones. With Donald Trump’s return to office, there are questions about whether that consensus will hold. For what it’s worth: The first time Trump was in office, it did, and Trump and his team saw the value in both institutions, even if they disagreed with some policy decisions. 

The one area of the findings that seems off-target is on the BRICS. The likelihood of the BRICS succeeding in fulfilling their main goals seems vastly overstated in these findings (likely a product of media reporting on BRICS expansion during 2023 and 2024). Here’s the question that is much tougher to answer: What do the BRICS actually want to achieve? What they oppose—the Western-led system—is clear. But what is their proactive agenda? Until they answer that question, the ability of BRICS to succeed as an institution will be limited at best.   

—Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center 

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9. Today’s democratic recession may deepen into a democratic depression

Overall, respondents appeared gloomy about the prospects for democracy around the world by 2035. Just under half envisioned the current “democratic recession” worsening and becoming a “democratic depression,” while only 17 percent anticipated a “democratic renaissance” instead. The remaining 37 percent expected the global state of democracy to remain much as it is today, with some encouraging progress but also considerable headwinds and backsliding. 

Sixty-five percent of respondents also forecast that global press freedoms will decrease by 2035, with another quarter expecting them to stay about the same as they are today and very few anticipating those freedoms increasing over the coming decade. 

Our question on the state of global democracy in our previous survey was not identical and therefore not directly comparable. Nevertheless, its results—24 percent expected more democracies a decade hence, 38 percent forecast fewer democracies, and another 37 percent foresaw stasis—presaged the dim outlook expressed in our latest survey. 

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10. Women are more pessimistic about the global future than men are 

Women notably expressed a bleaker outlook across many questions in the survey related to conflict, their own rights, and US clout over the next decade. 

For instance, 61 percent of female respondents predicted that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade, compared with 44 percent of male respondents who said the same. Women (54 percent) were also more likely than men (44 percent) to expect a democratic depression. Thirty-two percent of women pointed to women as the most likely group to have their rights curtailed in the coming decade—twice the proportion of men who gave the same answer. Women, moreover, were less likely than men to envision the United States as the world’s dominant military power (58 percent relative to 76 percent) and technological innovator (47 percent relative to 61 percent) in a decade’s time.  

Expand to read expert insight by Nicole Goldin

The pessimism from women likely reflects persistent inequities in military, economic, and political representation and participation, as well as the disproportionate impacts of crises and shocks—whether those are economic (like inflation), security-related (from wars such as those in Ukraine or Gaza), the result of political turmoil or transition, or the product of natural disasters and climate events.

Compounding these situations are the challenges of child or family care and pay gaps, which limit the work and earnings of many women, and worsening domestic and gender-based violence, which devastates women’s lives in all dimensions. In the United States, the rollback of Roe v. Wade has left many women believing their rights and protection more broadly are at risk.

—Nicole Goldin, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and head of equitable development at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research 

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About the authors

Mary Kate Aylward, Publications Editor, Atlantic Council

Aylward was an editor at War on the Rocks and Army AL&T before joining the Council. She was previously a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Uri Friedman, Senior Editorial Director, Atlantic Council

Friedman is also a contributing writer at The Atlantic, where he writes a regular column on international affairs. He was previously a senior staff writer at The Atlantic covering national security and global affairs, the editor of The Atlantic’s Global section, and the deputy managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

Paul Kielstra, Freelance Analyst

Kielstra is a freelance author who has published extensively in fields including business analysis, healthcare, energy policy, fraud control, international trade, and international relations. His work regularly includes the drafting and analysis of large surveys, along with desk research, expert interviews, and scenario building. His clients have included the Atlantic Council, the Economist Group, the Financial Times Group, the World Health Organization, and Kroll. Kielstra holds a doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford, a graduate diploma in economics from the London School of Economics, and a bachelor of arts from the University of Toronto. He is also a published historian.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

The post Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By Peter Engelke, Greg Lindsay, and Paul Saffo

Welcome to three possible worlds in the year 2035. As resident and non-resident senior fellows in the Atlantic Council’s foresight practice, we produced these scenarios by assessing how current trends and uncertainties across a variety of categories—including geopolitics, the economy, demography, the environment, technology, and society—might interact with one another in the years to come. 

These are not forecasts or predictions of what the future will bring. Instead, these scenarios are intended to inspire imagination and spur readers to consider possible futures, including future worlds that do not align with the readers’ expectations. To paraphrase a sentiment often expressed by the physicist and futurist Herman Kahn, the point of working with future scenarios is to find out what you don’t know and should know but that you didn’t even know you didn’t know. 

We invite readers to interpret these scenarios in that spirit. Consider the interplay among the cause-and-effect elements that lead to each of the potential future worlds, as well as the myriad other possible scenarios that could emerge in the years to come.

Perhaps the world of 2035 might vaguely resemble one of the three scenarios presented here, but that is not the central purpose of this exercise. The primary reason why we crafted these scenarios is to generate deeper insights into how today’s actions and inactions might create a better or worse world ten years from now.

The reluctant international order

Global governance has never been more complicated than it is in 2035. But although the problems are complex, thus far the governance landscape is proving capable of containing at least some of them, as occurred several years ago when we endured a near-miss catastrophe from a bioweapon-fueled pandemic.  

We might not be experiencing the halcyon days of a revitalized multilateralism, but thankfully we’re also not inhabiting a kill-or-be-killed nihilistic hellscape. We seem to be living through what some commentators are now calling the “Reluctant International Order.” 

Let’s begin with what has not happened: neither the much-feared collapse nor the much-hoped-for revitalization of what often is called the rules-based international order (we’ll use the acronym “RBIO”). Which means that neither the 1930s nor the 1990s have returned.  

The international order that the United States and its allies created and maintained after 1945 delivered benefits for decades—benefits that were admittedly partial and often uneven but nonetheless real. Embedded within the RBIO are norms, such as non-aggression toward other countries and respect for human rights, that are laudable ideals. And at its core are multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO), which were designed to contain conflict, assist with economic development, anticipate and then manage crises of various kinds, and provide some governance in an otherwise anarchic world. The whole order is premised on the notion that international cooperation, combined with the open exchange of ideas and goods, will lead to a better and more peaceful world. 

Yet there has long been dissatisfaction with the RBIO. Today, as before, many countries are unhappy with the RBIO and seek to upend or reform it. China and Russia, the two most powerful and vocal of these states, have remained steadfast in their opposition to at least parts of this order, although it also has become clear that their ends are not identical. A decade ago, both began to join with North Korea and Iran to form a grouping that was labeled an “axis of aggressors” because of widespread concern about those countries coordinating to directly challenge the West and the international order, militarily and otherwise. Numerous other countries, often middle and emerging powers in the so-called Global South have sought, at a minimum, to modify the RBIO. These states—with India and Brazil the most prominent examples—have accused the RBIO of being unrepresentative and its defenders of being hypocritical because of their selective application of the order’s underpinning norms. Even the core group of democratic nations that historically defended the order, including the United States, often have acted against the RBIO when it suited their interests. 

Resilient rules

Despite all this, the various challenges to the RBIO have never been powerful enough to destroy it. Neither the axis of aggressors nor the partnership between China and Russia ever amounted to real military alliances, reflecting weak rather than strong bonds among them. These revisionist states have acted in disjointed fashion, as a result of their divergent interests, and never staged a coordinated attempt to directly confront the West. Partly for that reason, there has been no global war and thus no wholesale shock that reset the global governance system, as occurred after World War II.  

Russia emerged from its war against Ukraine (which ended in a negotiated peace in 2026) far weaker than it was when the conflict began, and it has yet to sufficiently recover to mount another similar challenge westward in Europe. China has made no overt move to seize control of Taiwan either. Evidently, Chinese President Xi Jinping has decided he does not want to gamble his country’s future in a confrontation with the United States, which after all remains a great economic and military power with a formidable nuclear deterrent. (The United States’ increased investment in defense of the Western Pacific also appears to have influenced Xi’s calculations.) It does not help China that Russia is a much-debilitated junior partner. 

The case of Taiwan is important for another reason. It underscores that, so far, China and the United States have decided that coexistence is the preferable direction for their relationship, which has prevented the international system from collapsing altogether. Their rivalry has been channeled through other pathways short of war, including diplomatic efforts to curry favor abroad and support for various minilateral and multilateral institutions. And they’ve found, more than occasionally, that their interests actually intersect. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, both China and the United States have continued working in tandem to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, albeit by utilizing very different mechanisms and forms of leverage. 

But while the RBIO has not collapsed—meaning there has been no repeat of the era between World War I and World War II—it also has not been revitalized. There has been no return to a triumphalist end of history, no 1990s-style heyday wherein major and middle powers mostly work in concordance with one another toward peaceful and prosperous coexistence within what they perceive as a benign set of global norms and institutions. Hence the increasing references to a “Reluctant International Order,” if meant in jest. 

What has happened instead has been an evolution rather than a revolution, characterized more by experimentation and incrementalism than by some jarring disruption. This has occurred because the world’s problems demand coordinated responses even for countries reluctant to do so and because those countries recognize that the opportunity costs of not engaging are so high.  

Today, the outward institutional trappings of the RBIO remain in place. The UN continues its work as before, partially because China does not want to destroy it. (The UN’s embrace of state sovereignty, for example, appeals to China’s interests.) Global trade is still growing, despite the tariff wars of the mid-to-late 2020s, owing in part to technological developments that have continued to lower the cost of trade. And the norms underpinning the RBIO haven’t disappeared, either, since many around the world—national and sub-national governments, civil-society and non-profit organizations, grassroots groups and ordinary citizens—want to preserve them and continue to see value in cooperative approaches to transnational problems. 

Trading places

Consider trade. More than a decade ago, many nations began curtailing their exposure to global trade flows out of justifiable concern that trade was having detrimental impacts on their security, economies, and societies. Yet despite extensive anti-globalization rhetoric and policies (with the tariff wars the best example), the prevailing perception is that the benefits of trade continue to outweigh the costs. China and the United States, for instance, still have one of the largest bilateral trade relationships of any two countries in the world, despite their now lengthy history of trade disputes, including tariffs and a range of trade restrictions in sensitive technologies.  

The leaders of many countries have realized that they have a compelling interest in remaining engaged in trade and talks to increase trade. This has resulted in the creation, maintenance, or expansion of a number of regional free-trade agreements. Several of these efforts have proven quite successful, perhaps best illustrated by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Over the past fifteen years, African states have joined with the African Union to extend and deepen AfCFTA and, in so doing, to realize several of its longer-term objectives such as the reduction of intra-continental tariffs and loosening of visa restrictions. The case of AfCFTA and others like it—for instance, strengthened trade agreements between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Asian countries—underscore that while global trade volume has grown since the mid-2020s, the geography of trade continues to shift.   

Nonstate actors have been critical to the maintenance of this system. Multinational companies around the world have made their support for trade well-known, which has helped compel countries to continue defining their interests in pro-trade terms. 

Bioweapon-inspired cooperation

Nothing underscored both the value of cooperation and the powers (positive and negative) of nonstate actors like the 2029 bioweapon scare.  

That year, a shadowy, transnational doomsday cult—akin to Aum Shinrikyo, which terrorized Japan with sarin gas in 1995—used an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced synthetic biology (“SynBio”) process to develop a deadlier and more easily transmissible strain of smallpox. Because the cult’s plot to release it was foiled at the last minute, owing to frantic collaboration among national intelligence services and INTERPOL, the world narrowly avoided a pandemic that would have been far worse than the COVID-19 pandemic.  

Horrified by this close call, most of the world’s governments—including the United States, China, and Russia—grasped for solutions. Since pandemics do not respect boundaries, world leaders recognized that there was an upper limit on how much they could protect their people on their own. In response, they quickly sought to deepen collaboration with one another and with leading multilateral public-health institutions such as the WHO, multinational corporations including companies that develop major AI platforms, and the global scientific community that sets standards and runs laboratories. The mandate was clear: Determine how to monitor and regulate the biotechnology space more effectively—or risk perhaps hundreds of millions dying in an AI-enhanced, SynBio-caused (“AIxBio”) pandemic along the lines that the doomsday cult had almost willed into existence.  

One of this new coalition’s proposals, which was quickly funded and implemented, was to create an institution similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency but focused on AIxBio. Its formal membership is based on a novel multi-stakeholder model that includes national governments, big-tech firms, and scientific organizations.  

The smallpox bioweapon scare vividly illustrated, even for adversarial major powers, the intolerably high risk of countries not engaging with one another through international institutions and on international norms to address the world’s greatest challenges—and on the enduring relevance and value of the RBIO ninety years after its creation. Halting progress in some areas of the international system doesn’t qualify as a renaissance. But even a Reluctant International Order is better than retreat. 

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China ascendant

Welcome to 2035, and a world whose center of gravity has shifted decisively toward Beijing.  

China now has more influence on world affairs than does any other country, including the United States. It is ascendant on every metric of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. That power has enabled Beijing to begin remaking the world to its liking. It has been busy recasting the global system, including multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), in its preferred image, and is in the process of dismantling the democratic norms that have animated the international order since 1945.  

China has arrived at this ascendant position in part because the United States has not done much to stand in its way. At the turn of this century, such an outcome would have been impossible to imagine. Even a decade ago, when Washington’s commitment to the rules-based international order showed initial signs of wavering, such an outcome would have been difficult to forecast. But US leaders have been consumed by the challenges of dealing with the country’s weakening economy, fraying societal bonds, and unrelentingly harsh domestic politics. These dynamics have eliminated the longstanding bipartisan consensus around defending the global order that the United States, along with its many allies and partners, had built and maintained for decades.  

The result has been that the United States no longer has an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners, the core multilateral institutions at the center of the order that it built, and the norms and principles that it stood behind all those years. Instead, the United States has definitively turned inward. By nearly every metric, the United States remains a major power. But it no longer has much interest in maintaining its leadership role in the world. It has ceded that ground to others, especially to China. 

Taiwan-style tipping points

The impact of the US withdrawal from global affairs is evident in various flashpoints around the world, including in Taiwan. While the prevailing fear in the 2010s and early 2020s was of a devastating clash between the United States and China over the island, the Taiwan issue was resolved without firing a shot. China subordinated Taiwan by applying intense pressure—via sabotage, cyber operations, propaganda campaigns, overt and covert influence campaigns within Taiwan, espionage, murky hybrid operations on the island and around its waters—to influence Taiwanese domestic politics toward a cross-Straits settlement with the People’s Republic of China. Its efforts to shape domestic politics within Taiwan succeeded. In 2030, Taiwan’s government agreed to (among other things) such a settlement, which included ceasing defense cooperation with foreign governments and reducing Taiwan’s direct engagement with foreign officials. The United States, which did not respond to China’s various forms of pressure against Taiwan, ultimately could not prevent the cross-Straits agreement, given the Taiwanese government’s support for it. None of China’s individual provocations were dramatic enough for an already hesitant United States to risk a direct military confrontation with China over it.  

What happened in Taiwan has also played out on a global scale. There was no one exceptional event or even set of events that triggered a transformation of the international system—no explosion that China engineered to blow up the global order. Thus, there never was a single focal point for China’s rivals—especially the United States—to rally their citizens around and respond to in a coordinated and decisive way. Rather, there has been a gradual and now inexorable shift away from the US-led order and toward a Chinese-led one. This shift resulted from decisions made by both US and Chinese leaders: inward-looking in the case of the former, outward-looking in the case of the latter. It was, in short, a slow-motion fait accompli. 

China has positioned itself as the world’s inevitable leader, seizing on its strengths to curry favor with other countries and on the opportunity presented by the United States’ implosion to diminish its rival. Take the performance of the two countries’ economies as an example. A decade ago, the economic outlook was bleaker for China than it was for the United States. But over the past ten years, that script has flipped. In the mid-2020s, Chinese President Xi Jinping managed to right China’s sputtering economy, stabilizing it and returning it to steady growth (if less spectacular growth than during the country’s long boom). He did so by successfully transitioning the country to what many are now calling “an innovation system with Chinese characteristics,” striking a balance of rewarding innovation and entrepreneurialism while maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the nation’s political apparatus.  

All this has enabled China to return to selling itself and its economic rebound on the one hand, plus the United States’ economic stagnation (due to dysfunctional politics) on the other, as a compelling reason why the United States is both unreliable and a poor economic model for the rest of the world, and by extension why China represents a better model. That message has even more resonance around the world now than it did ten years ago.  

Because of the pull of China’s growing economy, which remains integrated within global trade flows, plus the relative weakness of the US economy, foreign governments have become more willing to sign onto China’s various economic diplomacy efforts, such as the Global Development Initiative. Beijing now hosts a robust schedule of international economic forums that position it at the center of the economic universe, and thus as the destination for intergovernmental bargaining and influence on issues such as trade and investment. To outside observers, the economic pull of Beijing has eclipsed that of Washington and, for that matter, of Brussels, London, Paris, Seoul, or Tokyo.  

As a result, China’s influence has grown in many parts of the world. In the Global South, lower- and middle-income countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia (where China remains engaged with India in a long-running contest for influence) have been even more eager to trade with and receive investment from China than they were in the 2020s. This outcome is the product of years (in some cases decades) of aggressive economic diplomacy by China and disinterest from the US government. It also stemmed from reform to China’s overseas lending and investment vehicles, which China recognized needed fine-tuning to make them more palatable abroad and deflect rising criticism of the unsustainable debt and other problems they engendered. Thus far, these policy shifts appear to have worked. China has also become the world’s largest trading nation for both imports and exports, ahead of the United States. Shifting trade in goods also has accelerated movement away from trade denominated in US dollars and toward trade denominated in renminbi—a sure sign of the relative strengths of the two economies.  

For China, the advantages are enormous: more wealth at home and influence abroad. China’s diplomatic ties with major materials exporters such as Brazil (soybeans and other crops), the Gulf Cooperation Council states (oil), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (critical minerals such as cobalt) have increased. For the United States, the reverse has been true. For the average American, wages and incomes have stagnated, and imported goods are more expensive. Abroad, US goods are less competitive in foreign markets than Chinese goods are.   

Allies hedging 

The United States still has numerous allies and partners, but the bonds that held them together are weaker now than they were in the past owing to the rise of China and the self-induced retreat of the United States. 

In Asia, nervous US allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines are hedging between China and the United States in more ways than they were in the 2020s. But now, having witnessed what happened in Taiwan, these countries are even more concerned about the security guarantee that the United States has provided to them. Both Japan and South Korea have admitted that they are exploring options to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter China and North Korea, and most analysts expect both to become nuclear-weapons states by 2040. Various forms of US-led minilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific such as the Quad have died slow deaths, the result of both US indifference and Asian countries’ doubts about the value of these efforts to counter and contain a rising China. India, for example, believes it can achieve more through its own bilateral actions to check Chinese influence than it can by working through such forums.  

Also contributing to the deep unease of US allies is the growth of China’s military in size and capabilities, and its increasing forward presence in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere around the world. China has been steadily increasing its number of basing agreements globally to the point where, just as US intelligence services feared a decade ago, China now has bases in Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans.  

A similar story is playing out in Europe, albeit focused on a different threat. There, European NATO members are arming themselves rapidly, spending well above the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold for defense spending that Washington had been requesting for decades. Although that amounts to a victory of sorts for US foreign policy, it really is a defeat because the spending is an expression of serious doubt about the United States’ commitment to NATO and the Alliance’s Article 5 collective-defense pledge should war come again to the continent. Although the previous war in Ukraine ended in a negotiated stalemate, most European observers believe that it is only a matter of time before a rearmed and resurgent Russia decides to test NATO, likely through a long-feared invasion focused on the Baltics.  

In this climate, many are pinning their hopes on Beijing rather than Washington, believing that China will restrain Russia, its junior partner, from going on the offensive in Europe. Partly for this reason, and the fact that China is now Europe’s largest trading partner (having surpassed the United States in the early 2030s), European leaders have muted their criticisms of China’s record on human rights, including privacy rights, and have eased China’s access to the common market despite ongoing concerns about dumping, intellectual-property theft, and other such practices.  

Institutional shifts 

In part because China never has been interested in tearing down the entire international system and replacing it with something else entirely, few Western leaders have paid much attention to how China has been busy recasting these institutions in its image. And indeed, the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) continue, with China maintaining its representation in them as it has for decades.  

But there have been important changes within the UN system. Recently, for instance, China has been far more successful than it was in previous decades at getting its appointees installed within various technical standard-setting bodies such as the UN’s International Telecommunication Union—a function of China’s unrelenting focus on these specialized bureaucracies plus its rising economic, scientific, and technological prowess.  

Or consider the UN’s historic role in maintaining peace and security. China was long willing to support UN peacekeeping operations around the world by providing troops and funds, at least to an extent. Yet with the United States and its democratic allies among the UN Security Council’s five permanent members—France and the United Kingdom—now far less willing to spearhead these operations, China has yet to pick up the leadership mantle. China remains willing to contribute to peacekeeping but generally not to lead large-scale efforts, whether in terms of the Security Council’s broad peacekeeping mandates or the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to build them. The result has been fewer such operations and weaker ones as well, leaving more of the world’s conflicts to devolve and even in some cases metastasize.  

Perhaps the most worrisome change has to do with the norms and principles that underpin the global system—both within the UN and more generally as well. Although China expresses support for some of the system’s principles—for example, the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty and territorial integrity—it manifestly does not support others and especially those based upon democratic values. As a result, serious emphasis on human rights and related norms, as well as global oversight of them, has collapsed within multilateral institutions, including the UN.  

These developments are having real, on-the-ground impact. China has successfully built a more robust surveillance apparatus globally that includes more sophisticated cyber-espionage operations capable of tracking the communications of ordinary people around the world, along with a major expansion of China’s overseas police stations. The Chinese government claims that these stations are designed only to service the Chinese diaspora, but their true purpose seems to be to keep track of and pressure both the diaspora and China’s external critics as well.   

The erosion of global human-rights enforcement speaks to a broader trend: The so-called democratic recession that has been plaguing the world since the early 2000s is now bordering on a depression. With China ascendant, the world’s autocratic leaders are acting with greater confidence at home and abroad. Midway through the 2030s, the long-running contest between democratic and authoritarian systems appears to be resolving—in favor of the latter. 

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Climate of fear

In 2035, the Earth’s climate is hotter and less stable than it’s ever been in human history. This instability is causing people to turn on one another—and politics to become more abrasive than it was a decade ago. Climate-driven turbulence is making nearly every other problem—be it geopolitical or conflict-related—harder to solve. These challenges transcend national boundaries and afflict every country, whether rich or poor, to the north or south. Numerous local conflicts and one tense regional standoff (in South Asia) have been fueled by the consequences of a changing climate. 

These trends have produced some positive outcomes as well, but in the 2030s it’s difficult to foresee a bright future. As a result, many are looking to radical solutions to get humanity out of its predicament. 

Ecological crisis

There is almost no good news to be found in the natural world. A range of climate-induced problems are all worse than they were a decade ago. Observable, on-the-ground environmental changes have consistently outpaced scientists’ predictions from twenty or even ten years ago.  

The data indicates that several climate tipping points—including the drying of the Amazon rainforest, the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and the ongoing slowing of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation system, which regulates temperatures and precipitation in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere—are nearer than we previously thought. Scientists’ modeling, based on real-world data in the 2030s, now points even more strongly toward one or more of these or other critical systems collapsing in the next few decades. When these systems begin to collapse, there will be no practical way back from truly horrific ecological disasters.  

Even short of such disasters, the world today lacks the capacity to adjust quickly enough to the climate impacts that are here already. Chronic heat is a problem nearly everywhere in the world, with lengthy heat waves now routine on every continent—including on Antarctica, where record highs, well above freezing, are increasingly common. Most frightening is the rapid increase in “wet bulb” days in some regions near the equator, where high heat plus high humidity make it impossible for humans to survive for long outdoors. Massive storms—flash flooding in the wake of record-breaking torrential rainfall, for example, or hurricanes and cyclones that strike well inland—are commonplace now as well. Several coastal cities around the world, including Bangkok, Miami, and Jakarta, regularly flood, even more frequently than they did a decade ago. In 2029, China’s low-lying Pearl River Delta was hit by a massive typhoon that crippled the region’s manufacturing output for months, disrupting global supply chains. 

These developments have numerous second- and third-order consequences. The world’s forests, for example, have become tinderboxes, which means that firefighting has become a significant part of national-security planning for an ever-lengthening list of the world’s governments. 

(Geo)political upheaval

Politics and geopolitics are changing with the natural world, largely for the worse. Climate change has weakened the world’s democracies, which already had suffered through decades of decline. From Spain and Greece to South Africa, Nepal, and Panama, storms and suffocating heat waves have disrupted elections by making it harder for some voters to cast their ballots. Such events have also affected who participates in elections in the first place, given how they have influenced the outflows and inflows of people through cities and countries, and the voter registration and verification problems that have followed.  

Many years ago, when climate-driven migration was first hypothesized in the scientific literature, few paid attention. Not so today, as fears about the consequences of so-called climate migrants or climate refugees have generated real policies involving real people. These fears often have been based on lurid imagination about crime and chaos rather than on facts.

In 2035, there are an estimated 150 million migrants worldwide who are either temporarily displaced or permanently on the move because of climate impacts, although no one knows the true number because migration is such a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. Yet everyone agrees that more migrants are coming.  

Most climate-driven migration remains within national boundaries, often coming in the form of rural-to-urban migration into cities such as Bogotá and Karachi. Or it is intra-regional migration within areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. Such trends are also occurring within wealthy regions and countries such as the United States.  

These migration patterns have reminded many of the Syrian crisis of the early 2010s, which was preceded by drought-stressed migrants fleeing the countryside for the cities. Although that internal migration likely was only an indirect cause of the subsequent uprising against the Assad regime—which lasted well over a decade and ultimately resulted in the regime’s overthrow—many now see repetition of that past. They point to how climate-fueled internal displacements have increased recruitment into armed nonstate groups. They note the increasing number of communities around the world where climate impacts have exacerbated preexisting vulnerabilities to cause local conflicts, too many of which have started to become deadly. And they cite the increasing number of failed and failing states resulting in part from climate-driven disasters such as intense, multi-year drought. 

Governments have responded through pull-up-the-drawbridges measures—and not just in Europe or the United States, where one might expect that to happen, but around the world, including within the Global South. Border walls designed to keep migrants out were already widespread ten years ago. They are everywhere now.  

India, for example, has clamped down on its borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, heavily fortifying them with more personnel, fencing, sophisticated electronic-surveillance systems, and autonomous enforcement technologies such as drones. Numerous critics, both within India and outside of it, have voiced objections, but the Indian government insists that it is only doing what its voters want. This has led to a volatile diplomatic situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which long ago patched up its relations with Bangladesh, has joined Bangladesh and Myanmar in loudly and publicly pushing India to reverse its border policies, to no avail. The region is not at war, nor is there an immediate risk of one. But it is at a knife’s edge, with climate-driven migration having become one of the biggest sources of friction. 

Turbulence-induced transformations

There are some bright spots in this otherwise discouraging picture. Renewables are now firmly established as the world’s dominant sources of energy, reflecting both their market competitiveness and the rapid electrification of the global economy. And nuclear energy has begun making a comeback in much of the world, with the latest reactor designs now seen as safely providing reliable, zero-emission electricity. (New power plants, however, remain rare.) In addition, green-technology markets are expanding rapidly across many industries such as food, water, energy, transportation, and consumer goods. Nearly a third of the world’s stock of cars and trucks is fully electric. 

The challenge lies in the rate at which decarbonization is occurring—a pace that simply has not been fast enough. Although global greenhouse-gas emissions finally peaked in the late 2020s, humankind nonetheless surpassed the carbon budget required to stay within the target of keeping global warming above pre-industrial levels to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as laid out in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scientists had prioritized staying below this target to limit the worst impacts of climate change.  

One of the factors contributing to this challenge is that much of the world’s legacy energy infrastructure remains in place. Decommissioning such infrastructure, particularly coal and natural-gas plants, is expensive. Too many of the world’s high-carbon plants still exist, especially coal-fired power plants concentrated in China.  

Behind all this is global energy consumption, which has continued to rise fast, consistently outstripping renewables’ capacity to fully meet the demand. (A challenge here is that interest rates for borrowing in riskier storm-affected regions have increased, constraining the expansion of capital-intensive renewables such as offshore wind farms.) There are many drivers of this increasing demand, including technological developments such as advances in artificial intelligence (AI). As was feared in the mid-2020s, the infrastructure necessary to support AI’s growth—in the form of computing power and data centers—boosted global energy demand. Although tech companies have greened their models, the problem is about scale: AI’s ubiquity translates into a massive source of energy usage. Some tech companies have become players in the nuclear-energy space for this reason. 

As they navigate this turbulence, and as already foreshadowed in the 2020s, both right- and left-wing populist governments are no longer reflexively hostile to policies to combat climate change like they once were. There is renewed interest in accelerating decarbonization efforts, including revitalizing the moribund United Nations-led process for mitigating climate change.  

Another response to the unsustainable status quo has been the embrace of more radical solutions. Geoengineering—and specifically solar radiation modification (SRM), which refers to atmospheric and even space-based efforts to reduce warming by reflecting sunlight back into space—has rapidly gone from a scientific curiosity to a subject of serious research. Although SRM engineering is complex, compared with other approaches it is straightforward and inexpensive. As a result, already in 2035 both state and nonstate actors are experimenting with SRM in the atmosphere. There is great fear that the implementation of these new approaches will be a nightmare, as for-profit companies, tech billionaires, and rogue states initiate their own unilateral solutions, while countries fight over the expected (but dimly understood) impacts on their regions. Although the scientific community is warning that SRM’s consequences aren’t yet sufficiently understood, there is a growing sentiment among many (though not all) politicians that it should be tried at scale. But everyone is asking whether effective geoengineering is even possible without some sort of global governance and regulatory regime.  

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and the climate is changing. Humankind’s efforts to master the natural world during the post-industrial era produced the climate crisis. Now, in 2035, the Earth increasingly seems the master of human affairs rather than the other way around.  

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Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Greg Lindsay, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Lindsay is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative, as well as a nonresident senior fellow of the Arizona State University Threatcasting Lab and the MIT Future Urban Collectives Lab.

Paul Saffo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Saffo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative and co-editor of Futures Research Methodologies, which will be released later this year.

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The post Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Executive summary
• Introduction
• A vital resource, a complicated history
• Country updates
• The future
• Opportunities and policy development
• Policy recommendations
• Conclusion
• About the authors

Executive summary

Water security is an urgent issue that demands immediate attention from Central Asian governments, businesses, civil society, and their international partners. Climate change, population growth, infrastructure problems, a lack of government foresight, and the unequal distribution of precious water resources between the upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the downstream nations (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have created a “perfect storm” of pressing water insecurity. The 2021 Central Asia drought, the loss of the Aral Sea, the evaporation of glaciers in the Tian Shan mountains, and the alarming shrinking of the Caspian Sea are reminders of how natural and man-made disasters have destructive consequences on Central Asia’s strained water resources.

This report addresses the status of water security across the five Central Asian countries, outlining recent developments, ongoing challenges, and opportunities for improvement. Geopolitically, interstate tensions and the role of international politics—e.g., influence from the West, Russia, and China and tensions with Afghanistan—all will continue to affect the region’s water security. This report will address international cooperation in projects for water sharing, including the current and future role of agencies like the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea and partners like the United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and extraregional governments. The report concludes with a holistic set of policy recommendations to help improve water security in Central Asia.

Water security is a complex and challenging topic for the five Central Asian countries (C5), a region heavily dependent on shared water sources. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan face increasing water-related challenges due to the unequal distribution of water resources across the region (upstream vs. downstream nations), interstate tensions, the legacy of Soviet-era water management systems, corruption and lack of good governance, and the effects of climate change. Despite efforts to modernize, countries still rely on outdated and insufficient water infrastructure that struggles to meet the demands of growing populations, as well as water-intensive industries like cotton.

Relevant recent developments in this region include the collapse of the Aral Sea, the declining water levels of the Caspian Sea, border conflicts over water access between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the Taliban’s construction of a controversial canal in Afghanistan. Challenges also offer opportunities, including regional agreements on sharing and protecting bodies of water, applying new water-management technologies, and using newly arid lands for new projects.

This report analyzes the current state and future of water security across the five Central Asian states while also considering external players such as Afghanistan, China, and the Caspian littoral countries. The region’s division between water-rich upstream countries and water-scarce downstream states is a key focus of this report. A useful map published in a 2017 report by German think tank Adelphi demonstrates how large swathes of the downstream countries—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—depend on water resources that flow from the mountainous regions of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan upstream. Water security impacts domestic politics, foreign policy, economic stability, infrastructure, and energy security. Thus, our recommendations address a wide range of cross-cutting issues, as a holistic view of water security is necessary to improve living conditions, the environment, economies, and industries while addressing regional geopolitical concerns.

A vital resource, a complicated history

There are several challenges to the health and integrity of Central Asia’s precious water resources, particularly the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, the Aral Sea, Lake Balkhash, and the Caspian Sea. Challenges include climate change, pollution, and issues related to human development, like population growth, urbanization, industrialization, and the all-important agricultural industry, among other human activities. Glacial melt also threatens the Pamir and Tien Shan mountain ranges, located in the region’s two upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Changes to the water flow will (literally) have a trickle-down effect that will affect the two countries and the downstream nations, namely Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. In other words, water security in Central Asia is heavily linked to transboundary water bodies.

But other challenges must be considered to understand the evolving situation across the region. They include irregular rainfall patterns, which lead to extended droughts in some areas while others suffer from unseasonable rainfalls causing floods; extreme weather patterns that affect both human life and the local environment; and the fragile state of water infrastructure due to neglect in the post-Soviet era.

Central Asia knows how catastrophic water disasters can be. Nearly all of the Aral Sea—90 percent of what had been the fourth-largest inland sea in the world—is simply gone due to poor water mismanagement. The problem commenced in the 1960s due to Soviet-era, large-scale irrigation projects, which included the diversion of the sea’s tributaries, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, and benefited, for instance, Uzbekistan’s important cotton industry. The negative consequences include soil salinization, waterlogging, and a sea-level drop, resulting in new dry lands. The Aral Sea’s diminishment has prompted economic decline and job loss for noncotton industries, not to mention health challenges for regional populations and devastation of their way of life. Astana has attempted to protect what remains of the Kazakhstani side of the sea, which nowadays mostly resembles a group of interconnected and fragmented lakes rather than a unified body of water, by constructing the Kok-Aral Dam, for example. Unfortunately, the Uzbekistani government still prioritizes its cotton industry over the protection of Aral Sea, parts of which are likely lost forever.

In a similar vein, the Caspian Sea is becoming increasingly precarious. The sea’s northern coast, which borders Kazakhstan and Russia, is already becoming shallower. While desalination projects are a growing part of the problem, the limited amount of water reaching the sea is insufficient to keep it healthy. For instance, the Soviets constructed dams and reservoirs in the Volga River that inhibit water (and marine life) flows into the Caspian. These include Russia’s Cheboksary Dam and the Volga Hydroelectric Station. There will be severe repercussions akin to what the Aral Sea is experiencing if the Caspian’s water level is not safeguarded. Besides the obvious challenges to human life and the regional environment, trade and commerce also will be affected. Specifically, the maritime and transportation sector will be impacted by the Caspian’s disappearance. Bypassing Russian territory, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), commonly known as the Middle Corridor, is integral to the transport of commodities and goods from China and Central Asia to Europe: The Caspian Sea serves as a crucial component of the TITR, with tankers and cargo ships sailing from Baku and Aktau to Turkmenbashi and vice versa. Declining water levels would put heavier ships at risk of being trapped and unable to access ports—and undercut the usefulness of the TITR.

The complexity of water

The C5 states have common problems regarding water security. Obsolete water infrastructure is Central Asia’s greatest water challenge. Overall, their Soviet-era water infrastructure requires repairs, replacement, or full modernization. Unfortunately, the Central Asian governments have been slow to invest in this area. While managing the flow of water across regional rivers or addressing the effects of climate change are challenging long-term issues, improving water infrastructure can significantly protect scarce water flows in the region. Outdated water infrastructure can result in up to “40 percent of water losses during irrigation and up to 55 percent of losses when supplying drinking water.” In other words, improving the transit of water in Central Asia would buy time, allowing regional governments to address some of the more complex problems stemming from climate change and water-diversion projects.

The intersection between water security and energy production is complex, particularly regarding hydroelectric power. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have extensive water resources that generate electricity through hydroelectric dams. However, this strategy creates tensions with downstream nations that depend on these rivers for agricultural irrigation and human consumption. Hydroelectric dams, like Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam, may become a source of conflict between upstream and downstream countries if relationships are not managed carefully. As climate change intensifies, the unpredictability of water flow can worsen interstate relations. Map I shows changes in river flows of major river systems in Central Asia.

The 2021 Central Asian drought highlighted the region’s vulnerability to water shortages. Kazakhstan, in particular, experienced serious agricultural losses, underscoring the risks of dependence on transboundary water sources. Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash, fed by the Ili River from China, presents another example of water insecurity. China’s upstream development projects threaten to reduce the water flow into Lake Balkhash, which could lead to a disaster on the Aral scale. Tensions exist between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over the Syr Darya, which originates in Kyrgyzstan and flows through Uzbekistan. Around 80 percent of Uzbekistan’s water originates from neighboring countries, leaving it vulnerable to upstream water-management decisions.

The political landscape in Central Asia complicates efforts to manage water resources. The region features a range of political systems, from strongly authoritarian Turkmenistan to the more open Kazakhstan. This contributes to differing levels of commitment to regional cooperation on water management. For example, Astana has identified water security as a problem. It promotes dialogue and proposes the creation of regional water mechanisms to address water-access issues, such as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, which originated in the early 1990s. On the other hand, Ashgabat has a more limited engagement with the rest of the region and the wider world including on environmental issues. Similarly, during the rule of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan was reluctant to engage with neighbors to discuss water cooperation. However, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is willing to engage. Meanwhile, Bishkek and Dushanbe’s growing reliance on hydropower to address domestic energy crises will exacerbate water-security problems with their downstream neighbors. More open governments tend to be more willing to discuss sensitive issues, including shared water resources, and admit their shortcomings and erroneous policies.

Finally, water quality tends to receive insufficient attention. Pollution from agriculture, industry, and aging infrastructure impacts water supplies, meaning that even when water reaches a household, drinking it may not be safe.

Country updates

Each C5 country grapples with unique issues driven by geography, infrastructure, and governance affecting water. There are efforts to address these challenges, with projects ranging from cross-border cooperation to investment in new infrastructure and international partnerships. However, political instability, lack of transparency, and outdated technologies impede progress.

Joint coordination is critical to addressing transboundary water issues. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will be the president of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) from 2024 to 2026. Astana aims to implement development and scientific programs to “[reduce] the negative impact [of the Aral Sea catastrophe] on the entire region and ensure stability and sustainable development of Central Asia.” Similarly, in 2018, the five Caspian states signed a convention in Aktau, Kazakhstan, to end a long-standing border dispute over the sea. Moreover, the five states signed the Tehran Convention in 2003, a much-needed environmental legal framework to protect the sea. While the territorial dispute was resolved, interstate cooperation to protect the Caspian remains limited and challenges continue.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan faces significant water challenges due to its dependence on transboundary water resources: The Aral Sea, Lake Balkhash, the Ural River, and the Caspian Sea are all shared with neighboring countries and fed by rivers originating outside of their boundaries, leading to complex management issues. The Ili River, which feeds Lake Balkhash, originates in China’s Xinjiang region, where ongoing development projects and increased agriculture strain water flows to China’s Central Asian neighbor. The Ural River, shared with Russia, suffers from pollution and declining water levels due to industrial activities including oil refining and chemical production. High zinc concentrations in the Ural make the water unsuitable for consumption once it reaches Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan is closely monitoring the health of Lake Balkhash. However, long-term solutions depend on cooperation with Beijing, which sees the Ili’s waters as a domestic issue despite the river’s flow into Kazakhstan. Astana is engaging Beijing and Moscow to address transboundary water issues. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic, as a Kazakh-Russian commission has been established to protect the Ural River. At the same time, Beijing and Astana are drafting an agreement to address river waters.

Water challenges in Kazakhstan take various shapes. The country already suffers from droughts, which are exacerbated by climate change. Moreover, shared water bodies mean Astana must engage in multivector diplomacy with neighboring countries to manage domestic water problems. For Kazakhstan, water security involves more than human consumption and agriculture: Trade is a component, as the country relies on the health of the Caspian Sea to transport goods and commodities, such as oil, from Aktau port to Baku.

The government of Kazakhstan has been straightforward about the need to address water challenges. In his September 1, 2023, address to the nation, President Tokayev was blunt about worst-case scenarios and the need to restructure water management. “The issue of water availability and quality remains critical. Given the population growth and the economy by 2040, the water deficit in Kazakhstan may reach 12-15 billion cubic meters,” he explained. The government soon after created the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to improve water management and usage in Kazakhstan. This ministry announced rules for regulating water relations between regions in December 2023, which came into force on August 31, 2024. In mid-2024, the ministry reestablished the National Hydrogeological Service to develop a state policy in underground water management, exploration, and state monitoring. Without a doubt, Astana recognizes water security as a clear and present danger, while agreements with neighboring states and more water-related projects need to occur faster to avoid a catastrophe.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan faces severe water shortages. Approximately 80 percent of its water resources originate from neighboring countries. Major rivers like the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, crucial for Uzbekistan’s agriculture and population, have reportedly lost 20 percent of their volume over the past five decades. Uzbekistan’s reliance on Soviet-era water infrastructure further compounds the problem, leading to inadequate water access in rural areas, where villagers often drink from irrigation ditches or travel to other settlements to collect water.

Tashkent’s Aral Sea strategy differs from Kazakhstan’s. Rather than replenishing the sea’s waters, Tashkent aims to improve newly dry territories. For example, the country is planting trees and shrubs along the Akkum ridge and Muynak district to combat wind erosion and stabilize sand dunes. These projects aim to prevent salt and dust from spreading to other regions, improving environmental conditions.

Uzbekistan also is introducing new technologies to address water security. According to Tashkent, around 1.26 million hectares, or 30 percent of irrigated areas, are now utilizing water-saving technologies, including sprinklers and drip irrigation, though up-front and maintenance costs are high. Tashkent is also analyzing several options to improve water management, according to the Uzbek media, including “transferring 50 percent of internal irrigation networks to closed irrigation systems,” increasing the annual capacity of local water-saving technology enterprises, reducing water salinity, and fortifying canals with concrete. Reforestation and environmental projects also can alleviate the environmental damage caused by the Aral Sea’s desiccation.

However, Uzbekistan’s economy depends heavily on the cotton industry, which requires large quantities of water. In 2012, the amount of water consumed to grow Uzbekistan’s cotton was estimated at sixteen billion cubic meters annually. Moreover, 90 percent of water consumed by Uzbek cotton originates upstream, and over 85 percent of arable land is further reliant on upstream-sourced water irrigation. With roughly 25 percent of the country’s GDP dependent on cotton, Uzbekistan is in no hurry to divest itself of its water-hungry cash crop. Attempts to convince Uzbek farmers to switch to fast-ripening, water-efficient, and climate-resilient cotton varieties have made limited impacts.

Uzbekistan is also exploring hydropower to address its growing electricity consumption. Tashkent aims to build a cascade hydroelectric power station along the Naryn River in the Namangan region, a project expected to cost around US$434 million. It remains to be seen how this hydropower plant will affect water flows for human consumption and other projects.

Reliant on water sourced from neighboring countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan is highly vulnerable to regional water policies and usage. Any upstream activities, such as dam construction or increased agricultural water use, directly impact Uzbekistan’s water availability. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s water infrastructure largely dates to the Soviet era. Some rural communities lack functional water pipelines or access to reservoirs. Modern upgrades are either incomplete or malfunctioning. In the village of Armandasht, new pipelines are failing to supply water two years after installation, leaving residents to rely on unsafe alternatives like irrigation ditches and wells. This disparity in water availability contributes to economic and health issues, particularly for impoverished communities.

Despite progress on the Kazakhstani side of the Aral Sea, areas on the Uzbek side are considered irreparably lost. The sea’s continued desiccation results in severe environmental consequences, including salt and dust storms that negatively affect agriculture and human health.

At a 2023 IFAS meeting, President Mirziyoyev said, “The problem of water shortage in Central Asia has become acute and irreversible and will only worsen further.” If the situation in Uzbekistan does not improve, authorities expect the national water shortage to reach 15 percent to 25 percent by 2050, with a desert area expanding to 123 million square meters. Ultimately, Tashkent must make difficult choices regarding its vital but water-intensive cotton industry. Diversifying toward nuts, fruits, and vegetables is advisable, though that would undoubtedly send shockwaves throughout the country’s economy and social order because it would require a major and expensive retraining and readjustment of farming techniques, equipment, and lifestyle, not to mention the search for customers for noncotton goods. For Uzbekistan, water and economic security are inextricably linked.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has ample water resources but lacks proper infrastructure and effective water-management policies. Despite its rivers, streams, and vast glaciers, the country faces significant challenges in delivering clean water to its population, especially in rural areas. In 2017, UNICEF identified Kyrgyzstan as one of Central Asia’s most vulnerable countries to climate change, which is expected to disproportionately affect the country’s poorest communities. Children will be particularly affected by the deteriorating situation, according to the UN agency.

Rapid population growth, particularly in urban areas like Bishkek, has outpaced the capacity of the water infrastructure, leading to frequent shortages. The city’s population numbers about 1.15 million, but the underlying and largely Soviet-era infrastructure was designed for around 650,000 people. In 2023, Bishkek experienced severe water shortages, first affecting the southern areas and later spreading to other parts of the city. Authorities cited insufficient glacier thaw as one cause, but rapid urbanization and poor urban planning also play a significant role. Bishkek has announced plans to provide a centralized drinking water system for 95 percent of the urban population and two million rural citizens by 2026. The project and promises are not new; a similar program, called Taza Suu, was launched in the early 2000s with financial support from the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. It resulted in new pipelines and service for many villages, but the project was plagued by “corruption schemes . . . and construction issues, and the equipment supplied failed to meet the requirements.”

Even when water arrives at a residence, it may not be safe for human consumption. “About 33 percent of piped water services throughout the country do not meet sanitary standards,” said Kyrgyzstan’s Department of Disease Prevention and State Sanitary and Epidemiological Surveillance in 2017. Yet conditions may be improving. In 2022, a World Bank delegation visiting Kyrgyzstan noted that access to and the quality of water supply and sanitation services across Kyrgyz rural communities were improving. The World Bank is currently funding a Sustainable Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Development Project, which costs around US$28 million.

In 2023, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) announced loans to Kyrgyzstan to renovate its water-supply networks, procure operational and maintenance equipment, and introduce household metering in Aidarken, Kadamzhai, Kok-Jangak, and Tash-Komur in the Batken and Jalal-Abad oblasts. Nevertheless, much of the infrastructure dates to the Soviet era, with little modernization having been done. The government is attempting to address this by expanding and upgrading water pipelines and storage reservoirs. However, the country needs short- and long-term projects, financial assistance, and technical expertise to overhaul its water infrastructure, and a recent World Bank report indicates that one-third of the rural population does not have access to clean drinking water.

Kyrgyzstan’s high vulnerability to climate change exacerbates its water challenges. The country relies on glacial melt for water, but inconsistent thawing patterns (due to climate shifts) cause seasonal water shortages. Additionally, more frequent, severe droughts will disproportionately affect lower-income communities.

Tajikistan

Despite being the most water-rich country in Central Asia, Tajikistan’s water future looks grim. The country’s Department of Water and Energy Policy predicts a drastic reduction in water consumption, from 2,520 cubic meters per person per year to just 1,167 cubic meters by the decade’s end. This projected drop is not just a symptom of poor rainfall or climate change (although these are significant factors), but also due to poor policy, outdated and inadequate infrastructure, lack of investment in water supply, and competing interests among different industries, the national government, and the country’s neighbors.

Tajikistan relies heavily on hydropower, which produces around 95 percent of its electricity. The country’s future crown jewel is the Rogun Hydroelectric Dam. The construction project began in 2016 and the dam, once operational, is intended to help Tajikistan become energy independent—though when exactly that will occur is debatable. According to a 2019 projection, the six planned energy generating turbines would be operational by 2026; now, though, the hope is that the third unit will come online sometime in 2025. The project comes with a hefty price tag, estimated at roughly US$6 billion. Once completed, it is expected to become one of the largest hydropower plants in the region, generating 3.6 gigawatts to power the aluminum industry, help meet domestic energy demand, and potentially export electricity to neighboring countries.

Efforts are underway to modernize critical water infrastructure. Tajikistan is working with international partners to address issues related to water quality, groundwater management, and the overall efficiency of water use across different sectors of the economy. The country also struggles with water distribution, quality, and efficiency. Increasing demand from growing urban populations and industrial sectors compounds the challenge. As competition for water resources between economic sectors intensifies, there is growing concern over the impact on groundwater quality. Tajikistan’s water systems are already under strain, and without significant improvements, water contamination could pose severe health and environmental risks shortly.

Tajikistan also faces increasing pressure from neighboring countries over shared water resources. For example, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan share the Syr Darya River with Tajikistan. Moreover, while hydropower provides the lion’s share of the country’s electricity, the sector is vulnerable to water-level fluctuations caused by climate change. More than twenty billion cubic meters of glacial ice, or about 2.5 percent, melted during the last century. A further temperature increase will accelerate glacial melting. The reliance on hydropower could become a double-edged sword if water resources continue declining, affecting energy security and water availability.

Turkmenistan

In stark contrast to realities observed on the ground, Turkmenistan’s government claims the country does not face significant water challenges. The Voluntary National Review of Turkmenistan in 2023 presents an optimistic view of the nation’s water security, boasting that “95 percent of the population has access to clean water” and “99.9 percent uses water services organized in compliance with safety requirements.” However, residents outside of the capital, Ashgabat, disagree. A resident from Turkmenbashi highlighted the neglect of rural areas, noting that the authorities “don’t see anything except the city of Arkadag [Ashgabat],” and described persistent water and heating shortages during the winter of 2023-24. The country’s failure to invest in modernizing infrastructure and its dependence on water-intensive industries like cotton agriculture exacerbate the challenges. Turkmenistan’s rigid authoritarian government limits civil discourse on environmental concerns, slowing progress toward meaningful solutions.

Turkmenistan’s water supply primarily comes from irrigation canals and dated Soviet-era infrastructure. While the central government has focused on providing water to the capital and vital economic hubs while neglecting rural and peripheral regions, water rationing is common, especially during the summer, when residents may only have access to water for a limited time each day.

The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) is working with Turkmenistan to address its water challenges. In August 2024, Turkmen Foreign Affairs Minister Raşit Meredow held virtual discussions with UNEP’s executive director, Inger Andersen, about establishing a regional center for technologies related to climate change in Ashgabat. This initiative aims to improve water management and mitigate the effects of climate change, including rising temperatures and arid conditions in Turkmenistan. Supported by USAID, Turkmen officials installed water metering systems along the Karakum Canal, which should improve water efficiency in the agricultural sector, which consumes a sizable portion of Turkmenistan’s water resources. (Water meters help farmers measure the amount of water delivered to different crops, maximizing the productivity of said crops, while reducing energy costs and water waste).

The future

The region’s long-term stability hinges on collaborative water management, transparency, and sustainable development initiatives. Without concerted and cooperative action, Central Asia risks further exacerbating interstate tensions, environmental degradation, social inequalities, and economic disruptions caused by water shortages.

The possibility of conflict

Water conflicts are already on Central Asia’s horizon. Between 2021 and 2022, there were violent clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over unmarked borders and land claims. While water was not the direct cause for many of these skirmishes, access to water—an issue for local communities—has intensified militarist political impulses and sharpened local suffering during the conflict. While Bishkek and Dushanbe appear to have resolved tensions for the time being, there is always the possibility of fighting over water to erupt again if conditions do not improve or continue to deteriorate—and dispute-resolution mechanisms are not in place.

Map III (below) shows the relative uses of irrigation in Central Asia, with the density of irrigated land in the Fergana Valley naturally visible. A significant number of farmers have abandoned their crops to focus on keeping fruit trees alive. If another severe drought occurs, protests and violence over water among border communities could escalate into low-intensity conflict. Lack of water could lead to widespread protests at the local level, resulting in government crackdowns.

Additionally, there is concern about the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. With the exception of Tajikistan, the other four Central Asian governments are engaging the Taliban to secure economic and trade agreements and peace along the borders, potentially leading to the establishment of a North-South corridor via Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. However, the possibility for conflict is still present: In early 2022, Turkmen border guards and Taliban fighters engaged in border clashes.

The controversial 285 kilometer Qosh Tepa canal in northern Afghanistan could foment conflict. The Central Asian states—except Tajikistan—took a “business as usual” approach when the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. However, the significant percentage of water that Qosh Tepa will divert from the Amu-Darya River upstream in Afghanistan will impact tens of thousands of people downstream in Uzbek and Turkmen communities, disrupting their agricultural capabilities and potentially forcing the resettlement of at least a portion of those affected. It will also interfere with Kazakhstan’s attempts to ameliorate the drying of the Aral Sea. While the project is proceeding, the Taliban is engaged in discussions with neighboring Uzbekistan “to address matters related to the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal.” Meanwhile, even having agreements in place is no guarantee of quiet—Iran and Afghanistan have had a water treaty in place since 1973 concerning water in the Helmand River, yet tensions over inadequate supply resulted in a cross-border clash in May 2023.

The Taliban government has no partner for the large-scale canal project and is proceeding with construction on its own. In November 2023, satellite imagery showed water escaping from what was supposed to be a completed portion of the canal, sparking fears that either miscalculation of the pressure of flowing water had caused a breach or the project had been sabotaged, sending water into the surrounding dry land to be absorbed by the sand for over a month. Kabul claimed that the outflow had been set up deliberately to manage the groundwater level in the area, yet there are ongoing serious concerns that the open-topped canal risks doing more harm and wasting more water in a region where poorly designed and outdated water transport systems are already responsible for the loss of a large proportion of this vital resource.

Climate change

Central Asia is no stranger to natural disasters, but climate change will exacerbate them. The region suffered a massive heatwave and drought during the summer of 2021, significantly damaging farms and animal husbandry. Mudslides also can result from intense rains or heat waves that melt glaciers. Melting means more water flowing downstream, leading to floods and, eventually, the disappearance of the glaciers themselves. Flooding can also endanger the populations living downhill and may spur migration, furthering societal pressure in the region.

The governments and nongovernmental organizations in the region, as well as international climate and water organizations and experts, recently participated in a series of discussions on climate change. For example, in May 2024, the Central Asian Climate Change Conference (CACC-2024) occurred in Almaty, Kazakhstan. A month later, Astana, the Kazakh capital, hosted the Sub-Regional Workshop on Integrated Planning for Climate and Air, organized by the UNEP-convened Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) and the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) secretariat. Similarly, the Dushanbe Water Process takes place in the Tajik capital, organized by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in cooperation with the EU and Tajikistan’s Ministry of Energy and Water Resources.

Central Asia is rapidly warming. A study published in Geophysical Research Letters found that “over the past 35 years, temperatures have increased across Central Asia [while] mountain regions have become hotter and wetter—which might have accelerated the retreat of some major glaciers.” The ADB presents similar troubling data: The decrease in glacier surface area in Central Asia over the past fifty to sixty years—due to changing climate conditions—has reached 30 percent. If the situation is not addressed, climate change will have several destructive effects. Economic damage from droughts and floods in Central Asia could reach “1.3 percent of GDP annually, while crop yields are expected to decrease by 30 percent by 2050,” leading to around 5.1 million internal climate migrants by that time.

Salt flats, new dry lands, and energy infrastructure

A challenge for the C5 is what to do with vast territories affected by climate change and other environmental issues. Not only has the Aral Sea dried up but parts of the landscape are contaminated and toxic due to Soviet testing of biological weapons on Vozrozhdeniyia Island, which used to be in the middle of the Aral Sea. Now that the sea has dried up, it is larger and no longer an island. A lack of reporting on the pathogens there means the nature of the danger is unclear.

However, there are possible uses for this land. The dried-up portions of the Aral and Caspian seas and glacier/snow-free territories could be used for agricultural projects, planting trees and greenery, or installing green energy infrastructure. For example, Uzbekistan is planting trees and shrubs along more than eight thousand hectares of the Akkum ridge, Muynak district, and by the Sudachye system of lakes. Creating a forest in the area will reduce wind erosion, consolidate moving dunes, and prevent salt and dust from moving to other regions and populated areas. The new dry lands could be utilized for green energy projects like solar and wind farms. Kazakhstan already operates the large Burnoye solar plants, while Uzbekistan has the Zarafshan wind farm and is constructing the Bash wind farm.

The region’s salt flats, like the Asht Salt Flat, or Asht Namak, in the Fergana Valley (on Tajik territory but close to the border with Uzbekistan), and Shalkarteniz and Sor Tuzbair in Kazakhstan, must also be protected. Protecting Central Asia’s environment from climate change while capitalizing on areas like the new dry lands is a complex, long-term, and expensive task. Regional authorities have highlighted the need to protect their nations’ environments.

During his speech at the UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai at COP28, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev explained that a new environmental code will facilitate the implementation of green technology, and “there is extraordinary potential for wind and solar power in my country and for green hydrogen.” The objective of the code is to introduce and support the best available techniques (BAT) and regulate activities that have or may have a negative impact on the environment. Since its introduction, government announcements and media reports suggest that Astana is increasingly interested in green technology to address internal energy demand. In early 2024, The Astana Times announced a green hydrogen production project in Mangystau Region.

Opportunities and policy development

Central Asian countries are aware of the water crisis and the need to develop policies and technologies to ameliorate the situation. International partners are engaged in cooperative efforts in hydrogeology, infrastructure buildup, utilities maintenance, and agricultural/irrigation modernization. EU countries, which have an elevated level of development in water management and environmental protection and prioritize climate-related policies, are particularly fit for this role as they seek new areas for engagement and partnerships in the region. Similarly, USAID is the primary US governmental agency engaging Central Asia on environmental issues. There also is an opportunity for greater diversification and participation on the part of other US federal agencies.

Extraregional partners

French entities are engaging with Central Asian nations. In 2023, the French Geological Survey (Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières, or BRGM) signed an agreement on water management with Kazakhstan’s Geology Committee of the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development. In Uzbekistan, the Suez Group of France signed a seven-year contract with the water company Uzsuvtaminot, the Municipality of Tashkent, and the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade to expand and improve drinking water access in Tashkent.

Moreover, France partnered with Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and the World Bank in organizing the One Water Summit, held in Riyadh on December 3, 2024. The event was announced by President Emmanuel Macron and Kazakh President Tokayev at the seventy-ninth session of the UN General Assembly in New York (on September 25), and the summit was held on the margins of the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD COP16). These meetings serve as an important links between Central Asia and actors with capital and expertise on water management.

As for other European countries, in August 2024, a Kazakhstani delegation traveled to Germany for working meetings that resulted in four agreements on agriculture and water management. The Netherlands is engaging Astana to share knowledge on good practices. And at a 2023 conference in Astana, Slovak water companies presented research results and proposals to address water-related problems, particularly in Kazakhstan, including resource management and safety of water structures.

The EBRD has provided a sovereign loan of US$8.93 million and another US$8.93 million in investment grants to improve the Kyrgyz Republic’s water supply. The Central Asia Water & Energy Program (CAWEP) aims to expand and improve access to drinking water among the C5 nations and Afghanistan. According to the annual 2022-2023 CAWEP report, current projects include improving water resources and environmental conditions along the Aral Sea and adjacent basin areas of Kazakhstan.

USAID is active in Central Asia. In April 2024, USAID launched a new water supply system in Tajikistan’s Rokhati village, Rudaki District, to provide drinking water to more than 3,000 people. Over the period of October 2020 to September 2025, USAID is investing US$21.5 million to strengthen regional capacity to manage shared water resources and mitigate environmental risks in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. These initiatives include organizing online lectures, sponsoring academic training, establishing national intersectoral committees and a regional coordination committee, and organizing a study tour of the Syr Darya River basin for water specialists and journalists to raise awareness.

Turkmenistan may turn to Israel for assistance: During an April 2023 visit by Foreign Minister Eli Cohen to open the Israeli embassy in Ashgabat, he met with President Serdar Berdymukhamedov to share experiences in agriculture and water-saving techniques. Meanwhile, Korea Water Resources Corp. (K-Water), a state-run water management agency, has signed agreements with Kyrgyzstan to foster cooperation in the water sector and climate crisis. Finally, Azerbaijan (which borders the Caspian and Baku) could engage Central Asia via international organizations like the Organization of Turkic States to develop water projects to protect the Caspian Sea and capitalize on its close relationship with Kazakhstan.

Working together

For years, Central Asia has been moving toward greater regional integration for economic, cultural, and geopolitical reasons. Geopolitically, regional integration enables interstate cooperation in the face of the ever-present influence of neighboring actors like Russia and China. Initiatives to mitigate water insecurity provide an opportunity to strengthen regional cohesion in a concrete sphere of shared interest. Working together to address common water-related challenges can serve as a confidence-building mechanism to deepen C5 integration.

When the C5 presidents met in Astana in early August 2024 to discuss water issues, President Tokayev emphasized that it is “necessary to develop a new consolidated water policy, based on equal and fair use of water and strict fulfillment of obligations.” Kazakhstan, known for supporting regional cooperation and integration via its multivector foreign policy, is engaging partners. In 2023, Astana and Bishkek approved the Strategic Action Program for the Chu and Talas river basins to protect the combined three million residents of the area. The 2022–2030 program, drafted by UNDP and UNECE, addresses water quality, volumes, and ecosystem conservation.

The third International Conference on the Decade of Action, “Water for Sustainable Development, 2018–2028,” took place in June 2024 in Dushanbe, part of the Dushanbe Water Process. Tatyana Bokova, head of Tajikistan’s Revenue Administration Department, said: “Over decades of cooperation with neighboring countries, various mechanisms for the integrated management of shared waters have been introduced. Our oldest intergovernmental agreement turns sixty this year, and it, like others, continues to meet modern needs.” Similarly, the fourth meeting of the Joint Uzbek-Turkmen Intergovernmental Commission on Water Management met in Turkmenabat on April 30, 2024. The parties agreed to expedite the registration of Uzbek water-management facilities in Turkmenistan and to implement a project to build an antifiltration wall at the Sultan Sanjar dam of the Tuyamuyun hydroelectric complex. The C5 governments are discussing outstanding water-related issues; however, the combined effects of climate change, population growth, water scarcity, and environmental degradation are becoming more pressing. A broad array of effective actions is urgently needed.

Policy recommendations

The C5 forum has sought to increase regional cooperation and connectivity. Initiatives like the Middle Corridor and regional blocs promote cooperation and dialogue, but the C5 does not act as a unified bloc. Kazakhstan relies on its multivector foreign policy, and Uzbekistan is opening to the world. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have deteriorating relations with the West; Bishkek tends to cooperate more closely with Russia and China. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan maintains a relatively isolationist foreign policy. In other words, the C5 governments have different foreign policies, objectives, and partners.

The C5 format to engage the rest of the world has brought mixed results, though summits with the United States, Europe, and the Gulf states have resulted in positive announcements, investment, and trade projects. Yet Central Asia must increase intraregional connectivity and confidence-building mechanisms to deepen C5 integration to address regional problems in a holistic and unified manner. Challenges like water security do not recognize borders, and no single government can successfully address them without working together with neighbors. As this report has noted, distrust and border incidents, including over access to water, continue to prevent a more cohesive regional bloc from engaging the broader world. A joint, high-level C5 water policy body could improve water management, prepare legislation and regulation, and identify and work with investment partners both in the international assistance space and the private sector. Now that the United States and Central Asia have held a presidential-level C5+1 (regional diplomatic platform) in 2023 and a B5+1 in 2024, a blue C5+1 focused on water issues could prove very fruitful.

Regional cooperation

• Strengthen the Central Asian water agencies. Regional agencies exist, tasked with managing water bodies, namely IFAS and the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC). Regional bodies also have subagencies devoted to environmental affairs. For example, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) has a Directorate for Energy, Minerals, and Environment, while one of the objectives of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is cooperation among the ministers of environment and ecology. There also are regular high-level conferences focused on water, such as the Dushanbe Water Process. Moreover, there is a legal environmental framework: the Tehran Convention, which entered into force in 2006, tasked with environmental protection of the Caspian Sea. However, ongoing water challenges, including the troubling Caspian situation, demonstrate that the existing environmental agencies and legal frameworks must be revised.
  • Restructure the ICWC (established in 1992) or create a new Central Asia Water Council/Secretariat. A challenge: deciding how much power a restructured ICWC or new agency would have in executing its mandate without raising concerns about national sovereignty. Water is a critical resource that demands greater cooperation and integration. A state-of-the-science entity exclusively focused on this resource is clearly needed but would require buy-in from all parties in the region to be effective.
  • Address the deteriorating Soviet-era water transport network throughout the region as a starting point, with progress in this critical area providing confidence-building and establishing credibility (as noted earlier in this report), so that more sensitive issues can begin to be discussed and acted upon. An ICWC with a broader mandate (and resources) or a new Central Asian water agency could then help regional governments search for joint solutions to sensitive regional topics. Because stopping hydropower projects in Tajikistan would protect Kazakhstani and Uzbekistani agricultural industries but prolong Tajikistan’s energy woes, for example, it would be important to identify and apply mutually agreed upon and accepted measures.
• Heighten the prominence of Tajikistan’s Dushanbe Water Process. Organized by a Central Asian state, this forum specifically focuses on water issues. The conference’s name and international recognition could grow if linked to preparations and negotiations for future One Water Summits, for example.

International engagement and partnerships

International activities in Central Asian water management, infrastructure development, and investment are important sources of funding and expertise; proper coordination can avoid or limit wasteful redundancies. Therefore, a strengthened regional agency, as suggested above, is crucial. Specifically, the Central Asian countries should pursue the following formats:

• Green 5+1: To build on the US-C5 presidential-level meeting and platforms, a ministerial environmental summit between Central Asian and US environmental officials should occur. This summit could have the additional positive outcome of keeping the New York Declaration alive (signed during the historical presidential 5+1 summit in 2023 between Biden and the Central Asian leaders). A Green 5+1 could occur, for example, at the 2025 Astana International Forum: Proper preparation would be needed, and the aim could be announcing specific initiatives with earmarked funding, which would put its earlier publicized general good intentions into action.
• Hold a green EU + Central Asia head-of-state summit: Europe engages with Central Asia on both country-to-country and bloc-to-region levels: EU-Central Asia summits, EU-Central Asia ministerial meetings, high-level political and security dialogues, and other high-level meetings. In September 2023, there was a C5+Germany summit in Berlin between the C5 presidents and the German chancellor. These meetings often address water. At the 2023 EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg, participants highlighted the need to address the nexus of water and climate change “in a strong and holistic manner.” In June 2024, Dushanbe hosted the High-level Central Asian Forum on “Water and Climate Change” organized by UNDP, with support from Brussels. The next step should be a high-level summit, ideally at the presidential/head of state level, between the EU and Central Asia on environmental challenges, especially water. The EU is interested in expanding cooperation with the region beyond the usual topics of energy, transportation, and civil society—and water is a perfect subject matter. Paris, The Hague, and Astana could spearhead this initiative in collaboration with the UN.
• Hold Green East Asia (i.e., Japan, South Korea) + Central Asia summits: The first C5+Japan meeting at the presidential/prime minister level occurred in August 2024. Meanwhile, South Korea’s then-President Yoon Suk Yeol toured Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in June 2024, with the first presidential summit scheduled for 2025. To increase engagement, a Green C5 + East Asia summit at the ministerial level could occur, leading to a presidential C5-East Asia Green summit.
• Further engage the international donor community: Engaging with the international donor community, like the World Bank and EBRD, is nothing new for Central Asian governments looking to attract investment and aid agreements. While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are quite active, the situation is more challenging for the three other countries that are less open to deeper relations with the West. Nevertheless, more donor coordination and participation are advisable to develop regional water conservation, efficient use strategies, and country-specific projects—and to avoid redundancies, incorporate lessons learned, and move away from revisiting project ideas that have not worked before. A donor coordination policy conference focusing on water and climate policy, conducted in the region, and leading to the establishment of a proposed coordinating authority, could go a long way to improve water-management and climate-response strategies.

Confidence building

It is vital that the Central Asian states engage both within the region and with upstream and Caspian littoral countries in high-level international discussions of water issues, raising the profile of the region and communicating the critical nature of the problem. Two conferences provide an opportunity for Central Asia and its neighbors to act.

• COP29: Azerbaijan hosted the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference in November. Azerbaijan had openly stated its hopes that COP29 would avoid some of the criticism of previous COPs by acting as an accelerator for smaller regional initiatives and creating workable frameworks for developing countries to act pragmatically on environmental issues. These foci perfectly complement Central Asian challenges. Central Asian calculations should carefully incorporate the COP29 outlook, especially given the importance of Azerbaijan’s cooperation on many issues.
• Regional climate summit: Kazakhstan will host a Central Asian environment summit in 2026. Water security in Central Asia must be a critical item on the agenda. Astana should rally support for effective initiatives and solutions. Summit workshops can identify high-priority projects for cooperative execution. COP29 provides a basis for this action. It is highly desirable that the suggested Central Asia Water Council or agency be established either prior to or at this event.

Technology, accountability and jobs

• Do what works: In recent years, national and regional governments and utilities around the world have implemented technologies like water-measuring systems, drip irrigation, recycling of gray water, and pump stations. Each of these technologies should be field tested in the region and utilized where appropriate.
• Encourage and incorporate new technologies: Water-saving technologies are being developed in several countries including Japan. Agencies like the Astana International Financial Centre (which has a Green Finance Center), USAID, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), or EBRD can create special funds for innovative water projects and provide grants to scientists (mainly from the C5) who are developing new technologies to address water security.
• Upgrade regional water infrastructure such as canals. To eliminate seepage, Soviet-era canal bottoms must be paved and insulated until they are watertight. Moreover, the tops of the canals could be covered with solar panels, which would provide energy to pump and measuring stations along the canal while reducing evaporation. Kazakhstan’s lengthy Irtysh–Karaganda Canal, the Arys-Turkistan Canal, and/or the Kyzylkum Canal could be testing grounds for solar panels. These initiatives are especially promising since they have already attracted the interest of private investors.
• Ensure transparency and accountability: As more money pours into water infrastructure, there is the increasing likelihood of misappropriation, theft, and corrupt practices. Regional governments must consider hiring international accountability agencies that can audit projects to ensure funds are appropriately spent. The citizenry’s trust in their leaders will grow if authorities take concrete steps toward transparency and efficient spending; and the confidence of international donors and partners would be strengthened, which is key to paving the way for continued future cooperation.
• Create jobs and prioritize training: New projects should contribute to job creation in countries with high unemployment. Prioritizing job training in the water sector will require collaboration between the water and professional education authorities. In this context, it is worth noting the opening of the Kazakh University of Water Management and Land Reclamation in September 2024. Water-related projects will create jobs, as occurred through Uzbekistan’s South Karakalpakstan Water Resources Management Improvement Project.
• Involve foreign donors and obtain end-user feedback: Government officials must engage with the general population to discuss water security and what citizens need. Kazakhstan’s “Listening State” initiative, for example, could have a specific water component. Other governments can follow Astana’s models and have town halls and meetings between community leaders and senior policymakers about what water-related challenges they face and what the residents of affected communities propose. Ideas should not only come from international agencies or a country’s senior leadership; local populations can also provide valid and helpful recommendations regarding how to manage water challenges. Engaging in listening initiatives will have the added benefit of fostering stakeholder buy-in.

Conclusion

Water shortage is a limiting factor for Central Asia’s regional development. To improve the current situation, the five countries of the region need to accelerate the renovation and upgrading of the regional water infrastructure, field test and incorporate new water-saving technologies, and attract international partners and foreign investment in area water infrastructure at a significantly higher rate. Coordination of these activities on the regional level is paramount.

A previous version of this report misstated the year Kazakhstan will host a Central Asian environment summit. It will be in 2026.

Ariel Cohen, LLB, PhD, is an internationally renowned expert on energy policy, Russia/Eurasia, Eastern and Central Europe, and the Middle East. He is a recognized authority on political and security risk man-agement; economic development and investment policy; the rule of law; crime and corruption; market-entry strategies; and other aspects of state/business relations.

Cohen is a senior fellow at the International Tax and Investment Center, a nonprofit research and edu-cation organization in Washington, and director of its Energy, Growth and Security Program. He also serves as a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

He has authored six books and monographs, has been involved in journalism since 1981, and has pub-lished over 900 articles in professional and popular media. A columnist for Forbes, he regularly appears on CNN, NBC, CBS, FOX, C-SPAN, BBC-TV, Al Jazeera, and all Russian and Ukrainian national TV networks.

He also writes for Newsweek, The National Interest, Huffington Post, the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist blog, and UPI, and has written numerous guest columns for The New York Times, Christian Science Moni-tor, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Times, and National Review Online. He is widely published in Europe and the Middle East.

Until July 2014, Cohen was a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. Dr. Cohen conducts White House briefings and regularly lectures at the request of US government institutions including the US Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Training and Doctrine and Special Forces Commands of the US Armed Forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He frequently testifies before committees of the US Congress—including the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Judiciary Commit-tee—and the Helsinki Commission. He also directs high-level conferences on a wide array of topics.

Cohen is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Bar Association, and the Amer-ican Council on Germany.

Wesley Alexander Hill is the assistant director and lead analyst for the Energy, Growth, and Security Program at the International Tax and Investment Center. The program focuses on critical natural resources, energy transformations, infrastructure, and geopolitics in Eurasia while exploring opportunities for investment and policymaking.

Hill is an accomplished foreign policy professional with expertise in energy policy, security studies, grand strategy, Chinese politics, Sino-American relations, Sino-African relations, and Sino-Eurasian relations. Hill has been featured in Al Jazeera, The Hill, Newsweek, Voice of America, The National Interest, and many other outlets. Hill is also a contributor to Forbes.

Earlier in his career, Hill was a political science lecturer and researcher at Tulane University. Hill is a fellow of the National Bureau of Asian Research, having conducted research at Beijing’s Tsinghua University and Taipei’s National Normal University. Hill began his career conducting foreign policy research and analysis in the constituent services office of Congresswoman Dina Titus.

Hill graduated from Tulane University.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, trade, and defense and security issues across the Western Hemisphere, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. He is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm based in Washington, DC.

His analyses have appeared in numerous refereed journals, including the SAIS Review of International Affairs, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, Polar Journal, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Perspectivas. He has published book chapters on Bolivia’s foreign policy, separatism in Moldova, and economic diversification in Kazakhstan. His essays and commentaries appear in The Diplomat, NE Global, Geopolitical Monitor, World Politics Review, e-International Relations, among others, and have been published by the Center for International Maritime Security.

Sánchez holds a master’s degree in international peace and conflict resolution from American University’s School of International Service. He has attended the Institute of World Politics, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and studied in Austria, Belgium, and France. He also studied at the National Defense University’s William J. Perry Center (formerly the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies) in Washington.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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While the withdrawal is an important global signal and will make efforts to combat climate change more difficult, the new administration’s de-prioritization of climate action will have immediate and concrete consequences for Americans themselves. The country will bear a heavier burden of inaction as well as the losses of delayed national investment in adaptation and resilience if Trump succeeds in fully repealing the Biden administration’s climate investments.

This month provided a stark example of that opportunity cost. The Los Angeles wildfires killed twenty-seven people and burned through over 12,000 structures. The loss is visible and immediate. Notably, the true cost is still being calculated. Analysts are projecting economic losses of as much as $150 billion and anticipate more deaths as the ramifications of degraded air quality and smoke take full effect.

The deeper concern is that this withdrawal, coupled with Trump’s other executive orders to facilitate the fossil fuel industry and backtrack on climate investments, will have significant impacts on the American public, since increasing greenhouse gas emissions has a direct effect on increasing the frequency and intensity of natural disasters.

Hence, if in addition to these decisions, the Trump administration opts out of actively investing in disaster preparedness, its economic and financial losses will rise exponentially. In fact, it is estimated that each dollar spent on disaster preparedness and climate adaptation saves twelve dollars in recovery and response. Without climate-related action and resilience-building efforts, it will fall to the American taxpayer to cover that additional eleven dollars.

The United States is stepping back on climate at a critical moment for action. The public and private sectors need to be taking this moment to coordinate and align. But instead, the new administration is signaling, at least initially, a lack of political will that could set the country back both in terms of individual preparedness and long-term economic opportunity.

Other countries are seizing the economic opportunities of climate adaptation and resilience. Germany is set to invest at least €1.6 billion in artificial intelligence, including for climate efforts, by 2025; Japan has committed to doubling adaptation finance to $14.8 billion by 2025; and countries such as Uruguay, Denmark, and Lithuania are recognized for having scaled up the share of solar and wind energy in their electricity mix by at least 6 percentage points annually over a five-year span.

Trump’s recent executive orders mark not only a lack of commitment to climate action but also a backtracking on notable climate investments under the Biden administration. The private sector will likely no longer have the government’s support in fast-tracking adaptation initiatives. As other countries scale up incentives, this will make it more difficult for the United States to hold any competitive advantage in the long term.

In the short-term, however, it’s lives and livelihoods that are at risk. Without mitigation and adaptation, climate change is set to kill 3.4 million people each year by the end of the century. While the United States’ retreat from climate leadership has significant geopolitical implications, the more pressing concern is on the national impacts. Americans will face the consequences of inaction. They will have lower capacity to overcome climate shocks and stresses, putting their own health, finances, and well-being on the line. In fact, our Climate Resilience Center estimated that heat-related labor-productivity losses could cost half a trillion dollars annually by 2050 in the United States alone. Ignoring or denying the reality of climate change will not avoid its impacts.

Indeed, the world will feel the loss of US leadership under the Trump administration. Progress can—and must—continue, but the average American will feel the weight of these decisions on a personal, financial, and social level for years to come. Although Trump has made his climate stance clear in his first few hours back in the White House, there is time for his administration and the president himself to reassess and reinvest in a new way forward.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He previously served as chief advisor and negotiator to the government of Peru during the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

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2024 was a transformative year for Latin America and the Caribbean. Elections brought some surprises, but the region also bucked the global trend as continuity was the theme in the Dominican Republic and Mexico, where Claudia Sheinbaum made history as its first female president. Further south, Brazil played a pivotal role as the host of the Group of Twenty and Peru welcomed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, asserting Latin America’s leadership on the global stage.

Meanwhile, the region faced enduring challenges—from Nicolas Maduro’s ignoring electoral results in Venezuela to the growing influence of transnational criminal organizations. The region remains trapped in a low-growth economic environment with considerable strains on fiscal revenue, while a strong hurricane season reinforced the importance of building greater resilience across the Caribbean. China’s influence surged, with increased, notable new investments and Colombia’s decision to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What might be in store for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025?

How might the incoming Trump administration engage with the region? Can economies across the hemisphere grow beyond current predictions? How will leaders address security challenges? Might new tech hubs emerge?

Take the quiz and see if you agree with our predictions for 2025!

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A low-carbon vision meets untold natural resource wealth

Guyana had embarked on an ambitious journey toward sustainable development long before ExxonMobil’s massive oil discoveries off its coast in 2015. In 2009, recognizing the value of its vast rainforests in the fight against climate change, Guyana launched its pioneering Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS). This wasn’t merely an environmental policy; it represented a fundamental rethinking of how a developing nation could approach economic growth.

The strategy’s origins lay in a holistic understanding of Guyana’s natural wealth. The country’s rainforests, covering roughly two thirds of its territory, store an estimated 19.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. Rather than viewing these forests as obstacles to development, Guyana recognized them as vital assets in the global fight against climate change.

An early partnership with Norway—which pledged up to $250 million to help preserve Guyana’s rainforests—established the LCDS’s credibility. It provided vital seed funding, helping Guyana develop the institutional capacity and technical frameworks necessary for environmental asset management on a national scale.

The 2015 oil discoveries placed Guyana at a crucial decision point—over 11 billion barrels of oil equivalent were enough to transform the nation’s economic trajectory overnight. Many nations might have abandoned their environmental commitments in the face of such wealth. Instead, Guyana chose to update and strengthen its low-carbon strategy, creating LCDS 2030.

The balancing act of LCDS 2030

Guyana’s approach reflects a sophisticated understanding of its natural capital. Rather than treating environmental protection and resource extraction as mutually exclusive, Guyana developed parallel value streams from its natural assets.

The country’s forests, for instance, generate revenue through both sustainable forestry and carbon credits, which monetize environmental stewardship. In 2022, Guyana made history by becoming the first nation to receive private sector validation for forest conservation-based jurisdictional carbon credits, leading to a landmark $750 million agreement with Hess Corporation.

The groundbreaking deal involves the sale of 37.5 million carbon credits (about 30 percent of Guyana’s credit issuance) between 2022-32, with increasing minimum prices from $15 to $25 per ton and a 60 percent revenue share for Guyana if market prices exceed these floors. The credits are independently verified under the United Nations (UN) ART TREES standard and meet UN social and environmental safeguards.

The country has further pushed boundaries by launching a Global Biodiversity Alliance aiming to develop a biodiversity credits system that extends beyond carbon, creating a comprehensive framework for valuing ecosystem services. By combining carbon credits, biodiversity credits, and sustainable forestry income, Guyana’s sustainable finance approach offers a new paradigm for how developing nations can maximize the value of their natural assets while preserving them for future generations.

Similarly, rather than treating petroleum wealth as an end in itself, Guyana views it as a means to finance its climate transition. Oil revenues are channeled into renewable energy projects, climate-resilient agriculture, coastal protection, and green job training. For example, the government has invested 12 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product in upgrading drainage and irrigation networks and expanding rehabilitation of sea and river defense structures at critical locations. These investments are complemented by planned water treatment facilities and comprehensive flood management programs.

By 2027, Guyana is projected to produce 1.2 million barrels of oil per day, rivaling some OPEC members. But unlike many oil producers, this production surge is balanced with concrete environmental commitments.

The power of inclusion

The most innovative aspect of Guyana’s approach lies in its governance framework. The Multi-Stakeholder Steering Committee overseeing the LCDS represents a comprehensive model of inclusive decision-making, drawing representatives from government, civil society, Indigenous organizations, the private sector, and academia. Specifically, Indigenous communities—traditional stewards of the forests—are integrated through village-level consultations, dedicated representation in decision-making, and capacity-building programs, ensuring they play a central role in shaping Guyana’s national sustainable development strategy.

Guyana’s global leadership

The strength of Guyana’s commitment to this balanced approach was powerfully articulated at the 16th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity in 2024. There, Vickram Bharrat, Guyana’s minister of natural resources, presented his nation’s journey not as a compromise, but as a pioneering model for development:

“As a developing, oil-producing nation with ambitious infrastructure projects, we face the challenge of balancing economic growth with environmental preservation. However, through the Low Carbon Development Strategy 2030, we are committed to ensuring that development proceeds without compromising our natural capital. Our forests will continue to serve as vital carbon sinks and biodiversity hotspots, supporting both climate action and ecosystem resilience.”

The minister’s words were backed by one of the most ambitious conservation commitments globally: expanding Guyana’s protected areas from 9 to 30 percent of its land mass by 2030.  At COP29 in Azerbaijan, Guyana further demonstrated its leadership by receiving the Transparency Award and co-chairing the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership. Bharrat’s call to move beyond theoretical debates to “measurable, accountable action” underscored Guyana’s role as a practical innovator in global climate solutions.

Lessons for a world in transition

Guyana’s ability to transform potential contradictions into complementary strengths offers a compelling model for managing the energy transition. The same government that oversees a rapidly expanding oil sector is also pioneering biodiversity credits and expanding protected areas. This isn’t coincidental—it reflects a nuanced understanding that modern development requires balancing multiple priorities and revenue streams.

The strategy treats oil wealth not as an end goal, but as a bridge to a sustainable future. Oil revenues are systematically channeled into building the infrastructure, institutions, and human capital needed for a low-carbon economy. This approach recognizes that the oil boom, while significant, is temporary. The benefits of preserved forests and biodiversity, however, are permanent.

For other oil producers, particularly those in the developing world, Guyana offers a template that could be adapted to local conditions. The success of this model is already providing compelling evidence that developing nations need not choose between economic development and environmental stewardship. Instead, they can pursue a more balanced path that recognizes and monetizes the value of all their natural assets and builds toward a more sustainable future.

Liliana Diaz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and an adjunct professor of energy, climate policy, and markets in the Americas at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

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By developing robust biodiversity credit markets, countries in the region will not only safeguard invaluable ecosystems but also set a global standard in climate finance.

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By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Energy and water have a complex and inextricable relationship, especially as growing populations, expanding cities, and the changing climate strain resources around the globe. Leaders at COP29 must come together in Baku to promote policies, strategies, and investments to meet the water and energy challenge.

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Guyana is on a rapid path to potentially becoming the fourth largest oil producer in the world. Now, the government has an opportunity to show the world how to do resource development right.

Energy & Environment Geopolitics & Energy Security

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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Since the inception of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, the international community has pursued both top-down and bottom-up approaches to address climate change. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 exemplified a top-down approach, imposing legally binding emission-reduction targets on developed nations. However, its impact was limited due to several large emitters not participating. This included the United States, which withdrew its support, and Canada and Australia, which later followed suit.

The Paris Agreement was the next major multilateral effort. After years of extensive negotiations, countries reached a breakthrough in drafting a new legal instrument to address the climate crisis in 2015. Unlike previous frameworks that primarily targeted industrialized nations, this new approach aimed to be universal. It marked a fundamental shift in multilateralism: Instead of setting international norms and obligations to be implemented at the national level, this strategy reversed the process. The global effort would now be the collective sum of what individual nations commit to at the national level—a bottom-up model rather than the traditional top-down approach, allowing countries to set their own emission reduction targets, known as Nationally Determined Contributions. 

The Paris approach was aimed in part to accommodate the United States, where domestic political dynamics resist externally imposed mandates (US lawmakers and politicians do not accept that other countries can dictate how the US economy should be run). Todd Stern, the former US special envoy for climate change and one of the architects of the Paris Agreement, explained in a recent podcast that a major objective was to design an agreement that the United States could join without repeating its usual pattern of negotiating terms only to back out later. The Paris Agreement, tailored to accommodate the US context, successfully brought the United States on board initially. But despite initial widespread participation, the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement in 2017 during the first Trump administration, then rejoined in 2021 during the Biden administration. The return of President-elect Donald Trump to the White House is likely to see the United States again leave the agreement. 

Both approaches—top-down and bottom-up—have now been attempted in global climate governance. The Kyoto Protocol embodied the former and the Paris Agreement introduced the latter. While progress has undoubtedly been made, much of it attributable to the Paris framework, the world is still falling short of what is necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of limiting global temperature rise. The recent NCQG aims to mobilize $300 billion annually by 2035 to assist developing countries. However, this figure falls far short of the estimated $1.3 trillion per year that experts deem necessary to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. 

Why, despite deploying these two fundamentally different approaches, has the multilateral system failed to deliver at the required scale?

The root cause, in my view, is that leaders are not focused on the heart of the problem of the climate crisis, which lies in the underlying global economic model. The current global economy is overly focused on profit generation and wealth accumulation, often at the expense of sustainability. This profit-driven model not only fuels the climate crisis but also creates systemic barriers to meaningful international cooperation and transformative change. It is a significant barrier to progress in achieving sustainable development since it treats natural resources (land) merely as factors of production rather than as integral components of ecosystems. In the current economic model, the four factors of production are: capital, human resources, land and natural resources, and entrepreneurship. This perspective leads to environmental degradation and hinders sustainable development. Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Thomas Piketty have advocated rethinking this model to prioritize ecological sustainability, social well-being, and more equitable development.

I tried myself in 2013 and 2014, in the context of my participation in the UN General Assembly’s Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which discussed and developed the SDGs, to draw attention to and bring the focus on the need to address systemic issues and reengineer the global economic model. I made this case because I believe it is necessary to truly achieve sustainable development. Unfortunately, my calls did not resonate as much as I would have hoped.

Large corporations, often through influential governments, resist systemic changes that could disrupt profit margins. The Paris Agreement sought to signal to corporate and investment circles that they needed to initiate transitions toward sustainability. While some progress has been made on this front, the transition lacks the necessary depth, speed, and equity. The current economic “software” still prioritizes profit maximization, impeding the rapid and comprehensive changes required. So, like any software, the economic machinery will follow and execute, no matter what we do. We need to rewrite the software.

A new economic model addressing climate change while prioritizing environmental and ecosystem conservation would integrate principles of sustainability, inclusivity, equity, and resilience. It should assign economic value to ecosystems (e.g., carbon sequestration, water purification, biodiversity), encourage investments in natural capital, promote a circular economy to minimize waste and maximize resource efficiency, and focus on transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. In order to decouple emissions from economic development and growth, massive investments and resources should be directed at accelerating and scaling up technological solutions.

Every year, the climate crisis gets worse. To effectively tackle this crisis, it is imperative to reengineer the economic model to prioritize the wellbeing of people and the planet rather than profit generation. This shift is urgent and essential for achieving sustainable development and ensuring that multilateral efforts yield tangible and meaningful outcomes. Time is not on our side. 

Mohamed Khalil is a senior Egyptian diplomat and expert in sustainable development and climate policy. He has played a key role in international climate negotiations, from COP17 in 2011 till COP29 in 2024, particularly regarding achieving the Paris Agreement in COP21 in 2015, shaping policies on climate adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable financing. 

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Underwhelming COP29

Participants at COP29 managed to reach an agreement on international carbon market standards, a key step to establishing such a market under the United Nations (UN), as envisioned in Article 6.4 of the 2015 Paris Agreement. However, COP29 became stuck on the key objective of the meeting: producing a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) as a new climate finance target for the next ten to fifteen years. This is meant to replace the current $100 billion annual figure—a pledge of financial aid to developing countries made by developed countries in 2009, but viewed as totally inadequate.

The most important issue to be settled is the quantum of the NCQG. Participating countries have disparate expectations, which are unlikely to be bridged. Developing countries have coalesced around the target of $1.3 trillion a year of international climate finance aid, based on a report by the High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance. Developed countries spearheaded by the European Union (EU) have reportedly toyed with a range of $200-300 billion, but are reportedly leaning toward $200 billion and a 2035 deadline.

The issue of the contributor base has also been important. Developing countries want to stick to the Paris Agreement, which calls for developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries. Developed countries want to widen the contributor base to include rapidly growing emerging market countries. These countries, such as China and the Gulf countries, are able to contribute and should do so because of their high levels of emissions. Many developing countries, in particular China, have strongly objected to these demands. As part of the debate, China announced that it has voluntarily provided 177 billion yuan ($24 billion) in project financing to help other developing countries deal with climate change since 2016. This statement highlights China’s preferences for a bilateral approach. China is using climate finance as a tool to further its geopolitical agenda, instead of contributing funds to multilateral efforts. If other countries decide to follow a similar bilateral approach, they could strike another blow against the unraveling multilateral world order.

A day after the COP29 officially ended, an agreement on NCQG was reached, calling for developed countries to provide $300 billion a year by 2035 to help developing countries in their climate efforts. No one is happy with the agreement. Developing countries have criticized it as  too little. Developed countries have tried to lower expectations about official aid, emphasizing that the funding would have to come from a wide variety of sources, including the private sector. In any event, the agreements concluded at the COP29 will be overshadowed by the fact that Trump would most likely pull the United States out of the 2015 Paris Agreement for a second time—and could even withdraw from the 1992 UN Treaty that provides the framework for the COP process. This time around, Argentina could follow suit and quit the Paris Agreement. President Milei already recalled his negotiators midway through the COP29 meetings. Without the US and possibly Argentina, the rest of the world would have to struggle to come up with meaningful nationally determined commitments to achieve net zero emissions and to mobilize climate finance to help developing countries. This outlook does not augur well for the COP30 to be hosted by Brazil in 2025.

A divided G20 Summit

The G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro has been described by media reports as chaotic and divided. Nevertheless, it managed to produce a Leaders’ Declaration, even though the debate about wording was cut short by Brazil’s President Lula—leaving a bitter taste among Western leaders. The Declaration contains watered-down language on practically all agenda items. A major result is the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, Lula’s signature project, which gathered support and was launched.

However, the facade of cooperation has been rocked by Argentina’s statement that while Milei did not want to prevent other leaders from signing the declaration, he strongly criticized key elements of the agenda. His targets included anything to do with the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and strengthening the role of governments in fighting global hunger (which according to Milei should be promoted by removing the involvement of governments). At the same time, Milei stressed that he would prioritize economic development over environmental protection, having dissolved Argentina’s Environment Ministry after taking office. These arguments are in line with Trump’s views. They will likely be advanced more forcefully in future G20 meetings, undermining the chance of agreements for joint actions and weakening the G20 itself.

Prospects for international cooperation: more turbulence

President Trump will likely reverse or ignore many of Biden’s environmental and climate change initiatives. However, as several red states have seen job creation thanks to IRA programs, he may continue some programs on a case-by-case basis. Overall, Trump’s approach would weaken environmental protection home and disengage from international climate efforts.

In the vacuum created by the United States and Argentina, China has already stepped in to champion international climate efforts under the Paris Agreement and open trade, as Xi Jinping claimed in his speech at the Rio G20 Summit. China has appealed to the EU to “collaborate effectively on the COP29 agenda…(to) establish a strong foundation for re-aligning their broad green and economic initiatives and improve their bilateral relationship.” China’s approach may appeal to the EU when it’s confronted with Trump’s denial of climate change and his protectionist unilateralism. However, if the EU were to cooperate with China on climate and trade issues, it would find itself at greater odds with a Trump administration already unhappy with the EU for free riding the US security umbrella while posting a trade surplus with the United States. The EU would be in a very difficult position, as it still very much depends on Washington for security, especially against a revanchist Russia emboldened by its successes in Ukraine.

The rest of the world can find ways to deal with climate change without the US federal government, as it did during Trump’s first presidential term—including working with US states and cities still keen to promote a green agenda. But the whole exercise would be inefficient and more difficult, especially when mobilizing climate finance.

As summarized by Bloomberg, the Rio G20 Summit has shown “how quickly the guardrails are coming off the international rule-based order…(as) the looming return of Trump hung over the proceedings like the proverbial sword of Damocles.” Expect more of the same, at future summits—starting with the 2025 G20 under the presidency of South Africa.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and a former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

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Eight Latin American countries attended this year’s G20 leaders’ summit. Besides Argentine President Javier Milei, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and newly inaugurated Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, delegations from Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay traveled to Rio as guest countries of the Brazilian G20 presidency. These countries face shifting international winds and are growing apart as governments respond in different ways to external developments, from growing US-China competition to the incoming US presidential administration.

Brazil’s G20 marks the third year in a row in which an emerging market is setting the G20 agenda, following the presidencies of Indonesia (2022) and India (2023). In this context, these countries have paved the way for greater harmonization of objectives between developed and developing countries, pushing for progress in key areas, including climate finance, hunger and poverty, digital public infrastructure, and reforming international financial institutions. Over the same period, Latin American G20 members have worked together to raise the importance of regional priorities, such as development and climate finance and the reform of multilateral institutions. This year, however, policy coordination has become more challenging as governments veer apart from one another in how they plan to adapt to a changing international landscape, risking a division of the region into competing groups.

Here is how the three Latin American countries in the G20 approached this year’s summit.

Brazil

Brazil faced the challenging task of balancing the disparate demands and priorities of all twenty-one permanent members of the G20 with its own priorities: social inclusion, global reform, and sustainability. The end goal, the successful signing of a (nonbinding) final declaration, was a complex task in a heavily divided world, and key Brazilian priorities such as promoting a billionaire tax to finance hunger relief faced opposition from the United States. The proposal, which was supported by France, Spain, and South Africa, was actually most vehemently opposed by fellow South American nation Argentina. Brazil ultimately succeeded in gaining consensus for a declaration that espoused its key objectives, including calls for multilateral reform, cooperation for more effective taxation of “ultra-high-net-worth individuals,” and a redoubling of efforts to end world hunger and fight climate change, among other topics. 

Yet Brazilian leaders are also aware that they will have more opportunities beyond the G20 to shape the agenda. Next year, the Lula administration will host the 2025 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) and will preside over the BRICS summit. It will be an important year for international climate negotiations that coincides with President-elect Donald Trump’s first year back in office, which has raised uncertainty about the United States’ continued participation in the Paris climate accords. This sentiment was perhaps best exemplified by Lula himself, who concluded in his final remarks that leaders had “worked hard,” but that they had “only scratched the surface of the deep challenges that the world has to face.”

Mexico

Under Sheinbaum, Mexico is reemerging as a more active participant in the G20 process and the world stage. This is the first time a Mexican president has attended the G20 in six years, ending that country’s limited presidential diplomacy under former President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador. During her participation, Sheinbaum signaled support for three areas of focus: gender equality, sustainable development, and digitalization. She also supported Brazil’s proposed Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty—which was a high mark of the Brazilian presidency—and presented the Sowing Life program to divert 1 percent of global military spending to sustainable development and reforestation.

Mexico’s return to international fora pleased domestic and international observers, and images of Sheinbaum in meetings with world leaders have set a clear break from her predecessor. However, Mexico’s deep ties to the US economy present a different calculus for the Mexican president when compared to Lula for 2025 and beyond, likely inspiring greater caution in her approach to the international arena, particularly as she prepares her country for potential confrontation with the incoming administration in the United States. She did nonetheless use the stage to defend the government’s controversial judicial reform. Her first major international appearance in Rio de Janeiro set the stage for how she plans to move forward in years to come.

Argentina

The main source of regional misalignment among the three Latin American G20 members came from Argentina, which in past days had made a series of symbolic gestures at the United Nations (UN) to signal the country’s new course under Milei. The country had stood out as the sole vote against UN resolutions this month on indigenous people’s rights and combating gender-based online violence. Argentina also recalled its delegation from the ongoing COP29 in Azerbaijan, raising concerns over the country’s continued commitment to the Paris agreement and the international climate regime, echoing Trump’s own withdrawal of the United States from the agreement in 2017. (Milei was also the first foreign leader to visit Trump on the Thursday following the US presidential election.)

Brazil was quick to respond through Environment Minister Marina Silva and Vice-President Geraldo Alckmin, who criticized Argentina’s move. In Brazil, there was also apprehension that these moves by its southern neighbor set a bad precedent for what may happen during the leaders’ summit. Across negotiations over the G20’s final declaration, Argentine representatives sought to block the inclusion of references to gender equality, women’s rights, a tax for billionaires, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In the end, Milei decided not to block the leaders’ declaration but dissociated himself from those issues. An official involved in the negotiations told the Associated Press that Argentina adopted the statement “under intense pressure from world powers.” Other areas, such as the promotion of regional democracy, artificial intelligence governance, and the energy transition, fared better in exchanges over the communiqué. Underscoring the tensions between Brasilia and Buenos Aries, Argentina is the only country not to have requested a bilateral meeting with Lula in Rio.

Trade, Trump, and beyond

Developments in Europe are also changing diplomatic calculations in the region. For months, it was expected that the long-delayed trade deal between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur, a South American trade bloc, might finally be announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her Mercosur counterparts during the G20 leaders’ summit. Brazil’s invitation of Paraguay and Uruguay, the bloc’s other members together with Argentina (plus Bolivia, which is completing its accession process), was partially inspired by this objective. France, however, has made its opposition to the agreement clear: French Prime Minister Michel Barnier warned last week that the government is “employing all means” to block it in its current form. French President Emmanuel Macron, who faces a steep legislative battle over France’s 2025 budget and is being pressured by farmers to block the deal, met Milei in Buenos Aires this past Sunday before traveling to Rio. After that meeting Maron told reporters that Milei “was not satisfied with the deal” and that he was “not satisfied with the way Mercosur worked.” Other EU members, including Austria, Hungary, Ireland, and Poland, may also step in to block the deal. Interestingly, French officials explained that Macron played an instrumental role to convince Argentina “to contribute to the international consensus” and refrain from blocking the G20 process.

Ultimately nothing transpired in Rio, although the agreement’s main proponents, including Germany, Spain, the Mercosur countries, and the European Commission, remain optimistic that significant progress may still be reached before the end of the year. This would constitute one of the largest trade agreements in history and would bring the two regions closer at a time when fears of renewed trade wars and higher tariffs are spooking international markets. Nevertheless, there is also concern that Argentina’s withdrawal from COP29 may still be used by the deal’s detractors in the EU to block progress over environmental policy, similar to how deforestation in Brazil has fueled anti-treaty momentum in previous years. European officials, including Kaja Kallas, the leading candidate to become the next high representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy, have made clear their belief that if the deal fails it will create a “void” that will be filled by China.

Meanwhile, Beijing presented a clear framing for Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s participation in the G20: “to champion cooperation, multilateralism,” a strategy meant to preemptively present China as an alternative to Trump’s “America First” approach to international affairs. The inauguration of the port of Chancay in Peru and the announcement of new economic cooperation agreements with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean further cemented the perception of China’s outsized competitive advantage vis-à-vis the United States in its ability to deliver tangible economic results.

As the G20 leaders’ summit concludes, its leaders should redouble their efforts to find common ground and work together, or they will face the risk of having their shared interests being swept away by rising global uncertainty and volatility.

Ignacio Albe is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Biodiversity loss is especially urgent in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The region is home to 60 percent of the world’s biodiversity and six of the planet’s seventeen megadiverse countries. The Amazon rainforest, for instance, is a critical global ecosystem that is under increasing threat from illegal mining and other activities. Conservation investments there and throughout the region are both an urgent local need and a strategic imperative with global implications.

It should be no surprise, then, that LAC countries are at the forefront in seeking to reduce biodiversity loss. Colombia just hosted the 2024 United Nations Biodiversity Conference, also known as COP16, where representatives from nearly two hundred countries met to discuss this issue. Next year, Brazil will host the annual United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) in Belém, on the Amazon River, where conservation efforts remain a priority.

I was at COP16, and over the two weeks it was held I heard an array of ideas about how do address global biodiversity loss. A surprising number of discussions, however, eventually landed on one core idea: biodiversity credits. In practice, the key difference between credits and offsets is their impact on biodiversity. A biodiversity credit is focused on creating a net-positive impact. This typically involves companies or governments buying a portion of or all of the credits of a project that preserves biodiversity for a set price. This encourages environmental stewardship and can meet an organization’s internal environmental goals. 

On the other hand, biodiversity offsets allow companies to purchase credits in a secondary market to compensate for environmental damages. Offsets are focused on compensation for emissions, deforestation, and other dangerous impacts, while credits are focused on investing in projects that enhance biodiversity and mitigate the impacts of climate change.

If kickstarted effectively, biodiversity credits would be part of larger biodiversity markets, which are projected to reach nearly seventy billion dollars by 2050. Drawing on lessons from carbon credit markets, the LAC region has a unique opportunity to drive a well-structured biodiversity credit market. Such a market offers a path toward ecological resilience, sustainable economic diversification, and social welfare for the region.

However, the market for biodiversity credits is currently in its infancy. Few institutional frameworks or regulatory structures support these credits, making it difficult for LAC countries to develop them to their full potential. And while biodiversity credits could catalyze conservation efforts, they face substantial challenges: The demand for them is small, they are largely voluntary, and they lack the policy backing necessary for market growth. The region’s biodiversity is under threat from illegal activities, and without significant investment, ecosystems that serve as global carbon sinks and biodiversity reservoirs are at risk.

A framework for action

To unlock the full potential of biodiversity credits, LAC leaders, international organizations, and private sector stakeholders must act with purpose. Here are five ways that regional and global actors can build momentum for biodiversity credits:

1. Develop institutional frameworks and ensure market integrity. The Biodiversity Credit Alliance (BCA), facilitated by the United Nations, is already bringing together multiple stakeholders to build credibility and equity in biodiversity markets. BCA’s role in aligning private sector investments with global biodiversity targets through standardized frameworks and its community engagement platform with nearly five hundred members offer LAC governments and the private sector an ideal partner to cultivate a transparent and accessible biodiversity market. 
2. Spur efficient regulatory policies to drive demand. Unlike carbon credits, which have seen substantial growth in demand through regulatory requirements, biodiversity credits currently rely on voluntary markets. Governments should ensure they implement strong regulatory frameworks, which are essential to boost demand, create consistency, and build trust among potential investors. These regulations would allow companies in LAC and abroad to integrate biodiversity credits into broader carbon and biodiversity finance strategies, ensuring these markets grow sustainably and support conservation goals.
3. Clarify biodiversity credit applications and standards. Biodiversity credits are distinct from biodiversity offsets and carbon credits, and the differences need to be understood if they are to be used effectively. Third-party regulators and multilateral development banks should define these credits in terms of their conservation goals to ensure metrics are carefully evaluated and transparent, which will enable integration into projects that enhance ecological resilience. This clarity can ensure that biodiversity credits are used appropriately, supporting true conservation rather than merely offsetting environmental damage.
4. Emphasize community-centered projects with accountability. To foster genuine trust in biodiversity markets, it is vital to center efforts around communities and transparency. Governments should take lessons learned from the carbon market, which underscore the importance of putting transparency and community benefit at the forefront of the agenda, particularly for projects that engage Indigenous and local populations. By partnering with local communities, LAC governments and multilateral banks can design projects that both protect biodiversity and help foster sustainable livelihoods.
5. Promote knowledge sharing and collaboration. Effective biodiversity credits require knowledge-sharing partnerships that avoid fragmentation and strengthen scientific knowledge. Collaborations with local coordinators, universities, and international agencies can help transfer expertise, fill data gaps, and deepen understanding of ecosystem health in the region. By linking Indigenous and local communities with academic resources, LAC countries can ensure that conservation is both scientifically sound and locally relevant.

LAC countries are rich in biodiversity, which also puts them on the front lines of potential biodiversity loss. They therefore need to be central in helping to pioneer biodiversity markets, a climate financing tool that, along with other mechanisms, can help create a path toward ecological resilience, economic diversification, and environmental conservation. By developing robust biodiversity credit markets, they could not only safeguard invaluable ecosystems like the Amazon but also set a global standard in climate finance, showing how natural resources can be both protected and leveraged for sustainable growth.

Isabel Chiriboga is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Following COP16, can Latin America and the Caribbean lead the creation of biodiversity markets? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the campaign trail, Trump made his climate plans clear—and they are not currently aligned with global goals and targets. Instead, he has stated that he will again withdraw from the Paris Agreement and end many of the climate policies launched during the Biden administration. 

His “America first” approach doesn’t align with the scientific reality of climate change. While Trump has signaled that his administration will put boundaries on its international commitments, the consequences of climate change do not recognize national boundaries.

With the looming threat of reduced climate commitments from the world’s largest economy (in terms of nominal gross domestic product), the negotiations at COP29 will take on a new significance. In 2016, when Trump was last elected, US negotiators were unable to make strong commitments at COP22 in Marrakesh. While they participated in these negotiations, they were encouraged to avoid any legally binding commitments until the next administration came into office. As the United States begins another transition from one administration to another, the same expectations could be placed on US negotiators this year.

Notably, the outcomes on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on Climate Finance will bear the consequences of those expectations. The goal was mandated under the Paris Agreement and officially set at COP15, where developed countries agreed to mobilize $100 billion annually to enable climate action in developing countries. Now, the world is revisiting that $100 billion benchmark since the scope of the climate crisis has dramatically increased since 2009. 

With a noncommittal United States, there are two likely scenarios. The first scenario is that the decision on the NCQG is deferred to next year’s COP in Brazil. The second scenario is a new, nonbinding goal that is less ambitious and that will lack a mechanism to enforce it.

In short, the wording will matter. Instead of words like “commit,” the second scenario could result in a new finance goal with more ambiguous language. Nevertheless, it would serve as an important political signal. It could be a reference point that emphasizes the value of the process and the need to accelerate climate finance. It would keep the pressure on governments, ensuring that they recognize their responsibility to mobilize financial resources toward reducing emissions and protecting people from the impacts of climate change. In its ability to set a precedent, the agreement itself can inspire action not only in the public sector but also the private sector. COP negotiators should therefore seek to make the wording that sets this financing goal as strong as possible.

In recent years, the rising costs of global warming have become increasingly and painfully clear. It is in every country’s interest—including the United States’—to increase international financial commitments. After all, every one dollar invested in prevention saves sixteen dollars in disaster response.

As COP29 begins and the world looks ahead to COP30 where substantial commitments are expected, the value of US leadership cannot be overstated. This is not just a moral responsibility, but a survival mechanism. Climate change is a global issue. If the United States refuses to cut emissions further and ends the policies and investments launched under the Biden administration, the Trump administration would put even more Americans’ health, finances, and safety at risk as they face the rapidly intensifying consequences of climate inaction.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center.

The post What Trump’s return as president means for COP29 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At this month’s COP29 in Baku, greater attention must be given to the complex relationship between energy and water. The meeting should promote long-term policies, strategies, and investments to meet this challenge.

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Hydropower’s role in the global energy system

Hydropower is the world’s single-largest source of renewable power. But most clean energy development analyses, including the 2024 World Energy Outlook by the International Energy Agency (IEA), emphasize the role of solar and wind in the energy transition. Their growth over the past decade has indeed been unprecedented; the IEA forecasts that global hydropower generation will be overtaken by solar photovoltaics in 2029 and by wind in 2030. Nevertheless, hydropower still contributes 14 percent of global power generation and 35 percent of the world’s non-fossil electricity. Hydropower is widespread in all regions, with 89 countries boasting installed capacity over 1,000 megawatts. Nine countries across four continents depend on hydropower for over 75 percent of their electricity generation, while another fourteen rely on it for more than half.

But drought and flood conditions have left this important power source vulnerable—after remaining constant for over a decade, hydropower output fell in 2021 and 2023 despite new capacity additions and improvements to older units.

New stresses, new demands

Climate change has exacerbated water stress. The World Resources Institute finds that a quarter of the world’s population lives in countries facing extreme drought conditions, notably in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Many other nations experience high water stress for at least one month a year.

This has a serious impact on power production. Droughts reduced hydropower generation by 8 percent in India during the first half of 2024. Droughts not only require increased thermal power use; they also reduce the availability of water for cooling thermal plants. In 2020, about 22 percent of global energy-related water use was for cooling thermal plants, drawn largely from freshwater sources. These volumes are projected to increase to at least 35 percent of world water use by 2050.

The agricultural sector is being profoundly affected by increased drought and record high temperatures. Irrigation systems, especially the expansive diesel and electric groundwater tubewell systems of South Asia, require increased energy supplies. A 2024 study suggests that future irrigation system expansion could increase energy consumption in irrigation worldwide by 28 percent.

Demand for desalination has risen about 7 percent per year in order to meet growing freshwater needs and groundwater depletion. Desalination plants are energy intensive, with total plant electricity consumption ranging from 1.3 kilowatt-hour (kWh) per cubic meter of water in new plants to as much as 3 kWh in older ones. This energy load and associated costs may strain electricity and water systems, as well as increase emissions if powered by fossil fuels. Desalination is expanding in a number of regions, notably in the Middle East and North Africa, which has the largest regional desalination capacity. Since 2022, the Algerian Energy Company has begun building five new desalination plants to augment the nineteen currently in operation. To reduce dependence on natural gas, the government is looking to use renewable energy to power these units.

Climate-induced severe weather comes at high cost

The severity of storms and floods have intensified in recent years, inflicting damage on energy and water infrastructure. Communities are being left devastated by severe weather events, such as the back-to-back hurricanes Helene and Milton in the United States.

The destruction of watersheds, including by wildfires that have reduced their ability to retain water, has resulted in mudslides and polluted lakes, rivers, and reservoirs with debris. Dams are critical to controlling water flows, but large floods put them under stress, with older facilities particularly impacted. In the United States alone, it is estimated that rehabilitating approximately 15,200 high-hazard dams will cost $24 billion.

The time for action is now

The energy-water nexus is creating new uncertainties for energy and climate planning, requiring a more integrated analytical framework for decisions on strategic investment. COP29 should support the development of improved data and monitoring of key energy-water indicators—such as reservoir and river flow levels, energy use and efficiency in water utilities, water prices, and infrastructure investment—that can be incorporated into national climate and energy plans.

Although it would be wise for hydro-dependent countries to diversify their clean generation, there still exists significant potential for new hydropower capacity, even though the IEA sees only marginal future growth contributing to emissions reduction. The International Hydropower Association estimates global hydropower potential stands at 1,782 gigawatts (GW), even larger than total installed capacity in 2023 of 1,416 GW, which includes pumped storage. Africa has the largest regional potential at 487 GW, but the lowest installed capacity of only 42 GW.

The International Renewable Energy Agency estimates that to meet net-zero emission goals, hydropower needs to double by 2050, requiring a much higher level of investment than the current $50-60 billion annually. Although China has been the largest international financier of hydropower projects, multilateral financial institutions have increased their funding over the past decade. The African Development Bank’s $1 billion program to upgrade twelve hydropower plants in Africa is an example of such funding.

Private sector participation is also critical to achieving net-zero goals through hydropower. Promising areas for private investment include pumped storage projects that can contribute to grid stability and store water, as well as desalination plants, which require large amounts of clean energy.

As COP29 pursues its mission to enhance ambition and enable climate action, clearer and stronger commitments—such as those that emerged on methane from public and private actors at COP28—are needed to meet the energy and water challenge. Addressing this critical issue is central to enabling emissions reduction and adaptation, and remedying loss and damage.

Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global Energy Center

Nuclear Energy Energy Transitions

EnergySource Oct 15, 2024

Attention to market realities are key to a successful COP29

By Robert Cekuta

Increasing funds for addressing climate and energy needs in developing countries is a COP29 priority. But it is important to remember that market conditions in recipient countries are critical in determining the success of such efforts.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

New Atlanticist May 14, 2024

Brazil’s tragic floods should put climate adaptation at the top of the G20 and COP agendas

By Valentina Sader

The ongoing flooding in Rio Grande do Sul is an example of the urgent need for countries to focus on adapting to climate change.

Brazil Climate Change & Climate Action

EnergySource Jun 2, 2023

Central Asia’s clean energy opportunity: Hydropower

By Maxwell Zandi

Central Asia has failed to harness its full hydropower capacity. But greater investments into the region can help unlock much of Central Asia’s potential.

Central Asia Energy & Environment

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Tackling the energy-water challenge at COP29 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Europe and the United States navigate leadership change and turnover on both sides of the Atlantic, the Europe Center’s new report Transatlantic horizons: A collaborative US-EU policy agenda for 2025 and beyond offers a productive vision for transatlantic relations with forward-looking policy recommendations for the next US administration and European Commission. 

On this special edition of the #AtlanticDebrief, Europe Center Nonresident Senior Fellow and Fellow with the Jain Family Institute Carol Schaeffer unpacks her section of the report “Treating the green transition like the geopolitical imperative it is” and recommendations for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

Staff

Nicole Lawler

Assistant Director

Europe Center

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – How can US-EU leadership approach the green transition? | A debrief from Carol Schaeffer  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Europe and the United States navigate leadership change and turnover on both sides of the Atlantic, the Europe Center’s new report Transatlantic horizons: A collaborative US-EU policy agenda for 2025 and beyond offers a productive vision for transatlantic relations with forward-looking policy recommendations for the next US administration and European Commission.

On this special edition of the #AtlanticDebrief, Europe Center Nonresident Senior Fellow Daniel Mullaney discusses his section of the report “Closing the gap between Mars and Venus on trade” and recommendations for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

Staff

Jörn Fleck

Senior Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – How can Washington and Brussels close the gap on trade policy? | A debrief from Daniel Mullaney appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Growing near-term risks from climate change create a need for more and faster research on the most promising and rapid form of climate intervention: solar radiation modification (SRM), its methods, efficacy, and side effects.¹

In light of the rapid escalation in harms to date from climate change, sunlight reflection and other climate interventions are a growing topic of global dialogue. The United Nations and the European Union have called for more scientific research in this area, and the US government has issued a congressionally mandated report describing the research required to assess SRM’s potential to reduce climate risks.

The world’s safety, security, and the basic needs of the most vulnerable people are at risk from the increasingly catastrophic impacts of climate change. All UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios for emissions reduction project that the climate system will continue to warm over the next several decades, with impacts and risks growing further. Increased suffering and mortality, economic and environmental loss, and instability are expected. Breaching natural systems’ tipping points would risk irreversible change.

Society currently lacks sufficient ability to predict and reduce these near-term risks and impacts. This makes reducing uncertainty in their projection and expanding the portfolio of available responses an urgent matter of global safety and security.

An increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere is the primary cause of climate change. The only long-term remedy is to reduce their atmospheric concentrations by eliminating emissions and pursuing the withdrawal of gases already emitted. Due to the long lifespan of GHGs and the difficulty of withdrawing them from the atmosphere, the climate is projected to continue to warm for several decades in all scenarios.

According to scientific assessments, a promising approach to rapidly reducing significant heat energy (warming) in the climate system is to slightly alter the amount of incoming or outgoing sunlight (the phenomena that causes Earth to appear luminous, sometimes called solar radiation modification, or SRM). Proposed approaches generally fall into three categories:

• Reflecting sunlight from the Earth’s surface.
• Reflecting sunlight or releasing infrared energy from the atmosphere.
• Reducing the amount of sunlight reaching Earth.